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C. DEAN LEWIS vs. DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 84-002795 (1984)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 84-002795 Latest Update: Feb. 08, 1985

Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, C. DEAN LEWIS, was first employed on March 4, 1966 by the Lafayette County School Board and remained employed by that agency until September 1, 1975. From the time of his employment with that agency, Mr. Lewis was enrolled in the agency retirement system. On September 1, 1975, Petitioner was employed as County Attorney by Suwannee County, Florida. From the time of enrollment in 1966 until such time as the retirement system became non- contributory, sums were withheld from his salary for payment into the retirement fund. When Petitioner became County Attorney for Suwannee County in September 1975, he continued his enrollment in the Florida Retirement System. The evidence presented in the form of enrollment cards fails to show the exact date of enrollment or for what position of employment he was enrolled. However, it is quite clear that Petitioner was enrolled in the Florida Retirement System or its predecessor system continuously since the inception of his employment by a governmental agency. On July 1, 1979, the Division of Retirement issued new rules regarding membership in the Florida Retirement System contained in Section 22B-1.04(5)(6), Florida Administrative Code. On September 15, 1979, the Division of Retirement promulgated its Memorandum No. 79-20, to all Florida Retirement System reporting agencies outlining the new guidelines for enrollment. This memorandum specifically referred to attorneys and encouraged the agency to examine the employment status of attorneys to determine whether that individual was an employee of the agency or merely a contractor. Thereafter on February 26, 1981, the Division of Retirement sent out another memorandum, Number 81-38, again to all retirement system reporting units, which placed specific emphasis on those situations involving employees versus consultants/contractors. This situation clearly pertains to the situation of the Petitioner here. When these memoranda were received by Suwannee County, at least one was inserted in Petitioner's personnel file. At no time, however, was any consideration given to the Petitioner's situation nor was any mention made by the County to the Petitioner regarding these memoranda. In addition, at no time did any representative of the Florida Retirement System or the Division of Retirement have any contact with Petitioner either in person or through correspondence to advise him that his status was under reconsideration and that he had an obligation to clarify his standing to the satisfaction of the Division. In early 1984 the Division of Retirement forwarded an employment relationship questionnaire to the Suwannee County Board of County Commissioners requesting that it complete the questionnaire as it pertained to Petitioner, the County Attorney. This questionnaire was completed by Jerry A. Scarborough, Clerk of the Circuit Court, who was responsible for maintaining the personnel records of Petitioner and most other county employees. On the basis of Mr. Scarborough's answers to various questions, the Division of Retirement on May 14, 1984, advised Petitioner of its intention to disenroll him from the Florida Retirement System. The Division listed some seven areas wherein Mr. Scarborough's answers indicated that Petitioner was a "consultant or other professional person" as defined in Rule 22B-6.01(12), rather than a true employee of the county. As such, Mr. Tom F. Wooten, Chief, Bureau of Enrollment and Contributions, Division of Retirement, concluded that Petitioner was, therefore, not eligible to participate as a member of the Florida Retirement System. Mr. Wooten further indicated the Division's intent to remove him from membership as of July 1, 1979. Thereafter, as was stated previously, on July 6, 1984, Mr. A. J. McMullian, III, State Retirement Director, by letter, advised Petitioner that he had considered his response to the original letter of intent but nonetheless, continued to conclude that he was not eligible to participate as a member of the Florida Retirement System. The July 6, 1984 letter by Mr. McMullian indicated the finality of the Division's decision. It is not now the Division's intention to disenroll Petitioner from the Florida Retirement System effective in 1979. Based on a recent decision of the Florida District Court of Appeals, the Division recognizes that it can reasonably disenroll him no earlier than the date he was first advised of the Division's concern regarding his status. That date is May 14, 1984, the date of the Division's initial letter of intent. The decision by the Division of Retirement to remove Petitioner and other professional contractors from the retirement system is based on its contention that the Petitioner and these other individuals are not bona fide employees of the agency under whose auspices they are enrolled in the system. It is not the position of the Division that only full-time employees can be enrolled. To the contrary, the agency is quite willing to accept that part-time employees are eligible for enrollment providing they meet the other criteria. With regard to the Petitioner and other professionals, primarily attorneys and physicians, it is the Division's contention that they are not true employees of the county but are independent-contractors or consultants who are not eligible for membership in the system. The factors leading to the conclusion drawn by the Division include such things as: Petitioner was not trained or schooled by the county in the professional work he performs; That he is not given instructions as to how the work is to be done; That he is not required to maintain regular office hours established by the county; That the county does not provide him with materials, tools, or equipment to perform his duties; That he is available to provide identical professional services to others in the county and in furtherance of that pursuit, maintains a business listing in the telephone book, and a trade journal to that effect as well as maintaining a private office for the practice of his profession; That he hires, pays, and supervises assistants who assist him in the performance of his law firm duties as well as those duties performed for the county; and That he is not eligible for annual or sick leave from the county. The Petitioner is hired by the county to advise the Board of County Commissioners, constitutional officers, and citizens of the county having business with the county referred to him by the Board. His private law firm also does additional work for the county in other areas for which it is compensated independently. Petitioner's yearly salary, which was recently increased from $6,000.00 to $8,000.00 per year is related solely to his performance of duties as county attorney. In that capacity he does not get involved in the county's litigation. His firm, as well as other firms in the area, is hired by the county separately for that function. Petitioner vehemently denies that any partner of his or any employee substituted or acted for him at meetings of the Board of County Commissioners in his capacity as county attorney. Whenever such partners or employees addressed the Board, they did so on work they were doing for the firm separately from that related to his position as county attorney. Petitioner contends that he spends an average of 10 hours per month on county business of which 80 percent is accomplished at the county courthouse. In addition to these 10 hours per month, citizens of the county, the press, and county officials contact him at home and at other places at all hours of the day and night regarding county business. He is not furnished an office in the county courthouse or any other county building. Though he contended that his seat in the county commission room is his office and the place where he accomplished most of his county related work, and though this contention was supported by the Clerk of Court, Mr. Scarborough, it is clear that in reality, Petitioner does not have an office furnished him by the county, and such work as he accomplished on the county's behalf is done primarily in the office of the official requesting it. It is also most likely that substantial correspondence and other clerical work is accomplished for the county by the petitioner in his private office and is accomplished by his own law firm employees. The county supplies him with some books and manuals including copies of various ordinances, codes, and attorney general opinions. The outside work which he does for the county, including, for example, such things as plat examinations, is billed to the county at a rate of $75.00 per hour. The amount he receives, however, never exceeds the amount received by the county for this service. In 1975, prior to his becoming county attorney, he discussed the potential for assuming this position with his predecessor and law partner, Mr. Airth. One of the major factors convincing him to accept the position of county attorney was the prospective retirement benefits he could expect after fulfilling a number of years in this job. Petitioner was hired by the County Commission on an oral contract basis and has never had a written contract with the county. At the first commissioner's meeting of each year, the Board considers Petitioner's continued relationship with the county and confirms it. It could, at any time, decline to extend the relationship, though it has not yet done so. This arrangement differs from that of a normal consultant in that the relationship with a relationship is terminated automatically when the specific job for which the individual is hired has been completed. Petitioner's relationship has been continuous since 1975 and at the present time there appears to be no indication that it will be terminated in the foreseeable future. His compensation is reported to the Internal Revenue Service on a form W-2. That which was submitted for the year 1983 reflects that social security taxes were withheld but no federal income tax. Petitioner explains this on the basis that he claims four dependents and that, therefore, no tax should have been withheld. This explanation is questionable at best. Petitioner takes exception to several of the answers by Mr. Scarborough on the questionnaire submitted to the Division of Retirement. For example, at question 4b, Petitioner contends that he does in fact attend regularly scheduled meetings of the Board of County Commissioners and other agencies and is, therefore, required to follow daily routines. He contends that he is given the specific work which has to be done and the time in which it is to be accomplished and is, therefore, instructed as to how the work is `to be done by his employer. He contends that this same relationship makes him no different than any other county agency or section director who have authority to accomplish their work with some latitude and discretion. Petitioner also contends that he was hired for one year, not an indefinite period, though he has continued to work since 1975 and anticipates no change in his relationship in the future. He contends that the requirement to attend meetings on definite dates at certain times, which takes up to 60 to 80 percent of his time on the job, constitutes the fixed hours and certain times mentioned in the questionnaire. Further, he indicates that with regard to the determination of the hours when the work should be performed, this decision is made not by the employee as indicated on the questionnaire, but by his employer, the county. Petitioner also contends that such help as he utilizes in performing county business is received from public employees, not from his own law firm employees, and that most of his work is done in the courthouse. While Petitioner does not earn annual leave, sick pay, bonuses, or other benefits, he has been enrolled in the retirement system, was eligible to purchase county insurance, and was carried as any other employee on the county's workers' compensation policy. He is authorized to miss one commission meeting per year for vacation and others during the year as excused for illness. Taken in its totality, it becomes obvious that Petitioner's relationship with Suwannee County, Florida is little different from that of any other attorney-client relationship of long standing. It is clear that Petitioner's relationship with the county, though it may have been intended since May, 1984 to fall within the guidelines set forth by Use Division of Retirement, did not do so from 1975 to the latter date. It is clear that the Petitioner's primary employment was that of a private practitioner. One of his clients, and perhaps his largest client in terms of population, is Suwannee County, but the relationship is that of attorney-client, not that of employer- employee. While Petitioner no doubt is the Suwannee County Attorney, he performs that function as a private practitioner and not as a member of the county work force even though his salary is paid from the general salary and wages account.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings Of Fact and Conclusions Of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that Petitioner, C. DEAN LEWIS, be disenrolled from the Florida Retirement System effective May 14, 1984. RECOMMENDED this 1st day of February, 1985 in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of February, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: William A. Frieder, Esquire Division of Retirement 2639 North Monroe Street Suite 207 - Building C Tallahassee, Florida 32303 C. Dean Lewis, Esquire c/o Airth, Sellers, Lewis & Decker Post Office Drawer 8 Live Oak, Florida 32060 Gilda Lambert, Secretary Department of Administration Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301

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YVONNE WEINSTEIN vs DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 01-001637 (2001)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida May 01, 2001 Number: 01-001637 Latest Update: Sep. 10, 2001

The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to participate in the Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP) of the Florida Retirement System (FRS), for the period September 1, 1998, through and including September 30, 1999.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a former employee of the School Board of Miami-Dade County (School Board) and is a retired member of FRS. In September 1998, Petitioner became eligible to participate in DROP by virtue of reaching 30 years of service with the School Board. In September 1998, Petitioner asked Respondent for an estimate of her retirement benefits. In January 1999, the estimate of Petitioner's retirement benefits was prepared by Respondent and mailed to Petitioner. During the 1998-99 school year, Petitioner had difficulties in her dealings with a new school principal. 1/ Petitioner testified that she delayed applying for DROP because she believed that her relationship with her employer would improve and she could continue to work as a teacher. Petitioner also testified that School Board administrators gave her erroneous information and misled her as to their intention to permit her to continue to teach. Petitioner argues that she would have elected to participate in DROP beginning September 1, 1998, had her employer told her the truth about her employment status. In this proceeding, Petitioner argues that she be permitted to participate in DROP effective September 1, 1998, on equitable grounds, without specifying the equitable principles upon which she relies. On October 27, 1999, Petitioner completed her application to participate in DROP and filed the application with the School Board's personnel office. Respondent received the completed application via facsimile on November 3, 1999. The first application sent in by Petitioner requested that her DROP participation start retroactive to September 1, 1998. Respondent, through its staff, denied that request and informed Petitioner that she would have to submit a second application, referred to by staff as a corrected application, requesting a start date of October 1, 1999. Pursuant to those instructions, Petitioner submitted a second application requesting that her start date be October 1, 1999. Petitioner's challenge to Respondent's denial of her request to accept her participation in DROP retroactive to September 1, 1998, was timely. Petitioner was later terminated from her position with the School Board. 2/ Respondent has been paid her drop benefits for the period beginning October 1, 1999, and ending when the School Board terminated her employment. Petitioner has not been employed by a FRS employer since the School Board terminated her employment.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order denying Petitioner's request for benefits under DROP for the period September 1, 1998 to September 30, 1999. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of August, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of August, 2001

Florida Laws (3) 120.57121.011121.091
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EUGENE L. BORUS vs. DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 84-002961 (1984)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 84-002961 Latest Update: Jan. 17, 1985

Findings Of Fact Eugene L. Borus began employment with the Department of Transportation (DOT) in February, 1962, and was enrolled in the Florida Retirement System (FRS) as a mandatory member. In April, 1976, he terminated employment and applied for retirement. He was retired effective May 1, 1976, with 12.33 years of credible service (Exhibit 2). Mr. Borus was reemployed on May 23, 1977, by DOT. During 1977 and under the provisions of the "Reemployment After Retirement" provisions of Section 121.091(9), Florida Statutes, Petitioner received both his salary and his retirement benefit up to 500 hours of employment at which point his retirement benefits ceased. Beginning January 1, 1978, and on each January 1 thereafter Petitioner was again paid his retirement benefit up to 500 hours of employment after which the retirement benefit was discontinued. In early 1984, Mr. Borus applied to the Division to have his 1976 retirement cancelled and his employment service with DOT since 1976 included in his creditable service so that at such time as he would again retire, his total creditable service would include all his employment time. If this transpired, his future retirement benefits would be greater than those currently paid. His request was denied by the Respondent by letter dated April 5, 1984 (Exhibit 1). No member of FRS who has retired and drawn retired pay, except for those excepted in Section 120.091(4)(e) and 121.091(9)(d) have ever been "unretired" and allowed to rejoin the FRS.

Florida Laws (2) 121.051121.091
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SHERRY STEARNS vs DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 98-001224 (1998)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Daytona Beach, Florida Mar. 10, 1998 Number: 98-001224 Latest Update: Mar. 22, 1999

The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner is eligible to purchase her employee service as a CETA employee with a state agency as credible service in the Florida Retirement Service.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Sherry Stearns, was employed by the State of Florida, Department of Labor and Commerce, in the Florida State Unemployment office from January 1976 until September 30, 1977. The records maintained by the Department of Retirement based upon payroll data submitted by the Department of Revenue reflect that Petitioner was not in a permanent position as reflected by the Code 0303 and the entry of "zz" in the last column showing she was not eligible for retirement benefits. The Petitioner offered no evidence in support of her claim to show that she was employed in a position which was covered or for which she could claim prior service credit.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner's claim be DENIED. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of July, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of July, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Sherry Stearns 360 South Senaca Boulevard Daytona Beach, Florida 32114 Stanley N. Danek, Esquire Department of Management Services Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 William H. Linder, Secretary Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Paul A. Rowell, General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950

Florida Laws (1) 120.57 Florida Administrative Code (1) 60S-1.004
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ROBERT H. BARR vs. DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 75-000317 (1975)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 75-000317 Latest Update: Feb. 01, 1977

Findings Of Fact Petitioner was employed as a Police Sergeant with Metropolitan Dade County. He is 38 years old and has 13.83 years of creditable service under the Florida Retirement System. (Exhibit A) On February 16, 1973, Petitioner was involved in an automobile accident in Broward County, Florida while serving with a detached drug abuse unit. On February 25, 1974, Petitioner applied for disability retirement benefits under Section 121.091(4) and Section 121.021(13), Florida Statutes, stating: "I believe I am incapacitated for further service in Florida because of injuries received in an in-line-of-duty automobile accident that occurred on 16 February 1973." (Exhibit A) After considering the evidence submitted in support of Petitioner's application, the Administrator of the Florida Retirement System determined that insufficient information was submitted to substantiate a finding of total and permanent disability as provided by Section 121.091(4), Florida Statutes. As a result, Petitioner was notified on March 20, 1975 of the Administrator's intention to deny the subject disability retirement application. (Exhibit B) Notice of Petitioner's right to an administrative hearing pursuant to Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, was also provided at that time. On April 2, 1975, Petitioner notified the Respondent of his intention to Petition for an administrative determination of his disability application pursuant to Section 120.47(1), Florida Statutes. (Exhibit C) Whereupon, the Director of the Respondent requested that the Division of Administrative Hearings assign a hearing officer to conduct a hearing which was ultimately held at 1350 N.W. 12th Avenue, Miami, Florida on the 12th day of September, 1975. (Exhibit D) The first witness to appear at this hearing on Petitioner's behalf was Detective Pete Kreimes who is employed by Metropolitan Dade County. The witness testified that he was trained by the Petitioner for the narcotics section and the two later became personal friends. He has known Petitioner for about five (5) years. Mr. Kreimes testified that Petitioner was an outstanding investigator while employed by Metropolitan Dade County. While performing these duties, Petitioner participated in the physically demanding activities of a law enforcement officer. He related the circumstances surrounding Petitioner's accident of February 16, 1973, and the long range affects he felt the accident had on Petitioner's physical condition. This included Petitioner's apparent discomfort in walking, standing or sitting for extended periods of time. The witness also stated that Petitioner developed a serious drinking problem after the accident due to what he believed was the frustration of not being able to continue in police work and because of the financial problems being encountered. Mr. Kreimes felt there were no jobs available in the area of law enforcement wherein the Petitioner could render useful and efficient service on a full-time basis. The next witness to appear was one Dr. Gilbert. Dr. Gilbert is a Medical Doctor with specialties in Psychiatry and Neurology. He also holds a Ph.D.. degree in the field of Psychology. Dr. Gilbert detailed the neurological impairments to the cervical and lumbar areas of Petitioner's spine. The witness related that the Petitioner suffered from a post concussion syndrome following a brain concussion. The doctor also diagnosed a traumatic neurosis resulting from the pain and trauma of the accident and manifesting itself in tension and anxiety. The witness acknowledged Petitioner's allergies to various medications which might otherwise be used to alleviate muscle spasm, tension and some of the pain brought on by neurological probless. Dr. Gilbert felt that the combination of Petitioner's inability to alleviate pain in this manner and his various emotional problems led to the excessive use of alcohol. However, the witness did not feel that Petitioner's excessive use of alcohol was advisable; although, he did feel, considering Petitioner's allergies, that the only hope of Petitioner's dealing with his pain was by mental conditioning. Dr. Gilbert felt that the Petitioner had not reached maximum medical improvement, because he had not yet completed his diagnosis and work up on Petitioner's disability due to possible brain damage. However, he did feel that, due to the combination of Petitioner's post concussion syndrome, neurological and emotional problems, he was unemployable at this time, without regard to Petitioner's excessive drinking. Mr. Harold Dunsky also testified as an employment expert on behalf of the Petitioner. Mr. Dunsky holds B.A., M.A., and J.D. degrees and has worked in the area of job placement and vocational counseling for the State of Illinois and the U.S. Government for over twenty years. Mr. Dunsky testified that after interviewing the Petitioner and considering various unidentified medical reports, he felt the Petitioner was unemployable on a full-time basis. The final witness to testify was the Petitioner, Robert Barr. The Petitioner related his educational and employment experience which consisted of an in precriminology and approximately fourteen (14) years as a police officer with Metropolitan Dade County. Mr. Barr explained that the first indication of his allergy problems was in 1961 when his upper back, shoulders and arm began to ache while playing ball. As a result of his allergic reaction to the medication taken at this time, he suffered his first cardiac arrest. In 1966 the Petitioner suffered another cardiac arrest as a result of a penicillin shot administered during a bout with the flu. Another allergic reaction took place in a dentist's office in 1970 as a result of an injection of sodium penathol. The medical witnesses had been advised by Barr of his past allergic reactions. Petitioner next detailed the circumstances surrounding his accident in February of 1973. He also related his current physical limitations, his financial problems, his desire to return to the field of law enforcement and his frequent use of alcohol to alleviate his pains and problems. At this point the Deposition of Dr. William Scott Russell, Jr., Dadeland Medical Building, Suite 303, Miami, Florida, was made a part of the record. Dr. Russell is a neurologist who began treating the Petitioner on September 10, 1973. Dr. Russell testified that the Petitioner complained of shoulder and arm pain due to thoracic outlet syndrome. The witness stated that this could be caused by a so-called jerk-injury or as a secondary phenomena in association with muscle spasm produced by an underlying disc injury. Dr. Russell also explained an impairment to the lower lumbar region of Petitioner's spine. This was diagnosed as nerve roots irritation of the, S1 nerve root. (Dep. Russell, 20) The witness stated that the Petitioner had a history of low-back problems relating to an automobile accident which occurred several years prior to his accident in February of 1973. (Dep. Russell, p. 14) Dr. Russell stated that the Petitioner represented that the pain from his prior accident ceased over a period of eight (8) months. (Dep. Russell, p. 14 and 44) Dr. Russell stated that based upon Barr's statements to him Barr had apparently fully recovered from that accident. The witness also stated that the Petitioner had a congenital defect in the lower lumbar area of his spine. Dr. Russell however concluded that this congenital defect had not effected Barr prior to the February 1973 accident because Barr had not had any pain prior to that accident, and lack of pain would have been evidence of an absence of disease or problems with regard to the congenital defect. (Dep. Russell, p. 29) The witness testified further as follows: "Q. Doctor, do you have an opinion, based on the reasonable degree of medical probability, as to whether or not the laminectomy defect was, is related at all to the accident here? First of all, I don't think it is a laminectomy defect. I think a laminectomy implies a surgical defect. I think it is probably a bony, let's say a failure, of the bone to fuse over a specific area. Q. Does that contribute, Doctor, in your diagnosis of the disc, does that contribute to the pain and discomfort in the area that you found? A. By itself it should not but it can contribute to an unstable back which may, in turn, make it easier for that particular individual to have to sustain disc injury." (emphasis supplied) Dr. Russell also testified that the Petitioner had multiple and severe drug allergies. Dr. Russell testified that the Petitioner began consuming excessive amounts of alcohol as a substitute for various muscle relaxants. As a result of Petitioner's resort to alcohol he began experiencing episodes of alcoholic gastritis or peptic ulcer disease. (Dep. Russell, p. 38) When asked to express in layman's terms the extent of the Petitioner's physical limitations, Dr. Russell testified: "A. I don't -- I wouldn't consider him, at present, employable under any circumstances or under any quasi- responsible type position, either from the point of view of having to do any sort of physical activity or, I hate to say this, but from the point view of his reliability at this particular moment. Q. What do you mean by that, 'reliability'? A. I'm not certain that alcohol and reliability go hand in hand." (emphasis supplied)

Florida Laws (2) 121.021121.091
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EUGENE R. MCREDMOND vs DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 90-007104 (1990)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Sarasota, Florida Nov. 07, 1990 Number: 90-007104 Latest Update: Aug. 30, 1991

The Issue The issue for consideration in this matter is whether Peter McRedmond, the deceased, should have been permitted to change the beneficiary on his state retirement plan to elect an annuity for the benefit of his estate and the Intervenor, Martin Horton.

Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, the Respondent, Division of Retirement, was the state agency responsible for the control, operation and monitoring of the State Retirement System. Petitioner, Eugene McRedmond, is the surviving brother of Peter McRedmond, deceased, a former member of the Florida Retirement System. Intervenor, Martin V. Horton, is the former live-in friend and companion to Peter McRedmond and the individual who claims an interest in Peter's retirements benefits. For some period prior to 1988, Peter McRedmond was employed at Manatee Community College as a psychology professor and as such was a member of the Florida Retirement System, (FRS). He was so employed until he retired for disability in early 1990. Before that time, however, in August or September, 1988, he was diagnosed as having AIDS by Dr. Warren D. Kuippers, a physician with the Community Migrant Health Center. Tests taken at or around that time indicated he was suffering from toxoplasmosis, a disease of the brain in which significant portions of that organ are eaten by parasites, resulting in intermittent periods of impaired judgement and reasoning ability. He also suffered numerous other medical problems including weight loss, a wasting syndrome, general weakness and fatigue. Notwithstanding the seriousness of his illness, because Mr. McRedmond wanted to qualify for retirement under the FRS system, he continued to work for another year to meet the minimum requirements for retirement. On April 27, 1990, he made application for disability retirement to be effective July 1, 1990. As a part of that application, Mr. McRedmond selected Option 1 under the FRS as the method under which he desired his benefits be paid and named the Intervenor, Mr. Horton, as his designated beneficiary to receive any benefits legally due after his death. Mr. McRedmond could have elected to receive benefits under either Option 1 or Option 2 of the plan. Option 3 was not available to him because of his marital status. Under Option 1, he would receive payments of $639.33 per month for the remainder of his life, regardless of how long he lived. Under Option 2, he would have been paid a slightly lesser monthly sum, $587.51, for the rest of his life, but not less than 10 calendar years, and if he were to die before 10 years were up, the payments would go to his designated beneficiary. In May, 1990, consistent with the procedure then in effect within the Division, Mr. McRedmond was sent a second Option selection form to give him as much information as was possib1e and to make sure he understood what he was doing as it related to his option selection. Mr. McRedmond again selected Option 1, had his signature notarized, and returned the executed form to the Division. The individual who performed the notary service did not recall the transaction but indicated her routine practice was not to notarize a document for anyone who did not appear to know what he was doing. Peter McRedmond died on August 23, 1990 from the disease with which he was afflicted. Several months before his death, in mid June, 1990, Mr. McRedmond and Mr. Horton discussed finances and what Horton could expect after McRedmond's death. It is clear that Mr. McRedmond wanted to make arrangements for Mr. Horton to finish his education without having to work while doing so. At that time, McRedmond's life insurance policy, in the face amount of $60,000.00, had Horton as the beneficiary. Shortly before his death, however, upon the prompting of his brother, Eugene, Petitioner herein, Peter McRedmond directed the policy be changed to make his estate the beneficiary. This was done by Eugene through a power of attorney. There was also some discussion of an additional $500.00 per month which was to go to Mr. Horton, but no one, other than Mr. Horton, recalls this. Also shortly before his death, Mr. McRedmond and Mr. Horton travelled to the family home in Connecticut for several weeks. During that time, Mr. McRedmond had at least one major seizure and family members noticed that while he was sometimes forgetful, for the most part his thinking was rational and normal. There can be little doubt that Mr. McRedmond had deep feelings for Mr. Horton and wanted the latter to be provided for after his death. Friends of both relate the numerous comments McRedmond made to that effect and are convinced that at the time he made the contested election, Mr. McRedmond was not of sound mind sufficient to knowingly make the choice he made. To be sure, the ravages of his disease had taken its toll and there were numerous occasions on which he was not lucid or competent to determine issues such as here. On the other hand, the benefits administrator with whom McRedmond talked at the time he selected his retirement plan option was totally satisfied that at that time, he fully understood the nature and effect of the option he selected and was choosing that which was consistent with his desires at the time. By the same token, the notary, whose testimony was noted previously herein, also was satisfied he knew what he was doing at the time of the second election. In its final configuration, Mr. McRedmond's estate includes all his assets, including the proceeds of the insurance policy previously designated to go to Mr. Horton, for a total of approximately $120,000.00. According to the terms of the will, the estate is to be put into a trust from which Mr. Norton is to receive $1,000.00 per month for his lifetime, as well as all his medical expenses. Since Mr. Horton has tested HIV positive, these can be expected to be extensive. Eugene McRedmond is the executor of the estate. Petitioner and Mr. Horton claim that since the trust contains all of Peter's assets existing at his death, the only other source of the additional $500.00 per month would be the benefits from the FRS. Both cite this as evidence of Mr. McRedmond's intent that the option selection providing for payment after death was his intention. This does not necessarily follow, however. Notwithstanding what Petitioner and Intervenor state were his intentions, Mr. McRedomnd took no action to make the change in option selection which would have effectuated them. Instead, he went out of town to visit family for several weeks, and even after receipt of the first retirement check, received on July 31, 1990, still took no action to make the change. During this period, after the return from Connecticut, Mr. McRedmond's condition deteriorated to the point he was often bedridden and was periodically unaware. However, there is ample evidence to indicate that he was often lucid during this period and still took no action to change his retirement option. During this time, Mr. Horton conducted come of Mr. McRedmond's business affairs for him pursuant to specific instructions. These included making bank deposits and as a part of one of these deposits, when Horton was to deposit two checks as requested by McRedmond, he also deposited the first retirement check. Horton and Eugene McRedmond both claim that at no time did Peter McRedmond ask or authorize him to do so. In a visit that Petitioner made to his brother in early August, 1990, just weeks prior to Peter's death, according to Petitioner his brother explained he had selected the wrong retirement option and requested that Eugene attempt to change the election. Peter gave Eugene a Power of Attorney with which he was to do this as well as to change the beneficiary on the life insurance policy. Consistent with those instructions, Eugene wrote a letter to the Division explaining the situation and that the check had been deposited by mistake. On August 13, 1990, Eugene telephonically contacted the Division where he spoke with Melanie White. During this conversation, in which he again spelled out the circumstances which he believed constituted the mistaken election, he was told to file a power of attorney. When he did this, the Division would not honor it claiming that since it had been executed in May, 1990, some three months earlier, it was not current. Subsequent to the death of Peter McRedmond and the filing of the claim against the Division, Eugene McRedmond and Martin Horton have entered into an agreement whereby any sums recovered from the Division will be split with 25% going to Mr. Horton and 75% going to the Trust. Upon the death of Mr. Horton, any sums remaining in the trust will be split by Eugene McRedmond and another brother.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that Petitioner's and Intervenor's claims for retirement benefits under Option 2 of the Florida Retirement System retirement plan, on behalf of Peter McRedmond, be denied. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee, Florida this 29th day of July, 1991. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Buildi5g 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clark of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of July, 1991 APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NUMBER 90-7104 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. FOR THE PETITIONER AND INTERVENOR: Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. First two sentences accepted and incorporated herein. Third sentence not proven. & 5. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted that Peter McRedmond had numerous conversations with friends about providing for Mr. Horton, but it was not established that he mentioned using his retirement benefits for that purpose. & 9. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Rejected as not necessarily following from the facts. Rejected as speculation not supported by fact, except that Petitioner claims Peter desired to change the option selection. First sentence accepted. Second sentence accepted in so far as it asserts Peter told Horton he would receive a monthly sum of $1,000.00. Balance rejected. Accepted and incorporated herein. Rejected as speculation and conclusion except for first sentence and first clause of second sentence. Accepted and incorporated herein. 17.-20. Accepted and incorporated herein. 21. First and second and last sentences accepted. 22.-24. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. & 28. Accepted. 29. Irrelevant. FOR THE RESPONDENT: 1-4. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. & 7. Accepted and incorporated herein. 8.-10. Accepted. Ultimate finding accepted. On the date he filed his application, Peter McRedmond was capable of understanding what he was doing and the implications thereof. & 13. Rejected as comments of the evidence and not Findings of Fact. First four sentences accepted. Remainder rejected except that McRedmond wanted Horton to get at least $1,000.00 per month for life, and more if possible. & 16. Accepted except for last two sentences of 16. Accepted except for last sentence which is a comment on the evidence and not a Finding of Fact. Accepted. & 20. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. & 23. Accepted and incorporated herein. 24. Accepted and incorporated herein. COPIES FURNISHED: Edward S. Stafman, Esquire Stafman & Saunders 318 North Calhoun Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Stanley M. Danek, Esquire Department of Administration Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 A. J. McMullian, III Director Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Bldg. C 1639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 John A. Pieno Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Linda Stalvey Acting General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550

Florida Laws (2) 120.57121.091
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ELDON SADLER vs DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 00-002214 (2000)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida May 26, 2000 Number: 00-002214 Latest Update: Jan. 18, 2001

The Issue The issue in the case is whether Eldon Sadler, Taylor County Property Appraiser, (Petitioner) is required to enroll Connie LaValle in the Florida Retirement System (FRS) for all of her employment with the Taylor County Property Appraiser's Office from June 1993 until the present.

Findings Of Fact Connie LaValle has been employed in Petitioner's office as a permanent part-time employee since September 16, 1992, as a "mapper." Pursuant to a contract, she has also been performing additional mapping services for Petitioner since June 1993, for which no contributions have been made to FRS. Contributions have been made for LaValle's other part-time employment in the office. Prior to June 2, 1993, LaValle and Petitioner spoke regarding LaValle's performing services related to implementing a Geographic Information System (GIS) in the event that Taylor County decided to obtain such a system. As a consequence, LaValle sought and obtained placement of her name on the Department of Revenue's approved bidder's list. Placement on the list is a prerequisite to entering into a contract with Petitioner's office. On June 2, 1993, Petitioner's office and LaValle entered into a contract whereby LaValle would perform "mapping services to aid in assessment." While not detailed as such in the written contract, these services were related to the GIS mapping function and were in addition to LaValle's existing part-time employment in the office. The contract was renewed on May 30, 1996. LaValle was not given any training for the tasks for which she contracted, she was not required to follow daily or weekly routines or schedules established in Petitioner's office, she was given no instructions in the way that work was to be performed, and Petitioner could not change methods used by LaValle or otherwise direct her as to how to do the work. LaValle did the contractual work at her convenience and was not required to perform that work in the office or pursuant to any schedule. She was paid for the work product as she finished it. Payment under one contract resulted in a $60 per map payment from Petitioner when the product was completed. Under the renegotiated contract, she received $3 per parcel on computerized maps. She was not guaranteed a minimum payment, nor did she receive pension benefits, bonuses, paid vacation time, or sick pay. Earnings pursuant to the contract were reported by LaValle as self-employment income on form 1099. The contract provided that neither Petitioner nor LaValle could terminate the agreement absent 30 days notice to the other party. In addition to furnishing her own work location, work equipment, tables, engineering scales, computer and other necessary equipment, LaValle also paid all related expenses. LaValle performed all contract work in her home. Although not prohibited by terms of the contract, she did not work for other entities. Respondent, pursuant to an audit of retirement records of Petitioner's office, determined that LaValle was performing additional duties for Petitioner's office and receiving salary for which no retirement contributions were paid. Petitioner was notified by Respondent by letter dated August 10, 1999, that LaValle previously filling a part-time regularly established position, was now performing additional duties for the same employer and was now considered to be filling a regularly established position for her total employment. Petitioner was informed that salary earned by LaValle for the additional duties should have been reported and contributions paid to Respondent for retirement benefits. Petitioner maintains that LaValle is an independent contractor with regard to additional duties and no retirement contributions are due and payable. Respondent has determined LaValle is not an independent contractor. Respondent asserts that the additional duties are an extension of her normal duties in her part-time position and contributions for retirement benefits are due with regard to compensation paid to her by Petitioner.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the State of Florida, Division of Retirement, enter a final order finding that payments made to Connie LaValle for additional duties from Petitioner's office constitute salary for additional employment requiring payment of retirement contributions by Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of October, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of October, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Levy E. Levy, Esquire 1828 Riggins Road Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Larry D. Scott, Esquire Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Ron Poppell, Interim Director Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Emily Moore, Chief Legal Counsel Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Bruce Hoffmann, General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950

Florida Laws (1) 120.57 Florida Administrative Code (1) 60S-6.001
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CHARLES OTERO vs. DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 86-002487 (1986)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 86-002487 Latest Update: Dec. 05, 1986

The Issue WHETHER CHARLES OTERO'S EMPLOYMENT AS A PART TIME TEACHER FOR THE HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD BETWEEN 1965 AND 1972 IS CREDITABLE SERVICE UNDER THE FLORIDA RETIREMENT SYSTEM. There was some discussion at the commencement of the hearing as to whether Otero's petition for formal hearing properly raised his claim that his service is creditable both as "past" and as "prior" service. The terms "past," "prior" and "previous" service are each separate terms of art defined in Rule 225-6, Florida Administrative Code. While Otero's petition requests permission to purchase Florida Retirement System ("FRS") credit for "prior" service, his petition also frames the ultimate issue in the broader terms as expressed above. (See Petition, paragraphs 4 and 5.) The Division's unilateral Pre-hearing Statement filed on October 29, 1986, paragraph f., states: "At issue is whether or not Petitioner should be permitted to purchase the requested employment time as creditable service in the Florida Retirement System." The Division has not suggested that a more specific request for "past" credit would have resulted in any different response. The broader issue is, therefore, considered here in the interest of economy.

Findings Of Fact In 1965, Charles Otero was an inspector for the Tampa Police Department. Through a joint effort of the Police Department and the Hillsborough County School District a unique high school course curriculum was developed to assist youths who were interested in pursuing careers in law enforcement. A survey was conducted and some preliminary recruiting revealed sufficient student interest to include the course as an elective at Leto Comprehensive High School in Tampa, Florida. The curriculum was divided into two levels: Law Enforcement I and Law Enforcement II. A student enrolling in Law Enforcement I had to be in 11th grade and be free of any physical impediments to a future law enforcement career. Law Enforcement I consisted of two hours instruction a day (one hour in the classroom and one hour of physical education), five days a week. The students who successfully completed this level were expected to go on to Law Enforcement II in the 12th grade. This course was conducted one hour a day, five days a week. Students were required to complete the first level before enrolling in Law Enforcement II. (Testimony of Otero and Farmer.) Charles Otero was hired as a part-time instructor for the Hillsborough County School District in September 1965. He began teaching the new course, Law Enforcement I, at Leto Comprehensive High School, two hours a day, five days a week for the entire school year. The following year, he taught both Law Enforcement I and II, for a total of three hours a day, five days a week. Without interruption, Otero continued teaching the courses at Leto through the 1968/1969 school year. He taught the same courses at Blake High School during the 1969/1970 school year, and from August 1970 until June 1974, he taught the same courses at the Hillsborough County Evening Vocational Center. He resigned in 1974 to become Police Chief for the City of Tampa. (Testimony of Otero, Mahin, Farmer and Scaglione). For each school year from 1965 until 1974, Charles Otero was hired under an annual part-time contract for instructional staff. The three contracts placed in evidence as Petitioner's Exhibits #4, #5 and #6 are typical of the forms used by Hillsborough County School District during the relevant period. Each contract specifies an hourly rate and provides that the hours of instruction are based upon the classes offered for which the teacher is qualified and assigned to teach by the county superintendent or his designee. The contract also provides for termination at will by either party upon written notice to the other. This option was not exercised during the relevant period. Otero was certified only as a part-time law enforcement teacher. (Testimony of Otero and Dobbins, Petitioner's Exhibits #4, #5 and #6). Otero's wages for teaching were paid from a Hillsborough County School District wages and salary account commonly used to pay part-time, adult education teachers. The adult education account was separate from the regular teachers' account. Otero was not paid from an OPS (other personnel services) account. (Testimony of Mann.) At the time that he was hired in 1965, both Otero and the Hillsborough County School District anticipated that the law enforcement courses would continue for at least two years, based on the survey and recruitment responses, and based on the expectation that the Level I students would go on to take the Law Enforcement II course. Since these were elective courses, the students were not required to enroll and if an insufficient number had enrolled, then Otero's courses would not have been taught. In fact, the courses continued and still continue today, with full-time teachers. (Testimony of Otero, Farmer, Scaglione and Dobbins.) Prior to December 1, 1970, full time instructional staff of the Hillsborough County School District participated in the teacher's retirement system under Chapter 238, Florida Statutes. On December 1, 1970, the FRS was created and the existing systems were closed out. Otero never participated in the teacher's retirement system, nor was he eligible for that system as a part- time teacher. In January 1972, he became a member of the FRS when the Hillsborough County School District commenced contributions on his behalf. Otero was re-employed by the Hillsborough County School Board in 1979, as Supervisor of Security and has been continually employed in that capacity on a full-time basis. He has likewise participated continually in the FRS since 1979. Otero conceded that his application to the Division indicating that he was seeking purchase of "refunded service" was in error. He had no "refunded service" under an existing system or the FRS. (Testimony of Otero and Sansom.) In June 1984, Charles Otero applied to the Division for an audit of his employment with the Hillsborough County School District to determine how much of his service would be creditable under the FRS. In July 1985, the Division responded that his employment as a part-time teacher from 1965 through 1971 is not creditable. (Testimony of Otero and Sansom, Petitioner's Exhibits #7 and #8.) The Division of Retirement is statutorily charged with administering the FRS and with determining what service may be claimed by a member as cieditable service in calculating that member's retirement benefits. Ruth Sansom has been Chief of the Division's Retirement Calculations Bureau since October 1980. She has been employed in some capacity in calculating retirement benefits for the teachers' retirement system and the FRS for 23 years. She is intimately familiar with the Division's policies. She has interpreted retirement laws and has assisted in policymaking and rulemaking for the Division. She is likewise familiar with Charles Otero's request and she testified regarding the bases for the Division's denial. The Division considered Otero's circumstances as similar to part-time adult education instructors who are paid on an hourly basis and whose students enroll on a voluntary basis. Those teachers who are hired with no contractual expectation of continuation are considered "temporary" instructional personnel and are not considered eligible for participation in the FRS. When examining a request for purchase of service, the Division applies the rules in effect at the time the request is made. The Division, however, applies those rules just as they would to an individual seeking enrollment in the FRS. The Division looks at the employment contract and legitimate expectations of the parties at the time of hire, rather than at the actual length of time the individual was employed. In other words, while the rule is applied retroactively, the employment circumstances of the individual are examined in a prospective manner. An individual is considered "temporary," even if employed for many years, so long as the employment relationship described at its commencement is merely temporary. A "part-time" teacher is not automatically "temporary." (Testimony of Sansom.) In making a determination regarding an individual's service credit the Division applies Chapter 121, Florida Statutes, Rules 225-1, 2 and 6, Florida Administrative Code, Memorandum 81-60 (Respondent's Exhibit #3) and a memorandum dated February 1, 1982 from A.J. McMullian, III. (Petitioner's Exhibit #9.)(Testimony of Sansom.)

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that: So long as the required contributions are made, Charles Otero's request to purchase "prior service" in the FRS for the period September 1965 to December 1970, be approved. Charles Otero's request for the period December 1970 until his enrollment in the FRS in 1972, be denied. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 5th day of December, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of December, 1986. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 86-2487 The following constitutes my specific rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties. PETITIONER'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT 1-3. Rejected as irrelevant. Adopted in paragraph 6. Adopted in paragraph 8. 6-10. Adopted in paragraph 6. 11. Adopted in paragraph 2. 12-13. Adopted in paragraph 1. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in paragraphs 1 and 2, except that the record establishes that he was hired effective September 28, 1965. (Petitioner's Exhibit 1.) Adopted in paragraph 5. 17-28. Adopted in summary form in paragraph 2. 29-35. Rejected as irrelevant. 36-38. Adopted in paragraph 4. 39-44. Adopted in summary form in paragraph 3. 45-46. Adopted in substance in paragraph 2. 47-49. Rejected as unnecessary. 50. Adopted in part in paragraph 2. The record is not clear that the Hillsborough County Evening Vocational Center was a "high school classroom." 51-56. Rejected as unnecessary. (See Conclusion of Law 7.) 57. Adopted in paragraph 2. 58-59. Adopted in substance in paragraph 5. 60-63. Adopted in paragraph 6. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 7. 66-67. Adopted in paragraph 8. 68. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. 69-70. Adopted in substance in paragraph 8. RESPONDENT'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT 1-3. Adopted in paragraph 2. Adopted in paragraph 6. Adopted in paragraph 5. Adopted in paragraph 3. Adopted in paragraph 5. Adopted by implication in paragraphs 3 and 5. 9-13. Adopted in paragraphs 3 and 5. Adopted in part in paragraph 5 (as to continual nature of the course); otherwise rejected as unsubstantiated by the record. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in substance in paragraph 4. Adopted in paragraph 6. 18-21. Adopted in paragraphs 2 and 6. 22-23. Adopted in paragraph 7. Adopted in "Background" portion of the recommended order. Adopted in paragraph 8. COPIES FURNISHED: Edward P. de la Parte, Jr., Esquire Edward M. Chew, Esquire 705 East Kennedy Boulevard Tampa, Florida 33602 Stanley M. Danek, Esquire William A. Frieder, Esquire Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center 2639 North Monroe Street, Suite 207 Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Andrew J. McMullian, III, Director Division of Retirement Department of Administration Cedars Executive Center, Bldg. C Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Gilda H. Lambert, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (6) 120.56120.57121.021121.051121.081216.262
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JUDI J. BURLESON vs. PAROLE AND PROBATION COMMISSION, 82-000625 (1982)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 82-000625 Latest Update: Aug. 20, 1982

The Issue The issues in this proceeding are whether the Petitioner abandoned an employment position with the Florida Parole and Probation Commission, and whether she was properly separated from employment with the Commission based upon abandonment. Petitioner contends that her failure to report for work with the Commission did not constitute an abandonment because the Commission's offer of employment was presented in such a manner as to make it impossible for the Petitioner to appear for work. The Commission contends that the Petitioner failed to report for work with the Commission for three consecutive workdays, that her failure to report was not authorized, and that she therefore abandoned her position with the Commission.

Findings Of Fact Prior to 1980, Petitioner had been employed with the Florida Parole and Probation Commission at its Pensacola office as a Parole Agent. Her employment was terminated, and she pursued a proceeding before the Florida Career Service Commission. The Career Service Commission ordered that the Parole and Probation Commission reinstate her to her former position and that she receive back pay and benefits. The Petitioner had moved to Tallahassee, and the Commission sought to accommodate her by offering her a position in Tallahassee. There were no immediate vacancies. The Petitioner was offered a position as Administrative Assistant to the Chairperson of the Commission. The position was at a lower pay grade than Petitioner had been in, and she declined the position. The Commission considered itself to be under an obligation to place Petitioner in a position similar to the one she had held previously. The 1980 session of the Florida Legislature authorized ten new positions to the Commission. Although the effective date of the authorization was July 1, 1980, the positions were only funded to commence in October, 1980, and to run through the remainder of the fiscal year. The Commission concluded that an emergency existed for filling two of the authorized positions. The Commission decided to take steps to fill a "Parole Examiner I" position and, a "Revocation Specialist" position immediately, rather than to wait until October In order to accommodate the immediate filling of those positions, the filling of other newly authorized positions would be delayed until subsequent to October. The Commission advertised for the Parole Examiner I and Revocation Specialist, positions by Job Opportunity Announcements dated July 7, 1980. The application deadline was July 18, 1980. These were the first professional level vacancies that the Commission had had in its staff other than the Administrative Assistant position since the time that the Career Service Commission ordered that Petitioner be reinstated. Commission personnel commenced to interview qualified applicants after July 18. At some point, consideration was given to offering one or both of the positions to the Petitioner. Commission personnel contacted Petitioner on July 28, 1980, and offered her the Parole Examiner I position. Petitioner was also advised that she could be considered for the Revocation Specialist position, which was at a higher pay grade than the position that Petitioner previously held. A letter confirming this was sent by the Commission to the Petitioner. The letter was dated July 28, 1980. By letter dated August 1, Petitioner stated that she would like to be considered for the Revocation Specialist position. On Wednesday, August 6, 1980, the Commission's Personnel Manager advised Petitioner that she was being offered the Revocation Specialist position and that she would be expected to report to her supervisor the following Monday, August 11, 1980, at 8:00 A.M. A letter confirming the offer and the conditions, dated August 6, 1980, was delivered to Petitioner by hand delivery on August 7. These letters formally confirmed conversations that had taken place among Petitioner and various employees of the Commission. On August 8, 1980, the Petitioner contacted the Commission's Personnel Manager and expressed a desire to take annual leave so that she could report to work in the new position subsequent to August 11. The Personnel Manager informed Petitioner that she would need to make her leave request directly to Harry P. Dodd, the Commission's Revocation Administrator, who would be Petitioner's supervisor. The Petitioner was able to contact Mr. Dodd in Starke, Florida, where he was performing Commission duties. She initially indicated that she would like to take two weeks' annual leave commencing on August 11. During the conversation, she scaled this request down to three days. Mr. Dodd was unclear as to the extent of his authority to grant or deny the leave request. He contacted the Commission's Personnel Manager and legal counsel and was advised that the decision of whether to grant or deny the leave request should be made by Mr. Dodd as a management decision. Mr. Dodd concluded that the leave request should be denied, and he contacted the Petitioner by telephone and advised her of that. Petitioner did not at that time advise Mr. Dodd that she would not report for work on August 11. By letter dated August 8, 1980, Petitioner advised the Chairperson of the Commission that she would not be able to report on August 11. She did not state her intentions to report at any future date. Petitioner did not report for work on August 11, 12, or 13, 1980. By letter dated August 13, the Commission advised Petitioner that it regarded her failure to report on August 11 as a refusal of the position. Thereafter, by letter dated October 15, 1980, the Commission advised Petitioner that if she were considered an employee rather than a prospective employee in view of the Career Service Commission's reinstatement order, that she had been absent without authorized leave for three days, and deemed to have abandoned her position. She was advised of her right to seek review of that decision through a petition to the Department of Administration. Petitioner filed such a petition, and this proceeding ensued. During July and August, 1980, the petitioner was employed on a part- time basis with the Federal Public Defender's Office in Tallahassee. Petitioner did not take any steps to advise anyone at her office as to the possibility of her accepting a position with the Parole and Probation Commission. While Petitioner testified that it would have been appropriate for her to give at least two weeks' notice before leaving the Federal Public Defender's Office, it does not appear from the evidence that her failure to give such notice would have unduly burdened her employer. Furthermore, if Petitioner had immediately advised her employer when she became aware that she may obtain full-time employment with the Commission, adequate notice could have been given. Petitioner and her husband had planned a vacation for August 11 and 12, 1980. While reporting to work on August 11 would have frustrated those plans, it does not appear that Petitioner would have incurred any significant expense or unhappiness from frustration of the vacation plans other than disappointment. It would have been difficult for the Petitioner to make arrangements for day care for her children in order to report for full-time employment with the Commission on August 11. It does not appear that those difficulties were insurmountable, however, and Petitioner could, albeit with difficulty, have made such arrangements. It was not impossible for the Petitioner to report for work with the Commission on August 11, 1980. The Commission's Revocations Section was severely understaffed during the summer of 1980. Legislation had been enacted which dramatically increased the number of parole revocations, and the Commission's staff had not been increased to handle the increase. During July and August, the Revocations Section had a severe backlog. It is for this reason that the Commission decided to take immediate steps to fill a newly authorized Revocation Specialist position. In addition to the increased workload and backlog, the Revocations Section had some peculiar personnel difficulties which increased the need to immediately fill the newly authorized position. One of the Revocation Specialists was seriously ill and frequently absent. Another was scheduled for military leave, which was not discretionary. Mr. Dodd had made plans to be on annual leave which could not be changed because he was using the leave to close a real estate transaction. In view of these difficulties, Mr. Dodd's refusal to grant the Petitioner's annual leave request was justified. It does not appear that the refusal of the leave request was made on any basis other than a sound management decision. After the Petitioner failed to report for work by August 13, the Commission took immediate steps to fill the Revocation Specialist position. While there were unexplained delays in accomplishing that, the position was filled effective August 26, 1980. There is no evidence from which it could be concluded that the Commission's offer of the Revocation Specialist position to the Petitioner was other than a bona fide offer. There is no evidence from which it could be concluded that any of the persons involved in offering the position to Petitioner felt any ill will toward her. The denial of the Petitioner's request that she not be required to report on August 11, as she had been directed, was based on a sound management decision. There is no evidence from which it could be concluded that the denial was generated by any ill feeling toward Petitioner or any desire that she not take the position. Taking the position on such short notice undoubtedly would have caused the Petitioner some inconvenience in leaving the position that she had held with the Federal Public Defender's Office and arranging child care. The frustration of vacation plans would have been disappointing. These factors do not, however, justify the Petitioner's failure to report as directed, nor could it be concluded that it was impossible for the Petitioner to report as directed. In view of the fact that the petitioner was offered the Revocation Specialist position in order that the Commission could comply with its responsibility to reinstate the Petitioner and the fact that the Petitioner was receiving back pay from the Commission, the Petitioner should be viewed as having been employed by the Commission. Her failure to report for work for three consecutive days as she had been directed to do constitutes an abandonment of her position with the Commission.

Florida Laws (2) 120.5714.01
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