The Issue Did Respondent plead nolo contendere to aggravated stalking, a felony, in violation of Section 784.048(4), Florida Statutes, so as to be subject to discipline by the Department of Insurance pursuant to Sections 648.45(1); 648.45(2)(a), (e), (j), (k); 648.45(3)(a), (c), and/or (e), and if so, what penalties may be imposed, pursuant to Sections 648.45, 648.46, 648.49, 648.50, , and/or 648.53, Florida Statutes?
Findings Of Fact At all times material, Respondent was licensed in the State of Florida by Petitioner Agency as a limited surety agent, License No. 265986204. At the time of formal hearing, Respondent's license was suspended, pursuant to a Second Amended Emergency Order of Suspension entered by the Agency on March 11, 1997. Certified Court documents reveal that on February 10, 1997, Lesley Charles Corbin entered a negotiated plea of nolo contendere to the charge of "aggravated stalking," in the Circuit Court of the Fourth Circuit, in and for Duval County, Florida, in Case No. 96-9760-CF. The particulars of the charge pled to allege that Respondent "did knowingly, willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follow or harass . . . [name] . . . after an injunction for protection against repeat violence pursuant to Section 784.046, to-wit: 92-1772-DV, contrary to the provisions of Section 784.048(4), Florida Statutes." The Court documents also reveal repetitive previous similar or related criminal charges against Respondent. Section 784.048(4), Florida Statutes, constitutes a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in Sections 775.082, 775.083, or 775.084, Florida Statutes, (Supp. 1996). Under the plea bargain, Count I, alleging aggravated assault pursuant to Section 784.021, Florida Statutes, was dropped, and adjudication was withheld on Respondent's nolo contendere plea to Count II. Respondent was required to enter into nine months of community control followed by one year probation with special conditions to protect the person he had stalked. Section 775.082(3)(d), Florida Statutes, provides that third degree felonies may be punished by up to 5 years' imprisonment. Section 775.083(1)(c) provides for third degree felonies to be punished by up to a $5,000 fine. Section 775.084(1)(c)1.b. applies to habitual felony offenders/stalkers and is not relevant here. The foregoing establishes prima facie facts in evidence, which facts Respondent did not overcome. Ms. Sarah Burt is the Bail Bond Coordinator for Petitioner Department of Insurance. In that capacity, she is responsible for administrative coordination of all bail bond related matters for the Agency. She is knowledgeable of the practices and procedures of the Agency regarding bail bondsmen and limited surety agency licensure and discipline, pursuant to Chapter 648, Florida Statutes. Based on her education, training, experience, and actual knowledge, Ms. Burt related that a plea of nolo contendere to a felony charge has always resulted in the Agency denying a licensure application or revoking of an existing license. To the best of Ms. Burt's knowledge and belief, this has been the Agency's consistent procedure in all similar circumstances. She did not know of any licensee who had retained his or her licenses after the Agency became aware the licensee had pled nolo contendere to a felony.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Insurance enter a Final Order finding Respondent guilty of violating Sections 648.45(2)(a) and (k), and 648.45(3)(a), Florida Statutes, and revoking his license. RECOMMENDED this 31st day of December, 1997, at Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of December, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Bill Nelson State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Daniel Y. Sumner, Esquire Department of Insurance The Capitol, Lower Level 26 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Dick E. Kesler, Esquire Department of Insurance 612 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399 R. Cash Barlow, Esquire Post Office Box 492 Jacksonville, Florida 32201
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent violated Subsections 648.44(8)(a), 648.44(8)(b), 648.45(2), 648.45(2)(e), 648.45(2)(j), 648.45(2)(k), 648.45(3), 648.45(3)(c), 648.45(3)(e), 648.30(1), 648.30(2), 648.30(3), and 648.30(4), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Pursuant to Chapter 648, the Department has jurisdiction over bail bond licensure, appointments, and related activities. Respondent, Pamela Jean Coleman, appeared before the undersigned in this proceeding, identified herself as Pamela Jean Coleman, and admitted that she is the Respondent in this matter and that the Department has jurisdiction over her and the subject matter involved in the Notice of Intent. At all times relevant to the dates and occurrences referred to in the Notice of Intent, Respondent was also known as Deborah Lee Diehl, Pamela Jean Jones, Pamela Jones, Pamela Coleman, Pam Jones, and Pamela J. Coleman. At all times relevant to the dates and occurrences referred to in the Notice of Intent, Respondent was not licensed as a bail bond agent in the State of Florida. On March 28, 1975, in Case Number 75-239CF, in the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit in and for Palm Beach County, Florida (Criminal Division), Respondent pled guilty and was adjudged guilty of buying or receiving or aiding in concealment of stolen property, a felony (a crime of moral turpitude). On October 22, 1975, in Case Number 75-2390CF, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit in and for Palm Beach County, Florida (Criminal Division), Respondent, a/k/a Deborah Lee Diehl, pled guilty and was adjudged guilty of the felony of violation of drug abuse law. Records of the State of Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) show that the conviction set forth in paragraph 6 above included convictions on March 28, 1975, and July 17, 1975, for parole violation. At the final hearing counsel for Respondent stated: Mr. Franklin: . . . I don't think there is any dispute as to those underlying facts about what happened in 1975 -- Ms. Coleman: Correct. Mr. Franklin: -- and what happened subsequent. And the subsequent event was that Ms. Coleman was -- received the grace of executive clemency. She did receive a limited restoration of civil rights that granted to her the restoration of all of her civil rights with the exception of a specific statutory authority to own or possess a firearm, at least as to all of the '75 convictions. . . . By Executive Order Number 80-C-0 filed with the Florida Secretary of State on March 7, 1980, Respondent was granted restoration of civil rights, except to specific authority for possession or owning a firearm, for any and all felony convictions in the State of Florida and/or restoration of civil rights in the State of Florida for any and all felony convictions in any state other than Florida, or in any United States court or military court for which this person has been duly discharged from imprisonment and/or parole, adult community control or probation, and for which this person has not been heretofore granted clemency. This grant of clemency included, but was not limited to, Case Nos. 75-239CF and 75-2390CF, in the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit in and for Palm Beach, Florida. On April 16, 1991, in Case Number CF91-1923AI-XX, Tenth Judicial Circuit in and for Polk County, Florida, Respondent, a/k/a Pamela Jean Jones, was charged with grand thief. On or about November 25, 1991, Respondent pled nolo contendere to the reduced charge of petit theft and was found guilty and convicted of petit theft.1 Petit theft is a first-degree misdemeanor, which constitutes a crime of moral turpitude. Record of the Delaware Secretary of State, dated May 5, 1997, confirmed that the Clarence Luther Cephas, Ltd., Inc. (Cephas Bail Bond Agency) was duly incorporated under the laws of the State of Delaware, was in good standing, and had a legal corporate existence as of May 5, 1997. Record of the Florida Secretary of State, Application for Reinstatement, confirmed that the Cephas Bail Bond Agency applied as a corporation qualified to do bail bond business in Florida and was reinstated to do bail bond business as of January 19, 1999. The Cephas Bail Bond Agency's application listed Pamela J. Coleman, 2353 Mammoth Grove Road, Lake Wales, Florida, as its president, secretary, director, and registered agent. The application dated October 26, 2000, bore the signature of Respondent and listed her telephone number as (863) 533-0405. Two Uniform Business Reports (UBR) of the Cephas Bail Bond Agency were filed with the Florida Secretary of State on August 6, 2001, and March 29, 2002. Both reports bore the signature of Respondent as President of the Cephas Bail Bond Agency. Testimony of Petitioner's witnesses conclusively established, without dispute, that Respondent participated in the bail bond business of the Cephas Bail Bond Agency during the approximate period of March 1997 to November 27, 2002. During that span of time, Respondent did on various occasions act and represent herself to the public as one having power to act in several capacities and positions with the Cephas Bail Bond Agency. Her activities included acting as a registered agent, a director, a bail bond agent, a temporary bail bond agent, a runner, a bail enforcement agent, and a bounty hunter. Clarence Luther Cephas, Sr., under oath on November 27, 2002, gave the following statement: I have known Pamela Coleman/Jones for approximately four years and she has been affiliated with me for most of the time that I have been in the bail bond business. I had asked her if she had ever been convicted of a felony and she said that she had been convicted as a teenager. She has a Certificate of Restoration of Civil Rights from the Office of Executive Clemency that is dated March 7, 1980. I was under the impression that if her rights had been restored, that it would not be a problem with her working for me. I named Pamela as an officer in my corporation because I did not have any family that I could list as an officer except for my daughter, who is a deputy sheriff and could not be an officer of the corporation. Records of the Circuit Court of the Tenth Judicial Circuit in and for Polk County, Florida, show that on or about December 16, 2002, an Amended Information was filed in Case No. CF02-00597A-XX, State of Florida vs. Pamela Jean Coleman, W/F, 09/17/1958, XXX-XX-9751, charging that between November 27, 2000, and January 25, 2002, in Polk County, Florida, Respondent, having been convicted of or pled guilty or no contest to a felony or a crime involving moral turpitude or a crime punishable by imprisonment of one year or more under the law of any state, territory, or county, regardless of whether adjudication of guilt was withheld, did participate as a director, officer, manager, or employee of a bail bond agency or office thereof, or exercise direct or indirect control in any manner in such agency or office, or own shares in a closely held corporation which had an interest in a bail bond business, contrary to Section 684.44. The testimonial and documentary evidence clearly and convincingly, during the period of November 2000 through December 2001, identified Respondent as the person who, on various occasions, did act in several capacities and positions as a bail bond agent and performed functions, duties, or powers prescribed for licensed bail bond agents. Undisputed evidence identified Respondent as the person who, early in 2001, presented herself to another and engaged in conduction and solicitation of bail bond business in the office of the Cephas Bail Bond Agency. Undisputed evidence identified Respondent as the person who, on June 19, 2001, presented herself and identified herself as Pamela Jean Coleman, Vice-President of Clarence Cephas Bail Bonds, to Noel Collier who was working in her husband's law office as a paralegal. Respondent presented to Ms. Collier bond release paperwork from the Cephas Bail Bond Agency and requested that a mutual client facing criminal charges sign the paperwork. Undisputed evidence demonstrated that on or about September 2001, Respondent held herself out as the person with whom to conduct bail bond business with Constance Castro in or about the home of Clarence Luther Cephas, Sr., that served also as the Cephas Bail Bond Agency office. The records of Circuit Court of the Tenth Judicial Circuit in and for Polk County, Florida, show that on or about January 31, 2003, in criminal Case No. CF02-00597A-XX, Respondent (a/k/a Deborah Lee Diehl, a/k/a Pamela Jean Jones, a/k/a Pamela Jones, a/k/a Pamela Coleman, a/k/a Pam Jones, and a/k/a Pamela J. Coleman) was tried, found guilty, and adjudicated guilty of a violation of Subsection 648.44(8), acting as a bail bondsman while being a convicted felon, a felony of the third degree, as charged in the aforesaid Amended Information. Respondent was sentenced by the court to 60 days in county jail (to be served on weekends) and placed on probation for a period of five years. The conditions of Respondent's probation required her to: (1) Pay restitution in the amount of $457.99 to the Department of Insurance within two years; (2) pay court costs of $400.00 within two years; and (3) not to be employed as a bail bondsman or to have any contact with her husband's (Clarence Luther Cephas, Sr.) business. Counsel for Respondent represented on this record that: (1) he was counsel of record in Case No. CF02-00597A-XX and that Respondent, in this proceeding, was the person charged, tried, convicted, and adjudicated guilty; and (2) he has filed a timely appeal of the conviction and sentence on behalf of Respondent in Case No. CF02-00597A-XX, in the Second District Court of Appeal.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order as follows: Finding that Respondent, Pamela Jean Coleman, is disqualified from participation in bail bond-related activities by a prior conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; and that Respondent is guilty of participating in the bail bond business, in violation of Subsections 648.30(1) through (3); 648.44(8)(a); 648.45(2)(e), (j), and (k); and 648.45(3)(a), (c), and (e). Enter a Cease and Desist Order pursuant to Section 626.9581 and the Florida Insurance Code, directing Respondent, Pamela Jean Coleman, to immediately cease and desist any and all bail bond-related activities in the State of Florida. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of October, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S FRED L. BUCKINE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of October, 2003.
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint issued against him in the instant case and, if so, what disciplinary action should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Respondent Respondent is now, and has been for the past seven years, a Florida-licensed bail bond agent (license number A134458). He is the owner of Big Larry's Bail Bonds (Agency), a bail bond agency located in Broward County, Florida, with which two other Florida-licensed bail bond agents, James Jones (who is Respondent's brother) and Ron Striggles, are affiliated. Count I On April 23, 2002, Hugh Clarke went to the Agency, where he obtained from Respondent a $4,500.00 bail bond for a friend, Richard Dyke, who had been arrested in Palm Beach County, Florida, on a theft charge. To obtain the bail bond, Mr. Clarke had to pay a bail bond premium fee of $450.00 and provide collateral in the amount of $1,050.00. Payment was made by a single check (check number 611) for $1,500.00 made out to the Agency. Mr. Clarke also signed a promissory note, which read as follows: On Demand Hugh McGrath Clarke after date, for value received, I Promise to pay to the order of CONTINENTAL HERITAGE INSURANCE COMPANY Four Thousand Five Hundred DOLLARS, at Big Larry's Bail Bonds, 1310 Sistrunk Blvd., Ft. Laud., Florida[,] [w]ith interest thereon at the rate of 20 percent, per annum[,] from Call Date until fully paid. Interest payable semi-annually. The maker and endorser of this note agrees to waive demand, notice of non payment and protest; and in case suit shall be brought for the collection hereof, or the same has to be collected upon demand of an attorney, to pay reasonable attorney's fees and assessable cost, for making such collection. Deferred interest payment to bear interest from maturity at 20 percent, per annum, payable semi-annually. It is further agreed and specifically understood that this note shall become null and void in the event the said defendant Richard Dyke shall appear in the proper court at the time or times so directed by the Judge or Judges of competent jurisdiction until the obligations under the appearance bond or bonds posted on behalf of the defendant have been fulfilled and the surety discharged of all liability thereunder, otherwise to remain in full force and effect. Respondent provided Mr. Clarke a signed Receipt and Statement of Charges, acknowledging that he had received from Mr. Clarke payment in full for the $450.00 bail bond premium fee. Respondent also presented Mr. Clarke with a pre-printed form entitled "Collateral Receipt and Informational Notice" (Collateral Receipt) that Respondent had filled out and signed (on the appropriate signature line), acknowledging that, on behalf of the surety, Continental Heritage Insurance Company, he had received from Mr. Clarke $1,050.00 as collateral to secure the bail bond that Mr. Clarke had obtained for Mr. Dyke. The Collateral Receipt contained the following "note," "informational notice," and "indemnitor information": NOTE: Unless a properly drawn, executed, and notarized legal assignment is accepted and acknowledged by the surety agent and the surety company named above, the collateral listed above will be returned only to the person(s) named on line (1) above [Mr. Clarke]. Collateral, except for those documents the surety must retain as directed by the law, will be returned within 21 days after the bail bond(s) has been discharged in writing by the court. The undersigned hereby acknowledges receipt of a copy of all collateral documents indicated above, and the Informational Notice printed below. * * * INFORMATIONAL NOTICE CONDITIONS OF BOND: The SURETY, as bail, shall have control and jurisdiction over the principal during the term for which the bond is executed and shall have the right to apprehend, arrest, and surrender the principal to the proper officials at any time as provided by law. In the event surrender of principal is made prior to the time set for principal's appearance, and for reason other than as enumerated below in paragraph 3, then principal shall be entitled to a refund of the bond premium. It is understood and agreed that the happening of any one of the following events shall constitute a breach of principal's obligations to the SURETY hereunder, and the SURETY shall have the right to forthwith apprehend, arrest and surrender principal and principal shall have no right of any refund whatsoever. Said events which shall constitute a breach of principal's obligations hereunder are: If principal shall depart the jurisdiction of the court without the written consent of the court and the SURETY or its Agent. If principal shall move from one address to another without notifying SURETY or his agent in writing prior to said move. If principal shall commit any act which shall constitute reasonable evidence of principal's intention to cause a forfeiture of said bond. If principal is arrested and incarcerated for any other offense other than a minor traffic violation. If principal shall make any material false statement in the application. * * * INDEMNITOR INFORMATION In addition to the terms and conditions of any Indemnity Agreement or other collateral documents which you have executed, this is to notify you that: The Indemnitor(s) will have the defendant(s) forthcoming before the court named in the bond, at the time therein fixed, and as may be further ordered by the court. The Indemnitor(s) is responsible [for] any and all losses or costs of any kind whatsoever which the surety may incur as a result of this undertaking. There should not be any costs or losses provided the defendant(s) does not violate the conditions of the bond and appears at all required court hearings. Collateral will be returned to the person(s) named in the collateral receipt, or their legal assigns, within 21 days after the surety has received written notice of discharge of the bond(s) from the court. It may take several weeks after the case(s) is disposed of before the court discharges the surety bonds. Respondent read to Mr. Clarke that portion of the Collateral Receipt that explained that the collateral would be returned "within 21 days after the surety ha[d] received written notice of discharge of the bond(s) from the court." Nonetheless, for some reason, Mr. Clarke was under the impression that he would be receiving his collateral back within 30 days of April 23, 2002, the date of the transaction, even in the absence of a discharge. In late May 2002, sometime after the 23rd of the month, Mr. Clarke began telephoning the Agency to inquire about the return of his collateral. On each occasion he called, he asked to speak with Respondent, but was told by the person who answered the phone that Respondent was not available. He left messages, but Respondent never returned his calls.2 Mr. Clarke telephoned the Agency approximately twice a month until November 2002, when, frustrated by his inability to reach Respondent by telephone,3 he sent, by facsimile transmission, a letter to the Department of Insurance requesting that it help him in his efforts to gain the return of his collateral. Although Mr. Clarke had been advised in September 2002 by Mr. Dyke that Mr. Dyke's criminal case "was over," Mr. Clarke never got to directly communicate this information to Respondent and to personally ask Respondent to give him back his collateral. Any information Mr. Clarke may have provided about the status of Mr. Dyke's criminal case and any demands Mr. Clarke may have made for the return of his collateral were provided and made to a person or persons at the Agency other than Respondent, who did not communicate them to Respondent. Pat Anthony, a Special Investigator with the Department of Insurance,4 was assigned the task of looking into the allegations Mr. Clarke had made in his letter. Ms. Anthony met with Mr. Clarke on December 6, 2002, and took his statement. The statement was reduced to writing (by Ms. Anthony, who wrote down what she understood Mr. Clarke to have said), and it then was "subscribed and sworn to" by Mr. Clarke. Mr. Clarke's statement read as follows: On 4/23/02, I went to Larry Jones' office to put up bail for Richard Dyke. I gave him a $450 check and a $1,050 check.[5] Richard told me the case was over with in 9/02.[6] I started calling Larry about a week later.[7] He had told me the $450 was his premium and I would get the $1,050 when the case was completed.[8] I have called several times. The man who answered the phone tells me Larry is not there. In January 2003, Ms. Anthony telephoned the Office of the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Palm Beach County (Clerk's Office) to inquire about the status of Mr. Dyke's criminal case. She was told by the person who answered the telephone that the case had concluded and that Mr. Dyke's bond had been discharged, but that there was "no way to know" whether Respondent had been notified of this information inasmuch as the Clerk's Office did not "always notify the out of town bondsman." Ms. Anthony subsequently advised Respondent as to what she had been told and suggested that he go to the Palm Beach County Courthouse to confirm the information she had been provided. Respondent followed Ms. Anthony's suggestion and went to the Palm Beach County Courthouse on January 21, 2003 (which was "within a week" of his conversation with Ms. Anthony). There, he obtained a certified copy (under seal of the Clerk's Office) of a summary or disposition sheet reflecting that Mr. Dyke's bond had been discharged. That same day, when Respondent returned to the Agency, he telephoned Mr. Clarke and made arrangements to have Mr. Clarke come by the Agency on January 27, 2003, to sign paperwork and pick up a check from Respondent for $1,050.00 (the amount of the collateral Mr. Clarke had given Respondent). Mr. Clarke picked up the check on January 27, 2003, as scheduled. It was not until March 2004 that Respondent received from the Clerk's Office a copy of the actual court order discharging Mr. Dyke's bond. Count II On or about September 1, 2002, the Department of Insurance filed a one-count Administrative Complaint (in Department of Insurance Case No. 43742-02-AG) against Respondent, alleging that "he [had] failed to return collateral and charged an amount in excess of the bond premium." On November 13, 2002, the Department of Insurance issued a Consent Order in Case No. 43742-02-AG, which provided as follows: THIS CAUSE came on for consideration and final agency action. Upon consideration of the record including the Settlement Stipulation for Consent Order dated October 25, 2002, and being otherwise advised in the premises, the Insurance Commissioner hereby finds: The Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner, as head of the Department of Insurance, has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this case and parties hereto. The entry of this Consent Order and compliance herewith by the Licensee, LARRY LORENZO JONES, shall conclude the administrative proceeding of Case No. 43742- 02-AG before the Department of Insurance of the State of Florida. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED: The Settlement Stipulation for Consent Order dated October 25, 2002, is hereby approved and fully incorporated herein by reference; Within thirty (30) days of the date of issue of the Consent Order, pursuant to Section 648.387, Florida Statutes, Licensee shall file[9] notice with the Department of the designated primary agent for each location of all bail bond agencies owned by the Licensee. Failure to file said notice will result in immediate suspension of Licensee's license and eligibility for licensure. Licensee shall be placed on probation for a period of twelve (12) months. As a condition of probation, Licensee shall strictly adhere to the Florida Insurance Code, Rules of the Department and the terms of this agreement. If during the period of probation period [sic] the Department has good cause to believe that Licensee has violated a term or condition of probation, it shall suspend, revoke, or refuse to issue, renew or continue the license of appointment of Licensee. Licensee shall pay a fine of two thousand five hundred dollars ($2500.00) within thirty (30) days of the date of issue of the Consent Order, pursuant to Section 648.52, Florida Statutes. Failure of Licensee to pay the fine within the specified time limit shall result in the immediate suspension of Licensee's license and eligibility for licensure in this state without further proceeding for a period of sixty (60) days. Reinstatement shall be conditioned upon Licensee's compliance with all terms of the Consent Order, including payment of the administrative fine.[10] Sometime in December 2002, Sally Burke, who was then a Bail Bond Coordinator with the Department of Insurance, visited the Agency for purposes of conducting an audit of the Agency's records. Ms. Anthony accompanied her on the visit. During the audit, Ms. Burke asked Respondent if he had completed and "turned in [the] designation form" required by Section 648.387, Florida Statutes. Respondent replied that he had "never received" a blank form to fill out. At Ms. Burke's request, Ms. Anthony handed Respondent a blank designation form. Respondent proceeded to complete it in Ms. Burke's and Ms. Anthony's presence. When he was finished, he attempted to give the completed form to Ms. Burke, but she told him, "Larry, you have to mail it in yourself, but make me a copy for my file." As requested, Respondent made a copy and gave it to Ms. Burke, who, in turn, handed it to Ms. Anthony. He then left the Agency and mailed the original to the Department of Insurance. When he returned to the Agency, Ms. Burke and Ms. Anthony were still there. Months later, in September 2003 at around the time of the issuance of the instant Administrative Complaint, Respondent received a telephone call from Greg Marr, an attorney with Petitioner, who told Respondent that Petitioner had never received his completed designation form.11 Respondent informed Mr. Marr that the completed form had been mailed in December 2002. Mr. Marr responded, "[O]ur records show that it's not in,"12 and asked Respondent to "send in another one," which Respondent did (on or around September 19, 2003). Petitioner received this completed designation form on September 26, 2003.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that Petitioner issue a final order dismissing, in its entirety, the Administrative Complaint issued against Respondent in the instant case. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of June, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of June, 2004.
Findings Of Fact Mr. Patterson is currently eligible for licensure and is licensed in this state as a limited surety agent (bail bondsman). At all times material to the Administrative Complaint, Mr. Patterson was eligible for licensure and was licensed in Florida as a limited surety agent (bail bondsman) with Crews Bonding Agency located in Jacksonville, Duval County, Florida. As such, he was a full-time employee of the Crews Bonding Agency and worked the 4:30 p.m. to 8:00 a.m., or night shift, each night. Mr. Patterson was the only licensed bail bondsman on this shift at the Crews Bonding Agency. Ralph Bunch Collins was also a full-time employee of Crews Bonding Agency at all times material, and at all times material, Mr. Collins worked the night shift with Mr. Patterson. Mr. Collins was recognized by Mr. Patterson and his employer as an administrative assistant whose job entailed clerical duties with regard to the bonding process. Mr. Patterson and Mr. Collins worked as a team. Mr. Collins is not a limited surety agent, bail bondsman, runner, or permittee under Chapter 648, F.S. At all times material, Jerelyn Rodriguez, ne' Langtree, was licensed in Florida as a limited surety agent (bail bondsman) with Crews Bonding Agency. She, also, was a full-time employee of that agency and was its designated office manager. Mrs. Rodriquez worked the hours of 8:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. daily with an administrative assistant named Mrs. Cook, and together Rodriquez and Cook constituted the Crews Bonding Agency's day shift team. The 1983 version of the statute under which Mr. Patterson is charged in the Administrative Complaint read as follows: 648.441 Furnishing supplies to an unlicensed bail bondsmen prohibited: civil liability and penalty.-- No insurer, bail bondsman, runner, or permittee under this chapter shall furnish to any person any blank forms, applications, stationery, or other supplies to be used in soliciting, negotiating, or effecting bail bonds until such person has received from the department a license to act as a bail bondsman and has duly qualified as such. Any insurer, licensee, or permittee who furnishes to any bail bondsman or other person not named or appointed by `the insurer represented any of the supplies mentioned in subsection (1) and accepts any basil bond business from or writes any bail `bond business for such bail bondsman, person, or agency shall be subject to civil liability to any insured of such insurer to thee same extent and in the same manner as if such bail bondsman or other person had been appointed, licensed, or authorized by the insurer, general agent, or bail bondsman to act in its or his behalf by the department. [Emphasis supplied] On March 27, 1984 a Consent Order was entered in the Circuit Court in and for Duval County, Florida, in the case styled, Jack I. Etheridge and F.G.C. Bonding and Insurance Corporation v. State of Florida and State of Florida Department of Insurance, Case No. 82-10537. That Consent Order provided, in pertinent part, as follows: 4. Florida statute 648.441(1) likewise must be given a liberal and common sense application in order to preserve its constitutionality. It is the intent of the Legislature, as interpreted by this Court that said subsection is designed to prohibit licensed bail bondsmen from allowing non- licensed persons to actually conduct a (sic) legitimate and licensed activities of a licensed bail bondsman. Therefore this Court finds that it is a constitutionally permissable (sic) legislative act to prevent licensed person (sic) from providing non- licensed persons with forms and supplies of the trade that would permit the non-licensed persons to violate the law. However, this does not preclude clerical activities by non- licensed persons under the direct supervision of a licensed person to the extent that it is consistent with the general intent of said section. (Emphasis supplied) [Patterson Exhibit 1] The wife of Jack I. Etheridge, who was a plaintiff in the foregoing civil lawsuit, was an owner of the Crews Bonding Agency at all times material to the instant administrative proceeding. The foregoing Circuit Court Consent Order to which DOI was a party is the only relevant interpretation by a court of competent jurisdiction of Section 648.441 F.S. which either party hereto or the undersigned has been able to discover. DOI put on no expert evidence of agency construction of the statute either formally by rule or informally by policy. Subsequent to that Circuit Court Consent Order, the statute interpreted therein [see FOF 5, supra] was amended to add subsection (3), as follows: Any person who violates this section is guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083. All three statutory subsections were in effect at all times material to the administrative charges against' Mr. Patterson. During the night shift of New Year's Eve, December 31, 1988, Susan Miller a/k/a Sharon Miller, who was then the wife of James Edward Miller, contacted the Crews Bonding Agency by telephone and relayed certain necessary information to Ralph Collins as a predicate to securing a bond to get her husband out of the Duval County Jail. In turn, Mr. Collins called the jail and received basic information for making out the necessary bonding papers. Mrs. Miller arrived at the bonding agency and Mr. Collins prepared certain paperwork for her signature, that of her husband, and that of the Mr. Patterson as bail bondsman. It is the unrefuted testimony of Mr. Patterson, Mr. Collins, Jerelyn Rodriquez, and Gilbert Clark that in doing so, Mr. Collins was conforming to the standard operating procedure of the Crews Bonding Agency and the custom in the bonding trade at least as far as that trade has been practiced within Duval County, Florida, since the entry of the March 27, 1984 Consent Order. Patterson Exhibit 2 and the testimony of Correctional Officer Larry Wooten established that, provided the licensed bondsman presents the bond and personally receives the prisoner into his custody, the foregoing clerical practice and procedure has been acquiesced-in by a published policy of the Duval County Sheriff's Office and by county jail personnel, of which Mr. Wooten is one. There was unrefuted testimony that without such clerical help, a licensed bondsman could not function 24 hours a day, as is common in the trade. It is also the unrefuted testimony of Mr. Patterson, Mr. Collins, and Mrs. Rodriquez that at all times material to the Miller transaction, Mr. Collins was subject to the supervision of Mr. Patterson, that Mr. Patterson had the absolute right to alter any document prepared by Mr. Collins prior to signing the Miller bond, and that Mr. Patterson ultimately could have rejected underwriting Mr. Miller's bond if, after Mr. Patterson's review, the documents Mr. Collins had prepared did not conform to the insurance law, rules, or standards to which Mr. Patterson, as a licensee, was bound to conform. The foregoing testimony is further supported by the testimony of Gilbert Clark. Mr. Clark is a licensed bail bondsman who is not now and never has been associated with the Crews Bonding Agency. He testified that Mr. Patterson could ultimately have refused to place the Miller bond even if Mr. Patterson's only dissatisfaction upon his review of the documents prepared by Mr. Collins had been the sufficiency of the collateral or premium provided by the Millers. With regard to the Miller transaction, Mr. Collins prepared the Indemnity Agreement (DOI Exhibit 2e) for signature by Mr. Miller's wife, which Mr. Collins notarized with certificate, seal, and stamp. Collins prepared a Promissory Note (DOI Exhibit 2f) and signed on the line provided for a witness to Mrs. Miller's signature but without applying his notary certificate, seal, or stamp. Collins prepared a Premium Receipt (DOI Exhibit 2g) and signed on the line acknowledging that the premium had been "received by" him in the form of a check from Mr. and Mrs. Miller. The nature of the Premium Receipt and the Collateral Receipt does not necessarily require the Millers' signatures, but Mr. Collins testified that his own signature on the Premium Receipt was meant to signify that he had witnessed signatures and that he had signed it as a notary but that he did not affix a notary certificate, seal, and stamp because he saw no reason for those formalities. Because of the requirements of Chapter 117 F.S. governing notaries public, because the document speaks for itself, and because Mr. Collins testified that he, in fact, received the premium, his testimony that he signed the Premium Receipt for the Miller transaction only as a notary or witness is not credible, particularly since the exhibit (DOI Exhibit 2g) does not bear the Millers' signatures. Mr. Collins prepared the Collateral Receipt (also DOI Exhibit 2g) and received the collateral, signifying same by his signature. (TR 40-41). However, Mr. Patterson signed on the Miller bond and went through all the bond papers, including the foregoing, with Mr. Miller after Mr. Patterson personally physically obtained Mr. Miller's release from jail. On July 7, 1989, Henry A. Robinson went to Crews Bonding Agency in an effort to bond his son, Henry Steve Robinson, out of the Duval County Jail. All of the father's negotiations were with Mrs. Rodriquez. The father did not testify. At all times material to the Robinson transaction, both Mrs. Cook and Mr. Collins had signs on their respective desks, proclaiming them to be administrative assistants, and a sign on Mr. Patterson's desk proclaimed him to be a bail bondsman. When Mr. Patterson and Mr. Collins arrived at Crews Bonding Agency for the July 7, 1989 night shift, some paperwork had already been prepared by Mrs. Rodriquez and others. Mrs. Rodriquez had already reviewed all the papers prepared by someone else, and Mrs. Rodriquez had tentatively committed to underwriting the bond on Henry Steve Robinson. Mr. Patterson did not thereafter "second guess" Mrs. Rodriquez's initial work or judgment despite his absolute right to reject the bond for all the reasons aforesaid in FOF 12. Some further Robinson transaction paperwork was prepared by Mr. Collins after he came on duty. The nature of several of these documents did not require either the signature of the father, the mother, or the son or the notarizing thereof, but the evidence indicates that Mr. Collins thought some of them did. Premium Receipt 127003 (DOI Exhibit 4f, apparently one of two such receipts) and the Collateral Receipt (DOI Exhibit 4b) for this transaction were signed by Mr. Collins on the "received by" lines. He testified that he signed these only as a Crews employee, i.e., a clerk administrative assistant, and as a notary but without affixing his notarial seal. Collins testified that he signed as a witness for the father's signature on the witness line as a Crews employee for the Contingency Promissory Note (DOI Exhibit 4c, TR 48-50), that he did not notarize the note initially when the senior Mr. Robinson signed it in his presence because arrangements were made for the senior Mr. Robinson's convenience to allow Mrs. Robinson to sign the following day, and that the next day, Mr. Collins just witnessed on the other side of that document. However, the documentary evidence (DOI Exhibit 4c) is clear that Mrs. Robinson (the mother) never signed the Contingency Promissory Note. Mr. Collins testified that he signed as a Crews Bonding Agency employee and then notarized with a certificate, seal, and stamp the Indemnity Agreement to the effect that it had been signed by Mr. Robinson's father and mother when in fact the mother never signed that document. (TR 52-56, DOI 4e). Due to the provisions of Chapter 117 F.S., the discrepancy between the exhibits and the testimony, and the vacillation of Mr. Collins in giving his oral testimony, it is found that contrary to Mr. Collins' oral testimony, he was confused or uninformed as to his actual function with regard to the Robinson transaction. However, Mr. Patterson reviewed all the Robinson papers and documents and signed the General Appearance Bond as surety and as attorney-in-fact and an agent of Crews Bonding Agency. Mr. Patterson also personally effectuated Henry Steve Robinson's release from jail on July 7, 1989. Henry Steve Robinson (the son) had been bonded out of the Duval County Jail by the team of Patterson and Collins of the Crews Bonding Agency on at least two occasions, and due to Mr. Robinson's confusion of dates, his testimony concerning exactly what papers he went over with Mr. Patterson or anyone else on July 7, 1989 was somewhat vague. However, he was very clear on some points: Mr. Collins never said he was a bail bondsman, it was Mr. Patterson who signed Robinson out of jail each time, and Robinson signed papers in the bonding agency office each time. Robinson believed that Mr. Patterson was the person who explained all the papers to him in Collins' presence on the date in question, but could not be sure. Mr. Collins and Mr. Patterson asserted that as of the July 11, 1990 formal hearing, Crews Bonding Agency clerical personnel are no longer permitted to sign premium and collateral receipts. This instruction was given in anticipation of amendments to Section 648.441 F.S. which were due to go into effect October 1, 1990. Although Mrs. Miller did not testify, the evidence as a whole from other witnesses supports the reasonable inference that this case arose partly because she complained to DOI when Mr. Collins and other Crews Bonding Agency employees refused to summarily reincarcerate her husband upon her oral complaints of domestic problems. No finding has been made concerning what impression of Mr. Collins was formed by Mrs. Miller or concerning the state of Mrs. Miller's mind because the evidence presented on those issues was speculative and not the type of hearsay which would explain or supplement direct and probative evidence. Neither Mr. Miller or Mr. Henry Steve Robinson appeared to have any complaints with the bonding process or participants.
Recommendation DOAH Case No. 90-0406 Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Insurance and Treasurer enter a Final Order dismissing the Administrative Complaint. DOAH Case No. 90-0584 Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Insurance and `Treasurer enter a Final Order granting Mr. Patterson's application for a resident license to represent Amwest Surety Insurance Company as a limited surety agent (bail bondsman). DONE and ENTERED this 17th day of October, 1990, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of October, 1990.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was first licensed as a ball bondsman in 1961 or 1962. In 1969 (Exhibit 2), Petitioner was charged with being incompetent and untrustworthy as a bail bondsman, found guilty and placed on one year's probation which was successfully completed. In 1973, Petitioner was again charged with conducting himself in a manner unbecoming a bail bondsman (Exhibit 3). These charges alleged failure to return the premium paid on a supersedes bond when the prisoner was not released from jail on the bond and failure to maintain his office open to the general public as required. In the Final Order issued in this case, Petitioner was fined $850 and placed on probation for two years. Upon failure of Petitioner to comply with the terms of the Final Order, his license was revoked for a period of ten months after which the revocation was set aside and his license restored. In 1979, a hearing was conducted by the undersigned Hearing Officer on charges alleging that Petitioner had failed to maintain the minimum requirement for permanent office records and failed to maintain a place of business accessible to the public and be actively engaged in the bail bond business in violation of Chapter 64B, Florida Statutes. Petitioner was found guilty as charged, and the recommendation that his license be revoked was adopted by the Commissioner of Insurance in the Final order. In 1986, Petitioner was arrested for operating a donut shop in Tampa utilizing topless waitresses in violation of Tampa Ordinance 24-11. These charges were dismissed on appeal to the circuit court (Exhibit 5). Witnesses called by Petitioner included the attorney who prosecuted the 1979 case (Exhibit 4) against Respondent; the investigator who investigated the 1979 charges for the Department, and a sitting circuit court judge who filed an appeal of the 1979 revocation order on behalf of the Petitioner At the time the charges which led to the revocation were preferred, Respondent was without power to write bonds, but still had an obligation to service bonds still outstanding. The two witnesses who testified in these proceedings on the status of a licensed bail bondsman without power to write new bonds both concurred that this places a bail bondsman in the anomalous position of one who has no need for an office to provide bail bonds for the public but who still needs to be accessible to those clients for whom he has outstanding bonds. This distinction was not clarified at the 1979 hearing. All three witnesses who testified on behalf of Petitioner were aware of nothing that would disqualify Petitioner as a bail bondsman at this time. No evidence was submitted that Petitioner was convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude, except for the admission by Petitioner that on or about August 11, 1966, he pleaded guilty to uttering a check without sufficient funds on deposit with which the check could be honored. This offense occurred more than 20 years ago and prior to Petitioner twice being found qualified for licensure by Respondent as a bail bondsman.
