The Issue The issue is whether Respondent's license to operate a family day care home should be revoked.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the testimony and evidence received at the hearing, the following findings are made: Parties The Department is the state agency responsible for licensing and regulating child care facilities, including family day care homes. The Department routinely conducts inspections of licensed family day care homes to determine whether the home is in compliance with the applicable statutes and rules. Any problems found during the inspection are noted on a report which is provided to the home's operator immediately following the inspection. When appropriate, the inspection report provides a time frame within which the problems must be corrected. Regular inspections are conducted approximately twice a year. More frequent inspections -- monthly or every six weeks - - are conducted on family day care homes which have a provisional license rather than a standard license. The Department also conducts inspections in response to complaints it receives, and it has the authority to inspect family day care homes at any time with or without notice. Respondent is the owner and operator of a licensed family day care home located at 1218 Jordan Avenue in Orlando, Florida (hereafter "Respondent's facility" or "the facility"). Respondent and her husband reside at that address as well. Respondent has operated day care homes in Florida since 1992, and she has been involved in child care for approximately 21 years. As a result, she is or should be familiar with the rules regulating family day care homes. Respondent keeps children in the back portion of her home. The children also play in Respondent's backyard, which is enclosed by an approximately six-foot high wooden fence. A wooden gate in the fence connects Respondent's backyard to the backyard of the house immediately behind Respondent's home. That house has been rented by Annette Rodgers since November 2002. Respondent does not have a pool in her yard. Ms. Rodgers' yard does have a pool, which at the time of the Department's February 27, 2003 inspection (discussed below), was only partially filled with water. Ms. Rodgers' pool is not visible from Respondent's back yard because of the wooden fence and gate. The photographs and videotape received into evidence show that Ms. Rodgers' pool is now completely enclosed by a series of fences.4 The evidence does not clearly and convincingly establish that the fences were not in place on February 27, 2003. Indeed, the weeds and high grass which can be seen along the base of and around the posts of the chain-link fence and the discoloration on some of the fence posts indicate that at least that fence has been in place for quite some time.5 Previous Inspections of Respondent's Facility and Actions Taken by the Department Respondent's facility was inspected on May 28, June 14, and September 30, 2002. Several areas of noncompliance were identified during each of those inspections, including inadequate supervision of children, unsafe storage of chemicals, evidence of roaches in the home, and incomplete enrollment and health records for the children at the home. On each occasion, Respondent was given a period of time within which to correct the areas of noncompliance. The inadequate supervision for which Respondent was cited in June 14, 2002, involved several children playing unsupervised in Respondent's carport area, which has access to the street; several children playing in the backyard under the "supervision" of Respondent's mother, who was not an authorized caregiver; and several children playing unsupervised on the porch area in the vicinity of tools and small screws. The Department issued Respondent a provisional license on October 28, 2002, presumably as part of the license renewal process. The provisional license was based upon Respondent's history of noncompliance with the Department's minimum standards, and it was valid through April 2, 2003, unless Respondent applied for an received a change in license status (which she apparently did not) or "if the license is suspended or revoked by the Department." A provisional license is issued where the Department has continued concerns regarding the day care home's compliance with the applicable statutes and rules. A provisional license is issued in lieu of denying a license renewal or suspending or revoking the home's license. A provisional license gives the licensee an opportunity to correct the areas of noncompliance, and because such homes are inspected more frequently, the Department has an opportunity to monitor the licensee's progress. On October 29, 2002, Respondent was assessed an administrative fine of $100.00 based upon deficiencies identified during the May 28 and June 14, 2002, inspections. The fine was based primarily upon the incident described above involving inadequate supervision of the children at the home. Respondent apparently did not contest the administrative fine or the issuance of the provisional license rather than a standard license. Despite the provisional license and the administrative fine, the Department's inspections continued to identify areas of noncompliance at Respondent's facility. For example, the November 14, 2002, inspection identified "evidence of rodents/vermin in the home" as well as incomplete enrollment and immunization records for the children in the home. The December 18, 2002, inspection identified these same deficiencies, including "live roaches in the children's area and the kitchen," as well as the storage of plastic shopping bags and chemicals which can pose dangers to children in an unlocked cabinet accessible to the children. These violations were the same as or similar to those for which Respondent had been previously cited and which led to the imposition of the administrative fine and issuance of the provisional license. The Department did not take immediate action to suspend or revoke Respondent's license based upon the results of the November 14 and December 18, 2002, inspections. Instead, the Department continued to give Respondent an opportunity to bring her home into compliance with the minimum standards in the Department's licensing rules and statutes. Inspection of Respondent's Facility on February 27, 2003 The Department next inspected Respondent's facility on February 27, 2003. That inspection was conducted by Department employee Brandi Blanchard. Ms. Blanchard had been responsible for inspecting Respondent's facility since at least September 2002, so she was familiar with the layout of the facility and its history of noncompliance. Respondent testified that Ms. Blanchard, unlike the prior inspector, had been "very good to her." Ms. Blanchard arrived at Respondent's facility by car between 8:30 a.m. and 8:45 a.m. As she arrived, Respondent was pulling her car into the driveway/carport at the facility. Ms. Blanchard parked her car directly behind Respondent's car. Ms. Blanchard got out of her car as Respondent was getting out of hers, and she said, "Hello, Ms. Alli," to Respondent. Upon seeing Ms. Blanchard, Respondent quickly went into the house through the carport door. Ms. Blanchard followed Respondent into the facility. Ms. Blanchard lost sight of Respondent as she went down a hallway towards the back of the house where the children were located. The backdoor of the house was open, and by the time that Ms. Blanchard caught up with Respondent, Respondent was directing the children through the facility's backyard towards the back gate connecting Respondent's yard to Ms. Rodgers' yard. Several of the children, led by Ms. Rodgers' 14-year-old son carrying an infant in a car seat and Ms. Rodgers' 13-year-old son carrying a toddler had already reached Ms. Rodgers' yard. Ms. Blanchard told Respondent to stop and return to the facility with the children, which she did. Ms. Blanchard went through the open gate onto Ms. Rodgers' property and directed Ms. Rodgers' sons to return to Respondent's facility with the children, which they did. While on Ms. Rodgers' property, Ms. Blanchard saw a partially-filled swimming pool and other ongoing construction. Ms. Blanchard did not notice any fencing around the pool and saw one of the children, which she estimated to be three or four years old, walking in the construction area close to the edge of the pool. After the children had been returned, Ms. Blanchard assessed the situation and commenced her inspection of the remainder of Respondent's facility. Ms. Blanchard found roach droppings in the bathtub and in other locations in the facility. Respondent acknowledged a roach problem, but claimed that she had an exterminator working on the problem and that he was due to come out and treat the facility. Respondent did not present any documentation to Ms. Blanchard to corroborate her claims regarding the exterminator, nor did she introduce such documentation at the hearing. Ms. Blanchard found plastic bags in an unlocked cabinet accessible to the children. Respondent acknowledged at the hearing that the bags were in the cabinet and further acknowledged the suffocation danger that they posed to young children. Ms. Blanchard's review of the facility's records identified missing enrollment and immunization records for the children in the home. However, Ms. Blanchard did not document the children whose records were missing and she did not determine whether, as Respondent claimed at the time and in her testimony at the hearing, any of the missing records were for students who had enrolled in Respondent's facility within the prior two weeks. Ms. Blanchard documented the results of her inspection, including the events surrounding the movement of the children to Ms. Rodgers' yard on her inspection report. The inspection report identified each of the violations that she observed, including inadequate supervision based upon Respondent's absence from the facility, unsafe storage of materials dangerous to children (i.e., plastic bags) in a location accessible to the children, evidence of roaches, incomplete enrollment and immunization records, and more than the allowed number of children in the home. Ms. Blanchard also cited Respondent's facility for the dangers posed by Ms. Rodgers' pool since the children were being taken onto Ms. Rodgers' property. With respect to the citation for having too many children, Ms. Blanchard's inspection report did not include any detailed information about the children such as their names (or initials), ages, or descriptions. The report simply stated that Ms. Blanchard counted seven children at the facility -- i.e., "3 infants, 3 preschool and 1 school age child." Ms. Blanchard's testimony at the hearing referred to only two infants, which was consistent with Respondent's testimony on that issue. As a result, the evidence is not clear and convincing that there were seven children in Respondent's care at the facility rather than the authorized six children. During the course of her inspection, Ms. Blanchard did not see any adults (other than Respondent, who arrived as Ms. Blanchard was arriving) at the facility. It is undisputed that Respondent's husband, who is the designated substitute caregiver, was not at the facility that morning. There is no credible evidence that Respondent's 22- year-old son, Abdel, was at the facility that morning. He did not testify at the hearing, and, if as Respondent claims, Abdel was at the facility that morning, Ms. Blanchard would have seen him at some point during the commotion surrounding Respondent's rushing the children out the back door or during her subsequent inspection of the facility. In any event, Abdel was not the substitute caregiver designated by Respondent. He was not even authorized to watch the children because, although he had been background screened by the Department, he had not taken the Department's mandatory child care training program and was not certified in cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR). It is more likely than not that Ms. Rodgers' teenage sons were actually left to supervise the children at Respondent's facility during the time that Respondent was gone on the morning of February 27, 2003. Indeed, that is the most likely explanation of their presence at the facility and their involvement in the movement of the children to Ms. Rodgers' yard. However, the evidence on this issue is not clear and convincing. Respondent's explanation of her actions on the morning of the inspection -- i.e., that she hurried into the house upon her arrival and directed all of the children to Ms. Rodgers' yard so she could convey an important message to Ms. Rodgers -- is not credible. Her explanation of the roach droppings that Ms. Blanchard found in the bathtub -- i.e., that it was actually dirt from washing one of the children's feet -- is also not credible. By contrast, Respondent's explanation of the incomplete records -- i.e., that the missing records were for those children who had enrolled in the facility within the prior two weeks -- is reasonable. Because Ms. Blanchard's inspection report did not identify the children whose records were missing and did not document the date of their enrollment, the evidence is insufficient to prove this violation. Respondent admitted at the hearing that she "was taking a chance" by leaving the children at the facility without her husband, the designated substitute caregiver, being present. Respondent testified that she was gone only 15 minutes to drop one of her children off at school, and that she follows that same routine every day although her husband is usually at the facility while she is gone. After Ms. Blanchard completed her inspection, she discussed the results with Respondent and provided Respondent a copy of the inspection report. Ms. Blanchard then went back to her office and discussed the results of the inspection with her supervisor, Patricia Richardson. Based upon the results of the February 27, 2003, inspection and the history of noncompliance at Respondent's facility (both before and after the provisional license), Ms. Richardson determined that Respondent's license should be revoked. Thereafter, on February 28, 2003, Ms. Richardson sent a letter to Respondent informing her that her license was being revoked and advising Respondent of her right to "appeal" that decision through the administrative process.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Family Services issue a final order revoking Respondent's license to operate a family day care home. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of June, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S T. KENT WETHERELL, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of June, 2003.
The Issue At issue in this case is whether Petitioner's application to register as a family day care home should be granted.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing, and the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: This case involves Petitioner's application to operate a registered family child care home. Petitioner had been registered as a family child care home from April 1989 to June 1992 and again from February 1995 to August 1998. The Department received Petitioner's most recent application on September 6, 2000. The Department regulates three types of day care facilities. In descending order of regulatory oversight, they are a licensed child care facility, a licensed family child care home, and a registered family child care home. Sections 402.305 and 402.313, Florida Statutes. While the first two categories of facilities require annual on-site Department inspections, background screening for all personnel, training, and more extensive paperwork, a registered family day care center involves no Department inspections and only requires that the operator complete a training course and provide to the Department certain paperwork and that the operator and other household members undergo background screening. The operator of a registered family day care home may care for no more than five preschool children from more than one unrelated family. Subsection 402.302(7), Florida Statutes. The application requires disclosure of "other family/household members." Petitioner's application identified David Barcelona as a household member and stated that his family relationship was "friend (roommate)." During her previous periods of registration, Petitioner had been the subject of numerous complaints to the Department. In May 1989, the Department notified Petitioner that she had been found to be caring for more than five preschool children. Petitioner acknowledged that she was operating above capacity, but assured the Department that the situation would be rectified by June 1, 1989. Nonetheless, complaints regarding the number of children at Petitioner's home persisted through at least June 1991. The Department also received several complaints concerning drug use in Petitioner's home. In September 1995, a complaint alleged that Petitioner and several other adults were seen smoking marijuana in the home. A complaint filed by a parent in February 1996 stated that the parent could smell marijuana on his children when he picked them up from Petitioner's home. A complaint from November 1996 stated that Petitioner was seen smoking marijuana in the presence of the children in her care. In each instance, the Department wrote a letter to Petitioner. The Department's letter of February 26, 1996, is representative and is quoted in relevant part: As a registered family day care home, you are not statutorily required to meet all the child care standards established in [then] Rule 10M-12 or 10M-10 of the Florida Administrative Code. In addition, Chapter 402.302-313 of the Florida Statutes does not provide the department with any statutory authority to regulate complaints of this nature within registered family day care homes. However, in the interest of safety and proper child care, we wanted to bring the complaint to your attention so that you might correct the issues as appropriate. Providing care for any child is very important. It is our hope that you are not engaging in any illegal or inappropriate activities which [sic] operating your child care business. During the Department's investigations of these complaints, Petitioner consistently denied that she used any illegal drugs. On August 10, 1998, the Department received a complaint that an unsupervised child was seen outside in the rain at Petitioner's house. On the same date, the Department received another complaint regarding Petitioner's live-in boyfriend, David Barcellona, and whether his presence rendered her home an unsafe environment for children. The complaint stated that Mr. Barcellona had not undergone background screening and had admitted to hitting one of Petitioner's own children. The complaint also stated that children reported witnessing Petitioner's use of marijuana and crack cocaine in the home. These complaints were resolved when Petitioner ceased providing child care. She sold her house and voluntarily relinquished her registration. A child protective services investigation was also commenced on August 10, 1998, by investigator Daniel McLean. His investigation confirmed that Mr. Barcellona had hit Petitioner's ten-year-old son "upside the head with an open hand" because the boy had called him a "faggot." Petitioner had given Mr. Barcellona permission to physically discipline her children. The children expressed a fear of living in the home with Mr. Barcellona. No observable injuries were found on either Petitioner's son or her eight-year-old daughter. Mr. McLean testified that Petitioner told him at least twice that she had smoked marijuana for 15 years. Mr. McLean attempted several times to obtain a drug screen from Petitioner without success. At length, Mr. McLean informed Petitioner that the Department would begin legal proceedings if Petitioner did not voluntarily surrender custody of her children to their natural father. On August 13, 1998, Petitioner signed the papers giving custody of the children to their natural father. She testified that "I picked the drugs over my children at that time." The evidence admitted at hearing established that, despite her denials, Petitioner had been a long-time user of marijuana. By her own admission, Petitioner was addicted to crack cocaine for a period of at least three months in 1998. Petitioner's sister, Lisa Lucius, estimated Petitioner's crack usage lasted for six months. Mr. McLean testified that Petitioner told him she had been using crack for seven months. At some point in 1999, Petitioner shoplifted a pair of tennis shoes, was arrested, and placed on one year's probation for petit theft. Her probation was conditioned upon her entering a 28-day live-in drug rehabilitation and counseling program at the Ruth Cooper Center in Fort Myers. Petitioner successfully completed this program. Another condition of her probation was her attendance twice weekly at Alcoholics Anonymous meetings. She complied with this condition. Finally, Petitioner's probation was conditioned upon providing random urinalysis drug tests. She complied with this condition, and her tests were all drug free. Petitioner testified that she has been drug free since completing the program at the Ruth Cooper Center. Since the conclusion of her probation in 2000, she has discontinued attendance at Alcoholics Anonymous or Narcotics Anonymous meetings. She testified that she no longer has a drug problem. In the registration application at issue in this proceeding, Petitioner listed David Barcellona as a family/household member. Both Petitioner and Mr. Barcellona were required to undergo Level 2 background screening as set forth in Subsection 435.04(1), Florida Statutes. Petitioner successfully passed the background screening and was so notified by a letter from the Department dated October 24, 2000. The letter informed Petitioner that she had passed the screening, but expressly cautioned: "Receipt of this letter does not automatically qualify you for the employment, specific position or license you may be seeking. That determination will be made [by] either an employer or licensing department." The background screening disclosed potentially disqualifying offenses for David Barcellona. As of November 6, 2000, the Department had sent Mr. Barcellona a letter offering him the opportunity to provide documentation as to the disposition of those offenses, but Mr. Barcellona had not responded. On October 31, 2000, Petitioner phoned Sarah Jarabek of the Department to inquire as to the status of her application. Ms. Jarabek told Petitioner that the Department had concerns about her history of substance abuse and about the presence of Mr. Barcellona in the home. They made an appointment to meet in Ms. Jarabek's office on November 6, 2000. On November 6, 2000, Petitioner and Ms. Lucius met with Ms. Jarabek, Nancy Starr, and Patricia Richardson of the Department. Petitioner provided evidence of the drug abuse treatment she had received while on probation. She also produced documentation that she had completed the required 30- hour Family Child Care Training Course, documentation of her church attendance and completion of a single parenting program at her church, and documentation that she had taken a technical training course for legal secretaries. Ms. Jarabek testified that she accepted all of Petitioner's representations at the meeting regarding her treatment and other matters, but that concerns remained because of Petitioner's history of denying her drug use and because the lonely, pressure-filled business of family day care might prove a poor rehabilitative environment. Ms. Starr testified that she believed more time should pass for Petitioner to demonstrate that she was not subject to a relapse. Petitioner had only been off probation since March 2000, and had yet to demonstrate her stability when her activities were not being constantly monitored. Ms. Starr was also concerned because Petitioner was not currently involved in any organized program to maintain her recovery and because Petitioner had denied using drugs when the complaints were filed in 1996 through 1998. At the November 6 meeting, the Department's representatives also raised the question of Mr. Barcellona's continued presence in the house. Petitioner told them that she had broken up with Mr. Barcellona and ejected him from her house, because she thought he was smoking crack cocaine. She told them that Mr. Barcellona had continued to harass her. He would bang on her door late at night, screaming, "I love you." He would spray his cologne outside her house, to "leave his scent." Petitioner and her children were "terrified" of him, and Petitioner was in the process of obtaining a restraining order against him. Ms. Jarabek believed Petitioner's statement that Mr. Barcellona was no longer living in the house, but remained concerned for the safety of children who would be staying at Petitioner's home, given Mr. Barcellona's erratic behavior. By letter dated November 14, 2000, David Barcellona was notified that he was ineligible for a position subject to background screening. Mr. Barcellona had not responded to the prior agency letter offering him the opportunity to provide documentation regarding the disposition of the disqualifying offenses. As the applicant for registration, Petitioner received a copy of the letter to Mr. Barcellona. By letter dated December 1, 2000, the Department notified Petitioner that her application to operate a registered family child care home had been denied. The letter cited the following as grounds for the denial: the history of at least 13 complaints regarding the operation of the home during Petitioner's previous registration periods, including six complaints related to Petitioner's use of marijuana and/or cocaine in the presence of her own or other people's children; the unreported presence of Mr. Barcellona in the home during Petitioner's previous registration periods; and the lack of sufficient time and evidence to demonstrate that Petitioner was capable of providing a safe and healthy environment for children in her care. Petitioner contended that the Department waived its ability to hold her prior complaints against her now because it repeatedly allowed her to re-register during the relevant years despite those complaints. Ms. Jarabek testified that this apparent anomaly was due to a change in Department policy since Petitioner was last registered. The Department previously took the position that it was required to ignore drug usage in a registered family day care home, because Section 402.313, Florida Statutes, did not expressly provide authority to deny or revoke a registration on that ground. Ms. Jarabek testified that the Department's current interpretation of its statutory authority to supervise the provision of child care permits it to consider drug usage in the home. The December 1 letter took note of the "positive changes" in Petitioner's life, but also noted that these changes were too recent to overcome the concerns about Petitioner's past behavior and future stability.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Family Services deny Petitioner's application for registration of her family day care home. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of May, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___________________________________ LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of May, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard D. Lakeman, Esquire Law Office of Richard D. Lakeman, P.A. Post Office Box 101580 Cape Coral, Florida 33910 Eugenie G. Rehak, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services Post Office Box 60085 Fort Myers, Florida 33906 Virginia A. Daire, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204B 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner is entitled to issuance of a license to operate a family day care home, pursuant to chapter 402, Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 65C-20.008.
Findings Of Fact The Parties Petitioner, Shaguandra Ruffin Bullock, is an applicant for a family day care home license for the Ruffin Bullock Family Day Care Home. Respondent is the state agency responsible for licensing family day care homes in Florida. § 402.312(1), Fla. Stat. Events Giving Rise to this Proceeding A "family day care home" is an occupied residence in which child care is regularly provided for children from at least two unrelated families and which receives a payment, fee, or grant for any of the children receiving care, whether or not operated for profit. § 402.302(8), Fla. Stat. On or about July 6, 2017, Petitioner filed an application to operate a family day care home. Respondent reviewed the application and determined that it was incomplete, pending completion of the background screening required by sections 402.313(3), 402.305, and 402.3055.2/ On or about December 8, 2017, Respondent sent Petitioner a Notice of Intent to Deny Family Day Care Home Licensure ("NOI"), informing her of Respondent's intent to deny her application for a family day care home. The NOI stated, in pertinent part: On October 10, 2017, the Department received background clearance letters from child care personnel at Respondent's Family Day Care Home. Pursuant to Section 402.313(3), Florida Stat., childcare personnel in family day care homes are subject to applicable screening provisions. Pursuant to Section 402.302(15), Florida Stat. and Section 39.201(6), Florida Stat., The Department assessed the background of child care personnel at Respondent's family day care home including, but not limited to information from the central abuse hotline. The Department's assessment revealed the Respondent did not meet minimum standards for child care personnel upon screening which requires personnel to have good moral character pursuant to Section 402.305(2)(a), Florida Stat. The foregoing violates Rule 65C- 22.008(3), Fla. Admin. Code,[3/] Section 402.305(2)(a), Fla. Stat. and Section 402.313(3), Florida Stat. Based on the foregoing, Ruffin Bullock Family Day Care Home's, [sic] pending licensure application will be denied. Evidence Adduced at the Hearing At the final hearing, Respondent acknowledged that the background screening for Petitioner and her husband, Marlon Bullock, did not reveal that either had ever engaged in any of the offenses identified in section 435.04, Florida Statutes, which establishes the level 2 screening standards applicable to determining good moral character in this proceeding, pursuant to section 402.305(2)(a).4/ Rather, Respondent proposes to deny Petitioner's license application solely based on two confidential investigative summaries ("CIS reports") addressing incidents—— one involving Petitioner that occurred over 11 years ago, and one ostensibly involving Marlon Bullock that allegedly occurred almost 11 years ago. The CIS report for Intake No. 2007-310775-01 addresses an incident that occurred on or about January 16, 2007. Petitioner acknowledges that the incident addressed in the CIS report for Intake No. 2007-310775-01 occurred. Petitioner testified, credibly and persuasively, that at the time of the incident, Petitioner and her then-husband, Bernard L. Johnson, were going through a very difficult, emotionally-charged divorce. Petitioner went to Johnson's home to retrieve their minor children. An argument between her and Johnson ensued, and she threw a car jack through the back window of Johnson's vehicle. As a result of this incident, Petitioner was arrested. However, she was not prosecuted, and the charges against her were dropped. Respondent's witnesses, Ann Gleeson and Suzette Frazier, both acknowledged that they did not have any independent personal knowledge regarding the occurrence, or any aspects, of the incident reported in the CIS report for Intake No. 2007-310775-01. The other CIS report, for Intake No. 2007-455485-01, addresses an incident that ostensibly took place on September 7, 2007, involving Marlon Bullock, who is now Petitioner's husband. Petitioner was not married to Bullock at the time of the incident reported in the CIS report for Intake No. 2007- 455485-01. She credibly testified that she was completely unaware of the incident, and had no knowledge of any aspect of it, until she saw the CIS report in connection with this proceeding. Gleeson and Frazier both acknowledged that they did not have any independent knowledge regarding the occurrence, or any aspects, of the incident addressed in the CIS report for Intake No. 2007-455485-01.5/ The CIS reports and their contents are hearsay that does not fall within any exception to the hearsay rule.6/ The CIS reports and the information contained therein consist of summaries of statements made by third parties to the investigators who prepared the reports. The investigators did not have any personal knowledge about the matters addressed in the reports. It is well-established that hearsay evidence, while admissible in administrative proceedings, cannot form the sole basis of a finding of fact in such proceedings. § 120.57(1)(c), Fla. Stat. Accordingly, the CIS reports do not constitute competent, substantial, or persuasive evidence in this proceeding regarding the matters addressed in those reports. Thus, Petitioner's testimony constitutes the only competent substantial evidence in the record regarding the matters addressed in the CIS report for Intake No. 2007-310775-01, and there is no competent substantial evidence in the record regarding the matters addressed in the CIS report for Intake No. 2007-455485-01. Respondent has not adopted a rule defining the term "good moral character." Therefore, it is required to determine an applicant's "good moral character" based on the definition of that term in statute. As noted above, section 402.305(2)(a) provides that "good moral character" is determined "using the level 2 standards for screening set forth in" chapter 435. Ann Gleeson reviewed Petitioner's application for a family day care home license. She testified that based on her review of the CIS reports for Intake No. 2007-310775-01 and Intake No. 2007-455485-01, she "didn't feel comfortable" recommending approval of Petitioner's application for a family day care home license, and she recommended that the license be denied. As noted above, Gleeson did not have any personal knowledge of any of the matters in the CIS reports. She relied on the reports and their contents in making her recommendation to deny Petitioner's application. Suzette Frazier, Gleeson's supervisor, made the ultimate decision to deny Petitioner's application for the license. At the final hearing, Frazier testified that she determined that Petitioner's license should be denied based on the matters addressed in the CIS reports. Frazier testified that Petitioner's application raised particular concerns because of the two CIS reports, even though the CIS report for Marlon Bullock contained a "Findings – No Indicator" notation.7/ Frazier testified that it is Respondent's "policy" to deny an application for a family day care home license in every case in which the background screening for the applicant reveals an incident addressed in a CIS report. According to Frazier, this policy applies even if the background screening shows that the applicant does not have a history involving any of the offenses listed in section 435.04. Further to this point, when Petitioner asked Frazier at the final hearing what she (Petitioner) could do to demonstrate that she has good moral character for purposes of obtaining her license, Frazier told her that although she could reapply, she would never qualify to get the license because of the CIS reports. Frazier testified that, in her view, the CIS reports contain information indicating that both Petitioner and Marlon Bullock have a "propensity" toward violent behavior. Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, 11th edition,8/ defines "propensity" as "a natural inclination or tendency." A "tendency" is "an inclination, bent, or predisposition to something." Id. An "inclination" is a "tendency toward a certain condition." Id. A "predisposition" is a "tendency to a condition or quality." Id. Frazier's view that Petitioner and Marlon Bullock have a "propensity" toward violent behavior is not supported by the competent, substantial, or persuasive evidence in the record. To the extent Frazier relies on the information contained in the CIS reports to conclude that Petitioner and Marlon Bullock have a "propensity" toward violent behavior, neither of these reports constitutes competent substantial evidence regarding the matters addressed therein. Furthermore, to the extent Petitioner acknowledges that she engaged in the conduct addressed in CIS report Intake No. 2007-310775-01, the competent, substantial, and persuasive evidence shows that this incident——which was an isolated event that occurred in the context of an extremely emotional and difficult personal event in Petitioner's life——simply does not establish that she has a "tendency" or "inclination" or "predisposition" toward violent behavior. To the contrary, the competent, persuasive evidence shows that this was a one-time event that happened over 11 years ago, that Petitioner did not have any instances of violent behavior before then, and that she has not had any instances of violent behavior since then. Far from showing a "propensity" toward violent behavior, the competent, persuasive evidence shows that Petitioner has exhibited an otherwise completely non-violent course of conduct throughout her life. Additionally, as previously noted, the evidence shows that neither Petitioner nor Marlon Bullock have any history involving any of the offenses listed in section 435.04. There is no competent substantial evidence in the record showing that Petitioner has engaged, during the past 11-plus years, in any criminal or other conduct that would present a danger to children, and there is no competent substantial evidence in the record establishing that Marlon Bullock has ever engaged in any criminal or other conduct that would present a danger to children. To the contrary, the competent substantial evidence establishes that Petitioner and Marlon Bullock are law-abiding citizens. Petitioner is employed as the manager of a department for a Wal-Mart store. Marlon Bullock is, and has worked for 23 years as, a chef. Petitioner credibly and persuasively testified that she is a Christian who attends, and actively participates in, activities with her church. Petitioner also credibly and persuasively testified that she has raised her four sons from her previous marriage to be law-abiding, upstanding citizens. None of them has ever been arrested or involved in any criminal behavior, and her three adult children are all gainfully employed. Petitioner posits, persuasively, that her children are testaments to the stability of her character and her ability to provide a safe, nurturing environment for the care of children. Frazier testified that Respondent's review of Petitioner's application showed that apart from the good moral character requirement, Petitioner's application met all other requirements to qualify for a family day care home license.9/ Findings of Ultimate Fact Although Respondent has adopted a rule, detailed in its Handbook, which establishes the background screening process for purposes of determining good moral character, Respondent has not adopted a rule defining "good moral character" or establishing, apart from the standards set forth in section 402.305(2)(a), any other substantive standards for determining "good moral character." Accordingly, pursuant to the plain language of section 402.305(2)(a), the level 2 screening standards set forth in section 435.04 are the standards that pertain in this proceeding to determine good moral character. Pursuant to the foregoing findings of fact, and based on the competent, substantial, and persuasive evidence in the record, it is found, as a matter of ultimate fact, that Petitioner and Marlon Bullock are of good moral character. Conversely, the competent, substantial, and persuasive evidence in the record does not support a determination that Petitioner and Marlon Bullock do not have good moral character. As noted above, Respondent determined, in its review of Petitioner's application, that other than the good moral character requirement, Petitioner met all other statutory and rule requirements for a family day care home license. Because it is determined, in this de novo proceeding under section 120.57(1), that Petitioner and Marlon Bullock meet the good moral character requirement, Petitioner is entitled to issuance of a family day care home license pursuant to sections 402.305(2)(a), 402.312, and 402.313 and rule 65C-20.008. Finally, it is noted that Respondent has not adopted as a rule pursuant to section 120.54(1)(a), its "policy" of denying applications for family day care home licenses in every case in which the background screening for the applicant reveals an incident addressed in a CIS report. Accordingly, pursuant to section 120.57(1)(e)1., Respondent cannot rely on or apply this "policy" to deny Petitioner's application for a family day care home license.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order granting Petitioner's license for a family day care home. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of April, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CATHY M. SELLERS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of April, 2018.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services was the state agency in Florida responsible for the licensing of family child day care centers in this state. Respondent, Elizabeth Horton, has, since before January 31, 1992, operated the Little Darling Horton-Cotton Family Day Care at 3710 11th Street East in Bradenton, Florida. The location is Mrs. Horton's home, and she resides there with Alfrader L. Cotton, her companion, Craig E. Horton and Sheldon G. Horton, her sons, and Tangela D. Horton, her daughter. In January, 1992, Mrs. Horton submitted an application for a license to operate a family day care center at the stated location and listed the others noted above as residents. Thereafter, on July 9, 1992, June 28, 1993, July 11, 1994, July 18, 1994 and December 21, 1995, Mrs. Horton submitted application forms for renewal of her license. On each of the renewal application forms, those same individuals were listed as residents of the home. Mrs. Horton's brother, L. H., was not listed as a resident or in any capacity on any of the application forms. On or about December 3, 1993, a report of abuse of a minor female, A. M., born on February 12, 1984, was received in the Department. The substance of the allegation was that A. M., along with her little brother, born on March 6, 1985, were placed by their mother at the Respondent's home from about 5:00 PM until early the next morning each week night, while their mother was at work. The report further alleged that Mrs. Horton's brother, L. H., had molested A. M. while she was staying in the Horton home. He was alleged to have awakened her in the middle of the night while she was asleep in the Horton daughter's bedroom on the pretext of taking her to the bathroom, but fondled her breasts and vaginal area. This report was investigated by personnel of the Department and was classified as verified. A report of neglect was entered against Mrs. Horton arising out of her failure to supervise the children and a Hearing Officer from the Division of Administrative Hearings, after a formal hearing pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, entered a Recommended Order recommending that the Department enter a Final Order amending the proposed confirmed report to a classification of unfounded and expunging Mrs. Horton's name from the case record and all Department records. The Hearing Officer found, however, that L. H. had committed the abuse, and this determination was subsequently affirmed by the Secretary of the Department in the Final Order entered in this case. In 1989, L. H. was found guilty in the Circuit Court in Manatee County of lewd and lascivious acts in the presence of a child eleven years of age or younger, in violation of Section 800.04, Florida Statutes, a felony, and was sentenced, among other things, to community control for two years followed by seven years probation. After his arrest for the assault on A. M., on June 28, 1995, his prior sentence was increased to seven years in prison. He was also tried in Circuit Court for Manatee County for sexual battery, and was, on that same date, sentenced for the second offense to life imprisonment, with the provision he serve no less than twenty-five years. Whenever an individual is issued a license to operate a family day care center, that person is provided with a copy of a handbook containing the rules of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services relating to the licensing and operation of those facilities. Included within that pamphlet is a copy of Department rule 10M-10.002, dealing with personnel, which requires that all persons who are members of the operator's family or who reside in the day care home must be screened as must be persons providing substitute care in the absence of the operator. The evidence regarding the status of L. H. is contradictory. A. M. indicates that L. H. would be at the center from about 10:00 PM at night, after Mrs. Horton picked him up at work; would be there when she, A. M., went to bed at some time after 9:00 PM and before 11:00 PM; and, most of the time, would also be there then next morning, having spent the night in the bedroom of Mrs. Horton's son, Craig. A. M. cannot recall if L. H. ate his meals at the Horton home or took his showers there, but she recalls that he did cook there several times. She never saw him change or wash his clothes there and she never saw any of his clothes in the closet. Though she contends she was never left alone with L. H. by Mrs. Horton, she claims she was touched on her private parts by him on several occasions in the early hours of the morning, while the others in the house were sleeping. A. M.'s mother does not know if L. H. lived at the Horton child care center or not. He was there sometimes at night when she dropped the children off, and he was always there when she picked them up the next morning. To the best of her knowledge, the children were never left alone with him. Mrs. Horton, on the other hand, while admitting she knew that her brother had been convicted of a felony regarding a sexual offense against a minor child, categorically denies that L. H. lived at her home. She admits that he visited there from time to time and admitted to Ms. Winfrey, the child care supervisor from the Department, that he spent the night there from time to time as well. According to Mrs. Horton, L. H. lived with their parents in a home in the next block east on 11th Street East. Respondent admitted at hearing to picking him up from work around 9:00 PM at times, but not regularly. She contended at hearing he would come to the house to watch TV and to play games with her son, but rarely did he stay and never did he spend the night. The probation officers who visited L. H. would sometimes come to her house to see him but would never come in. None of the probation officers ever said anything to her about L. H.'s being at her home with children being present. At no time until the report of abuse was filed did she have any idea that L. H. was behaving improperly with any children in her charge. When she found out what he had done, she told him not to come back to that house. Mrs. Horton's daughter, age 17, claims that L. H. did not live at the care center at any time. He did not wash his clothes there or do anything which indicated he lived there. Since she was older, she stayed up later than A. M., going to bed around 10:00 PM or so. As she recalls, L. H. would usually leave the house about 10 or 11:00 PM and she would see him leave often. She did not often go to bed while he was still there. Taken together, the evidence establishes that while L. H. may not have resided at the house on a permanent basis, he was there frequently enough to be considered a member of the family as defined in the Department rules.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services enter a final order denying Elizabeth Horton renewal of her license to operate a family day care center. DONE and ENTERED this 8th day of October, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of October, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: Raymond R. Deckert, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative services, Room 500 400 West Dr. M. L. King, Jr. Boulevard Tampa, Florida 33614 Elizabeth Horton 3710 11th Street East Bradenton, Florida 34208 Alfrader Cotton Qualified Representative 3710 11th Street East Bradenton, Florida 34208 Gregory D. Venz Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services Building Number Two, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Richard Doran General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services Building Number Two, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issue for disposition in this proceeding is whether Petitioner is entitled to licensure as a family day care home.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner resides in Lakeland, Florida. In the fall of 2002, she applied for a license to operate a family day care home in her residence. In the course of discharging its statutory responsibility of investigating applicants seeking licensure for family day care homes, a representative of Respondent, Gloria Mathews, an experienced child care licensing inspector, visited Petitioner's residence and discovered numerous instances of non- compliance with requirements of Sections 402.301 through 402.319, Florida Statutes (2002), and Florida Administrative Code Chapter 65C-20. Ms. Mathews talked with Petitioner, pointed out the various instances of non-compliance, and made suggestions regarding correcting the various instances of non-compliance. Ms. Mathews anticipated that upon Petitioner’s correcting the areas of non-compliance, Petitioner would notify her and request a re-inspection. She was not contacted by Petitioner for several months. On May 20, 2003, Francis Williams, an employee of Youth and Family Alternatives, a private, not-for-profit agency that contracts with Respondent to provide assistance to individuals seeking family day care licensure, went to Petitioner's home to provide guidance and assistance to Petitioner in her effort to obtain licensure. Ms. Williams determined that several instances of non- compliance continued. In addition, Ms. Williams noted that Petitioner was caring for five non-related children without being licensed and later discovered that a sixth child had gone unsupervised for more that 15 minutes while Petitioner, Ms. Williams, and five children were in the yard noting various non-compliant conditions and discussing required improvements. On July 28, 2003, Ms. Williams again visited Petitioner's home, found discrepancies, noted that Petitioner was caring for non-related children, and, in Petitioner's absence, discovered a substitute caregiver who had not been screened. On August 27, 2003, Ms. Mathews revisited Petitioner's home and discovered that she was not in compliance; she did not have health examination forms for all of the children. Ms. Mathews and Ms. Williams, both having extensive experience in family day care facilities, testified that they did not believe that Petitioner should be licensed based on her continuing disregard for the rules provided for the safety and protection of children. Petitioner had little to offer regarding the failure of her home to qualify due to the various instances of non- compliance and her violation of the prohibition of caring for non-related children without being licensed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Family Services enter a final order denying Petitioner's application for a family day care home license. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of February, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of February, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Jack Emory Farley, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 4720 Old Highway 37 Lakeland, Florida 33813-2030 Cassandra Napier 1535 Peavy Court Lakeland, Florida 33801 Paul Flounlacker, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204B Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Respondent's license to provide foster care should be revoked for any of the reasons set forth in the Department's revocation letter dated July 23, 1998.
Findings Of Fact At all times material, the Respondent was licensed by the Petitioner to operate a foster home. In conjunction with the placement of foster children in her home, the Respondent signed an Agreement to Provide substitute Care for Dependent Children. In that document, the Respondent agreed to the following conditions, among others: 2 - We are fully and directly responsible to the Department for the care of the child. * * * - We will not permit the removal of the child from our home, except by an authorized representative of the Department or by instruction of such representative. - We will not give the child into the care or physical custody of any other person(s), including the natural parent(s), without the consent of a representative of the Department. * * * 9 - We will accept dependent children into our home for care only from the Department and will make no plans for boarding other children or adults. * * * 11 - We will notify the Department immediately of any change in our address, employment, living arrangements, family composition, or law enforcement involvement. * * * 15 - We will comply with all requirements for a licensed substitute care home as prescribed by the Department. On May 1, 1997, a family services counselor visited the Respondent's home on a routine visit to check on the status of one of the foster children in the Respondent's home. During that visit the counselor observed various hazardous and unsanitary conditions in the home. Several upstairs windows were open. The windows had no screens or other barriers to prevent a child from falling out the window. There was a foul stench in the house. Contributing to the stench were numerous plates of decaying food randomly scattered throughout the home. There was a light fixture with a bare bulb and no light shade. On May 1, 1997, the child that the counselor was visiting was seven years-old. The counselor was concerned, for several reasons, about the quality of care the child was receiving. The child was very dirty, and did not appear to have been bathed recently. The child also had a large, obvious ringworm. The counselor asked the Respondent if the child had been taken to a doctor for treatment of the ringworm. The Respondent admitted that she had not taken the child to the doctor and then stated some illogical and frivolous reasons for her failure to seek medical attention for the foster child. During the May 1, 1997, visit, the seven year-old foster child told the counselor that the children in the neighborhood hated him. When asked for details, the foster child described an incident during which, while he was outside, a group of neighborhood children removed all of the foster child's clothing and then urinated on him. When questioned about this incident, the Respondent admitted that she had witnessed the incident. The Respondent's only excuse for allowing the incident to occur was that she had told the foster child not to go outside and he disobeyed her and went outside without permission. On various unspecified occasions during the latter part of 1997 and the first three months of 1998, the Respondent's minor grandson, who sometimes lived with the Respondent and sometimes lived with his mother, engaged in sexual intercourse with one of the female minor foster children in the Respondent's home. The Respondent was aware that her grandson had engaged in sexual intercourse with one of her foster children. The Respondent made ineffectual efforts to prevent her grandson from having sexual intercourse with the female foster child. At least three months after discovering this conduct, the Respondent advised personnel of the DCFS for the first time that her grandson had been having sexual intercourse with one of the foster children in the Respondent's home. Around mid-afternoon on January 9, 1998, a police office of the South Bay Police Department went to the Respondent's home at the request of a family services counselor of the DCFS, who was making a routine visit to check on the status of two of the foster children living at that home. On that afternoon, the only adults present were the counselor from DCFS and the police officer. Two of the Respondent's foster children were home without any adult supervision. Those two foster children were thirteen and fifteen years of age, respectively. On January 9, 1998, the Respondent was on a trip outside the State of Florida. She had been gone for at least two days and was not expected to return for several more days. She had one of her foster children with her on the out-of-state trip. The Respondent had not advised the DCFS that she was taking a foster child out of the State of Florida, nor did she have permission from anyone at DCFS to take the foster child out of the State of Florida. Similarly, the Respondent had not advised the DCFS that, while on her out-of-state trip, she was leaving two of her foster children in her home, supposedly under the car and supervision of her adult brother, Leroy Ball. Mr. Ball had not been approved by anyone at DCFS as a temporary substitute caregiver for any of the foster children living with the Respondent. On January 9, 1998, the Respondent's home presented a variety of hazardous and unsanitary conditions. These conditions are perhaps best described in the words of the police officer who was present that day:1 Upon arriving at the scene I found that the children were left abandon[ed] completely. There was no adult supervision whatsoever. I found the interior of the house was in disarray. There were numerous unsanitary conditions within the household, human defecation, rotting food, open garbage cans, knives on the floor, tools, equipment, alcoholic containers that were half empty, strewn all over the house. * * * The baby training potty was right at the entry to the kitchen in the living room and it had urine, mold growing on top of the water and looked like defecation inside the bowl itself. * * * There was an overabundance of garbage and clothes. It was just everywhere. It wasn't just one place. It wasn't a bag here, a bag there, piece here, piece there. It was strewn everywhere on every piece of furniture, on the floor. Within every two feet there was garbage of some sort on the floor as if someone had thrown bags of garbage. It was just thrown all over the house. * * * I did look in the kitchen and I took photographs which I submitted and I found food that was half-cooked and half raw sitting there decaying, which was moldy and just rotting in the kitchen. * * * [Referring to a photograph] That was the upstairs bathroom. There was defecation in the water in the toilet. I was unaware if water was actually working in the residence at that time. It didn't appear to me that it was. I would've assumed that somebody would've flushed the toilet if it hadn't (sic) been. It seemed like it had been that way for several days. The two foster children who were left in the Respondent's home while she went on an out-of-state trip did not have a key to the house. Accordingly, they were unable to lock the house. On January 9, 1998, the police officer and the family services counselor interviewed the two foster children. Information provided by the children indicated that the Respondent had been out-of-town for two days and that a man named Leroy Ball was supposed to be taking care of them, but that they had not had any adult supervision during the past two days. Efforts to locate Leroy Ball were unsuccessful. Due to the lack of adult supervision and due to the hazardous and unsanitary condition of the home, the police officer and the family services counselor removed the two foster children from the Respondent's home. The police officer took one of the foster children (for whom a warrant was outstanding) to the police station, where the child was fed and then transported to a juvenile detention facility. The family services counselor took the other foster child and delivered the child to another foster home. Later in the afternoon of January 9, 1998, a child protective investigator went to the Respondent's home. The only person present at that time was Leroy Ball, an adult man, who is the Respondent's brother. During an interview with the investigator, Leroy Ball explained that his sister, the Respondent, had to go out of town to a funeral and that during her absence he was supposed to care for the two foster children who had earlier that day been found in the home without any adult supervision. Mr. Ball also explained that he worked each day from approximately 5:00 a.m. until approximately 5:00 p.m. At the time of the interview, Mr. Ball did not know the whereabouts of the two foster children he was supposed to be caring for. Several days later, on January 13, 1998, the child protective investigator interviewed the Respondent. During that interview the Respondent admitted that she had made an out-of- state trip with one of her foster children, and also admitted that she had left two of the foster children at her home, with the understanding that her brother, Mr. Ball, would be supervising them. In subsequent interviews with Department personnel, the Respondent blamed the unsanitary conditions in her home on the two children she had left there and on her brother's failure to do what he was supposed to do. The DCFS never consented to Mr. Ball being placed in a temporary role supervising any of the foster children who lived with the Respondent. While licensed to operate a foster home, the Respondent was required to keep the DCFS informed as to who was living in the Respondent's home. While so licensed, there were several occasions on which the Respondent failed to report changes as to who was living in her home. On at least one occasion the Respondent provided the DCFS with false information about who was living in her home.
Recommendation Based on all of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be issued in this case revoking the Respondent's foster home license. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of March, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of March, 1999.
