The Issue Whether Petitioner was subjected to housing discrimination by Respondent based on Petitioner's national origin, Puerto Rican, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Rosa M. Cabrera is of Puerto Rican descent and, therefore, belongs to a class of persons protected from discrimination based on national origin under the Florida Fair Housing Act, Sections 760.20 through 760.37, Florida Statutes, (2009). On September 17, 2009, she filed a complaint for housing discrimination against the management of Costa del Sol, LLC. Respondent, Monica Londono, is employed by Morgan Whitney, Inc., the company that manages Costa del Sol, a sixteen-unit apartment complex at 7425 Byron Avenue, Miami Beach, Florida 33141. Ms. Cabrera lived at Costa del Sol for 4 years. In her complaint, she alleged discrimination in the conditions and services provided to her as a tenant based on her national origin. The Housing Authority of Miami Beach inspected Ms. Cabrera's unit annually as required for units subsidized under the Housing Choice Voucher Program, also known as Section 8. On March 23, 2009, a notice was mailed to Ms. Cabrera to inform her that her annual inspection was scheduled for April 10, 2009, between 10:00 a.m. and 1:00 p.m. Mr. Cabrera was not there, on April 10, 2009, when the inspector arrived, so a door handle notice and a letter mailed the same day notified her that the inspection was rescheduled for April 13, 2009. About the same time, Ms. Cabrera said she had trouble with her hot water heater. On April 13, 2009, the unit failed inspection. The inspector found that a bedroom air conditioner was not cooling properly, that a sink stopper was missing, and that a closet door mirror was cracked. A re-inspection was scheduled for May 11, 2009. On April 22, 2009, Ms. Cabrera was offended and apparently turned away, what she said was, a group of six people who came to make repairs without giving her prior notice. On May 11, 2009, the same defects were noted and, on May 29, 2009, the Housing Authority abated the rent and terminated its contract for the unit with Costa Del Sol effective June 30, 2009. Ms. Cabrera was scheduled to meet her Section 8 case worker, Housing Authority Specialist Felipe Roloff, to "start the moving process" at 4:00 p.m., on June 5, 2009. Ms. Cabrera did not keep the appointment and it was rescheduled for June 16, 2009. On June 9, 2009, however, an "abate-cure" inspection was conducted and the unit passed. On July 21 and 23, 2009, Ms. Cabrera contacted Mr. Roloff to tell him that her refrigerator was not working and the landlord was given 24 hours to repair or replace it. When a handyman came alone to make repairs, Ms. Cabrera was afraid to let him in her apartment fearing sexual battery. So Ms. Londono accompanied the handyman when they attempted to deliver a refrigerator. They were unable to exchange the refrigerators because Ms. Cabrera had changed the locks without giving the manager a new key a violation of the terms of her lease, and she would not unlock the door. Ms. Cabrera's son arrived home at the same time and he also did not have a new key. At his suggestion, the refrigerator was left in the hallway for him to exchange it with the one in Ms. Cabrera's apartment later. Ms. Cabrera claimed, without any supporting evidence, that Ms. Londono publicly embarrassed her by calling her a "fucking Puerto Rican bitch" and a "ridiculous old lady." Ms. Londono, who is also of Puerto Rican descent, denied the allegation. Someone, Ms. Londono believes it was Ms. Cabrera, called the Miami Beach Code Compliance Division, to report that the refrigerator was left in the hallway and it was hauled away as household waste. Ms. Cabrera said the refrigerator left in the hallway was in poor condition. Ms. Londono, according to Ms. Cabrera, called the police and accused her of stealing the refrigerator. There is no supporting evidence of their accusations and suspicions about each other. When she finally got a replacement refrigerator, Ms. Cabrera said it was missing one of the crisper drawers. Ms. Cabrera believed she was being discriminated against in receiving poor services and also when Ms. Londono required her to move a plant from the hallway, but did not make another tenant move his motorcycle from the area where it was parked. Ms. Londono notified Mr. Roloff of Ms. Cabrera's lack of cooperation, and that she intended to collect August rent and to withhold a portion of the security deposit to cover the cost of the missing refrigerator. On August 5, 2009, the Housing Authority issued to Ms. Cabrera a Notice of Termination of Housing Assistance effective September 30, 2009. The Notice cited her failure to allow the landlord to enter to make necessary repairs and her failure to report the income of her son who was living with her. When the rent was not paid on August 5, 2009, Ms. Londono delivered a three-day notice to pay rent or vacate to Ms. Cabrera's unit. Ms. Cabrera did not vacate. Eviction proceedings were begun in September. Ms. Cabrera was evicted on November 22, 2009. After Ms. Cabrera moved the report of the inspection of the unit indicated that, among other damage, it was infested with fleas, supporting Ms. Londono's previous claim that Ms. Cabrera was leaving her window open to allow cats to come and feed in her unit, in violation of Section 8 rules. Ms. Cabrera's claim of discrimination based on national origin is not supported by the evidence.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Face and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Relief be denied. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of March, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELEANOR M. HUNTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of March, 2010. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Rosa M. Cabrera 7851 Northeast 10th Avenue, Apt. 26 Miami, Florida 33138 Monica Londono Morgan Whitney, Inc. Costa del Sol, LLC 1385 Coral Way, Penthouse 403 Miami, Florida 33145
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent, Hardin Hammock Estates (hereinafter referred to as "Hardin"), discriminated against Petitioner, Ms. Celeste Washington (hereinafter referred to as Ms. Washington), on the basis of her race in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act, Sections through 760.37, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Parties. Celeste Washington is a black adult. Hardin is a housing rental complex with 200 single- family residences. Hardin is located in Miami-Dade County, Florida. Hardin provides "affordable housing" to lower-income individuals and, therefore, its residents are required to meet certain income requirements in order to be eligible for a residence at Hardin. At the times material to this proceeding, Hardin was managed by Reliance Management Incorporated (hereinafter referred to as "Reliance"). At the times material to this proceeding, Salah Youssif, an employee of Reliance, acted as the property manager at Hardin. Mr. Youssif is himself black, having been born in Sudan. Ms. Washington's Charge. On or about August 29, 2002, Ms. Washington filed a Complaint with the Commission. After investigation of the Complaint, the Commission issued a Determination of No Reasonable Cause, concluding that "reasonable cause does not exist to believe that a discriminatory housing practice has occurred" and dismissing the Complaint. On or about May 5, 2003, Ms. Washington filed a Petition with the Commission. Ms. Washington alleged in the Petition that Hardin had violated the Florida Fair Housing Act, Sections 760.20 through 760.36, Florida Statutes. In particular, Ms. Washington alleged that Hardin had "violated the Florida Fair Housing Act, as amended, in the manner described below": Washington was told that the waiting list at Hardin Hammock Estates was closed. She visited this development twice and was told the waiting [sic] was close [sic]. At that time she viewed the wating [sic] list and the majority of the names are [sic] Hispanic. Islanders do not consider themselves as Black Americans. The "ultimate facts alleged & entitlement to relief" asserted in the Petition are as follows: Hardin Hammocks has willful [sic] and [knowingly] practice [sic] discrimination in there [sic] selection practice and a strong possibility that the same incomes for Blacks & others [sic]. Black Americans rent is [sic] higher than others living in these [sic] developments. At hearing, Ms. Washington testified that Hardin had discriminated against her when an unidentified person refused to give her an application and that she believes the refusal was based upon her race. Management of Hardin; General Anti-Discrimination Policies. The residence selection policy established by Reliance specifically precludes discrimination based upon race. A human resource manual which describes the policy has been adopted by Reliance and all employees of Reliance working at Hardin have attended a workshop conducted by Reliances' human resource manager at which the anti-discrimination policy was addressed. An explanation of the Federal Fair Housing Law of the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development is prominently displayed in the public area of Hardin's offices in both English and Spanish. As of July 1, 2002, approximately 52 of Hardin's 200 units were rented to African-American families. Hardin's Application Policy. When Mr. Youssif became the property manager at Hardin, there were no vacancies and he found a disorganized, outdated waiting list of questionable accuracy. Mr. Youssif undertook the task of updating the list and organizing it. He determined that there were approximately 70 to 80 individuals or families waiting for vacancies at Hardin. Due to the rate of families moving out of Hardin, approximately one to two families a month, Mr. Youssif realized that if he maintained a waiting list of 50 individuals it would still take approximately two years for a residence to become available for all 50 individuals on the list. Mr. Youssif also realized that, over a two-year or longer period, the individuals on a waiting list of 50 or more individuals could change drastically: their incomes could change; they could find other affordable housing before a residence became available at Hardin; or they could move out of the area. Mr. Youssif decided that it would be best for Hardin and for individuals interested in finding affordable housing that Hardin would maintain a waiting list of only 50 individuals and that applications would not be given to any person, regardless of their race, while there were 50 individuals on the waiting list. Mr. Youssif instituted the new waiting list policy and applied it regardless of the race of an applicant. If there were less than 50 names on the waiting list, applications were accepted regardless of an individual's race; and if there were 50 or more names on the waiting list, no application was accepted regardless of an individual's race. Lack of Evidence of Discrimination. The only evidence Ms. Washington presented concerning her allegations of discriminatory treatment is that she is black. Although Ms. Washington was refused an application for housing at Hardin,3 the evidence failed to prove that Ms. Washington's race played any part in the decision not to give her an application.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing Celeste Washington's Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of November, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LARRY J. SARTIN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of November, 2003.
The Issue Whether the Petitioner has been the subject of a discriminatory housing practice.
Findings Of Fact Several years prior to 2007, Petitioner, Wanda Hutcheson, leased one side of a duplex apartment from LGMS. The apartment was located on 3359 Greenbrier Circle, in Gulf Breeze, Florida. During the time that LGMS owned the property, the property manager found her to be a responsible tenant who paid her rent on time. Indeed, the manager felt that she had improved the look and value of the property because she had done extensive landscaping in her front yard. The increase in value was not shown by the evidence. At the time, Petitioner’s landlord knew that she had a mental disorder known as Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD). In part, the extensive yard work done by Petitioner was due to her OCD. She regularly watered her yard with the shared sprinkler system that served both apartments in the duplex. However, the electricity for the water pump that operated the sprinkler system was hooked into the electrical system for the apartment adjoining Petitioner’s apartment. The sprinkler system was operated by a switch located either by or in the electrical box for the adjoining apartment and the electrical box for her apartment. Petitioner was frequently in the area of those boxes. Respondent, Sand Dunes Property, LLC (Sand Dunes), is a limited liability company owned and operated by Respondents, Robert and Justin MacFarland. In 2006, Sand Dunes purchased several parcels of rental property from LGMS, including the apartment leased by Petitioner. In February 2006, prior to Sand Dunes’ purchase of the property, the MacFarlands visited the premises they were about to purchase and met Petitioner. At that time, Petitioner told the Respondents that she had OCD. She neither requested nor indicated the need for any special accommodations from the Respondents regarding her lease. The evidence did not show that the Respondents knew or were aware that OCD could be a disability that might significantly interfere with a person’s life activities. To them, Petitioner did not seem mentally disabled and appeared able to carry out her daily activities. She appeared to live her life as any other person might. In fact, among other things, Petitioner drove a car, occasionally worked cleaning houses, performed yard work, had the electrical part of her apartment’s sprinkler system transferred to her electrical system, paid her lease and cared for other people’s children. Around March 2006, subsequent to the purchase of the property by the Respondents, Peter Bouchard moved into the apartment next to Petitioner’s apartment. Shortly after he moved in, Petitioner was watering her yard with the sprinkler system. Mr. Bouchard saw her and turned off the sprinkler system. He told her he did not believe in watering the grass and that he did not want his yard watered. He told her that as long as the pump was hooked to his electrical box that she could not use the sprinkler system since he was paying for the electricity used in its operation. He suggested that she could have the pump transferred to her electrical box if she wanted to continue to use the system. Petitioner called Respondents and left a message about the need to transfer the electrical connection for the sprinkler system to her electrical box and to make sure it was alright for her to pay to have the system transferred. The evidence did not show that she related the details of Mr. Bouchard’s actions to Respondent’s. She did not receive a response to her message and eventually paid for the system to be transferred to her electrical box. At some point, even though she did not own the sprinkler systems components, she removed the sprinkler heads from Mr. Bouchard’s side of the yard. She capped the pipe where the heads had been and filled the hole. She did not tell anyone that she had removed the sprinkler heads, but kept the sprinkler heads in her apartment. Additionally, during March 2006, Petitioner complained to Santa Rosa Animal Control about Mr. Bouchard’s two dogs being abused by him and barking. She also complained about the two dogs of the neighbor who lived behind her, Jodi Henning. Both of these incidents were investigated by Animal Control and no abuse was discovered. In fact, the dogs never barked or only barked for a short time when the investigator visited the duplex on two occasions. Petitioner’s actions appeared to be in retaliation for Mr. Bouchard’s refusal to permit her to use the sprinkler system. Finally, at some point, Petitioner while on her front porch saw Mr. Bouchard’s son walking to his apartment. She told the boy that she would cause Mr. Bouchard’s dogs to be removed for abuse and then would have him removed for the same reason. The comment upset both the boy and Mr. Bouchard. On April 3, 2006, Sand Dunes mailed a written offer to enter into a new lease with Petitioner. The offer was made to Petitioner because her lease would terminate on May 30, 2006. The offer was conditioned upon an increase in the monthly rent on Petitioner’s apartment. The offer stated, “Please let us know by May 1st of your decision so that we may set up an appointment to review and sign your new lease agreement.” The intent of the letter’s language was to not be contractually bound until a new lease was signed by the parties. There was no evidence that Respondents treated any other potentially continuing tenant differently. Around April 4, 2006, Mr. MacFarland left a message for Petitioner regarding a maintenance check on her apartment’s air conditioner. Petitioner returned the call and left a message that she could not be present at the time suggested and asked that the work be performed at another time. Petitioner received the written offer of renewal on April 5, 2006, and attempted to accept the offer by leaving a message on Respondent’s telephone. After the first message, Petitioner left town to attend a family function out of state. Around April 6, 2006, air-conditioning maintenance checks were performed on nine of ten units owned by the Respondents in the Greenbrier area. Around April 6 or 7, 2006, Respondents were contacted by Mr. Bouchard. Mr. Bouchard complained about Petitioner to the MacFarlands. He told them that Petitioner had stolen the sprinkler heads out of his side of the yard and that she turned off the electricity to his apartment. He showed them a photograph of the unlocked electrical box to his unit. He also relayed to Respondents that Petitioner had repeatedly accused him of abusing his dogs, not properly vaccinating his dogs and had repeatedly reported him to Animal Control for animal abuse and barking dogs. Apparently, Mr. Bouchard complained enough about Petitioner to Respondents to make them believe that Respondent was a particularly disruptive and vengeful tenant. At some point, Respondents became aware of Jodi Henning’s problems with Petitioner. Ms. Henning lived in a different complex from Petitioner. However, her backyard adjoined Petitioner’s backyard. She called the Sheriff's Department on Ms. Hutcheson on a few occasions for problems she had with Petitioner. None of the incidents amounted to an arrest. During an evening in March 2005, Ms. Henning’s dogs were inside with her. They had not been outside. Ms. Henning answered the door. Petitioner, who was quite angry, complained about Ms. Henning’s dogs and told her that she had made an enemy of Petitioner and that she would make Ms. Henning’s life miserable. Ms. Henning called the Sheriff’s Department. The 911 operator asked if Petitioner was drunk. Ms. Henning said that Petitioner was not drunk, but just crazy and mean. Petitioner was told by law enforcement personnel that Santa Rosa County Animal Control should be contacted if she had an issue with a neighbor's dog. She then filed a complaint with Santa Rosa County Animal Control about Ms. Henning’s dogs. Petitioner made a similar complaint in April 2006. Neither complaint was found to have merit by the investigator for Animal Control. Additionally, Ms. Henning felt that she could not go out in her yard without Petitioner coming out to watch her. Petitioner never engaged in any physically, aggressive behavior. However, Ms. Henning felt she became threatening to the point she was afraid. Petitioner had told both Ms. Henning and Mr. Bouchard that she had OCD. However, based on their observation of her, neither thought that Petitioner was disabled by her condition. They both thought that she was simply nosy and mean. On the other hand, there were former neighbors who thought Petitioner was a nice person and a good neighbor. However, the evidence did not demonstrate that these neighbors’ opinions were known to the Respondents during the time the offer to lease was outstanding. Mr. MacFarland obtained copies of "call reports" received by Animal Control regarding Ms. Henning and Mr. Bouchard's dogs. Those reports consisted of complaints in March 2005 about Ms. Henning's two dogs, and in March 2006 concerning Ms. Henning's two dogs and Mr. Bouchard's two dogs. On April 10, 2006, Respondents sent a letter on Sand Dunes' stationary revoking the earlier offer to lease her apartment after expiration of her lease. Based on the Respondents limited knowledge about Petitioner during the time the offer to lease was outstanding, their conclusion was neither unreasonable nor discriminatory. Thereafter, the Respondents were entitled to rely on the expiration of the lease by its terms and the peaceful return of the premises. Petitioner received the revocation letter around April 12, 2007, when she returned home from out of state. No explanation was given in the letter for the withdrawal of the offer to lease. Petitioner called Mr. MacFarland on the date she received the revocation letter. She was very distraught and tearful. During the long conversation, the only explanation Respondent recalled from Mr. MacFarland as to why Respondents withdrew their offer was that he did not like her. Petitioner also was told to communicate with their lawyer, Keri Anne Schultz, Esquire. Petitioner went to Ms. Schultz's law office to discuss the situation with her. Ms. Shultz was not in the office. Petitioner was told by the receptionist that she could not wait in the office for Ms. Schultz to return. Ms. Hutcheson wanted to write Ms. Schultz a note regarding renting the duplex. Mr. Bordelon, Ms. Schultz's partner, threatened to call the police if Petitioner remained at the office. Petitioner left the office. Thereafter, the only communication from the MacFarlands or their attorney was legal notices to vacate the premises. Petitioner did attempt to send them information on OCD. The evidence was not clear whether the Respondents received the information or reviewed it. Petitioner refused to vacate the premises and an eviction action was filed in June 2006. A hearing was held in the Circuit Court in June and July of 2006. By court order dated August 17, 2006, Respondents were awarded possession of the property on August 31, 2006, at 11:59 p.m. Unfortunately, Petitioner, due to ill health, did not begin to vacate the premises until a few days prior to forcible removal. She was not finished moving on September 5, 2006, five days after the Respondents were to be put in possession of the property. The Respondents had the Sheriff’s Deputy remove Petitioner from the premises, telling her that she should have been out a long time ago. The MacFarlands, with a little help from Mr. Bouchard, removed the rest of Petitioner’s possessions to the curb. During the removal, the bottom of a box Mr. Bouchard was carrying came undone and some of the contents fell onto the pavement. One jar of food was broken. All of these events were very distressful to Petitioner. Upon learning that she would be evicted, Petitioner began seeing Dr. Bingham in May 2006. Eventually, she was involuntarily committed for a short time and has been seeing Dr. Bingham every two or three weeks for the last year. The apartment remained vacant for several months after the eviction. Eventually, Mr. Bouchard moved into the unit at a lower rate of rent than he paid for his old apartment but higher than the amount Petitioner would have paid if the new lease had taken effect. As indicated, between February 2006 and April 2006, Mr. and Mrs. MacFarland's only contact with Petitioner was a visit to her duplex apartment with the realtor selling the property and some voice mails exchanged between them concerning the sprinkler and air conditioning systems. Respondents had little knowledge regarding Petitioner. Even though the evidence demonstrates that Respondents could have acted more kindly and could have better informed themselves about the circumstances of Petitioner, there was no evidence that the withdrawal of the offer to renew was made based on an intent to discriminate against Petitioner because of her mental disability. Therefore, the Petition for Relief should be dismissed.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of December, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of December, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Melissa A. Posey, Esquire Melissa A. Posey, P.A. 201 East Government Street, Suite 36 Pensacola, Florida 32502 Robert and Justyn MacFarland Sand Dune Properties 7173 Blue Jack Drive Navarre, Florida 32566 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether the Hernando County Housing Authority (Respondent) unlawfully engaged in a discriminatory housing practice against Peggy Troiano (Petitioner) on the basis of her disability by refusing to provide Section 8 funding for a housing unit being occupied by Petitioner and the housing unit's owner, Petitioner’s daughter, Julia Williams.
Findings Of Fact At all relevant times, Petitioner was an individual participant in a tenant-based voucher arrangement under the Section 8 Housing Program funded by HUD and administered by Respondent. Petitioner is an individual claiming that she is disabled because of a toxic injury that requires her to live isolated in a non-toxic environment. Respondent does not contest Petitioner’s claim of disability and it is, therefore, found that Petitioner is disabled or handicapped within the meaning of applicable law. Julia Williams is Petitioner’s daughter who, at all relevant times, owned the house located at 15141 Pomp Parkway, Weeki Wachee, Hernando County, Florida (“15141 Pomp Parkway unit”). Ms. Williams is specially trained to deal with toxic injury and is paid through a federally-funded, consumer-directed program to provide assistance to Petitioner. Respondent is a public housing agency that administers the Section 8 Housing Program as part of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, which recodified the U.S. Housing Act of 1937. As a recipient of funding from HUD for its Section 8 Program, Respondent is required to comply with HUD Section 8 regulations, as well as all Federal, State, and local fair housing laws and regulations. In order to receive funding from HUD, Respondent is required to sign an annual contributions contract (ACC) wherein it agrees to follow the Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.). If Respondent does not follow the C.F.R. or HUD’s guidelines, HUD has the right to terminate Respondent’s Section 8 program funding. In addition, HUD could make Respondent repay any funding used for ineligible housing. On March 17, 2014, during the annual reexamination for her Section 8 voucher, Petitioner signed, under the penalty of perjury, a summary report which identified her as the only household member permitted to live in any unit under her Section 8 voucher. Around the time of the annual reexamination, Petitioner was living at a unit on Philatelic Drive with plans to move into and rent a unit at 15141 Pomp Parkway. The Pomp Parkway unit was owned, but not being occupied, by Petitioner’s daughter Julia Williams. In April of 2014, Petitioner asked Respondent for permission to rent the unit from her daughter. Petitioner and her daughter spoke with Respondent’s officials about her request. Generally, a public housing agency, such as Respondent, cannot approve a unit for participation in the Section 8 program if it is owned by a parent, child, grandparent, grandchild, sister, or brother of any member of the participant’s family. See 24 C.F.R. § 982.306. Respondent, however, ultimately approved Petitioner’s rental of the Pomp Parkway unit under the Section 8 program, even though it was owned by Petitioner’s daughter, pursuant to a limited exception under 24 C.F.R. § 982.306(d), which provides an express exception to the rule if “the [public housing agency] determines that approving the unit would provide reasonable accommodation for a family member who is a person with disabilities.” 24 C.F.R. § 982.306(d). Also, during April of 2014, Petitioner and Ms. Williams were working on constructing a caregiver suite for the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit and had discussions with Respondent’s staff about it. There are documents purportedly created during this time frame summarizing several conversations between Respondent, Petitioner, and Ms. Williams. The documents state that Respondent’s officials had a conversation with Petitioner and her daughter wherein they discussed the requirements for a live- in aide and that Petitioner and Ms. Williams were warned that Ms. Williams could never live in the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit. Respondent also contends that Petitioner and Ms. Williams were warned that, even if Ms. Williams was approved as a live-in aide, Ms. Williams could not live in the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit. On the other hand, Petitioner contends that the alleged conversations warning her that her daughter could not reside in the home did not occur during this time frame, and that she and her daughter continued to renovate the house to specifications suitable to accommodate Petitioner's disability with the expectation that her daughter would ultimately be able to reside in the home after renovations were complete. Upon consideration of the credibility of the witnesses and timing of the purported documents, the undersigned finds that the testimony and documents regarding these alleged April conversations are unreliable and do not support a finding that the conversations and warnings actually occurred during the April time frame. The evidence is also insufficient to support Petitioner's contention that Respondent was somehow responsible for Petitioner's expectation that her daughter would be able to both act as Petitioner's caregiver and live in the home while Petitioner was receiving rent vouchers under the Section 8 program. Petitioner was the only person that Respondent approved to live in the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit under her Section 8 voucher. In May of 2014, Petitioner’s daughter entered into a one-year residential lease with Petitioner and a Housing Assistance Payment Contract (HAP Contract) with Respondent. According to the HAP Contract, Petitioner was the only person able to reside in the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit without the express, written consent of Respondent. At the time the HAP Contract was signed, Petitioner advised Respondent that she would be the only person living in the unit. Ms. Williams, as the landlord, signed a check cashing agreement with Respondent wherein she agreed Petitioner would be the only person occupying the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit. Also, Petitioner’s income verification summary report provides that Petitioner is the only person allowed to live in a unit covered by her Section 8 voucher. In early May of 2014, Ms. Williams moved into the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit without notice to Respondent. Petitioner has never received written approval from Respondent to have Ms. Williams live and occupy the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit under the Section 8 voucher program. By letter dated June 17, 2014, Petitioner submitted an HCHA Live-in Aide Request Verification Form, along with letters from her doctor. Petitioner also requested that her daughter Julia Williams serve as her live-in aide. Approval for a live-in aide is a different process than the approval process to have someone added to the household. While Petitioner's request for a live-in aide stated that Petitioner was living at 15141 Pomp Parkway, it did not mention that Petitioner's daughter was the owner of the dwelling, nor did it include a specific request that Ms. Williams be allowed to move into and occupy the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit that she owned. Upon receipt of the written request for a live-in aide by Petitioner, Respondent began its investigation to determine whether Petitioner met the qualifications for a live-in aide and whether Ms. Williams met the qualifications to serve as a live- in aide. Respondent has implemented 24 C.F.R. § 5.403 into its written policy regarding live-in aides, which provides: LIVE-IN ATTENDANTS A family may include a live-in aide provided that such live-in aide: Is determined by the [public housing agency] to be essential to the care and well-being of an elderly person, a nearly-elderly person, or a person with disabilities, Is not obligated for the support of the person(s), and Would not be living in the unit except to provide care for the person(s). Under the C.F.R., a public housing agency is required to approve a live-in aide, if needed, as a reasonable accommodation for an elderly or disabled person. 24 C.F.R. § 982.316 (“The PHA must approve a live-in-aide if needed as a reasonable accommodation” to a family with an elderly or disabled person.). By letter dated June 27, 2014, Respondent notified Petitioner of the approval of her request for her daughter to serve as her live-in aide. Although Respondent was aware that a home occupied by an owner was not eligible for a Section 8 voucher at the time it gave its permission for Petitioner's daughter to serve as Petitioner's live-in aide, the letter did not speak to that issue. Rather, the June 27, 2014, letter, signed by Donald Singer, stated: Pursuant to your letter dated June 17, 2014 requesting a reasonable accommodation for a live in aide. Your letter also ask [sic] that the live in aide be your daughter, Julia Williams based upon her qualifications as presented. After reviewing the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) regulations for Live-in Aides and the Housing Authority's Section 8 Program Administrative Plan for Live in Aides our office has determined that your daughter, Julia Williams meets the program qualification(s) to act as your Live in Aide. Therefore our office is approving Julia E. Williams as your Live in Aide effective immediately. Should you have any questions regarding this action/letter please contact our office at 352-754-4160. By email on August 11, 2014, Petitioner notified Mr. Singer that she and her live-in aide, Julia Williams, intended to live at the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit. On August 11, 2014, Petitioner’s daughter Julia Williams was still the owner of the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit. Under 24 C.F.R. § 892.352, a unit being occupied by its owner is deemed “ineligible” and a public housing agency is prohibited from providing funding for such unit. The C.F.R. provides a limited exception for shared housing that allows an owner to occupy a unit funded by Section 8. Under that limited exception, however, the Section 8 participant cannot be a blood relative of the resident owner. 24 C.F.R. § 982.615(b)(3). Based upon the prohibition under the C.F.R. which forbids a public housing agency from funding a unit occupied by an owner who is a blood relative of the Section 8 participant, by letters dated August 22, 2014, Respondent notified Petitioner and Ms. Williams that the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit was “ineligible housing” that could not be funded. The letters also informed Petitioner that Julia Williams' approval as a live-in aide did not supersede HUD regulations and that, because Julia Williams was occupying the unit, Respondent was terminating the HAP contract effective September 30, 2014. The only reason Respondent terminated the funding for the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit was because the C.F.R. does not allow Respondent to continue funding a unit occupied by its owner. Prior to the August 22nd letters, Respondent was advised by HUD that Respondent did not have any discretion in funding “ineligible housing.” HUD approved the draft of the August 22nd letters. The evidence does not support a finding that either Respondent or HUD waived or should otherwise be prevented from applying the limitations and requirements of the law that a Section 8 participant cannot be a blood relative of the resident owner. Respondent would have been willing to continue Petitioner’s housing assistance as long as Petitioner met program requirements and the housing was deemed eligible housing under the C.F.R. through the issuance of a new three-bedroom voucher for a different unit, or by having Petitioner live in the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit without Ms. Williams both owning and occupying the unit. By letter dated August 27, 2014, Respondent provided Petitioner with a new Section 8 voucher and voucher packet information so that Petitioner could start searching for a new rental unit where Ms. Williams could continue to serve as Petitioner’s live-in aide under Petitioner’s Section 8 voucher. The new voucher was required to be returned to Respondent by September 30, 2014. There was no testimony that Petitioner returned the new Section 8 voucher to Respondent by September 30, 2014, or that Ms. Williams moved out of 15141 Pomp Parkway by that date. On September 4, 2014, before the funding was terminated for the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit, Petitioner filed a complaint for discrimination. Petitioner emailed a signed three-bedroom voucher on October 30, 2014, a month after funding under the new voucher expired, for the rental of the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit that had already been deemed ineligible housing as defined by 24 C.F.R. § 982.316. That voucher is not valid and the facts fail to support a finding that Respondent’s refusal to allow Petitioner to participate in the Section 8 voucher program while occupying a unit owned and occupied by her daughter was because of Petitioner’s disability.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Complaint and Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED the 22nd day of May, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JAMES H. PETERSON, III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of May, 2015.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent, The Pines at Warrington, LP, et al., and Pinnacle, and American Management Service Company (The Pines), discriminated against Petitioner, Susan M. Walters (Ms. Walters), because of her disability and gender in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act, Sections 760.20- 760.37, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Ms. Walters, during times pertinent, suffered from schizophrenia, chronic differentiated type alcohol abuse, and a personality disorder. The Pines is an apartment community consisting of 160 units. The community is managed by Pinnacle, a subsidiary of American Management Services, LLC. Approximately 90 percent of the residents at The Pines are women. Ms. Walters completed a detailed application for residency in The Pines with Joy John (Ms. John), the facility's leasing specialist. Ms. Walters signed the application on October 24, 2007. She entered into a lease for a term of one year on October 31, 2007. During the course of these events, Ms. Walters did not claim a disability or mention that she was disabled. No one in management at The Pines perceived Ms. Walters to be disabled. During the application and contract process, Ms. Walters was provided with copies of the rules and regulations governing residents of The Pines. The lease required Ms. Walters to provide management at The Pines 60 day's notice, if she wanted to vacate the premises. In or around February 2008, Ms. Walters acquired a dog. She informed management at The Pines, and in accordance with the lease agreement, began making payments toward the required pet deposit. During April 2008, Ms. John and Dawn Chapman, Property Manager, received complaints about Ms. Walters' dog. The dog's barking was disturbing residents of The Pines. Four to five complaints were received each week during April. Ms. John and Ms. Chapman advised Ms. Walters of the complaints and provided her with suggestions as to how to ameliorate the problem. Nevertheless, the barking continued. On May 13, 2008, Ms. Walters was provided a "Seven Day Notice of Noncompliance with Opportunity to Cure," addressing the dog issue. It informed Ms. Walters that she must prevent the dog from disturbing other tenants. It further informed her that if the problem continued, she might be evicted. Another week of barking precipitated a "Seven Day Notice of Noncompliance with Possible Lease Termination Following." This was dated May 21, 2008, and signed by Dawn Chapman. The notice again made clear to Ms. Walters that if the barking continued she might be evicted. These notices were often given to other residents of The Pines when their barking dogs annoyed other tenants. Many of the residents of The Pines were minorities. One of them, Rhonda Lavender, complained about Ms. Walters because she put up a sign in a stairwell that included the word "nigger." Another resident, a disabled man who lived in the unit above her, complained that she "lambasted him" because he dropped a boot and it made a loud noise. Others complained about her coming out of the door to her apartment and screaming. None of the residents, who complained about Ms. Walters' barking dog, or her other offensive actions, mentioned her gender or that she was disabled. At no time during the residency of Ms. Walters at The Pines did she provide Ms. John or Ms. Chapman information with regard to having a disability. The only evidence of a disability presented at the hearing was a form Ms. Walters referred to as "a doctor's release for medical records," signed by an unidentified "physician." It was also agreed that Ms. Walters received payments based on a disability from the U.S. Social Security Administration. However, no evidence was adduced that indicated Ms. Walters was limited in one or more major life activities. Ms. Walters' rent payment for June was due June 5, 2008, but was not paid. On June 6, 2008, a "Three Day Notice- Demand for Payment of Rent or Possession" was affixed to the door of her apartment. The notice demanded payment of the sum of $518.00 or delivery of possession of the premises. The notice informed Ms. Walters that eviction proceedings would ensue if she did not pay in three days. By June 6, 2008, however, Ms. Walters had determined that she was going to vacate the premises. She told Ms. Chapman that she would pay her June rent on June 20, 2008, but this was a prevarication because Ms. Walters had no intention of paying any more rent. On or about July 4, 2008, Petitioner vacated her apartment. She placed her keys in the drop box designated for rental payments. The rent for June was never paid. Ms. Walters testified under oath that during her occupancy of the dwelling her bank card went missing. She stated that on another occasion $20 went missing from her apartment and that subsequently $10 disappeared. She said the fire alarm rang once for two hours. She said she was disturbed by noisy neighbors and a loud maintenance man. She said that once after returning from her job she discovered a glass plate in her apartment that had been shattered. She did not reveal any of these allegations to management at The Pines when they occurred, if they did occur. Ms. Walters claimed that someone entered her apartment in May and sprayed a chemical that encouraged her dog to defecate inside the apartment. She said she could not check her mail because management at The Pines had locked her out of her mailbox. She said someone came in and scratched her Teflon frying pan and burned up her microwave oven. She did not make these allegations to management at The Pines when they occurred, if they did occur. Even if one believes that her property was violated, and evidence to that effect was thin, there is no indication at all that anyone involved in managing The Pines was involved. Moreover, no adverse action was taken toward Ms. Walters. Two notices about barking dogs and a written demand that she pay rent do not amount to an adverse action.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Relief of Susan M. Walters be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of October, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of October, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Dawn Chapman The Pines at Warrington 4101 West Navy Boulevard Pensacola, Florida 32507 Angela North Olgetree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C. 301 Congress Avenue, Suite 1150 Austin, Texas 78701 Susan M. Walters 1112 Bartow Avenue Pensacola, Florida 32507 Monica Jerelle Williams, Esquire Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak, and Stewart, P.C. 100 North Tampa Street, Suite 3600 Tampa, Florida 33602 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Respondent, Bosshardt Property Management, LLC (“Bosshardt”), violated the Fair Housing Act as alleged in the Housing Charge of Discrimination.
Findings Of Fact The following Findings of Fact are made based on the exhibits and testimony offered at the final hearing. Ms. Rabalais is the owner of Lot 198 at Salt Springs Resort, a Florida recreational vehicle condominium established pursuant to chapter 718, Florida Statutes. As an owner of a lot in Salt Springs Resort, she is a member of SSRA, the homeowner’s association. Bosshardt is a Florida corporation providing community association management services and was the Community Association Manager (“CAM”) for SSRA from September 2013 until August 31, 2019. Bosshardt acted as the agent, and at the direction of SSRA, managed the business related to the property, including enforcement of SSRA rules and decisions of the Board of Directors. The CAM is the general point of contact for the association. The CAM would collect on bills and collect payments for assessment and manage the property. Petitioner contends Respondent subjected her to retaliation beginning after the filing of Petitioner’s HUD complaint. In support of her position, Petitioner points to alleged harassment by Ms. Noble, the failure to maintain her lawn and repaint her lot number, and removal of one of her posts from the townhall webpage. Throughout the hearing, Ms. Rabalais raised allegations about incidents that occurred before December 20, 2018, which is 365 days prior to the filing of her Complaint of Discrimination dated December 20, 2019. However, some of the facts will be discussed herein to help supplement and explain the alleged continued discrimination and to provide a more detailed record of Ms. Rabalais’s complaints. Golf Cart Incident Petitioner alleges that Bosshardt was responsible for housing discrimination and harassment arising out of an April 17, 2018, confrontation between Petitioner and Sharon Noble, a lot owner and former SSRA board member. Ms. Rabalais identified Ms. Noble as one of the worst of her neighbors who disliked her. At some point before Ms. Rabalais filed the complaint of discrimination, Ms. Noble and Ms. Rabalais were good friends. While there is a dispute regarding the nature of the relationship, at some point the friendship deteriorated. In 2016, a dispute arose between Ms. Rabalais and Ms. Noble over Ms. Rabalais’s intent to file a lawsuit against SSRA and Ms. Noble’s refusal to assist her. The dispute was referenced in emails between Ms. Rabalais and Ms. Noble and through Ms. Noble’s testimony at hearing. Ms. Noble acknowledged at the hearing that she and Ms. Rabalais were no longer friends. On April 17, 2018, Sharon Noble was driving her golf cart on the road in front of Ms. Rabalais’s lot. She stopped her cart to send a text message to someone. At around the same time, Ms. Rabalais attempted to enter her drive way. Ms. Rabalais was unable to enter the drive way as two carts could not drive on the road side by side. Ms. Rabalais began to blow her horn so Ms. Noble circled around behind Ms. Rabalais’s golf cart to allow her to drive pass her. Ms. Noble then finished her text message and left the area. Ms. Noble credibly testified that she did not attempt to intimidate Ms. Rabalais. Ms. Noble believed the incident was intentional and as a result, she wrote an incident report documenting the incident. Ms. Noble reported the incident to the SSRA. Jane Jorden was in Ms. Rabalais’s golf cart and witnessed the incident. She recalled that Ms. Noble was recording Ms. Rabalais’s lot and blocking the driveway with her golf cart. Ms. Rabalais became upset after Ms. Noble drove her cart behind her. Ms. Rabalais went to the guard gate to report the incident and call the police. Tom, one of the employees working at the guard gate, completed a report regarding the incident. Tom did not testify at the hearing and, thus, his statement about the incident is not relied upon for a finding of fact. It is simply used to supplement the testimony offered at the hearing. Tom did not observe the incident but rather reported that the police were called and took statements from Ms. Noble and Ms. Rabalais. SSRA sent Ms. Rabalais a letter advising her to contact the police if she is concerned about her safety. While Ms. Rabalais believes that she was subjected to discrimination and retaliation by Respondent by way of the actions of Ms. Noble, the fact is that Ms. Noble, and more importantly Bosshardt, was in no position to deny Ms. Rabalais access to common services and facilities under SSRA’s control. To the extent Ms. Rabalais believed her fellow neighbors disliked her or were not nice to her, that activity is not actionable as unlawful housing discrimination. The greater weight of the evidence establishes that the incident with Ms. Noble was a personal dispute that was not due to housing discrimination facilitated at the direction of Bosshardt. Lost Assessment Payment Between July 1, 2018, and October 1, 2018, a quarterly assessment accrued. Ms. Rabalais’s check with a send date of September 28, 2018, was mailed to Bosshardt using an address that was previously known to be Bosshardt’s address. However, the assessment check payment was returned and the label affixed to the envelope indicated that the mail was returned to sender, was not deliverable as addressed, and was unable to be forwarded. In order to qualify as a candidate for a position on the SSRA Board of Directors, all assessments must be paid before a designated date. As a result of the assessment check not being delivered before the deadline to declare candidacy, Ms. Rabalais did not meet the criteria to run for the Board. Ms. Rabalais alleges in her complaint that Bosshardt engaged in a discriminatory act by not accepting her payment so she could not run for the Board of Directors. There is no sufficient evidence to support this allegation. Although there was testimony from Ms. Nelson that there were suspicious circumstances surrounding delivery of the check, the evidence offered at hearing does not demonstrate that Bosshardt engaged in nefarious or discriminatory actions regarding the assessment payment. The greater weight of the evidence, however, established that the check was returned undelivered. Failure to Maintain Property and Paint Lot Number Ms. Rabalais alleged in her Complaint that Respondent failed to maintain her lawn and failed to repaint her lot number as it did for other lot owners. There was no clear indication that the conduct occurred on or after December 20, 2018. Generally, all lot owners received basic services. An exception would be if the lot owner has a “no trespassing” sign on the property. Diane Suchy worked as the designated CAM for SSRA. She testified that maintenance staff were employees of SSRA and worked at the direction of Bosshardt. They maintained common areas and the lawns of individual lot owners. The maintenance team also repaints the lot numbers as needed. Gary Gensberg, the maintenance supervisor, testified that he maintained Ms. Rabalais's lawn and conducted weed maintenance as needed. He also recalled that Ms. Rabalais did not have a large area that required maintenance. Regarding the lot numbers, they would be repainted if it was not visible. Ms. Rabalais's lot number was visible at the time in question. Mr. Gensberg credibly testified that he was never given instructions to not maintain Ms. Rabalais's lot. Despite the maintenance team maintaining Ms. Rabalais property as needed, the evidence established that Ms. Rabalais posted no trespassing signs on her property for an unknown period of time. Furthermore, there was no evidence to support a finding that if Ms. Rabalais’s lawn was not maintained or her lot number was not repainted, it was result of discrimination based on disability or retaliation. Townhall Facebook Group Page Gary Griffith, the Bosshardt president at the time of the allegations alleged in the Complaint, testified about the lot owners’ Facebook group page. Mr. Griffith testified that Bosshardt did not manage the Facebook group page. Rather, Mr. Foster, Brenda Harvey, and other lot owners, were administrators on the account. Thus, Bosshardt made no determination regarding who could post or remove posts from the account. The page had rules for posting including, the exclusion of posts that were argumentative, contained unfounded allegations, or attacked the Board of Directors. On February 4, 2019, Ms. Rabalais posted a message about her experience with litigation with SSRA and Bosshardt. At the end of that message she wrote, “SSRA/Bosshardt has caused a homeowner to kill himself and ruined many owners’ lives ….” The administrators determined the post was unsubstantiated and threatening and failed to comply with the guidelines established for the page. As a result, the post was removed. Based on the evidence offered at hearing, Bosshardt was not involved with removal of Ms. Rabalais’s February 4, 2019, post. Therefore, there was no evidence to establish that Bosshardt discriminated against Ms. Rabalais when her post was removed from the Town Hall page. Expert Testimony Petitioner offered the testimony of Gary Solomon, Ph.D., as an expert regarding HOA syndrome. He works as a professor at the College of Southern Nevada. HOA syndrome is not a recognized clinical disorder, and there are no peer-reviewed articles offered to support Dr. Solomon’s opinion. Despite his purported knowledge about HOA syndrome, he was unable to provide a basis for his conclusions. Dr. Solomon had not read the SSRA rules or policies and procedures; and he had no understanding of Florida condominium law. He was also unable to provide an opinion regarding whether Ms. Rabalais had suffered from HOA syndrome. Based on the evidence offered at hearing, Dr. Solomon was not accepted as an expert in this matter.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of April, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S YOLONDA Y. GREEN Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of April, 2021. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 John McDonough, Esquire Meier, Bonner, Muszynski, O'Dell & Harvey Suite 2000 260 Wekiva Springs Road Longwood, Florida 32779 Scarlett Rabalais Post Office Box 5224 Salt Springs, Florida 32134 Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of her religion or national origin in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Tal Simhoni ("Simhoni"), a Jewish woman who identifies the State of Israel as her place of national origin, at all times relevant to this action owned Unit No. 212 in Mimo on the Beach I Condominium (the "Condominium"), which is located in Miami Beach, Florida. She purchased this unit in 2009 and a second apartment (Unit No. 203) in 2010. Simhoni has resided at the Condominium on occasion but her primary residence, at least as of the final hearing, was in New York City. The Condominium is a relatively small community consisting of two buildings comprising 28 units. Respondent Mimo on the Beach I Condominium Association, Inc. ("Association"), a Florida nonprofit corporation, is the entity responsible for operating and managing the Condominium and, specifically, the common elements of the Condominium property. Governing the Association is a Board of Directors (the "Board"), a representative body whose three members, called "directors," are elected by the unit owners. Simhoni served on the Board for nearly seven years. From July 2010 until April 2011, she held the office of vice- president, and from April 2011 until June 1, 2017, Simhoni was the president of the Board. Simhoni's term as president was cut short when, in May 2017, she and the other two directors then serving with her on the Board were recalled by a majority vote of the Condominium's owners. The Association, while still under the control of the putatively recalled directors, rejected the vote and petitioned the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Condominiums, Timeshares, and Mobile Homes ("DBPR"), for arbitration of the dispute. By Summary Final Order dated June 1, 2017, DBPR upheld the recall vote and ordered that Simhoni, Marisel Santana, and Carmen Duarte be removed from office, effective immediately. The run-up to the recall vote entailed a campaign of sorts to unseat Simhoni, which, as might be expected, caused friction between neighbors. Without getting into details that aren't important here, it is fair to say that, generally speaking, the bloc opposed to Simhoni believed that she had poorly managed the Condominium, especially in connection with the use of Association funds. Some of Simhoni's critics were not shy about voicing their opinions in this regard, which—— understandably——led to hard feelings. Simhoni vehemently disputes the charges of her critics and, clearly, has not gotten over her recall election defeat, which she blames on false, unfair, and anti-Semitic accusations against her. This is a case of alleged housing discrimination brought under Florida's Fair Housing Act (the "Act"). Specifically, Simhoni is traveling under section 760.23(2), Florida Statutes, which makes it "unlawful to discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of race, color, national origin, sex, handicap, familial status, or religion." (Emphasis added). The applicable law will be discussed in greater detail below. The purpose of this brief, prefatory mention of the Act is to provide context for the findings of fact that follow. The principal goal of section 760.23(2) is to prohibit the denial of access to housing based on discriminatory animus. Simhoni, however, was not denied access to housing. She is, in fact, a homeowner. Contrary to what some might intuit, the Act is not an all-purpose anti-discrimination law or civility code; it does not purport to police personal disputes, quarrels, and feuds between neighbors, even ugly ones tinged with, e.g., racial or religious hostility. To the extent the Act authorizes charges based on alleged post-acquisition discrimination, such charges must involve the complete denial of services or facilities that are available in common to all owners as a term or condition of ownership——the right to use common areas, for example, pursuant to a declaration of condominium. Moreover, the denial of access to common services or facilities logically must result from the actions of a person or persons, or an entity, that exercises de facto or de jure control over access to the services or facilities in question. This is important because, while Simhoni believes that she was subjected to anti-Semitic slurs during her tenure as Board president, the fact is that her unfriendly neighbors——none of whom then held an office on the Board——were in no position to (and in fact did not) deny Simhoni access to common services and facilities under the Association's control, even if their opposition to her presidency were motivated by discriminatory animus (which wasn't proved). As president of the Board, Simhoni wound up on the receiving end of some uncivil and insensitive comments, and a few of her neighbors seem strongly to dislike her. Simhoni was hurt by this. That impolite, even mean, comments are not actionable as unlawful housing discrimination under section 760.23(2) is no stamp of approval; it merely reflects the relatively limited scope of the Act. Simhoni has organized her allegations of discrimination under six categories. Most of these allegations do not implicate or involve the denial of common services or facilities, and thus would not be sufficient to establish liability under the Act, even if true. For that reason, it is not necessary to make findings of fact to the granular level of detail at which the charges were made. The Mastercard Dispute. As Board president, Simhoni obtained a credit card for the Association, which she used for paying common expenses and other Association obligations such as repair costs. In applying for the card, Simhoni signed an agreement with the issuer to personally guarantee payment of the Association's account. It is unclear whether Simhoni's actions in procuring this credit card were undertaken in accordance with the Condominium's By-Laws, but there is no evidence suggesting that Simhoni was forced, encouraged, or even asked to co-sign the Association's credit agreement; she seems, rather, to have volunteered. Simhoni claims that she used personal funds to pay down the credit card balance, essentially lending money to the Association. She alleges that the Association has failed to reimburse her for these expenditures, and she attributes this nonpayment to anti-Semitism. There appears to be some dispute regarding how much money, if any, the Association actually owes Simhoni for common expenses. The merits of her claim for repayment are not relevant in this proceeding, however, because there is insufficient persuasive evidence in the record to support a finding that the Association has withheld payment based on Simhoni's religion or national origin. Equally, if not more important, is the fact that Simhoni's alleged right to reimbursement is not a housing "service" or "facility" available in common to the Condominium's owners and residents. Nonpayment of the alleged debt might constitute a breach of contract or support other causes of action at law or in equity, but these would belong to Simhoni as a creditor of the Association, not as an owner of the Condominium. In short, the Association's alleged nonpayment of the alleged debt might give Simhoni good legal grounds to sue the Association for, e.g., breach of contract or money had and received——but not for housing discrimination. The Estoppel Certificate. On September 20, 2017, when she was under contract to sell Unit No. 212, Simhoni submitted a written request to the Association for an estoppel certificate, pursuant to section 718.116(8), Florida Statutes. By statute, the Association was obligated to issue the certificate within ten business days——by October 4, 2017, in this instance. Id. The failure to timely issue an estoppel letter results in forfeiture of the right to charge a fee for preparing and delivering the certificate. § 718.116(8)(d), Fla. Stat. The Association missed the deadline, issuing the certificate one-week late, on October 11, 2017; it paid the prescribed statutory penalty for this tardiness, refunding the preparation fee to Simhoni as required. Simhoni attributes the delay to anti-Semitism. It is debatable whether the issuance of an estoppel letter is the kind of housing "service" whose deprivation, if based on religion, national origin, or another protected criterion, would support a claim for unlawful discrimination under the Act. The undersigned will assume for argument's sake that it is such a service. Simhoni's claim nonetheless fails because (i) the very statute that imposes the deadline recognizes that it will not always be met and provides a penalty for noncompliance, which the Association paid; (ii) a brief delay in the issuance of an estoppel letter is not tantamount to the complete deprivation thereof; and (iii) there is, at any rate, insufficient persuasive evidence that the minimal delay in issuing Simhoni a certificate was the result of discriminatory animus. Pest Control. Pest control is not a service that the Association is required to provide but, rather, one that may be provided at the discretion of the Board. During Simhoni's tenure as Board president, apparently at her urging, the Association arranged for a pest control service to treat all of the units for roaches, as a common expense, and the apartments were sprayed on a regular basis. If the exterminator were unable to enter a unit because, e.g., the resident was not at home when he arrived, a locksmith would be summoned to open the door, and the owner would be billed individually for this extra service. After Simhoni and her fellow directors were recalled, the new Board decided, as a cost-control measure, to discontinue the pest control service, allowing the existing contract to expire without renewal. Owners were notified that, during the phaseout, the practice of calling a locksmith would cease. If no one were home when the pest control operator showed up, the unit would not be sprayed, unless the owner had left a key with the Association or made arrangements for someone else to open his door for the exterminator. By this time, Simhoni's principal residence, as mentioned, was in New York. Although she knew that the locksmith option was no longer available, Simhoni failed to take steps to ensure that the pest control operator would have access to her apartment when she wasn't there. Consequently, Simhoni's unit was not sprayed on some (or perhaps any) occasions during the phaseout. Simhoni blames anti-Semitism for the missed pest control visits, but the greater weight of the evidence fails to support this charge. Simhoni was treated the same as everyone else in connection with the pest control service. Moreover, Simhoni was not completely deprived of access to pest control, which would have been provided to her if she had simply made arrangements to permit access to her unit. Short-term Rentals. Article XVII of the Condominium's Declaration of Condominium ("Declaration"), titled Occupancy and Use Restrictions, specifically regulates leases. Section 17.8 of the Declaration provides, among other things, that the Association must approve all leases of units in the Condominium, which leases may not be for a term of less than one year. In other words, the Declaration prohibits short-term, or vacation, rentals, which are typically for periods of days or weeks. Short-term rentals can be lucrative for owners, especially in places such as Miami Beach that attract tourists who might be interested in alternatives to traditional hotel lodgings. On the flip side, however, short-term rental activity is not necessarily welcomed by neighboring residents, who tend to regard transients as being insufficiently invested in preserving the peace, quiet, and tidy appearance of the neighborhood. At the Condominium, the question of whether or not to permit short-term rentals has divided the owners into competing camps. Simhoni is in favor of allowing short-term rentals. Accordingly, while she was Board president, the Association did not enforce the Declaration's prohibition of this activity. (It is possible, but not clear, that the Association was turning a blind eye to short-term rentals even before Simhoni became a director.) This laissez-faire approach did not sit well with everyone; indeed, dissatisfaction with short-term rentals provided at least some of the fuel for the ultimately successful recall effort that cost Simhoni her seat on the Board. After Simhoni and the rest of her Board were removed, the new directors announced their intent to enforce the Declaration's ban on short-term rentals. Simhoni alleges that the crackdown on short-term rentals was an act of religion-based housing discrimination. Her reasoning in this regard is difficult to follow, but the gist of it seems to be that the Association is selectively enforcing the ban so that only Simhoni and other Jewish owners are being forced to stop engaging in short-term rental activity; that the prohibition is having a disparate impact on Jewish owners; or that some owners are harassing Simhoni by making complaints about her to the City of Miami Beach in hopes that the City will impose fines against her for violating municipal restrictions on short-term rentals. The undersigned recognizes that a neutral policy such as the prohibition of short-term rentals conceivably could be enforced in a discriminatory manner, thus giving rise to a meritorious charge under the Act. Here, however, the evidence simply does not support Simhoni's contentions. There is insufficient evidence of disparate impact, disparate treatment, selective enforcement, harassment, or discriminatory animus in connection with the Association's restoration of the short-term rental ban. To the contrary, the greater weight of the evidence establishes that the Association is trying to stop short-term rentals at the Condominium for a perfectly legitimate reason, namely that a majority of the owners want section 17.8 of the Declaration to be given full force and effect. The Feud with Flores. Simhoni identifies Mr. and Ms. Flores as the worst of her antagonists among her neighbors. As advocates of the recall, these two were fierce critics of Simhoni. The Floreses reported Simhoni to the City of Miami Beach for engaging in short-term rentals without the required business tax receipt, in violation of the municipal code. At a code enforcement hearing, Mr. Flores gave Simhoni the finger. None of this, however, amounts to housing discrimination because the Floreses' actions did not completely deprive Simhoni of common facilities or services, even if such actions were motivated by anti-Semitism, which the greater weight of the evidence fails to establish. Indeed, there is no persuasive evidence that the Floreses ever had such control over the Condominium's facilities or services that they could have denied Simhoni access to them. Simhoni argues in her proposed recommended order, apparently for the first time, that the Floreses' conduct created a "hostile housing environment." Putting aside the legal problems with this belatedly raised theory, the Floreses' conduct was not sufficiently severe and pervasive, as a matter of fact, to support a "hostile environment" claim. Nor is there sufficient persuasive evidence in the record to support a finding that the Floreses acted in concert with the Board to harass Simhoni, or that the Board acquiesced to the Floreses' conduct. Roof Repairs. Simhoni alleges that the Association failed to repair the area of the roof over her unit, which she claims was damaged in Hurricane Irma, and that the Association has refused to make certain repairs inside her unit, which she asserts sustained interior water damage as a result of roof leaks. Simhoni asserts that, using Association funds, the Association not only repaired other portions of the roof, but also fixed interior damages similar to hers, for the benefit of non-Jewish owners. The greater weight of the persuasive evidence shows, however, that the roof over Simhoni's unit is not damaged, and that the Association never instructed the roofing contractor not to make needed repairs. Simhoni, in short, was not denied the service of roof repairs. As for the alleged damage to Simhoni's unit, section 7.1 of the Declaration provides that repairs to the interior of a unit are to be performed by the owner at the owner's sole cost and expense. The evidence fails to establish that the interior damage of which Simhoni complains falls outside of her duty to repair. Because this is a housing discrimination case, and not a legal or administrative proceeding to enforce the terms of the Declaration, it is neither necessary, nor would it be appropriate, for the undersigned to adjudicate fully the question of whether the Association is obligated to repair Simhoni's unit as a common expense. Here, it is sufficient to find (and it is found) that section 7.1 of the Declaration affords the Association a legitimate, nonpretextual, nondiscriminatory reason to refuse, as it has, to perform the interior repairs that Simhoni has demanded.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding the Association not liable for housing discrimination and awarding Simhoni no relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of February, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of February, 2019.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondents committed an act of discrimination based upon familial status against Petitioners in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact Petitioners own Unit L-105 at The Collins, located at 6917 Collins Avenue, Miami Beach, Florida 33141. Petitioners have a three-year-old daughter who resides with them and claim membership, for purposes of alleging discrimination under the Florida Fair Housing Act, in the class of familial status. Petitioners have exclusive use of their private patio, a limited common element, adjacent to their ground floor unit, subject to the terms and conditions, as well as the rules of the Association. This patio is in close proximity to the Association’s ungated common swimming pool. Unlike most of the condominiums on floors above the pool area, Petitioners’ unit does not have a glass protective barrier on their patio, or any barrier whatsoever installed outside their unit by the Association. All of the units located above Petitioners’ unit that have balconies that are raised from the pool’s surface in heights varying between the second floor and many floors above, without a glass barrier at the end of the balconies, would have a significant and dangerous drop to the pool level for anyone stepping over the edge. Petitioners owned Unit L-105 for 13 years before having a daughter, now three years old, which changed their status to familial for the past three years. Petitioners sought to have the Association allow them to install a glass barrier between their patio and the ungated pool in order to end their claim of discrimination based upon familial status and protect their daughter from accidentally falling into the pool if left unattended on the patio. Respondents refused to install or allow the installation of a glass barrier on Petitioners’ patio, citing that it would not conform with the rules and regulations of the condominium association concerning the common elements of the condominium. Petitioners installed what they called a “temporary” fence around their patio. The fence involved the drilling of holes into the concrete surface of the pool deck and installing posts and netting into the holes to create a fencelike barrier. Claiming this was not approved and not in conformance with the rules and regulations for the common elements of the condominium, the Association brought in workers who removed the fence, the posts, and filled in the holes that had been drilled into the concrete. The Association billed Petitioners $1,200 for having the removal and repair work done for the unapproved installation of the fence. At some point, after the fencing had been removed, Petitioners moved out of their condominium unit, but remain the owners of it. At the time of the hearing, Petitioners had pending in circuit court an action regarding the pool fence. No further details were given regarding the nature of the action and relief sought. Mr. Riveiro testified that he and his wife are willing to bear the cost, including any needed permits, parts, labor, and inspections for installing a temporary fence that will protect their daughter from accidentally falling into the pool. Mr. Blanco, the Association’s board president, who has served on the board of the Association for 15 or more years, testified that, during his tenure, the board has never discriminated against persons for any reason, including based upon their familial status. Respondents offered several solutions to Petitioners, including allowing a temporary fence that could be easily removed, but did not involve drilling holes in the common area of the pool deck. According to the local code enforcement officials, all that is required for garden or pool level doors that open to an “ungated pool” are door alarms to alert the occupants when the door is opened from inside or out. Mr. Riveiro testified that he could not use door alarms and keep his doors open to enjoy the breeze and fresh air because, after a time, the alarms sounded to remind the occupants the door has been left open. Because of this, Petitioners were not satisfied with setting up an internal fence that would keep their daughter from running out the door. An internal fence was superfluous since always keeping the doors closed avoids the need for a fence, but restricts Petitioners full use and enjoyment of their unit. If the residents wanted fences to be installed on the pool level, they would have to be uniform in design and function. Because this would be considered a material alteration to the common elements, 75 percent of the unit owners would have to vote in favor of such a change. A material alteration to the common elements was neither requested by Petitioners nor voted upon by the Association’s unit owners upon request from any individual, family, or the Association board itself.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding Respondents not liable for housing discrimination and dismissing Petitioners’ Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of April, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT S. COHEN Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of April, 2021. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 Darrin Gursky, Esquire Gursky Ragan, P.A. 141 Northeast 3rd Avenue Miami, Florida 33132 Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 Fernando Riveiro 14838 Southwest 35th Street Davie, Florida 33331 Mayelin Perez 4495 Southwest 67th Terrace, No. 207 Davie, Florida 33314
The Issue Whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner based upon Petitioner’s race or handicap in providing housing assistance. Whether Respondent, in providing housing assistance, failed to make reasonable accommodations for Petitioner’s physical disability.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner and his family have been in subsidized housing for many years. Most recently, housing assistance has been provided by the Alachua County Housing Authority, first through the Tenant Based Rental Assistance (TBRA) program and, currently, through Section 8 subsidized housing. At the time of the administrative hearing, Petitioner and his family were still in Section 8 housing administered by Respondent. Under the TBRA program, the Castellio family was required to meet regularly with Housing Authority staff and their affiliates. They also had to meet certain performance standards relative to employment searches and maintenance of the household. Petitioner’s family was often unable to meet those performance standards-–particularly with respect to employment and payment of electrical bills. Because of his interactions with Respondent's staff, Petitioner had earned the reputation of being loud, demanding, and physically imposing. In one incident, Petitioner tried to prevent one of Respondent's workers from mowing his yard by physically blocking the lawn mower, even though such maintenance was required under the government program and was also an issue of local code enforcement. More than one of Respondent's staff reported that Petitioner would raise his voice when he was in Respondent's Housing Authority office. Some of Respondent's staff were intimidated by Petitioner. Because of this, the director of the Alachua Housing Authority, Gail Monahan, was tasked with dealing with Petitioner and the Castellio family. The pertinent part of Petitioner's Complaint states: My name is Christopher S.A. Castellio. My wife's name is Ethelyn L. Reese-Castello. We are the proud parents of five children which ages are 5, 7, 9, 11, and 16. Our 16 year old is living in Bend, Oregon with his uncle who has more resources to provide for him. Approximately for two years now, my family and I have lived on Section 8 through the Alachua County Housing Authority here in Gainesville, Florida. We have to report to the Executive Director of the Alachua County Housing Authority, Ms. Gail Monahan, every Wednesday of every week in order to report progress of trying to become self supporting and financial independent. During this time I have been humiliated in front of my wife, Ms. Monahan's office staff, other customers and patrons and, most humiliating, in front of my own kids. Ms. Gail Monahan has absolutely no compassion, professionalism, or moral conduct. Ms. Gail Monahan has called me everything but a child of God. In front of my kids, she has called me a lying sack of s-t, a sorry son of a b--h, a con artist, a--hole, and an f--wad. One day I just walked into her office and the first thing she said was, "hay you little s--tbird, what have you done s--ted out today." I served 6 years in the United States Marine Corps during Desert Storm from 1986 until 1992. While serving I injured my knee in Kuwait. I returned to the states where I underwent knee surgery. I was honorably discharged several months later. Ms. Monahan says I'm lying about my service, despite my service and medical records. Right now I am in constant pain in both my knees and my back. I have taken two MRI's for both knees and my doctor says that I desperately need a total right knee replacement and a basic left knee operation based on my MRI's. Ms. Monahan also says that's a lie. And she refuses to look at any doctor's reports. She said I probably faked them. Ever since I've been meeting with Ms. Monahan she has always had something discrimitory [sic], degrading, intimidating, and threaten [sic] to say to me. She always threatens to take our housing away from us, like she's doing right now, if we don't do exactly what she says to do. I do believe that she is prejudice [sic] against me because I am a very, very light-skinned black man with red hair and freckles. I do look like a white man to most people and my wife is very dark skinned African American. We have done everything she has told us to do but still she says that we have done nothing. She does not take into consideration the bad economy and that jobs are very hard to come by and that more and more people are being laid off every day. So she is going to make a family with 4 small children become homeless just because I can't work because of my back and my knees and because my wife couldn't find a job in today's economy. By the way, my wife has finally found a job working at Wal-mart. We finally received a letter from Ms. Monahan informing us of the termination of tenant based rental assistance. In the allotted time of seven working days, I have answered her letter in writing, requesting a hearing to appeal her decision. As of the date of this letter, I have not received anything or any notice of any hearing from Ms. Monahan. I will fax you a copy of both letters. Our move out date has been set as December 31st, 2009. Consistent with his Complaint, Petitioner testified that Ms. Monahan, the director of the Alachua County Housing Authority treated him badly, believed he was lazy, and questioned whether he suffered from a physical disability. In further support of the allegations, Petitioner’s wife, Ms. Reese-Castellio, testified that Gail Monahan was “mean” to their family. According to Ms. Reese-Castellio, Ms. Monahan called Petitioner a liar, said that he “didn’t give a damn” about his family, and suggested to her that she should consider leaving Petitioner. At the final hearing, Ms. Monahan admitted that she did not respect Mr. Castellio because he did not appear to be making any effort to support his family. She denied, however, that she cursed at him, and testified that she never discriminated against Petitioner or his family. While it is clear that there was personal animosity between Petitioner and Ms. Monahan, the evidence was insufficient to show that either Ms. Monahan or Respondent discriminated against Petitioner or his family. On cross-examination, Ms. Reese-Castellio disclosed that Ms. Monahan's remarks were only directed toward Petitioner, and that Ms. Monahan did not use racial epithets or otherwise give any indication that she was discriminating against Petitioner or his family because of race, handicap, or any other impermissible factor. Petitioner's wife further testified that she had no complaints about any of the other staff members at the Housing Authority. Likewise, Petitioner failed to provide evidence that either Ms. Monahan or Respondent has ever acted in a discriminatory manner toward him or his family based on race, ethnicity, handicap, or any other impermissible basis. Further, the evidence presented at the final hearing did not show that either Petitioner or his family have ever been denied housing assistance by Respondent. In fact, the evidence revealed that Petitioner and his family’s housing benefits administered by Respondent have never been interrupted or denied, and that the Castellio family has been treated at least as well, if not better, than other housing clients served by Respondent. In addition to administering basic housing benefits under TBRA and the Section 8 program, Respondent arranged to pay over $1,300 to repair Petitioner’s family car, paid for utilities when the Castellios were unable to do so, and provided bus vouchers and other transportation for the family on a regular basis. Respondent’s decision to provide these additional benefits was made by Ms. Monahan. At the final hearing, both Petitioner and his wife confirmed that Respondent had provided additional assistance and that Gail Monahan had control over these additional benefits. Neither Petitioner nor Ms. Reese-Castellio offered an explanation for why Ms. Monahan would go “above and beyond” the requirements of subsidized housing in order to assist the Castellio family. Ms. Monahan, in her credible testimony, explained that she had considerable compassion for Ethelyn Castellio and the Petitioner’s children, and that her compassion led her to offer extensive support for the Castellio family beyond simple housing assistance. Although Petitioner testified that the family was rejected as potential tenants at an apartment complex known as “Eden Park” after initially being accepted by the private landlord, and said that he believed that Gail Monahan had something to do with the rejection, Petitioner offered no evidence to support that belief. Ms. Monahan stated that neither she nor anyone from the Housing Authority spoke to anyone at Eden Park regarding the Petitioner or his family. She explained that tenants are responsible for locating suitable housing which is then inspected and approved by the Housing Authority. The credible testimony of Ms. Monahan, together with Petitioner's own testimony and admissions, demonstrated that Respondent did not interfere in the Eden Park situation, and never delayed inspections or unreasonably rejected any housing benefits for the Castellio family. In addition, while indeed, as alleged in the Complaint, Respondent issued a letter informing Petitioner that his family's rental assistance was scheduled to be terminated, the evidence adduced at the final hearing showed that the letter was issued in error, and that it was withdrawn. Finally, while the Commission states on page 5 of its Determination of no cause dated February 16, 2010, that “Complainant alleged he requested a reasonable accommodation, and Respondents denied his request,” a plain reading of the Complaint, quoted in paragraph 7, above, does not reveal that Petitioner ever alleged that Respondent failed to accommodate his disability. Moreover, the applications Petitioner and his family filed in 2008 and 2009 to obtain housing assistance from the Respondent state that the family was not seeking any accommodations on account of disability and that no one in the family suffered from any physical handicap. At the final hearing, Petitioner confirmed that the family never asked Respondent for accommodation based on any physical disability and reported in their applications that no member of the family was handicapped or required an accommodation.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Complaint and Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of November, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JAMES H. PETERSON, III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of November, 2010.
