The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Petitioner should be exempted from employment disqualification, thereby allowing him to work in a position of special trust or responsibility with the Department of Juvenile Justice (Department).
Findings Of Fact On September 23, 1994, the Petitioner was arrested by the Broward County Sheriff's Office and was charged with the crimes of aggravated assault with a firearm and carrying a concealed weapon. On November 8, 1994, on the advice of counsel, the Petitioner entered a plea of nolo contendere to the charge of aggravated assault with a firearm. On August 22, 1995, the Petitioner was sentenced to a five-year period of probation, and as a special condition of his probation was ordered to pay $250.00. The charge of carrying a concealed weapon was not processed. In April of 1999, the Petitioner applied for the position of coordinator with Atlantic Coast Marine Institute (ACMI). This position would have brought the Petitioner into direct contact with juveniles. On April 28, 1999, ACMI submitted to the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) a Request for Preliminary FCIC/NCIC and DHSMV Screening on the Petitioner. As a result of his criminal history, on May 2, 1999, the Petitioner was rated "Unfavorable/Disqualifying" on his preliminary screening. By letter dated July 22, 1999, the Petitioner was advised of the results of the preliminary screening, and was also advised of the procedure for requesting an exemption from employment disqualification. The Petitioner thereafter filed a timely request for exemption with supporting documents. By letter dated August 26, 1999, the Petitioner was advised that his request for exemption from employment disqualification pursuant to Section 435.07, Florida Statutes, was denied. Thereafter, the Petitioner filed a timely request for a hearing to challenge the denial of his request for exemption. The disqualification of the Petitioner is based solely on his entry of a plea of nolo contendere to the charge of aggravated assault with a firearm, and the court sentence based on that plea. The Petitioner's plea of nolo contendere, which was based on the advice of legal counsel, was a plea of convenience to bring about a prompt resolution of the criminal charges and to avoid the possibility of a prison sentence. The Petitioner did not enter that plea because he believed he was guilty of the offense of aggravated assault with a firearm. To the contrary, the Petitioner has at all times believed, and continues to believe, that he is innocent of the criminal offense to which he pled nolo contendere. The Petitioner's belief in this regard is well-founded, because at the time of the incident which led to the filing of criminal charges against the Petitioner, he did not have a firearm in his possession and, therefore, could not have assaulted anyone with a firearm. 2/ Following his sentence on the criminal charge, the Petitioner made good faith efforts to timely comply with all conditions of his probation. He had occasional difficulties making the financial payments required by his sentence due to difficulties in obtaining steady employment. Ultimately, the Petitioner fulfilled all conditions of his probation and, as of September 13, 1999, the Petitioner's probation was terminated early by court order. Both before and after the incident that led to the Petitioner's arrest, he has worked in positions involving the care and supervision of young people. The Petitioner enjoys working with young people and appears to be quite good at such work. 3/ The Petitioner was raised in a military family. He also served for four years in the military. He is a self- disciplined person who takes his personal and professional responsibilities seriously. He is active in his community and does his best to be an upstanding citizen. In sum, the Petitioner is a decent and honorable person who enjoys working with youth, is good at working with youth, and should not be disqualified from employment positions working with youth.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Juvenile Justice enter a final order granting Petitioner's request for an exemption from disqualification for employment in a position of special trust. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of April, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of April, 2000.
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent violated Sections 943.13(7), 943.1395(6), and 943.1395(7), Florida Statutes, and if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner certified Respondent as a correctional officer on February 14, 1986. Since that time, Respondent has held Correctional Certificate Number 81761. On or about May 8, 1994, Respondent was in the front yard of his residence. Police officers pulled into Respondent's driveway and requested that Respondent approach the patrol car. Respondent walked away from the police car. As he walked away, Respondent dropped an item from his pocket. The item that Respondent dropped was a bag containing white powder. The white powder was cocaine. Respondent was aware of the presence of the bag on his person. Respondent's possession of the bag containing cocaine was unlawful. One of the police officers advised Respondent that he was under arrest. The police officer instructed Respondent to put his hands behind him. Respondent refused to put his hands behind him. The police officers physically restrained Respondent. Respondent subsequently entered a plea of nolo contendere to the offenses of attempted possession of cocaine and resisting officer without violence. On July 17, 1995, Respondent was adjudicated guilty of these two offenses by the county court judge, in and for Putnam County, Florida, in Case Number 95-2767MM06. The court suspended any fine or cost which might be imposed for the conviction of resisting officer without violence. The court ordered Respondent to pay a fine of $241.50, prosecution costs of $50, and an investigation cost of $50 for the conviction of attempted possession of cocaine.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law, it RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner enter a Final Order revoking Respondent's certification as a correctional officer. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of August, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of August, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Amy J. Bardill, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489 Johnnie Holcy, Jr. Route 6, Box 300 Palatka, Florida 32177 A. Leon Lowry, II, Director Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489 Michael Ramage, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489
The Issue Whether Respondent, a certified correctional officer, while under oath, did make false statements, which she did not believe to be true, in an official proceeding regarding a material matter, and, if so, what discipline should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based upon observation of the demeanor and candor of each witness; stipulations by the parties; documentary materials received in evidence; and evidentiary rulings made pursuant to Section 120.57, Florida Statutes (2004), the following relevant and material facts, arrived at impartially and based solely on information presented at the final hearing, are determined: Deputy Marvina K. Johnson was certified by the Department of Law Enforcement, Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission (Commission), on September 17, 1991; was issued Correctional Certificate Number 62620; and, on June 23, 2000, was issued Instructor Certificate Number 211202. At all times material, Ms. Johnson was employed by the Manatee County Sheriff's Department (Sheriff's Department) until her dismissal in November of 2003. At some time during the month of June 2003, Ms. Johnson met Bruce Straubel in a local gym. Shortly after their initial meeting, the two became romantically involved. This romantic relationship progressed to the point that Mr. Straubel moved into Ms. Johnson's residence; thereafter, they established joint bank accounts and shared housekeeping and household expenses. At all times heretofore, Mr. Straubel was working in the construction industry. The evidence demonstrated that Ms. Johnson did not know and that she was not informed by Mr. Straubel that he was a convicted felon serving five years' probation at the time of their initial meeting in June and throughout the first few months of their relationship. The evidence of record demonstrated that it was not until early August 2003 that Ms. Johnson became aware of Mr. Straubel's criminal past. Sergeant Gaythel Siplin, Ms. Johnson's co-worker, testified that she was invited to Ms. Johnson's residence for a party where she was introduced to Mr. Straubel by Ms. Johnson. Sergeant Siplin, throughout the course of the evening, correctly assumed that Ms. Johnson and Mr. Straubel were seemingly truly romantically involved. From her apparent concern and her 20 plus years as a correctional officer with experiences of potential problems female correctional officers may encounter when involved with males of unknown background, Sergeant Siplin inquired if Ms. Johnson had conducted a background check on Mr. Straubel, to include AIDS testing, credit check, and criminal background check. The answer given, as recalled by Sergeant Siplin, was negative. On another occasion, unidentified in the record but believed by the witness to have been during the month of July 2003, Sergeant Siplin testified that she again advised Ms. Johnson to "check out" Mr. Straubel; meaning do a medical, credit, and criminal background check because in her mind "Mr. Straubel was too good to be true . . . like he fell from heaven." Sergeant Siplin testified that Ms. Johnson told her on or about the first of August that "Bruce" was involved in construction and building houses and that he was involved in a situation where he was charged with false imprisonment. Sergeant Siplin knew for a fact that false imprisonment is a violent offense, and she told Ms. Johnson to check into Mr. Straubel a little bit further. Ms. Johnson was not certified to make inquiries through use of the Department of Law Enforcement's NCIC computer connection to ascertain the identity of a person with a felony conviction. According to Sergeant Williams, information about Mr. Straubel was available to Ms. Johnson through the internet by connecting to the Department of Correction's website. Sergeant Siplin related her "concerns about Ms. Johnson's relationship with Mr. Straubel" to other members of the Sheriff's Department. This "concern" founded its way into the Internal Affairs (IA) Office during August 2003. During a conversation between Lieutenant Smalls and an unnamed probation officer, the lieutenant was told that "one probationer [unnamed] was seeing a fellow employee." On or about August 19, 2003, Lieutenant Smalls met with and informed Captain Williams of the information taken from an unidentified probation officer. Captain Williams checked and affirmed that Mr. Straubel was a convicted felon. The IA investigation team, consisting of Major Potts, Captain Williams, Captain Smith, Lieutenant Smalls, and Carolyn Smith, summoned Ms. Johnson into the IA office and asked whether she knew Mr. Straubel was a convicted felon, to which Ms. Johnson answered "No." Not withstanding Ms. Johnson's denial of "knowledge that Mr. Straubel was a convicted felon," she was told by a [unnamed] superior officer of the Sheriff's Department to "cease and desist her relationship or any other contact with Mr. Straubel because of his criminal history." Ms. Johnson gave undisputed testimony that during her interview, her superior officer told her, "[I]f you had married him all of this would not be in play, you should have married him." Ms. Johnson complied with the "cease and desist her relationship or any other contact with Mr. Straubel" order of her superior officer from August 19, 2003, until sometime beginning in late October or early November 2003. Ms. Johnson gave undisputed testimony that she paid for Mr. Straubel to move into another living facility, establishing separate residence. She deposited money into his bank account and made a valid effort to "discontinue seeing Mr. Straubel." However, her efforts failed, and she first began calling Mr. Straubel; the repeated calls led to meetings outside her home; the meetings outside her home led to her going to his motel for overnight visits; the overnight motel visits led to Mr. Straubel coming over and spending nights at her home. Sergeant William Diamond testified that on or about November 14, 2003, Mr. Straubel called IA and asked to meet and did meet with IA members on or about November 17, 2003. According to Sergeant Diamond, during the meeting, Mr. Straubel acknowledged that he and Ms. Johnson were still "having an affair." Although available, Mr. Straubel did not testify. Because IA got its information from a probation officer, and, thereafter, the probationer presumably called IA and volunteered to meet with IA, the logical and most reasonable assumption is that the convicted felon, Mr. Straubel, was prompted by his probation officer to contact IA. However, the Commission chose not to call Mr. Straubel to testify. Therefore, testimony of Sergeant Diamond, purporting to be "statements made by Mr. Straubel to IA on or about November 17, 2003," which are hearsay upon hearsay statements, is insufficient to establish the truth of the matter asserted therein, is insufficient to establish the truth of the allegations sought to be established, and is, therefore, rejected by the undersigned. On November 24, 2003, Ms. Johnson was called in by IA and questioned regarding her knowledge of Mr. Straubel and his criminal history and her relationship with him. There was testimony regarding "dates phone calls were made to and from Respondent's phone"; however, there is no written evidence of record of the alleged phone calls or the dates they were made, if made. There was testimony regarding some questions asked of Ms. Johnson by the IA team members regarding motel rental payments and bank deposits. Again, there is no written evidence of record of the motel rental payment, or bank deposit slips, etc., that was produced by Petitioner. Accordingly, the testimony regarding or relating to documentation not of record is insufficient alone to establish a firm belief as to the truth of the matter sought to be established. Ms. Johnson never denied not seeing Mr. Straubel. When questioned whether she had "seen Mr. Straubel" after the August 19, 2003, order to cease and desist her relationship with Mr. Straubel, Ms. Johnson answered "no" but continued her answer to explained her temporary successful attempt to discontinue her relationship and her subsequent relapse back into the relationship with Mr. Straubel, after passage of time. During questioning by IA, Ms. Johnson admitted paying Mr. Straubel's motel bill after he moved out of her residence; she acknowledged that she was aware that in his past Mr. Straubel had gotten into "some trouble"; but she denied knowing, at that time, his trouble was a felony conviction. After IA presented her unidentified documentation that Mr. Straubel was a convicted felon, Ms. Johnson accepted IA's documentation as evidence of Ms. Straubel's criminal background. Her mere acknowledgement of the documentation presented to her by IA does not establish, as fact, she had knowledge of this information prior to IA's interrogation. Mr. Strabuel was not called to testify, and the tape recording of his earlier interview with IA was not introduced into evidence. The witnesses' recollection, made from repeated references to summation notes of tapes and other documents not in evidence, purporting to be statements Mr. Straubel voluntarily made to IA about what Mr. Straubel may or may not have told Ms. Johnson in June 2003, is hearsay upon hearsay and not acceptable as evidence to prove the truth sought to be established. For that reason this testimony is rejected in toto. The Sheriff's Department terminated Ms. Johnson's employment at the conclusion of the IA investigation, the exact month and date are not in evidence of record. After her termination by the Sheriff's Department, Ms. Johnson entered college and, as of this proceeding, had earned 46 credits toward her college degree. Subsequent to the close of this proceeding Ms. Johnson and Mr. Straubel were married on August 16, 2004, in Manatee County, Florida. The evidence of record is neither clear nor convincing that on November 24, 2003, while under oath Ms. Johnson intentionally made a false statement(s), which she did not believe to be true. The testimony of Sergeant Diamond alone, based upon summation notes purportedly taken from two tape recordings of an interview between Lieutenant Smalls and Mr. Straubel and three tape recordings purportedly containing interviews with Captain Smith, Sergeant Siplin, Deputy Eleanor Mays and Ms. Johnson, is neither clear nor convincing when transcription summaries of the tape recordings and not the tape recordings themselves where introduced into evidence. There is no evidence of record of the specific question(s) asked Ms. Johnson and no evidence of record of her specific answer to each question regarding her relationship with Mr. Straubel after August 19, 2003. The evidence of record regarding the November 24, 2003, interrogation episode, viewed most favorably, is not clear. When questioned by the IA committee and/or members regarding specific bills she allegedly paid, phone calls she allegedly made, and bank deposits she allegedly made; those phone bills, telephone logs, and bank deposit slips are not of record. Accordingly, an objective evaluation of Ms. Johnson's answer to each question regarding each specific document can not be made. Thus, Ms. Johnson's knowledge at the time each answer was given, her intention when an answer was given to a specific question, and whether her answer was true or false, can not be objectively made or reasonably inferred from the nonspecific summation testimony of Sergeant Diamond. Assuming Sergeant Diamond's entire testimony was accurate, the ambiguity created by the absence of dated documents and the absence of accurate transcripts of the several tape recordings upon which he based his testimony must be resolved in favor of Ms. Johnson. Other than the faulty memory of Sergeant Diamond, refreshed from an unauthenticated 19-page summation report, there is no substantial and specific evidence of all specific questions asked of Ms. Johnson or the specific answer to each question given under oath by Ms. Johnson. Sergeant Diamond's testimony consisted primarily of debatable expressions announced prospectively that may result in the loss of a valuable license. Viewed most favorably, the testimony of Sergeant Diamond, taken from a 19-page unauthenticated summation report of tape recordings and alleged confessions and admissions by other parties, is lacking in "specificity" and fails to produce a firm belief, without hesitancy, as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established. Ms. Johnson's denials of essential elements in the Administrative complaint, even if unbelievable, does not prove the accusations. The Commission failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that on or about November 24, 2003, Ms. Johnson, did unlawfully make a false statement, which she did not believe to be true, under oath administered by Sergeant Diamond and Investigator Nancy Schoff in an official proceeding, to wit: internal investigation, in regard to a material matter as alleged in the Administrative Complaint.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner, Department of Law Enforcement, Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission, enter a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint against Respondent, Marvina K. Johnson. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of November, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S FRED L. BUCKINE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of November, 2004.
The Issue The issue presented is whether Petitioner James Joseph Richardson has met his burden of proving actual innocence, thereby entitling him to compensation under the Victims of Wrongful Incarceration Compensation Act.
Findings Of Fact On October 25, 1967, Petitioner's wife prepared a breakfast of grits for their seven children. In a separate pot she prepared the children's lunch of beans, gravy, rice, and hogs head meat. She also fried some fresh chicken which she used to make sandwiches for her and Petitioner's lunch. She and Petitioner then left to get a ride to the grove where they worked picking fruit. It was their routine for Petitioner's wife to cook the food. The eldest child, eleven-year-old Betty Jean Bryant, would later serve it to all the children after the Richardsons left for work. It is not clear whether the children actually ate their breakfast grits that day. The school-age children went to school while the younger children remained at home. It was the routine for Petitioner's neighbor Betsy Reese to look after them. Petitioner's family and Betsy Reese and her children lived in the same structure, assumedly similar to a duplex. There was a common porch across the front. There was also a shed in the back yard. The school-age children returned to the home at lunchtime. Reese divided the food in the second pot into seven equal portions, and the children ate lunch. Right after the children returned to school after lunch, they began exhibiting terrible symptoms, such as leaking from their orifices, twitching, and rigidity. Teachers began grabbing the Richardson children and rushing them to the hospital. One of the teachers, knowing there were younger children at home, drove to the Richardson home. Those children were on the shared porch, displaying the same symptoms. Reese was sitting on the porch, holding one of the children. The teacher took them to the hospital. Petitioner and his wife were summoned to the hospital. Six of the children died that same day, and the seventh child died early the next morning. At the hospital, medical personnel did not know what substance was causing the illness and deaths. Sheriff Frank Cline went to the Richardson home and conducted several searches of the home and the shed attempting to find what had poisoned the children. When Petitioner and his wife arrived at the hospital, Cline obtained from Petitioner the key to the refrigerator and searched again. The next morning Reese and Charlie Smith, who was described as the town drunk, found a bag of parathion, a highly- toxic insecticide, in the shed behind the house. Cline and his deputies had searched the shed approximately four times during the day the children became sick and Cline had searched the shed by himself late that night, and no bag of parathion had been seen by them. It was determined that parathion was present in the pot the grits were cooked in, the pot the lunch was cooked in, the frying pan the chicken may have been cooked in, flour, corn meal, sugar, and other substances found in the refrigerator. It was also determined that parathion is what killed the children. Petitioner had a key to the refrigerator as did his wife. Indications are that a third key was left on the refrigerator for the babysitter's use. Petitioner was tried for the first degree murder of the eldest child Betty Jean Bryant and was convicted. The jury did not recommend mercy, and he was sentenced to death. His conviction was reviewed by the Supreme Court of Florida. Richardson v. State, 247 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 1971). Petitioner's death sentence was commuted to life when Florida's death penalty was held to be unconstitutional the following year. In October 1988, 21 years after the seven children were murdered, the official file, which had been stolen ten years earlier from the office of the assistant state attorney who had prosecuted Petitioner, appeared in the office of the Governor of the State of Florida. Governor Bob Martinez ordered the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) to investigate the disappearance and re-appearance of the file and accompanying information. That investigation resulted in new information and admissions surrounding the circumstances leading to the arrest and conviction of Petitioner. The Governor entered an Executive Order on July 31, 1989, appointing Janet Reno, State Attorney for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida, to provide prosecutorial assistance to FDLE. That Executive Order further directed FDLE to continue its investigation into all statements and evidence concerning Petitioner's arrest and conviction and to also investigate any violations of the criminal laws or misconduct by public officials relative to the events surrounding the deaths of the children and the arrest and conviction of Petitioner. On February 13, 1989, another Executive Order, amending the first, was signed by the Governor assigning State Attorney Reno to the Twelfth and Twentieth Judicial Circuits to discharge the duties of the State Attorneys in those Circuits relating to the investigation and prosecution of Petitioner's case. On March 31, 1989, a third Executive Order was signed. It amended the first two and recited that Reno and FDLE had reported their findings to the Governor and that Reno had also advised the Governor that Petitioner had filed a motion for post-conviction relief in the Circuit Court for the Twelfth Judicial Circuit. The Executive Order directed Reno to assume and discharge the duties of the State Attorney relating to any post-conviction proceedings involving Petitioner. A fourth Executive Order was then entered amending the first three by adding to Reno's duties consideration of any further prosecution of Petitioner. As a result of the extensive investigations conducted by Reno and FDLE, Reno joined in Petitioner's pending motion for post-conviction relief. Petitioner's request that his conviction and sentence be vacated was granted, and Petitioner was released from prison. Reno also made the decision that Petitioner would not be re-tried for the murder of Betty Jean Bryant and would not be prosecuted for the murders of the six other children. On May 5, 1989, Reno issued a 35-page Nolle Prosse Memorandum explaining in detail the evidence she had reviewed, the conflicting evidence she had considered, the apparent- perjured testimony that had been given at Petitioner's trial, and the conflicting witness statements which the State had before trial but had not disclosed to Petitioner's attorneys despite a court order to do so. The Memorandum discussed additional problems she had encountered because the physical evidence from the trial 21 years earlier had been misplaced or destroyed, a witness had later recanted his trial testimony, and key witnesses had died since the trial had taken place. Further, as a result of the publicity surrounding her investigation a number of persons had come forward claiming to have evidence, but they had never come forward during the initial investigation. Reno and the two Assistant State Attorneys who worked with her on her investigation determined that in evaluating whether Petitioner should be given post-conviction relief and whether Petitioner should be re-tried, they would only consider the files, records, and evidence that existed at the time that Petitioner was tried. They considered the evidence that had not been disclosed to anyone for 21 years to be unreliable. Some of it was also conflicting. She signed the Nolle Prosse Memorandum as did the two Assistant State Attorneys Don L. Horn and Richard L. Shiffrin. At the final hearing in this cause Don Horn testified extensively as to the contents of the Memorandum. Although he, Shiffrin, and Reno had discussed the misconduct they discovered on the part of the Sheriff and the prosecuting attorneys, they knew that the statute of limitations prevented taking action against those public officials, so the Memorandum did not discuss any action to be taken against them. It only considered the evidence against Petitioner. The Memorandum concluded that a "totally inadequate and incomplete investigation" into the deaths of the seven children had been conducted. Obvious leads had not been pursued, inconsistencies were not resolved, and standard investigative procedures had not been followed. The Memorandum further opined that at the time that Petitioner was charged with murder, the State did not have sufficient evidence to prove his guilt beyond and to the exclusion of a reasonable doubt. The Memorandum concluded that Petitioner "was probably wrongfully accused" based upon the evidence that existed at the time. Three years later a 260-page Memorandum Opinion prepared by United States Attorney Robert Merkle and indicating a need for further investigation into the 1968 prosecution of Petitioner was presented to the Treasurer of Florida. The Opinion, which was not admitted in evidence, was described as a "scathing indictment" of Reno's investigation. As a result, Governor Lawton Chiles issued a confidential Executive Order on October 16, 1992, appointing State Attorney Reno to further investigate all matters pertaining to or arising from the issues raised in the Opinion involving Petitioner's prosecution. On October 30, 1992, the Governor issued a second Executive Order deleting the provisions of his prior Order requiring that it be sealed and confidential. Assistant State Attorney Richard L. Shiffrin, who participated in Reno's first investigation, and Gertrude M. Novicki, Reno's Chief Assistant for Special Prosecutions, were assigned to conduct this investigation. Both of those Assistant State Attorneys signed the Response of the State Attorney of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit. The Response is not dated but a word-processing notation suggests it may have been issued on or about April 30, 1993. At the final hearing, Novicki testified regarding her Response. Rather than responding to or explaining each of the details set forth in Merkle's Memorandum Opinion, Novicki and Shiffrin re-examined the propriety of both the vacating of the original judgment of guilty and the decision to enter a nolle prosse. In doing so, they reviewed the original prosecution in light of the evidence at trial and of the law as it existed in 1968 and also reviewed the ability to re-prosecute Petitioner in light of the evidence currently available and admissible. The Response concluded that the Order granting Petitioner's motion to vacate his conviction and sentence was supported by the facts and the law and that the decision to enter a nolle prosse reached in 1989 was proper. The Response's summary states that the physical evidence against Petitioner did not establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the testimonial evidence as to Petitioner's admissions of culpability were of dubious admissibility and value, the evidence of motive was equivocal at best, and the decision to enter a nolle prosse was unquestionably correct. The summary ends as follows: "Whether or not [Petitioner] is guilty of this horrible crime is uncertain. What is certain is that proof beyond a reasonable doubt of guilt is lacking." The prior proceedings involving Petitioner and the prior reviews of those proceedings have focused on the criminal law standard of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. That standard, however, is not applicable to this proceeding. In this proceeding wherein Petitioner is seeking monetary compensation for his wrongful incarceration, Section 961.03, Florida Statutes, requires Petitioner to establish by clear and convincing evidence that he committed neither the act nor the offense that served as the basis for the conviction and incarceration and that he did not aid, abet, or act as an accomplice to a person who committed the act or offense. Further, he must prove his actual innocence by verifiable and substantial evidence in order to meet the definition of wrongfully incarcerated person. Petitioner testified that he did not poison his children, that he did not kill his children, and that he never told anyone that he did. He also testified that he did not aid or assist anyone in poisoning or killing his children. In order to provide verifiable and substantial evidence in support of his testimony that he is innocent, Petitioner has taken two approaches. The first is by relying on the investigation detailed in the 1989 Nolle Prosse Memorandum and the testimony of Don Horn, one of the authors. (In its defense, the State offered the 1993 Response and the testimony of Gertrude Novicki, one of its authors.) In so doing, Petitioner has offered clear and convincing evidence that the investigation leading up to Petitioner’s prosecution and conviction was incomplete. The investigation revealed conflicting evidence about whether Petitioner had obtained life insurance policies on his children the night before they were murdered, which he had not, and whether Petitioner believed that he had. The investigation did not determine how the parathion got into the pots and skillet and various food products in the refrigerator or when. The investigation appeared to focus only on Petitioner as a suspect and not also on others whose involvement was suspicious. Toward the end of the investigation and prior to Petitioner’s criminal trial, the prosecutors wrote memos expressing concern about the weakness of their case and their possible inability to present even a prima facie case. After those memos were written, the Sheriff produced three jailhouse informants to testify that Petitioner admitted to them his crimes. They also gave statements that Petitioner said he thought that Reese did it and gave details of different motives she might have had. Rather than resolving the conflicting statements, the prosecution withheld the conflicting statements from the defense. The Nolle Prosse Memorandum discusses these statements and informants and finds that one of the jailhouse informants recanted his testimony after Petitioner’s trial and one was drunk when he testified. The third one, whose statements were given under circumstances that made them highly doubtful, died before the trial, and his testimony given at the preliminary hearing was given to the jury in the form of five witnesses who testified as to their recollections of his testimony. The informants were not the only ones to provide perjured testimony at Petitioner’s trial; the Sheriff also appears to have done so. A review of the Nolle Prosse Memorandum and the detailed evidence it discusses makes it clear that Petitioner was wrongfully accused based upon the evidence and lack of evidence the prosecution had gathered. It is further clear that Petitioner’s conviction and sentence based upon that insufficient evidence should have been vacated, and they were. It is further clear that re-trying Petitioner would be fruitless because the evidence available 21 years after the murders was insufficient: the physical evidence was missing or destroyed, many of the key witnesses were dead, and the evidence that might have been admissible for a re-trial was conflicting. However, the inability of the State to prove Petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt does not prove that Petitioner is actually innocent of committing the murders or aiding in the commission. Petitioner’s second approach to providing verifiable and substantial evidence of his actual innocence is attempting to show that Reese, not the Petitioner, murdered the children. The 1989 investigation showed that, at the time the Richardson children were poisoned, Reese was on parole for killing her second husband with a gun. Although there was also a rumor that she had poisoned her first husband, no evidence was found to support that rumor. Parenthetically, there was also a rumor that Petitioner killed his three other children in Jacksonville, but that was also untrue. Similarly, there was a rumor that Sheriff Cline fathered Reese’s granddaughter and that was why he steered the investigation away from her. The blood tests of all concerned done as part of the 1989 investigation proved that rumor also untrue. Petitioner relies also upon the facts that Reese was the last person in the Richardson home on the day in question, the person who served the children the poisoned lunch, and the person who found the parathion in the shed. Her unconcerned behavior while the Richardson toddlers were exhibiting horrible symptoms on her porch and her lack of concern about whether her children who were playing there might be at risk from whatever was making the Richardson children so sick are suggested to be evidence that she knew why the Richardson children were sick and why her children would not be. It was also suggested that she must have been the murderer since her third husband had gone to Jacksonville with Petitioner and his wife but they had returned without Reese’s husband who never did return to her. Petitioner relies heavily on evidence which he suggests constitutes admissions of her guilt by Reese. The 1988 investigation considered an affidavit by one certified nursing assistant and a taped interview of another, both of whom worked at a nursing home where Reese became a patient in 1986. The affidavit by Belinda Romeo asserts that Romeo asked Reese on more than 100 separate occasions if she killed the seven Richardson children, that Reese replied that she did, and that Reese was competent at the times Romeo asked that question. On the other hand, the transcript of a taped interview of Doris Harris, who was present several times when Romeo questioned Reese, is clearly contrary to that affidavit. Harris states that by the time Reese was admitted to the nursing home, she was incontinent, unable to walk, unable to feed herself, only “half way aware,” unable to say what day or year it was, "back to a child's state," and suffering from Alzheimer’s. When Romeo would ask if she killed the children, she would say that she killed them, say the name Charlie, and then lapse into incoherent mumbling. Harris believed that Reese was saying she killed them because she was the one who fed them the poisoned food, and not because she was the one who put the poison in the food. Reese’s “admissions” are, therefore, ambiguous and not trustworthy. Petitioner also introduced into evidence a 1988 affidavit of Richard H. Barnard, the Chief of Police who began an investigation into the children’s deaths. After he got Reese to admit she was in the Richardson home that day and served the children their lunch, he was removed from the investigation by the “Governor’s office” in a phone call which he believes Sheriff Cline instigated. His affidavit undermines the statements of the jailhouse informants, expresses his concern that Sheriff Cline may have tampered with the jury, and states his opinion that Sheriff Cline framed Petitioner. He concludes with his opinion that Petitioner was innocent and Reese was guilty. The hearsay evidence and suggestions that Reese was guilty of the murders do not constitute verifiable and substantial evidence of Petitioner’s innocence. Opinion testimony does not constitute verifiable and substantial evidence of Petitioner's innocence. The Nolle Prosse Memorandum and the Response do not constitute verifiable and substantial evidence of Petitioner’s innocence. The testimony of Horn and Novicki as to what they considered during their investigations does not constitute verifiable and substantial evidence of Petitioner’s innocence. Lastly, Petitioner’s own testimony denying his guilt is not verifiable and substantial evidence of his innocence. Simply put, the evidence in this proceeding does not establish Petitioner’s actual innocence. Since Chapter 961, Florida Statutes, does not provide a definition of “actual innocence,” Petitioner argues that the definition should be that based upon the evidence it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him. That definition is found in Supreme Court of the United States and Supreme Court of Florida cases. Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614 (1998); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995); Tompkins v. State, 994 So. 2d 1072 (Fla. 2008); Mills v. State, 786 So. 2d 547 (Fla. 2001). Petitioner’s argument is not persuasive. All of those cases involved motions for post-conviction relief, not claims for money damages. That definition of actual innocence was likely utilized when Petitioner was granted post-conviction relief by having his conviction and sentence vacated and being released from prison, which is the relief which results from meeting that definition. That definition of actual innocence tests the legal sufficiency of evidence. The Statute regulating this proceeding does not consider legal sufficiency; rather, it considers factual sufficiency by requiring the undersigned to make findings of fact as to Petitioner’s actual innocence if proven by verifiable and substantial evidence. In other words, proof of factual innocence is required. Perhaps the reason the Statute does not contain its own definition of actual innocence is that the Legislature intended the words to have their plain, ordinary meaning. A review of the two investigations of Petitioner’s prosecution clearly shows an absence of evidence proving Petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. However, a review of the two investigations does not show that Petitioner is actually innocent. Accordingly, Petitioner has failed to meet his burden of proving actual innocence by clear and convincing evidence and, thus, has failed to establish that he is a wrongfully incarcerated person eligible for compensation under the Victims of Wrongful Incarceration Compensation Act. RECOMMENDED DETERMINATION Based on the record in this proceeding and the above Findings of Fact, it is RECOMMENDED that an order be entered by the Circuit Judge determining that Petitioner has failed to meet his burden of proving actual innocence by clear and convincing evidence, denying Petitioner’s claim for compensation, and dismissing his Petition. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of August, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINDA M. RIGOT Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of August, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert I. Barrar, Esquire Law Offices of Ellis Rubin & Robert I. Barrar 6619 South Dixie Highway, No. 311 Miami, Florida 33143 Raul C. De La Heria, Esquire 2100 Coral Way, Suite 500 Miami, Florida 33145 Dennis Nales, Esquire Office of the State Attorney 2071 Ringling Boulevard, Suite 400 Sarasota, Florida 34237 Earl Moreland, Esquire Office of the State Attorney 2071 Ringling Boulevard, Suite 400 Sarasota, Florida 34237
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner should revoke, suspend or otherwise discipline Respondent’s certification as a law enforcement officer pursuant to Section 943.1395(7), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner issued Certificate Number 91034 to Respondent on August 24, 1984. At all times material to this matter, Respondent worked as a patrolman for the City of Chiefland Police Department. During the last couple months of his active duty service, he was training to become a K-9 officer. In 1993, Petitioner issued a letter of guidance to Respondent and placed him on one year of probation after Respondent admitted that he had engaged in sex while on duty. On March 17, 1994, Henry W. Nicholson became Chief of Police in the City of Chiefland. In the summer of 1994, Michelle Hallman (formerly Michelle King) worked at ABC Pizza. She was eighteen years old at that time. On days that she was not working, Michelle sometimes went to ABC Pizza to help the other employees close up. On one such evening, Ms. Hallman met Respondent and Officer Hicks in the ABC Pizza Parking lot. They had a casual conversation in which Ms. Hallman joked that she would tell the Chief that Respondent had pinched her on the butt. Respondent laughed and replied that he would tell the Chief that Ms. Hallman dropped on her knees and begged. Respondent also told Ms. Hallman that he did not need that kind of trouble again. The Chief pulled into the parking lot while Ms. Hallman was talking to Respondent and Officer Hicks. The Chief needed to let Respondent know that he was not planning to go to K-9 training with Respondent that evening. About a month later, on June 10, 1994, Respondent was patrolling near a community center known as the Pine Land Center. He saw Ms. Hallman riding by in her car. He and Ms. Hallman pulled their respective cars into the parking lot of the community center and had another casual conversation. During this conversation, Ms. Hallman asked Respondent if he ever messed around. Respondent replied that because of his past problems he never went out with anyone unless the girl asked him. The next evening, June 11, 1994, Respondent began his shift at 6:00 p.m. He was scheduled to work a twelve hour shift. Early in the evening, Respondent saw Deputy Meeks, a deputy with the sheriff’s office. They agreed to eat supper together at the Subway around 11:00 p.m. As the evening progressed, Respondent answered several calls. Between 8:30 and 9:00 p.m. Respondent responded to a call involving a dog bite. After completing the matter involving the dog bite, Respondent saw Ms. Hallman at or near the Circle K. She told him she wanted to talk to him. They agreed to meet at a small public park known as Delma Lock. The park was near a school and a football field. A baseball game was in progress at a baseball field located between the Circle K and the park. The area of the park in which Respondent and Ms. Hallman met was dimly lit. Even so, Ms. Hallman felt like there were too many people around the park or driving by that might recognize her. Respondent suggested they go to the police station. Respondent parked his patrol car in front of the police station. When Ms. Hallman arrived she parked on the side of the building. They went in the side door and into Respondent’s office. There was no other person present in the building. Ms. Hallman told Respondent that she had been a witness to an automobile accident earlier in the day. Respondent and Ms. Hallman had been in his office just a few minutes when Deputy Meeks knocked on the back door of the police station. Respondent opened the door for Deputy Meeks who was ready to go to the Subway for supper. While Respondent and Deputy Meeks were eating their sandwiches at the Subway, Ms. Hallman came in to get a sandwich for a friend of hers. She carried on a brief conversation with Respondent. Sometime around midnight, Respondent spent a few minutes at the Midtown Jiffy visiting with a friend of his, Joan Schubert. From 12:46 to 12:56 a.m., Respondent checked on the alarm at the Senior Citizens Center. Respondent next saw Ms. Hallman near the Circle K. They agreed to meet back at the Delma Lock park. Once again there were too many people at the park for Ms. Hallman to be comfortable. Respondent suggested they meet at the Department of Transportation building. He told Ms. Hallman how to find the building. Ms. Hallman arrived at the designated building first. Respondent pulled into the driveway and told her to follow him. They drove behind the building and parked. Both of them got out of their cars. The area was well lit, but cars from the highway in front could not see what was going on. Respondent took off his gun belt and dropped his pants. Ms. Hallman dropped her shorts. They had sexual intercourse standing up and leaning against the trunk of Ms. Hallman’s car. After having sex, Respondent heard a radio call for Deputy Meeks to respond to a disturbance at Levy Norris’s house. The call originated around 1:35 a.m. The dispatcher explained that the Norris residence was across the road from the Catholic church and down an unpaved road beside Thompson’s garage. Respondent knew that Deputy Meeks was making the final loop of his patrol before going off duty at 2:00 a.m. Respondent was out of breath when he got to his radio. He called Deputy Meeks on the radio and asked him where he was coming from. Deputy Meeks replied that he was in Rosewood which was at least ten miles away. Respondent said that he was “right here at the church.” Respondent asked Deputy Meeks whether he should wait or go on to the Norris residence. Deputy Meeks told Respondent to go ahead and gave Respondent directions. Respondent left Ms. Hallman in the parking lot of the Department of Transportation building. She did not see him again. Respondent was enroute to the Norris residence by 1:38 a.m. He arrived on the scene at 1:42 a.m. It took him four minutes to get there. The Catholic church was used as a landmark to identify the road on which Levy Norris lived. It is located in the same vicinity as the Department of Transportation building where Respondent met Ms. Hallman. Later in June of 1994, Ms. Hallman went to Chief Nicholson to complain that another of his officers made derogatory comments about her which caused her to lose a prior job. Ms. Hallman said the same officer was attempting to get her fired from her current job by making derogatory remarks about her to her employer. In the course of investigating this complaint, Chief Nicholson learned that Respondent may have had an affair with Ms. Hallman. Chief Nicholson called Ms. Hallman and requested that she come to his office. At that meeting, Ms. Hallman denied that she and Respondent had sex. A day or two later, Ms. Hallman returned to Chief Nicholson’s office. She admitted that she had sex with Respondent. Respondent never included his interaction with Ms. Hallman in his duty log. Respondent gave sworn statements to Chief Nicholson on June 24, 1994 and July 1, 1994. When questioned, Respondent knowingly made false statements to mislead Chief Nicholson about his relationship with Ms. Hallman. Chief Nicholson concluded his internal investigation and decided to terminate Respondent’s employment. Chief Nicholson advised Respondent of his decision in a memorandum dated July 6, 1994 and received by Respondent’s counsel on July 25, 1994. The Chiefland City Commission, sitting as the City Personnel Review Board, conducted a hearing on August 29, 1997. Respondent’s employment with the City of Chiefland was terminated effective September 6, 1994.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law it is recommended that Petitioner enter a Final Order revoking Respondent’s law enforcement certification. DONE AND ORDERED this 8th day of April, 1997, in Tallahassee, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of April, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Paul D. Johnston, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, FL 32302 Joan Stewart, Esquire 300 East Brevard Street Tallahassee, FL 32301-1218 A. Leon Lowry, II, Director Division of Criminal Justice Standards and Training Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, FL 32302 Michael Ramage, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, FL 32302
Findings Of Fact The parties stipulated that Petitioner, Gary N. Piccirillo, was afforded a presumptive parole release date interview on May 14, 1982. Thereafter, on June 9, 1982, Respondent, Florida Parole and Probation Commission (FPPC), considered Petitioner's presumptive parole release date (PPRD) and set it for September 30, 1986. On June 28, 1982, Petitioner sought review of his established PPRD pursuant to Rule 23-21.12, Florida Administrative Code, and Section 947.173, Florida Statutes. In November 1983, a special parole interview was granted Petitioner, but the Commission at that hearing declined to change or modify Petitioner's PPRD. Petitioner's next biennial interview for review of his PPRD is scheduled for September 1984. However, Petitioner is currently scheduled to be released from confinement in either September or October 1984, if he is given credit for all earned gain time. Petitioner questions that portion of the rule which provides for only one review of the Commission action establishing or changing the PPRD, but apparently fails to recognize that portion which also provides for subsequent (biennial, special, or effective) establishments of PPRD, which tend to ensure at least periodic reviews of the PPRD. Petitioner attacks the validity of the rule, as amended on October 1, 1982, as it pertains to Sections (1)(e) and (2). He contends that (1)(e), which calls for verification of written or printed evidence provided directly by the inmate and notification to the proper state attorney if any of this evidence is invalid because it constitutes a threat of a penalty, which tends to inhibit the average inmate from presenting evidence he might otherwise present. Petitioner does not question the propriety of reporting false information, only the inclusion of a basis for doing so within the rule. Petitioner also contends that that portion of Paragraph (2) of the rule which provides that the Respondent will not address matters within certain categories, unless new factual information came into existence after the initial interview, is unfair, unduly restrictive, and places an unreasonable burden on prisoners who would be unprepared psychologically to present all their information at the initial interview in its best light. Petitioner contends that after the newness of incarceration wears off and the individual is more comfortable with the system, he would be better prepared to present this information again.
The Issue Whether Petitioner, Cassondra Davis, suffered an adverse employment action as a result of unlawful discrimination.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing, the following findings of facts are made. Petitioner, Cassondra Davis, is a female African- American. At all times material, Petitioner was employed by Respondent, Department of Corrections, at Brevard Correctional Institution (Department). Petitioner's last day of actual work at the Department was April 10, 1996. Susan Blais, Personnel Manager at Brevard Correction Institution during the relevant time frame, testified that because of medical problems, Petitioner was unable to return to work after April 10, 1996, until her physician released her to return to work. Petitioner never presented a medical return-to-work release. Instead, she utilized her entitlement to Family Medical Leave Act leave. Once this leave was exhausted, rather than terminate Petitioner, the Department wrote to her physician, Dr. F. F. Matuk, on September 16, 1996, requesting a diagnosis of Davis' condition, as well as an opinion as to whether she could perform the duties of a correctional officer as outlined in a job description enclosed with the request for opinion. (Respondent's Exhibit 1) Dr. Matuk responded to the Department by letter dated September 20, 1996, stating that Petitioner had several work restrictions, including no weight manipulation over 20 to 30 pounds, avoidance of driving over 30 to 40 minutes, avoidance of neck extension, and allowances for extended periods of rest. He did not believe that Petitioner was able to perform the duties of a correctional officer but stated that she would most likely be able to perform a sedentary desk job. (Respondent's Exhibit 2) Susan Blais testified that no such desk jobs were available at that time. Petitioner submitted a letter of resignation to the Department in July 1997, wherein she attributed the resignation to medical reasons. (Respondent's Exhibit 3)
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of March, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of March, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Azizi M. Coleman, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Cassondra A. Davis 1009 Cannes Drive Poinciana, Florida 34759-3918 Cassondra A. Davis 1216 Pua Lane, No. 107 Honolulu, Hawaii 96817-3821 Gary L. Grant, Esquire Department of Corrections 2601 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500 Dana A. Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue The central issue in this case is whether Respondent should be terminated from employment with the school district.
Findings Of Fact On January 4, 1994, Respondent completed an applicant security check form for employment with the Petitioner. The form specified a series of questions related to past or pending criminal charges to which Respondent was to check either a "yes" box or a "no" box. On each occasion, Respondent checked the "no" box. At the conclusion of the form is a certification as follows: I certify that the above responses are true, complete, and correct to the best of my knowledge and are made in good faith. I understand that any incompleteness or false information on this form may be just cause for a rejection of my application for employment or dismissal in the event I am employed by the School Board of Palm Beach County. Respondent did not disclose that in 1987 she was charged with aggravated assault and possession of a weapon. As a result of the charges, Respondent was sentenced to one year probation, required to pay a fine and court costs, and fifty hours of community service. When Mr. Lachance learned of the results of the background search (which differed from Respondent's application), he met with Respondent who admitted the criminal charges but who alleged that she had believed them to be resolved. The recommendation was then made to the Board to terminate Respondent's employment as a bus driver.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That School Board of Palm Beach County, Florida enter a final order dismissing the Respondent from her employment with the school district in accordance with the Board action of April 7, 1995. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of January, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of January, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 95-2884 Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Petitioner: 1. Paragraphs 1 through 5 are accepted. Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Respondent: 1. None submitted. COPIES FURNISHED: Lee M. Rosenberg, Esq. School District of Palm Beach County Office of the General Counsel 3318 Forest Hill Boulevard Suite C-302 West Palm Beach, Florida 33406 Ms. Tina King 5030 Elcharo North West Palm Beach, Florida 33415 Dr. Bernard Shulman Superintendent Palm Beach County School Board 3340 Forest Hill Boulevard West Palm Beach, Florida 33406-5869 Frank T. Brogan Commissioner of Education Department of Education The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Douglas Clayton Brown (Brown), applied to Respondent, Department of Insurance and Treasurer (Department) , for examination as a general lines agent. By letter of September 9, 1986, the Department advised Brown that his application was denied because he had pled guilty to certain felonies which involved moral turpitude, and that he had failed to divulge on his application for examination that he had been charged with such felonies. Brown filed a timely request for formal hearing to contest the Department's decision. On March 21, 1983, an Information was filed in the Circuit Court of the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County, Florida, charging Brown with one count of burglary, Section 810.02(2) Florida Statutes; and two counts of aggravated assault, Section 784.021, Florida Statutes. Brown entered a plea of guilty to the charges. On December 12, 1983, the court entered a judgment wherein it adjudged Brown guilty of having committed one count of burglary with a deadly weapon and two counts of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. The court withheld the imposition of sentence, and placed Brown on 10 years probation. 1/ On August 20, 1984, Brown filed a motion in the criminal proceeding to terminate his probation and vacate the adjudication of guilt. By order of March 4, 1985, the court granted Brown's motion to vacate the adjudication of guilt, but continued his probation on the same terms and conditions as previously set. Subsequently, on March 13, 1985, the court entered a formal order that withheld adjudication of guilt and the imposition of sentence on the charges, and reimposed the term of probation previously established. By application dated March 4, 1985, filed with the Department on March 13, 1985, Brown sought examination for licensure as a general lines agent. Pertinent to this case the application requested and Brown responded: 12(a) Have you ever been charged with a felony? No Brown's application contained a material misrepresentation since he failed to disclose that he had been charged with a felony which involved moral turpitude. Brown's attempt to rationalize his nondisclosure was unpersuasive. According to Brown, he inquired of his attorney before completing his application and was advised that he could respond in the negative to the question set forth in paragraph 6, supra. Brown's assertion is not, however, supported by the proof and is inherently improbable and unworthy of belief. (See: Petitioner's exhibit 2).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the application of Petitioner, Douglas Clayton Brown, for examination as a general lines agent be DENIED. DONE AND ORDERED this 9th day of June, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of June, 1987.
