The Issue Is the Respondent's assessment for corporate income tax and interest for the tax years ending 12/31/78, 12/31/79, and 12/31/80 appropriate, and may it be properly imposed upon Petitioner?
Findings Of Fact The instant dispute between the parties arose out of how the substantial business interests of Petitioner Murray Kramer Corp. are to be defined and by what accounting method its corporate income tax assessments are to be made. Milton P. Weiss, C.P.A., is Petitioner's accountant and qualified representative for purposes of this proceeding. He is neither an internal bookkeeper for the corporation nor a corporate officer thereof. At all times material, Petitioner was conducting business, deriving income, or existing within the State of Florida, pursuant to Chapter 220, F.S. Petitioner invests primarily through partnerships. Among Petitioner's holdings and investments is ownership of an orange grove in the State of Florida from which it derived income by way of the sales of citrus fruit grown in Florida during the taxable years at issue: 1978, 1979, and 1980. The orange grove constitutes real and tangible property in Florida for purposes of Florida's corporate income tax. Petitioner has consistently filed Florida corporate income tax returns on a "separate accounting" basis since the inception of Florida's Corporate Income Tax Law on January 1, 1972. Petitioner used this method for the years at issue: 1978, 1979, and 1980. It did so without petitioning the Respondent Department of Revenue for permission at or before the filing of the returns to use the "separate accounting" method to determine the Florida tax base. Accordingly, Petitioner did not receive prior written permission from the Department to use the "separate accounting" method for those years, and the Department did not require that the Petitioner use the "separate accounting" method in those years. Nonetheless, Petitioner asserts that its pattern of using the "separate accounting" method for six years put the Department on sufficient notice that the corporate taxpayer would continue to use that method indefinitely and further asserts that it was therefore entitled to use such a "separate accounting" method on the basis of its prior consistent usage. Petitioner's Florida corporate returns declare investment income from dividends, interest, gains from securities, partnership income, and income from its orange grove located in Florida. In each of the disputed tax years, Petitioner entered its federal taxable income on Line 1 of the Florida Corporation Income Tax Return, FORM F-1120. This amount is not at issue and is accepted as a "given" by both parties. However, in each of the disputed tax years, Petitioner did not complete the apportionment schedule on Page 3 of the respective returns. Instead of using the apportionment method, Petitioner computed what it characterized as "Florida Profit" or "Florida Income" on a schedule it attached, based totally on the profits it derived from the Florida orange grove and then inserted that amount on Line 6, Florida Portion of Adjusted Federal Income, of the "Computation of Florida Tax Liability" on the Florida return. This entry did not relate computationally to the amount of federal taxable income reported federally on Line 1. All gross receipts from the sale of citrus fruit by Petitioner were derived from sales made to Zellwood Fruit Distributors. This dollar amount is also undisputed. Petitioner received payment from its Florida orange grove operation in the form of checks drawn by Zellwood. Approximately June 20, 1983, Respondent Department of Revenue made an initial audit of Petitioner's books and records for the taxable years in question. Respondent's auditor assigned at that time had full and free access to Petitioner's books and records. He and his supervisor memorialized their view that the "separate accounting" method employed by Petitioner was proper, but this judgment call (by the auditor on June 29, 1983 and by his supervisor on July 1, 1983) was in the nature of free-form agency action and was neither accepted nor formalized by their superiors within the agency who ultimately determined that the Petitioner should have employed the "apportionment" method and that the burden was upon the Petitioner even under the apportionment method to establish that one hundred percent of its income was not derived in Florida. The Respondent Department therefore determined the tax owed by Petitioner upon the basis of 100% of Petitioner's income as opposed to the yearly percentages that Petitioner had unilaterally assigned to its orange grove, and issued its Revised Notice of Intent to Make Corporate Income Tax Audit Changes on November 7, 1983. Florida's apportionment formula is a three-factor function which takes selected business activities of the taxpayer and computes the portion of that activity attributable to Florida, divided by that activity everywhere. A composite of the subtotal of those three measures (payroll, sales, and property) of business activity are used to compute Florida's share of the "everywhere" base that would be available under the adjusted federal taxable income base. See, Section 214.71(1), F.S. The Department calculated the tax using the three statutorily recognized apportionment factors of payroll, sales, and property. Concerning the first apportionment factor, payroll, Petitioner had federally reported no amount of payroll, and therefore this factor was determined by the Department to be zero, and pursuant to Section 220.15, F.S., the payroll factor was eliminated and the other two factors were used exclusively. Concerning the sales factor, all gross receipts of the orange grove were considered to be derived within the State of Florida, and all gross income attributable to intangible personal property was excluded from the sales factor, pursuant to Section 220.15(1), F.S. Concerning the property factor, the Department determined that all real and tangible personal property was within the State of Florida. The situs of the intangible property was not established by the taxpayer. Therefore, because Section 214.71, F.S. limits the construction of the property factor to include only "real and tangible personal property," it was thus determined to exclude intangible property. The Respondent Department of Revenue issued its Notice of Proposed Assessment on November 16, 1983, showing a balance of $10,596.00 ($7308.00 tax, $275.00 penalty, and $3,013.00 interest computed through October 31, 1983, plus notice of daily interest of $2.40 per day from November 1, 1983 until paid.) Petitioner timely availed itself of informal protest procedures, and the Department issued its Notice of Decision on March 15, 1985. By its June 21, 1988 Notice of Reconsideration, the Department concluded its informal proceedings and denied Petitioner's assertion of the right to use a "separate accounting" method and further denied Petitioner's challenge to the Department's assessment by the "apportionment" method, which in this instance had not made any apportionment for "outside Florida" activities. The situs of intangible personal property was not sufficiently demonstrated by the Petitioner at formal hearing. The Petitioner also did not establish that it owns real or tangible personal property outside Florida. Zellwood Fruit Distributors provided Petitioner Murray Kramer with letters attesting that, based upon information received from Winter Gardens Citrus Products Cooperative, Winter Gardens' sales percentages in the State of Florida were as follows: 1979 1980 18.60% 21.07% Zellwood provided no such figures to Petitioner for the year 1978. Petitioner contends, on the basis of the after the fact Zellwood letters, that Zellwood was a member of Winter Gardens, a cooperative, and Murray Kramer was an associate grower of Zellwood. At formal hearing, no one from Zellwood or Winter Gardens testified; no contract between Petitioner Murray Kramer and either Zellwood or Winter Gardens was introduced to prove agency; no bills of lading, sales slips, corporate documents, or other connective link among the three entities was offered in evidence; nor was any primary, direct, non-hearsay evidence of sales amounts or situs of Winter Gardens' sales offered by Petitioner. Milton Weiss, Petitioner's accountant, asserted that if a straight "apportionment" (not "separate accounting") calculation had been made for the income derived in Florida by Petitioner, percentages would be: 1978 1979 1980 24.03% 15.31% 15.01% These percentages rely in part on what are clearly the out-of-court statements of Zellwood's correspondent, relaying further out-of-court statements from Winter Gardens Citrus. (See the immediately preceding Finding of Fact). Neither of these out-of-court hearsay statements is such as may be used to supplement or explain direct evidence, since no direct, primary source evidence of these sales or income has been presented before the undersigned in this de novo proceeding. See, Section 120.58(1), F.S. Petitioner has not directly paid wages during the tax years at issue. Petitioner has not produced any federal partnership tax returns nor other persuasive proof to account for the return on its investments through partnership channels. During the tax years at issue, Petitioner was not a member of a Florida cooperative, as that term, "cooperative," is used in Section 214.71(3)(a)2, F.S. (See Finding of Fact 15). Petitioner was unable, by evidence of a type commonly relied upon by reasonably prudent persons in the conduct of their affairs, to establish that all amounts other than the percentages of gross income Petitioner had assigned by either of the alternative accounting methods was generated outside of the State of Florida. In so finding, the undersigned specifically rejects Petitioner's assertion that the initial audit report of June 1983 could, by itself alone, legally or factually establish that only the orange grove income was Florida income, that Petitioner's Florida income was solely from the orange grove, that the interest, dividends, and gains on securities sales were not derived in Florida, that the Petitioner taxpayer received rent income from partnerships, that the partnership real estate which gave rise to the rent income was 100% outside Florida, or that the Respondent's initial audit "verified" the figures needed to compute the sales factor, the figures for the property factor, and the figures for the payroll factor of the "apportionment" method for the following reasons: In addition to the first auditor's report being free-form agency action which was ultimately rejected by the agency, and in addition to the failure of either the first auditor or his supervisor to testify in the instant Section 120.57(1) de novo proceeding as to the accuracy of the underlying primary documentation which Petitioner Murray Kramer claimed the first auditor had apparently reviewed, Petitioner did not offer in evidence at formal hearing any such direct evidence documentation which it claimed had been reviewed by the auditors. Further, Respondent's successive auditor, Mr. Siska, testified that it is auditor practice to only examine those books and records individual auditors believe to be necessary to complete the audit. This discretionary element eliminates any guarantee of what the initial auditor relied upon. For the same reasons, Petitioner's assertion that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) audit of its books and records for the year 1979 "verifies" that the Petitioner's books and records accurately reflect the transactions that took place, is rejected. Petitioner Murray Kramer had admitted a letter (P-10) notifying the corporation that the IRS' "examination of ... tax returns for the above periods shows no change as required in the tax reported. The returns are accepted as filed." The tax period indicated on this exhibit is "7912", which is not helpful, and even if it means, as Mr. Weiss testified, that the 1979 federal tax return which is part of the Florida Corporate Tax Return is accurate under federal law, this IRS letter alone does not verify all the underlying documentation for all three years in question. Also, specifically with regard to investments made through other entities, Mr. Weiss' testimony suggests that the wages paid and partnership returns of these other entities never were in the possession of, nor accessible by, this Petitioner. Petitioner's reliance on its federal returns is apparently based, in part, at least, upon its assertion that it is a "financial institution" as defined in Sections 214.71(3)(b) and 220.15(2), F.S., but the presentation quality of evidence in this case does not permit of such a finding, either. Petitioner has paid no portion of the assessed taxes.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a Final Order which dismisses the Petition and affirms the assessment. DONE and ORDERED this 26th day of June, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of June, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 88-4100 The following constitute rulings, pursuant to Section 120.59(2), F.S. upon the parties' respective proposed findings of fact (PFOF). Petitioner's PFOF: 1, 6. Accepted. 2, 9, 10, 11, 17, 19. Rejected for the reasons set out in the Recommended Order. 3, 5, 7, 8, 12, 14, 16. Accepted but not dispositive of any material issue for the reasons set forth in the Recommended Order. With regard to item 8, specifically, this determination is non-binding in the de novo proceeding. 4. Rejected upon the citation given as not proved or applicable as stated. 13. Accepted in part and rejected in part as not proved or applicable as stated. See Conclusions of Law 11-12. 15, 18. Rejected as out of context and misleading upon the record as a whole, and as not dispositive of any material issue, and as subordinate and unnecessary to the facts as found. Respondent's PFOF: 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18. Accepted. 4, 5. Accepted in part; what is not adopted is subordinate or unnecessary to the facts as found. 17. Accepted, but by itself is not dispositive of any material issue at bar, for the reasons set out in the Recommended Order. COPIES FURNISHED: Milton P. Weiss, C.P.A. 686 Hampstead Avenue West Hampstead, New York 11552 Jeffrey M. Dikman, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Tax Section Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Sharon A. Zahner, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Revenue Room 204, Carlton Building Post Office Box 6668 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668 William D. Townsend, Esquire General Counsel 203 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Katie D. Tucker, Executive Director Department of Revenue 102 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Milton P. Weiss, C.P.A. 3091 North Course Drive Pompano Beach, Florida 33069 =================================================================
The Issue The issue presented is whether the $5.00 per gallon tax on perchloroethylene provided for in Section 376.75, Florida Statutes, is subject to Florida sales and use tax pursuant to Chapter 212, Florida Statutes. STIPULATED FACTS Petitioner is a for-profit Florida corporation that sells perchloroethylene and other dry-cleaning supplies to the dry-cleaning industry. It is a "wholesale supply facility" as that term is defined in Section 376.301(17), Florida Statutes. Petitioner is a member of the Florida Drycleaners' Coalition, a state-wide trade association whose members consist of the owners/operators of dry-cleaning facilities and wholesale supply facilities. In 1993 and prior to and during the 1994 Florida legislative session, the Florida Drycleaners' Coalition employed lawyers-lobbyists to suggest and seek passage of amendments to Chapter 376, Florida Statutes, commonly known as the Florida Dry-Cleaning Solvents Cleanup Program. In 1994, the Florida Legislature enacted Chapter 94- 355, Laws of Florida, which amended Chapter 376, Florida Statutes. Chapter 94-355 created Section 376.3078(2)(a), Florida Statutes, which provides that: All penalties, judgments, recoveries, reimbursements, loans, and other fees and charges related to the implementation of this section and the tax revenues levied, collected, and credited pursuant to ss. 376.70 and 376.75, and registration fees collected pursuant to s. 376.303(1)(d), shall be deposited into the Water Quality Assurance Trust Fund, to be used upon appropriation as provided in this section. Charges against the funds for dry-cleaning facility or wholesale supply site rehabilitation shall be made in accordance with the provisions of this section. Chapter 94-355, Laws of Florida, also created Section 376.75, Florida Statutes, which provides, in part, as follows: Beginning October 1, 1994, a tax is levied on the privilege of producing in, importing into, or causing to be imported into the state perchloroethylene (tetrachloroethylene). A tax of $5.00 per gallon is levied on each gallon of perchloroethylene when first imported into or produced in the state. The tax is imposed when transfer of title or possession, or both, of the product occurs in this state or when the product commingles with the general mass of this state. Petitioner's corporate secretary and 50 percent shareholder is David J. Pilger. He contributed financially to the employment by the Florida Drycleaners' Coalition of lawyers- lobbyists charged with seeking passage of amendments to Chapter 376, Florida Statutes, and met several times with those lawyers- lobbyists in Tallahassee. He was assured during those meetings that it was the opinion of those lawyers-lobbyists that there was no danger of Florida sales tax being applied to the $5.00 per gallon tax on perchloroethylene. The Department conducted an audit of Petitioner for the period of January 1, 1993, through January 31, 1998. At no time prior to the Department's audit of Petitioner's financial records did Petitioner receive from the Department materials of any kind indicating that Florida sales and use tax would apply to the $5.00 per gallon tax on perchloroethylene. The Department had, however, adopted emergency Rule 12BER94-2, effective October 1, 1994, and Rule 12B-12.003(2)(b), Florida Administrative Code, effective February 19, 1995. The 1998 Florida Legislature amended Section 376.75, Florida Statutes, by enacting Chapter 98-189, Laws of Florida, effective July 1, 1998, which added a sentence regarding the $5.00 per gallon tax, as follows: "This tax is not subject to sales and use tax pursuant to ch. 212." The Department has assessed and/or collected from certain taxpayers Florida sales and use tax on the sales price of perchloroethylene and the $5.00 per gallon tax on perchloroethylene. The sales and use taxes are deposited into the general revenue fund pursuant to Section 212.20(1), Florida Statutes. The $5.00 per gallon tax on perchloroethylene is deposited into the Water Quality Assurance Trust Fund, pursuant to Section 376.3078(2)(a), Florida Statutes. The Department issued its Notice of Proposed Assessment to Petitioner on October 22, 1998, assessing sales and use tax of $39,098.66, penalties of $19,549.64, and interest of $11,184.10 through October 22, 1998, with interest of $12.85 to accrue per day. The Department issued its Notice of Proposed Assessment to Petitioner on October 22, 1998, assessing indigent care surtax of $2,128.98, penalties of $1,064.48, and interest of $611.97 through October 22, 1998, and interest of $.70 to accrue per day. Petitioner charged its customers and remitted to the Department the $5.00 per gallon tax on perchloroethylene provided for in Section 376.75, Florida Statutes, but neither collected from the customer nor remitted to the Department sales and use tax on this $5.00 per gallon tax. The $5.00 per gallon tax collected by Petitioner from its customers was reflected at the bottom of Petitioner's invoices as "the ENVRN TAX." Petitioner charged its customers and remitted to the Department the excise tax provided for in Section 206.9935(2), Florida Statutes, but neither collected from its customers nor remitted to the Department sales and use taxes or indigent care surtax on this excise tax. This tax was reflected at the bottom of Petitioner's invoices as "PERC TAX." Petitioner does not contest the Department's assessment of sales and use taxes and indigent care surtax on the water quality tax provided for in Section 206.9935(2), Florida Statutes. Petitioner does not dispute that its sales to its customers during the audit period were paid for by its customers.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered sustaining the assessment against Petitioner, together with interest, but compromising the entire penalty amount. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of November, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of November, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Jarrell L. Murchison, Esquire John Mika, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, Tax Section Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Fred McCormack, Esquire Landers & Parsons, P.A. 310 West College Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Linda Lettera, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668 Joseph C. Mellichamp, III, Esquire Office of the Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, Tax Section Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Larry Fuchs, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
Findings Of Fact The following facts were stipulated to by both Petitioner and Respondent: The Petitioner is a Delaware corporation with its principal office at Toledo, Ohio. The Petitioner qualified to do business in Florida December 31, 1970, and was assigned #825570. The Petitioner did incur a net operating loss for the Fiscal Year ending December 31, 1974, which resulted in a carry forward to 1975 and 1976 for Florida purposes. The 1974 net operating loss for federal income tax purposes amounted to $5,432,905 (as adjusted). For Florida return purposes, net 1974 "Schedule I" additions to federal income were $27,817. Net 1974 "Schedule II" subtractions from federal income per the Florida return as filed were $1,451,951. The apportionment factor for 1974 was 1.5645 percent for Florida tax purposes. The 1975 federal taxable income was $1,295,459. For Florida purposes, net 1975 "Schedule I" additions to federal income were $26,276. Net 1975 "Schedule II" subtractions from federal income per the Florida return as filed were $2,313,813. The apportionment factor for 1975 was 1.5197 percent for Florida tax purposes. The assessment of additional income tax for Fiscal Year ending December 31, 1976, by the Department of Revenue, which is the subject of Petitioner's protest, totals $1,889 resulting from the interpretation of the Florida statutes concerning the amounts mentioned in items 4 through 10 preceding. Total disallowed operation loss carry forward to the year 1976 after apportionment was $37,792. The issue of law involved herein is the interpretation of Section 220.13, Florida Statutes, which section is deemed to control the assessment for Fiscal Year ending December 31, 1976.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the State of Florida, Department of Revenue, upholding the assessment made by the Department of Revenue, and denying the relief requested herein by Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of September 1979 in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM E. WILLIAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of September 1979. COPIES FURNISHED: J. W. Neithercut, Vice President Questor Corporation Post Office Box 317 Toledo, Ohio 43691 William D. Townsend, Esquire Assistant Attorney General The Capitol, Room LL04 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Shepard King, Esquire Steel, Hector & Davis 1400 S.E. First National Bank Building Miami, Florida 33131 Joseph Z. Fleming, Esquire 25 Southeast Second Avenue Ingraham Building, Suite 620 Miami, Florida 33131
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Florida Renewable Energy Production Tax Credit (“Tax Credit”) application filed by Petitioner, Florida Power Development, LLC, A Florida Limited Liability Company (“Florida Power”), was eligible for consideration by Respondent, Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, Office of Energy (“DACS” or the “Department” or “Office of Energy”).
Findings Of Fact Florida Power is a company which produces power by way of burning biomass materials, primarily wood chips, at its energy plant at 10311 Cement Plant Road, Brooksville, Florida. Most of the energy it produces is sold to Duke Energy. The plant had previously been a coal fired power plant, but Florida Power spent $196 million converting it into a renewable energy facility utilizing biomass fuel. JP Morgan is the parent company of Florida Power. The Office of Energy is the state agency responsible for overseeing the Tax Credit program authorized under section 220.193, Florida Statutes (2016).2/ The Department is empowered to review and approve (or disapprove) all Tax Credit applications which it receives. The Office of Energy is located at 600 South Calhoun Street, Suite 251, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0001. Applications for a Tax Credit are available on the DACS website, as are the statutes and rules governing the Tax Credit program. The rules specify the date applications are due in each “production year” and set forth the process for filing the applications. Applications addressing the production year at issue in this proceeding of January 1, 2016, through June 30, 2016, were due at the Office of Energy no later than August 15, 2016. Florida Power’s application was not received by the Office of Energy until August 17, 2016, two days after the deadline. As a result, the Department deemed Florida Power’s application ineligible for consideration. Florida Power believes that circumstances surrounding the filing of its application for a Tax Credit excuse or make moot its failure to meet the deadline. Florida Power had filed applications for Tax Credits in prior production years. In 2015, its application was prepared by Tateswood, a company located in Houston, Texas. Tateswood provides management services to several power plants, including several owned by Florida Power. The application was submitted via overnight delivery, i.e., FedEx, from Houston, Texas, to the Office of Energy in Tallahassee, Florida. A senior official from Tateswood, Jeff Winkler, signed the application and had it overnighted to the Department. The application was received timely and approved by the Office of Energy.3/ Florida Power received a tax credit that year of approximately $1.49 million. Around July 28, 2016, Florida Power received the data it needed from Duke Energy to file the Tax Credit application for the 2016 production year (which was less than a full year as the Tax Credit program was expiring). Florida Power’s accountant, Lashauna Filo, also worked for Tateswood in Houston, Texas. She prepared the 2016 application for Mr. Winkler’s signature. Mr. Winkler was traveling, but he was expected to be in Brooksville prior to the application submission deadline. Ms. Filo emailed the application to the Brooksville plant on August 10, 2016, five days prior to the date it was due in Tallahassee. Mr. Winkler signed the application and gave it to Ms. Brown, plant administrator, who was given the task of submitting the application to the Office of Energy.4/ She noted verbiage on the face of the application form which says it can be submitted to the Department via “certified mail or hand delivery.” The due date of August 15 also appeared on the face of the application. Ms. Brown had not been involved with filing a Tax Credit application previously. After conferring with one of her supervisors, Dave Hermanson, she selected the first option--certified mail–-for submitting the application. She typed an envelope, filled out a Certified Receipt form, and put the application into a post office box at the Brooksville, Florida, post office. Ms. Brown did not consider literally hand-delivering the application to DACS because Tallahassee is roughly a four-hour drive from Brooksville, and it seemed there was enough time for the package to get to the Department. Ms. Brown did not understand that “hand delivery” allowed for delivery by overnight courier. Neither Florida Power nor Tateswood have attorneys on staff to provide guidance or assistance in matters such as these. Instead, Ms. Brown relied upon the advice given her by Mr. Hermanson. Unfortunately, the application did not sail smoothly through the USPS system. It was received by a Tampa USPS facility at 8:00 p.m., on August 10, was “coded” for Tallahassee, and departed that facility at 9:43 p.m., the same evening. It arrived at the Adams Street USPS facility in Tallahassee at 1:19 p.m., on August 11. However, the package had been improperly “coded” in the Tampa USPS facility to zip code 32301, rather than to zip code 32399. The 32399 zip code is used for state agencies in Tallahassee. This mis-code by the Tampa office caused the package to be erroneously sent from the Adams Street office to the downtown Tallahassee facility, rather than being processed for a “state agency” delivery. Thereafter, it went to another USPS site, the Lake Jackson facility, where it arrived on August 12. The package did not make it back to the Adams Street facility where it belonged until 5:36 a.m. on August 16-–one day after the submission deadline. The application was delivered to DACS on August 17, 2016, at 9:08 a.m., two days after the deadline. Clearly, Florida Power’s application for a Tax Credit was not timely received by the Office of Energy. However, Florida Power raises several facts which may relate to whether equitable tolling or equitable estoppel principles apply to this situation. Florida Power points out that verbiage on the face of the application itself does not specifically use the words “overnight express” as a means of submitting the application. Florida Power maintains, therefore, that it was misled into believing that physical hand-delivery or certified mail were its only options. Inasmuch as Florida Power had submitted their prior year’s application via FedEx, their claim lacks credence. Furthermore, the rule addressing application submission defines “hand delivery” as “any physical submission of an application to the Office [of Energy] from a representative of an applicant, courier, or a private delivery service.” Fla. Admin. Code R. 5O-2.003(3)(b)2. Florida Power was very familiar with the Tax Credit program, but could not say why it was not familiar with the rules governing that program. Unfortunately, certified mail, Florida Power’s delivery option for the application at issue, does not guarantee delivery by a date certain. Rather, certified mail-–which is processed exactly the same way as non-certified mail-–is merely a means for tracking a letter or package. Thus, a person who mails a letter by way of certified mail assumes the risk that the letter may not be delivered on or before a desired date. It appears that the risk is quite high. A USPS employee testified at final hearing that there are 50 to 70 complaints per day in Tallahassee concerning certified mail and several hundred certified letters may be misdirected each week. Florida Power further argues that the Department has seen several applications submitted via certified mail arrive at DACS late, i.e., after the “received by” deadline. Florida Power asserts that this fact has put DACS on notice that allowing an applicant to submit an application via certified mail constitutes a flaw in the system. The Department maintains that the use of certified mail is a valid way of tracking applications and is feasible. During the development of the rule governing submissions of the applications, no interested party voiced any objection to the use of certified mail as a delivery option. There is no evidence in the record that DACS was previously aware of the magnitude of errors by USPS so that it (DACS) should not include certified mail as an option for submitting applications. One must wonder, as does Florida Power, why there needs to be tracking of the applications at all since the operative date is the date of receipt by DACS. But the Department must deem it necessary for some reason and it is the current state of the law. Florida Power contends in its PRO that there are numerous fallacies in the Department’s rule regulating Tax Credit applications. This proceeding, however, is not a rule challenge brought pursuant to section 120.56, Florida Statutes. The validity or propriety of the rule is not in question. At issue in the instant proceeding is whether Florida Power complied with the duly promulgated and existing rule. DACS is one of the few state agencies which await delivery of its mail from the post office, rather than sending someone to retrieve it from USPS. DOAH is also one of those agencies. While awaiting delivery may delay an agency’s receipt of mail at times, it would not have affected Florida Power in this case because the package was not available for pick-up until August 16, one day after the deadline. There is no requirement in law or rule that any state agency opt to pick up its mail from USPS rather than have it delivered. Florida Power’s lament that DACS could have chosen to have its mail delivered is of no consequence. Some government agencies use the postmark on letters or packages as evidence that the item was timely mailed out; think IRS and April 15, for example. However, the DACS rule requires receipt of the application by the Department; the rule does not currently employ a “submitted by” compliance date. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 5O-2.003(b). When the Tax Credit program was originally initiated, the Department undertook regular rule development. The first rule promulgated by the Department was drafted in July 2012 and was ultimately adopted in the spring of 2013. That version of the rule stated that all applications must be “submitted” by a date certain. Upon receipt of one application after the due date, but which had been “submitted” by the applicant before the deadline, the Department decided it needed to re-think that provision. Rulemaking was recommended in order to amend the language relating to timely filing of applications. During the rulemaking process, which was duly noticed and advertised, DACS received no input from interested parties concerning the proposed amendment to the rule. The amended rule requires applications to be “received by” DACS on or before the deadline established by rule. This amendment eliminated any disputes concerning when an application was “submitted” by an applicant. The current, duly promulgated rule utilizes “received by” rather than “submitted” as the operative date. Florida Power points out that DACS has missed some of its own statutorily mandated deadlines concerning the reporting of Tax Credit information to the governor’s office. Florida Power does not cite to any authority which relieves an applicant from the requirements of a rule when an agency misses its own deadlines. So, that DACS was not timely in carrying out its own mandated duties is irrelevant to whether Florida Power satisfied its required actions. Nonetheless, the Department provided a legitimate rationale for its tardiness, though such reasons are irrelevant to the issue in this case. DACS employees utilize a checklist when reviewing Tax Credit applications. The checklist is just that, a matrix that can be checked off as each element or requirement of the application is reviewed, i.e., date of receipt, signature, application form, etc. The first question on the checklist asks whether the application “was submitted by” the requisite due date. April Groover Combs, who reviewed the Florida Power application using the checklist, simply interpreted the “was submitted by” language as “was received by.” Mrs. Combs had authored the rule and was involved in its amendments, so she understood what was required regardless of how the checklist referred to the items. Florida Power suggests that the internal checklist error somehow invalidates the Department’s actions; it does not. An internal document used by employees is not meant to provide rights to the public. It is not a rule. Thus, any errors within such a document are immaterial.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services upholding its rejection of the Tax Credit application filed by Florida Power as ineligible for consideration. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of April, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of April, 2017.
Findings Of Fact The following findings of fact are based upon the stipulation of the parties and the evidence presented: During a routine inspection on June 11, 1986 at Ron's Chevron #4, 1790 North Hercules, Clearwater, Florida, samples of all grades of gasoline were taken. A sample was taken from each side of a pump labeled "Chevron Unleaded". Using a field method for measuring lead content, it was determined that both samples contained more than 0.11 grams of lead per gallon, which exceeds the standard of 0.05 grams per gallon. The results of the field measurement were confirmed at the Department's main laboratory by Nancy Fischer on June 16, 1986. A stop sale notice was issued on June 12, 1986, and the contaminated product was withheld from sale to the public. On June 17, 1986, Petitioner was required to post a bond in the amount of $1,000 in lieu of the Department confiscating 5,850 gallons of fuel. The product was released for sale as Chevron Regular, a leaded fuel. New product was placed in the tank and proved lead free. Lead in gasoline is detrimental to a car designed to run on unleaded fuel. The lead can cause serious damage to the emission system and possibly the engine by stopping up the catalytic converter. The parties stipulated that the sole issue in this case is the amount of the bond. There is no evidence that Petitioner intentionally contaminated the fuel for financial gain. The cause appears to have been carelessness at some point between, or at, wholesale and retail. The Department accepted a bond of $1,000 and allowed Petitioner to retain the fuel for relabeling and sale as leaded fuel. The Department's penalty imposed in this case is consistent with its past practice in factually similar cases.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is recommended that the Department enter a Final Order requiring Petitioner to post a $1,000 refundable bond. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of October 1986 in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD D. CONN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of October 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Ronald Trimm Ron's Chevron #4 1790 North Hercules Clearwater, Florida 33515 William C. Harris, Esquire Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 The Honorable Doyle Conner Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue At issue is whether Respondent committed the offenses set forth in the Administrative Complaints and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The parties Petitioner, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Construction Industry Licensing Board (Department), is a state agency charged with the duty and responsibility for regulating the practice of contracting pursuant to Section 20.165, Florida Statues, and Chapters 455 and 489, Florida Statutes. Respondent, Richard M. Golfman, was, at all times material hereto, licensed by the Department as a certified general contractor, having been issued license number CG C032860, and authorized to engage in the practice of general contracting as an individual.1 The Feinstein project (DOAH Case No. 00-0599) On or about October 30, 1998, Respondent entered into a written contract with Norman and Sheila Feinstein to furnish the materials and perform the labor necessary to enclose and remodel the screened patio, and to build a rock garden, at their home located at 5468 Northwest 20th Avenue, Boca Raton, Florida, for the sum of $5,000. At the time, the Feinsteins paid Respondent $1,500 as the initial payment (deposit) under the terms of the contract. The contract Respondent presented and the Feinsteins executed on October 30, 1998, did not include Respondent's license number, nor did it contain a statement concerning consumers' rights under the Construction Industries Recovery Fund. Following execution of the contract, Respondent made repeated promises to construct the rock garden; however, it was not until November 10, 1998, that Respondent appeared on-site and constructed the rock garden, albeit not to the Feinsteins' satisfaction. Subsequently, Respondent had some high-hat electrical fixture cans and a bundle of furring strips delivered to the home for the patio project but, thereafter, despite repeated requests, refused to perform any work on the project or refund any money to the Feinsteins. The value of the labor and materials Respondent invested in the rock garden, as well as the cost of the building materials (the high-hat fixtures and furring strips) delivered to the job-site, was $250, a sum considerably less than the $1,500 the Feinsteins had entrusted to Respondent under the terms of their agreement. The Burres/Berger project (DOAH Case No. 00-0600) On or about November 23, 1998, Respondent submitted a written proposal to Tanya Burres to furnish the materials and perform the labor necessary to replace the existing roof on her home located at 7270 Montrico Drive, Boca Raton, Florida, for the sum of $22,125. The proposal was a one-page preprinted form. In the upper left there appeared, printed immediately following Respondent's handwritten name, the following: THE GOLFMAN GROUP, INC. P.O. Box 811926 Boca Raton, Florida 33431 The proposal did not include Respondent's license number, nor did it contain a statement concerning consumers' rights under the Construction Industries Recovery Fund. At the time the proposal was submitted, Tanya Burres was under contract to sell the home to Drs. Glenn Berger and Michelle Fiorillo, husband and wife (the Bergers), and Ms. Burres had agreed to split with the Bergers the cost of a new roof for the home. At the time, Ms. Burres had suggested the Respondent as a contractor to perform the work (because he had previously done satisfactory work for Ms. Burres); however, it was understood that the employment of any contractor was subject to the Bergers' approval. That the Bergers' agreement was required before any such employment would be accepted was clearly conveyed to Respondent. On November 23, 1998, Tanya Burres signed the proposal and gave Respondent a check payable to his order in the sum of $1,106.25, representing her half of the ten percent deposit called for by the proposal. The Bergers, however, declined to accept the proposal, and refused Respondent's request for the balance of the deposit. Rather, the Bergers, having received adverse information from the Department regarding Respondent's record, preferred to employ a different contractor, and Ms. Burres accorded the Bergers a monetary credit at closing (on the purchase of the home) for one-half the cost to re-roof the home. When the Bergers informed Ms. Burres (shortly after she signed the proposal on November 23, 1998) that they would not agree to use Respondent, Ms. Burres attempted to stop payment on her check; however, the check had already been cashed. Thereafter, Ms. Burres attempted on numerous occasions to contact Respondent by telephone and by his pager, but Respondent failed to return any of her calls or messages. To date, Respondent has failed to account for or return Ms. Burres' deposit of $1,106.25. The costs of investigation and prosecution As of February 25, 2000, the Department's costs of investigation and prosecution, excluding costs associated with any attorney's time, totaled $234.85 for DOAH Case No. 00-0599 (the Feinstein project) and $195.65 for DOAH Case No. 00-0600 (the Burres/Berger project.) Previous disciplinary action At hearing, the Department offered proof that, on two prior occasions, Respondent had been subjected to disciplinary action by the Construction Industry Licensing Board (the Board). (Petitioner's Exhibit 2.) The first occasion is reflected in the terms of a Final Order of the Board, dated August 4, 1987, which found Respondent guilty of the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint (which were not revealed at hearing beyond what may be inferred from the terms of the Final Order), and resolved that Respondent suffer the following penalty: Respondent's licensure is hereby suspended for ten (10) years. Provided, Respondent may obtain termination of said suspension at anytime, without further action by the Board, upon providing the Board's Executive Director with a certified bank check in an amount sufficient to cover and pay a fine of five hundred dollars ($500), and the bad check alleged in the Administrative Complaint, and all service charges in connection therewith, and all other fees accruing as of the date Respondent seeks said termination of supervision. The second occasion Respondent was subjected to disciplinary action is reflected in the terms of a Final Order of the Board, dated July 18, 1997, which approved a stipulated settlement of certain complaints then pending before the Board. That Final Order approved the dismissal of a number of counts contained in five Administrative Complaints then pending before the Board and, as to the remaining counts, agreed (without Respondent admitting or denying the allegations of fact contained in the Administrative Complaints) to the following penalty: 3. FINE AND COSTS: Respondent shall pay a fine of Nine Hundred dollars ($900.00) and costs of Eight Hundred fifty One dollars ($851) to the Board within thirty (30) days of the filing of the Final Order. Said payment shall be in the form of a cashier's or certified check and shall be made payable to the "Construction Industry Licensing Board." To assure payment of the fine and costs, it is further ordered that all of Respondent's licensure to practice contracting shall be suspended with the imposition of the suspension being stayed for thirty (30) days. If the ordered fine and costs are paid in compliance with the terms set forth above, the suspension imposed shall not take effect. However, should payment not be timely made, the stay shall be lifted and Respondent's license shall be immediately suspended. Upon payment of the fine and costs in full, the suspension imposed shall be lifted. Respondent apparently satisfied the fines and costs imposed by the foregoing orders. (Petitioner's Exhibit 2.)
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be rendered adopting the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and which, as a penalty for the violations found, imposes an administrative fine in the total sum of $13,500.00, revokes Respondent's licensure, orders that Respondent pay restitution to Norman and Sheila Feinstein in the sum of $1,250.00 and to Tanya Burres in the sum of $1,106.25, and assesses costs of investigation and prosecution (through February 25, 2000) in the total sum of $430.50 against Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of June, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of June, 2000.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Kenneth Tuch is liable to Florida Power and Light Company for receipt of unmeasured electric energy and if so, what amount is due?
Findings Of Fact Kenneth Tuch resides alone at 1924 N.E. 25th Street, Ft. Lauderdale, Florida. He receives his electric current from Florida Power and Light Company. In June of 1985, an employee of American Cable Company went to Mr. Tuch's home to investigate a complaint about the quality of cable television reception at the Tuch residence. The employee noticed that the air conditioning was on in the Tuch residence while he was investigating the complaint. When following the cable lines outside the home, he noticed the electric meter was not operating. He provided this information to Florida Power and Light which sent two employees to the Tuch residence on June 20, 1985. They found the air conditioning and swimming pool pump were on, but the electric meter disk did not turn. The meter seal was opened and the meter was removed from its socket, and photographed. The photographs demonstrate that the potential clip of the meter was open. The potential clip is used when testing a meter. When it is open no registration of electric current is made. The meter was originally placed at the Tuch residence in 1960. The potential clip could not have been open then, for it never would have registered any electric consumption were that the case. The potential clip would not have fallen into the open position on its own. There was tampering with the potential clip because a screw in the slot in the center of the clip had been tightened to keep the clip in the open position. In addition, the picture of the potential clip and the screws (FP&L Exhibit 5) show wear and tear on the screw. Marks on the area around the screw slot in the center of the potential clip show that the clip has been slid back and forth. These facts prove a deliberate attempt to divert unmeasured electricity. The meter seal consists of a wire bail of a horseshoe shape which fits into a rectangular base body approximately 1 and 1/4 inches by 3/4 inch by 1/8 inch. The seal removed from Tuch's meter bears the inscription on one side "77 FP&LS" and on the other side, the numbers "0379126". The condition of the seal was such that by tugging on the wire bail, it would loosen from the body of the seal, and open, but the bail could be replaced into the seal body giving the impression on casual observation that the seal was intact. While the inscription on the seal indicates that it is a genuine Florida Power and Light seal, it is not in the condition in which seals are originally placed. It is not possible to open the wire bail of a seal and thereby gain access to the meter canopy without tampering with the seal. The billings for consumption of electricity at the Tuch residence show an erratic pattern of monthly electric consumption during the period for which Florida Power and Light has records available, January 1982 through June 1986. For the years 1982 through 1984, Mr. Tuch was billed for an average of 11,022.33 kilowatts per year. On June 20, 1985, the meter at the Tuch residence was replaced with a new meter which was locked in place. Readings were taken from the new meter on June 21, June 27, July 2 and July 9. During those 19 days, 1,063 kilowatts had been consumed for an average use of 55.9 kilowatts per day. This equals 1,677 kilowatts for a 30 day period. An average percentage of use chart was introduced into evidence as the basis for distributing the total yearly kilowatt consumption based upon seasonal variations in consumption. According to the chart 9.8 percent of the total kilowatts used by Florida Power and Light customers in 1985 were consumed in the July billing period. That being so, the total estimated annual usage given a July bill of 1,677 kilowatts would be 17,112 kilowatts. The total additional billing on that basis for 1982, 1983, 1984 and 1985 (through the date of the discovery of the tampering) would be $1,829.57. A potential problem with this methodology for determining annual usage is that it extrapolates a bill for a one year period based on readings taken over only 19 days. As a check on the method Florida Power and Light also placed in evidence the readings for approximately six months actual usage after replacement of the meter which had been tampered with. Mr. Tuch used 7,865 kilowatts during the 172 day period from June 20 through December 31, 1985. This was an average use of 45.72 kilowatts per day. When multiplied by 365 days the estimated yearly usage is 16,690 kilowatts. This results in a billing $17.52 lower than the extrapolation and shows the reasonableness of using the 19 day period to project annual usage. The electric meter removed from Mr. Tuch's residence was tested, but due to its age was then destroyed. Florida Power and Light rendered its additional bill two months later. Mr. Tuch therefore did not have the opportunity to inspect or test the meter. Florida Power and Light tested the meter appropriately before it was destroyed and it was accurately registering current flow when the potential clip was closed. If this case involved questions about the accuracy of the registration on the meter which had been removed, Mr. Tuch's inability to test the meter would have seriously impaired the fairness of this proceeding. The testimony and photographic evidence, which is accepted, is that the potential clip was open, and thus the meter would register no use of current at all. Essentially the meter had been turned on and off. This tampering caused the underregistration, not inaccuracy of the meter's measurement ability. In this case, the inability to test the old meter did not prejudice Mr. Tuch. Florida Power and Light is not entitled to recover $157. 88 in investigative costs. The witness proffered to testify about investigative costs was listed in interrogatories as a witness on matters of corporate policy. See Notice of Serving Answers to Interrogatories filed April 21, 1986. While it may be corporate policy to bill those who divert current for investigative charges, the exhibit purporting to set out the costs incurred in the Tuch investigation was admitted to show the corporate form for recording charges. No evidence of the charges in this specific case was admitted (Transcript 196-97). 1/
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Public Service Commission requiring Kenneth Tuch to pay Florida Power and Light $1,829.57 for current diverted. If such payment is not made, electric service to Mr. Tuch's residence at 1924 N.E. 25th Street, Ft. Lauderdale, Florida, should be discontinued. DONE AND ORDERED this 29th day of January, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida WILLIAM R. DORSEY, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of January, 1987.
The Issue Whether the Respondent is guilty on six counts of charging an advance fee for the listing of time-share estates for sale, in violation of Section 721.20(4), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a corporation organized under the laws of Arkansas and was authorized by the Florida Secretary of State to transact business in the State of Florida from November 1991 through December 1997. Respondent's main office is now located in Mountain Home, Arkansas. Respondent's credit card terminals are in Arkansas. Respondent has an escrow and operating account in Mountain Home, Arkansas. Respondent hired Jack McClure to open and operate its Florida office. Jack McClure held a Florida real estate broker's license. National Resort Mart conducted business from its Florida office in Kissimmee, Florida, until McClure's death in December 1997. Respondent opened and maintained escrow and operating accounts in Florida from 1992 through 1997 for its Florida business. The Florida office was limited to the activities of time-share real estate sales. The Respondent did not list time- shares, nor collect any advance fees for listing time-shares at its Kissimmee, Florida, branch office. Global Title Company of Naples, Florida, conducts the closings for Respondent for the majority of their Florida time- share sales. Respondent advertised its Florida office in its direct mail brochure, sent to Florida time-share owners, with the statement: "Our Orlando office is situated only seven miles from Disney World." Ms. Valnecia Williams of Madison, Florida, owns a time- share unit at Cypress Point Resorts in Central Florida. Williams received a mailed "brochure" from Respondent's home office which advised her that Respondent was in the business of buying and selling time-shares. Based on the Respondent's direct mail flyer, Williams called the Kissimmee, Florida, telephone number to find out information related to her listing. Apparently, the call was automatically switched to the home office. She received some initial information. Several weeks later she called the Respondent's Arkansas office and talked to a different salesperson. Williams agreed to list her time-share, Cypress Pointe Resort, Unit 5206, Week 37, with Respondent on March 5, 1997, at an asking price of $12,9000 in an open listing for a period of a year. Consideration was in the form of a seven percent of gross sale of the unit, or a $750 minimum commission, to be paid to Respondent at the closing of the sale. Respondent charged an advance fee of $439 from Ms. Williams of Madison, Florida, at the time she listed her Florida time-share period at Cypress Point Resort for sale with Respondent. Williams authorized Scott Fisher, Respondent's salesperson in Arkansas to charge the refundable advertising and marketing fee of $439 to Williams' USAA Federal Savings Bank charge card. Williams was not pleased with the service provided by Respondent and, on or about July 28, 1997, demanded a refund from the Respondent. Sometime within the next two months Respondent complied with the request and refunded the fee by crediting Williams' charge card with the same amount. Kim Collins of Faith, North Carolina, owns a time-share unit at Westgate Lakes, Orlando, Florida. Collins received brochures from Respondent's home office seeking a listing for her time-share unit in Florida, approximately one year later. Collins called Respondent at an "800" number which was automatically forwarded to Respondent's main office in Arkansas. Eventually, Collins decided to use Respondent's services and borrowed the money from her mother to pay the advance fee and sign the listing contract. Respondent collected an advance fee from Mr. and Mrs. Richard Collins of Faith, North Carolina, of $439 at the time they listed their Florida time-share period at Westgate Lakes, Orlando, for sale with Respondent, by mail and check to the Respondent's main office in Arkansas. Collins' time-share has been listed for sale with Respondent since July 1, 1996. Dan Coffey of Jacksonville, Florida, owns a time-share unit at Orange Lake in Central Florida. Coffey received a brochure from Respondent's home office and called for more information. Coffey agreed to list his unit for sale with Respondent on October 14, 1996, at a negotiable price of $12,900. Respondent collected an advance fee from Mr. and Mrs. Daniel Coffey of Jacksonville, Florida, of $439 at the time they listed their Florida time-share period of Orange Lake Resort, Orlando, Florida, for sale with Respondent. In like manner, Respondent collected an advance fee from Mr. and Mrs. Rick Rogers of Maumee, Ohio, at the time they listed their Florida time-share period with Respondent. Respondent also collected an advance fee from Mr. and Mrs. Donald Gordon of Pensacola, Florida, at the time they listed their Florida time-share period with Respondent. Respondent collected an advance fee from Mr. and Mrs. William Budai of Duquesne, Pennsylvania, of $539 at the time they listed their Florida time-share period at Westgate Villas, Kissimmee, Florida, for sale with Respondent. The contract signed by each complainant was titled "Listing Agreement." The Listing Agreement between the time- share owner of the Florida unit and Respondent was for the listing of their time-share for sale for a percent of gross sale of the unit to be paid at the closing, with an advance fee payable immediately. All transactions between the owners and Respondent were made through the Respondent's home office in Arkansas. No advance fee was collected within the boundaries of the State of Florida. Complainants Collins and Coffey did not receive refunds of the advance fees they paid to Respondent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes, enter a final order that: Finds Respondent guilty of six violations of Section 721.20(4), Florida Statutes. Respondent pay a penalty of $10,000 per violation for each of the six violations, to be paid within thirty (30) days of the entry of the final order. That Respondent refund $439 each to Kim Collins and Daniel Coffey, to be paid within thirty (30) days of the entry of the final order. That Respondent cease and desist from collecting advance fees for the listing of time-share periods for Florida residents and/or Florida time-share units. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of May, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of May, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Mary Denise O'Brien, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 James H. Gillis, Esquire James H. Gillis Associates, P.A. 8424 Pamlico Street Tallahassee, Florida 32817-1514 William Woodyard, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Philip Nowick, Director Division of Florida Land Sales, Condos, and Mobile Homes Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
