The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioners should be issued a family foster home license.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the testimony, exhibits, and stipulated facts in the Joint Stipulation, the following Findings of Fact are made: Parties and Process Petitioners, who are husband and wife, submitted an application for licensure as a family foster home. Although this was an application for initial licensure, Petitioners were previously licensed as a foster home from August 2013 to October 2019.1 The Department is the state agency responsible for licensing foster care parents and foster homes, pursuant to section 409.175, Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Chapter 65C-45. Petitioners voluntarily relinquished their foster home license on or about October 28, 2019, around the time two female foster children, S.W. and H.C.S., were removed from their care. It is unclear whether the children were removed because of an abuse investigation related to H.C.S., or whether they were removed because Petitioners closed their home to foster children. Regardless, Mrs. Gilio testified that they let their license lapse because they needed a break after fostering H.C.S. The Department administers foster care licensing by contracting with third-party private entities. In Circuit 13, where Petitioners are located, the Department contracted with Eckerd Community Alternatives, doing business as Eckerd Connects (Eckerd), to be the agency responsible for facilitating foster care licensing. Eckerd has subcontracted with Children's Home Network (CHN) to facilitate foster care licensing. 1 Petitioners had previously been denied a foster care license in 2009. At the time relevant to Petitioners, the Department used the "attestation" model of foster home licensing. In this model, a private licensing agency with whom the Department has contracted will conduct a home study on the foster home applicants and attest to the applicants' fitness to be licensed. The Department does not have the discretion to deny the license once the licensing agency has attested to the appropriateness of the applicants, except if they have been named as caregivers in three or more abuse reports within five years. If there are such abuse reports, the Department is required to review those reports and make a final decision regarding the application. There is no requirement that the reports result in a finding of actual abuse for them to be reviewed by the Department.2 Although it is unclear when Petitioners submitted their application for the foster care license in this case, sometime in late 2019, CHN conducted and compiled a Unified Home Study (home study), which included Petitioners' background screening; previous reports of abuse, abandonment, or neglect involving the applicants, and references from all adult children. The home study was reviewed at a meeting on December 19, 2019, by Eckerd, through the Committee. The Committee considered the application, home study, and licensing packet and heard from various agency staff. Petitioners were also allowed to voice comments and concerns at this meeting. Had the Committee approved the application, it would have been sent to the Department along with an attestation that stated the foster home meets all requirements for licensure and a foster home license is issued by the Department. However, the Committee unanimously voted not to recommend approval of a foster home license to Petitioners. 2 The categories of findings for an abuse report are "no indicator," "not substantiated," and "verified." "No indicator" means there was no credible evidence to support a determination of abuse. "Not substantiated" means there is evidence, but it does not meet the standard of being a preponderance to support that a specific harm is the result of abuse. "Verified" means that there is a preponderance of credible evidence which results in a determination that a specific harm was a result of abuse. Frank Prado, Suncoast Regional Managing Director for the Department, ultimately decided to deny Petitioners' application for a family foster home license due to their prior parenting experiences, the multiple abuse reports regarding their home, and the recommendation of the Committee. Mr. Prado expressed concern about the nature of the abuse reports and Petitioners' admission that they used corporal punishment on a child they adopted from the foster care system in the presence of other foster children. Petitioners' Parenting History Petitioners have seven children: one is the biological son of Mr. Gilio; another is the biological son of Mrs. Gilio; and five were adopted through the foster care system in Florida. Of these seven children, six are now adults. Three of the adopted children, Jay, Sean, and Jameson, are biological brothers who Petitioners adopted in 2001. Shawna, who was adopted around 2003, is the only adopted daughter. The Petitioners' one minor child, H.G., is a nine-year-old boy and the only child who resides in their home. H.G. suffers from oppositional defiance disorder. Petitioners admitted they adopted Shawna after there had been allegations of inappropriate behavior made against Jay, by a young girl who lived next door to Petitioners. Later, while they were living with Petitioners, Jay, Sean, and Jameson were arrested for sexually abusing Shawna at different times. As a result, one or more of the sons were court-ordered to not be around Shawna, and the other brothers were required to undergo treatment and never returned to Petitioners' home. During the hearing, both Petitioners seem to blame Shawna, who was nine years old when the sexual abuse by Jay in their home allegedly began, for disrupting their home. They accused her of being "not remorseful" and "highly sexualized." Regarding the abuse by Sean and Jameson, which occurred when Shawna was approximately 12 years old, Mr. Gilio stated Shawna thought it was okay to have sex with boys, and it was "hard to watch every minute of the day if they're, you know, having sex." When Shawna was about 19 years old, she filed a "Petition for Injunction for Protection Against Domestic Violence" against Mr. Gilio in circuit court. The Petition outlined allegations of past sexual comments and inappropriate disciplinary behavior from 2007 to 2012, while she lived with Petitioners. Mr. Gilio denied at the hearing having any knowledge about the Petition against him, but admitted he made comments about Shawna's breasts. As part of the application and home study process, the CHN collected references from Petitioners' former foster children and adult children. Shawna (Petitioners' only adopted daughter) gave them a negative reference and specifically stated she would not want female foster children to live with Petitioners. Reports of Abuse Petitioners were involved in 24 abuse reports during their time of licensure between 2013 and 2019. During the past five years, Petitioners were named as either alleged perpetrators or caregivers responsible in eight reports that were made to the Florida Child Abuse Hotline (Hotline). Of those eight reports, five of them named Mr. Gilio as the alleged perpetrator causing a physical injury, one report named Mr. Gilio as the caregiver responsible for a burn on a foster child, and one report named Mr. Gilio as an alleged perpetrator of sexual abuse against a foster child. Mrs. Gilio was named as an alleged perpetrator of asphyxiation as to a foster child. Seven of the reports in the last five years against Petitioners were closed with no indicators of abuse. One of the abuse reports was closed with a "not substantiated" finding of physical injury. In this report, Mr. Gilio was the alleged perpetrator and the victim was H.G., Petitioners' minor adopted son. Additionally, after Petitioners let their foster license lapse in October 2019, a subsequent report was made against Mr. Gilio for improper contact with a former foster daughter. This incident was discussed at the Committee meeting, but it was unclear if this allegation was ever investigated. Corporal Punishment According to the Department's rules, discussed below, foster parents are forbidden to engage in corporal punishments of any kind. In 2019, there were two reports alleging Mr. Gilio of causing physical injury by corporal punishment on H.G. At the time, there were other foster children in the household. Technically, Mr. Gilio was allowed to use corporal punishment on H.G. because he was no longer a foster child and had been adopted from foster care. If a parent uses corporal punishment on a child, there can be no findings of abuse unless the child suffered temporary or permanent disfigurement. However, foster care providers are not permitted to use corporal punishment. More than one witness at the hearing had concerns about the use of corporal punishment against H.G. because of his operational defiance disorder and because other foster children (who may have been victims of physical abuse) were in the household. Brendale Perkins, who is a foster parent herself and serves on the Hillsborough County Family Partnership Alliance, an organization that supports licensed foster parents, testified she witnessed Mr. Gilio treating a foster child in his care roughly. At the time, she was concerned because this was not the way children in foster care (who may have previously been victims of abuse) should be treated. She did not, however, report it to any authorities. The Department established through testimony that the policy against using corporal punishment is taught to all potential foster families. Mr. Gilio, however, denied ever being instructed not to use corporal punishment against foster children or while foster children were in the home. He also claimed that H.G.'s therapist had never recommended any specific punishment techniques. The undersigned finds Mr. Gilio's testimony not credible. Cooperation with Fostering Partners The Department established that decisions regarding foster children are made within a "system of care" which includes input from case managers, guardian ad litem (GAL), and support service providers. The relationship between Petitioners and others working as part of this system during the time of fostering was not ideal; it was described by witnesses as "tense" and "disgruntled." One witness, a supervisor at CHN, testified Mr. Gilio was not receptive or flexible when partnering with other agencies, and was not always open to providing information when questioned. As an example, Petitioners fired a therapist without consulting with the CHN staff or the GAL for the child. At the final hearing, Mr. Gilio continued to claim he did nothing wrong by not consulting with others in the system regarding this decision. Kristin Edwardson, a child protection investigator for the Hillsborough County Sheriff's Office, was tasked with investigating the reports of abuse and neglect against Petitioners that had been reported to the Hotline. She testified she was concerned with the level of cooperation they provided her and other investigators. Although they ultimately would cooperate, Petitioners made it difficult for the investigators and would often "push back" and make the situation more stressful. She described Mr. Gilio as being disrespectful, belittling, and dismissive of her. Licensing Review Committee On December 19, 2020, the Committee, made up of eight individuals, was convened to review Petitioners' application for a foster home license. When determining whether a family should receive a foster home license, the Committee is to evaluate the applicants' background, parenting experience, references from community partners, and the family's openness and willingness to partner. Sheila DelCastillo, a regional trainer with the GAL program, was a Committee member. She had prior knowledge of Petitioners from a report that a foster child's room in Petitioners' home smelled strongly of urine during a home visit and that GAL staff had found a prescription bottle beside the child’s bed that belonged to Mr. Gilio. With regards to Petitioners' application, she read the licensing review packet and home study that contained numerous abuse reports. Ms. DelCastillo was concerned about the 24 abuse reports Petitioners’ received during their time of licensure, the negative reference from Shawna, their use of corporal punishment on H.G., and Petitioners' downplaying of the events that led to multiple abuse reports. Michelle Costley, a licensing director with CHN in charge of level 2 traditional foster homes, also served on the Committee. Ms. Costley has 14 years of experience, with seven of those years spent in foster care licensing. As director of licensing, Ms. Costley was concerned about the number of abuse reports received regarding Petitioners; Mr. Gilio's inability to be open and flexible when working in partnership with other agencies; and the needs of Petitioners' child, H.G. She was also concerned about Petitioners' decision to fire a therapist of a foster child without consulting the GAL or the other individuals involved with that child. Regarding the alleged abuse, Ms. Costley was concerned that most of the reports regarding Petitioners involved allegations of physical abuse, inappropriate touch of a sexual nature, or sexual abuse, with most alleged victims being younger than eight years old. She explained that even though these reports could not be "verified," these types of allegations are harder to establish because testimony by children of that age often is unreliable and there usually must be evidence of physical injury, which no longer is present by the time the alleged abuse is investigated. Ms. Perkins also served on the Committee. Ms. Perkins served as a foster parent mentor, working with foster parents to help them build co- parenting strategies and navigate the system of care. She has been a licensed foster parent for 13 years and has adopted 11 children from foster care. As stated earlier, she was familiar with Petitioners from the Hillsborough County Family Partnership Alliance meetings. Ms. Perkins was concerned with the number of abuse reports with similar allegations, but different victims. She also discussed Petitioners' use of corporal punishment, noting that they could have been using verbal de-escalation methods instead of corporal punishment due to the traumatic histories of many foster care children. Ms. Edwardson also served on the Committee. In addition to her personal interactions with Petitioners, Ms. Edwardson was concerned about the totality of the information presented to the Committee regarding the abuse reports and Mr. Gilio's lack of cooperation. She noted that although they were not substantiated, the number and nature of the reports related to young children were of concern. Based on the Committee notes and transcript of the meeting, Petitioners were allowed to respond to the Committee's questions at the December 2019 meeting. They argued that none of the abuse reports were proven true and any injuries were not their fault. They seemed more concerned about who made the abuse reports and why the abuse reports were called in than whether the foster children were protected in their care. For example, although Mr. Gilio admitted to hitting H.G. with a stick twice as big as a pencil, he denied any bruising was caused by the stick. A report of a burn on another child was explained by Mr. Gilio as an accident that occurred while he was teaching her how to iron; he could not understand why this was reported as possible abuse. Ms. Gilio explained that H.C.S. was a very active child which resulted in her needing stitches and requiring restraint. After hearing from Petitioners, the Committee members discussed their concerns that Petitioners were not forthcoming about the various abuse incidents, and would not take responsibility for any of the injuries or issues raised by the abuse reports. All eight members voted to not move Petitioners' application forward.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Children and Families denying a family foster home license to Petitioners, Mary and James Gilio. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of November, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HETAL DESAI Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of November, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Anthony Duran, Esquire Tison Law Group 9312 North Armenia Avenue Tampa, Florida 33612 (eServed) Deanne Cherisse Fields, Esquire Department of Children and Families 9393 North Florida Avenue Tampa, Florida 33612 (eServed) Lacey Kantor, Esquire Department of Children and Families Building 2, Room 204Z 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 (eServed) Javier A. Enriquez, General Counsel Department of Children and Families Building 2, Room 204F 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 (eServed) Chad Poppell, Secretary Department of Children and Families Building 1, Room 202 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 (eServed)
The Issue Are the Respondents entitled to renew their license to operate a family foster home?
Findings Of Fact Respondents held Family Foster Home License No. 059520, effective from May 18, 1995 through May 18, 1996. The license was not renewed based upon allegations in this case. At times relevant, Respondents provided foster care to F.J., who was thirteen when the hearing was conducted, to V.K. who was eight when the hearing was conducted, and to F.J. and V.K.'s two younger brothers. The children lived with the Respondents for approximately six and one-half years. Although F.J. is thirteen years old, she is a developmentally disabled child with an I.Q. in the range of 46 to 58. Her mental and developmental age is less than eleven years. On May 30, 1995 an investigation was begun concerning alleged sexual abuse of F.J. by James Comer. This led to the removal of the children from Respondents' home. On May 30, 1995 F.J. described James Comer's sexual misconduct to Brenda Mims, a human services counsellor for Petitioner. At that time F.J. told Mims that James Comer had touched her breast and felt on her. When F.J. described the contact which James Comer had with her, F.J. put her hands on her breast to demonstrate. She did not describe the point in time when this happened. On that date Mims interviewed Mary Comer concerning the allegations by F.J.. Mary Comer confirmed that F.J. had told Mary Comer that James Comer was "bothering her" and F.J. wanted it to stop. Mary Comer indicated that she thought that F.J. was referring to a "tickling incident". Mary Comer told Mims that she had confronted James Comer about the tickling and asked him to stop tickling F.J.. When Mary Comer spoke to Mims, she referred to F.J. coming to her and saying that "Dada" was bothering F.J.. The term "Dada" is the name the children used to refer to James Comer. The children referred to Mary Comer as "Granny". On June 7, 1995 Mims talked to F.J. again. At that time F.J. was concerned that James Comer not be able to find her in her new home. Assurances were given that James Comer could not find her. On this occasion F.J. told Mims that James Comer "would feel on her" and she didn't like it. In this conversation F.J. described fondling James Comer's penis. F.J. stated that James Comer would hit her with his fist sometimes if F.J. wouldn't cooperate with his advances. F.J. described a big roll of money that James Comer would give her if F.J. would cooperate with him. Otherwise James Comer would not give F.J. money. According to Mims, F.J. said that James Comer would give her money if F.J. would "be with him". In the June 7, 1995 discussion F.J. and V.K. told Mims that Mary Comer tried to prohibit James Comer from bothering F.J. and James Comer began to beat Mary Comer. Following such incident, the police were called, but James Comer was not removed from the home. In the June 7, 1995 conversation V.K. told Mims that on one occasion V.K. peeked out the door and saw F.J. lying on James Comer while he was seated in the reclining chair. Deborah Gipple is a licensed mental health counselor who has experience in counseling child victims of sexual abuse or other trauma. Gipple began counseling F.J. in November, 1995 and continued the counseling to the date of hearing. Gipple observed in F.J. conduct which is consistent with a child who has been sexually abused. This included F.J. exposing herself, rubbing against other children, problems in the classroom and at home concerning the need to follow directions, and a distrust evidenced by sneaking about doing things that were not necessary to avoid detection, such as sneaking about and removing food. F.J. told Gipple that James Comer touched between F.J.'s legs and touched her breast. F.J. further stated that James Comer had her lay on top of him. F.J. told Gipple that sometimes James Comer would come in the night and take F.J. from her bed. In these conversations Gipple observed that F.J. was aware that James Comer's actions were wrong. In these discussions F.J. stated a concern about her sister V.K. and the possibility that James Comer would harm V.K.. V.K. was competent to testify when she testified at hearing. On one occasion when V.K. was in the hallway with her brothers at night she looked in the T.V. room and saw F.J. on top of James Comer while he was seated in a reclining chair. V.K. described that F.J. was moving her body and doing "nasty stuff". On another occasion V.K. was outside the house and observed F.J. and James Comer in the T.V. room. As V.K. describes it, F.J. was playing with James Comer while he was sitting down. F.J. was on James Comer's lap. V.K. did not give exact details concerning what F.J. and James Comer were doing. Concerning these two instances, V.K. recalls that Mary Comer was not home on the first occasion. V.K. has no recollection concerning Mary Comer's whereabouts on the second occasion. V.K. had been subjected to corporal punishment by James Comer when living in his home. She also observed James Comer administer corporal punishment to her two brothers. In the June 3, 1996 video that was made to record F.J.'s remarks concerning James Comer, together with statements she made to others, F.J. demonstrates sufficient appreciation of the meaning of the duty and responsibility to tell the truth to warrant a finding that she was competent for that purpose. In the video she describes that James Comer made her touch his "private parts". She did not describe the period of time over which the sexual contacts were made between James Comer and F.J. She did recount how these events had occurred on a number of occasions. On one occasion her clothes were off when James Comer touched her. In the video tape F.J. describes that James Comer had touched her breast and genital area by pointing to those areas on her body. F.J. identified that the occasions when she was inappropriately touched occurred when Mary Comer was not at home. In the video F.J. refers to the fact that she told Mary Comer about being touched by James Comer, but that Mary Comer did not believe her. By October 1995 F.J., V.K. and their brothers had been placed in the foster home of Roberta Graham where they presently reside. While living with Graham, F.J. told Graham that "Dada", referring to James Comer, was touching F.J. in wrong places, that he touched her on her breasts, and that he took her hand and massaged his "private part", referring to his penis. F.J. told Graham that this happened when Mary Comer went out to get drinks. F.J. told Graham that the other children were outside playing and the door was locked and James Comer and F.J. were inside when events occurred. F.J. mentioned to Graham that an incident happened at night when everyone was in bed and "Dada" called F.J. out alone and then the other children, her brothers and V.K. came out of the room. This is the night time incident V.K. testified about. This incident at night occurred when Mary Comer was not at home. F.J. told Graham that on one occasion James Comer removed F.J.'s clothes when she came out of the bathroom after blocking the door to prohibit F.J.'s exit. F.J. expressed concern to Graham that "Dada" was going to turn from doing things to F.J. to doing things to V.K.. F.J. told Graham that she had reported James Comer's actions to Mary Comer in saying that she told "Granny". F.J. stated to Graham that when F. J. told Mary Comer, she, (Mary Comer) said, "If you tell anyone, you will have to leave". F.J. made the remarks about James Comer's inappropriate conduct approximately thirty times to Graham and was consistent about the facts reported. The remarks by F.J. on the video tape and to Mims, Gipple and Graham which have been recited concerning James Comer are credited as true. Following the accusations about James Comer's sexual misconduct directed to F.J., Petitioner through its employees, Esther Tibbs and Judy Parks, met the Respondents on February 5, 1996 to advise Respondents that Petitioner intended to revoke the foster care license. The grounds for seeking revocation were related to the sexual misconduct by James Comer and the use of corporal punishment in disciplining the foster children. In the past, commencing 1988, Petitioner had received complaints concerning the use of corporal punishment by Respondents in disciplining their foster care children. Petitioner through its employees had counseled Respondents about the inappropriateness of corporal punishment. In one instance correspondence was sent to the Respondents on this subject reminding the Respondents that it was inappropriate to use corporal punishment even to the extent of an "occasional slap on the backside. . .under any circumstances". This reminder was sent through correspondence dated March 25, 1993. In 1988, unrelated to the foster children who have been referred to in these facts, Pamela Davis, Guardian Ad Litem for A.L. spoke to James Comer concerning his administration of corporal punishment to that child. James Comer told Davis that he had beaten the child "to beat the devil out of her" and it hadn't worked. He further stated that Davis could take the child from his home. Davis did remove the child from foster care provided by Respondents. On February 12, 1996 Respondents requested a formal administrative hearing to contest the grounds for revoking their foster home license.
Recommendation Based on the facts found and the conclusions of law reached, it is, RECOMMENDED: that a Final Order be entered which denies the renewal of the Family Foster Home License for Respondents. DONE and ENTERED this 5th day of July, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of July, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 96-0943 The following discussion is given concerning proposed facts by the Petitioner: Paragraphs 1-5 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 6 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraphs 7 & 8 are subordinate to facts found with the exception that the fourth sentence is not supported by competent evidence in the record, nor are paragraphs 9 and 10. Paragraph 11 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 12 in the first sentence is subordinate to facts found. The last sentence to paragraph 12 and paragraph 13 are not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraph 14 is discussed in the evidentiary ruling under Section 90.803(23), Florida Statutes. Paragraph 15 is subordinate to facts found with exception that the next to last sentence in the reference that on the second occasion "Granny" had gone somewhere is not supported by competent evidence in the record. Paragraphs 16-18 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 19 is not supported by competent evidence in the record. Paragraphs 20 and 21 are subordinate to facts found with the exception that the reference to "they" in paragraph 21 should be "she". The first and the third sentence to paragraph 22 are not supported by the record. The second sentence is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 23 is not supported by the record. Paragraphs 24 and 25 with the exception of the last phrase to paragraph 25 are subordinate to facts found. The last phrase to paragraph 25 is not supported by the record. Paragraph 26 is subordinate to facts found with the exception of the reference to October 10, 1988, which is not supported by competent evidence in the record. Paragraphs 27-29 are not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraph 30 is subordinate to facts found with the exception of the reference to November 26, 1995 which is not supported by evidence in the record. Paragraph 31 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. The second paragraph 29 is subordinate to facts found. COPIES FURNISHED: Lucy Goddard, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1000 Northeast 16th Avenue, Box 3 Gainesville, Florida 32601 James and Mary Comer, pro se Post Office Box 722 Micanopy, Florida 32667 Gregory D. Venz, Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services Building 2, Suite 204X 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Richard Doran General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue As originally framed, the issue was whether respondents' foster home license should be revoked for alleged failure to cooperate with HRS policy and personnel.
Findings Of Fact As part of the settlement agreement, HRS abandoned any effort to prove the factual allegations which gave rise to these proceedings.
Recommendation It is, accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That HRS enter a final order rescinding its letter of July 10, 1991, to Mr. and Mrs. William Scarff, with the understandings and conditions recited above. DONE and ENTERED this 23 day of January, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: Ralph J. McMurphy, Esquire 1000 NE 16th Avenue Gainesville, FL 32609 William and Mary Scarff 8281 Weeping Willow Street Brooksville, FL 34613 ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23 day of January, 1992. John Slye, General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 Sam Power, Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700
Findings Of Fact In August, 1980, the home of Jacob and Donna Vermeulen was licensed by Petitioner as a pre-school foster home. Under that licensure, the Vermeulens were able to care for children from birth to four years of age. The subject of this proceeding, hereinafter referred to as S.L., was born on May 26, 1976. When S.L. was four years old he and his younger sister were removed from the custody of his natural mother (after he witnessed the homicide by bludgeoning of his father by his mother) because S.L. and his sister had been physically abused by both natural parents. Petitioner placed S.L. and his sister into the Vermeu1en foster home. After S.L. and his sister had been living with the Vermeulens for approximately six months, Petitioner removed them from the Vermeulen home and returned them to the custody of their natural mother. After approximately six months, the two children were again removed from their natural mother since she again physically abused them. Petitioner requested the Vermeulens to again take custody of S.L. and his sister. The Vermeulens were reluctant to do so since both S.L, and his sister were now older than was allowed under the Vermeulens' license, and because S.L. had problems relating with the other foster children living in that home during his first stay there. However, Petitioner's social workers begged the Vermeulens to take the children back since Petitioner was unable to find any other placement for S.L. The Vermeulens agreed to make their home available to S.L. and his sister, and the two children thereafter lived in the Vermeulen home for approximately two and one-half years prior to April 16, 1984. S.L. is a difficult child to care for; he is very emotional, developmentally immature, fearful, and fidgety. He has difficulty sleeping or listening, has a very low self-esteem, and is unable to complete tasks since he becomes emotionally frustrated. Not only is S.L. a clumsy child (most probably due to medication), he also throws himself onto the floor and onto his toys, both as part of his aggressive play behavior and also in conjunction with throwing temper tantrums. S.L. initiates fights in school, on the school bus and at home with the other children in the Vermeulen home to such an extent that fighting somewhere would have been almost a daily occurrence. His excessive demands for attention were often accompanied by negative behavior, such as hitting other children and throwing temper tantrums. On December 21, 1983, S.L. was evaluated by psychiatrist Josephine Perez. Perez diagnosed S.L. as suffering from Attention Deficit Disorder with Hyperactivity. Perez determined that the high dosages of anti-psychoic medication that S.L. had been taking were inappropriate, and she prescribed different medication for him. Perez recalls that during S.L.'s initial evaluation in December she noticed that his legs and arms were filled with bruises. S.L. began treating weekly with Perez from January 16, 1984, until April 16, 1984. On each visit at least one of the Vermeulens was present, and each visit contained a seasion between Perez and the foster parent discussing the child's progress and training the foster parent in the use of behavioral modification techniques. During those several months S.L. appeared at Perez's office on one occasion with a black eye and on another occasion with a bruising above his eye. One injury resulted from a fall in the bath tub, and another resulted from a fall out of bed; both falls were probably attributable to changes Perez made in S.L.'s medication. The Vermeulens discussed both incidents with Perez since they were concerned that S.L,'s medication was still not in the proper dosage. The Vermeulens testified that sometimes when S.L.'s medication was changed, he was unable to control even his arms and was unable to sit still long enough to eat. In January, 1984, when S.L. began treating with Dr. Perez there were six children living in the Vermeulen home: four foster children, one adopted child, and one natural child. The Vermeulens and Dr. Perez discussed the number of children living in the Vermeulen home, which prohibited giving S.L. the excessive amount of time required by him to satisfy his need for attention. Perez told the Vermeulens that in her professional opinion S.L. should be in a home with no more than one other child. In turn, the Vermeulens told Perez that they had been requesting Petitioner to remove S.L. from their home out of their concern (1) for S.L. since he needed so much more attention than was available to him and (2) for the other children not only because S.L. would kick and hit them but also because the Vermeulens had discovered S.L. in his sister's bedroom standing over her with a knife in his hand on two occasions. Although Perez agreed that S.L. should be placed a different foster setting, she did nothing to assist in obtaining a different placement and did not discuss with any employee of the Petitioner ("HRS") her recommendation and the Vermeulens' desire that S.L. be placed in a setting, preferably, where he was the only child. The Vermeulens, however, continued to request of HRS employees, including the visiting social workers and medical personnel, that S.L. be removed from their home, with visitation rights being given to the Vermeulens if possible. During this time period the Vermeulens determined that they wished to adopt Michelle, a foster child in their care. On Friday, April 13, 1984, an HRS employee went to the Vermeulen home to discuss that petition for adoption and to advise the Vermeulens that HRS would not allow them to adopt Michelle. Mr. and Mrs. Vermeulen S.L., and the rest of the children living in the home were present during that discussion. The Vermeulens were advised that they would not be permitted to adopt Michelle so long as S.L. was living in their home since he is a "therapeutic foster child" and Petitioner's rules would prohibit the adoption while a "therapeutic child" was in the home. Mrs. Vermeulen was unable to understand Petitioner's position: its refusal to remove S.L. from her home after repeated requests and its refusal to allow her to adopt Michelle for the reason that S.L. was in her home. Mrs. Vermeulen became upset, and S.L. told her and Petitioner's employee to put him in a foster home indicating he would rather be sent away than prevent Michelle from being adopted by the Vermeulens. Since the HRS employee was having a difficult time discussing HRS's position, she left the Vermeulen home. On Friday, April 13, 1984, or on Monday, April 16, 1984, S.L. became involved in a fight on the school bus on the way home from school. The bus driver told Mrs. Vermeulen about the fight. On Monday April 16, 1984, Mrs. Vermeulen took S.L. to his weekly therapy session with Dr. Perez. During that session, S.L. indicated to Perez that he had been bad and had been "paddled" on the legs. He would give her no details, but Perez believed it was Donna Vermeulen who paddled S.L. Rather than discuss it with Mrs. Vermeulen, Perez acted as though nothing had been said. Further, although a medical doctor, she did not examine S.L. Instead, Perez discussed with Mrs. Vermeulen behavioral modification techniques to be utilized with S.L. and sent them home. She then telephoned HRS, and a child abuse report was completed. On April 18, 1984, an HRS employee went to S.L.'s school, removed the child from his class, and took the child to be examined by the Child Protection Team. S.L. was first examined by the nurse. When S.L. was unable to explain to the nurse from where each mark on his body originated (or refused to), she interrogated him with questions such as "Did your mommy hit you?" The nurse made notations on a chart indicating numerous marks or bruises on S.L.'s body. However, an HRS employee saw S.L. disrobed when he was being examined by the doctor on the team and saw only two marks on his lower back. Other HRS employees went to the Vermeulen home and removed all the children. No one discussed the incident or accusation with either Mr. or Mrs. Vermeulen until the following day. Until he was removed from her class on April 18, 1984, S.L. was taught by Debbie Froug an Exceptional Education teacher for emotionally disturbed children. Although Froug describes S.L. as a basically honest child, she testified that he sometimes gets very confused. A careful review of the videotaped testimony of S.L. and of the conflicting testimony of the witnesses in this case indicates that Froug's latter description is probably an understatement. No witness in this case heard the same explanation (or accusation) as any other witness. S.L's videotaped testimony illustrates why: there is no statement made by S.L. that is not contradicted by him a few seconds later. For example the videotaped deposition contains on page 27 the following: O. Did you ever have a black eye? A. No. O. Didn't you talk to Dr. Perez about having a black eye once? A. Yes, but I didn't. How did you get the black eye? One of the kids on the bus. Things stated in the affirmative by S.L. in his deposition are also stated in the negative in that same deposition. Further, it is sometimes impossible to ascertain if S.L. is describing being hit by his real father, by his real mother, or by his foster mother. Although no accusation appears to ever have been made, including in the Administrative Complaint, that Jacob Vermeulen ever struck S.L., by the time of S.L.'s deposition eight months after the alleged incident when S.L. was asked if Jacob ever hit him, that question was answered in the affirmative. In short, the evidence is clear that S.L. had some bruises or marks on his body on April 18, 1984; that those bruises or marks were both received accidentally and intentionally inflicted, and that the bruises or marks on S.L.'s body were received as a result of S.L. falling from being uncoordinated or overmedicated, from S.L. flinging himself onto the floor or onto or against objects, and from being hit or kicked by other children with whom S.L. engaged in almost-daily physical combat. Donna and Jacob Vermeulen used only approved behavior modification techniques with S.L. and did not hit S.L. with or without any object, spank S.L., or otherwise inflict physical abuse upon him. Although the Vermeulens' license as a foster home was in effect at all times material hereto, it has lapsed. A foster home license is not automatically renewed but rather requires an annual licensing study. Other than "the incident" charged herein the Vermeulens have received no prior complaints from HRS.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is REC0MENDED that a Final Order be entered dismissing with prejudice the Administrative Complaint filed herein and directing that any licensure study performed regarding the renewal or extension of Respondents' license be made omitting therefrom consideration of any of the matters set forth herein. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 19th day of July, 1985 at Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of July,1985. COPIES FURNISHED: Leonard Helfand, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 401 N.W. 2nd Avenue, Suite 1070 Miami, Florida 33128 Thomas J. Walsh, Esquire 590 English Avenue Homestead, Florida 33030 David Pingree, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioners should be licensed to operate a foster home in Marianna, Jackson County, Florida.
Findings Of Fact Respondent licensed Petitioners to operate a foster home in Respondent's District No. 9, West Palm Beach, Florida, beginning in 1995 through April 1, 2000. The Department of Health, under its Children's Medical Services Program, licensed Petitioners as medical foster parents for almost two years of that time. At all times material to this proceeding, Petitioners had five children living with them in West Palm Beach, Florida. Two boys, aged six and three, were Petitioners' adopted sons. A two-year-old boy, A.B., and his one-year-old sister, T.B. were medical foster children. C.S. was a two-year-old female foster child. In August 1999, Petitioners bought a home in Respondent's District No. 2, which includes Marianna, Jackson County, Florida. Mr. Mayes is a carpenter and intended to make repairs to the home before moving his family to North Florida. Petitioners knew their foster home license in District No. 9 was not transferable to District No. 2. Therefore, they applied for a foster home license in District No. 2. Petitioners wanted their three foster children to move with them to Mariana, Florida. Petitioners hoped to adopt C.S. and to keep A.B. and T.B. in the same placement until another family adopted them. All of the foster children had been in Petitioners' home since they were a few days old. A.B. was a very active two-year-old child. He regularly climbed out of his crib. On one occasion he climbed up on the stove and turned on the burners. He seemed to "have no fear." In the fall of 1999, Mrs. Mayes requested Respondent to provide her with behavior management assistance for A.B. Because Petitioners were planning to move out of District No. 9, Respondent decided to wait until A.B. was settled after Petitioners' move to perform the behavior management evaluation. In the meantime, Petitioners could not keep A.B. in his highchair during mealtime. They had difficulty keeping him in his crib. They bought a safety harness and attempted to use it to keep A.B. in his crib on one occasion and in his highchair on another occasion. A.B. was able to wiggle out of the harness on both occasions. Petitioners subsequently discarded the harness. They resorted to tightening the highchair's feeding tray in order to keep A.B. still long enough to feed him. Petitioners never used and never intended to use the harness to punish A.B. Petitioners usually disciplined the children by placing them in timeout for one minute per year of age. Timeout for Petitioners' foster children usually meant being held in Mrs. Mayes' lap. Mrs. Mayes admitted using the safety harness on A.B. during a telephone conversation with Respondent's medical foster care counselor in January 2000. The counselor informed Ms. Mayes that foster parents are not allowed to use a harness to restrain foster children. Prospective foster parents must participate in and complete training classes designed by Respondent. Persuasive evidence indicates that Respondent teaches prospective foster parents during this training that children should never be restrained by a harness. Petitioners have taken these training classes. If A.B. and the other children were free to go into a bedroom, they would pull everything out of the chest of drawers. They would flush objects down the toilet in the bathroom. Mr. Mayes put a hook-type latch on the door to the Petitioners' bedroom, A.B.'s bedroom, and the bathroom in the hall. The primary purpose of the door latches was to keep the children out of unsupervised areas of the home. Petitioners never used the door latches as a means of discipline. On two occasions Mrs. Mayes latched the door to A.B.'s room while he was in the room asleep. The first time she latched the door while she went to the mail box in front of her home. The other time, she latched the door while she bathed another child who had a doctor's appointment later that afternoon. On both occasions, A.B. was locked in his room for only a few minutes. Petitioners knew that they needed permission from Respondent in order to take A.B., T.B., and C.S. out of the state on vacations. On several occasions, Respondent's staff gave Petitioners permission to take the foster children to North Florida for short visits during the time that Mr. Mayes was remodeling the home. Respondent's staff approved these short visits as if they were vacations. Petitioners knew that they needed to be licensed in Respondent's District No. 2 before Respondent's staff in District No. 9 could approve the permanent transfer of the foster children. At the same time, the Respondent's staff in District No. 2 could not license Petitioners until they actually made the move with all of their furniture. Petitioners discussed their dilemma with several members of Respondent's staff in District No. 9. During these conversations, Petitioners asked Respondent if they could take the children with them and treat the time that they would be temporarily unlicensed as if it were a vacation. At least one member of Respondent's staff responded that treating the move initially as if it were a vacation was "an option that could be explored." Respondent's staff subsequently advised Petitioners that under no circumstances could the foster children move to Jackson County, temporarily or permanently, until Petitioners were properly licensed. Petitioner's never attempted to deceive Respondent; to the contrary, they were openly looking for an acceptable way to take the foster children with then when they moved. They never intended to circumvent the proper licensing process. Based on Petitioners' former experience with Respondent, they believed that treating the move as a vacation would be an appropriate way to solve what was otherwise a "catch twenty-two" situation. By letter dated March 14, 2000, Respondent's staff in District No. 2 advised Petitioners that they would receive a provisional foster home license as soon as information furnished by Petitioners and copies of Petitioners' file from the licensing unit in District No. 9 could be sent to Respondent's office in Panama City, Florida. Respondent removed the three foster children from Petitioners' home just before Petitioners moved to Jackson County on April 1, 2000. In a memorandum dated April 19, 2000, Respondent listed Petitioners' home as one of two medical foster homes in Jackson County, Florida. Despite the representation in this memorandum, Respondent issued the letter of denial on June 5, 2000.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent enter a final order denying Petitioners a foster home license. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of October, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of October, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: James Mayes Gail Mayes 4561 Magnolia Road Marianna, Florida 32448 John R. Perry, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 2639 North Monroe, Suite 252-A Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2949 Virginia A. Daire, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204B 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue Whether Petitioner’s application for licensure as a family foster home should be granted.
Findings Of Fact Sometime around 2004, Petitioner held a license as a foster home in Florida. During the licensure period, Petitioner fostered X. B. and T. T. in her home where she resided with her three biological children. X. B. stayed in Petitioner's home for approximately three weeks to a month. Throughout X. B.'s stay, Petitioner failed to provide breakfast to X. B. prior to school. Petitioner's failure necessitated the case manager providing such breakfast to X. B. when she drove X. B. to school. Additionally, on several occasions the case manager saw evidence of roach infestation in the home. In particular, upon X. B.'s return to Petitioner's home from visiting X. B.'s siblings, the case manager found him in a roach-infested environment, with no running water in the home since the service had been turned off by the service provider for non-payment of the bill. The toilet bowl was filled with feces and urine and had feces on the lid. It was unsanitary and unusable. X. B. asked the case manager to take him to the local gas station so that X. B. could use the bathroom. Soon after, X. B. was removed from Petitioner's care due to unsanitary conditions and/or unsafe conditions in Petitioner's home. T. T. was a one-year-old child who was also placed in Petitioner's foster home during her earlier licensure period. Again, the case manager saw evidence of roach infestation in Petitioner's home. At first, the case manager only saw a couple of roaches in the home. However, the roach problem progressively grew to the point that during one of the case manager's visits the wall behind the baby's crib looked like it was moving because there were so many roaches on it. Soon after, the case manager removed T. T. to another foster home. When they arrived at the new home, a roach crawled out of T. T.'s diaper bag. Upon inspection of the bag, the case manager discovered many dead roaches in the bag. More importantly, half of a dead roach was discovered in the baby bottle of milk that T. T. was drinking while being moved to T. T.'s new foster home. Clearly, the condition of Petitioner's foster home was neither sanitary nor safe. Petitioner's care of both these children resulted in verified abuse reports in Florida's abuse registry for conditions hazardous to the health of children. Petitioner's initial foster home license either lapsed or was not renewed. Since 2004, Petitioner has not been financially stable. In fact, she often asked her neighbors for money to pay her utility bills or buy gas for her car. Additionally, Petitioner lost different homes to foreclosure in 2006 and 2007. Since 2009, she and her children have moved to a different home an average of once a year. To her credit, Petitioner attended college and obtained her doctorate in Theology and Philosophy. However, her history has not demonstrated either household stability or financial ability in her life. In 2011, Petitioner applied for licensure as a family foster home. She successfully completed the Model Approach to Partnership in Parenting (MAPP) training program on September 20, 2011. In June 2012, Trauma Therapist for Children’s Homes Society, Katie Klutz, began the required home study of Petitioner. During the home study, Petitioner and her three biological children were living in a three bedroom home. Petitioner moved her bedroom furniture into the living room in order to make room for potential foster children. The bedroom space was separated from the living room by "curtains" that afforded no significant privacy for those living in the home. Clearly, Petitioner's home did not provide sufficient space to foster an additional child in the home. Petitioner has since moved to a larger home that was not the subject of the home study for this license. However, given Petitioner's past household instability, the very limited evidence regarding this new home does not support a finding that Petitioner's current home offers sufficient space to provide for the privacy and well-being of a foster child. More importantly, Petitioner has not worked since having an accident on the job in May 2010. A neighbor also provided a written reference in which she praised Petitioner’s spirit but stated that it is “a real struggle” for Petitioner to maintain her home and that “she will definitely need additional support in this area.” Notably, it was unclear how Petitioner was currently supporting her household. She has no employment. Petitioner claimed that she received money from a church or charitable organization that she founded. However, there was no evidence that such limited income, if any, was sufficient to support her family and/or provide financially stable conditions to Petitioner and her family. Moreover, Petitioner's bank records reflect that in June 2012, she made deposits of $167.53 and debited the account $266.07. Her ending balance in June was $18.81. At hearing, other than child support and food stamps, Petitioner offered no evidence of additional finances or income that is attributable to her. Given these facts, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate home safety, household stability or financial ability sufficient to entitle her to be licensed as a foster home. Therefore, Petitioner's application for such licensure should be denied.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner's application for licensure as a foster home should be denied. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of March, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of March, 2013. COPIES FURNISHED: Paul A. Rowell, Esquire Department of Children and Families 2383 Phillips Road Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Shakinah Glory 4768 Woodville Highway Apartment 428 Tallahassee, Florida 32305 M. Burnette Coats, Esquire Department of Children and Families 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Gregory Venz, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Families Building 2, Room 204B 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Marion Drew Parker, General Counsel Department of Children and Families Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 David Wilkins, Secretary Department of Children and Families Building 1, Room 202 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issue for determination at final hearing is whether Respondent's foster care license should be revoked.
Findings Of Fact On July 1, 1995, Mildred Sands (Respondent) was issued a provisional foster home license by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (Petitioner), with an effective period of July 1, 1995 - June 30, 1996. Her license number is 0795-06-3. A provisional license is issued when all requirements for a license are not met and the licensee is given a specific time period to comply with the remaining requirements. Due to a court action involving a minor child, J. F., who was born on May 7, 1983, the court placed J. F. with Respondent. In order for the minor child to live with Respondent, Petitioner issued Respondent a provisional license. Prior to the placement, Respondent knew J. F.'s mother for several years on a personal basis. The mother and her children were at one time living with Respondent. Respondent is J. F.'s godmother and has interacted with her since J. F.'s birth. Prior to licensing, on June 12, 1995, Respondent signed a "Bilateral Service Agreement" (Bilateral Agreement) with Petitioner, agreeing to abide by or with several conditions. The Bilateral Agreement provides in pertinent part: 2. We are fully and directly responsible to the Department for the care of the child. * * * 8. We will accept dependent children into our home for care only from the Department and will make no plans for boarding other children or adults. We will notify the Department if any adult relative or family members returns to live in the home. * * * 10. We will notify the Department immediately of any change in our address, employment, living arrangements, arrest record, health status or family composition, as well as any special needs for the child (i.e. health, school problems, emotional problems). * * * 16. We will comply with all requirements for a licensed foster home as prescribed by the Department. * * * 18. We understand that any breach of the Agreement may result in the immediate removal of the child(ren) and revocation of the license. Respondent signed a "Discipline Policy Agreement" (Discipline Agreement) on July 19, 1993, when she was initially licensed as a foster care provider and on June 12, 1995, during her re-licensure process. The Discipline Agreement signed on July 19, 1993, provides in pertinent part: The following disciplinary practices are FORBIDDEN in caring for your foster child. Failure to comply may result in an investigation and possible closure of your home. * * * Hitting a child with an object. Slapping or spanking a child, or ANY OTHER physical discipline. The Discipline Agreement signed on June 12, 1995, provides in pertinent part: [T]he following disciplinary practices are FORBIDDEN on our children. FAILURE OF THE FOSTER PARENT(S)... TO COMPLY MAY RESULT IN THE REMOVAL OF THE CHILD(REN) FOR AN INVESTIGATION AND RESULT IN THE CLOSURE OF YOUR HOME. * * * Hitting a child with ANY object. Slapping, smacking, whipping, washing mouth out with soap, or ANY other form of physical discipline. On February 14, 1995, Petitioner waived placement requirements in order for J. F.'s siblings to be placed with Respondent to keep the family unit together. J. F.'s siblings had been living with her grandmother who had become ill and was unable to care for the children. On September 1, 1995, Petitioner received a report of alleged child abuse allegedly committed by Respondent against J. F., who was 12 years old, at Respondent's foster home. Respondent was allegedly disciplining J. F. Within a short span of time that same day, Petitioner began an investigation. The minor child, J. F., had raised bruises, swelling, abrasions, and redness on the lower part of her legs. Also, J. F. had a small scratch on one of her legs and a scratch on her left arm. The injuries were purportedly inflicted by a ruler. No expert opinion was presented to confirm that the injuries were consistent with such an instrument, and no attempt was made to obtain the instrument used to commit the alleged abuse. Petitioner removed all the children from Respondent's home. Petitioner notified Respondent that it was revoking her foster home license due to the alleged excessive corporal punishment. The minor child, J. F., did not testify at the hearing. 1/ Respondent did not inflict the injuries to the minor child, J. F. 2/ Respondent did not use corporal punishment of any kind on the minor child, J. F. Respondent did not violate the Discipline Agreement. Respondent was responsible for the supervision and care of the minor child, J. F. Respondent was not aware of J. F.'s injuries and was, therefore, unable to notify Petitioner of the injuries or to obtain medical attention for J. F.'s injuries. Respondent had allowed the children's adult sibling, who was 19 years old, to live with her and the children. Respondent failed to notify Petitioner that the adult sister would be and was living in her home. In failing to notify Petitioner, Respondent violated the Bilateral Agreement, paragraph numbered 8.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the foster home license of Mildred Sands not be revoked. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of August 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of August, 1996.
The Issue Whether Petitioner may be granted a Children, Youth and Families Special Home foster care license pursuant to Section 409.175, Florida Statutes, and Rule 10M-6.05, Florida Administrative Code. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURE Pursuant to Chapter 415, Florida Statutes, and the confidentiality guidelines established in Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Tallahassee Democrat, Inc., 481 So.2d 958 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986), initials in place of the names of certain children have been utilized throughout formal hearing and this Recommended Order. At formal hearing, one Hearing Officer exhibit was admitted (Interlineated Amended Pre-Hearing Stipulation, HO-A). Petitioner presented the oral testimony of Petitioner Ann Marie Miller, Paula Margarita Maxwell, Gail Burt, Alice Norita Beale, Anne Smith, Betty Shannon, Mary Beth Shaughnessey, Rex R. Diem, Carol Jay Nofsinger, Dennis Dillon, Linda Lou Slater, Deborah Heaton, Lori Slater and Victoria Parrett (by deposition P-4) and had admitted 7 exhibits. I.D. P-8 was not admitted. Respondent presented the oral testimony of George H. Siebert, Cheri Klamm, Sue McLaughlin, Gail Vinson, Sandy Rounds, and Sue Vogt, and had admitted 10 exhibits. I.D. R-6 was not admitted. Pursuant to stipulation of the parties, Petitioner was granted leave to take and file depositions of two witnesses who had failed to appear for formal hearing in response to validly served subpoenas. Provision was made for Respondent to file written objections to the after-filed depositions in the form of certified questions and to advise the undersigned if a transcript of the oral proceedings of November 24-25, 1986, would be filed. The depositions have been filed by Petitioner and no objections thereto have been filed by Respondent. Accordingly, the depositions of Victoria Butler and James D. Grimshaw, D.O., are deemed admitted as Petitioner's Exhibits 9 and 10, respectively. The parties have also filed their proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law without the provision of any transcript and within the extended time-frame to which they stipulated at formal hearing. Accordingly, those proposals have been ruled upon pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, in the appendix to this Recommended Order.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner was previously licensed for an HRS Foster Home in 1970. In 1978 her licensing classification was changed to that of a Group Home for Developmental Services as provided for in Section 393.067, Florida Statutes, and 10F-6.10, Florida Administrative Code. At all times, her license number remained 0983-003-008. During that period of fourteen years, her license was never suspended, revoked, or otherwise disciplined by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS), nor has HRS ever sought prosecution of Petitioner by the State Attorney. Group Homes for Developmental Services (DS) provide foster care for profoundly disabled persons, usually children developmentally handicapped by birth defects or catastrophic injury. On an average, infants in this category have a 1-2 year maximum life expectancy. The most common cause of death among these children is pneumonia. Of the 100-200 children in this category placed with Respondent over the last 6 years of her DS licensure, the most common types of disabilities were congenital deformities, mental retardation, brain damage, developmentally immature digestive systems, seizure activity, and respiratory ailments. Most of the children had special feeding requirements such as liquid diets and gastrointestinal feeding tubes and also had incontinency problems. Few were ambulatory. All required frequent prescription medications. The Petitioner surrendered her DS license 0983-003-008 on April 1, 1984, in the wake of an investigation surrounding the death of the child, E. C., who had been placed in Petitioner's care. Petitioner filed an application with HRS on September 3, 1985 for a Children, Youth, and Families (CYF) Special Home foster care license as provided for in Section 409.175, Florida Statutes, and 10M-6.05, Florida Administrative Code. A CYF Special Home license does not, in practice, address the same type of client as does the Group Home for Developmental Services license. Rather, according to HRS witness George Siebert, the type of children subject to placement under a CYF license would usually have no physical developmental disability or severe physical impairment. Although CYF children might have emotional, personality, and minor physical problems originating from child or sexual abuse, drugs, alcohol, or family displacement, they are almost always verbal, ambulatory, continent, and capable of regular school attendance at regular school. They do not, as a rule, require of the CYF licensee the 24- hour-per-day intensive nursing skills and administration of prescription medicines for the mere preservation of life that are required by children certified eligible for developmental services. Rule 10M-6.05(1)(j), Florida Administrative Code, permits mixing CF and DS programs in the same foster home but only by special agreement between the licensee and HRS. Petitioner's application for a new CYF license was received in the HRS Licensure Office by Victoria Butler, Central Licensing Supervisor, on September 11, 1985. Victoria Butler, having knowledge of Petitioner's prior experiences with licensure as a Group Home for Developmental Services contacted the program office and was informed that a "staffing" would be held to determine the disposition of the Petitioner's pending CYF license application. The "staffing" was held October 10, 1985, and the application was ultimately rejected on the basis of HRS' prior experience with Petitioner while she held her DS license. Thereafter, HRS did not pursue all the remaining investigations, interviews, and inspections required by statute and rule to determine Petitioner's eligibility for the CYF license. Without further investigation, etc., Petitioner's application was preliminarily denied on October 21, 1985, and she was issued a formal denial dated November 26, 1985. Mr. Siebert testified that Petitioner's application was denied solely upon authority and application of the criteria contained in Section 409.175, Florida Statutes, and Rule 10M-6.05(1)(c),(e), and (j) and Rule 10M-6.05(2)(g), (i), and (n), Florida Administrative Code. At formal hearing, HRS witnesses expressed no concerns with any other licensure standards provided by rule or statute. The specifics of the November 26, 1985 denial due to past DS licensure performance were given as: misrepresentations of the number of clients in the home; concerns about the level of care provided by Petitioner including the consistency and quality of the medical care provided by the Petitioner; and nine complaints of neglect and abuse, three of which were listed as "indicated." The "indicated" complaints alleged by Respondent were: 01/05/84 - medical neglect, 03/28/84 - dangerous environment, and 06/05/84 - medical neglect. If these "indicated" complaints are contained in the HRS abuse registry and if they are "substantiated," "verified," or "established," they would be grounds to deny the CYF license. 1/ There has never been a judicial determination with regard to any of the complaints documented against Petitioner's DS license. Moreover, it is unclear whether the complaints listed as "indicated" in local HRS records were ever transmitted to the abuse registry. 9.a. With regard to the "indicated" reports, the burden of proof to substantiate same shifts within this administrative proceeding to the Respondent agency when Respondent seeks to use them for purposes of screening a license applicant, Anderson v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 485 So.2d 849 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). Respondent has failed to substantiate, verify, or establish by direct, credible, competent and substantial evidence that Petitioner was guilty of abuse or neglect in the incidents of 01/05/84, 03/28/84, and 06/05/84. The circumstances surrounding the 01/05/84, report are that E. C., a male Developmental Service infant in Petitioner's care, had been ill during the night of 12/09/83 with twelve loose stools and high temperature. Petitioner, a licensed practical nurse, had unsuccessfully used various methods throughout the night to reduce the fever. These methods had been successful in similar situations in the past. These methods included cool baths and doses of Tylenol. Excess administration of Tylenol was not established by competent testimony. The following morning, having an appointment for another child, D. P., Petitioner took E. C. to the hospital with her so that he might also be examined. While waiting at the hospital to be seen, E. C. worsened. It took over two hours of entreaties by Petitioner and Cheri Klamm, HRS foster care counselor, before they could persuade a hospital physician to examine E. C. on an emergency basis. This was because E. C. did not have an appointment, and because the hospital would not accept Petitioner's signature to secure treatment. Finally, Cheri Klamm reluctantly agreed to sign for E. C.'s admission. This chronology of events is concurred in by Petitioner, Cheri Klamm and Victoria Parrett. By the time he was finally diagnosed, E. C. was severely dehydrated and eventually a portion of his bowel had to be surgically removed as "dead." He expired during the night. E. C. was approximately 8 months old at date of death with a maximum two year life expectancy. Following interviews and investigations, the HRS report was concluded by the intake investigator as "no disposition" on the medical neglect allegation and on a concurrent "possible dangerous environment" allegation as "closed as unfounded." Upon the foregoing circumstances, Petitioner is determined not to have contributed willfully or neglectfully to the death of E. C. The circumstances surrounding the 03/28/84 report are that as a result of the death of E. C., HRS personnel had recommended reducing the licensed number of DS children assigned to Petitioner from 7 to 2 or 3. As of 3/27/84 Petitioner had 5 children in her home which was then agreeable to the HRS Developmental Services Program Office personnel. D. P. was a "failure to thrive" female infant, missing half her brain and affected with several other congenital abnormalities. D. P. had been placed as a Developmental Services child with Petitioner soon after birth. Petitioner had "bonded" with D. P. and with her natural parents. In January, 1984, D. P. underwent surgery for insertion of a gastrointestinal feeding tube in her stomach. Thereafter, HRS insisted, contrary to the parents' wishes, on placing D. P. in a medical foster home. D. P. did very well there but D. P.'s mother wanted D. P. returned to Petitioner's home because she considered the care superior, cleaner and more loving. She approached Petitioner about taking D. P. in but HRS workers told Petitioner she was unauthorized to take D. P. back because to do so would put Petitioner over the recommended number of children for her DS license. HRS representatives also refused to replace D. P. with Petitioner in reliance on medical recommendations concerning D. P.'s medical conditions and the number of children already in the Petitioner's home. However, HRS representatives promised Petitioner they would try to get the move authorized and Petitioner agreed on 3/27/84 not to take D. P. back. Then D. P.'s mother, in a unilateral decision, took D. P. from the medical foster home and attempted to care for D. P. by herself. Within a day, the mother found she could not cope with the feeding tube. In distress, she brought D. P. to Petitioner. Petitioner relented and took D. P. into her home for special care despite her prior representations to HRS that she would not do so. HRS was notified the following day. With the addition of D. P. to the home there were 6 children full-time in the home. Petitioner voluntarily surrendered her license and HRS removed the DS children from the home. Four of the five families returned their children to the Petitioner's home. Petitioner and Cheri Klamm testified that the Circuit Court ordered that the children be permitted to stay. The Circuit Court Order was not admitted in evidence, but the foregoing fact is found upon corroborating testimony of two witnesses. In the course of its investigation of this incident, the HRS intake investigator became aware on 4/02/84 of the presence of daycare children in the home for part of the day. The intake counselor considered this as raising the number of children in the home to 12 and she found the complaint of "dangerous environment to be "indicated." HRS never prosecuted this matter through the State Attorney as it could have done if it considered it a serious problem. Under the foregoing circumstances, and upon the testimony set forth in Finding of Fact 10 infra, it is determined that no child was abused, neglected, or endangered by Petitioner's taking D. P. into her home, although there were technical rule violations both of mixing daycare clients and DS clients and of exceeding the agreed number of clients. The circumstances surrounding the 06/05/84 report arose after Petitioner surrendered her DS license on April 1, 1984. D. P. had remained in Petitioner's home at the parents' expense. Petitioner had successfully nursed D. P. through a respiratory illness a few weeks before 06/05/84. Dr. Grimshaw, an osteopathic physician specializing in pediatrics, had seen the child that time and was again consulted on 6/04/84 for the same type of ailment. Because of Petitioner's previous success with a similar infection, Dr. Grimshaw made the judgment call to allow Petitioner to keep D. P. at home instead of admitting her to the hospital. D. P. died suddenly overnight of pneumonia, the most common form of death in this type of child. D. P. was approximately 18 months old with a total life expectancy of less than 2 years. Allegations that D. P.'s formula was changed by Petitioner without a doctor's approval and that D. P. lost significant weight while in Petitioner's care are not supported by the greater weight of the direct credible evidence. According to Dr. Grimshaw, the weight stabilization of D. P. at approximately this time in her short life was reasonable in light of all developmental factors. Although the investigator's report was returned as "indicated," the foregoing circumstances do not establish that Petitioner contributed either willfully or neglectfully to D. P.'s death. None of the other complaints noted by HRS in its denial of Petitioner's present CYF license application were found to be "indicated" by the HRS intake interviewers/investigators who handled them at the time they arose. Unfounded complaints are clearly not "verified," "established," or "substantiated" and ought not now to be resurrected to deny a new and different license. However, at formal hearing, Petitioner addressed these concerns as well and refuted them, Specifically, concerning an occasion when she briefly left her 15 year old daughter alone in the house with the DS patients and another occasion when she briefly left a pregnant adult retarded client in charge, HRS treated these as minimal administrative problems which were corrected upon being brought to Petitioner's attention. From 1980-1984, Petitioner also provided after school daycare for other "special" children who were not certified and supported by HRS as DS children. HRS personnel knew this. These included some learning disabled children, some retarded children, and some handicapped children. All but one was ambulatory. Usually they were picked up by working parents before the DS certified residents arrived home each afternoon from their special school. In late February or early March 1984, agency personnel advised Petitioner to discontinue the practice but did not insist that she discontinue it when Petitioner wanted to continue the daycare until the end of the school year because she felt obligated to the parents. Contrary to the conclusions reached by the intake investigator in the intake report for 3/28/84, Cheri Klamm testified at hearing that no children were endangered by this practice. HRS allegations of school complaints and complaints by the Maxwell Home against Petitioner and her home for dirty, unkempt children were not proven and are refuted by the testimony of Maxwell, Klamm, and Diem. HRS allegations of misuse of medicines and failure to keep adequate records thereof were not proven. Petitioner had requested the removal of Cheri Klamm as her foster case worker. Almost all of the complaints against Petitioner originated in a personality conflict between these two. Petitioner is devoutly religious and viewed her work as a DS foster parent as a "calling" to improve the quality of life of disadvantaged persons. As a single parent, she has adopted a Downs Syndrome child with impaired hearing and a mentally retarded hydrocephalic child. This child is one whose medical records were questioned and he is making substantial developmental progress. Petitioner has won church, private and community awards for her services to DS children. She seeks a CYF license to continue her calling but in a less demanding way. Petitioner has affirmatively demonstrated that her plan for a licensed CYF home is financially reasonable. By her testimony and that of her family, a school principal, parents, another DS foster parent, nurses, and an osteopathic physician, she has demonstrated that she is of good moral character and medically qualified as an LPN, and that through education, training, experience, and temperament, she is able to take on the care and nurture of the less demanding CYF foster children if a CYF license is granted. The oral testimony of witnesses in her behalf exceeds the three references required by statute. She has shown the home is sanitary and she successfully forced its sanitation inspection. She has passed the required criminal records check. The agency has failed to substantiate, verify, or establish its reports of abuse and neglect, and it is unclear if these ever were put in the central abuse registry at all. Petitioner has not been able to demonstrate approval of her home by the local fire department because HRS did not arrange such inspection and she has not passed a fingerprint check which has been legislatively mandated since this license application has been pending. However, she has demonstrated that the response to her house for the fire department and police department is approximately 10 minutes and that her house contains acceptable equipment in case of fire. She has attended all special training for CYF licensure as recommended by the Secretary of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. Petitioner acknowledges that she may have been uncooperative in the past due to personal differences with the foster care counselor assigned her, but she has expressed an understanding of agency Rule 10M-6.05(2) requiring consistency in informing the foster care counselor of fluctuations in home population, of the need to limit the number of CYF clients to conform to that rule and of the need to eliminate any daycare clients. The agency has the authority to monitor any license issued and to discipline as necessary if Petitioner does not live up to the standards imposed by statute and rule.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED that Respondent grant Petitioner a CYF Special Home license provided she successfully passes the fire department inspection and fingerprint check. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 16th day of February, 1987, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of February, 1987.
The Issue The issue presented herein is whether or not Petitioner is eligible to be assigned foster children.
Findings Of Fact Based on the Hearing Officer's observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, documentary evidence received, and the entire record complied herein, I make the following relevant factual findings: Petitioner, Johnnie Mae Smith, was licensed as a foster parent on July 1, 1987, for one (1) female foster child (Certificate No. 787-48-1). Thereafter, Petitioner requested that foster children be placed in her home and she was denied. Specifically, by letter dated December 4, 1987, Gloria P. Simmons, District Operations Manager, Children Youth and Family (CYF) Services, advised Petitioner that "we are not placing any foster children in your home for the following reasons: Insufficient income to provide adequate cash flow to support additional expenses incurred. Lack of integrity in reporting income while receiving AFDC 1/ payments. "Your provocative, overbearing, abrasive, and implusive (sic) behavior." Petitioner was advised of her right to appeal Respondent's denial of placement of foster children in her home and she timely appealed that denial. Gene Majure, (Majure hereafter) Senior CYF Counselor, has been employed by Respondent in excess of 16 years. Majure is presently assigned to making license recommendations for foster home applicants in Dade County. Majure was assigned Petitioner's foster home applicants license application for review. During October 1986, Petitioner received pre-service training as a foster parent at which time she made application for licensure as a foster parent. Petitioner's initial foster home study was conducted by Gene Majure, who rejected it primarily on the basis of "insufficient income." Petitioner protested her initial foster home application rejection and instead of being processed through normal appeal channels, she was informed by Leonard Helfand, District Legal Counsel, that she would be reinvited to pre- service training and she could reapply. Petitioner reattended the second part of pre-service training on May 21, 1987, and she officially reapplied. Lois Rossman, (hereafter Rossman) Senior Youth and Family Counselor, and Peggy Ann Siegal, Children Youth and Family Supervisor, visited Petitioner in her home on June 12, 1987. Their interview of Petitioner revealed that Petitioner shared her three-bedroom home in Opa Locka with her two daughters, Chantrell (15) and Latrise (14). Petitioner is separated from her husband for approximately one year and his specific whereabouts is unknown. Majure again visited Petitioner during January 1987. At that time, Majure inquired as to Petitioner's financial income and Petitioner responded verbally, and in writing, on October 9, 1986, and again on June 12, 1987, that she has $400 per month earned income which income is derived from a laundry service which she has operated for the past 5 years. On the other hand, Petitioner signed a monthly income statement with AFDC indicating that she has no earned income. To the extent that Petitioner has earned income, she incorrectly reported her income to AFDC since October 1986, which may result in either an overpayment or fraudulent involvement in her income reporting. (Respondent's exhibit 3). Rossman was also assigned Petitioner's case to determine her eligibility to be assigned foster children. Rossman was present on the June 12, 1987, visit to Petitioner's residence at which time Petitioner again related that she had earned income of approximately $400 per month which income statement was contrasted with the available records that Respondent's employees had obtained from the AFDC office wherein Petitioner indicated that she had no earned income. To the extent that Petitioner does not have earned income, she has indicated a total income of $264 per month and stated expenses of approximately $400-$605 per month which creates cause for concern as to her ability to maintain a stable and secure family environment for foster children. Rossman also became involved in circumstances wherein Petitioner repeatedly called the CYF counselor's office demanding to speak with supervisory employees wherein she demanded that she be assigned foster children since she was licensed. When secretarial employees advised Petitioner that her message would be relayed and that as soon as a supervisor or other placement official became available, they would return her call, Petitioner would again call using an alias to attempt to get through. This problem persisted for several months following the time that Petitioner's foster home application was approved in July 1987. Respondent's secretarial employees who answer the phone and greet clients in person have been trained to deal with irate and abusive clients, however Petitioner's unrelentless calling became so problematic that employees felt harassed and one employee broke down and starting crying based on Petitioner's persistence about seeing or talking to certain supervisory employees at certain times. Prior to the time that Petitioner's foster home license application was approved, she was much more pleasant in her conversations with employees in the CYF office. (Testimony of Peggy Siegal and Ellie Roman). Petitioner also keeps three large dogs in her yard, one of which is a Pit Bull and two are large German Shepherds who made threatening postures at Respondent's employees when they visited Petitioner's home for inspections. Although Petitioner maintains that the two German Shepherds do not belong to her, they were at her home on each occasion when she was visited by licensing staff and Respondent's sanitation inspector. Petitioner keeps the dogs, which roam at will around the fenced area her home, at bay by swinging a rubber hose at them. The fact that Petitioner is receiving welfare benefits is not an automatic disqualification which prevents her from being assigned foster children. Petitioner encountered problems with her spouse which culminated in a separation and she was, therefore, left with insufficient income to maintain herself and she applied for and is receiving welfare benefits. Petitioner plans to begin employment at Jackson Memorial Hospital shortly.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that: Respondent, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, enter a final order finding that Petitioner is not eligible to be assigned foster children. 2/ DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 13th day of October, 1988. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of October, 1988.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent should deny Petitioners' application to be licensed as foster parents.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the state agency responsible for licensing and regulating foster parents in the state. Respondent first licensed Petitioners as foster parents on June 29, 2003, and renewed the license on June 29, 2004. The last license expired on June 28, 2005. Petitioners allowed their license to expire on June 28, 2005. They wanted to make improvements to a new home they had moved into before bringing foster children into the home. Petitioners submitted a completed application for a new license on March 20, 2006. By letter dated April 27, 2006, Respondent denied the application for licensure. Petitioners did not receive the notice of denial until May 3, 2006, because Respondent sent the notice to the address of record in the old license application files instead of the correct address in the application for a new license that is at issue in this proceeding. The letter denying the application for licensure incorrectly stated that Respondent intended to revoke Petitioners' license. The misstated literal terms of the letter nevertheless provided Petitioners with adequate notice of the actual proposed agency action to deny the license application. Contrary to the literal terms of the letter, Petitioners understood that the letter constituted notice of Respondent's proposed denial of their license application. Petitioners timely requested an administrative hearing by letter dated May 7, 2006. The request for hearing stated, in relevant part: [W]e received notice advising us that [Respondent] has initiated proceedings to revoke our foster home license. . . . Please note that we are not a licensed foster home at this time. Our license expired in June, 2005. So, we are somewhat confused about proceedings to revoke something that does not exist. Please be advised that we did [sic] however, complete an application for a 'new' foster care license. . . . We were also told that, [sic] our application would be denied and that we would have the right to request an administrative hearing to contest the 'denial'. If the letter that we received is in regard to our application for licensure, and if that application has been denied, then we are requesting an administrative hearing to contest that decision. Respondent's Exhibit 1C. Respondent gave the request for hearing to the agency clerk to forward to DOAH to conduct the hearing. However, the agency clerk was confused by the literal terms of the denial letter. When the agency clerk could not ascertain an existing foster home license to revoke, the agency clerk merely "sat" on the request for hearing and did not forward it to DOAH. By letter dated November 13, 2006, Respondent corrected the literal terms of the previous letter. The letter dated November 13, 2006, correctly notified Petitioners of Respondent's proposed denial of the license application. By letter dated November 23, 2006, Petitioners again requested an administrative hearing to contest the proposed denial of the license application. In addition, the request for hearing notified Respondent of Petitioners' intent to rely on the so-called default license provisions in Subsection 120.60(1), Florida Statutes (2006).1 Respondent gave the request for hearing to the agency clerk. This time, the agency clerk referred the matter to DOAH. However, the agency clerk did not refer the request for hearing to DOAH within the 15 days mandated in Subsection 120.569(2)(a). Rather, DOAH received the referral from the agency clerk on March 6, 2007; approximately 103 days after the date of the second request for hearing and approximately 303 days after the date of the first request for hearing. The delays in referring the requests for hearing to DOAH did not impair either the fairness of the proceeding or the correctness of the agency action. It is undisputed that when Petitioners were previously licensed as foster parents they repeatedly administered corporal punishment to a foster child who was approximately four years old at the time. It is also undisputed that Petitioners punished the child by requiring the child to stand for one hour to one hour and a-half almost daily. Both types of discipline violate applicable standards for foster care and evidence Petitioners disqualification to be foster parents. The parties spent most of the evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether the four-year-old female suffered from a condition identified in the record as reactive attachment disorder (RAD). However, the trier of fact finds evidence concerning RAD to be irrelevant and immaterial to the issue of whether Petitioners are qualified to be foster parents. The evidence that Petitioners administered unauthorized discipline to a four-year-old foster child in their care clearly evidences their lack of qualification. No medical evidence established a nexus between the alleged disorder and illicit discipline of a young child.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent issue a final order denying Petitioners' application to be licensed as foster parents. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of May, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of May, 2007.
