The Issue Whether Petitioner failed to maintain required records to support and document Medicaid prescription claims paid by the Medicaid program for the audit period (June 24, 1998, to June 1, 2000). If so, whether Petitioner received overpayments from the Medicaid program. If so, whether extrapolation was appropriately used to determine the amount of that overpayment (alleged by Respondent to be $1,053,137.49).
Findings Of Fact PETITIONER At all times relevant to the allegations of this case, the Petitioner was licensed pursuant to Chapter 465, Florida Statutes, to provide pharmacy services in Florida with pharmacy license number PH0012223. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Petitioner was an authorized Medicaid provider with provider number 102126500. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Petitioner had a valid Medicaid Provider Agreement with Respondent. During the audit period, Petitioner provided pharmacy services to Medicaid recipients and billed those services to the Medicaid program under its Medicaid provider number. Specifically Petitioner sold or dispensed drugs to Medicaid recipients who resided in nursing homes. Petitioner operated solely to serve nursing home populations. Petitioner usually received pharmacy orders by telephone or facsimile transmission from a nursing home. Typically, the staff at Petitioner’s facility would take the call or receive the facsimile transmission, write down the pertinent information, enter the data into the pharmacy’s computer system, dispense the item, and route the drugs to the nursing home via courier. All drugs are dispensed in sealed containers and are delivered with a manifest listing all the medications by name and patient. Jerry Kelly, a pharmacist employed by Petitioner’s parent corporation, described how nursing home orders or prescriptions were obtained and taken, beginning on line 11, page 716, of Volume VI of the hearing transcript: The vast majority, probably 90, 95 percent, are faxed over from the nursing home by nurses. A few may be called in with the nurse acting under the regulatory authority to act as the agent of the physician. These orders are then reviewed by the pharmacist. An order issue technician will enter that information into the computer, creating the original prescription.[2] The pharmacist then checks that data that was entered into the prescription to make sure all elements are there and the order entry is correct. Labels are then printed, which go to the floor to be filled by technicians. The pharmacist then checks the final product. That product is sent to a staging area where delivery manifests are printed. Those orders are then checked off the delivery manifest to make sure that no orders have been missed. The tote is sealed and then delivered to a nursing home by courier service. At the nursing home, the nurse and the driver check these orders off together, both sign that delivery manifest, and a copy of that delivery manifest comes back to the pharmacy. Q. Can you explain to the Court the typical process at [Petitioner’s parent corporation] by which refills, so to speak, are received and handled. A. Back then refills were handled by pulling a label off of the prescription container, apply it to a refill order sheet or a piece of paper of any kind that would fax . . . those are faxed to the pharmacy, those labels are pulled and faxed to the pharmacy by a nurse acting again under the regulatory authority of a -- to act as the agent of the physician. That’s also verifying to us that those orders are continued for another month. The prescription number is put in by an order entry tech. Those labels are printed and filled. From there on, the process is exactly the same. Prior to the audit period, Petitioner was purchased by another corporation. Subsequent to the audit, Petitioner ceased to operate as a pharmacy. RESPONDENT Respondent is the state agency charged with the responsibility and authority to administer the Medicaid program in Florida. Respondent’s OMPI is responsible for overseeing the integrity of the Medicaid program in Florida. Pursuant to this authority Respondent’s OMPI oversees audits to assure compliance with the Medicaid provisions and provider agreements. These integrity audits are routinely performed and Medicaid providers are aware that they may be audited. At all times material to the allegations of this case, the Medicaid program in Florida was governed by a “pay and chase” procedure. Under this procedure, Respondent paid Medicaid claims submitted by Medicaid providers and then, after- the-fact, OMPI audited such providers for accuracy and quality control. These integrity audits are to assure that the provider maintains records to support the paid claims. HERITAGE In 1999 OMPI contracted with Heritage through Consultec, L.L.C. (Medicaid’s fiscal agent), to perform and report pharmacy audits of pharmacy providers within the state. Auditors from Heritage were assigned Petitioner’s audit. The Heritage employees in charge of the subject audit were experienced and appropriately trained. THE AUDIT Respondent’s audit no 01-1017-00-3/H/JDJ reviewed Petitioner’s Medicaid claims paid by Respondent for the period June 24, 1998, through June 1, 2000. Ken Yon is the OMPI administrator who was responsible for managing the instant case and who worked with the Heritage auditors to assure the policies and practices of Respondent were met. In this case, the Heritage auditors presented at Petitioner’s facility unannounced on July 31, 2000 and sought 250 randomly selected claims for review. By limiting the number of claims, the auditors were not required to sift through the records of 139,036 claims (the total number of claims that the Petitioner submitted during the audit period). For the universe of 139,036 claims, 250 randomly selected claims is a reasonable sample to audit. The adequacy of the sample number as well as the manner in which it was generated is supported by the weight of credible evidence presented in this matter. Also, the results of extrapolating a sample of 250 claims to the universe of 139,036 claims would be statistically valid if the sampled claims were randomly chosen. The 250 sample claims selected for the subject audit were randomly chosen. Heritage asked the Petitioner to present prescription records it was required to retain to support the claims for the audit period. Petitioner offered the auditors its computerized records for many of the 250 samples in lieu of the hard copies the auditors requested. The auditors refused to accept the computerized records and, as reflected by the Audit Report, Petitioner was unable to produce acceptable evidence of prescriptions for a great many of the 250 samples.3 The auditors found that 171 of the 250 claims sampled were discrepant, in that they did not meet standards for payment. The auditors analyzed the number of discrepant claims and determined that the average overcharge per sampled claim was $36.3434 (sic). Multiplying the number of claims in the universe by that average yielded an initial estimate of the overcharge in the amount of $5,053,040.96. The 95% one-sided, lower-confidence limit4 for the initial estimate was determined to be $3,946.215.96, which is the amount of the overpayment alleged in the FAAR. THE FAAR AND SUBSEQUENT COMPUTATIONS After the auditors completed their review of the records at Petitioner’s facility, JoAnn Jackson, a licensed pharmacist with extensive experience in auditing pharmacies, was assigned by Respondent to review Heritage’s audit report and to prepare the Respondent’s FAAR. The vast majority of the discrepant claims (165 of the 171) were categorized as CF, which meant that the auditors could not find required documentation of the subject prescription or could not find required documentation for the refill of a prescription. These findings were reported to the Petitioner, who was given additional time to locate and produce documents to support the claims. Respondent was willing to accept documentation for claims up through the time of hearing.5 Based on additional documentation submitted by Petitioner after the auditors had completed their field work, Respondent’s staff recalculated the amount of the overpayment by the use of extrapolation (including the reduction of the initial estimate to the 95% one-sided, lower confidence limit) to be the amount of $1,053,137.49, which is the amount of the overpayment at issue at the formal hearing. Respondent established that each alleged discrepant claim that it used to recalculate the amount of the overpayment was, in fact, discrepant and did not meet Medicaid record-keeping standards. RECORD RETENTION REQUIREMENTS Although Petitioner’s manner of doing business was different from the conventional pharmacy (the so-called corner drugstore), it was subject to the same Medicaid records retention requirements as a conventional pharmacy that serves as a Medicaid provider. Pursuant to the applicable Medicaid Provider Agreement between Petitioner and Respondent, Petitioner was to comply with all Medicaid handbooks in effect during the audit period. Petitioner was also required to comply with all applicable state and federal Medicaid Program rules and laws in effect during the audit period. For each claim submitted during the audit period by Petitioner to Respondent for payment under the Medicaid Program, Petitioner was required to “keep, maintain, and make available in a systematic and orderly manner all medical and Medicaid- related records as Respondent requires for a period of at least five (5) years.” Petitioner was also required to make these supporting records available to Respondent upon Respondent’s request. A Medicaid provider must retain all medical, fiscal, professional, and business records on all services provided to a Medicaid recipient. In addition to the foregoing, a Medicaid provider must maintain a patient record for each recipient for whom new or refill prescriptions are dispensed. Specific to the issues of this case, a Medicaid provider must retain prescription records for five years from the date the prescription was last filled or refilled. For the audit period in this case, the prescription that authorized the dispensing of each drug for which Petitioner claimed payment under the Medicaid program should have been maintained and made available for the auditors since each prescription would have been within the five-year period. The records may be kept on paper, magnetic material, film, or other media. However, in order to qualify for reimbursement, the records must be signed and dated at the time of service, or otherwise attested to as appropriate to the media. Rubber stamp signatures must be initialed. The records must be accessible, legible and comprehensive. Applicable records that must be kept for quality control so that an after-the-fact audit can verify the integrity of the Medicaid claims that were paid by Respondent. Each claim reviewed and at issue in this cause was a paid Medicaid claim subject to the Petitioner’s provider agreement and the pertinent regulations. In order to stand as a sufficient prescription form, a writing must be created contemporaneous to the order (phone requests that are transcribed are acceptable), must contain specific information (type of drug, strength, dose, patient, doctor, DEA number, refill, etc.), and it must be kept for the requisite time. It would be acceptable for the prescription to be computer generated so long as it was written contemporaneous to the order and preserved as required by law. At the times relevant to this proceeding, Florida Administrative Code Rule 64B16-28.140(1)(d) and (e), provided, in part, as follows: Original prescriptions . . . shall be reduced to writing if not received in written form. All original prescriptions shall be retained for a period of not less than two years from date of last filling. To the extent authorized by 21 C.F.R. Section 1304.04, a pharmacy may, in lieu of retaining the actual original prescriptions, use an electronic imagining record keeping system, provided such system is capable of capturing, storing, and reproducing the exact image of the prescription, including the reverse side of the prescription if necessary, and that such image be retained for a period of no less than two years from the date of the last filling. Original prescriptions shall be maintained in a two or three file system as specified in 21 C.F.R. 1304.04(h). PETITIONER’S COMPUTERIZED RECORDS There was a dispute between the parties as to whether Petitioner’s computer records should have been accepted as evidence that valid prescriptions underlie each dispensed drug within the sample. That dispute is resolved by finding that the computer records maintained by the Petitioner did not retain prescriptions in the format dictated by rule. An electronic imaging recording system may be used when the system captures, stores, and can reproduce the exact image of the prescription, including the reverse side of the prescription if necessary. The Petitioner’s system did not do that. An electronic system must be able to produce a contemporaneous hard-copy printout of all original prescriptions dispensed and refilled. The original prescriptions must be maintained in a two or three file system as specified in 21 C.F.R. 1304.04(h). If the Petitioner’s system could do that, it did not. Fundamentally, a Medicaid claim for a drug that has been dispensed by a Medicaid provider must have as its basis a valid prescription. While Petitioner’s computer records established what drugs had been dispensed, those records did not meet the requirements for establishing that the drugs were dispensed pursuant to valid prescriptions. OVERPAYMENT Any Medicaid providers not in compliance with the Medicaid documentation and record retention policies may be subject to the recoupment of Medicaid payments. As set forth in the Conclusions of Law section of this Recommended Order, the term “overpayment” is defined by Section 409.913(1)(d), Florida Statutes (2000). EXTRAPOLATION At hearing, Petitioner continued to dispute the procedure of applying the audit sample overpayment to the population of claims to mathematically compute the overpayment for the audit period. Extensive testimony was taken as to the extrapolation process used in this proceeding. Respondent has used a statistical extrapolation method to compute overpayments for years. The statistical concept and process of applying a sample to a universe to mathematically compute an overpayment is not novel to this case. All testimony, including the testimony of Dr. Intriligator, has been fully considered in the findings reached in this case. The testimony of Dr. Mark Johnson, an expert in statistical sampling and analysis, has been deemed credible and persuasive as to the issues of the appropriateness of the sample (as to size and how it was generated), the use of the sample overpayment to calculate an overall payment, and the statistical trustworthiness of the amounts claimed in this case. The only way to determine the amount of the actual overpayment is to examine each of the 139,036 claims that were made during the audit period. Dr. Johnson’s testimony established that the probability is overwhelming that the amount of the alleged overpayment is substantially less than the actual overpayment. Respondent established that Petitioner received an overpayment during the audit period as alleged in the FAAR and it established that the amount of the overpayment is at least $1,053,137.49.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a Final Order that finds that Petitioner has received an overpayment from the Medicaid program in the amount of $1,053,137.49. It is further recommended that the final order require Petitioner to repay that overpayment. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of February, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th of February, 2006.
The Issue The issue presented for decision herein is whether or not Respondent's license should be disciplined based on conduct, set forth hereinafter in detail as contained in an Administrative Complaint filed herein dated February 14, 1986. INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT By Administrative Complaint dated February 14, 1986, Petitioner alleged that Respondent, while a licensed physician in the State of Florida, presigned blank prescriptions which prescriptions were later completed by one Dr. Jorge Horstmann in violation of Section 458.331(1),(aa), Florida Statutes. The complaint also alleged that Respondent never examined the alleged patient, Vivian Perez, who was an undercover operative, nor did the Respondent maintain any patient records for the treatment and thereby violated Section 458.331(1)(q), Florida Statutes, by failing to keep written medical records justifying the course of treatment and by prescribing a legend drug other than in the course of the physician's professional practice; that Respondent committed gross or repeated malpractice or failed to practice medicine with that level of care, skill and treatment which is recognized by a reasonably prudent physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances in violation of Section 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes. The Administrative Complaint further alleged that Respondent billed medicaid for various visits for the undercover operative, as well as fictitious children, and made or filed reports with Medicaid which the Respondent knew to be false and thereby failed to perform statutory or legal obligations placed upon a licensed physician in violation of Sections 458.331(1)(1) and 817.234, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, documentary evidence received during the hearing and the entire record compiled herein, I hereby make the following relevant factual findings. Respondent, Alfonso Rodriguez-Cuellar is, and has been at times material hereto, a licensed physician in the State of Florida having been issued license number MME002856. During June, 1983, Respondent shared office space with Dr. Jorge Horstmann who was at the time, not a licensed medicaid provider. Respondent was licensed as a medicaid provider during times material and was so licensed during June, 1983. During June, 1983, an investigation was undertaken by the State of Florida Auditor General's Office and as a result of that investigation, Special Agent Vivian Perez visited Respondent's office and requested to be attended by Dr. Horstmann. At the time, Special Agent Perez presented the receptionist, Emerson Figeuroa, her Medicaid card listing herself and (3) fictitious children as medicaid recipients. During that visit, four (4) Medicaid files were prepared by office staff and Special Agent Perez was seen by a person who identified himself as Dr. Horstmann. Dr. Horstmann appeared and testified in these proceedings and acknowledged that he, in fact, treated Special Agent Perez. Dr. Horstmann did not examine Agent Perez. Dr. Horstmann was carrying a prescription pad while he attended to Agent Perez and Agent Perez observed Dr. Horstmann complete prescriptions from the pad with the exception of the signatures. (Petitioner's Composite Exhibit 1). Dr. Horstmann left the room where he was attending Agent Perez. When he returned, they were signed by Respondent. Agent Perez was then given the prescriptions and she took them to a pharmacy and filled them by purchasing non- pharmaceutical items. (TR 89-92). Emerson Figeuroa was employed by Respondent as a medical assistant and receptionist since approximately 1982. Ms. Figeuroa denied that Respondent presigned prescriptions for Dr. Horstmann and contends that records are maintained for all of Respondent's patients. Ms. Figeuroa recognized Respondent's signature on two prescriptions received in evidence as being Respondent's signature. (Respondent's Exhibit 1 and 2). At the same time, Ms. Figeuroa denied that Respondent's signature appeared on prescriptions introduced which were the prescriptions given to Agent Perez. Hugh Fitzpatrick, a medical investigator for Petitioner, interviewed Respondent during June of 1983. Investigator Fitzpatrick's main concern was whether Respondent was presigning prescriptions for Dr. Horstmann. Investigator Fitzpatrick inquired of Respondent regarding that claim and Respondent admitted that he signed the prescriptions given to Agent Perez for Dr. Horstmann; that he signed the prescriptions as a friend and that he knew that Dr. Horstmann had been licensed and simply had not been provided with the documentation reflective of the fact that he (Dr. Horstmann) had been licensed as a Medicaid Provider. Respondent testified on his own behalf and openly admitted that the signatures on the prescriptions provided to Agent Perez were his although he questioned the "MD" next to his signature. (TR 58-60). Respondent also conceded that he never treated a patient by the name of Vivian Toledo (a/k/a Vivian Perez); he had no medical records for Toledo (Perez) or her children and acknowledged that he medically treat a large volume of patients, a great majority of which are Medicaid recipients. Respondent conceded that he received a check from Medicaid for $1,900 reflecting payment for the medical treatment of a large number of medicaid patients. Respondent conceded that although he signed the medicaid forms, the forms are prepared by other office personnel. Respondent usually does not verify the names of the individuals on the list to ascertain if he, in fact, treated each patient listed before he executes the form requesting payment from medicaid. (TR 64 and 86). Respondent is duty bound to ensure that he only bills medicaid for patients that he has, in fact, treated.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby Recommended that Respondent's license be suspended for a period of (30) days. It is further recommended that the Board impose an administrative fine against Respondent in the amount ($2,000). Recommended this 10th day of February, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of February, 1987. COPIES FURNISHED: Joel S. Fass, Esquire Colodny, Fass & Talenfeld, P.A. 626 N. E 124 Street North Miami, Florida 33161 Franz A. Arango, Esquire 1999 S. W. 27th Avenue Miami, Florida 33145 Dorothy Faircloth, Executive Director 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Salvatore A. Carpino, Esquire General Counsel 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Fred Roche, Secretary 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Petitioner GLADES HEALTH PLAN, INC., (GLADES) is a for-profit corporation with offices in Belle Glade, Florida. GLADES was formed for the purpose of applying for and obtaining a contract with the State of Florida for a Medicaid Prepaid Health Plan. Respondent, AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION, (AHCA), is the agency of the State of Florida statutorily responsible for the administration of the Florida Medicaid prepaid health plan program. On October 5, 1994, GLADES filed a Medicaid prepaid health plan contract application with AHCA. In December of 1994, a series of newspaper articles were published which raised concerns regarding the quality of health care and service provided by Medicaid prepaid health plans in Florida. In response to these concerns, AHCA, beginning in the latter part of December of 1994, implemented a number of administrative changes, and also undertook a comprehensive review to assess the quality of health care and service provided by existing Medicaid prepaid health plans. In order to accomplish this comprehensive review, AHCA redirected all of the agency's managed care staff to conduct a survey of the assessment of the quality of health care and services provided by the existing Medicaid prepaid health plans. Because AHCA's managed care staff was redirected to conduct this comprehensive review of the existing Medicaid prepaid health plans, there were insufficient staff available to review Medicaid prepaid health plan contract applications. AHCA was also concerned with contracting with additional health plans until the assessment of the existing plans was completed. AHCA accordingly placed a temporary moratorium on the consideration of applications for Medicaid prepaid health plan contracts until the completion of the comprehensive review. The purpose of the agency's comprehensive review of existing health plans and imposition of a temporary moratorium on pending contract applications for new health plans was to assess the quality of care and service of the existing Florida Medicaid prepaid health plan program, and to develop in-house agency policies to address problems identified by agency staff conducting the comprehensive review. On December 30, 1994, James M. Barclay, vice-president of GLADES, received a letter from AHCA relating to another organization with which he is affiliated, Heartland Healthcare, Inc., which like GLADES, had filed a Medicaid prepaid health plan contract application that was pending with AHCA. The December 30, 1994 letter from AHCA to Barclay recited AHCA's concern with the quality of health care and service provided by existing Medicaid prepaid health plans. The letter further stated that due to the implementation of administrative changes, and the need for agency staff to be committed to the comprehensive review of existing Medicaid prepaid health plans, AHCA had imposed a moratorium on the consideration of Medicaid Prepaid Health Plan contract applications to last approximately sixty to ninety days. GLADES did not receive a letter, or other communication from AHCA notifying GLADES of AHCA's imposition of a temporary moratorium on the consideration of its Medicaid prepaid health plan contract application, and no action was taken by AHCA with regard to the GLADES' contract application during this period. Upon completion of the agency's comprehensive review of existing Medicaid prepaid health plans, AHCA, in the spring of 1995, discontinued the moratorium on consideration of Medicaid prepaid health plan contract applications. In processing Medicaid prepaid health plan contract applications subsequent to the discontinuation of the moratorium, AHCA determined not to contract with any prepaid health plan unless the plan was a public entity, or commercially #licensed under the provisions of Chapter 641, Florida Statutes. The basis for AHCA's decision in this regard was that the agency's comprehensive review of Medicaid prepaid health plans indicated that the existing commercially licensed Medicaid prepaid health plans provided a better quality of care to Medicaid recipients than the health plans that were not commerically licensed. On September 13, 1995, AHCA filed with the Department of State, Bureau of Administrative Code, proposed rules amending Rule 59G-8.100, Florida Administrative Code. The proposed rule amendments set out criteria for AHCA's consideration of Medicaid prepaid health plan contract applications. The criteria include commercial licensure under Chapter 641, Florida Statutes, managed care accreditation, prior health care experience, and need for managed care services. Under the proposed rule amendments, failure to meet such criteria, including commercial licensure, is grounds for denial of a Medicaid prepaid health plan contract application. AHCA has not promulgated or instituted proceedings to promulgate rules regarding the temporary moratorum imposed in this case. GLADES is not commercially licensed under the provisions of Chapter 641, Florida Statutes. Subsequent to the discontinuation of the moratorium, AHCA has taken no action with regard to GLADES' Medicaid prepaid health plan contract application. Because GLADES is not commercially licensed, AHCA presently considers the GLADES' Medicaid prepaid health plan contract application inactive. AHCA has not written, published or otherwise made a formal statement of agency policy to the effect that Medicaid prepaid health plan contracts are not licenses as that term is defined in Section 120.52(9), Florida Statutes. AHCA has not promulgated or instituted proceedings to promulgate rules to the effect that Medicaid prepaid health plan contracts are not licenses.
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner received Medicaid overpayments and, if so, the total amount of the overpayments. Petitioner agreed at the onset of the hearing not to contest the findings of the Agency that Petitioner received Medicaid monies to which he was not entitled. Therefore, the issue remaining for determination is: Whether Respondent calculated the overpayment amount of $52,850.82 using a valid statistical formula and a valid sample of recipients and claims during the audit period of March 1, 2000, through March 1, 2002.
Findings Of Fact Based upon observation of the witnesses while testifying, the documentary materials received in evidence, official recognition granted, evidentiary rulings made, and the entire record compiled herein, the following relevant and material facts are established. The Agency is charged with administration of the Medicaid program in Florida pursuant to Sections 409.907 and 409.913, Florida Statutes (2003). Among its administrative duties, the Agency operates a program to oversee the activities of Florida Medicaid providers to ensure that fraudulent and abusive behavior and neglect occur to the minimum extent possible and to recover overpayments and impose sanctions as appropriate. "Overpayment" is statutorily defined to mean "any amount that is not authorized to be paid by the Medicaid Program, whether paid as a result of inaccurate or improper cost reporting, improper claiming, unacceptable practices, fraud, abuse or mistake." § 409.913(1)(d), Fla. Stat. (2000). The FAAR, covering the audit period of March 1, 2000, through March 1, 2002, together with the Agency's work papers, set out a Medicaid overpayment amount of $52,850.82 that the Agency seeks to recoup from Petitioner. Petitioner is a physician enrolled in the Medicaid program under provider number 0580091-00, who operated under his provider number during the audit period of March 1, 2000, through March 1, 2002, under the auspices of a standard Medicaid provider agreement. As a part of the Medicaid provider agreement, the provider agrees to comply with all local, state and federal laws, rules, regulations, licensure laws, Medicaid bulletins, and statements of policy. Petitioner participated in the Medicaid program during the FAAR period of March 1, 2000, through March 1, 2002, and received payment for the services that the Agency now questions and are the subject of the audit. During the above audit period, the applicable statutes, rules, and Medicaid handbooks required Petitioner to retain all medical, fiscal, professional, and business records on all services provided to a Medicaid recipient. Petitioner had to retain these records for at least five years from the date of services. The Florida Medicaid program prepares and furnishes handbooks to all enrolled Medicaid providers, including Petitioner. These handbooks set forth the Medicaid policies with regard to services rendered and billed by providers. Petitioner had a duty to make sure that each claim submitted was true and accurate and was for goods and services that were provided, by an enrolled Medicaid provider, in accordance with the requirements of Medicaid rules, handbooks, and policies, and in accordance with federal and state law. Medicaid providers who do not comply with the Medicaid documentation and record retention policies hereinabove may be subject to administrative sanctions and/or recoupment of Medicaid payments. Medicaid payments for services that lack required documentation and/or appropriate signatures will be recouped. Mr. Hector Tapining (Mr. Tapining) and Phyllis Stiver (Nurse Stiver), registered nurse consultant for Medicaid Program Integrity, conducted an on-site visit to Petitioner's office and requested records. From the files of Petitioner, Mr. Tapining generated a random list of 30 Medicaid recipients (the cluster sample) who had received services by Petitioner during the two- year audit period of March 1, 2000, through March 1, 2002. The Agency thereafter generated worksheets reflecting: (1) the total number of Medicaid recipients during the audit period; (2) total number of claims made by Petitioner, with dates of medical services provided; (3) the total amount of money paid Petitioner during the audit period; and (4) the analyst's worksheets representing his review of each recipient's claim(s) for the audit period. Additional Agency-generated worksheets reflected: (1) the total number of Medicaid recipients during the audit period; (2) the total number of claims of Petitioner, with dates of service; (3) the total amount of money paid to Petitioner during the audit period; and (4) the analyst's worksheets representing his review of each recipient's claim(s) for the audit period. Mr. Tapining provided the worksheets to Nurse Stiver for her review of compliance with Medicaid enrollment and documentation. Mr. Tapining provided the worksheets to E. Rawson Griffin, III, M.D. (Dr. Griffin), the medical records consultant, for his review and evaluation of appropriate billing codes. The formula used by the Agency is a valid statistical formula, the random sample used by the Agency was statistically significant, the cluster sample was random, and the algebraic formula and the statistical formula used by the Agency are valid formulas. Dr. Griffin, after review of 30 patient records, concluded that Petitioner engaged in a general pattern of over coding at the highest level of code (99205) for services rendered that appeared to be rather straight-forward and simple for the medical services rendered at the time of each visit. Over coding is the term employed when supporting documentation for medical billing does not support the billing code chosen and assigned by the provider. In his review, Dr. Griffin saw no middle codes (99213s and/or 99214s) billed by Petitioner. Dr. Griffin opined that it was extraordinary that Petitioner would see and service 30 patients on their first visits, who at that time presented a complaint necessitating a medical necessity level code 99205, the highest level of Medicaid service. Continuing, Dr. Griffin explained that over coding is entering in the patient's billing statement a code higher than the patient's medical complaint and the Patient's recorded medical necessity warranted for the visit or visits (1st, 2nd, 3rd, etc.) on the date those services were provided by Petitioner. In Dr. Griffin's opinion, Medicaid billing codes are to be determined by consideration of the following medical factors: (1) the patient's particular medical complaint and the degree of complexity of that complaint at the time of the initial visit, (2) the type of and the complexity of medical examinations and the tests necessarily required to be administered based upon the type and complexity of the initial complaint, and (3) the resulting interpretations of the tests and the examinations administered for treatment of the complaint. It is only after completion of the above analysis and documentation in the patient's medical records, would a code 22915 billing be appropriate. Dr. Griffin's analysis of the cluster sample of 30 Medicaid records of patients serviced by Petitioner resulted in his down coding Petitioner’s billing as shown below.2 I.D. Number Service Date Code Billed Adjustment B.K. 1 03-29-2000 215 (5) 214 B.K. 1 07-19-2000 214 213 1 08-17-2000 214 213 1 12-11-2000 215 214 1 02-22-2001 215 214 1 05-23-2001 214 213 1 06-24-2001 214 212 J.A.C. 4 No date 215 214 J.R. 5 10-02-2000 215 213 B.F. 6 07-25-2000 215 213 F.H. 8 04-10-2000 215 213 F.H. 8 05-04-2000 214 213 (2 visits) D.C. 9 01-23-2000 215 213 T.M. 10 06-07-2000 215 213 T.M. 10 06-28-2000 214 213 D.W. 13 01-12-2000 215 213 P.L. 14 01-10-2000 214 213 I.H. 15 12-18-2000 215 213 M.V. 17 04-10-2000 215 213 R.R. 21 04-17-2001 214 213 S.K. 25 11-20-2000 212 211 A.H. 26 12-19-2000 215 212 T.P. 27 02-20-2000 215 213 M.R. 28 11-14-2002 215 214 E.C. 29 04-28-2000 214 213 E.C. 07-03-2000 214 213 12-28-2000 214 212 01-02-2000 214 212 01-23-2000 214 212 02-06-2000 214 212 04-03-2000 214 212 (6 visits) R.S. 30 04-16-2001 215 213 Nurse Stiver reviewed the cluster sample of 30 Medicaid records of patients serviced by Petitioner for compliance with Medicaid policy(s) to ensure that services billed are the services for which Medicaid pays and are services that meet all aspects of the Medicaid policy(s) as specified in the Medicaid Handbook. Medicaid policy, regarding provider enrollment, requires (all) providers who services Medicaid patients to be (individually) enrolled in the Medicaid program as providers before providing service and billing Medicaid for those services. The Agency verifies the education, credentials, and criminal background of each enrollee to ensure the safety of Medicaid recipients. The individual provider enrollment is required as a condition precedent for providers to bill Medicaid for services and to be paid by Medicaid for those services. The enrollment requirement includes PAs and ARNPs. Nurse Stiver's review of Petitioner's documents sought to ascertain whether each provider who actually rendered services had executed a voluntary enrollment contract agreement between the Agency and that provider. In these contract agreements, the provider agrees to comply with all laws and rules pertaining to the Medicaid program when furnishing a service or goods to a Medicaid recipient, and the Agency agrees to pay a sum, determined by a fee schedule, payment methodology, or other manner, for the service or goods provided to the Medicaid recipient. The Medicaid Handbook requires separate and/or individual enrollment of each and every entity that provides Medicaid service(s) to Medicaid recipients. The mandatory enrollment includes a provider(s) who makes written entries on and/or signs Medicaid documents. Should the medical service provider and the provider documenting the Medicaid recipient's medical files and the provider billing Medicaid for services rendered be different providers, each provider must be individually enrolled in the Medicaid program. Within a chain of provider entities, the failure of one provider entity to be enrolled entitles the Agency to full recoupment of all Medicaid payments made to the enrolled Provider. Nurse Stiver applied the above analysis to the cluster sample of 30 Medicaid recipients' records recovered from Petitioner's files and to the Agency's worksheets. Nurse Stiver's review and her investigation revealed specific instances in which the paid billing claims evidenced that Petitioner's non-enrolled PAs and/or Petitioner's non-enrolled ARNP either provided the medical services or documented the medical services provided to the Medicaid recipients as shown below: Patient Service Date(s) Services and/or documentation 1. B.K. Serviced 9 times Signature-not enrolled 2. E.J. 08-14-01 Records written and signed by PA not enrolled and (not countersigned by Petitioner) 3. E.T. Serviced 4 times Services provided not entitled to Medicaid payment (unauthorized) J.A. (stipulation) Stipulation3 B.F. 11 visits-serviced Provider not enrolled M.R. 7 visits-serviced Provider not enrolled F.H. 11 visits-serviced Provider not enrolled through 12. Stipulations 13. D.W. 2 visits-serviced Provider not enrolled 14. through 17. Stipulations 18. L.A. 5 visits-serviced Provider not enrolled 19. and 20. Stipulations 21. R.R. 3 visits-serviced Provider not enrolled 22. and 23. Stipulations 24. L.S. 1 visit-serviced Provider not enrolled 25. S.K. 3 visits-serviced Provider not enrolled 26. through 28. Stipulations 29. E.C. 12 visits-serviced Provider not enrolled 30. Stipulation After the review and examination of the claims submitted within the cluster sample, Nurse Stiver concluded the above services billed to the Agency were not performed by Petitioner. She opined that either or both of Petitioner's employees, Justo Lugo and Phillip Nguyen (PAs) and/or Andrea McDonald (ARNP) provided or assisted in providing services. As non-enrolled providers in the Medicaid program, the PAs and the ARNP’s participation in providing services to Medicaid recipients and/or participation in assisting Petitioner in providing medical services and/or participation in Petitioner's billing Medicaid for medical services to Medicaid recipients violated Medicaid policy. Respondent established that the Medicaid program payments for services provided by an individual not enrolled as a provider in the Medicaid program are overpayments of which the Agency is entitled to full recoupment. After the reviews and the analysis by Nurse Stiver and Dr. Griffin, using the Agency's formula for calculating the extrapolated overpayments, the Agency determined overpayment in the amount of $64,453.74 to have occurred. Based upon these findings, the Agency issued a Preliminary Agency Audit Report (PAAR) letter setting out the overpayment amount of $64,453.74 and inviting Petitioner to submit additional documentation. Petitioner's additional documentation submittals were reviewed by the Agency. The post-PAAR review resulted in a reduction of overpayment to $52,850.82 as the total overpayment for all claims considered, and sought to be recovered from Petitioner by the Agency. The Agency's worksheets resulting in the $52,850.82 overpayment included: (1) the medical record review summary; (2) a spreadsheet setting out the names of the recipients, the dates of service, the procedure billed, the amount paid by the Agency, the amount allowed by the Agency, and the resulting overpayment; (3) the overpayment calculation using cluster sampling; (4) the patient worksheets, or claims; and (5) the procedure code summary of the claims in the universe, as defined in Section 409.913, Florida Statutes (2000). The formula used by the Agency is a valid statistical formula, the random sample used by the Agency was statistically significant, the cluster sample was random, and the algebraic formula and the statistical formula used by the Agency are valid formulas. The Agency's data and calculations were reviewed by Ian McKeague, Ph.D. (Dr. McKeague). He reproduced the calculations and concluded that $52,850.82 is the correct overpayment amount made by Medicaid to Petitioner. Petitioner produced neither written authority nor expert testimony contesting the validity of the statistical formula and Dr. McKeague's resulting calculation of overpayment. Nurse Stiver, with over 14 years employment with the Agency, worked with the Medicaid policies and handbooks. She worked with Mr. Tapining on the audit of Petitioner documents. Specifically, she reviewed Petitioner's records for compliance with Medicaid policy, to ensure that the services billed are the services Medicaid paid for and that those services met all aspects of Medicaid policy. Nurse Stiver's investigation and review revealed specific instances in which the paid claims show that the PAs and/or the ARNP, not Petitioner himself, provided the services to Medicaid patients. In each case where the Agency determined Petitioner was not entitled to payment, Nurse Stiver reviewed the medical records and determined that the ARNP or one of the PAs, who were not enrolled in the Medicaid program, actually rendered services to Medicaid recipients. Her determination was based upon her many years of nursing experience that the person rendering the services is the person who documents the services rendered. From her review, it appeared that the ARNP or a PA (not enrolled), not Petitioner, documented the service billed to and paid by Medicaid. Services rendered by an ARNP or a PA who is not enrolled as a provider in the Medicaid program cannot be compensated by the Medicaid program. Petitioner argued that he provided all Medicaid services billed to Medicaid and, on those rare occasions reviewed by Nurse Stiver, his employees (either the ARNP or the PAs), who by happenstance would be present in the treatment room, aided him by merely documenting services he himself rendered to the Medicaid patients. Petitioner presented an alternative argument that on other of those rare occasions reviewed by Nurse Stiver, his employees would be in the room when Petitioner actually provided services to Medicaid patients, and, while he was providing those services, he would simultaneously dictate to his employee who would transcribe his dictations on the Medicaid forms. Petitioner elected not to compel attendance by subpoena of his employees, even though the final hearing was continued to provide Petitioner an opportunity to do so. Petitioner's argument, that the proposed testimony by his employees would have been sufficient to challenge the Agency determination that Petitioner's billing was for services performed by a provider who was not enrolled in the Medicaid program, is without a foundation in fact and rejected. The Medicaid Provider Reimbursement Handbook provides, in part, that "Records must be retained for a period of at least five years from the date of service." The handbook goes on to provide in pertinent part: PAs must meet the general Medicaid provider enrollment that are contained in Chapter 2 of the Medicaid Provider Reimbursement Handbook, HFCA-1500 and Child Health Check- Up 221. In addition, PAs must follow the specific enrollment requirements that are listed in this section. * * * PAs must meet the provider requirements and qualification and their practice must be fully operational before they can be enrolled as Medicaid providers. * * * If a PA is employed by or contracts with a physician who can enroll as a Medicaid provider, the physician must enroll as a group provider and the PA must enroll as a treating provider within the group. * * * Services provided by a PA under the direct supervision of a physician may be billed using the physician's provider number instead of the PA's provider number. Direct physician supervision means the physician: (*) Is on the premises when the services are rendered, and (**) reviews, signs, and dates the medical record. * * * Medical records must state the necessity for and the extent of services provided. The following minimum requirements may vary according to the services rendered: * * * Note: See the service-specific Coverage and Limitations Handbook for record keeping requirements that are specific to a particular service. Providers who are not in compliance with the Medicaid documentation and record retention policies described in this chapter may be subject to administrative sanctions and recoupment of Medicaid Payments. Medicaid payments for services that lack required documentation or appropriate signatures will be recouped. Note: See Chapter 5 in this handbook for information on administrative sanctions and Medicaid payment recoupment. Petitioner, by signing a Medicaid provider agreement, agreed that all submissions for payment of claims for services will constitute a certification that the services were provided in accordance with local, state, and federal laws, as well as rules and regulations applicable to the Medicaid program, including the Medical Provider Handbooks issued by the Agency.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Agency for Health Care Administration, enter a final order requiring Petitioner, Mazhar G. Nawaz, M.D., to repay Respondent the principal amount of $52,850.82 plus interest as provided in Section 409.913, Florida Statutes (2002). DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of February, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S FRED L. BUCKINE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of February, 2004.
The Issue Whether or not the Respondent's license to practice pharmacy should be suspended or revoked pursuant to Section 465.101(1)(e) and 893.13(3)(a) 1 , Florida Statutes. The Hearing Officer explained to the Respondent the nature of the hearing and his rights under the Administrative Procedure Act, including the right to be represented by counsel at his own expense, if he so desires. It was also explained to the Respondent that he could testify in his own behalf, but that he was not required to do so and that if he did so testify, he could be cross- examined by counsel for Petitioner. Respondent acknowledged understanding of these rights and elected not to testify in his own behalf during the course of the hearing; however, he did participate in the cross-examination of Petitioner's witnesses and made a closing statement in which he denied the allegations against him.
Findings Of Fact During the period in question, i.e., April, 1975, Mr. Stanley Margolis was the manager of Gray Drug Store, No. 365, located at 12852 Biscayne Boulevard, North Miami, Florida. He and the Respondent are the only licensed pharmacists employed at that store (testimony of Mr. Margolis). "Eskatrol" is a trade name for a drug which is bottled and sold in capsules called "spansules". It contains dextro- amphetaminesulfate and acts as a stimulant on the central nervous system. It is used primarily as an appetite suppressant, although it also is sometimes prescribed in an emergency situation for narcolepsy to keep a person awake. It is a Schedule II drug under the Florida Comprehensive Drug Abuse and Prevention Act, Chapter 893, F.S. because it is an amphetamine (Testimony of Mr. Bell, Dr. Danoff). The procedure employed by Gray Drug Store to order Schedule 11 drugs was for Mr. Margolis to write a narcotic order form which he sent to a wholesaler who would then fill the order and send back an invoice with the narcotics in a box that was signed for by one of the pharmacists. At that time, the drugs would be counted, checked off and written down. Either Margolis or Respondent was on duty at the drug store at all times when it was open for business and Respondent could sign for such deliveries if Margolis was not then present. On approximately April 10 or 11, the store had run out of narcotics order forms and had exhausted its supply of several drugs, including ones with the trade name of Eskatrol. However, on Saturday, April 12, a prior order for ten bottles of Eskatrol, each bottle containing 50 capsules or "spansules" as they were termed, were received at the store. Respondent was on duty at this time and signed for the shipment. It was his responsibility to check the numbers of bottles received, enter the amount in a narcotics journal and place the drugs in a locked cabinet. On Monday, April 14, Margolis came on duty, reviewed the receipt of Eskatrol and determined that the shipment was correct based upon his examination of the invoice. He did not check the drug cabinet at this time. About 6:00 or 7:00 p.m. he received a prescription for 50 sparsules of Eskatrol. At this time, he noticed that there were only eight bottles in the cabinet when there should have been ten. He thereupon checked his prescription files for narcotic and other drugs and found no prescription to cover the two missing bottles of Eskatrol ewhich would have contained a total of 100 spansules. The store maintained a daily prescription log which indicated the prescriptions filled and a "waiting" file which was used to hold prescriptions for emergency drugs which had been issued pursuant to a telephonic request of a physician while waiting for the written prescription from the physician to arrive at the store. Mr. Margolis, on the morning of April 16, asked Respondent about the discrepancy. The Respondent told him that the wholesaler had been" short two bottles." Margolis was disturbed about this alleged shortage and therefore called the district manager of Gray Drugs, a Mr. Krake. On the morning of April 17, Margolis found a telephoned prescription form for 50, spansules of Estatrol in the "waiting" file (Petitioner's Exhibit 1). The Respondent told him that it had been called in and that he was waiting for the prescription. He said that he had written the prescription. Margolis identified the handwriting as being that of the Respondent. The prescription was in the name of Ron Richards and showed an address of "2405 Northeast 135". It did not bear a street, avenue, or city designation. There was no date entered in the "Date" space on the form, but the figures "4/14" appeared on the "RX" portion of the form. This portion also bore the handwritten number 221030, and showed the figures "825". The doctor's name was Danoff and shown with address of 4100 South Hospital at Plantation. The number 5870448 also appeared on the prescription form and the words "will mail". Mr. Margolis then reviewed what had been entered on Sunday in the prescription log book and discovered that prescription number 221030 showed a patient named Kasen and a price of $1.95 for the prescription (Petitioner's Exhibit 2) . The practice of the pharmacy had been to use a numbering machine which would stamp the prescription and the patient's receipt with the prescription number. Although 99 percent of the prescriptions are marked with the numbered stamp, occasionally there can be some mistake if the machine jumps, and the same number can only be stamped two times by the machine. On April 14, while Mr. Margolis was checking the non-narcotic prescription files, he had seen a prescription numbered 221030 for 15 Actifed tablets, prescribed by a Dr. Wrench for a patient named Kasen. The retail price of 15 Actifed tablets is $1.95. His log book also reflected that the next number in sequence, prescription no. 221031, was also prescribed by Dr. Wrench for patient Kasen for Keflex (Petitioner's Exhibit 3). Both of these prescriptions were entered on the log for April 13th. Margolis does not know what happened to the other prescription bearing the number 221030; he saw it last on the night of April 15 (testimony of Mr. Margolis; Petitioner's Exhibits 1-3). Dr. Sherwood Danoff, a licensed physician who practices at Plantation, Florida, specializes in dermatology. He is not familiar with the name of Ron Richards and did not call the Gray Drug Store of North Miami, Florida, on April 13, 1975, to order Eskatrol for that individual. He had never written a prescription for Eskatrol, which is a combination of an amphetamine and a barbituate used in diet control as an appetite suppressant. He did not receive a phone call on April 13 from the Gray Drug Store and has never spoken on the phone to anyone representing himself to be the Respondent Mark Gorsky. The normal dosage of Eskatrol is one or two capsules a day and, although he has prescribed Schedule II drugs on an emergency basis over the phone, he would never issue a prescription for a dosage that would cover more than a 10-day period. An emergency prescription by telephone is usually given only for the period until the patient can get in to see the doctor. This is known as an oral prescription and the doctor must follow this up with a written prescription within 72 hours. Although Petitioner's Exhibit 1 reflects Dr. Danoff's phone number, he did not phone in the prescription (testimony of Dr. Danoff). On April 17, Mr. William W. Smith, the regional manager of Professional Services for Gray Drug Stores, Mr. Anthony Difulio, the Director of Loss Prevention for the drug Store chain for Florida, and Mr. Vernon K. Bell, an agent for the Florida Board of Pharmacy, met at the Gray Drug Store in North Miami to look into the discrepancy reported by Mr. Margolis. Mr. Smith made an inspection of the books and records of the store and discovered that certain narcotic drugs were missing, including two bottles of Eskatrol. He checked with Dr. Danoff's nurse and Gulf Company, the wholesaler of Eskatrol. He tried to find the address of Ron Richards, as shown on the prescription in an incomplete form, but any projection of the address by avenues or streets would place it in Biscayne Bay or the ocean. Mr. Smith, together with Mr. Difulio, Mr. Bell, and Mr. Krake, went into a back room of the drug store to discuss the situation and later asked the Respondent to join them. Neither Mr. Difulio nor Mr. Bell arc law enforcement officers and do not have the power to take a person into custody other than that effected under an ordinary citizen's powers. During this period, not all of the above-mentioned individuals remained in the room during the entire period of approximately an hour or an hour and a half. Mr. Gorsky left the room on two occasions. Prior to questioning the Respondent, Mr. Bell advised him that he did not have to answer any questions, that he had a right to remain silent and a right to counsel. He did not threaten him or offer him any inducements to answer questions. After this warning, Respondent decided not to take the polygraph or make a written statement, but he did make oral statements. At no time was Respondent told he was under arrest. Mr. Bell asked Respondent if he could explain or know anything about the shortage of Eskatrol. The Respondent stated that he had received a call from Dr. Danoff on Sunday, April 13, concerning the prescription and that he called the doctor back to make sure that it was authentic; that he had placed the `number at the right bottom of the prescription and in his mind it was legitimate. When asked about the existence of Ron Richards, Respondent told Bell that Richards had been in the store several times. Respondent admitted to Bell that he had written the prescription (Petitioner's Exhibit l) and that it was his handwriting. There is a certain conflict in what Respondent stated at this meeting in view of the fact that Mr. Difulio testified that Respondent had said a customer had come into the store on April 13 and said that a doctor wanted him to have Eskatrol; that he had called the doctor and verified the prescription. Difulio did not recall if Respondent had stated that he had first had a call from the doctor, although he testified that Respondent said that he had prepared the prescription and filled it for Richards. When shown by Difulio that the cash register tapes for April 13 did not reflect an entry of $8.25, and Respondent was asked for an explanation, he stated that he had probably "got taken" by believing the telephone number he called was that of the doctor. In addition, Respondent told Difulio that after filling the prescription, he became scared and put a number on it from another patient and, when asked by Difulio what had happened to it, Respondent stated that he had torn it up and destroyed it. Difulio did not recall Respondent telling Mr. Bell about Dr. Danoff calling Respondent concerning the prescription. However, Respondent made several different statements during the course of his interrogation while various of the parties to the meeting went in and out of the room (testimony of Mr. Smith, Mr. Difulio, Mr. Bell).
The Issue Whether Medicaid overpayments were made to Respondent and, if so, what is the total amount of those overpayments. Whether, as a "sanction," Respondent should be directed to submit to a "comprehensive follow-up review in six months."
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings s of fact are made to supplement and clarify the factual stipulations set forth in the parties' Joint Prehearing Stipulation and their January 26, 2007, pleading:4 Respondent and his Practice Respondent is a pediatric physician whose office is located in a poor neighborhood in Hialeah, Florida. He has a very busy practice, seeing approximately 50 to 60 patients each day the office is open. Respondent documents patient visits by making handwritten notations on printed "progress note" forms. Because of the fast-paced nature of his practice, he does not always "have time to write everything as [he] would like, because [there] is too much" for him to do. Respondent's Participation in the Medicaid Program During the Audit Period, Respondent was authorized to provide physician services to eligible Medicaid patients. Respondent provided such services pursuant to a valid Provider Agreement (Provider Agreement) with AHCA, which contained the following provisions, among others: The Provider agrees to participate in the Florida Medicaid program under the following terms and conditions: * * * Quality of Services. The provider agrees to provide medically necessary services or goods of not less than the scope and quality it provides to the general public. The provider agrees that services or goods billed to the Medicaid program must be medically necessary, of a quality comparable to those furnished by the provider's peers, and within the parameters permitted by the provider's license or certification. The provider further agrees to bill only for the services performed within the specialty or specialties designated in the provider application on file with the Agency. The services or goods must have been actually provided to eligible Medicaid recipients by the provider prior to submitting the claim. Compliance. The provider agrees to comply with all local, state and federal laws, rules, regulations, licensure laws, Medicaid bulletins, manuals, handbooks and Statements of Policy as they may be amended from time to time. Term and signatures. The parties agree that this is a voluntary agreement between the Agency and the provider, in which the provider agrees to furnish services or goods to Medicaid recipients. . . . Provider Responsibilities. The Medicaid provider shall: * * * (b) Keep and maintain in a systematic and orderly manner all medical and Medicaid related records as the Agency may require and as it determines necessary; make available for state and federal audits for five years, complete and accurate medical, business, and fiscal records that fully justify and disclose the extent of the goods and services rendered and billings made under the Medicaid. The provider agrees that only records made at the time the goods and services were provided will be admissible in evidence in any proceeding relating to the Medicaid program. * * * (d) Except as otherwise provided by law, the provider agrees to provide immediate access to authorized persons (including but not limited to state and federal employees, auditors and investigators) to all Medicaid- related information, which may be in the form of records, logs, documents, or computer files, and all other information pertaining to services or goods billed to the Medicaid program. This shall include access to all patient records and other provider information if the provider cannot easily separate records for Medicaid patients from other records. * * * (f) Within 90 days of receipt, refund any moneys received in error or in excess of the amount to which the provider is entitled from the Medicaid program. * * * (i) . . . . The provider shall be liable for all overpayments for any reason and pay to the Agency any fine or overpayment imposed by the Agency or a court of competent jurisdiction. Provider agrees to pay interest at 12% per annum on any fine or repayment amount that remains unpaid 30 days from the date of any final order requiring payment to the Agency. * * * Respondent's Medicaid provider number (under which he billed the Medicaid program for providing these services) was (and remains) 370947700. Handbook Provisions The handbooks with which Petitioner was required to comply in order to receive Medicaid payment for services rendered during the Audit Period included the Medicaid Provider Reimbursement Handbook, HCFA-1500 (MPR Handbook); Physician Coverage and Limitations Handbook (PCL Handbook); the Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnosis and Treatment Coverage and Limitations Handbook (EPSDTCL Handbook); and the Child Health Check-up Coverage and Limitations Handbook (CHCUCL Handbook). Medical Necessity The PCL Handbook provided that the Medicaid program would reimburse physician providers for services "determined [to be] medically necessary" and not duplicative of another provider's service, and it went on to state as follows: In addition, the services must meet the following criteria: the services must be individualized, specific, consistent with symptoms or confirmed diagnosis of the illness or injury under treatment, and not in excess of the recipient's needs; the services cannot be experimental or investigational; the services must reflect the level of services that can be safely furnished and for which no equally effective and more conservative or less costly treatment is available statewide; and the services must be furnished in a manner not primarily intended for the convenience of the recipient, the recipient's caretaker, or the provider. The fact that a provider has prescribed, recommended, or approved medical or allied care, goods, or services does not, in itself, make such care, goods or services medically necessary or a covered services. Note See Appendix D, Glossary, in the Medicaid Provider Reimbursement Handbook, HCFA-1500 and EPSDT 224, for the definition of medically necessary.[5] The EPSDTCL and CHCUCL Handbooks had similar provisions. Documentation Requirements The MPR Handbook required the provider to keep "accessible, legible and comprehensible" medical records that "state[d] the necessity for and the extent of services" billed the Medicaid program and that were "signed and dated at the time of service." The handbook further required, among other things, that the provider retain such records for "at least five years from the date of service" and "send, at his or her expense, legible copies of all Medicaid-related information to the authorized state and federal agencies and their authorized representatives." The MPR Handbook warned that providers "not in compliance with the Medicaid documentation and record retention policies [described therein] may be subject to administrative sanctions and recoupment of Medicaid payments" and that "Medicaid payments for services that lack required documentation or appropriate signatures will be recouped." EPSDT Screening/Child Health Check-Up The EPSDTCL Handbook provided: To be reimbursed by Medicaid, the provider must address and document in the recipient's medical record all the required components of an EPSDT screening. The following required components are listed in the order that they appear on the optional EPSDT screening form: Health and developmental history Nutritional assessment Developmental assessment Physical examination Dental screening Vision screening Hearing screening Laboratory tests Immunization Health education Diagnosis and treatment The CHCUCL Handbook, which replaced the EPSDTCL Handbook in or around May 2000, similarly provided as follows: To be reimbursed by Medicaid, the provider must assess and document in the child's medical record all the required components of a Child Health Check-Up. The required components are as follows: Comprehensive Health and Developmental History, including assessment of past medical history, developmental history and behavioral health status; Nutritional assessment; Developmental assessment; Comprehensive Unclothed Physical Examination Dental screening including dental referral, where required; Vision screening including objective testing, where required; Hearing screening including objective testing, where required; Laboratory tests including blood lead testing, where required; Appropriate immunizations; Health education, anticipatory guidance; Diagnosis and treatment; and Referral and follow-up, as appropriate. Coding Chapter 3 of the PCL Handbook "describe[d] the procedure codes for the services reimbursable by Medicaid that [had to be] used by physicians providing services to eligible recipients." As explained on the first page of this chapter of the handbook: The procedure codes listed in this chapter [were] Health Care Financing Administration Common Procedure Coding System (HCPCS) Levels 1, 2 and 3. These [were] based on the Physician[]s['] Current Procedural Terminology (CPT) book. The Current Procedural Terminology (CPT) book referred to in Chapter 3 of the PCL Handbook was a publication of the American Medical Association. It contained a listing of procedures and services performed by physicians in different settings, each identified by a "procedure code" consisting of five digits or a letter followed by four digits. For instance, there were various "procedure codes" for office visits. These "procedure codes" included the following, among others: New Patient * * * 99204 Office or other outpatient visit for the evaluation and management of a new patient which requires these three key components: a comprehensive history; a comprehensive examination; and medical decision making of moderate complexity. Counseling and/or coordination of care with other providers or agencies are provided consistent with the nature of the problem(s) and the patient's and/or family's needs. Usually, the presenting problem(s) are of moderate to high severity. Physicians typically spend 45 minutes face-to-face with the patient and/or family. * * * Established Patient * * * 99213 Office or other outpatient visit for the evaluation and management of an established patient, which requires at least two of these three key components: an expanded problem focused history; an expanded problem focused examination; medical decision making of low complexity. Counseling and coordination of care with other providers or agencies are provided consistent with the nature of the problem(s) and the patient's and/or family's needs. Usually, the presenting problem(s) are of low to moderate severity. Physicians typically spend 15 minutes face-to-face with the patient and/or family. 99214 Office or other outpatient visit for the evaluation and management of an established patient, which requires at least two of these three key components: a detailed history; a detailed examination; medical decision making of moderate complexity. Counseling and/or coordination of care with other providers or agencies are provided consistent with the nature of the problem(s) and the patient's and/or family's needs. Usually, the presenting problem(s) are of moderate to high severity. Physicians typically spend 25 minutes face-to-face with the patient and/or family. * * * Fee Schedules In Appendix J of the PCL Handbook, there was a "fee schedule," which established the amount physicians would be paid by the Medicaid program for each reimbursable procedure and service (identified by "procedure code"). For both "new patient" office visits (99201-99205 "procedure code" series) and "established patient" office visits (99211-99215 "procedure code" series), the higher numbered the "procedure code" in the series, the more a physician would be reimbursed under the "fee schedule." The Audit and Aftermath Commencing in or around August 2002, AHCA conducted an audit of Respondent's Medicaid claims for services rendered during the Audit Period (Audit Period Claims).6 Respondent had submitted 18,102 such Audit Period Claims, for which he had received payments totaling $596,623.15. These Audit Period Claims involved 1,372 different Medicaid patients. From this group, AHCA randomly selected a "cluster sample" of 40 patients. Of the 18,102 Audit Period Claims, 713 had been for services that, according to the claims, had been provided to the 40 patients in the "cluster sample" (Sample Claims). Respondent had received a total of $23,263.18 for these 713 Sample Claims. During an August 28, 2002, visit to Respondent's office, AHCA personnel "explain[ed] to [Respondent] what the audit was about [and] why [AHCA] was doing it" and requested Respondent to provide AHCA with copies of the medical records Respondent had on file for the 40 patients in the "cluster sample" documenting the services provided to them during the Audit Period. The originals of these records were not inspected by AHCA personnel or agents during, or any time after, this August 28, 2002, site visit. Sometime within approximately 30 to 45 days of the August 28, 2002, site visit, Respondent, through his office staff, made the requested copies (First Set of Copies) and provided them to AHCA. There is nothing on the face of these documents to suggest that they were not true, accurate, and complete copies of the originals in Respondent's possession, as they existed at the time of copying (Copied Originals). They do not appear, upon visual examination, to be the product of "bad photocopying." While the handwritten entries and writing are oftentimes difficult (at least for the undersigned) to decipher, this is because of the poor legibility of the handwriting, not because the copies are faint or otherwise of poor quality. Each of the Sample Claims was reviewed to determine whether it was supported by information contained in the First Set of Copies. An initial review was conducted by AHCA Program Analyst Theresa Mock and AHCA Registered Nurse Consultant Blanca Notman. AHCA then contracted with Larry Deeb, M.D., to conduct an independent "peer review" in accordance with the provisions of Section 409.9131, Florida Statutes. Since 1980, Dr. Deeb has been a Florida-licensed pediatric physician, certified by the American Board of Pediatrics, in active practice in Tallahassee. AHCA provided Dr. Deeb with the First Set of Copies, along with worksheets containing a "[l]isting of [a]ll claims in [the] sample" on which Ms. Notman had made handwritten notations indicating her preliminary determination as to each of the Sample Claims (Claims Worksheets). In conducting his "peer review," Dr. Deeb did not interview any of the 40 patients in the "cluster sample," nor did he take any other steps to supplement the information contained in the documents that he was provided. Dr. Deeb examined the First Set of Copies. He conveyed to AHCA his findings regarding the sufficiency of these documents to support the Sample Claims by making appropriate handwritten notations on the Claims Worksheets before returning them to AHCA. Based on Dr. Deeb's sufficiency findings, as well as Ms. Notman's "no documentation" determinations, AHCA "provisional[ly]" determined that Respondent had been overpaid a total $80,788.23 for the Audit Period Claims. By letter dated July 7, 2003 (Provisional Agency Audit Report), AHCA advised Petitioner of this "provisional" determination and invited Respondent to "submit further documentation in support of the claims identified as overpayment," adding that "[d]ocumentation that appear[ed] to be altered, or in any other way appear[ed] not to be authentic, [would] not serve to reduce the overpayment." Appended to the letter were "[t]he audit work papers [containing a] listing [of] the claims that [were] affected by this determination." In the Provisional Agency Audit Report, AHCA gave the following explanation as to how it arrived at its overpayment determination: REVIEW DETERMINATION(S) Medicaid policy defines the varying levels of care and expertise required for the evaluation and management procedure codes for office visits. The documentation you provided supports a lower level of office visit than the one for which you billed and received payment. The difference between the amount you were paid and the correct payment for the appropriate level of service is considered an overpayment. Medicaid policy specifies how medical records must be maintained. A review of your medical records revealed that some services for which you billed and received payment were not documented. Medicaid requires documentation of the services and considers payment made for services not appropriately documented an overpayment. Medicaid policy addresses specific billing requirements and procedures. You billed Medicaid for Child Health Check Up (CHCUP) services and office visits for the same child on the same day. Child Health Check- Up Providers may only bill for one visit, a Child Health Check-Up or a sick visit. The difference between the amount you were paid and the appropriate fee is considered an overpayment. The overpayment was calculated as follows: A random sample of 40 recipients respecting whom you submitted 713 claims was reviewed. For those claims in the sample which have dates of service from January 01, 2000 through December 31, 2001 an overpayment of $4,168.00 or $5.84667601 per claim was found, as indicated on the accompanying schedule. Since you were paid for a total (population) of 18,102 claims for that period, the point estimate of the total overpayment is 18,102 x $5.84667601= $105,836.33. There is a 50 percent probability that the overpayment to you is that amount or more. There was then an explanation of the "statistical formula for cluster sampling" that AHCA used and how it "calculated that the overpayment to [Respondent was] $80,788.23 with a ninety-five percent (95%) probability that it [was] that amount or more." After receiving the Provisional Agency Audit Report, Respondent requested to meet with Dr. Deeb to discuss Dr. Deeb's sufficiency findings. The meeting was held on September 25, 2003, approximately six months after Dr. Deeb had reviewed the First Set of Copies and a year after AHCA had received the First Set of Copies from Respondent. At the meeting, Respondent presented to Dr. Deeb what Respondent represented was a better set of copies of the Copied Originals than the First Set of Copies (on which Dr. Deeb had based the sufficiency findings AHCA relied on in making its "provisional" overpayment determination). According to Respondent, the First Set of Copies "had not been properly Xeroxed." He stated that his office staff "had not copied the back section of the documentation and that was one of the major factors in the documentation not supporting the [claimed] level of service." The copies that Respondent produced at this meeting (Second Set of Copies) had additional handwritten entries and writing (both on the backs and fronts of pages) not found in the First Set of Copies: the backs of "progress note" pages that were completely blank in the First Set of Copies contained handwritten narratives, and there were handwritten entries and writing in numerous places on the fronts of these pages where, on the fronts of the corresponding pages in the First Set of Copies, just blank, printed lines appeared (with no other discernible markings). The Second Set of Copies was not appreciably clearer than the First Set of Copies. In the two hours that he had set aside to meet with Respondent, Dr. Deeb only had time to conduct a "quick[]," partial review of the Second Set of Copies. Based on this review (which involved looking at documents concerning approximately half of the 40 patients in the "cluster sample"), Dr. Deeb preliminarily determined to "allow" many of the Sample Claims relating to these patients that he had previously determined (based on his review of the First Set of Copies) were not supported by sufficient documentation. Following this September 25, 2003, meeting, after comparing the Second Set of Copies with the First Set of Copies and noting the differences between the two, AHCA "made the decision that [it] would not accept the [S]econd [S]et [of Copies]" because these documents contained entries and writing that appeared to have been made, not contemporaneously with the provision of the goods or services they purported to document (as required), but rather after the post-Audit Period preparation of the First Set of Copies. Instead, AHCA, reasonably, based its finalized overpayment determination on the First Set of Copies. Thereafter, AHCA prepared and sent to Respondent a Final Agency Audit Report, which was in the form of a letter dated June 29, 2004, advising Respondent that AHCA had finalized the "provisional" determination announced in the Provisional Agency Audit that he had been overpaid $80,788.23 for the Audit Period Claims (a determination that the preponderance of the record evidence in this case establishes is a correct one).
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that AHCA enter a final order finding that Respondent received $80,788.23 in Medicaid overpayments for the Audit Period Claims, and requiring Respondent to repay this amount to AHCA. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of April, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of April, 2007.
The Issue Whether Respondents violated Sections 458.331(1)(k), (m), (n), and (t), Florida Statutes, and if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Agency for Health Care Administration (Agency), is the state agency charged with regulating the practice of medicine pursuant to Section 20.42 and Chapters 455 and 458, Florida Statutes. Respondent, Alan K. Roberts, M.D. (Roberts), is and has been at all times material to this proceeding a licensed physician in the State of Florida having been issued license number ME 0030398 in 1977. He is a Board Certified family practice physician. Respondent, Peter R. Genovese, M.D. (Genovese) is and has been at all times material to this proceeding a licensed physician in the State of Florida having been issued license number ME 0013626. He is a Board Certified family practice physician. Roberts and Genovese are the co-owners of Sunshine Medical Center (SMC) which operates three separate offices located in the Miami area at Sunset Drive, Port of Miami, and Port Everglades. Jose R. Menendez, M.D. (Menendez) has been a licensed physician in the State of Florida since 1973. Menendez began working for SMC in 1992 and worked there for approximately six months. Menendez worked at the Sunset Drive and Port of Miami locations. Aside from his salary, Menendez received no other remuneration and had no financial interest in SMC. PATIENT C.W. In 1985, SMC had a contract with the Public Employees Service Company (PESCO) whereunder SMC would perform routine screening physicals on Dade County teachers and administrators. The physicals were called VISTA examinations. Patient C.W., a clerk with the Dade County School System, went to SMC for a VISTA examination on October 16, 1985. She filled out a patient information form indicating her home address, home telephone number, name of employer, and her work telephone number. C.W.'s examination consisted of blood tests, urinalyses, chest x-rays, EKG, hearing function tests and a spirometry. All of the tests were administered by a female employee of SMC. After completion of the tests, C.W. met with a man whom she believed was a doctor, who in her presence, looked at the x-rays. C.W. did not see the x-rays herself. She was advised that "everything looked fine." She was not told that she had a problem with her lungs or that the x-rays showed that she had any suspicious tumors or masses on her lungs. In reality, the x-rays indicated abnormalities in her chest. C.W.'s spirometry test results were abnormal and her white blood cell count was low, but she was not informed of these abnormalities. C.W.'s charts show that she was seen at SMC on October 16, 1985, but do not indicate what doctor was responsible for supervising and administering the tests and what doctor met with C.W. after the tests were completed. There are no physical findings recorded in the clinical data portion of C.W.'s chart and no notes are in the chart as to the results of the tests performed. Neither Dr. Genovese nor Dr. Roberts examined C.W. on October 16, 1985. SMC used a pre-printed form letter to notify its patients of the results of the VISTA examination. The form letter contained the stamped signatures of the Respondents. On October 21, 1985, an undated form letter was sent to C.W. advising her that the results of the VISTA examination were normal and satisfactory and that no medical follow-up was necessary. A handwritten notation on the form letter stated, "Please increase the iron intake. Your blood work show (sic) decrease iron. Also, stop smoking." C.W. received the letter. The form letter contained stamped signatures of the Respondents. On November 4, 1985, the Respondents were conducting a routine review of patients' charts and x-rays, including those of C.W. The Respondents noted the abnormality on C.W.'s x-ray. C.W.'s charts did not mention the abnormality. On November 4, 1985, Respondents sent a second preprinted and presigned form letter to C.W. which advised C.W. that the results of the VISTA examination required a follow up visit. The form letter contained the following handwritten note: Review of our records reveals that your lab reports were omitted from our report of 10-21-85. A copy is enclosed for your family doctor. Also, your chest x-ray is abnormal and you should see your family doctor immediately for a second x-ray and follow-up care. The second letter was sent by first class U.S. mail. C.W. did not receive the second letter informing her of the abnormal x-ray. On November 12, 1985, the laboratory supervisor for SMC placed a telephone call to C.W. at her home but did not get an answer. On November 14, 1985, Genovese placed a telephone call to C.W.'s home but did not receive an answer. On November 19, 1985, Roberts called C.W. at home and received no answer. On November 19, 1985, Roberts called PESCO and advised a PESCO staff member that C.W. had an abnormal chest x-ray. No further attempt was made by Respondents to contact C.W. The purpose of the telephone calls to C.W. was to make certain that she got follow-up treatment for the mass in her lung. After the examination at SMC, C.W. began having a fever and generally felt ill. In February, 1986, C.W. consulted with a doctor and was advised that she had a tumor in her lung. The lower lobe of her right lung was surgically removed; however, the cancer spread to other parts of her body. C.W. died as a result of lung cancer. When the October 21 and November 4, 1985 letters were sent under the Respondents' preprinted signatures, the Respondents became involved in the care of Patient C.W. Patient C.W. was advised by a form letter from Respondents that her examination was satisfactory, when a review of C.W.'s x-ray showed a gross abnormality. To so advise the patient gave the patient a false reassurance that she was physically well except for her anemia. The document did not accurately reflect the test results of the patient. Respondents again involved themselves in the care of Patient C.W. when they reviewed her x-rays and discovered the abnormality in her lung and sent a second letter to notify her that the x-ray was abnormal and that she should see her family doctor. Although the letter was sent first class U.S. mail and was not returned to Respondents, Respondents should have either sent the letter by certified mail or made personal contact with C.W. Failure to do so constituted a level of care and treatment which fell below that level which is recognized by a reasonably prudent similar physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances. INSURANCE BILLINGS In order to start the billing process for services provided at SMC, each doctor generates a "super bill" which reflects the services provided such as office visit, x-rays, laboratory work and electrocardiograms. The charges are placed on the super bill by clerical staff and returned to the doctor at the end of the day to be checked for accuracy. The super bill is then transmitted to the billing department at SMC where it is encoded by a clerk and an insurance claim form is generated. As part of the encoding process, either a doctor's name or SMC's name is placed on the form. As part of SMC's quality assurance program, the insurance claims are reviewed in batches to check that the diagnoses, procedures and charges are appropriate. It is common for the insurance claims to be backed up for 7 to 10 days in the billing department. The money collected for the insurance billings goes directly to SMC. SMC submitted insurance claims for treatment of the following five patients during March 1993 through May 1993: J.V., R.L., L.W., P.Z., and D.W. SMC submitted a claim form dated March 31, 1993 to Metropolitan for services rendered to patient J.V. on March 25 and 29, 1993. The claim form stated that the physician was J.R. Menendez. Part of the services rendered to on March 25, 1993 was an injection of terramycin. Menendez did not work on March 25, 1993. He has never administered any Terramycin intramuscularly or intravenously to a patient in his professional career. Menendez did not provide any services to patient J.V. on March 25, 1993. The services listed on the claim form were provided to patient J.V. on March 25, 1993, by staff at SMC; however it was by someone other than Menendez. Menendez did provide follow-up services for J.V. on March 29, 1993. SMC submitted an insurance claim form dated March 31, 1993, for services provided to patient R.L. on March 30, 1993. The claim form stated that the physician was J.R. Menendez. Menendez did not work on March 30, 1993 and did not provide any services to patient R.L. on that date. However, the services listed on the insurance claim form were provided to patient R.L. by someone at SMC on March 30, 1993. SMC submitted an insurance claim form dated March 31, 1993, for services provided to patient D.W. on March 31, 1993. The claim form stated the physician was J.R. Menendez. Menendez did not work on March 31, 1993, and did not provide any services to patient D.W. on that date. Someone at SMC, other than Menendez, provided the services to patient D.W. on March 31, 1993. SMC submitted an insurance claim form dated March 31, 1993, for services provided to patient P.Z. on March 31, 1993. The claim form stated the physician was J.R. Menendez. Menendez did not work on March 31, 1993, and did not provide any services to patient P.Z. on that date. P.Z. was provided the services on March 31, 1993, by someone at SMC other than Menendez. SMC submitted an insurance claim form dated March 31, 1993, for services provided to patient L.W. on March 30, 1993. Part of the services rendered to L.W. was an injection of terramycin. Menendez did not work on March 30, 1993, and did not provide any services to patient L.W. on that date. Someone else at SMC provided the services to patient L.W. on March 30, 1993. SMC submitted an insurance claim to Central States Southeast and Southwest Areas Health and Welfare Fund for services provided to patient P.W. on February 3, 1993. The claim form stated that the physician was Jose M. Menendez and contained the purported signature of J. Menendez, MD. Menendez did not provide services to P.W. on February 3, 1993, and did not sign the insurance claim form. P.W. was a regular patient of Roberts. Roberts examined and treated on February 3, 1993. As of August 12, 1993, SMC had not received payment from Central States for services provided to P.W. on February 3, 1993. SMC submitted a second claim for the February 3 services, but this time the physician was listed as Dr. Modesto Ordoqui. Some time in April, 1993, one of the Respondents gave Menendez a folder containing some insurance claim forms to review to make sure the services correlated with the diagnoses. After reviewing the files, Menendez concluded that he had not provided services to patients J.V., R.L., L.W., P.Z. and D.W. listed on the insurance claim forms given to him by Roberts. On April 15, 1993, at a dinner meeting with Respondents, Menendez told them that he had not provided the services to the patients on the insurance claims that Roberts had given him to review. The Respondents told him that they did not know what he was talking about. Menendez resigned that evening.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered dismissing the Administrative Complaints in Case Nos. 94-3430 and 94-3757; finding Respondent Dr. Kenneth Alan Roberts guilty of violating Sections 458.331(1)(m) and (t), Florida Statutes in Counts One and Two of Case No. 94-3759, finding Respondent Dr. Peter R. Genovese guilty of violating Counts One and Two in Case No. 94-2142; and imposing the following penalty as to each Respondent: (1) one year probation with terms and conditions to be set by the Board, (2) an administrative fine in the amount of $3,000, and (3) a reprimand. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of December, 1995, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of December, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-2142 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes (1993), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. Paragraph 1: Accepted. Paragraph 2: The second sentence is rejected as unnecessary. The remainder is accepted. Paragraphs 3-4: Accepted. Paragraphs 5-8: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 9: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 10: Accepted. Paragraph 11: The first, second, fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh sentences are accepted in substance. The remainder is rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 12: The first and fourth sentences are accepted in substance. The remainder is rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 13: Rejected as unnecessary based on the finding that Menendez did not work on March 25, 30, and 31, 1993. Paragraph 14: Accepted that Menendez did not work on March 25, 30, and 31, 1993. The remainder is rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 15: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The remainder is rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 16: The first two sentences are rejected as unnecessary. The third and fourth sentences are accepted in substance. The fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth sentences are rejected as unnecessary. The last sentence is rejected as not supported by the evidence. The remainder is rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 17: The first sentence is rejected as unnecessary. The second sentence is accepted in substance. The last sentence is rejected as not supported by the record. The remainder is rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 18: The first sentence is rejected as unnecessary. The second and third sentences are accepted in substance. The last sentence is rejected as not supported by the evidence. The remainder is rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 19: The first two sentences are rejected as unnecessary. The third sentence is accepted in substance. The last sentence is rejected as not supported by the evidence. The remainder is rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 20: The first two sentences are rejected as unnecessary. The third sentence is accepted in substance. The last sentence is rejected as not supported by the evidence. The remainder is rejected as constituting argument. Paragraphs 21-22: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 23: Rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 24: The first sentence is accepted. The remainder is rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 25: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 26: Sentences 1-8, 10, and 11 are accepted in substance. Sentences 9 and 12 are rejected as unnecessary. The last sentence is rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 27: The second and third sentences are accepted in substance. The remainder is rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 28: Rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 29: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 30: The first sentence is rejected as not supported by the evidence. The billing practices may not have been proper in that the correct treating physician's name was not listed on some of the insurance claims but the evidence does not support a finding that the incorrect billing was anything other than a clerical mistake. The last sentence is rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 31: The first two sentences are rejected as unnecessary. The third and fourth sentences are accepted in substance. The remainder is rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 32: Accepted in substance that the second billing was a rebilling. The documentary evidence established that the second billing was in Dr. Ordoqui's name. The last sentence is rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 33: The last sentence is accepted in substance. The remainder is rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraphs 34: The first through the fourth sentences are accepted in substance. The last two sentences are rejected as not supported by the evidence. The remainder is rejected as constituting argument. Paragraphs 35-38: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 39: The second sentence is rejected as subordinate to the facts found. The remainder is accepted in substance. Paragraph 40: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The remainder is rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 41: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 42: Accepted in substance that Respondents met on November 4, 1985 and discovered the abnormality in the x-ray. Paragraph 43: The last phrase of the last sentence is rejected as unnecessary. The remainder is accepted in substance. Paragraph 44: Accepted. Paragraph 45: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 46: The evidence did not establish that Rene Bravo saw Patient C.W. The remainder is irrelevant based on the findings of fact. Paragraphs 47-49: Accepted in substance. Respondents' Proposed Findings of Fact. Paragraphs 1-3: Accepted. Paragraphs 4-6: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 7: The last sentence is accepted. The first sentence is rejected to the extent that the evidence does not establish that either Respondent gave either claim form for P.W. to Menendez. Given that one of the claim forms was not generated until after Menendez resigned, at least one of the forms could not have been given to Menendez. It is accepted that Menendez did not recognize the signature on one of the claims as his. Paragraph 8: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 9: The last sentence is rejected as not necessary. The remainder is accepted in substance. Paragraph 10-11: Rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 12: The first sentence is accepted. The second sentence is rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 13: Rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 14: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 15: Accepted that the second billing was a rebilling for services for which no payment had been received. Based on the bill under Dr. Ordoqui's name, it appears that the first bill was under Menenedez's name and the second bill was under Dr. Ordoqui's name. Paragraphs 16-23: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 24: Accepted in substance that neither Respondent examined C.W. on October 16, 1985. Paragraph 25: Rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 26: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The second sentence is accepted in substance to the extent that the use of a form per se does not constitute notification below the prevailing standard of care. Paragraph 27: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 28: Rejected as irrelevant since the Respondents adopted that method to inform the patients and by sending it out under their signature became responsible for the care of the patient. Paragraph 29: Accepted in substance that it was customary for the Respondents. Paragraphs 30-31: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 32: Rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 33: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 34: The first sentence is rejected as not supported by the evidence. The second sentence is accepted in substance except as to treated. Paragraphs 35-36: Rejected as not supported by the evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph A. Garwood, Esquire Agency For Health Care Administration 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Kenneth J. Metzger, Esquire Agency For Health Care Administration 1940 North Monroe Street allahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Harold M. Braxton, P.A. Suite 400, One Datran Center 9100 South Dadeland Boulevard Miami, Florida 33156-7815 Dr. Marm Harris Executive Director Board of Medicine 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0770 Jerome W. Hoffman, Esquire General Counsel Agency For Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32309
