The Issue The issue in these consolidated cases is whether proposed amendments to Rule 10-5.011(1)(o), and (p) F.A.C. relating to certificates of need for hospital inpatient general psychiatric services, are invalid exercises of delegated legislative authority, as defined in Section 120.52(8), F.S.
Findings Of Fact Metamorphosis of the Rules Prior to 1983, hospitals were not separately licensed, and certificates of need (CON) were not required for the designation of beds for psychiatric and substance abuse services. In 1983, statutory amendments to Chapter 381, F.S. addressed psychiatric beds as reviewable projects in the CON program. In 1983, HRS adopted rules establishing four new categories of beds, now found in Rules 10-5.011(1)(o), (p), and (q), F.A.C.: Short-term psychiatric, long-term psychiatric, and short and long-term substance abuse. At the time that the categories were created, HRS conducted an inventory of the hospitals, asking how many beds were designated in each category. Based on the responses, published in the Florida Administrative Weekly, future projections of need were made and applications were considered for CONs. Another category of psychiatric beds was not included in the 1983 rules. Intensive residential treatment programs for children and adolescents were created by statute in 1982, and are defined in Section 395.002(8), F.S. as: a specialty hospital accredited by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals which provides 24-hour care and which has the primary functions of diagnosis and treatment of patients under the age of IS having psychiatric disorders in order to restore such patients to an optimal level of functioning. These facilities, called IRTFs, may become licensed as hospitals pursuant to Section 395.003(2)(f), F.S., but as hospitals they must obtain CON approval pursuant to Sections 381.702(7) and (12), F.S. and Section 381.706(1) (b), F.S. IRTFs have no statutory or regulatory restrictions on length of stay and were approved by HRS at one time under an unwritten policy that there be one such facility available in each HRS planning district, without regard to the availability of other long or short term psychiatric programs. In 1985, HRS proposed a rule amendment which would have eliminated the short and long term distinction, as well as the distinction between psychiatric services and substance abuse services. Six months later, the proposed rule amendment was withdrawn. It was highly controversial; several challenges were filed; objections were made by various local health councils; and a new administrator took over. The agency decided to rework its proposed change~;. The agency next began the process of revision in 1987, and in 1988 convened a workshop group to review an issue paper prepared by agency staff. Another work group met in 1989 to consider the consolidation of psychiatric and substance abuse rules. HRS staff reviewed literature on the subjects of substance abuse and psychiatric services, including literature relating to access by indigent patients and the provision of services to children and adolescents. Staff prepared rule drafts which were circulated in- house, including the alcohol, drug abuse and mental health program office; and to such outside groups as the Association of Voluntary Hospitals of Florida, the Florida Hospital Association and the League of Hospitals. The proposed rule amendments which are the subject of this proceeding were filed on January 19, 1990 (substance abuse), and on January 26, 1990 (inpatient psychiatric services) in the Florida Administrative Weekly. The Parties HRS administers the CON program pursuant to Section 381.701, et seq., F.S. (1989). The CON program regulates entry into the Florida health care market by providers through review and approval of certain capital expenditures, services and beds. The petitioner, Florida League of Hospitals, Inc. is a nonprofit corporation which is organized and maintained for the benefit of investor-owned hospitals which comprise its membership. The remaining petitioners and intervenors are current providers of hospital inpatient psychiatric services, long and short term, and of inpatient substance abuse services, long and short term. The petitioners and intervenors are all substantially affected by the proposed rules and have stipulated to the standing of all parties in this proceeding. Abolishing Distinctions Between Long-Term & Short-Term Psychiatric Beds "Short term hospital inpatient psychiatric services" is defined in existing rule 10-5.011(1)(o)1, FAC, as follows: Short term hospital inpatient psychiatric services means a category of services which provides a 24-hour a day therapeutic milieu for persons suffering from mental health problems which are so severe and acute that they need intensive, full-time care. Acute psychiatric inpatient care is defined as a service not exceeding three months and averaging length of stay of 30 days or less for adults and a stay of 60 days or less for children and adolescents under 18 years. "Long term psychiatric services" is defined in existing rule 10- 5.011(1)(p)1., FAC as a category of services which provides hospital based inpatient services averaging a length of stay of 90 days. Neither rule addresses services to adults with an average length of stay (ALOS) of 30-90 days, or services to children and adolescents with a 60-90 day ALOS. Because of this, and the "averaging" process, long term hospitals legitimately serve "short term" patients and short term hospitals may serve "long term" patients. One party has calculated than a long term facility could legally provide short term services for 80% of its patients, and long term services for only 20% of its patients and still have an ALOS of 90 days. Under the existing rules a facility must file a CON application to convert from long term to short term beds, or vice versa, and is subject to sanctions for failure to comply with the designation on its CON. The proposed changes would repeal rule 10-5.011(1) (p), FAC regarding long term services, and would amend rule 10- 5.011(1) (o), FAC to delete the definition of short term services, thereby permitting facilities to serve patients without regard to length of stay. The proposed changes are supported by several factors upon which a reasonable person could rely. Substantial changes have occurred in the last decade in clinical practices and in third party reimbursement to reduce the ALOS for hospital inpatient psychiatric care. Prior to the 1960s, there was no distinction between long and short term care, as all hospital based care was long term with an emphasis on psychoanalytic therapy. Beginning in the 1960s, the concept of community mental health programs evolved with an emphasis on deinstitutionalization of patients in large public "asylums" and with a goal of treatment in the least restrictive environment. In more recent years the trend has spread to the private sector. Improvements in the availability and use of psychiatric drugs, the use of outpatient care or partial hospitalization, and improved follow up care have led to a dramatic decrease in ALOS. Long term care is costly, and whether third party payors have been a driving force, or are merely responding to the trends described above, long term inpatient reimbursement is virtually nonexistent. During the 19805, most insurance companies imposed a 30-day limit on psychiatric inpatient care or imposed monetary limits which would have effectively paid for less than a 90-day term. CHAMPUS, the program providing insurance to military dependents, was providing long term coverage in 1982, but by 1986 its coverage was rarely available for more than 30-60 days, and today, under CHAMPUS' case management system, 30 days is a "luxurious amount". Other large third-party payors such as Blue Cross/Blue Shield have similar limits or aggressively use case management (the close scrutiny of need on a case by case basis) to limit reimbursement for inpatient care. Of the two or three long term facilities in existence at the time that HRS' rules were originally adopted, only one, Anclote Manor still reported an ALOS of over 90 days by 1989, dropping from an ALOS of 477.9 days in 1986 to 145.4 days in 1989. At the same time its occupancy rate dropped below 50%. There is an interesting dialogue among experts as to whether there still exists a clinical distinction between long term and short term inpatient psychiatric care. Studies at the Florida Mental Health Institute found no difference in rate of rehospitalization over a 12 month period between patients who were in a nine week program and patients from Florida State Hospital with a 500 day length of stay. Some mental health practitioners are looking now at treating the chronic psychiatric patient with repeated short term hospital stays and less intensive care between episodes, rather than a single long term inpatient stay. Other practitioners maintain that a long term psychiatric problem is behavioral in nature and requires a total life readjustment and longer length of stay. Whichever practice may be preferable, the facts remain that fewer and fewer mental patients are being treated with long term hospitalization. The proposed rules would not foreclose any facility from providing long term care, if it finds the need. To the extent that a clinical distinction exists between short and long term care, the existing rules do not address that distinction, except from a wholly arbitrary length of stay perspective. The existing rules no longer serve valid health care objectives. Existing providers with short term CONs are concerned that the allowing long term facilities to convert will further glut an underutilized market and will result in an increase in vacant beds and a rise in the cost of health services, contrary to the intent of the CON program. Intensive residential treatment facilities (IRTFs), which will be folded into the need methodology for children and adolescent beds, have no current restrictions on length of stay and may already compete with impunity with the short term providers. Moreover, long term facilities are also providing substantial short term care as a result of the trends discussed above. HRS has not consistently enforced the length of stay restrictions of long term providers' CONs. Whether those CONs were improvidently granted is beside the point. The capital costs have already been incurred; the beds are available; and the beds are being used, in part, for short term services. Abolishing the distinction is a rational approach to current conditions. And in determining that all existing providers would be placed in the same position regarding length of stay, HRS avoids the regulatory nightmare of trying to enforce limitations on existing providers and approving new beds without limitations. Creating a Distinction Between Adult and Children/Adolescent Beds Rule 10-5.011(1)(o)3.c. creates a CON distinction between general psychiatric services for adults, and those services for children and adolescents. Rule 10-5.011(1)(o)4., as proposed, would create separate need criteria for hospital inpatient general psychiatric services for adults and for children/adolescents. Adolescents are defined in Rule 10- 5.011(1)(o)2.a., as persons age 14 through 17 years. Persons over 17 years are adults, and under 14 years are children. There are valid clinical reasons to distinguish between programs fob the separate age groups. Although there is some overlap, differing therapies are appropriate with different ages. The types of services offered to adults are not the same as those which are offered to children. Children, for example, often receive academic educational services while being hospitalized. Adults receive career or vocational counseling and marriage counseling. The required separation by age categories would remove some flexibility from providers. However, this is offset by the Department's valid need to track for planning purposes inpatient services to children and adolescents separately from those provided to adults. Based on anecdotal evidence, HRS' Office of Alcohol, Drug Abuse and Mental Health Program Office is concerned about the possible overutilization of hospital inpatient services for children and adolescents and the potential that when insurance reimbursement expires they are discharged without clinical bases. Taking Inventory Under the proposed rule, in order to separately regulate adult and children/adolescent beds, HRS will fix an inventory of uses as of the time that the rule takes effect. For facilities with CONs which already allocate beds between the two groups, the proposed rule will have no effect. For facilities without a designation, as long as adults and children/adolescents are kept in separate programs, the allocation can now be mixed and changed at will. The rule amendment will freeze that use in place. HRS has conducted a preliminary survey to determine the existing uses of psychiatric, substance abuse and residential treatment program beds. The survey of approximately 120 facilities is complete, but is not intended to limit those facilities unless their CON already provides a limit. A final inventory will be taken after the proposed rules become effective. The inventory will be published, and providers will be given an opportunity to contest its findings. The ultimate outcome will be amended CONs and licenses which reflect each facility's mix of adult and children/adolescent beds. The process is a fair and reasonable means of commencing separate regulation of services to these age groups. The Definitions Proposed rules 10-5.011(1)(o)2.1., 2.p., and 2.t.) define "hospital inpatient general psychiatric services", "psychiatric disorder" and "substance abuse", respectively. Each of these provisions defines the terms by reference to classifications contained in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Diseases (DSM-III-R Manual) and equivalent classifications contained- in the International Classification of Diseases (ICD-9 Codes). The rule as originally proposed included the phrase "or its subsequent revisions", after incorporating the manuals by reference. In testimony, and in the parties second agreement (Hearing Office exhibit 3) the phrase is deleted. However, it still appears in proposed rule 10-5.011(1) (o)2.1., perhaps inadvertently. The DSM-III-R is a generally recognized manual for the classification of mental disorders and is widely used by clinicians and medical records professionals to categorize the conditions of patients. The ICD-9 codes are broader than just mental disorders, but they have a section on mental disorders with numbers that are identical to those in the DSM-III-R. Although the manuals are complex and subject to interpretation, clinicians are accustomed to their use and they provide a reasonable guide as to the services which may be provided in an inpatient substance abuse program, as distinguished from an inpatient psychiatric program. Advertising Limited Proposed rule 10-5.011(1)(o)3.d. (as amended in the parties second agreement, Hearing Officer exhibit #3), provides: D. Advertising of services. The number of beds for adult or for children and adolescent hospital inpatient general psychiatric services shall be indicated on the face of the hospital's license. Beds in intensive residential treatment programs for children and adolescents which are licensed as specialty hospital beds will be indicated as intensive residential treatment program beds on the face of the hospital's license. Only hospitals with separately-licensed hospital inpatient general psychiatric services, including facilities with intensive residential treatment programs for children and adolescents which are licensed as specialty hospitals, can advertise to the public the availability of hospital inpatient general psychiatric services. A hospital with separately licensed hospital inpatient general psychiatric services that does not have a certificate of need for hospital inpatient substance abuse services may advertise that they [sic] provide services for patients with a principal psychiatric diagnosis excluding substance abuse and a secondary substance abuse disorder. The Department does not currently have CON, licensure, or other rules which limit the ability of a health care provider to advertise its services, and has never used advertising as a factor in conducting CON review for any proposed services. HRS included provisions regarding advertising in its proposed rules because it had evidence that existing facilities have used misleading advertisements. The evidence came from other providers, rather than consumers. However, it is the consumer whom the agency feels may be confused by advertising which implies that services are available when such services cannot be legally provided under the facility's license. The advertising provision is prospective in nature, seeking to prevent licensed providers from advertising services for which they are not licensed. The provisions do not relate to CON review, and the staff is unclear as to how the rule would be implemented. Licensing and CON review are two separate functions within the agency. Although the term is not defined in the proposed rule, advertising broadly includes word of mouth referrals and public presentations by professionals in the community, as well as traditional media and written advertisements. Properly utilized, advertising helps consumers exercise choice and gain access to needed services. Improper advertising is subject to the regulation of federal and state agencies other than the department. New Need Methodology, with Preferences Proposed Rule 10-5.011(1)(o)4., deletes the existing population ratio methodology and creates a need formula based upon use rate, for adult and children/adolescent inpatient psychiatric services. Certain preferences are also described. 34. Rule 10-5.011(1) (o)4.e.(III) provides: In order to insure access to hospital inpatient general psychiatric services for Medicaid-eligible and charity care adults, forty percent of the gross bed need allocated to each district for hospital inpatient general psychiatric services for adults should be allocated to general hospitals. The same provision for children and adolescent services is found in rule 10-5.011(1)(o)4.h.(III). Medicaid reimbursement is not available for inpatient services in a specialty hospital. 35. Rule 10-5.011(1)(o)4.i. provides: Preferences Among Competing Applicants for Hospital Inpatient General Psychiatric Services. In weighing and balancing statutory and rule review criteria, preference will be given to applicants who: Provide Medicaid and charity care days as a percentage of its total patient days equal to or greater than the average percentage of Medicaid and charity care patient days of total patient days provided by other hospitals in the district, as determined for the most recent calendar year prior to the year of the application for which data are available from the Health Care Cost Containment Board. Propose to serve the most seriously mentally ill patients (e.g. suicidal patients; patients with acute schizophrenia; patients with severe depression) to the extent that these patients can benefit from a hospital-based organized inpatient treatment program. Propose to service Medicaid-eligible persons. Propose to service individuals without regard to their ability to pay. Provide a continuum of psychiatric services for children and adolescents, including services following discharge. The preferences are similar to those in CON rules relating to other types of health services and are intended to implement, in part, the legislative mandate that the agency consider an applicant's ". . . past and proposed provision of health care services to medicaid patients and the medically indigent." Section 381.705(1) (n), F.S. Under Medicaid reimbursement general hospitals are paid a set per diem based on a variety of services provided to all Medicaid patients, regardless of actual cost of the individual service. As psychiatric services are generally less costly than other services on a per diem basis, hospitals may recoup a greater percentage of their costs in serving Medicaid psychiatric patients. This and the fact that public hospitals receive some governmental subsidies do not obviate the need for incentives in the CON program. Not all of the charity care provided by these hospitals is funded and a large amount is written off. Although Petitioners argue that the preferences are not needed, or are too generous, none provide competent evidence that the facilities who do not enjoy the preferences are unduly prejudiced. The 40% allocation of bed need to general hospitals is a guideline, not a maximum, as applied by the agency, and presumes that there are general hospitals competing in any batch in question. It is not intended to frustrate a separate section of the rule which allows a hospital with at least an 85% occupancy rate to expand regardless of need shown in the formula and the occupancy rate district-wide. See 10- 5.011(1) (o)4.d. and g. "Evaluation of Treatment Outcomes" The proposed rules contain three provisions relating to a hospital's evaluation of its patients' treatment outcomes. Rule 10-5.011(1) (o)3.i, includes among "required services", ". . . an overall program evaluation of the treatment outcomes for discharged patients to determine program effectiveness." Rule 10-5.011(1)(o)8.j., requires in the application, A description of the methods to be used to evaluate the outcome of the treatments provided and to determine the effectiveness of the program, including any summary evaluation outcome results for hospital inpatient psychiatric services provided at other facilities owned or operated by the applicant in Florida and other states. The data shall exclude patient specific information. Rule 10-5.011(1)(o)9.e., imposes a similar additional requirement in applications from providers seeking more beds: A summary description of any treatment outcome evaluation of the hospital inpatient general psychiatric services provided at the facility for which additional beds are requested, for children, adolescents or adults as applicable to the facility for the 12-month period ending six months prior to the beginning date of the quarter of the publication of the fixed bed need pool. The purpose of these requirements, according to HRS, is to insure that hospitals will know whether its patients are better off when they leave than when they were admitted to the program. Most hospitals have such knowledge. The terms, "outcome determination", "summary evaluation outcome results", "summary description of treatment outcome evaluation" and "overall program evaluation of treatment outcomes", are nowhere defined in the proposed rules, and the department intends to leave to each applicant or provider the methodology for determining whether its patients are "better off" for having been in its program. Hospitals do not routinely evaluate their patients after discharge and such follow up would be difficult and costly. Most hospitals do, however, establish a treatment plan upon admission, continue to review and revise that plan as needed throughout treatment, and determine the patients' readiness for discharge based on the goals successfully attained. This is the process described by Florida Hospital's Center of Psychiatry Administrative Director. The rules require no more than a description similar to that provided by Florida Hospital. The rules set no standards and do not dictate that follow- up of discharged patients be accomplished, even though post discharge evaluation may be of value and is generally accepted as the best tool for measuring treatment effectiveness. The measurement of treatment outcome is an inexact process and relies on a series of subjective standards which need to be described. HRS does not intend to set those standards and, other than have its applicants demonstrate that a process is in place, the agency has no idea how the required information will impact its CON review. Without definitions and standards, the agency will have no way of comparing one applicant's information with another's. Without specificity and more guidance the rules fail to apprise the applicant of what is required and will provide no meaningful information to the agency in its CON review function. Miscellaneous Provisions The Non-Physician Director. The proposed definition of "Hospital Inpatient General Psychiatric Services" in Rule 10-5.011(1) (o)2.1. includes services provided under the direction of a psychiatrist or clinical psychologist In drafting this definition, agency staff relied on advice from experts at their workshops and on advice from the agency's own Alcohol, Drug Abuse and Mental Health Program Office, to the effect that professionals, other than physicians, are qualified to direct the units. Interpretation and Application. It is not the intention of HRS that its rules be interpreted to override good medical practice or the sound judgement of treating physicians. Thus, the rules would not prohibit stabilization of a patient who is presented to the emergency room of a hospital without a CON for substance abuse or psychiatric services. Stabilized Alzheimers patients may be housed in nursing homes. Nor do the rules prohibit or subject to sanctions the occasional admission of a psychiatric or substance abuse patient to a non-substance abuse or psychiatric bed so long as this occurs infrequently in a hospital without psychiatric or substance abuse programs. "Scatter" beds are not eliminated. Those beds would continue to be licensed as acute-care beds, as they would not be considered part of an organized program, with staff and protocols, to provide psychiatric or substance abuse services. Proposed rule 10-5.011(1)(o)4.h.(v) provides that applicants for IRTPs for children and adolescents seeking licensing as a specialty hospital must provide documentation that the district's licensed non-hospital IRTPs do not meet the need for the proposed service. The department is not seeking specific utilization data in this regard, as such is not available. General information on the availability of alternatives to inpatient hospital services is obtainable from local health councils and mental health professionals in the community. Quarterly Reports. Proposed rule 10-5.011(1)(o)10. requires: Facilities providing licensed hospital inpatient general psychiatric services shall report to the department or its designee, within 45 days after the end of each calendar quarter, the number of hospital inpatient general psychiatric services admissions and patient days by age and primary diagnosis ICD-9 code. The Health Care Cost Containment Board (HCCCB) is already collecting similar quarterly data from providers. The reporting system is being updated and improved but in the meantime HRS is experiencing problems with the type and accuracy of the data it receives from HCCCB. One problem is that HCCCB collects its data with regard to all discharges in a psychiatric or substance abuse diagnostic category, whereas HRS is interested only in data from a psychiatric or substance abuse program. Until the system improves, HRS needs the information it seeks from the providers in order to plan and apply the need methodology. The agency intends to designate local health councils to collect the data and has already worked with them to set up a system. If reports provided to the HCCCB comply with the proposed requirement, HRS has no problem in receiving a duplicate of those reports. The Economic Impact Statement Pursuant to Section 120.54(2), F.S., HRS prepared an economic impact statement for the proposed rule. It was authored by Elfie Stamm, a Health Services and Facilities Consultant Supervisor with HRS. Ms. Stamm has a Masters degree in psychology and has completed course work for a Ph.D. in psychology. She has been employed by HRS for 13 years, including the last ten years in the Office of Comprehensive Health Planning. She is responsible for developing CON rules, portions of the state health plan, and special health care studies. It was impossible for Ms. Stamm to determine how the rule could impact the public at large. The economic impact statement addresses generally the effect of abolishing the distinction between long and short term services and acknowledges that the rule will increase competition among short term service providers. The impact statement also addresses a positive impact on current long term providers.
Findings Of Fact Introduction Petitioner, Leesburg Regional Medical Center ("Leesburg"), is a 132-bed acute care private, not-for-profit hospital located at 600 East Dixie Highway, Leesburg, Florida. It offers a full range of general medical services. The hospital sits on land owned by the City of Leesburg. It is operated by the Leesburg hospital Association, an organization made up of individuals who reside within the Northwest Taxing District. By application dated August 13, 1982 petitioner sought a certificate of need (CON) from respondent, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS), to construct the following described project: This project includes the addition of 36 medical/surgical beds and 7 SICU beds in existing space and the leasing of a CT scanner (replacement). The addition of the medical/surgical beds is a cost effective way to add needed capacity to the hospital. Twenty-four (24) beds on the third floor will be established in space vacated by surgery and ancillary departments moving into newly constructed space in the current renovation project. A significant portion of this area used to be an obstetric unit in the past; and therefore, is already set up for patient care. The 7 bed SICU unit will be set up on the second floor, also in space vacated as a result of the renovation project. Twelve additional beds will be available on the third and fourth floors as a result of changing single rooms into double rooms. No renovation will be necessary to convert these rooms into double rooms. It is also proposed to replace the current TechniCare head scanner with GE8800 body scanner. Based on the high demand for head and body scans and the excessive amount of maintenance problems and downtime associated with the current scanner, Leesburg Regional needs a reliable, state-of-the-art CT scanner. The cost of the project was broken down as follows: The total project cost is $1,535,000. The construction/renovation portion of the project (24 medical/surgical and 7 SICU beds) is $533,000. Equipment costs will be approximately $200,000. Architectural fees and project development costs total $52,000. The CT scanner will be leased at a monthly cost of $16,222 per month for 5 years. The purchase price of the scanner is $750,000 and that amount is included in the total project cost. The receipt of the application was acknowledged by HRS by letter dated August 27, 1982. That letter requested Leesburg to submit additional information no later than October 10, 1982 in order to cure certain omissions. Such additional information was submitted by Leesburg on October 5, 1982. On November 29, 1982, the administrator for HRS's office of health planning and development issued proposed agency action in the form of a letter advising Leesburg its request to replace a head CT scanner (whole body) at a cost of $750,000 had been approved, but that the remainder of the application had been denied. The basis for the denial was as follows: There are currently 493 medical/surgical beds in the Lake/Sumter sub-district of HSA II. Based upon the HSP for HSA II, there was an actual utilization ratio of existing beds equivalent to 2.98/1,000 population. When this utilization ratio is applied to the 1987 projected population of 156,140 for Lake/Sumter counties, there is a need for 465 medical/surgical beds by 1987. Thus, there is an excess of 28 medical/surgical beds in the Lake/Sumter sub-district currently. This action prompted the instant proceeding. At the same time Leesburg's application was being partially denied, an application for a CON by intervenor-respondent, Lake Community Hospital (Lake), was being approved. That proposal involved an outlay of 4.1 million dollars and was generally described in the application as follows: The proposed project includes the renovations and upgrading of patient care areas. This will include improving the hospital's occupancy and staffing efficiencies by reducing Med-Surg Unit-A to 34 beds and eliminating all 3-bed wards. Also reducing Med-Surg Units B and C to 34 beds each and eliminating all 3-bed wards. This will necessitate the construction of a third floor on the A wing to house the present beds in private and semi-private rooms for a total of 34 beds. There is also an immediate need to develop back-to-back six bed ICU and a six-bed CCU for shared support services. This is being done to fulfill JCAH requirements and upgrade patient care by disease entity, patient and M.D. requests. Another need that is presented for consideration is the upgrading of Administrative areas to include a conference room and more Administrative and Business office space. However, the merits of HRS's decision on Lake's application are not at issue in this proceeding. In addition to Lake, there are two other hospitals located in Lake County which provide acute and general hospital service. They are South Lake Memorial Hospital, a 68-bed tax district facility in Clermont, Florida, and Waterman Memorial Hospital, which operates a 154-bed private, not-for-profit facility in Eustis, Florida. There are no hospitals in Sumter County, which lies adjacent to Lake County, and which also shares a subdistrict with that county. The facilities of Lake and Leesburg are less than two miles apart while the Waterman facility is approximately 12 to 14 miles away. South Lake Memorial is around 25 miles from petitioner's facility. Therefore, all three are no more than a 30 minute drive from Leesburg's facility. At the present time, there are 515 acute care beds licensed for Lake County. Of these, 493 are medical/surgical beds and 22 are obstetrical beds. None are designated as pediatric beds. The Proposed Rules Rules 10-16.001 through 10-16.012, Florida Administrative Code, were first noticed by HRS in the Florida Administrative Weekly on August 12, 1983. Notices of changes in these rules were published on September 23, 1983. Thereafter, they were filed with the Department of State on September 26, 1983 and became effective on October 16, 1983. Under new Rule 10-16.004 (1)(a), Florida Administrative Code, subdistrict 7 of district 3 consists of Lake and Sumter Counties. The rule also identifies a total acute care bed need for subdistrict 7 of 523 beds. When the final hearing was held, and evidence heard in this matter, the rules were merely recommendations of the various local health councils forwarded to HRS on June 27, 1983 for its consideration. They had not been adopted or even proposed for adoption at that point in time. Petitioner's Case In health care planning it is appropriate to use five year planning horizons with an overall occupancy rate of 80 percent. In this regard, Leesburg has sought to ascertain the projected acute care bed need in Lake County for the year 1988. Through various witnesses, it has projected this need using three different methodologies. The first methodology used by Leesburg may be characterized as the subdistrict need theory methodology. It employs the "guidelines for hospital care" adopted by the District III Local Health Council on June 27, 1983 and forwarded to HRS for promulgation as formal rules. Such suggestions were ultimately adopted by HRS as a part of Chapter 10-16 effective October 16, 1983. Under this approach, the overall acute care bed need for the entire sixteen county District III was found to be 44 additional beds in the year 1988 while the need within Subdistrict VII (Lake and Sumter Counties) was eight additional beds. 2/ The second approach utilized by Leesburg is the peak occupancy theory methodology. It is based upon the seasonal fluctuation in a hospital's occupancy rates, and used Leesburg's peak season bed need during the months of February and March to project future need. Instead of using the state suggested occupancy rate standard of 80 percent, the sponsoring witness used an 85 percent occupancy rate which produced distorted results. Under this approach, Leesburg calculated a need of 43 additional beds in 1988 in Subdistrict VII. However, this approach is inconsistent with the state-adopted methodology in Rule 10- 5.11(23), Florida Administrative Code, and used assumptions not contained in the rule. It also ignores the fact that HRS's rule already gives appropriate consideration to peak demand in determining bed need. The final methodology employed by Leesburg was characterized by Leesburg as the "alternative need methodology based on state need methodology" and was predicated upon the HRS adopted bed need approach in Rule 10-5.11(23) with certain variations. First, Leesburg made non-rule assumptions as to the inflow and outflow of patients. Secondly, it substituted the population by age group for Lake and Sumter Counties for the District population. With these variations, the methodology produced an acute care bed need of 103 additional beds within Lake and Sumter Counties. However, this calculation is inconsistent with the applicable HRS rule, makes assumptions not authorized under the rule, and is accordingly not recognized by HRS as a proper methodology. Leesburg experienced occupancy rates of 91 percent, 80 percent and 73 percent for the months of January, February and March, 1981, respectively. These rates changed to 86 percent, 95 percent and 98 percent during the same period in 1982, and in 1983 they increased to 101.6 percent, 100.1 percent and 95.1 percent. Leesburg's health service area is primarily Lake and Sumter Counties. This is established by the fact that 94.4 percent and 93.9 percent of its admissions in 1980 and 1981, respectively, were from Lake and Sumter Counties. Although South Lake Memorial and Waterman Memorial are acute care facilities, they do not compete with Leesburg for patients. The staff doctors of the three are not the same, and there is very little crossover, if any, of patients between Leesburg and the other two facilities. However, Lake and Leesburg serve the same patient base, and in 1982 more than 70 percent of their patients came from Lake County. The two compete with one another, and have comparable facilities. Leesburg has an established, well-publicized program for providing medical care to indigents. In this regard, it is a recipient of federal funds for such care, and, unlike Lake, accounts for such care by separate entry on its books. The evidence establishes that Leesburg has the ability to finance the proposed renovation. HRS's Case HRS's testimony was predicated on the assumption that Rule 10-16.004 was not in effect and had no application to this proceeding. Using the bed need methodology enunciated in Rule 10-5.11(23), its expert concluded the overall bed need for the entire District III to be 26 additional beds by the year 1988. This calculation was based upon and is consistent with the formula in the rule. Because there was no existing rule at the time of the final hearing concerning subdistrict need, the witness had no way to determine the bed need, if any, within Subdistrict VII alone. Lake's Case Lake is a 162-bed private for profit acute care facility owned by U.S. Health Corporation. It is located at 700 North Palmetto, Leesburg, Florida. Lake was recently granted a CON which authorized a 4.1 million dollar renovation project. After the renovation is completed all existing three-bed wards will be eliminated. These will be replaced with private and semi-private rooms with no change in overall bed capacity. This will improve the facility's patient utilization rate. The expansion program is currently underway. Like Leesburg, the expert from Lake utilized a methodology different from that adopted for use by HRS. Under this approach, the expert determined total admissions projected for the population, applied an average length of stay to that figure, and arrived at a projected patient day total for each hospital. That figure was then divided by bed complement and 365 days to arrive at a 1988 occupancy percentage. For Subdistrict VII, the 1988 occupancy percentage was 78.2, which, according to the expert, indicated a zero acute care bed need for that year. Lake also presented the testimony of the HRS administrator of the office of community affairs, an expert in health care planning. He corroborated the testimony of HRS's expert witness and concluded that only 26 additional acute care beds would be needed district-wide by the year 1988. This result was arrived at after using the state-adopted formula for determining bed need. During 1981, Lake's actual total dollar write-off for bad debt was around $700,000. This amount includes an undisclosed amount for charity or uncompensated care for indigent patients. Unlike Leesburg, Lake receives no federal funds for charity cases. Therefore, it has no specific accounting entry on its books for charity or indigent care. Although Leesburg rendered $276,484 in charity/uncompensated care during 1981, it is impossible to determine which facility rendered the most services for indigents due to the manner in which Lake maintains its books and records. In any event, there is no evidence that indigents in the Subdistrict have been denied access to hospital care at Lake or any other facility within the county. Lake opines that it will loose 2.6 million dollars in net revenues in the event the application is granted. If true, this in turn would cause an increase in patient charges and a falling behind in technological advances. For the year 1981, the average percent occupancy based on licensed beds for Leesburg, Lake, South Lake Memorial and Waterman Memorial was as follows: 71.5 percent, 58.7 percent, 63.8 percent and 65.7 percent. The highest utilization occurred in January (81 percent) while the low was in August (58 percent). In 1982, the utilization rate during the peak months for all four facilities was 78 percent. This figure dropped to 66.5 percent for the entire year. Therefore, there is ample excess capacity within the County even during the peak demand months.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the application of Leesburg Regional Medical Center for a certificate of need to add 43 acute care beds, and renovate certain areas of its facility to accommodate this addition, be DENIED. DONE and ENTERED this 15th day of December, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of December, 1983.
Findings Of Fact On April 1, 1986, a letter of intent was filed on behalf of Anthony J. Estevez to apply for a CON in the March 16, 1986, batching cycle for a 120-bed long-term psychiatric hospital in Dade County, Florida, HRS Service District XI. A long-term psychiatric hospital is defined in Rule 10-5.011(p), Florida Administrative Code, as a "category of services which provides hospital based inpatient services averaging a length of stay of 90 days." Subsequently, DHRS notified Mr. Estevez that his letter of intent was effective March 17, 1986; the application was to be filed by April 15, 1986; the application was to be completed by June 29, 1986; and the date for final department action was August 28, 1986. On April 15, 1986, Mr. Estevez filed his CON application with DHRS (designated action #4854). Anthony J. Estevez' name appeared along with Health Care Advisors Corporation on the line of the application which requested "legal name of project sponsor." Mr. Francis A. Gomez, Mr. Estevez' authorized representative, had the responsibility for the preparation and submission of the application. Mr. Estevez signed the CON application as the project sponsor. HCAC Psychiatric Hospital of Dade County was meant to be the name of the proposed facility. HCAC is an acronym for Health Care Advisors Corporation, Inc. HCAC was incorporated as of April 14, 1987, but the name had been reserved prior to that time. HCAC was initially intended to be a health care management corporation owned by Mr. Estevez. However, it is now anticipated that Flowers Management Corporation (Flowers) will manage the project under the HCAC corporate umbrella. Mr. Estevez owns 100 percent of the stock of HCAC and is also its sole director and sole shareholder. Mr. Estevez considered HCAC and himself to be one and the same for the purpose of the CON application. HCAC initially proposed to construct in Dade County, Florida, a freestanding 120-bed long-term psychiatric hospital. HCAC proposed to divide those beds into three groups: (1) 75 beds for adults; (2) 30 beds for geriatrics; and (3) 15 beds for adolescents. On May 15, 1986, DHRS requested additional information from HCAC regarding its CON application. On June 19, 1986, and June 23, 1986, HCAC in two separate filings provided DHRS with responses to its request for additional information which DHRS believed was omitted from the original application. The application was deemed complete effective June 29, 1986. On August 20, 1986, Francis Gomez, Paul McCall, a health care consultant employed by HCAC at that time, and HCAC's attorney, met with Islara Soto of DHRS regarding the CON application. At this meeting, HCAC advised DHRS of its intent to orient the facility programmatically to meet the needs of the Hispanic population of Dade and Monroe Counties. By letter dated August 29, 1986, DHRS notified Mr. Francis Gomez of its decision to deny CON application 4584. HCAC requested a formal administrative hearing to contest the denial. At the formal hearing, HCAC indicated a desire to abandon its proposal to provide 15 beds dedicated to serve adolescent patients and sought to introduce evidence relating to a down-sized 105-bed long-term psychiatric hospital serving only adult and geriatric patients. Charter renewed its prehearing motion to exclude any evidence concerning a 105-bed facility. (Approximately three or four weeks prior to the administrative hearing, HCAC had decided to go forward with a proposal for the 105-bed facility.) The undersigned ruled that HCAC would be allowed to present evidence concerning a down-sized 105-bed facility to the extent that such evidence related to a separate and identifiable portion of the original application. HCAC's Proposal The proposed building site for the facility, although not finally selected, is intended to be within the Northwest Dade Center cachement area which is in the northwest corner of Dade County. The ownership of the proposed facility will be by Mr. Estevez and/or his family or wife. The proposed area to be serviced by the facility is Dade and Monroe Counties (HRS Service District XI). HCAC proposes to offer at its facility a psychiatric inpatient unit, patient support services, diagnostic/treatment services, ambulatory care, administrative services, environmental/maintenance, educational and training services, and materials management. The HCAC facility will be managed by Flowers Management Corporation (Flowers), of which Mr. Estevez is a majority shareholder. Flowers was created approximately three and a half years ago for the purpose of providing management in the psychiatric field. Humana Hospital, a hospital chain, has selected Flowers to manage four of its facilities and is also considering Flowers for an additional two facilities. Those facilities are currently providing short-term psychiatric and substance abuse services. Nelson Rodney will be responsible for the design and implementation of the treatment programs in the HCAC facility. Rodney is employed as Regional Vice President of Flowers and is responsible for the management of the Florida hospitals affiliated with Flowers, including a chemical dependency unit at Humana-Biscayne Hospital and a psychiatric unit at Humana West Palm Beach Hospital. The HCAC facility is intended to provide specialty long-term psychiatric services for chronically mentally disturbed individuals requiring a 90-day or greater average length of stay. Many of the patients would be a danger to themselves and others and will require a very restrictive setting -- a locked facility. The programs proposed to be offered involve a range of inpatient diagnostic services, including an intensive diagnostic work-up done prior to admission for all patients. Each patient will have an individualized treatment plan updated every two weeks. The treatment program will include specialized therapy, such as art, music, milieu therapy and special education. There would also be specialized inpatient and outpatient treatment programs for family members and significant others. Discharge planning from the day of admission to assure continuity of care would be another aspect of the program. The proposed HCAC facility would offer a community-like atmosphere. It would provide both open and locked units. Flower's therapeutic model encourages patient participation in daily activities and in the many decisions of what is occurring at the hospital. One component of the project will be an initial screening process by a multi-disciplinary team who will employ a predetermined set of admissions criteria to assist in appropriate levels of care determination. The multi- disciplinary team would consist of a psychiatrist, psychologist, sometimes a neurologist, social worker, a family social assessment person, the patient, and others. The team will attempt to identify and admit only those patients who will have an expected length of stay greater than 90 days. The HCAC facility would provide seminars and workshops to practitioners in the community as well as its own staff. In-service training will also be offered. HCAC proposes to be flexible in the design of its treatment programs and allow new treatments to be utilized. A variety of therapies will be available to provide individualized treatment plans in order to optimize the chance of successful outcome in the patient's treatment. Currently, Flowers affords an in-house program of evaluation. Peer review serves this function in order to assess quality of care rendered to patients in the facility. The HCAC facility proposes to have an Hispanic emphasis. More than 50 percent of the staff will be bilingual. Upper management will consist of individuals who have an acute understanding of Hispanic culture and treatment implications of that culture. The facility will be more flexible in family visitation than is done in many facilities which is an important aspect of the Hispanic culture. The facility as managed by Flowers would have the required "patient's bill of rights" and will also seek JACH accreditation, although these items were not discussed in the application. The HCAC facility would offer each patient an attending psychiatrist who will be part of the multi-disciplinary team that will determine the individualized plan for each patient. Sufficient health manpower including management resources are available to HCAC to operate the project. Additionally, the facility will provide internships, field placements and semester rotations. PROJECT AND CONSTRUCTION COSTS HCAC's CON application, admitted into evidence as Petitioner's Exhibit 4, contains 26 tables concerning various aspects of the 120-bed project as well as Exhibit III.D.1., an operating pro forma. In response to a request for omissions by DHRS, HCAC submitted, among other things, a revised Table 7, revised Table 8, and a revised operating pro forma for the 120-bed project. The items making up HCAC's omission responses were admitted into evidence as Petitioner's Exhibit 5. In conjunction with its desire to complete a 105-bed facility only, HCAC submitted various new tables and a new operating pro forma (forecasted income statement), which were admitted into evidence as Petitioner's Exhibit 6. Table 1 - Source of Funds The estimated total project cost of the 120-bed facility would be $6,469,500. The estimated project cost of the 105-bed facility would be $5,696,940. The financing of the project is contemplated to be done through NCNB bank which has expressed its willingness to finance the project. It is reasonable to assume that HCAC would and could obtain the necessary financing for the proposed facility. Table 2 - Total Debt Table 2 for both the 120-bed project and the 105-bed project shows that 100 percent of the project costs would be financed by debt at an interest rate of 13 percent. The 13 percent interest rate was projected in 1986 and is higher than current rates. It is reasonable to assume that 100 percent of the costs can be financed at 13 percent for either the 120-bed or 105-bed project. Table 3 - New Purchase Equipment HCAC initially projected that $750,000 would be needed to equip the proposed 120-bed facility. The projected expenditure for the 105-bed facility is $500,000. The projected costs of $750,000 and $500,000 for the equipment needed for the 120-bed and 105-bed facility, respectively, are unreasonably low. For example, of the $500,000 projected for equipment costs for the 105-bed project, $80,000 is for mini-vans, $15,000 is for the security system, $40,000 is for a computerized medical records system, and $40,000 for a computerized on-line nurse care program. This would leave $325,000 for all other necessary equipment. Pharmacy, laboratory services and x-ray equipment would be on contract. The remaining $325,000 would be insufficient to equip the kitchen (which would require $80,000), furnish patient rooms (approximately $150,000) and equip the remainder of the 105-bed facility which would reasonably require housekeeping equipment, exam room equipment, chart racks for the nurses station, seclusion room beds, office furniture and equipment, laundry equipment, lockers or shelving, refrigerators, ice makers, day room furniture and lounge furniture. A more reasonable projection for equipment costs would be in the neighborhood of $850,000 to $900,000. Table 7 - Utilization by Class of Pay Tables 7 and 8 of the original application which dealt with utilization by class of pay and effect on patient charges, were revised by HCAC in their responses to DHRS' Omissions Request. Table 7 reflects estimations of the net revenues which HCAC expects to capture from specific payor mixes, namely, contract/indigent, Medicare and insurance/private pay. There is no Medicaid reimbursement available for psychiatric care rendered in a freestanding psychiatric facility. The proposed payor mix for the 120-bed facility is, in patient days, as follows: Year 1 -- Contract/Indigent 8.64 percent (1989) Medicare 26.10 percent Insurance and Private Pay 65.26 percent Year 2 -- Contract/Indigent 8.48 percent (1990) Medicare 26.15 percent Insurance and Private Pay 65.37 percent The proposed payor mix for the 105-bed facility is, in patient days, as follows: Years 1 and 2 - Medicare 3.3 percent Insurance and Private Pay 90.7 percent Indigent 6.0 percent The change in payor mix was not attributed to down-sizing of the facility, but rather was the result of HCAC's additional research and understanding of what the payor mix would most likely be. The change in payor mix does not represent a substantial change to the original application taken as a whole. Francis Gomez, who prepared the Table 7 and was designated as an expert for HCAC in the area of health care facilities management and financial and marketing operations, conceded that HCAC's Table 7 for the 120-bed facility is not reasonable. The Table 7 for the 105-bed facility is also not reasonable. HCAC's contractual allowances are not reasonable. HCAC projects 3.3 percent for Medicare and nothing for HMOs or PPOs. It is unreasonable for HCAC's proposal to make no provision for HMO and PPO type arrangements in view of its projection of 90.7 percent insurance and private pay. Because the proposed patient mix for the 105-bed project is adults and geriatrics, 20 to 25 percent would be a more reasonable Medicare projection. HCAC's projected 90.7 percent insurance and private patient days is unreasonably high in view of the project's intended emphasis of serving the Hispanic population in HRS Service District XI. In 1980, 27.8 percent of the Hispanics in Dade County had incomes less than 150 percent of the poverty level. The 1987 United States Hispanic market study establishes that 20 percent of the Hispanic adults who are heads of households are either retired, students or unemployed. These groups of individuals would not reasonably fit into the insurance and private pay category in most cases. Thus, the 90.7 percent figure for insurance and private pay would have to be reduced significantly. Table 8 - Effects on Patient Charges HCAC's revised Table 8 for the 120-bed facility lists net revenues rather than gross charges for the specific services listed. In year one (1989), the table lists the following projected charges/rates: daily room charge - $214.61; average daily ancillary charge - $25.00; contract/indigent - $125.00; and Medicare - $229.61. In year two (1990), the table lists the following projected charges: daily room charge - $223.19; average daily ancillary charge - $26.00; contract/indigent - $130.00; and Medicare - $238.79. The Table 8 for the 105-bed facility reflects an all-inclusive gross charge of $300 per day in both years (1989 and 1990) for the daily room charge, Medicaid and Medicare. The $300 per day figure would include ancillary charges but not physician fees. The projected patient charges fall within the range of charges currently in effect at psychiatric hospitals in Dade and Monroe Counties and are reasonable for both the 120-bed facility and the 105-bed project. Table 10 - Projected Utilization The financial feasibility of any proposed hospital is largely tied to the ability of the hospital to generate an adequate level of utilization. Absent an adequate level of utilization, a facility will not generate sufficient revenues to meet expenses. Table 10 for both the 120-bed facility and the 105- bed facility sets forth the projected utilization of the proposed facility, by month and year, in patient days, for the first two years of anticipated operation. Table 10 for the 120-bed facility projects the facility will exceed 80 percent occupancy for two of the last three months of the second year and be at 80 percent occupancy at the end of that year. Eighty percent occupancy of 120 beds yields an average daily census of about 96 patients. Table 10 for the 105- bed facility projects that the facility will arrive at 92 percent occupancy at the end of the first year of operation and remain at 95 percent throughout the second year. Ninety-five percent occupancy of the 105-bed facility equals an average daily census of about 99 or 100 patients. The Table 10 "fill-up" rates for both the 120-bed and 105-bed facilities are unreasonable and not practical to be achieved. There is presently an emphasis on providing psychiatric care in less restrictive settings, a trend favoring reduced lengths of stay and a trend in third-party payors to provide reimbursement for a shorter number of days. In addition, nationwide statistics show that only 4 percent of the patients admitted to psychiatric facilities require treatment longer than 90 days. Table 11 - Manpower Requirements For the 120-bed facility, HCAC projected in the Table 11 a staffing ratio of one full-time equivalent (FTE) per occupied bed of 1.625 for the first year of operation and 1.43 for the second year. For the 105-bed facility, HCAC projected in the Table 11 1.91 FTE per occupied bed ratio for the first year and 1.45 for the second year. The actual average of FTEs available for both facilities would be 1.8 to 2.0. The application figures are lower than the actual average because students and other non-paid personnel were not included. Thus, when all programmatic FTEs are included, the number of FTEs per occupied bed is higher than what is listed in the Table 11 for either project. There is a relationship between the number and quality of staff personnel and a facility's ability to provide quality psychiatric care. The industry standard for FTEs is 1.8 to 2.0 FTEs per occupied bed. HCAC's proposed staffing for both the 120-bed and 105-bed projects are reasonable. For both proposed facilities, HCAC projects 110.5 FTEs for the first year with a total annual salary of $1,932,000 which equals an average salary of approximately $17,400 per FTE. HCAC's projected total annual salary expense is unreasonably low. Specifically, the salary for the occupational therapist is too low and the nursing salaries are too low because of shortages. Table 16 - Areas and Square Feet / Table 18 - Space Requirements HCAC proposes a total 59,603 square feet of gross area for the 120-bed facility and a total of 56,050 square feet of gross area for the 105-bed facility. The decrease in size for the 105-bed facility is attributed to a reduction of the ground floor, a reduction of the second floor by removing the adolescent portion and an increase of ancillary services on the second floor for the geriatric population. HCAC projects 168 feet of net living space in the patient's bedroom for both the 120-bed facility and the 105-bed facility. HCAC's proposal of total area and square feet requirements for both the 120-bed and 105-bed facility are reasonable for the delivery of quality psychiatric care within the proposed facilities. There would be adequate land space for parking at HCAC's facility to forego the necessity of constructing a parking garage. Table 19 - Nursing Unit Area Summary HCAC proposes a total of 34,479 square feet of gross area for the nursing unit in the 120-bed facility and the 105-bed facility. The square footage figures under Table 19 for both the 120-bed facility and 105-bed facility are reasonable. Table 25 - Estimated Project Costs Project Advisors Corporation (PAC), of which Mr. Estevez is the Chief Executive Officer, will be responsible for the design and construction of the proposed facility. PAC is a design and construction company which employs a registered architect, several licensed general contractors, an engineer, two graduate architects and a registered graduate architect. The registered architect and basically 90 percent of the staff have previously been involved in the design and construction of health related facilities. HCAC's projected total cost for the 120-bed facility is $6,469,500 and the projected total costs for the 105-bed facility is $5,696,940. HCAC projected construction costs per square foot of $57.55 for the 120-bed facility and $60.00 per square foot for the 105-bed facility. Although the average construction cost of psychiatric facilities today is around $75 to $95 per square foot, HCAC's projected costs are reasonable and reflect reasonable charges given the fact that PAC, the company which would construct the facility, is controlled by Mr. Estevez. The projected costs of land acquisition are also reasonable. HCAC's projected equipment costs are contained in both Table 25 and Table 2. As previously discussed, the projected equipment costs for both projects are unreasonably low. Table 26 - Project Completion Forecast HCAC projects that construction for both the 120-bed facility and 105- bed facility would be completed approximately one year after DHRS' approval of the construction documents. The project completion forecasts for both projects are reasonable. Exhibit III.D.1.- Operating Pro Forma/Forecasted Income Statement Revised Exhibit III.D.1 sets forth the operating pro forma for the first two years of operation of the 120-bed facility (1989 and 1990). HCAC's pro forma for its 120-bed facility is not reasonable. The supplies and other expenses depicted in the pro forma (year one at $55.60 per patient day and year two at $58.10 per patient day) are unreasonably low. A more reasonable estimate would be approximately $100 per patient day. The pro forma for the 120-bed facility does not include any estimate for the Hospital Cost Containment Board (HCCB) tax. Similar facilities in Florida pay an HCCB tax which is composed of one and a half percent of net revenue. Utilizing the more reasonable estimate of $100 per patient day for supplies and other expenses, and including the appropriate HCCB tax, the total supplies and other expenses would increase approximately $1,100,000 and the HCCB tax would be approximately $85,000 in year one. Instead of showing a profit of $395,012, HCAC would potentially lose approximately $785,000 in that year. In year two, the total supplies and other expenses would increase approximately $1,400,000 and the HCCB tax would be approximately $115,000 to $117,000. Thus, in year two, instead of showing a profit of $919,036, HCAC would potentially lose approximately $617, 000. HCAC's "forecasted income statement" for the 105-bed project is also not reasonable. Specifically, the contractual allowances, the allowance for bad debt, and the salaries, wages and fringe benefits are unreasonable. Contractuals include such things as Medicare, Medicaid, HMOs and PPOs, which all generate discounts which are considered contractual allowances. HCAC estimates its bad debt factor at 1.6 percent. A more reasonable projection would be 6 to 8 percent of gross revenue. CONSISTENCY WITH THE DISTRICT XI HEALTH PLAN AND STATE MENTAL HEALTH PLAN The District XI local health council has produced the 1986 District XI Health Plan. The district plan contains the relevant policies, priorities, criteria and standards for evaluation of an application such as HCAC's. HCAC's application is consistent with some of the applicable sections of the District XI Health Plan but inconsistent with the plan taken as a whole. Policy No. 1 of the District XI health plan states that the district should direct its efforts toward a licensed bed capacity of 5.5 non-federal beds per thousand population ratio by 1989. Presently there are 11,294 beds in District XI which represents a number in excess of 5.5 non-federal beds. HCAC's application is inconsistent with this policy. Policy No. 1, Priority No. 1, states that proposals for the construction of new beds in the district should be considered only when the overall average occupancy of licensed beds exceeds 80 percent. Priority No. 1 refers to certain types of beds, specifically, acute care general beds, short- term psychiatric beds and substance abuse beds. HCAC's application is not inconsistent with this priority because long-term psychiatric beds are not mentioned. Policy No. 1, Priority No. 2 favors the encouragement of projects that meet specific district service needs through the conversion of existing beds from currently underutilized services. Because HCAC is not the operator of an existing hospital and it is not possible for HCAC to convert any beds from other services, HCAC's application is inconsistent with Policy No. 1, Priority No. 2. Policy No. 1, Priority No. 3 would only be relevant in the case of an existing hospital but not in the case of a new hospital where no comparative hearing is involved. HCAC's application is not inconsistent with Policy No. 1, Priority No. 3. Policy No. 1, Priority No. 4 allows for priority consideration for the initiation of new services for projects which have had an average occupancy rate of 80 percent for the last two years and which have a documented history of providing services to Medicaid and/or other medically indigent patients. HCAC's application is not entitled to priority consideration under Policy No. 1, Priority No. 4. Policy No. 2 is a broad policy which provides that service alternatives should be available within the district to meet the needs of community residents, while at the same time maintaining an efficient level of utilization. This policy is necessarily tied to the demonstration of overall need for the facility. If HCAC can show need for the proposed facility, its proposal would be consistent with this policy. Policy No. 2, Priority No. 1(f) (Psychiatric Bed Services) provides for priority consideration to be given to specific institutions which have achieved an 80 percent occupancy rate for the preceding year. HCAC's application is not entitled to priority consideration under Policy No. 2, Priority No. 1(f). Policy No. 2, Policy No. 3(f) states that a CON applicant should propose to provide the scope of services consistent with the level of care proposed in the application in accordance with appropriate accrediting agency standards. In the case of psychiatric bed services the appropriate accrediting agency is the Joint Commission for Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAH). Although HCAC neglected to address its ability to comply with JCAH standards in its application, it has established its intent to seek JCAH accreditation. HCAC's proposal is consistent with Policy No. 2, Priority No. 3(f). Policy No. 2, Priority No. 4 gives a preference to those applicants that propose innovative mechanisms such as various complimenting outpatient and inpatient services which are directed toward an ultimate reduction in dependency upon hospital beds. HCAC does not meet this priority because it has not proposed any mechanisms to complement outpatient services with inpatient services directed toward an ultimate reduction in the dependency on hospital beds. Policy No. 2, Priority No. 5 gives a preference to applicants who have based their project on a valid marketing research effort and have placed it in the context of a long-range plan. HCAC does not meet this priority because there was no evidence that the project was based on a valid marketing research plan or placed in the context of a long-range plan. Policy No. 2f Priority No. 6 states that existing facilities as well as applicants for new services should demonstrate a willingness to enter into cooperative planning efforts directed at establishing a system whereby duplication of specialized services is avoided while quality of such services is enhanced. HCAC presented no documentation of transfer agreements with other hospitals and did not substantiate its willingness to enter into cooperative planning efforts with letters of intent, referral agreements or memoranda of understanding. Policy No. 3 provides that services in the community should be made available to all segments of the resident population regardless of the ability to pay. HCAC's proposal is consistent with this policy because a provision for services to indigent patients has been made. Policy No. 3, Priority No. 1 provides that priority should be given to applications proposing services and facilities designed to include Medicaid (Baker Act) patients to the greatest extent possible based on documented history or proposed services. Although Medicaid does not reimburse for freestanding psychiatric services, and Baker Act is only available to short-stay facilities specifically chosen to receive a Baker Act contract, HCAC has not designed its project to include those patients to the greatest extent possible. Thus, HCAC's application is not consistent with Policy No. 3, Priority No. 1. Goal I of the 1986 District XI Goals and Policies for Mental Health and Substance Abuse Services is applicable to HCAC's application. This goal favors mental health services in the least restrictive setting possible. Long- term institutional care may be the least restrictive setting possible in the continuum of mental health care for the treatment of certain more serious types of patients. The concept of "continuum of care" means the full breadth of services available within a community, from least restrictive to most restrictive, from least intensive to most intensive. There must be settings along the full continuum of psychiatric care for patients to receive the level of care they may need. HCAC's application is not inconsistent with Goal I. Issues Relating to CON Recommendations and Priority for Inpatient Psychiatric Services (District XI Health Plan 1986, page 26). In this section of the district health plan, the Planning Advisory Committee states its recommendations and preferences for services for the comprehensive treatment of the mentally ill. The Committee recognizes that long-term hospitalization is a viable form of treatment for some mentally ill patients. However, the Committee expresses a preference for short hospital stays and applicants that project treatment modalities with an average length of stay under 20 days. In addition, the Committee emphasizes a preference for services to be obtained through the conversion of medical/surgical beds, because the district has a large surplus of such beds. Overall, HCAC's project is not consistent with the recommendations and priorities of the Planning Advisory Committee. HCAC's proposal is inconsistent with the goals, objectives and recommendations of the State Health Plan taken as a whole. The State Health Plan contains an important and significant goal that no additional long-term hospital psychiatric beds should be added in the area until the existing and approved beds in the district have achieved an 80 percent occupancy level. The existing long-term hospital psychiatric beds in the district have an occupancy level at approximately 67 percent. AVAILABILITY AND ADEQUACY OF ALTERNATIVES There are available, accessible and appropriate facilities within the service district which can be utilized for the services proposed by HCAC that are presently underutilized. Currently, there are short-term psychiatric providers, a long-term provider, residential facilities, nursing homes and adult congregate living facilities that are available as alternatives in the service district, and in many cases are significantly underutilized. Although the services to be offered by the HCAC facility would be in excess of what is provided in an adult residential treatment facility, nursing home or adult congregate living facility, those facilities could serve as viable alternatives in appropriate cases. In 1986, there were 6,513 existing nursing home beds in District XI and an additional 1,928 approved for opening. There are 24 adult congregate living facilities in District XI with 50 beds or more. The total number of beds for ACLFs in 1986 was 2,620. In addition, Grant Center Hospital has 140 existing and 20 approved long-term psychiatric beds; its occupancy rate is low. THE ABILITY OF THE APPLICANT TO PROVIDE QUALITY OF CARE AND THE APPLICANT'S RECORD OF PROVIDING QUALITY OF CARE The "Flowers Model," made a part of the application, is a description of how, from a clinical perspective, the proposal will be managed. Although Flowers does not presently operate any long-term psychiatric facilities, the Flowers Model is appropriate for a long-term psychiatric care facility. From a clinical and programmatic perspective, the HCAC facility would provide good quality of care. PROBABLE ECONOMIES AND IMPROVEMENTS IN SERVICE WHICH MAY BE DERIVED FROM OPERATION OF JOINT, COOPERATIVE OR SHARED HEALTH CARE RESOURCES HCAC has not demonstrated that there will be any improvements in service which may be derived from operation of joint, cooperative or shared health care resources. The Northwest Dade County proposed location of the HCAC facility would place the project within two hours travel of 90 percent or more of District XI population. Nevertheless, HCAC's facility would increase the number of people who would be within two hours of long-term adult psychiatric facilities by less than 1 percent. The patients in District XI will not experience serious problems in obtaining inpatient care of the type proposed in the absence of the service proposed by HCAC. There is presently adequate and accessible long-term hospital inpatient services for District XI population based on the existing and approved facilities in District X (Southwinds Hospital, Florida Medical Center) and District XI (Grant Center). There are two approved but not yet open long-term psychiatric facilities in District X, Broward County. Florida Medical Center holds a CON for 60 long-term adult psychiatric beds to be located in Lauderdale Lakes and Southwinds Hospital holds a 75-bed CON with 60 beds counted for long-term treatment of adult and geriatric patients to be located in Andy Town. In addition, there are 238 long-term state hospital beds at South Florida State Hospital in Broward County. Although the need for long-term psychiatric beds is assessed on a district-wide basis, it is reasonable to consider psychiatric beds in Broward County (District X) as an alternative to HCAC's proposal because they are within two hours access of individuals within the two counties. Likewise, it is reasonable to consider approved beds because need is projected for a future date. Not counting approved beds would overestimate need and result in duplication of services. FINANCIAL FEASIBILITY HCAC has not demonstrated that the 120-bed project or the 105-bed facility is financially feasible in the short or the long term. The projection of revenues and expenses in the pro forma (120-bed project) and the forecasted income statement (105-bed project) were flawed to such an extent that financial feasibility of the project was not shown. IMPACT ON COSTS AND COMPETITION If HCAC's project were to be built, a likely result is increased charges for the provision of services in the area. HCAC's proposed facility would negatively impact the availability of psychiatric nurses. There is a shortage of psychiatric nurses in Dade County and it is difficult to recruit and hire R.N.s with psychiatric experience. In order to hire nurses in a time of shortage, hospitals must recruit staff from other facilities. Shortages can increase the cost of recruitment and the cost of salaries. Charter is a hospital located in District XI and consists of 88 beds, 80 of which are licensed as short-term psychiatric beds and eight of which are licensed as short-term substance abuse beds. Short-term psychiatric inpatient care is defined in Rule 10-5.011(1)(o), Florida Administrative Code, as "a service not exceeding three months and averaging a length of stay of 30 days or less for adults." HCAC's proposed facility, if approved, would have a negative economic impact on Charter. It is very likely that many of the patients at the proposed HCAC facility would experience lengths of stay between 45 and 60 days. Charter treats a significant number of patients (approximately 15 percent) who stay longer than 30 days. Because of the difficulty of initially identifying patients who would require either short or long-term stays, many of Charter's patients could be lost to the HCAC project. Charter could suffer a loss of up to 657 patient days per year if HCAC's proposed facility is approved. This loss of patients would impair Charter's ability to have certain types of programs, equipment and staff. PROVISION OF HEALTH CARE SERVICES TO MEDICAID PATIENTS AND THE MEDICALLY INDIGENT HCAC's project does not propose a significant amount of indigent care and HCAC has no history of providing health care services to Medicaid patients and the medically indigent. OCCUPANCY RATE FOR EXISTING LONG-TERM HOSPITAL PSYCHIATRIC BEDS Grant Center Hospital is the only existing long-term psychiatric facility in District XI. It has 140 beds and specializes in treating children and adolescent patients. Its occupancy rate at the time of review for the preceding year was approximately 67 percent. The appropriate period to calculate occupancy rate of existing facilities in this case is July 1985 to July 1986 because this is the most recent 12-month period preceding application decision. The occupancy rate of all psychiatric beds within District XI was below 80 percent. HCAC'S PROPOSED NEED METHODOLOGY At the hearing, W. Eugene Nelson testified on behalf of HCAC on the need for the proposed long-term adult psychiatric beds. Mr. Nelson was accepted as an expert in the field of health care planning, including psychiatric bed need assessment. Mr. Nelson performed his analysis in District XI using the Graduate Medical Educational National Advisory Committee (GMENAC) methodology. The need methodology proposed by HCAC is inappropriate to adequately and accurately predict need for long-term adult psychiatric beds in District XI. The GMENAC study is a national study based on national data developed to determine physician requirements in 1990 for 23 medical specialities. GMENAC estimates the prevalence of certain psychiatric disorders among the general population and estimates the number of those persons who need care for their conditions in differing treatment settings ranging from outpatient services to 24-hour institutional care. HCAC's methodology, utilizing the GMENAC study, predicted a gross need of 895 beds in District XI in the applicable horizon (July 1991). The total number of existing long-term psychiatric beds in the entire State of Florida is only 836 beds, and the majority of those beds are experiencing occupancy levels under 65 percent. Many of these long-term facilities have been around for a period of at least three years and are still experiencing low occupancy. Therefore, the low levels are probably not based on the fact that the facilities are in a start-up mode. HCAC's bed need computation is as follows: Adult Long Term Psychiatric Bed Requirements (Excludes Alcohol, Drug Abuse, Mental Retardation, Organic Brain Syndrome and "other" Conditions) District XI: July 1991 Condition Admission Rate Schizophrenia & Other Psychoses 99 Affective Disorder Psychosis 20 Affective Disorder Neuroses 60 Neuroses and Personality Disorders 199 20 Projected 1991 Population Age 18+ 1,459,437 Total Projected Admissions 2,904 Average Length of Stay 90 Projected Patient Days Target Occupancy 80.00 261,385 percent Total Beds Required 895 Beds Currently Available 438 South Florida State Hospital (450 X .48) Residential Treatment Facilities 216 233 Net Beds Needed 496 The projected 1991 population for District XI for age 18 and above is 1,459,473. The population projections were received from the Office of the Governor. The anticipated admissions per 100,000 is calculated to be 199 for the conditions listed. The total projected admissions for 1991 is 2,904. The 2,904 projected long-term care admissions when multiplied by the average length of stay of 90 days generates 261,385 projected patient days in the 1991 horizon period in District XI. The 261,385 patient days is then divided by 365 days in the year, and then by 80 percent, the latter of which is contained in the rule as the optimum or desired occupancy for long-term psychiatric beds. This yields a total gross long-term psychiatric bed requirement for adults and geriatrics of 895 beds. In performing his analysis, Mr. Nelson used Table 4, page 22 of the GMENAC Study which lists information for mental disorders requiring care by treatment setting. The prevalence rate of 199 admissions per 100,000 population was based on the study's projection of the mental disorders listed requiring a "24-hour" treatment setting. Nelson used a projected 90-day length of stay in his computations. There is nothing in the GMENAC document that sets forth the average length of stay of persons reflected in the 24-hour column. Therefore, it is misleading to assume that persons admitted subject to the 199 per 100,000 admissions rate will actually experience an average length of stay as long as 90 days. For HCAC's admission rate to be valid, all of the facilities in District XI would have to average a 90-day length of stay. This is an unreasonable assumption. Nationwide, only a small percentage of all psychiatric admissions experience a length of stay as long as 90 days. In computing beds currently available in District XI, Mr. Nelson did not consider nursing home beds, adult congregate living facility beds, or the 135 long-term psychiatric beds that have been approved for two facilities in District X (Broward County). Nelson also did not consider whether short-term facilities were capable or willing to take additional patients for long-term treatment. Thus, the computation of beds currently available in the HCAC methodology is unreasonably low. HCAC's need methodology generated a long-term psychiatric bed to population ratio of .61 per thousand. DHRS' rule for short-term psychiatric beds was a population ratio of .35 per thousand. Short-term care facilities have admission rates two to three times greater than long-term facilities and nationwide statistics establish that only 4 percent of all psychiatric patients stay longer than 90 days. It is not reasonable for the bed rate for long-term adult psychiatric beds to be higher than the rate for short-term psychiatric beds. Mr. Nelson excluded organic brain syndrome diagnosis from his analysis and admission rate based on an assumption that many of those patients are in nursing homes. Nelson did not use nursing home beds in computing his need methodology because he believed that eliminating the organic brain syndrome category from the Table 4, page 22, 24-hour column in the GMENAC study eliminates the need for considering nursing home beds in the inventory. For that approach to be valid, the number of organic brain syndrome patients that go to long-term psychiatric facilities would need to cancel out the number of patients in other diagnostic categories who go to nursing homes. Nelson did not consult or review any data concerning the number or percentage rates of schizophrenics and other mentally ill patients in nursing homes or the number of organic brain syndrome people being treated in long-term psychiatric facilities. In addition, Nelson did not know what percentage, if any, of the GMENAC projected admissions were nursing home admissions. In computing existing beds, Nelson listed two types of facilities previously existing in District XI which were applicable to his methodology: the state hospital (216 beds) and residential treatment facilities (233 beds). The correct number of beds available for adults from District XI in the state hospital is 238. The actual number of beds for residential facilities is 335. Dr. Howard Fagin testified as an expert in health planning and feasibility analysis, including psychiatric bed need assessment and feasibility. In Dr. Fagin's opinion, Nelson's bed need methodology is incorrect and the conclusions drawn are wrong because Nelson used an inappropriate length of stay based on the GMENAC study and also incorrectly identified the applicable beds which should be considered for comparable facilities under the GMENAC study and, therefore, his total numbers in terms of gross and net beds needed are incorrect. Dr. Fagin's critique of Mr. Nelson's bed need methodology is persuasive and credible. HCAC has failed to show that its proposed need methodology could accurately project the need for long-term psychiatric beds in District XI.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that CON Application No. 4854 by Health Care Advisors Corporation, Inc. be DENIED. DONE and ORDERED this 1st day of March, 1988 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. W. MATTHEW STEVENSON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of March, 1988. COPIES FURNISHED: Lesley Mendelson, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services Fort Knox Executive Center 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 308 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 H. Darrell White, Esquire Gerald B. Sternstein, Esquire Post Office Box 2174 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 William E. Hoffman, Esquire 2500 Trust Company Tower 25 Park Place Atlanta, Georgia 30303 George N. Neros, Jr., Esquire 101 North Monroe Street Monroe-Park Tower Suite 900 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Donna H. Stinson, Esquire The Perkins House Suite 100 118 North Gadsden Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 R. S. Power, Esquire Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Building One, Room 407 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the methodology for grouping hospitals adopted by the HCCB pursuant to Sections 4D- 1.03, 4D-1.12(1) and 4D-1.12(2), F.A.C., constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority as being arbitrary or capricious? Mercy has also raised one issue as to whether the grouping methodology is violative of constitutional guarantees of administrative equal protection and due process. This issue, however, is beyond the jurisdiction of the Division of Administrative Hearings.
Findings Of Fact Introduction. The HCCB and Its Hospital Grouping Function. The HCCB was formed pursuant to Part II of Chapter 395, Florida Statutes (1979). The HCCB was created pursuant to the specific authority of Section 395.503, Florida Statutes (1979), in order to further the accomplishment of legislative intent contained in Section 395.5025, Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.): It is the intent of the Legislature to assure that adequate health care is affordable and accessible to all the citizens of this state. To further the accomplishment of this goal, the Hospital Cost Containment Board is created to advise the Legislature regarding health care costs; inflationary trends in health care costs; the impact of health care costs on the state budget; the impact of hospital charges and third-party reimbursement mechanisms on health care costs; and the education of consumers and providers of health care services in order to encourage price competition in the health care marketplace. The Legislature finds and declares that rising hospital costs and cost shifting are of vital concern to the people of this state because of the danger that hospital services are becoming unaffordable and thus inaccessible to residents of the state. It is further declared that hospital costs should be contained through improved competition between hospitals and improved competition between insurers, through financial incentives which foster efficiency instead of inefficiency, and through sincere initiatives on behalf of providers, insurers, and consumers to contain costs. As a safety net, it is the intent of the Legislature to establish a program of prospective budget review and approval in the event that competition-oriented methods do not adequately contain costs and the access of Floridians to adequate hospital care becomes jeopardized because of unaffordable costs. As a part of its responsibilities the HCCB is required, "after consulting with appropriate professional and governmental advisory bodies and holding public hearings, and considering existing and proposed systems of accounting and reporting utilized by hospitals," to specify a uniform system of financial reporting for hospitals. Section 395.507(1), Florida Statutes Suppl.) to: In order to allow "meaningful comparisons" of data reported by hospitals under the uniform system of financial reporting, the HCCB is required by Section 395.507(2), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.) to group hospitals according to characteristics, including, but not limited to, a measure of the nature and range of services provided, teaching hospital status, number of medical specialties represented on the hospital staff, percentage of Medicare inpatient days, average daily census, geographical differences, and, when available, case mix. In providing for grouping of hospital, the HCCB is required to establish ten general hospital groups and additional speciality groups "as needed." Section 395.507(2), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.). No hospital group can contain fewer than five hospitals, however. Id. Grouping is to be provided by rule. Id. Pursuant to Section 395.509(1), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.), every Florida hospital is required to file its budget with the HCCB for "approval." The budget is required to be filed on forms adopted by the HCCB and based on the uniform system of financial reporting. Section 395.507(6), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.). To determine whether a hospital's budget is to be approved, all hospitals in Florida are to be placed in groups. A hospital's budget is then compared to the budgets of the hospitals assigned to its group. Hospital groups for this purpose are established pursuant to Section 395.509(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.). The provisions of Section 395.509(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.), are identical to Section 395.507(2), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.). In determining whether a hospital's budget is to be approved, Section 305.509(2), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.), establishes two initial "screens" which a hospital must meet based upon the hospital's gross revenue per adjusted admission. The term "gross revenue" is defined as: the sum of daily hospital service charges, ambulatory service charges, ancillary service charges, and other operating revenue. Gross revenues do not include contributions, donations, legacies, or bequests made to a hospital without restriction by the donors. Section 395.502(11), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.). "Adjusted admission" is defined by Section 395.502(1), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.), as: the sum of acute admissions and intensive care admissions divided by the ratio of inpatient revenues generated from acute, intensive, ambulatory, and ancillary patient services to gross revenues. Gross revenues per adjusted admission (hereinafter referred to as "GRAA") is therefore the total hospital ambulatory and ancillary service charges and other operating revenue for all acute and intensive care admissions divided by the ratio of inpatient revenues from acute, intensive, ambulatory and ancillary patient services to gross revenue; or, stated more simply , inpatient revenue per admission. The "screens" which must be met in order for a hospital's budget to be approved upon initial determination are: (1) the hospital's GRAA must not be in the upper 20th percentile of the hospitals within its group; and (2) the rate of increase in a hospital's GRAA as contained in its current budget compared to the hospital's GRAA as reported in its most recently approved budget must not exceed a "maximum allowable rate of increase" if the hospital's GRAA is in the 50th to 79th percentile of the hospitals in its group. If a hospital's GRAA is in the 49th percentile or less of the hospitals in its group, its budget is automatically approved. In determining whether a hospital's GRAA fails the screens, Section 395.509(2), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.), provides: Percentile values for gross operating revenue per adjusted admission shall be determined monthly by the board for each group established pursuant to s. 395.507(2) by ranking projected gross operating revenues per adjusted admission contained in the most recently approved or submitted budgets for the hospitals in each group, including any hospital that is contesting its grouping assignment. In determining the applicability of paragraph (a) or paragraph (b), the board shall consider the basis of the projections by the hospital, including consideration of the following factors: any increase in patient admissions caused by the creation of preferred provider organizations or health maintenance organiza- tions, population increases, changes in the hospital case mix or in services offered, changes in technology, or other similar factors. If a hospital's GRAA fails either of the screens (its GRAA is in the upper 20th percentile of its group or its GRAA rate of increase is excessive and its GRAA is in the 50th to 79th percentile of its group) that hospital's budget must be reviewed by the HCCB "to determine whether the rate of increase contained in the budget is just, reasonable, and not excessive." Section 395.509(5), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.). Pursuant to Section 395.509(6), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.), the HCCB is authorized, if it first determines under Section 395.509(5), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.), that the hospital's rate of increase is not just, reasonable and not excessive, to amend or disapprove any hospital's budget which does not meet the two screens of Section 395.509(2), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.), to establish a rate of increase which is "just, reasonable, and not excessive." The HCCB's authority under Section 395.509(6), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.), applies only if the HCCB first complies with the following pertinent provisions of Section 395.509(5), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.): The board shall disapprove any budget, or part thereof, as excess that contains a rate of increase which is not necessary to maintain the existing level of services of the hospital or, if the hospital increases its existing level of services, any amount not necessary to accomplish that increase. In making such deterioration . . . the board shall consider the following criteria: The efficiency, sufficiency, and adequacy of the services and facilities provided by the hospital. The cost of providing services and the value of the services to the public. The ability of the hospital to improve services and facilities. The ability of the hospital to reduce the cost of services. The ability of the hospital to earn a reasonable rate of return. The accuracy of previous budget submissions by the hospital compared to the actual experience of the hospital the The number of patient days reimbursed by Medicare or Medicaid. The number of patient days attributable to the medically indigent. The research and educational services provided by the hospital if it is a teaching hospital. The projected expenditures or revenues for or from construction of facilities or new services which are subject to regulation under s. 381.494 may not be included in the budget of a hospital until the construction or services are approved or authorized by the state health planning agency. The cost of opening a new hospital, for first 3 years. The Challenged Rules. In carrying out its duty to establish a uniform system of financial reporting, the HCCB adopted Section 4D- 1.03, F.A.C., which provides: The Board, pursuant to Section 395.505, Florida Statutes, hereby adopts and establishes a uniform system for hospitals to file the prior year audited actual data report, the interim report of financial and statistical information. This system is described and the forms, instructions, and definitions therefor are contained in the Board's publication entitled Hospital Uniform Reporting System Manual. The Chart of Accounts adopted pursuant to Section 395.507(1), Florida Statutes, and this Chapter 4D-1, and as hereafter modified, shall be utilized by each hospital for submitting the prior year audited actual data report, the interim report and the budget report. In order to determine whether a hospital's budget should be automatically approved under Section 395.509(2), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.), the HCCB adopted Section 4D-1.12, F.A.C. Sections 4D-1.12(1) and (2), F.A.C., provide: The staff shall review the budget report based upon the hospital's ranking for gross revenue per adjusted admission within its group and upon its rate of change in gross revenue per adjusted admission in the proposed budget as required in Section 395.507(6), Florida Statutes, and the most recently Board approved budget. As part of the budget report review process, groupings of hospitals shall be established according to the characteristics and methodology as outlined in Chapter V, Section B, Hospital Unit Uniform Reporting System Manual and as outlined in Section 395.507(2), Florida Statutes. Percentile values for gross revenue per adjusted admission shall be determined monthly for each group by ranking projected gross revenue per adjusted admission contained in the most recently approved or submitted budgets for the hospitals in each group, including any hospital that is contesting its grouping assignment. 12. Sections 4D-1.03 and 4D-1.12(1) and (2), F.A.C., are the rules challenged by Mercy. These rules, as quoted herein, were effective as of November 5, 1984. The rules were originally adopted effective June 30, 1980. The rules were amended to their present wording in response to "major" legislation enacted in 1984 which amended Part II, Chapter 395, Florida Statutes (1983), and granted authority to the HCCB for the first time to approve, disapprove or amend hospital budgets under certain circumstances. Chapter 79-106, Laws of Florida. The challenged rules essentially provide that the HCCB, when grouping of hospitals for purposes of the uniform system of financial reporting and for purposes of reviewing and comparing budgets to determine if they should be automatically approved under Section 395.509(2), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.), will apply the grouping methodology outlined in Chapter V, Section B of the Hospital Uniform Reporting System Manual (hereinafter referred to as the "Manual"). Section 4D-1.18, F.A.C., also adopted effective November 5, 1984, incorporates by reference the Manual within each rule in Chapter 4D-1, F.A.C., which references the Manual. This rule has not been challenged in this proceeding. The Hospital Grouping Methodology and Its Development. Generally, Chapter V, Section B of the Manual, sets out the objective of the grouping methodology, the procedure for forming groups, a list of the variables considered in forming groups and the weight to be accorded each variable. The goals of the grouping methodology, as provided in the Manual, are to "facilitate comparison of hospitals with similar patient mix and market conditions" and to "develop groups of sufficient size . . . to assure statistically valid comparisons." Based upon the procedure for forming groups contained in the Manual, hospitals are grouped into nine, non-teaching, short-term hospital groups, one Major teaching hospital group and a number of specialty hospital groups. It is the method of grouping hospitals into nine short-term hospital groups which is at issue in this proceeding. Assignment of hospitals to the nine short-term hospital groups is accomplished through the use of the "McQueen's K-means clustering algorithm included in the cluster analysis t computer program package CLAN developed by T.D. Klastorin and Robert Ledingham (June, 1980 version)." A clustering analysis is a method of grouping a set of objects (in this case, hospitals) into relatively homogeneous groups. The goal of a clustering algorithm is to minimize the differences between the members of the group. The objects are grouped based upon a set of variables which are considered significant for purposes of comparing the objects. In order to account for the significance of each variable, the variables are weighted. The variables have a numerical score and after weighing, the weighted sum of the variables for each object is compared and the objects are grouped based upon their variable scores. There are a number of clustering algorithms which can be used to group hospitals. The HCCB chose to use the "McQueen's K-means" clustering algorithm. The use of McQueens K-means clustering algorithm has not bean challenged in this proceeding. Nor does the evidence establish that the selection of McQueen's K-means clustering algorithm is arbitrary and capricious. The clustering algorithm is performed by computer. The computer program utilized by the HCCB to perform the algorithm is called "CLAN" and was developed by T.D. Klastorin and Robert Ledingham. The evidence at the hearing supports a finding that the selection of this computer program is reasonable. Once hospitals are grouped, they are notified of their group designation and allowed to request reconsideration of their group assignment. The request must made within thirty days after notification. Following the creation of the HCCB in 1979, Price Waterhouse & Company was engaged by the HCCB as a consultant to assist in still establishing an appropriate hospital grouping methodology. The HCCB also created an advisory committee to assist the HCCB and Price Waterhouse & Company in developing the grouping methodology. This committee, designated as the Technical Advisory Committee (hereinafter referred to as the "TAC") was comprised of individuals from the hospital industry and academia and certified public accountants. The TAC worked with Price Waterhouse & Company in developing the grouping methodology and the uniform reporting system. Because of time constraints, the TAC's involvement with evaluating the methodology was limited. The HCCB ultimately decided to pattern the grouping methodology it adopted after the grouping methodology then being used by the State of Washington, as recommended by Price Waterhouse & Company. The Washington system was not adopted exactly; a number of changes to Washington's methodology were made to the grouping methodology adopted by the HCCB. Mercy has proposed several findings of fact beginning on page 35 and ending on page 38 of its proposed order concerning the "Differences in Washington Hospital Characteristics and Grouping Methodology Model." Those proposed findings of fact can be and are hereby disposed of by the following finding of fact: because of differences in the hospital industries of the States of Florida and Washington and other differences between the two States, Florida's grouping methodology cannot be justified solely on the basis that Washington's grouping methodology was used as a starting point in developing Florida's grouping methodology. Those differences, however, do not support a finding of fact that Florida's grouping methodology is arbitrary and capricious since the Washington system was not adopted without substantial modifications, including a reduction of Washington's eighteen variables initially to fourteen and ultimately to seven, and the use of unequal weighting of the variables. The TAC reviewed and discussed the grouping methodology initially approved by the HCCB prior to its approval. Some of Mercy's witnesses, who were members of the TAC, indicated during their testimony that the TAC never decided anything because no "vote" was ever taken of TAC members and that the TAC did not advise the HCCB but instead advised the staff of the HCCB. Their testimony in this regard has been given little weight. The fact that no formal "vote" was taken of TAC members does not mean that the TAC did not take a position on matters it discussed. The consensus of the TAC could be, and was, gleaned from its discussions. The staff of the HCCB in fact reported decisions of the TAC to the HCCB verbally and by minutes of TAC meetings. Although the accuracy of staff's reports was sometimes questioned, no question was raised about whether TAC had taken positions. The fact that the HCCB staff reported TAC actions to the HCCB also disputes the testimony to the effect that TAC did not advise the HCCB but instead advised the staff of the HCCB. While it may be true that TAC did not deal directly with the HCCB, its analysis was reported, to the HCCB. The HCCB ultimately adopted rules effective June 30, 1980, which incorporated by reference to the Manual, the general outline of the grouping methodology adopted by the HCCB. The TAC ceased to exist following adoption of the HCCB's initial rules. Two new advisory committees were formed: a Technical Advisory Panel (hereinafter referred to as "TAP") on grouping and a TAP for financial analysis. The grouping TAP was made up of individuals from the hospital industry. The grouping TAP met in November and December of 1980 and reviewed the results of test runs of the grouping methodology initially adopted by the HCCB. The results of the initial run were described as "bizarre." This run used equal weighting of the variables. Equal weighting was abandoned and three to four more test runs were made and reviewed by the grouping TAP. After each run the variable weights were adjusted until the results appeared to be "reasonable." The HCCB also established a committee consisting of members of the HCCB designated as the Research and Development Committee (hereinafter referred to as the "R & D Committee"). The R & D Committee reviewed the results of test runs and also found the final groups reasonable. The HCCB met in January, 1981, and adopted the grouping methodology with the adjusted variable weights arrived at as a result of the test runs for use in establishing hospital groups for use in 1981. The grouping methodology was reviewed every year after its initial adoption in 1980. The methodology was reviewed by the HCCB, HCCB's staff, the TAP's and the R & D Committee each year. Throughout the period from 1980 to the present, criticisms of the grouping methodology have been made. Some of these criticisms were agreed with and others were rejected by the HCCB or its staff. Following review of the grouping methodology by the TAP's and the R & D Committee in 1981, the original fourteen variables were reduced to eight. In January, 1982, the weight of one of the variables was changed and one variable was replaced by another variable. In December, 1982, a variable was deleted; seven variables remained. In 1983, clustering analysis was limited in its application to the formation of short-term acute care general hospital groups. In 1984, following the significant amendment of Chapter 395, Florida Statutes (1983), the HCCB adopted the present challenged rules. The rules were effective November 5, 1984. The only change in the grouping methodology approved by the HCCB was the substitution of the Florida price level index variable for percent of population over age 65. The weight assigned to the Florida price level index was the same as the weight that had been assigned to the percent of population over age 65. The changes made to the grouping methodology in 1984 were first suggested by the staff of the HCCB to the grouping TAP in June of 1984. The grouping TAP met on July 11, 1984 and considered and discussed the proposed changes. A number of problem areas were discussed. Although no test run results were presented at this TAP meeting, they were provided to TAP members before the HCCB adopted the grouping methodology changes. Concerns about the geographic or exogenous variables expressed at the grouping TAP meeting suggested a belief that too much or too little emphasis was being placed on geographic considerations. Mercy has proposed a number of findings of fact beginning on page 33 and ending on page 35 of its proposed order concerning the significance of the changes made by the Legislature in 1984 to Part II of Chapter 395, Florida Statutes (1983). Those proposed findings of fact essentially deal with the fact that the powers of the HCCB after the 1984 amendments may have a more significant impact on hospitals and that, therefore, the grouping methodology is of greater interest to hospitals. Mercy's proposed findings of fact are not, however, relevant in determining whether the challenged rules are arbitrary and capricious. The fact that the effect of the grouping methodology on a hospital may now be different does not mean that the use of the grouping methodology, as modified after the 1984 legislative changes to the law, which was developed when the purpose of grouping was different, is not an appropriate methodology. The evidence does not support such a conclusion. Therefore, to the extent that Mercy's proposed findings of fact under Section II, A, of its proposed order have not already been made, they are rejected as unnecessary. Mercy and the HCCB have proposed findings of fact as to whether Mercy has ever questioned the HCCB's grouping methodology since it was first adopted prior to instituting this proceeding. Those proposed findings of fact are not deemed relevant in determining whether the grouping methodology is arbitrary and capricious. If the grouping methodology is in fact arbitrary and capricious, the fact that Mercy did not challenge the methodology when it was first adopted will not make it any less arbitrary and capricious today. Mercy's Challenge. A. Introduction. Mercy is a not-for-profit, general acute care hospital with 550 licensed beds located in Dade County, Florida. Mercy has raised a number of points in this proceeding and its proposed order in challenging the rules in question. All of those points, according to Mercy, prove that the rules are an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. In determining whether the facts support such a conclusion, the following standard must be kept in mind: [I]n a 120.54 hearing, the hearing officer must look to the legislative authority for the rule and determine whether or not the proposed rule is encompassed within the grant. The burden is upon one who attacks the proposed rule to show that the agency, if it adopts the rule, would exceed its authority; that the requirements of the rule are not appropriate to the ends specified in the legislative act; that the requirements contained in the rule are not reasonably related to the purpose of the enabling legislation or that the proposed rule or the requirements thereof are arbitrary or capricious. A capricious action is one which is taken without thought or reason or irrationally. An arbitrary decision is one not supported by facts or logic or despotic. Administrative discretion must be reasoned and based upon competent substantial evidence. Competent substantial evidence has been described as such evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Agrico Chemical Company v. State, Department of Environmental Regulation, 365 So.2d 759, 763 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), cert. denied, 376 So.2d 74 (1979). Additionally, the following must be kept in mind: The well recognized general rule is that agencies are to be accorded wide discretion in the exercise of their lawful rulemaking authority, clearly conferred or fairly implied and consistent with the agencies' general statutory duties. . . . An agency's construction of the statute it administers is entitled to great weight and is not to be overturned unless clearly erroneous. . . . Where, as here, the agency's interpretation of a statute has been promulgated in rulemaking proceedings, the validity of such rule must be upheld if it is reasonably related to the purposes of the legislation interpreted and it is not arbitrary and capricious. The burden is upon petitioner in a rule challenge to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the rule or its requirements are arbitrary and capricious. . . . Moreover, the agency's interpretation of a statute need not be the sole possible interpretation or even the most desirable one; it need only be within the range of possible interpretations. Department of Professional Regulation v. Durrani, 455 So. 2d 515, 517 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). The witnesses who testified in this proceeding who were accepted as experts were qualified in a number of different areas. Those witnesses qualified as experts in statistical analysis or related areas and health care finance rendered opinions as to the appropriateness of the HCCB's grouping methodology. The method of grouping hospitals adopted by the HCCB is a statistical method. Therefore, the determination of whether the HCCB's methodology is arbitrary and capricious depends largely upon whether the methodology is statistically sound. Mercy and the HCCB therefore presented the testimony of witnesses qualified in the area of statistics: Rick Zimmerman, Ph.D., an expert in statistical analysis and social science statistics (for Mercy), and Duane Meeter, Ph.D., an expert in economics and applied statistical analysis and Frank Fox, Jr., Ph.D., an expert in applied statistics (for the HCCB). All three witnesses were knowledgeable and credible. Dr. Zimmerman testified that the HCCB's grouping methodology was "clearly inappropriate." Dr. Zimmerman's opinion was based upon a three step analysis in which he determined: (1) whether the variables selected by the HCCB are appropriate; (2) whether the weights assigned to the variables by the HCCB are appropriate; and, (3) the effect changing the variables and/or weights would have on hospital groups. The results of Dr. Zimmerman's analysis, which formed the basis for his opinion that the HCCB's grouping methodology is not appropriate, are discussed, infra. Mercy has proposed a number of findings of fact in its proposed order concerning the credibility of Dr. Meeter's and Dr. Fox's testimony. Some of those proposed findings of fact have been considered in determining the weight given to their testimony. Both Dr. Meeter and Dr. Fox were, however, knowledgeable and credible. In addition to the opinion of its statistical expert, Mercy presented the testimony of three witnesses who were accepted as experts in health care finance: Messrs. Lawrence R. Murray, Jerry A. Mashburn and Anthony Krayer. All three are certified public accountants. All testified that it was his opinion that the HCCB's grouping methodology was arbitrary. The bases for their opinions are discussed, infra. Selection of "Seed" Hospitals. In order to use a clustering algorithm, a starting point is needed; the first object (hospital) to be placed in each group must be selected. The first objects selected are called "seed" objects. Mercy has attached the HCCB's method of selecting the nine "seed" hospitals in initially performing the McQueen's K-means clustering algorithm. Mercy has proposed the following findings of fact with regard to this point: While none of the parties challenged the use of McQueen's and the CLAN program, no support was offered during the hearing for the method by which the HCCB had selected the nine seed hospitals as initial clustering points. The HCCB's own statistician criticized the HCCB's selection method. The Rankis-Zimmerman report indicates that the final groupings based upon the HCCB's seed hospitals were vastly different than groupings based upon the utilization of seed hospitals selected on a statistical basis. Both the HCCB's and Mercy's statisticians proposed statistically sound methods for selecting seed hospitals, which had not been employed by the HCCB in the Grouping Methodology. [Citations omitted] These proposed findings of fact are not relevant to this proceeding. The burden is on Mercy to show that the selection of "seed" hospitals was arbitrary and capricious; the HCCB is not required to show "support" for its method of selecting the seed hospitals. Additionally, whether there are other methods of selecting seed hospitals is not the test. The HCCB's interpretation of the statute need not be the sole interpretation or even the most desirable one; it only needs to be within the range of possible interpretations. Durrani, supra. Therefore, even if the Rankis-Zimmerman report does indicate that the final groupings of hospitals of the HCCB were vastly different than groupings based upon other methods of selecting seed hospitals, it does not automatically follow that the HCCB's method of selecting seed hospitals was not "within the range of possible interpretations. The weight of the evidence does not prove that the HCCB's method of selecting seed hospitals was arbitrary and capricious. Selection of the Variables. In delegating legislative authority to the HCCB to establish a grouping methodology, the Legislature provided that the following relevant characteristics are to be taken into account: A measure of the nature and range of services provided; Number of medical specialties represented on the hospital staff; Percentage of Medicare inpatient days; Average daily census; Geographic differences; and Case mix, "when available." In response to the Legislature's mandate, the HCCB has adopted seven variables or characteristics. The variables selected by the HCCB include five hospital- specific (endogenous) variables and two geographic (exogenous variables). The variables are as follows: Endogenous Variables: Average occupied beds. Available services. Physician mix. Number of residents. Percent Medicare days. Exogenous Variables: Florida price level index. Personal income. The following findings of fact are made with regard to each of the specific characteristics required to be taken into account by the Legislature and the variables adopted by the HCCB: 1. A measure of the nature and range of services provided. The HCCB has provided in the Manual that "available services" or a service index will be considered. The specific services considered are listed on Table B, Chapter V, of the Manual. Table B also weights or provides a score for each of the various services listed. Each hospital gets the specified score if it has a particular service available. The available services listed are based upon a survey of hospital administrators and chief financial officers in New York, New York, made in the 1970's. Problems with the list of available services have been pointed out to the HCCB and its staff. The primary problem is that the volume of services provided is not taken into account. The problems with the service index, however, relate to the fact that the service index is a proxy for case mix. To date, there is no alternative available which would be a better proxy for case mix. The Legislature contemplated this fact by providing that a measure of the services provided by a hospital will be considered and that case mix will be taken into account "when available." Therefore, while there are "problems" with the service index, consideration of available services is mandated by the Legislature and there are no acceptable alternatives available use for by the HCCB. 2. Number of medical specialties represented on the hospital staff. 52. The HCCB has provided that a physician specialties mix be considered in grouping hospitals. This physician specialties mix is based upon a list of twenty- six specialties for which a hospital gets a single credit for each specialty available regardless of the number of physician specialists available in each specialty or the volume of patients admitted by a physician. 52. Like the service index, the physician specialties mix is a proxy for ease mix and has problems associated with its use. Also like the service index, consideration of this factor is mandated and there are no acceptable alternatives available for use by the HCCB. 3. Percentage of Medicare inpatient days. 53. The HCCB has provided that "percentage Medicare days be considered in grouping hospitals. Consideration of this variable has not been shown to be arbitrary and capricious. 4. Average daily census. 53. The HCCB has provided that "average occupied beds" is to be considered in grouping hospitals. It does not appear that this variable's use was proper, as discussed, infra. 5. Geographic differences. The HCCB has provided that geographic differences be considered in grouping hospitals by providing for the inclusion of the Florida price level index, by county, and median income, by county, as variables to be considered. The only thing that the evidence established with regard to these variables was that they are not "very good" predictors, that "if" they are intended as a measure of input prices they are "poor substitutes," and that there may be "better" measures of the cost of doing business. The evidence does not, however, show that the use of these variables is arbitrary and capricious. Mercy has proposed a number of findings of fact concerning geographic influences in part II, H of its proposed order. The proposed findings of fact begin on page 29 and end on page 33. Most of these proposed findings of fact are not made in this Final Order because they are not deemed relevant or material and are unnecessary to the resolution of this proceeding. The proposed findings of fact contained in part II, H of Mercy's proposed order purportedly show that the HCCB has inadequately accounted for geographic influences. The evidence does establish that the financial characteristics of Florida hospitals and GRAA are affected by the geographic location of a hospital. This is especially true in Florida because of the impact on parts of the State from tourism, language barriers, the number of elderly residents, the available labor markets, and competition. It is also true that the combined weights of the two geographic variables the HCCB has selected for consideration in the grouping methodology--the Florida price level index and median income--is only one-seventh of the combined weights of all the HCCB's variables. It is also true that the grouping methodology results in hospitals from different areas of the State being grouped together, i.e., Mercy's hospital group includes twenty- three hospitals, four of which are located in Dade County and three of which are located in Escambia County. It does not necessarily follow, however, that the HCCB has been arbitrary and capricious in designating only two variables to take into account geographic differences between hospitals. The evidence also does not support a conclusion that it was not proper for the HCCB to limit the weight of the geographic variables to one-seventh of the total weight of the variables. Nor does the evidence demonstrate that the inclusion of hospitals from different areas of the State in the same group is not a proper result just because geographic influences are important. The fact that a large percentage of Dade County and south Florida hospitals do not qualify for automatic approval of their budgets under Section 395.509(2), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.), because they are in the upper 20th and the upper 50th to 79th percentiles does not necessarily prove that geographic influences have not been adequately accounted for either, as suggested be Mercy on page 30 of its proposed order. The evidence simply does not support such a conclusion. Nor does it necessarily follow that because Dade County hospitals are "efficient" in the minds of some of Mercy's witnesses and yet are unable to achieve automatic approval of their budgets that the grouping methodology does not adequately account for geographic influences, as suggested by Mercy on pages 30 and 31 of its proposed order. First, the Legislature has provided that factors other than geographic differences are to be considered, which the HCCB has provided for. It may therefore be that some Dade County hospitals do not achieve automatic approval of their budgets because of the other variables. The fact that not all Dade County hospitals fail to achieve automatic approval of their budgets supports such a conclusion. Also, even though a hospital's budget is not automatically approved it does not necessarily mean that it is considered inefficient. If that were the case, its budget would probably be subject automatically to amendment or disapproval. That is not the case. If a hospital's budget is not automatically approved its budget is subject to further review under Section 395.509(5), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.). It may still be determined that the hospital is "efficient" based upon this review. The Legislature, in enacting Part II of Chapter 395, Florida Statutes, did indicate that it intended to promote competition and efficiency among hospitals in order to contain hospital costs. Section 395.5025, Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.). The grouping methodology and, in particular, the comparison of hospitals' GRAA under Section 395.509(2), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.), does not alone achieve that intent. Therefore the opinion of several of Mercy's witnesses that Dade County hospitals and in particular, Mercy, are efficient does not support a conclusion that the methodology is arbitrary and capricious or that geographic influences are not adequately considered. On pages 31 and 32 of its proposed order, Mercy suggests that Dade County hospitals only compete with other Dade County hospitals and therefore grouping hospitals from all sections of the State is illogical. In support of this suggestion, Mercy proposes findings of fact to the effect that the HCCB has recognized that consumers are interested in comparing hospital charges on a regional basis and has provided information about hospital cost on a county-by- county basis in the past. Mercy's proposed findings of fact are not accepted for essentially the same reasons that its proposed findings of fact with regard to the efficiency of hospitals were rejected. These proposed findings of fact do not support a finding that the HCCB's grouping methodology is arbitrary and capricious or that geographic differences have not been adequately taken into account. Mercy's has also proposed findings of fact with regard to geographic differences to the effect that after the Legislature specifically required that "geographic differences" be considered in an amendment to Chapter 395, Florida Statutes (1981), in 1982, the HCCB has not added any additional geographic factors to be considered. Although no additional geographic variables have been added, geographic variables have been reviewed and have been changed since 1982. More importantly, these proposed findings of fact do not prove that the existing variables are not adequate. 6. Case Mix. 66. Case mix is to be taken into account "when available." The evidence does not establish that case mix is available at this time. 7. Other variables. The HCCB is not limited to a consideration of the factors which the Legislature specifically provided are to be considered. Sections 395.507(2) and 395.509(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.). The only other variable the HCCB has provided for consideration is "number of residents." No evidence of significance concerning this variable was presented at the hearing. There was testimony at the hearing that there are other variables which would be appropriate for consideration in grouping hospitals. The evidence does not, however, establish that failure to consider other variables means that the grouping methodology adopted by the HCCB is arbitrary and capricious. Dr. Zimmerman opined that he had determined that the variables selected by the HCCB were not appropriate. Dr. Zimmerman based his opinion upon the fact that he had conducted a "multiple regression analysis." According to Dr. Zimmerman, a "multiple regression analysis is a statistical procedure used to evaluate the relationship of a given set of independent, predictor variables (the HCCB's seven variables) to a single dependent variable (GRAA)." Based upon his application of multiple regression analysis, Dr. Zimmerman concluded that three of the variables used in the HCCB's grouping methodology are not statistically significant predictors of GRAA: available services, average occupied beds and median income. Two of these variables (available services and average occupied beds) are required by Sections 395.507(2) and 395.509(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.), to be taken into account in the grouping methodology. These Sections also require that geographic factors, which median income is, be taken into account. This does not, however, mean that median income must be included as a variable by the HCCB. Dr. Meeter testified that the statistical significance of the HCCB's variables can be determined by the use of "log transformation." Based upon Dr. Meeter's use of log transformation, median income and available services are statistically significant variables; average occupied beds is not statistically significant. Although the HCCB was required to include "average daily census" as a factor in grouping hospitals, the HCCB was not required to use "average occupied beds." Based upon Dr. Zimmerman's and Dr. Meeter's testimony, the use of average occupied beds as a variable was not proper. Whether the use of available services and median income as variables was proper depends upon whether log transformation is a proper method of determining the statistical significance of variables. Although the evidence on this question was in conflict, it appears that the use of log transformation was proper. The inclusion of available services and median income is therefore not arbitrary and capricious. A second problem with the variables used by the HCCB suggested by Dr. Zimmerman involves the correlation between the seven predictor variables or "multicollinearity." The existence of multicollinearity can invalidate a clustering program. Dr. Zimmerman determined that the correlation between the physician mix, available services and average occupied beds variables and between the Florida price level index and median income variables is large enough that there is a "potential" problem. Dr. Zimmerman's determination that there is a "potential" problem was made through two techniques. He first used "paired correlation." Based upon paired correlation, Dr. Zimmerman used a "rule of thumb" that a paired correlation of 0.7 or higher should be looked at closer. Finding a paired correlation between physician mix, available services and average occupied beds of .74 and between the Florida price level index and median income of .71, Dr. Zimmerman then calculated "R squared" to determine if a potential problem did in fact exist. Dr. Zimmerman indicated that the calculation of R squared is the most highly recommended method of determining if multicollinearity is a problem but agreed there are other methods of making such a determination. Dr. Meeter indicated that Dr. Zimmerman's rule of thumb that based upon paired correlations of 0.7 or higher indicates the problem should be looked at more closely is too strict. Other than Dr. Zimmerman's "experience" (which according to Dr. Zimmerman, consisted of a class he took), Dr. Zimmerman did not cite any authority which supported his rule of thumb. The only other source Dr. Zimmerman referred to--the "SPSS" manual--only indicates that the .82-1.0 range indicates that extreme collinearity exists. Another problem raised by Dr. Meeter with Dr. Zimmerman's conclusions as to multicollinearity, involves the use of "variance inflation factors" (hereinafter referred to as VIF is another technique used by statisticians to determine if multicollinearity is a problem. Dr. Zimmerman did not look at VIF. VIF can be determined by transforming R squared: VIF 1/1- R2. A VIF in excess of 5 or 10 is an indication that multicollinearity exists. One source quoted by Dr. Meeter even indicates that a much higher VIF is necessary to conclude that multicollinerity exists. Transforming Dr. Zimmerman's R squared calculations indicates that VIF is in excess of 5 in only one instance. As discussed more fully, infra, Dr. Zimmerman used a number of alternative methods of grouping hospitals which he designated as "Schemes." Based upon Dr. Zimmerman's "Scheme 3," Dr. Zimmerman found an R squared value of .819. The VIF for an R squared value of .819 is in excess of 5. Scheme 3, however, is not an application of the HCCB's grouping methodology; it is a grouping methodology in which the variables are assigned different weights. As indicated by Dr. Meeter, the weights used in grouping can effect the correlation of the variables. Therefore, the fact that Scheme 3 indicates a possible multicollinearity problem does not prove that multicollinearity is in fact a problem with the HCCB's grouping methodology. Based upon the foregoing it is found that multicollinearity does not exist sufficiently to conclude that the variables used by the HCCB are arbitrary and capricious. Dr. Zimmerman only testified that there was a "potential" problem. Additionally, although multicollinearity may invalidate a clustering program, the evidence does not prove that the HCCB's clustering program is in fact invalid because of any existing "potential" problem. In light of the foregoing findings of fact, it is clear that the HCCB's variables are appropriate with the exception of average occupied beds. The fact that this one variable is not statistically significant, however, does not by itself support a finding that the grouping methodology is inappropriate. The Lack of Testing of the Grouping Methodology. A third point raised by Mercy is entitled "Lack of Testing" in its proposed order and includes several proposed findings of fact on pages 17 and 18 of Mercy's proposed order. Mercy has essentially proposed findings of fact that: (1) it had been recommended to the HCCB when it originally adopted its grouping methodology in 1980 that a statistician be hired to test the grouping methodology; (2) that the failure to do so had been criticized in the past; that it had been recommended that the HCCB obtain assistance of individuals knowledgeable in Florida hospital characteristics to evaluate the grouping process but had failed to do so; (4) that the HCCB had not, until just prior to the hearing of this case, hired a statistician; (5) that the HCCB has not used multiple regression analysis or within-cluster co- variance weighting; and, (6) that the State of Washington's State Hospital Commission has employed a statistician to test its methodology and has effectively been advised by individuals knowledgeable with Washington's hospital characteristics. These proposed findings of fact do not establish that the grouping methodology adopted by the HCCB is arbitrary and capricious even if they were all correct findings of fact. All that these proposed findings of fact show is that the HCCB may not have gone about the adoption of its grouping methodology in the most appropriate manner. Any such shortcomings, based upon 20/20 hindsight, in the manner in which the methodology was adopted do not prove that the grouping methodology itself is not appropriate. Additionally, the evidence does not support all of these proposed findings. In particular, as was discussed, supra, the HCCB did in fact look to individuals knowledgeable in Florida hospital characteristics to evaluate its grouping methodology. The Weight of the Variables. The most significant and troublesome challenge made by Mercy to the HCCB's grouping methodology involves the weights assigned to the variables considered in grouping hospitals. The weights assigned by the HCCB to the seven HCCB variables are: Variable Weight Endogenous: Average occupied beds. 1.0 Available services. 2.0 Physician mix. 0.5 Number of residents. 0.5 Percent Medicare days. 2.0 Exogenous: Florida price level index. 0.5 Personal income. 0.5 The determination of whether the weights selected by the HCCB are arbitrary and capricious depends largely upon the evidence presented at the hearing by those witnesses knowledgeable in the field of statistics. Three witnesses were qualified as experts in statistically related fields. All three were well qualified in their fields and were credible and persuasive. According to Dr. Zimmerman, "the weights used currently by the HCCB are clearly inappropriate." In Mercy exhibit 17, Dr. Zimmerman reaches the following conclusion with regard to the HCCB's variable weights: These weights clearly do not reflect the relationship of the various variables to GRAA and thus appear as arbitrary and inappropriate for use in clustering hospitals on the basis of cost-related variables. Dr. Zimmerman's opinion is based upon the use of "multiple regression analysis," which, according to Mercy exhibit 17, "assesses the relationship of each of the predictor variables to the dependent measure (GRAA)." The evidence, however, does not support a finding of fact that multiple regression analysis is the only statistically valid method of establishing weights to be used in clustering analysis. In fact, there are a number of statistically valid methods of establishing variable weights. One of those acceptable methods is the "subjective" method which was used by the HCCB. Doctors Meeter and Fox substantiated this finding of fact. The use of the subjective method involves the participation of individuals knowledgable in the Florida hospital industry in reviewing and commenting on the weights used. The evidence clearly supports a finding that individuals with such knowledge participated in the process of developing the HCCB's grouping methodology including the selection of variable weights. Even one of Mercy's witnesses provided testimony which supports this conclusion: Mr. Kenneth G. McGee testified that "[i] t was just a trial and error process of changing weights until we ended up with something that people considered more reasonable than what had been produced in the past." Mercy has questioned Dr. Meeter's testimony with regard to the use of the subjective method of weighting variables based upon a number of proposed findings of fact. First, Mercy has proposed findings of fact to the effect that Dr. Meeter indicated that the subjective method is "bad" if not carefully applied. What Dr. Meeter actually said was that any method should be applied carefully. Secondly, Mercy has proposed a finding of fact that in a book relied upon by Dr. Meeter in rendering his opinion about the subjective method--John Hardigan's 1975 book, Clustering Algorithms--the author describes the subjective method as an "unsatisfactory" one. What Dr. Meeter's testimony proves is that Hardigan's comment was a tongue- in-cheek comment that there are several appropriate methods of weighting variables all of which are unsatisfactory, including regression analysis (used by Dr. Zimmerman) and the subjective method (use by the HCCB). Dr. Meeter also relied upon other statistical literature in rendering his opinion as to the use of the subjective method in determining variable weights. Finally, Mercy has suggested that Dr. Meeter did not undertake any independent "statistical" analysis which would support his opinions. Based upon the nature of Dr. Meeter's testimony, it does not appear that such a statistical analysis is a prerequisite to concluding that the use of the subjective method is an acceptable method of determining variable weights. Mercy has proposed a finding that the subjective method of weighting is inappropriate based upon Dr. Zimmerman's testimony. Dr. Zimmerman was asked the following questions and gave the following responses concerning the subjective method: Q Now, in your understanding of how the Board arrived at its weights, is it your opinion that that is totally inappropriate methodology for clustering? Yes or no or maybe? A I am looking to counsel for counsel here. MR. PARKER: Do you understand the questions? THE WITNESS: I do understand the question. And let me give you my full answer as I best understand it. The weights -- and I think what I have commented on at great length -- the weights used by the Hospital Cost Containment Board are clearly on statistical grounds inappropriate. There's no question about that. BY MR. COLLETTE: Now, on these clustering grounds, you testified as to your familiarity with clustering grounds, on clustering grounds, are they totally inappropriate? A If the question is -- I wouldn't say that. Hearing that there is no objection, I will continue. I would rule out the use of a purely subjective weighting scheme as a final solution for cluster analysis. I think it might be one that would be considered at a very early step, but never used, as kind of a preliminary idea. However, I would clearly rule out the use of a purely subjective weighting scheme as something to be proud of and actually put into application. So, if that means yes to your question, I guess yes in that specific way. Dr. Zimmerman's responses are not totally clear with regard to whether the subjective method is, in his opinion, an acceptable method of determining variable weights. Nor would his response, if totally clear, overcome the weight of the evidence in support of a conclusion that the HCCB's method of determining variable weights is not arbitrary and capricious. Alternative Methods of Grouping Hospitals. Mercy has proposed a number of findings of fact under a section of its proposed order entitled "Alternative Variables and Weights Indicated by Statistical Analyses." Pages 22 to 29 of Mercy's proposed order. Some of the proposed findings included therein have been dealt with in other portions of this Final Order, including those findings of fact dealing with the use of multiple regression analysis and multicollinearity. In Dr. Zimmerman's report (Mercy exhibit 17) and during his testimony a number of alternative methods of grouping hospitals were tested and evaluated. Dr. Zimmerman concluded that a number of these alternative methods would be preferable to the methodology adopted by the HCCB. Dr. Zimmerman tested twelve different methods (referred to as "Schemes" by Dr. Zimmerman): the HCCB's, the State of Washington's and ten other methods which used some or all of the seven variables designated by the HCCB. Scheme 3 used all seven variables selected by the HCCB but with different weights. Dr. Zimmerman rejected this scheme because of multicollinearity. In Scheme 4, Dr. Zimmerman used only the four variables which he found to be statistically significant: physician specialties mix, number of residents, percent Medicare days and the Florida price level index. Dr. Zimmerman recognized that this Scheme was not acceptable because of the statutory mandate as to the types of factors which must be taken into account. In order to recognize the requirement of Sections 395.507(2) and 395.509(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.), that certain variables be taken into account and to alleviate the purported multicollinearity problem, Dr. Zimmerman combined the variables he considered highly correlated into two "scales." "Scale 1" combined physician specialties mix, available services and average occupied beds and "Scale 2" combined the Florida price level index and median income. The weights assigned to these scale were based upon the weights Dr. Zimmerman felt were more appropriate as discussed, supra. Dr. Zimmerman then used multiple regression analysis and a variety of combinations of variables and Scales in Schemes 6-12. Of these Schemes, Dr. Zimmerman testified that Schemes 6 and 10 were preferable, if Scheme 4 could not be used. Scheme 6 involved the use of all of the variables: percent Medicare days, number of residents and Scales 1 and 2. Scheme 10 involved the use of all of the variables except median income: percent Medicare days, number of residents, the Florida price level index and Scale 1. Dr. Zimmerman compared the results of using the HCCB's grouping methodology to the results from using Schemes 3,4,6 and 10. The results showed that more Dade County hospitals had GRAA's, in comparison to the hospitals in the resulting groups under Schemes 3,4,6 and 10, which would result in automatic approval of their budgets than under the HCCB's methodology. Mercy's position within its group also improved as a result of using Schemes 3,4,6 and 10. These proposed findings of and Mercy's proposed findings of fact concerning alternatives considered by Dr. Meeter do not prove that the HCCB's grouping methodology is arbitrary and capricious. As found, supra, six of the seven variables selected by the HCCB are reasonable. The weights assigned to those variables have also been found to be reasonable and Mercy's suggested findings of fact with regard to multicollinearity have been rejected. Mercy has failed to prove that the HCCB's grouping methodology is arbitrary and capricious. Therefore, any alternative methods or Schemes and the results of using such methods cannot and do not overcome such findings. Conclusions. Based upon the foregoing, it is clear that the bases for the opinions that the HCCB's grouping methodology is inappropriate are not supported by a preponderance of the evidence. Dr. Zimmerman's opinion, which was based upon a number of conclusions, was only supported by the fact that one of the variables selected by the HCCB is not proper. The evidence, however, does not support a finding that this fact alone means that the grouping methodology adopted by the HCCB is inappropriate. The facts do not support a conclusion that the grouping methodology adopted by the HCCB is arbitrary and capricious.
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the violations alleged in the Amended Administrative Complaint, and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken against him.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at the final hearing and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Respondent is now, and has been since October 17, 1996, a Florida-licensed registered nurse. He holds license number 3109442. From September 11, 2000, to March 28, 2001, Respondent was employed as a registered nurse by the North Broward Hospital District and assigned to the emergency room at Imperial Point Medical Center (IPMC) in Broward County, Florida. IPMC is a division of the North Broward Hospital District. It serves as a designated Baker Act receiving facility where persons are "brought involuntary[ily] for psychiatric evaluation" and referral. Some of these persons are "dangerous and violent" and have "cause[ed] injuries to the staff of the emergency room." In early 2001, Respondent was involved in two separate incidents in which he mistreated a patient in the emergency room at IPMC. The first incident occurred on or about February 23, 2001. On that day, K. N., a 21-year-old female, was admitted to the emergency room suffering from "acute intoxication." Pursuant to emergency room policy, upon her admittance to the emergency room, K. N. was "completely undressed . . . to make sure that [she was] not hiding any drugs, contraband, weapons, [or other] things of that nature." K. N. was lying, "passed out" and completely naked, on a stretcher in an examining room with Respondent by her side, when one of the hospital's emergency room technicians, Robert Russo, walked into the room to assist Respondent. Respondent greeted Mr. Russo by making the following comments about K. N.: "Look at those tits. Wouldn't you like to get a piece of that?" Mr. Russo left the room to get a hospital gown for Respondent to put on K. N., as Respondent was required to do, in accordance with hospital policy, so as "to preserve [K. N.'s] dignity." Mr. Russo returned with a gown and gave it to Respondent, but Respondent did not put it on K. N. or otherwise use it to try to cover K. N. Respondent, though, did continue making comments about K. N.'s body. Referring to K. N.'s genitals, he remarked to Mr. Russo, "That's sweet," or words to that effect. Feeling "uncomfortable," Mr. Russo left the room. By allowing K. N. to remain completely naked and by making the remarks he did to Mr. Russo about K. N.'s body, Respondent failed to conform to the minimal acceptable standards of prevailing nursing practice. The following month, Respondent was involved in another incident in which he acted inappropriately toward an IPMC emergency room patient. This second incident occurred on March 18, 2001. The patient Respondent mistreated on this day was F. L., a 17-year-old male with a history of drug abuse. F. L. was brought to the IPMC emergency room by the City of Pompano Beach Fire/Rescue at the request of F. L.'s mother, J. L., who accompanied him to the emergency room and remained there for the duration of F. L.'s stay. J. L. had "called 911" after F. L. had come home from a night of drinking and, in her presence, had had a seizure. By the time fire/rescue arrived at their home, F. L. was conscious, and he remained conscious during the ambulance ride to IPMC. J. L. wanted F. L. to be involuntarily committed under the Baker Act. She did not think she would be able to handle his coming back home because he "was on drugs at the time" and she thought that he would "go crazy" if he did not receive treatment. F. L. was aware of his mother's desire. In the past, he had attempted to "fight" (verbally, but not physically) efforts to have him "Baker Acted." F. L. was admitted to the IPMC emergency room at 3:49 a.m. on March 18, 2001. At the time of his admittance, F. L. was conscious, "somewhat calm," and able to stand up and walk "with a wobble" and to speak coherently (although his speech was slurred). He was asked to give a urine sample for a "urine screen," and with the help of his mother, who accompanied him to bathroom "[s]o he wouldn't fall or miss the cup," he complied. F. L. soon became upset and "verbally abusive to the staff" on duty, including Respondent. Respondent decided that F. L. needed to be restrained. With the help of others, including Mr. Russo, Respondent restrained F. L. "with Velcro restraints on the wrists and the ankles." Respondent then requested that F. L. give another urine sample. F. L., in turn, "asked for a urine bottle." Respondent refused F. L.'s request. Instead, he took out a Foley catheter. A Foley catheter is a thin, flexible rubber tube that is threaded through the urethra and into the bladder. It is used to drain urine from the bladder. It should be sterile and lubricated when inserted. F. L. went "totally beserk" when he saw the catheter, letting it be known in no uncertain terms that he did not want to be catherized and again requesting that he be given a "urine bottle." Respondent responded, inappropriately, by "hit[ting] [F. L.] in the face with the catheter numerous times," while telling F. L. two or three times, "I'm going to shove this hose down your dick." This caused F. L., understandably, to become even more loud and boisterous. Respondent enlisted the assistance of three or four others, including Mr. Russo and George Austin, a Wackenhut security officer on patrol at the hospital, to place F. L. in four-point leather restraints (one for each ankle and wrist) on a stretcher in Room 6. 1/ F. L. resisted, but was eventually subdued and restrained on the stretcher. Given F. L.'s out-of-control behavior, placing him in four-point restraints was warranted. After F. L. was restrained on the stretcher, Respondent, against F. L.'s will, inserted the Foley catheter (that he had used to hit F. L. and that was therefore not sterile) in F. L. 2/ Respondent did so in a rough and negligent manner, without using lubricating jelly or any other type of lubrication. Subsequently, while F. L. was still in four-point restraints on the stretcher, he became "more upset, more verbally abusive," and "tried to sit up." Respondent responded, inappropriately, by "grabb[ing] [F. L.] by the neck," "slapp[ing] him back down onto the stretcher," and "choking [F. L.] until [F. L.] was almost blue." Respondent "let go" of F. L. only after an observer intervened. After Respondent stopped choking him, F. L. "asked for his mother." 3/ Respondent responded, again inappropriately, by telling F. L. three times, "I got your mother right here," as he "grabbed his own testicles." 4/ As could be expected, this "further upset" F. L., and he again tried to sit up. Respondent's response was, again, an inappropriate one. He "climbed up on the stretcher," "put his right knee on [F. L.'s] chest," "cover[ed] F. L.'s face" with his left hand, and with his right hand "grabbed" F. L.'s penis and scrotum and "squeeze[d] and twist[ed]." Respondent, without any justification, "squeeze[d] and twist[ed]" F. L.'s penis and scrotum "two or three times" while F. L. was in four-point restraints on the stretcher. On one of these occasions, he told F. L. (as he was "squeeze[ing] and twist[ing]") "something like," "What are you going to do now?" During his encounter with F. L. on March 18, 2001, Respondent used more force against F. L. than was reasonably necessary to properly discharge his nursing duties and to protect himself and those around him. 5/ By physically, and also verbally, abusing F. L., Respondent failed to conform to the minimal acceptable standards of prevailing nursing practice. 6/ When J. L. was finally reunited with her son, she noticed that he had red marks on his face and "bruise[s]" on his extremities. The IPMC emergency room physician who evaluated F. L. determined that there was reason to believe that F. L. was "mentally ill as defined in Section 394.455(18), Florida Statutes" (based upon an "initial diagnosis" of "acute agitation"), and that F. L. otherwise met the "criteria for involuntary examination" under the Baker Act. At approximately 2:45 p.m. on March 18, 2001, F. L. was discharged from IPMC and transferred to Florida Medical Center. Sometime after the March 18, 2001, incident involving F. L., a security officer and nurse working at IPMC expressed to Beverly Gilberti, the nurse/manger of IPMC's emergency room, their "concerns" regarding Respondent's "practice." On March 26, 2001, Ms. Gilberti contacted Gayle Adams, IPMC's human resources specialist, and told her about the security officer's and nurse's "concerns." Ms. Adams began an investigation into the matter. Ms. Gilberti telephoned Respondent and advised him that he was being suspended pending the outcome of an investigation into alleged wrongdoing on his part. Respondent was given "very little information as to what type of complaint[s]" were being investigated. On March 28, 2001, before the investigation had been completed, Respondent telephoned Ms. Adams and "verbally resigned over the phone."
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Board issue a final order in which it dismisses Count Three of the Amended Administrative Complaint, finds Respondent guilty of the violations alleged in Counts One and Two of the Amended Administrative Complaint, and, as punishment for having committed these violations, permanently revokes Respondent's license and requires him to pay a fine in the amount of $1,000.00, as well as the "costs related to the investigation and prosecution of the case." 16/ DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of November, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of November, 2002.
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the documentary evidence received and the entire record compiled herein, I hereby make the following Findings of Fact: Respondent is, and has been at all times material hereto, a licensed physician in the State of Florida, having been issued license number ME 0040343. On the morning of October 7, 198A, the Metro-Dade County Rescue Squad called the emergency room at Miami General Hospital and informed the staff that they were enroute to the hospital with a gunshot victim. Dr. Segurola, the emergency room physician, was informed of the victim's condition and immediately ordered a nurse to notify the operating room team and call a surgeon because he knew in advance that "this was going to be a serious surgical case." At approximately 7:42 a.m., the rescue squad arrived at Miami General Hospital with the victim, Samuel Kaplan. Kaplan was taken to the emergency room suffering from a gunshot wound to the abdomen inflicted by a .32 caliber bullet. When Kaplan arrived in the emergency room, his systolic blood pressure was approximately 60, he was wearing a MAST suit, he had an intravenous (IV) line going, and he was receiving oxygen. Although Kaplan was conscious and able to speak, his condition was unstable and very serious. Kaplan was initially treated by Dr. Segurola, the emergency room physician. Three nurses, a respiratory therapist and an x-ray technician were also present in the emergency room. Dr. Segurola conducted a brief physical examination of Kaplan. An entrance wound was found, but there was no exit. After the examination, a second IV line was started in the other arm and a third, central line was started in the subclavin vein. The IV lines were set at maximum or "wide open." The emergency room staff was attempting to rapidly increase Kaplan's blood volume and pressure. Kaplan's hemoglobin level was low (approximately 8 or 9), which is a sign that a patient is anemic due to loss of blood. At approximately 8:00 a.m., Respondent received a message from his telephone answering service to call Dr. Segurola at the hospital's emergency room. At approximately 8:02 a.m., the Respondent returied the telephone call and spoke with Dr. Segurola concerning the patient's condition. During the conversation, the Respondent advised Dr. Segurola to contact the operating room team and anesthesiologist to prepare for surgery. The Respondent arrived at the emergency room of Miami General Hospital in response to the call at approximately 8:12 a.m. Upon the Respondent's arrival at the emergency room, he was informed that Kaplan's blood pressure was 108/50, heart rate 106 and respiration 28. The Respondent spoke to Kaplan and Kaplan stated that he had been shot in the stomach. Respondent then proceeded to conduct a brief, but thorough, physical examination of the patient. When Respondent completed his examination, he was advised that Kaplan's blood pressure was approximately 124/50, heart rate remained at 106 and respiration remained at 28. At this point, the Respondent believed that Kaplan's condition was stabilized. Respondent advised Dr. Segurola that Kaplan should immediately be taken to the operating room for surgery. The Respondent was informed that the operating room was not quite ready and that the anesthesiologist had not arrived. While waiting for the operating room team, Respondent and Dr. Segurola reviewed x-rays of Kaplan. The emergency room nurse continued to take Kaplan's vital signs. Kaplan's blood pressure remained at 124/50. At approximately 8:20 a.m., while Respondent, Dr. Segurola and others in the emergency room were waiting for confirmation that the operating room was ready, a hospital admissions clerk walked in and informed the emergency room staff that Kaplan belonged to the Health Maintenance Organization ("HMO"). An HMO is a plan in which a patient makes pre-payment for services and is then provided medical services from a designated panel of participating physicians. The emergency room maintained two "on-call" lists, one for HMO surgeons and one for non-HMO surgeons. The Respondent was on the non-HMO list. Dr. Segurola and Respondent had a brief discussion wherein both men acknowledged that under existing hospital policy, the HMO surgeon should have been called. Thereafter, Dr. Segurola informed a nurse to telephone the on-call HMO surgeon. The HMO surgeon on call was Dr. Moises Jacobs. A secretary in the emergency room placed a call to Dr. Jacobs at approximately 8:25 a.m. Dr. Jacobs returned the phone call between 8:25 a.m. and 8:30 a.m. Dr. Jacobs spoke with Dr. Segurola. While Dr. Segurola was on the phone, Dr. Jose Selem, the anesthesiologist, arrived in the emergency room. Dr. Jacobs told Dr. Segurola to ask the Respondent to take the patient to surgery immediately and stated that he would arrive at the hospital in about 20- 30 minutes. When the Respondent was told of Dr. Jacobs' request he replied that the patient was stable and could wait for Dr. Jacobs. Dr. Selem, the anesthesiologist, also spoke with Dr. Jacobs on the telephone. Dr. Jacobs told Dr. Selem to advise Respondent that Respondent could take the patient to surgery. When Dr. Selem advised Respondent of what Dr. Jacobs has said, the Respondent replied that since Dr. Jacobs was coming to the hospital and Kaplan was an HMO patient, Respondent preferred to wait for Dr. Jacobs, the HMO surgeon. Dr. Selem then left the emergency room and went to the operating room to prepare the necessary instruments. At approximately 8:30 a.m., the Respondent advised Dr. Segurola that he was going to the hospital cafeteria for a cup of coffee and, if any changes occurred in the patient, he should be contacted. The cafeteria was located across a corridor approximately 20-25 feet from the emergency room. At the time, Kaplan was still alert and his vital signs were being constantly monitored by the nursing staff. Dr. Segurola remained in the emergency room. The operating room and all necessary personnel were ready for surgery at approximately 8:40 a.m. Sometime between 8:40 a.m. and 8:45 a.m., one of the nurses told Dr. Segurola that the Respondent's condition was deteriorating and that his blood pressure was dropping. At approximately 8:45 a.m., Kaplan's blood pressure had dropped to 80/50. Dr. Segurola told the nurse to give more blood to Kaplan (a blood transfusion had already been started). Dr. Segurola then went to the cafeteria to speak with Respondent. Dr. Segurola told Respondent that the patient's condition was deteriorating, a blood transfusion had been started, and he feared that Kaplan might die in the emergency room. The Respondent inquired as to how long it had been since Dr. Jacobs had been called and Dr. Segurola responded twenty (20) minutes. Respondent questioned whether it really had been 20 minutes. Both men looked at their watches and determined that it had been about 15 minutes since Dr. Jacobs had been called. Respondent told Dr. Segurola to call the anesthesiologist. Dr. Segurola went back to the emergency room, believing that Respondent was going to immediately follow him there. When Dr. Segurola arrived back at the emergency room, Kaplan's condition had not improved. Dr. Segurola waited about three (3) more minutes and went back to the cafeteria for the second time. Dr. Segurola again informed the Respondent about Kaplan's deteriorated condition and his fear that Kaplan was going to die in the emergency room. Respondent once more asked Dr. Segurola to call the anesthesiologist. Dr. Segurola told Respondent that the anesthesiologist was there and that "we need you there." Dr. Segurola then went back to the emergency room. The Respondent remained in the cafeteria. Shortly before 9:00 a.m., while Dr. Segurola was away from the emergency room, Dr. Lustgarten, a neurologist, had just finished his rounds and was leaving the hospital through the emergency room to the parking lot. Dr. Lustgarten looked in on Kaplan to determine if there was any neurological damage. Dr. Lustgarten examined Kaplan and concluded that there was no neurological damage and that, in his opinion, Kaplan's condition was stable with a systolic blood pressure of approximately 100. Dr. Lustgarten left the emergency room just as Dr. Jacobs arrived at approximately 9:00 a.m. Dr. Lustgarten told Dr. Jacobs that Kaplan had no neurological damage. Dr. Jacobs conducted a brief examination of Kaplan and determined that Kaplan needed to be taken to the operating room immediately for surgery. The anesthesiologist, Dr. Selem, had by then been summoned to the emergency room and assisted Dr. Jacobs in an unsuccessful attempt to intubate Kaplan prior to taking him to the operating room. Shortly after Dr. Jacobs arrived, the Respondent left the cafeteria and headed towards the emergency room. Before Respondent reached the entrance to the emergency room, he was informed by one of the nurses that Dr. Jacobs had arrived. The Respondent stood at the entrance to the emergency room for a brief period and watched as Dr. Jacobs and others attended to Kaplan. Respondent then left the building, went to his car and drove home. Meanwhile, Dr. Jacobs performed an emergency exploratory laparotomy and left thoracotomy on Kaplan. Between 9:00 am. and 9:15 a.m., after Kaplan was moved from the emergency room to the operating room, his blood pressure went from 90 down to 60, and he went into shock. There are three possible contributing factors for Kaplan's going into shock at this time: (1) moving him may have dislodged ,a blood clot which in all likelihood prevented an earlier complete "bleeding out"; (2) the blood clot may have been diluted by the IV fluid; and (3) the institution of anesthesia. During surgery it was discovered that the bullet had perforated the aorta, a major blood vessel. While still in surgery, Kaplan went into cardiac arrest and was pronounced dead at 10:25 a.m. on October 7, 1984. At the time that Respondent left the emergency room and went to the hospital cafeteria, Kaplan's vital signs were in a relatively stable condition. Kaplan's vital signs de-stabilized while Respondent was in the hospital cafeteria, and his systolic blood pressure dropped from approximately 120 to approximately 80. At all times prior to being taken to the operating room, Kaplan's vital signs were maintained with the assistance of a MAST suit. A MAST suit is an inflatable device used in the treatment of trauma patients which applies pressure to the body and assists in elevating blood pressure. When the MAST suit is removed, the patient's vital signs will deteriorate again. For this reason, many physicians consider vital signs obtained under such conditions to be false readings, and the MAST suit is usually not removed until the patient is in the operating room. Although the Respondent suspected that the bullet might have damaged the small bowels and caused some internal bleeding, the Respondent neglected to ask about the amount of fluids Kaplan had received. Kaplan had received over 4 to 5 liters of fluid prior to arriving at the hospital and received an additional 5 liters of fluid while waiting to be taken to surgery. Although this information would have been useful, it would not necessarily have indicated the extent of Kaplan's massive internal bleeding. The amount of fluids that Kaplan received prior to the Respondent leaving the emergency room was not necessarily a sign that Kaplan's condition was unstable. In the treatment of trauma cases, time is of the essence. A trauma patient with a gunshot-wound to the abdomen should be taken to surgery as soon as possible. In some cases, it may be advantageous to delay surgery in order to stabilize the patient's vital signs or to increase blood volume. Generally, if surgery is performed within the first hour after the injury is sustained (referred to as "the golden hour"), the better the chances of the patient surviving. The golden hour does not apply to injuries of the heart and major blood vessels. In those cases, the patients will "bleed out" in a time much shorter than one hour. Nevertheless, even where the golden hour has passed, the patient should be taken to surgery at the first available opportunity and without delay. While in the emergency room at Miami General Hospital, Kaplan's condition ranged from "serious" to "critical." From the time that Kaplan was initially admitted to Miami General Hospital his condition was such that he required immediate surgical intervention. A reasonably prudent physician in the Respondent's position would have performed surgery at the first available opportunity and would not have waited for the arrival of another surgeon. Although pursuant to hospital and HMO rules, the HMO surgeon should have been called first, where an emergency situation exists the first surgeon available is expected to take the patient to surgery, and that physician will be provided payment by the HMO. The Respondent was aware of the hospital's and HMO's policies regarding HMO and non-HMO patients based on prior experience. The Respondent has never previously been disciplined or investigated by Petitioner or any medical board in any jurisdiction. Respondent maintains an excellent reputation for competence and compassion among his fellow physicians. Respondent is well liked by his patients and has provided medical services in the past to patients with no medical insurance.
Findings Of Fact The parties further stipulated at the hearing that the billing for which Shands seeks payment does not include charges for services rendered during the months Linda Sue Austin was being treated as an out-patient at Shands. All other facts, as stipulated to by the parties and as set forth above, are hereby adopted.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent has been licensed as a registered nurse in Florida, having been issued license number RN-1611972, and was employed in the emergency room at Mt. Sinai Medical Center, Miami Beach, Florida, as a registered nurse. The Department is the state agency charged with the responsibility to prosecute Administrative Complaints pursuant to Chapters 120, 455 and 464, Florida Statutes, and rules adopted thereunder. On or about March 14, 1989, the Respondent began his shift at midnight and met a patient in the emergency room named J.S., who had been in the trauma section of the emergency room for a couple of hours. The patient was becoming loud and beligerent, demanding that he be moved from the emergency room and admitted to a hospital bed. Initially, the Respondent tried to calm J.S. by assuring him that a hospital room was being prepared for him, and that he would be moved from the emergency room very soon. J.S.'s aggressive behavior escalated, however, to a point where he was yelling profanity at Respondent, and threatening to get a gun and kill Respondent, as well as everyone else in the emergency room. J.S. remained in the emergency room for approximately two hours after Respondent came on duty. During this time, others who observed the patient and Respondent's interaction with the patient included Preston Dean Ross, emergency medical assistant, off-duty police officer Mark Michael Hockstadt, and Richard Whitehurst, registered nurse, all of whom testified at hearing. J.S. did not testify at hearing, nor is there any statement in the record from J.S. as to how the Respondent treated him during this two hour period. Respondent admits that while J.S. was under his care in the emergency room he referred to the patient as a "scum bag", "mother f---er", and a "piece of shit". Respondent denied that he used these terms directly at J.S., or in the emergency room where he was located, but he admits he vented his frustration about this patient by referring to him in this manner in the emergency room hallway with comments to Preston Dean Ross, officer Mark Michael Hockstadt, and Richard Whitehurst. Officer Hockstadt and Richard Whitehurst supported Respondent's testimony that these comments were not made by the Respondent directly at J.S. However, Whitehurst testified that it is not unusual for nurses to use vulgarity about patients outside of patient areas. Ross testified that Respondent did call J.S. a "scum bag" and "mother f---er" to his face, and referred to J.S. as a "piece of shit" in the hallway. Based upon the demeanor of the witnesses and the fact that there is no supporting evidence for Ross' testimony, it is found that Respondent did not use vulgarity or profanity about J.S. while in the same emergency room with J.S., or while in the presence of the patient, but that he did refer in this manner to J.S. in the hallway outside of the patient's room. J.S. immediately complained to other hospital personnel about Respondent, and specifically stated to other hospital personnel that Respondent had called him a "scum bag". It is found that Respondent's profane and vulgar comments about J.S., which Respondent had made in the emergency room hallway, were overheard by the patient. Respondent admitted he spoke with J.S. in a very firm manner. The evidence establishes that there were loud and repeated verbal encounters between J.S. and the Respondent in the emergency room. Respondent admitted he was frustrated by J.S.'s behavior in the emergency room. Due to this frustration, Respondent's comments about the patient to Ross, officer Hockstadt and Whitehurst were made in a manner which was loud enough to be overheard by J.S., and in fact, these comments were heard by the patient. While being transported from the emergency room to his hospital room, J.S. asked Respondent for his name and address. Respondent refused to tell J.S. his name due to the fact that J.S. had previously threatened to get a gun and kill him, and Respondent, therefore, did not want him to know where he lived. On or about March 21, 1989, the Respondent was dismissed by Mt. Sinai Medical Center for discourteous treatment of a patient, and the use of profanity in the presence of a patient, fellow employees or management personnel, based upon his treatment of J.S. on March 16, 1989. According to Linda Edin, the nursing manager of the emergency room at Mt. Sinai and Respondent's ultimate supervisor at the time of this incident, the Respondent's actions on March 16, 1989, relating to his care of the patient J.S. constitute unprofessional conduct.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is recommended that the Board of Nursing enter a Final Order imposing an administrative fine in the amount of $150 against Respondent, and further, placing Respondent's license on probation for a period of one year, provided that if the Respondent successfully completes a program of continuing education designated by the Board of Nursing, his probationary period shall be terminated after it has been in effect for at least six months. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of December, 1990 in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD D. CONN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of December, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER Rulings on the Department's Proposed Findings of Fact: 1-2. Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Adopted in Finding of Fact 2. Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. 5-6. Adopted in Finding of Fact 2. 7-8. Adopted in Findings of Fact 3-5, 8. Rejected in Findings of Fact 6 and 7. Rejected as not supported by competent substantial evidence. Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. 12-13. Rejected as immaterial and unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 9. Rejected as immaterial and unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 9. Rejected as not supported by competent substantial evidence. 18-19. Rejected as immaterial and irrelevant. Rulings on the Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact: Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Adopted in Finding of Fact 2. Rejected as not supported by competent substantial evidence. Adopted in Finding of Fact 2. 5-6. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 3, but otherwise Rejected as not supported by competent substantial evidence. Rejected in Findings of Fact 5-8. Rejected as immaterial and unnecessary. Adopted in Findings of Fact 5 and 7. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. Rejected as immaterial and unnecessary. 12-13. Adopted in Finding of Fact 9. 14-15. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected in Findings of Fact 5, 7, 8 and 10. Rejected as immaterial and unnnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. Rejected in Findings of Fact 5, 7, 8 and 10. COPIES FURNISHED: Tracey S. Hartman, Esquire 1940 North Monroe Street Suite 60 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Richard E. Lober, Esquire 10680 N.W. 25th Street Suite 202 Miami, FL 33172 Kenneth E. Easley, Esquire General Counsel 1940 North Monroe Street Suite 60 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Judie Ritter, Executive Director Board of Nursing 504 Daniel Building 111 East Coastline Drive Jacksonville, FL 32202
The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether Respondent’s denial of Petitioner’s Level II appeal should be upheld or whether the inpatient residential mental health services provided to R.H. by McLean Hospital’s 3 East Dialectical Behavior Therapy (“DBT”) program from September 9, 2015, through September 22, 2015, and again from October 15, 2015, through December 11, 2015, were “medically necessary” and therefore covered under the terms of the State Employees’ PPO Group Health Insurance Plan.
Findings Of Fact DSGI is the state agency responsible for administration of the state group insurance program, pursuant to section 110.123, Florida Statutes. Petitioner, A.H., is a State of Florida employee and was insured through the State Employees’ PPO Group Health Insurance Plan (the “Plan”). R.H., the child of A.H., was eligible for coverage under A.H.’s health insurance policy as of September 1, 2015. Pursuant to contract, Florida Blue acts as DSGI’s third-party medical claims administrator for employee health insurance benefits. New Directions is Florida Blue’s subcontractor and third-party administrator for mental health and substance abuse reviews and authorizations. “Utilization management” is the process of reviewing a service claim to determine whether the service is a covered benefit under the Plan and whether the service is “medically necessary” as that term is defined in the Plan. In cases involving mental health or substance abuse services, the service must also satisfy the more detailed and specific coverage guidelines, titled “Medical Necessity Criteria,” established by New Directions.1/ Consistent with general practice in the field, the “medical necessity” criteria of the New Directions document observe the following levels of care, in increasing order of intensity: psychiatric outpatient; psychiatric intensive outpatient; psychiatric partial hospitalization; psychiatric residential; and psychiatric acute residential. In the interests of conserving medical resources and preserving patient liberty, safety, and dignity, every effort is made to place patients in the least intensive level of care consistent with effective treatment of their presenting condition. R.H., a female who was 15 years old during the period relevant to this proceeding, has been diagnosed with borderline personality disorder and has a history of eating disorders. Her treating psychologist in Florida, Nicolle Arbelaez Lopez, noted that R.H. was also being treated for generalized anxiety disorder. R.H. had an inpatient admission to the Renfrew Center in Florida for eating disorder treatment in May 2015. R.H. transitioned to partial hospitalization over the summer, followed by a step down to the Renfrew Center's intensive outpatient program, then by a step up back to partial hospitalization when her eating disorder behaviors worsened. Though less intensive than a full residential admission, intensive outpatient treatment and partial hospitalization allow patients to receive comparatively intensive treatment while remaining in their home environment.2/ R.H.’s final discharge from the Renfrew Center was on August 21, 2015. At the time she was admitted to McLean Hospital’s 3 East DBT program, R.H. had a recent history of engaging in superficial cutting of her arm. On August 30, 2015, R.H. intentionally hit herself in the hand with a hammer. R.H.’s mother took her to the emergency room for treatment and told the treating personnel that R.H. had fallen down some stairs. The hammer blow caused swelling and bruising but no broken bones. R.H. was also continuing to purge and restrict her food intake. R.H.’s treating psychiatrist, Dr. Thania V. Quesdada, and her psychologist, Ms. Lopez, both urged that she be admitted to one of three nationally-recognized immersion DBT programs. Her family chose the program at McLean Hospital. DBT is a cognitive behavioral treatment that was originally developed to treat chronically suicidal individuals diagnosed with borderline personality disorder, though it is now employed for treatment of other conditions, including eating disorders. DBT teaches behavioral coping skills such as mindfulness, distress tolerance, interpersonal effectiveness, and emotional regulation. At the hearing, DSGI did not dispute the general efficacy of DBT treatment. However, DSGI did dispute whether R.H.’s presentation merited “immersion” DBT, i.e., a residential inpatient admission. McLean Hospital’s 3 East DBT program is self-pay and requires a minimum stay of 28 days. The program does not accept insurance and does not assist patients with insurance reimbursement efforts. Because of its stance on insurance, the 3 East DBT program is obviously not an in-network provider under the Plan. Prior to admission, Petitioner was aware that the 3 East DBT program did not accept insurance. R.H. was in residential treatment at McLean Hospital from September 9, 2015, through September 22, 2015. While at McLean Hospital, R.H. engaged in restricting and purging behaviors that led to medical instability. She was discharged to Cambridge Eating Disorder Center on September 23, 2015. She remained at the Cambridge Center until October 15, 2015. R.H.’s stay at the Cambridge Center was pre-certified by New Directions and is not at issue in this proceeding. On October 15, 2015, R.H. returned to McLean Hospital, again as a residential inpatient admission. She remained at McLean Hospital until her discharge on December 11, 2015. The total billed amount for R.H.’s two stays at McLean Hospital was $96,950, which was paid by the family out-of- pocket. Section 3-5 of the Plan sets forth the following under the heading “Mental Health and Substance Dependency Services”: “Physician office visits, Intensive Outpatient Treatment, Inpatient and Partial Hospitalization and Residential Treatment Services are covered based on medical necessity.” The general definition of “Medically Necessary” is set forth at section 15-4 of the Plan: [s]ervices required to identify or treat the Illness, injury, Condition, or Mental and Nervous Disorder a Doctor has diagnosed or reasonably suspects. The service must be: consistent with the symptom, diagnosis and treatment of the patient’s Condition; in accordance with standards of good medical practice; required for reasons other than convenience of the patient or the Doctor; approved by the appropriate medical body or board for the illness or injury in question; and at the most appropriate level of medical supply, service, or care that can be safely provided. The fact that a service, prescription drug, or supply is prescribed by a Doctor does not necessarily mean that the service is Medically Necessary. Florida Blue, CVS/Caremark, and DSGI determine whether a service, prescription drug, or supply is Medically Necessary. New Directions’ Medical Necessity Criteria guidelines provided the following admission criteria for psychiatric residential admissions: Must meet all of the following: A DSM diagnosis is the primary focus of active, daily treatment. There is a reasonable expectation of reduction in behaviors/symptoms with treatment at this level of care. The treatment is not primarily social, custodial, interpersonal, or respite care. The member has documented symptoms and/or behaviors that are a significant deterioration from baseline functioning and create a significant functional impairment in at least three (3) of the following areas: primary support social/interpersonal occupational/educational health/medical compliance ability to maintain safety for either self or others Must have one of the following: The member’s family members and/or support system demonstrate behaviors that are likely to undermine goals of treatment, such that treatment at a lower level of care is unlikely to be successful. This lack must be situational in nature and amenable to change as a result of the treatment process and resources identified during a residential confinement. The member has a documented history of an inability to be managed at an intensive lower level of care. There is a recent (in the last six months) history of multiple brief acute inpatient stays without a successful transition to a lower level of care, and at risk of admission to inpatient acute care. New Directions’ Medical Necessity Criteria guidelines provided the following admission criteria for eating disorder residential admissions: Must meet 1-4 and either 5, 6, or 7 A DSM diagnosis found in the Feeding and Eating Disorder section is the primary focus of active, daily treatment. There is a reasonable expectation of reduction in behaviors/symptoms with treatment at this level of care. The treatment is not primarily social, custodial, interpersonal, or respite care. The member has documented symptoms and/or behaviors that are a significant deterioration from baseline functioning and create a significant functional impairment in at least three (3) of the following areas: primary support social/interpersonal occupational/educational health/medical compliance ability to maintain safety for either self or others Must have one of the following: The member’s family members and/or support system demonstrate behaviors that are likely to undermine goals of treatment, such that treatment at a lower level of care is unlikely to be successful. This lack must be situational in nature and amenable to change as a result of the treatment process and resources identified during a residential confinement. The member has a documented history of an inability to be managed at an intensive lower level of care. There is a recent (in the last six months) history of multiple brief acute inpatient stays without a successful transition to a lower level of care, and at risk of admission to inpatient acute care. There are active biomedical complications that require 24-hour care, including, but not limited to: Adults Children/Adolescents Pulse <40 <50 Blood Pressure <90/60 <80/50 Orthostatic changes in BP Systolic: >20 point drop Systolic: > 20 point drop (Supine to standing) Diastolic: > 10 point drop Diastolic: > 10 point drop Potassium < 3 meq/l Hypokalemia Body temperature < 97 F Abnormal core temperature Electrolytes/ serum chemistry Significant deviation from normal Significant deviation from normal Must have either a. or b.: A low body weight that can reasonably lead to instability in the absence of intervention as evidenced by one of the following: Less than 85% of IBW or a BMI less than 16.5. Greater than 10% decrease in body weight within the last 30 days. In children and adolescents, greater than 10% decrease in body weight during a rapid growth cycle. Persistence or worsening of eating disorder behavior despite recent (with [sic] the last three months), appropriate therapeutic intervention in a structured eating disorder treatment setting. If PHP or IOP is contraindicated, documentation of the rationale supporting the contraindication is required. One of the following must be present: Compensatory behaviors (binging, purging, laxative abuse, excessive exercise, etc.) have caused significant physiological complications. Compensatory behaviors occur multiple times daily and have failed to respond to treatment at a lower level of care and acute physiologic imbalance can reasonably be expected. New Directions’ contact notes for this case indicate that it was called by someone named “Rachelle” on behalf of A.H.’s family on September 3, 2015. This person asked about the authorization process for McLean Hospital. No witness was presented who had direct knowledge of the contents of this conversation. The note indicates that “Rachelle” was advised that any authorization process must be initiated with New Directions by McLean Hospital. On September 9, 2015, the day R.H. was admitted to McLean Hospital, Florida Blue received what its notes reference as a “critical inquiry” message regarding this admission. A Florida Blue employee phoned the number attached to the message but discovered it was not for A.H. but for “someone at AllState Insurance who is out of the office.” (This person turned out to be Pearl Harrison, R.H.’s grandmother and qualified representative in this proceeding, who had not yet obtained a release to receive confidential medical information concerning R.H.). No number for A.H. could be found. Florida Blue contacted New Directions, which confirmed that no request for pre-authorization3/ had been received from McLean Hospital or the member. R.H.’s stays at McLean Hospital were not emergency admissions. The term “medical emergency” was not specifically defined in the 2015 Plan, but expert testimony at the hearing established that it is a term of common meaning and usage in the medical community. An emergency situation is one in which there is an immediate risk of death, serious bodily harm, or creation of an irreversible condition. If care is not administered immediately, the person will harm herself or someone else. Michael Shaw, the utilization management team leader for New Directions, explained that emergency care is not provided at the residential level of care, but in an inpatient setting under lock and key. The medical records indicated that R.H.’s last incident of self-harming behavior occurred about a week prior to her admission to McLean Hospital. Her injuries were superficial and she was in no immediate danger or risk of irreversible damage. Section 7-1 of the Plan provides for hospital admissions, including the following pertinent language as to non-emergency admissions to non-network hospitals and pre- certification for stays at non-network hospitals: Non-Network Hospital: Non-emergency Admission Every non-emergency admission to a non- network Hospital must be pre-certified. This means that before services are provided Florida Blue must certify the Hospital admission and provide the number of days for which certification is given. Precertification of non-network Hospital stays is your responsibility, even if the Doctor admitting you or your dependent to the Hospital is a Network Provider. Failure to obtain pre-certification will result in penalties (higher out-of-pocket costs). For more information on penalties, see “If You Do Not Pre-Certify Your Stay” within this section below. To pre-certify your stay in a non-network Hospital, ask your Doctor to call Florida Blue at (800) 955-5692 before your Hospital admission and provide the reason for hospitalization, the proposed treatment or surgery, testing, and the number of Hospital days anticipated. Florida Blue will review your Doctor’s request for admission certification and immediately notify your Doctor or the Hospital if your admission has been certified and the number of days for which certification has been given. If the admission is not certified, your Doctor may submit additional information for a second review. If your Hospital stay is certified and you need to stay longer than the number of days for which certification was given, your Doctor must call Florida Blue to request certification for the additional days. Your Doctor should make this call as soon as possible. * * * If You Do Not Pre-Certify Your Stay: Non- Network Hospital Benefits for covered services will be reduced by 25 percent of the covered charges, not to exceed a maximum benefit reduction of $500 IF you are admitted to a participating Hospital (Payment for Hospital Services or PHS Provider)[4/] that is not part of the Preferred Patient Care (PPC) Network and admission certification has not been requested on your behalf or the request is denied. This Plan will not pay room and board benefits for your first two days of hospitalization IF your non-network Hospital admission is denied, but you are admitted to a non-network Hospital anyway. This Plan will not pay room and board benefits for your entire Hospital stay IF you are admitted to a non-network Hospital without having your Doctor call prior to the admission. This Plan will not pay room and board benefits for the additional days that were not certified IF your non-network Hospital admission is certified but your stay is longer than the number of days for which the admission was certified. The Plan’s pre-certification requirement was not met. Neither A.H. nor McLean Hospital requested pre-certification. Mr. Shaw testified that he spoke to three different people at McLean Hospital, all of whom stated that the 3 East DBT program does not accept or work with insurance. Mr. Shaw was unable to generate the paperwork needed to begin the pre-certification process because McLean Hospital declined to share with him the necessary clinical information about R.H.5/ Although pre-certification was not obtained for R.H.’s stays at McLean Hospital, Florida Blue conducted a post-service review to determine whether the claim was eligible for reimbursement. Petitioner submitted a request for a Level I appeal pursuant to Section 12 of the Plan, under which a person denied benefits or payment of a claim for medical services may obtain a review by Florida Blue. Petitioner submitted a package of R.H.’s medical records for review. Prest & Associates, Inc., a URAC-approved independent review organization,6/ was retained to conduct an independent review of Petitioner’s claim. Dr. Barbara Center, a staff psychiatrist with Prest & Associates, performed a review designed to determine the medical necessity of R.H.’s stays at McLean Hospital. Dr. Center is board-certified in General Psychiatry, Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, and Addiction Medicine. Dr. Center reviewed the claim in terms of the New Directions criteria for psychiatric residential admissions and for eating disorder residential admissions. She performed two reviews, one for the admission starting on September 9, 2015, and another for the admission starting on October 15, 2015. Dr. Center stated that the McLean Hospital medical records provided by Petitioner gave a detailed description of R.H.’s history of present illness, past psychiatric history, and other elements of her history that were adequate for making a medical necessity determination. As to the September 9 admission, Dr. Center concluded that medical necessity criteria were not met for either a psychiatric residential or an eating disorder residential admission. As to the psychiatric residential criteria, Dr. Center concluded that R.H.’s admission failed to satisfy criteria 3, 4, and 5. Dr. Center testified that criterion 4 looks at symptoms and behaviors that represent a significant deterioration from the patient’s baseline functioning in several areas. R.H.’s primary support structures were stable. Her mother was clearly involved in her care and had the support of other family members. Dr. Center stated that the medical records showed no sign of substantial social or interpersonal deterioration, aside from some typical difficulty in starting high school. R.H. was having no medical instability at the time of admission. She was not at a dangerously low body weight. She had a recent onset of self-harming behaviors, but there was no documentation of acute risk issues that warranted placement in 24-hour care. As to criterion 5, Dr. Center testified that the records showed no indication that R.H.’s family and support system was unsupportive or unable to take her to treatment and participate in her care. There was no documentation that R.H. could not progress in a less intensive level of care. Dr. Center noted that R.H.’s prior treatment for eating disorders had been at varying levels of care and that R.H. had not had multiple brief acute inpatient stays. Criterion 3 is a diagnosis of exclusion, meaning that if there is no apparent medical necessity for the residential placement, then the reason must be “primarily social, custodial, interpersonal or respite care.” Dr. Center found in the records no support for a 24-hour residential placement. She noted that R.H.’s self-injury was of a recent onset and that McLean Hospital had ruled out any immediate prospect of self-injury or serious threat to other people. Cutting is not uncommon among adolescents and does not rise to the level of requiring residential care. Mental health providers distinguish between self-injurious behaviors and suicidal ideation, and McLean Hospital did not describe R.H. as suicidal. Dr. Center testified that, at the request of Mr. Shaw, she also reviewed R.H.’s admission in terms of the New Directions eating disorder residential criteria. Dr. Center noted that R.H. was not at a dangerous body weight (122 pounds, with a BMI of 22.2) at the time of her admission on September 9. There was no indication of medical instability or of out-of- control eating disorders requiring 24-hour care. Dr. Center testified that DBT is routinely taught on an outpatient basis and that she recommended outpatient treatment for the stay beginning on September 9. She opined that R.H. did not meet numbers 3 through 7 of the New Directions eating disorder residential criteria. As to the McLean Hospital admission beginning on October 15, 2015, Dr. Center recommended intensive outpatient treatment. Dr. Center knew that R.H. had been transitioned from McLean Hospital to the Cambridge Center to address the eating disorder as her primary symptom. Dr. Center felt that continuing R.H. in an intensive outpatient setting would help her stabilize and maintain the progress she had made at the Cambridge Center. Dr. Center stated that a basic tenet of medical care, and especially psychiatric care, is that the patient be treated in the least restrictive setting possible under the circumstances. She stated that it is always best to treat people in the environment they live in. Treatment in the 24- hour residential setting removes the patient from the stressors she will have to deal with when she goes home. Upon her readmission to the McLean Hospital from Cambridge Center, R.H. denied suicidal ideation and homicidal ideation, and the record disclosed nothing to indicate suicidal thoughts. R.H. denied auditory or visual hallucinations and her mood was described as “euthymic,” i.e., essentially normal. Dr. Center acknowledged that the medical record showed that R.H. had been in intensive outpatient treatment for her eating disorder at the Renfrew Center in Florida from July 23 through August 21, 2015, with limited success. Dr. Center stated that the issue for R.H. had recently changed from her eating disorder to her self-harming behavior and believed that an intensive outpatient program focusing on skills to deal with self-injurious behaviors would be the appropriate placement under the circumstances. Dr. Center also acknowledged that her review did not include the records of R.H.’s treating psychiatrist and therapist during her stay at Renfrew, and that their notes indicated that R.H.’s condition had regressed while in intensive outpatient care. Dr. Center testified that these records might have persuaded her to recommend a higher level of care, such as a partial hospital program, but that she still would not have recommended residential placement. After Dr. Center rendered her opinion that R.H.’s residential stays at McLean Hospital were not medically necessary, the claim was reviewed by Dr. Frank Santamaria, Florida Blue’s care management medical director. In rendering his opinion, Dr. Santamaria reviewed the medical records sent by Petitioner and McLean Hospital, the log of contact notes kept by New Directions, and Dr. Center’s report.7/ He testified that the available records were adequate to allow him to render an opinion as to medical necessity. Dr. Santamaria concluded that, as to the New Directions criteria for psychiatric residential admissions, R.H. failed to meet criteria 3, 4, and 5. He opined generally that when assessing the need for a residential stay, he is looking for someone who is at risk of self-harm or harming others or who has an acute severe psychiatric condition such as a psychotic disorder that requires confinement. Dr. Santamaria noted that R.H.’s eating disorder was not the primary concern at the time of her admissions to McLean Hospital; however, because the eating disorder was occurring at the same time as the psychiatric problem, he was also looking for medical manifestations of the eating disorder, such as severe weight loss affecting blood chemistry. Criterion 4 requires documented symptoms and/or behaviors that are a significant deterioration from baseline functioning and create a significant functional impairment in at least three of five listed areas. Under area 4a, “primary support,” Dr. Santamaria noted that R.H. had good support from her mother and grandmother. He did not believe that primary support was a problem.8/ As to area 4b, “social/interpersonal,” the notes indicated that R.H. recently had an altercation with a friend. Dr. Santamaria did not find such an altercation out of the ordinary for a 15-year-old and thus found no functional impairment under 4b. Area 4c, “occupational/educational,” appeared to pose no problem because the records indicated that R.H. was an A-B student, despite her rocky first week of high school. As to area 4d, “health/medical compliance,” Dr. Santamaria noted that R.H. had been compliant with medical instructions and her family had been good about seeking care for her. As to area 4e, “ability to maintain safety for either self or others,” Dr. Santamaria acknowledged that R.H. had hit her hand with a hammer and acted in other self-injurious ways, chiefly superficial cutting. He testified that such behaviors are not uncommon in younger populations and do not necessarily make the person a candidate for residential care. Self-injury alone does not satisfy the criterion, unless there is a concern for suicide or homicide. The hammer incident occurred in August, at least one week before R.H.’s admission to McLean Hospital. The McLean Hospital admission note of September 9, 2015, indicates no reported history of suicidal thinking. Dr. Santamaria found no documentation to indicate R.H. was aggressive against herself or others. She had no acute conditions such as psychotic disorders. Dr. Santamaria noted that even if area 4e were deemed to have been met, criterion 4 requires significant functional impairment and degradation from baseline functioning in at least three of the listed areas, and that R.H. at most satisfied one area of the criterion. Criterion 5 of the New Directions psychiatric residential criteria requires that one of three conditions relating to the patient’s support system or treatment history be met. Dr. Santamaria concluded that none of the three conditions were met. Condition 5c requires a recent history of multiple brief acute inpatient stays without a successful transition to a lower level of care. Dr. Santamaria conceded that the record he examined disclosed little information about prior therapies that had been tried with R.H., but he concluded that the record was sufficient to confirm that R.H. did not have multiple brief inpatient stays. He was reasonably confident that McLean Hospital would have documented such stays had they occurred because they would be a very significant part of her history. Dr. Santamaria also noted that R.H. had been able to transition to an intensive outpatient program from her inpatient admission to the Renfrew Center in May 2015. Condition 5a requires that family members or the patient’s support system demonstrate behaviors that are likely to undermine the goals of treatment, such that treatment at a lower level of care is unlikely to be successful. The record disclosed that R.H.’s mother, who was her custodial guardian, had a history of substance abuse but had gone through a rehabilitation program, attended Narcotics Anonymous regularly, and had been sober for one year at the time of R.H.’s October 15, 2015, admission to McLean Hospital. Dr. Santamaria testified that if R.H.’s mother were currently using drugs and R.H. had nowhere else to go, then condition 5a might be met. However, the actual situation presented by the medical record did not establish that R.H. was living in an unsafe environment that could undermine her treatment. As to condition 5b, a documented history of an inability to be managed at an intensive lower level of care, Dr. Santamaria concluded that R.H. had responded to various therapies in the past. As noted above, criterion 3 of the New Directions psychiatric residential criteria is exclusionary, i.e., if the placement appears not to be medically necessary, then one begins to seek another motivation, such as the desire for a change of pace or a respite for the family. Dr. Santamaria noted that DBT does not require placement at the residential level. It can be done at an intensive outpatient or partial hospitalization level, both of which are lower levels of care than residential.9/ This fact made Dr. Santamaria suspect that the prime motive for R.H.’s placement may have been custodial. Dr. Santamaria testified that he also analyzed R.H.’s admission under the New Directions eating disorder residential criteria. He stated that he could not be certain from the record whether McLean Hospital was treating R.H.’s eating disorder, as well as providing DBT, but he knew that McLean Hospital was mindful of the eating disorder. He also knew that R.H.’s transfer to the Cambridge Center was partly because her eating disorder was becoming worse. Dr. Santamaria concluded that R.H. did not satisfy criteria 3 through 7 for an eating disorder residential admission. Dr. Santamaria testified that R.H. did not meet eating disorder residential criteria 3 through 5 for the same reasons she did not meet the identical criteria 3 through 5 of the psychiatric residential criteria. Criterion 6 concerns biomedical complications of an eating disorder. Dr. Santamaria reviewed the medical records and concluded that R.H. presented none of the complications that would require 24-hour care at the time of her admission on September 9, 2015. Dr. Santamaria likewise found that R.H. satisfied neither factor 7a nor 7b of Criterion 7. As to 7a, R.H. did not present with a low body weight and there was no documentation that she had lost 10 percent of her body weight in the last 30 days. As to 7b, there was no evidence that R.H.’s “compensatory behaviors,” i.e., binging and purging, had caused “significant physiological complications” or that such behaviors occurred multiple times daily and did not respond to treatment “at an intensive lower level of care.” Dr. Santamaria testified that his analysis as to the October 15, 2015, admission was identical to that for the September 9, 2015, admission. As to both admissions, he believed that intensive outpatient was the appropriate level of care. Dr. Santamaria defined “intensive outpatient” as three hours of intensive therapy for at least three days per week. He believed that this level of care could address all of R.H.’s issues, including her self-injurious behavior. Dr. Santamaria concluded that if R.H. tried the intensive outpatient level of care and failed, then a higher level could be considered. Like Dr. Center, he stated that he might have recommended a partial hospitalization setting had he known that intensive outpatient had been tried and failed, but he still would not have recommended a 24-hour residential admission. Petitioner’s presentation implied that Florida Blue and/or Prest & Associates base their coverage decisions on financial considerations rather than strictly on the merits of the claims. Dr. Center and Dr. Santamaria both testified that they had no incentive, financial or otherwise, to deny a claim for reimbursement. Their testimony on this point is credible. Petitioner offered no direct evidence that Florida Blue or Prest & Associates directly pressure their physician employees to reject meritorious claims, and there is no evidence that Dr. Santamaria or Dr. Center based their recommendations on anything other than their assessment of R.H.’s medical records in light of the relevant medical necessity criteria. Petitioner raised questions about the completeness of the records examined by Dr. Santamaria and Dr. Center and sounded a skeptical note as to the diligence of the physicians’ efforts to obtain additional documentation. As found above, both Dr. Santamaria and Dr. Center testified that they had adequate documentation to render an opinion as to medical necessity in this case. Both physicians stated that in other cases they have taken additional steps to obtain missing information, including making peer-to-peer calls to the treating physicians or reaching out to the case managers, but that no such steps were necessary in this case. Both physicians conceded that not all of the medical records were available to them at the time of their reviews. They did not have records from R.H.’s stays at the Renfrew Center and the Cambridge Center or the notes of R.H.’s treating physicians in Florida. Both Dr. Center and Dr. Santamaria credibly testified that nothing in these additional records would have changed their opinion as to the medical necessity of residential treatment for R.H. Section 12 of the Plan, which sets forth the appeal process for a denied claim, expressly states: “Your appeal may include any additional documentation, information, evidence or testimony that you would like reviewed and considered during the appeal process.” This language is included in the explanations for both the Level I and Level II appeals. Nothing prevents the member from providing any documentation whatsoever during the appeal process. Dr. Center and Dr. Santamaria are physician reviewers, not medical investigators. If something Petitioner asserted to be relevant to the decision was missing from the files, it was not the fault of the reviewing physicians. It is ultimately the member’s responsibility to provide appropriate documentation for review. By letter dated April 5, 2016, Florida Blue notified Petitioner that it “remains unable to approve additional coverage and/or payment for the Residential Treatment.” The letter set forth the following rationale for the denial: Per the State Employees’ PPO Plan Booklet and Benefits Document page 5-5: “Services or supplies that are not Medically Necessary, as determined by Florida Blue and/or CVS Caremark clinical staff and Division of State Group Insurance, are non- covered.” Specifically, coverage for the Mental Health (Eating Disorder) Residential stays is denied as it does not meet the definition of medical necessity. This is for hospital stay on and after 09/09/2015 and 10/15/2015. The final decision to proceed with the requested services is between the provider and the member. Records show that the member was not deemed to be a present risk to self or to others. Though the member had a preoccupation with weight sand [sic] eating, there was no evidence of inability to adequately care for self with functioning in multiple sphere areas, including stabilization of the eating disorder issues. There was no report of medical instability or psychosis. The member was in a body weight range. The member was described as having her eating disorder symptoms under control. From the clinical evidence, this member could have been safely treated at each occasion at a lesser level of care such as in an eating disorder intensive outpatient setting. This review was done using New Directions Clinical Care criteria and is based on the opinion of a board certified psychiatrist. Services that are not medically necessary are not covered under your health benefit plan. The denial letter provided Petitioner with information regarding the Level II appeal process to DSGI, including a reference to the pertinent section of the Plan. The denial letter reiterated that Petitioner could submit any information or documentation that Petitioner believed could assist in DSGI’s review of the appeal. Petitioner submitted a request for a Level II appeal to DSGI on May 23, 2016. The Level II appeal was reviewed by DSGI’s legal nurse coordinator, Kathy Flippo. Ms. Flippo reviewed all of the documents reviewed by Dr. Center and Dr. Santamaria, plus additional records submitted by Petitioner with the Level II appeal request. Ms. Flippo determined that the stays at issue were non-emergency admissions that required pre-certification and that the pre-certification requirements of the Plan were not met. Ms. Flippo reached the same conclusions as Dr. Center and Dr. Santamaria regarding the New Directions psychiatric residential criteria. Ms. Flippo concluded that R.H. did not meet criteria 3, 4, or 5. Ms. Flippo testified that she did not review the case pursuant to the New Directions eating disorder residential criteria because Petitioner’s Level II appeal addressed only the psychiatric issues and because R.H.’s eating disorder stay at the Cambridge Center was covered by Florida Blue. By letter dated July 29, 2016, signed by Tami Fillyaw, director of DSGI, Petitioner was informed that the Level II appeal had been denied. The letter informed Petitioner of his rights under the Plan to file a petition for a formal or an informal hearing contesting the denial of the appeal and/or to request a binding external review from an Independent Review Organization (“IRO”).10/ Petitioner requested both an administrative hearing and an external review.11/ The external review was conducted under the auspices of the Medical Review Institute of America, Inc. (“MRIoA”), a URAC-accredited external review network. The MRIoA assigned a physician whom it stated is board-certified by the American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology in the specialties of General Psychiatry and Child & Adolescent Psychiatry.12/ The external review upheld the adverse determinations regarding coverage for the McLean Hospital stays. In its decision letter dated November 11, 2016, the MRIoA provided the following relevant clinical summary and findings: At the time in question, the patient was a 15 year old female with a variety of difficulties related to depression, anxiety, eating disorder symptoms, and symptoms of obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD) with self-harming behaviors. This review has to do with a question of whether residential treatment center (RTC) level of care (LOC) for two episodes of service 9/9/15-9/22/15 and 10/15/15-12/11/15 met the plan criteria for medical necessity. It is noted that the patient was treated in a special eating disorders program on the dates between these two episodes. * * * The patient’s presentation did not meet the plan criteria for medical necessity for the dates in question. Specifically, the patient did not meet criteria #5 of the Admission Criteria. The patient is noted to have a caring and effective support system that would have supported a less intensive level of care. There was no recent history of inability to be effectively treated at an intensive level of service below residential treatment center (RTC) level of care (LOC), and there was no recent history of inability to transition from inpatient treatment into a less intensive level of care. At the time of admission to residential treatment, it is clear that the patient struggled with mood dysregulation along with episodes of food restriction and self- harming behaviors. She was not responding to attempts at outpatient treatment. The residential program in question was sought out specifically due to its approach to the utilization of DBT (dialectical behavior therapy). However, there is no indication that the patient could not have responded to attempts to escalate her treatment in the outpatient setting through the use of either intensive outpatient or partial hospitalization services. In particular, the patient could have been involved in a formal DBT program without utilization of residential treatment. Her symptom severity for the dates in question was not of a severity to require the use of round the clock observation and treatment. As a result, there was no medical necessity for residential treatment center (RTC) level of care (LOC). * * * The appeal letters from the patient’s family, outpatient providers, and residential facility discuss the need for residential treatment due to the patient’s symptoms severity, particularly the patient’s episodes of self-harming behavior and the need for her to participate in the immersive DBT program utilized at the residential program in question. The patient’s need for more intensive treatment is acknowledged. However, the patient’s recent treatment history was one of outpatient treatment with a previous history of residential treatment for eating disorder symptoms. For the DOS in question, the patient could have obtained appropriate and effective DBT in a less restrictive setting, such as either a partial hospitalization program (PHP) or an intensive outpatient program (IOP). Based on the above, the previous determination has been upheld. At the hearing, Petitioner complained that, prior to receiving the letter denying the Level II appeal, he had no inkling that medical necessity determinations were based on criteria produced by New Directions. The Plan’s definition of “medically necessary” does not reference the fact that Florida Blue relies on the New Directions criteria for medical necessity determinations in psychiatric and eating disorder admissions. Petitioner basically argues that not having the precise language of the New Directions medical necessity criteria deprived him and the medical providers of the ability to frame the coverage requests in such a way as to satisfy the criteria. The record evidence shows Florida Blue does not make the New Directions medical necessity criteria directly available to its members. In fact, New Directions is nowhere mentioned in the Plan. Witnesses for DSGI correctly stated that anyone can download the criteria from the New Directions website, but Petitioner pointed out that one must be aware the criteria exist before one can download them. If this case is typical, it appears that a Florida Blue member must be denied coverage and go through the appeal process before Florida Blue makes him aware of precisely how the determination of medical necessity is made. Dr. Santamaria testified that Florida Blue does not expect its members to have any knowledge of the New Directions criteria or to “understand all the medical jargon.” The member is expected to present Florida Blue with the best and most accurate medical information available (preferably before the services are rendered) and rely on Florida Blue to make the decision. Dr. Santamaria stated, “Your role is not to do the utilization management. That’s my role. Your role is, if you disagree with a coverage determination, to appeal it and to even have your doctor speak on your behalf or write a letter or do whatever. It’s not your role to access the documents and to use them on your own. That--that’s not what they were created for.” Dr. Santamaria emphasized that the member’s “role” is not to “meet criteria” but to provide Florida Blue with information sufficient to allow its experts to apply the criteria. While his phrasing may be condescending, Dr. Santamaria’s statement is basically accurate: the medical records determine whether the criteria have been met. Petitioner’s awareness of the particulars of the criteria would not change the substance of the medical record. The undersigned tends to agree with Petitioner that Florida Blue’s process could be more transparent. However, Petitioner failed to show how the outcome would have been different if the New Directions medical necessity criteria had been available to him or McLean Hospital. Every expert who examined the medical records agreed that R.H. did not meet the criteria for medical necessity. Their opinions are credited. Ms. Flippo emphasized that Florida Blue did not deny coverage merely because McLean Hospital’s 3 East DBT program was self-pay. If the member had been able to obtain pre- certification for hospitalization and a proper bill had been presented to Florida Blue, it would have been covered at the allowable non-network coverage amount. Ms. Flippo also stated that even if pre-certification had been obtained, Florida Blue would certainly not have covered the 70 days that R.H. spent in McLean Hospital. Ms. Flippo had never seen more than 15 days at a time approved, even for members who were floridly psychotic and admitted under the Baker Act. With modern treatments and medications, it is seldom necessary to keep patients at a residential level of care for months at a time. All of the experts agreed that DBT is more commonly provided on an outpatient basis. Additionally, Mr. Shaw pointed out that the ability of the insurer to pay the non-contracted, non-network rate to the hospital is contingent on the hospital’s willingness to accept insurance payments. McLean Hospital’s 3 East DBT program did not accept insurance. Mr. Shaw succinctly stated, “We’re not obligated to pay you back because you made the choice to go to a facility that takes your money but not ours.”
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services, Division of State Group Insurance, issue a final order denying Petitioner’s claim for coverage under the State Employees’ PPO Plan for R.H.’s residential treatment at McLean Hospital from September 9, 2015, to September 30, 2015, and October 15, 2015, to December 11, 2015. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of May, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of May, 2017.
