Other Judicial Opinions A party who is adversely affected by this Final Order is entitled to judicial review pursuant to Section 120.68, Florida Statutes. Review proceedings are governed by Rules 9.110 and 9.190, Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. Such proceedings are commenced by filing one copy of a Notice of Appeal with the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Attn: Ronda L. Bryan, Agency Clerk, 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 92, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 and a second copy, accompanied by the filing fees prescribed by law, with the District Court of Appeal, First District, or with the District Court of Appeal in the Florida Appellate District where the party resides. The Notice of Appeal must be filed within thirty (30) days of rendition of the order to be reviewed. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been furnished via Certified U.S. Mail to Oasis Cafe at Key Biscayne, c/o Carlos Flores, 19 Harbor Drive, Miami, Florida 33149; by regular U.S. Mail to the Honorable Darren A. Schwartz, Administrative Law Judge, Division of Administrative Hearings, 1230 Apalachee Parkway, Tallahassee, Florida 32399- 3060; and by hand delivery to Marc Drexler, Chief Attorney, Division of Hotels and Restaurants, Department of Business and Professional Regulations, 1940 North Monroe Styeet, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202, this |@¥day of Yezember , 2013. msn For the Division of Hotels and Restaurants 7196 4008 G11) 4516 1240 | SENDERS, RECORD
The Issue Whether the specifications set forth in Respondent's Invitation To Bid for Lease No. 590:2029 are in accordance with law.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: The Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (Department) determines space need annually pursuant to a letter of agency staffing, primarily generated as a result of legislatively allocated new positions. Based on the letter of agency staffing showing the need for additional office space in the Inverness, Florida service area of the Department's District Three, the Department caused an ITB to be advertised regarding Lease No. 590:2029 seeking some 19,373 square feet of office space, plus of minus 3%. The Petitioners presently lease office space to the Department in the Inverness, Florida, District Three service area. This office space is located within the preferred zone set forth in Attachment B to the ITB. In addition to the presently leased space, the Petitioner intends to offer additional space within the preferred area. The Department's Leasing Manual HRS M 70-1 (Manual) sets out the procedure to be followed when the Department is seeking to lease office space of 2,000 square feet or more in privately owned buildings. Within this manual are the forms to be utilized for this purpose and, among other forms, is an ITB packet that contains a Bid Submittal Form (BSF) and, within the BSF is a page entitled Evaluation Criteria. The Department followed the procedure set forth in the manual in advertising for competitive bids on Lease No. 590:2029 for office space in Inverness, Florida service area of District Three and, in doing so, used the ITB packet that contains the BSF with the Evaluation Criteria page. The BSF, including the Evaluation Criteria page, is a slightly modified version of the Department of General Services' (DGS) Request For Proposal Submittal Form - BPM 4136, incorporated by reference in Rule 13M-1.015(3)(e), Florida Administrative Code, as a suggested format. The Evaluation Criteria page of the Department's BSF contains nine of the eleven evaluation criteria set forth on the evaluation criteria page of the BPM 4136, but does not place any limit on the weight of award factors as does BPM 4136 on two of the same criteria used by the Department. The Evaluation Criteria set out in paragraph C. 2. and 4. of BPM 4136 which corresponds to paragraph 1(a) and 2(c) of the Department's Evaluation page, provide that award factors for these two criteria should not exceed ten, whereas the Department does not place a limit on the award factors for any of the criteria. The two Evaluation Criteria on BPM 4136 that do not appear on the Department's Evaluation Criteria page address the availability of dining facilities and proximity of offered space to other Department activities and public services. Both the BSF and BPM 4136 are used in bidding for space in existing facilities and, therefore, require a scaled floor plan showing present configuration, with measurements that equate to the net rentable square footage using the Standard Method of Space Measurement. The BSF does not attach a "floor plan for suggested configuration of offices and rooms" as does the BPM 4136 but does provide the number, types and sizes of rooms to be placed in the existing facility. Both forms leave the final configuration of the floor plan to the successful bidder and the lessee. The Department's reasoning for not including a "suggested floor plan" is that this may reduce the number of prospective bidders due to the varied configuration of existing facilities in the bid area. The majority of the clients to be served by the Department in Citrus County, Florida reside within the preferred zone shown as Attachment B. However, there may be other areas where a lesser concentration of clients may be served by "outposting". That is, servicing those clients on a regular scheduled basis at other smaller facilities within an area outside of the preferred zone. The Department no longer requires the facility to be under one roof but how co-location is accomplished is important to the efficient utilization of services and supervision of staff. Elderly and handicapped clients experience difficulty in utilizing needed services (when more than one service is needed) because of distance between buildings. Department clients frequently utilize the services of more than one program and such multi-service utilization is projected to increase in the future. Public transportation in Citrus County, Florida is partially funded by the Department to assist its clients and is uniformly available to the clients in the Inverness services area. The Department did not prepare any studies of functional space needs, staff space needs, client needs, client demographics or client transportation needs before or after the ITB was advertised. The Evaluation Criteria did not include a factor for future expansion even though the Department's caseload is projected to increase. In accordance with the procedure set forth in the Manual an Evaluation Committee (Committee) was appointed to determine, among other things, the award factor or weight to be placed on the nine Evaluation Criteria set forth on the Evaluation Criteria page of the BSF. The committee determined the significance of the nine criteria on the Evaluation page to the Department's needs in regard to Lease No. 590-2029 and awarded a weight factor in accordance with the significance of the criteria. Those criteria most significant to the Department's needs received the highest weight. These award factors were added to the Evaluation page of the BSF at the time the ITB was advertised. No additional Evaluation Criteria were used by the Committee. There was insufficient evidence to show that Committee's action in determining the weight to be given the nine criteria was arbitrary or capricious or unlawful even though different weights had been placed on some of the same criteria in the 1988 ITB. Likewise, there was insufficient evidence to show that any of the specifications set forth in the ITB did not promote fair competition or otherwise reflect normal policy or, that the criteria were designed to favor a specific location or prospective bidder within the preferred zone. The procedure and the forms set forth in the Manual and used by the Department, including the procedure followed by the Evaluation Committee in putting together the ITB for Lease No. 590:2029, comports substantially with all substantive provisions of Chapter 13M-1, Florida Administrative Code, and more specifically with Rule 13M-1.015, Florida Administrative Code. The differences, such as they are, are not substantial, nor is there any extrinsic or intrinsic divergence from the substance of the rule such as to mislead any potential bidder who sought to address the ITB.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, accordingly, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Department dismissing Petitioners' Formal Notice of Written Protest. DONE and ENTERED this 2nd day of October, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of October, 1990. APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 89-6017BID The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on the Proposed Findings Of Fact submitted by the parties in this case. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Petitioner Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. - 3. Covered in the Preliminary Statement 4. 6. Adopted generally in Findings of Fact 4 - 11, otherwise not material or a restatement of testimony and stated as a finding of fact. 7. - 8. Not material or relevant. 9. - 22. Adopted generally in Findings of Fact 4 - 11, 15, 17 and 18, otherwise not material or a restatement of testimony and not state as a finding of fact. 23. - 24. Not material or relevant. 23. - 24.*Covered in the Conclusions of Law, otherwise not material or a restatement of testimony and stated as a finding of fact. 25. - 27. Adopted in Findings of Fact 2 and 16. 28. - 31. Not material. Adopted in Finding of Fact 16, otherwise a restatement of testimony and not stated as a finding of fact. - 37. Not material or a restatement of testimony and stated as a finding of fact. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Respondent 1. Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. 2. - 3. Not material. 4. 6. Adopted in Findings of Fact 14, 15 and 13, respectively. 7. - 9. Not material. 10. - 12. Adopted in Findings of Fact 11, 12 and 13. 13. - 15. Rejected as not being supported by substantial competent evidence in the record. 16. Adopted in Finding of Fact 13. 17. Not material. 18. Adopted in Finding of Fact 11. 19. - 22. Not Material COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas V. Infantino, Esquire Post Office Drawer 30 Winter Park, FL 32609 Arthur R. Shell, Esquire 1000 Northeast 16th Avenue Gainesville, FL 32601 Sam Powers, Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 Linda Harris, General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 Case No. - 89-6017BID
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the violations of Emerald Coast Utility Authority’s Human Resources Manual as alleged in the agency action letter dated July 17, 2017.
Findings Of Fact At the outset of the hearing, Mr. Ward’s attorney announced that Mr. Ward no longer wished to challenge ECUA’s intent to terminate his employment. In other words, Mr. Ward withdrew his request for a hearing. Furthermore, Mr. Ward made a statement consistent with his attorney’s announcement. The undersigned finds that Mr. Ward’s decision to withdraw his hearing request was voluntarily made and uncoerced.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Executive Director of Emerald Coast Utilities Authority find that Mr. Ward violated Section B-13 A (4)(conduct unbecoming an ECUA employee), Section B-13 A (13)(falsification of records), Section B-13 A (18) (loafing), Section B-13 A (26)(substandard quality or quantity of work), and Section B-13 A (33)(violation of ECUA rules or guidelines or state or federal law) of the ECUA’s Human Resources Manual.3/ DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of September, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S G. W. CHISENHALL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of September, 2017.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner takes exception to the findings of fact contained in the Recommended Order at paragraphs 12, 19, and 27, wherein the Hearing Officer found that the evidence did not prove that the Respondent had committed the violations charged as referenced in each finding. This conclusion is not supported by competent and substantial evidence as required by section 120.57(1)(a) 10., Florida Statutes. The Hearing Officer was convinced that the multitude of forms utilized by the Respondent in selling the non-insurance products (motor clubs) to Hulan Mitchell, Jenna Chester and Michele Humose demonstrated that they had given their informed consent. However, the Hearing Officer overlooked the blatant misrepresentation and false statement contained in the "premium" receipts issued to each of the insureds. Although the Hearing Officer is free to determine the credibility of the witness' testimony, the Hearing Officer cannot ignore or reject unrefuted competent and substantial evidence in the record that clearly and convincingly demonstrates that the premium receipts are a misrepresentation of fact or false statement. No witness testimony is necessary to make this finding. The documents speak for themselves and were not otherwise questioned or refuted. The record unequivocally established the following: Hulan Mitchell - The "premium" receipt (Pet. Ex. "1") issued to Mr. Mitchell indicates a total premium of $378. The actual cost of the "insurance" was $328 with a downpayment of $98 required. See Premium Finance Agreement (Pet. Ex. "1") This is absolutely unrefuted on the record. The premium receipt includes $50 for the cost of the motor club, which is not a policy of insurance and accordingly is not "premium". Also the downpayment required, purportedly for insurance, included $50 for the motor club ($98 + $50 = $148). Furthermore, based on clear documentary evidence in the record, Mr. Mitchell was again subject to a misrepresentation of fact (undisputed) wherein on July 9, 1993 he received a letter (Pet. Ex. "1") threatening to cancel his "insurance" policy because he did not pay a $48 balance due on the motor club. Accordingly the record clearly indicates that the Respondent has made a false or misleading statement with reference to the insurance transaction for Mr. Mitchell. The fact that the Hearing Officer held that Mr. Mitchell knew (despite his testimony otherwise) that he had purchased a motor club, does not negate the fact that the Respondent made a false or misleading statement. JENNA CHESTER - The deceptive premium receipt practice was visited upon Ms. Chester on two occasions. First on February 1, 1994 a "premium" receipt (Pet. Ex. "2") was issued in an amount of $670 for "total premium" due and a required downpayment of $261. The actual cost of the "insurance" was $585 with a required downpayment of $176. See Premium Finance Agreement (Pet. Ex. "2") The "premium" receipt and downpayment included a non-insurance fee for a motor club in the amount of $85. On May 23, 1994 Ms. Chester went to the Respondent to repurchase coverage which had been cancelled. At that time, another "premium" receipt was issued to her in the amount of a "total premium" of $719 and a required downpayment of $286 (Pet. Ex. "2") The actual cost of the insurance was $619 and a required downpayment of $186. See Premium Finance Agreement (Pet. Ex. "2") The additional $100 was for the non-insurance motor club which was sold to Ms. Chester. Although the Hearing Officer held that Ms. Chester knew she was purchasing this motor club (despite Ms. Chester' s testimony otherwise) this does not negate the fact that the Respondent has made false or misleading statement in this insurance transaction with Ms. Chester. Michelle Humose - The unrefuted documentary evidence indicates that on May 5, 1994, Ms. Humose was issued a "premium" receipt (Pet. Ex. "3") indicating a "total premium" in the amount of $926 and a required downpayment of $348. The actual cost of the "insurance" was $826 with a required downpayment of $248 See Premium Finance Agreement (Pet. Ex. "3") The additional $100 included in the "premium" receipt was for the non-insurance motor club sold to Ms. Humose. Again despite the Hearing Officer's finding contrary to Ms. Humose's direct testimony that she did not know she was purchasing a motor club, the Respondent has clearly and convincingly made a false or misleading statement with respect to this insurance transaction with Ms. Humose. It is implicit in the Findings of Fact by the Hearing Officer that each referenced transaction took place as described herein. The Hearing Officer merely failed to explicitly state in the Recommended Order that the unrefuted documentary evidence establishes a prima facie misrepresentation of fact. Indeed, the exact factual scenario established herein was determined to constitute a misrepresentation in In the Matter of: Kenneth Michael Whitaker, Case Number 93-L-432DDH (Final Order dated July 3, 1995). It was specifically determined "that the Respondent's standard business practice of combining the costs of insurance coverages with the costs of the auto club memberships and then calling such costs "total premium" on receipts issued to customers constituted a misrepresentation and was deceptive." Also, it was further determined "that the Respondent's standard business practice of deducting all or part of the ancillary product fee up front resulted in false statements on other documents that the full downpayment for premium or financing of premium had been made, when in actuality it had not." Whitaker Final Order at pp's 9-10. The Department determined that this activity was a violation of section 626.611(9), Florida Statutes. This finding was also affirmed on appeal in Whitaker v. Department of Insurance and Treasurer, Case No. 95-2702, (21 FLW 1353, Slip Opinion dated June 13, 1996). The court upheld this violation when it summarized the practice in the opinion as follows: Appellant took all or part of the ancillary product from the required premium downpayment and gave the consumer a receipt which listed the full downpayment as "Total Premium". The receipt did not reveal that part of the "premium" went to purchase an ancillary product. Whitaker Slip Opinion at pp's 3-4. This type of fraudulent and deceptive practice also constitutes a violation of section 626.9541(1)(b), Florida Statutes, by placing before the public a representation or statement which is untrue, deceptive or misleading. The Hearing Officer has already considered the unrefuted facts on the record and was clearly in error to make a finding otherwise. Accordingly, pursuant to section 120.57(a)(a) 10., Florida Statutes, which reads in part: The agency may not reject or modify the findings of fact, including findings of fact that form the basis for an agency statement, unless the agency first determines from a review of the complete record, and states with particularity in the order, that findings of fact were not based upon competent substantial evidence or that the proceedings on which the findings were based did not comply with essential requirements of law. the Department may modify the findings of fact. In this case there was no competent and substantial evidence to make a finding that the Respondent did not make a false or misleading statement with the premium receipts issued in this cause. A review of the entire record demonstrates unrefuted documentary evidence which supports the modified findings of fact contained herein. Therefore, Petitioner's exceptions to findings of fact 12, 19 and 27 are hereby GRANTED. RULINGS ON EXCEPTIONS TO CONCLUSIONS OF LAW The Petitioner takes exception to conclusions of law at paragraphs 30 and 31, based on the Hearing Officer's rejection of unrefuted facts established on the record, i.e., deceptive and misleading premium receipts. Conclusions of Law 30 and 31 are revised to reflect that the premium receipts issued to insureds constitute fraudulent and deceptive practices as well as placing before the public a representation or statement which is untrue, deceptive, or misleading. Conclusion of Law 30 is modified as follows: In this case, the Respondent was charged with violating sections 626.611(4), 626.611(5), 626.611(7), 626.611(9), 626.611(13), 626.621(2), 626.621(6), 626.9541(1)(b), 626.9541(1)(e), 626.9541(1)(k)1., and 626.9541(1)(z), Florida Statutes. Boiled down to the essentials the Department alleged that Respondent violated the provisions listed above by unlawfully selling insureds motor club memberships without their informed consent, made false and misleading statements regarding the coverage provided and falsely represented and illegally required insureds to purchase motor club membership as part of their purchase of automobile insurance and that Respondent engaged in the prohibited practice of "sliding" additional coverages or products into the purchase of the insured without the informed consent of the insured. This revision is necessary because the Hearing Officer failed to include sections 626.9541(1)(b) and 62.9541(1)(e), Florida Statutes, as alleged violations. Conclusion of Law 31 is likewise revised as follows: The Department failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent attempted to "slide" coverage or ancillary products involved in this case. Likewise, the evidence did not clearly or convincingly demonstrate that Respondent did not obtain the informed consent of her customers prior to selling them the auto club memberships involved here. However, based on the unrefuted evidence in the record, the Respondent has violated sections 626.611(9) and 626.9541(1)(b), Florida Statutes, by issuing "premium receipts" which falsely and deceptively represented "total premium" which included a fee for a non-insurance product, ie. motor club membership. Accordingly, the Respondent is guilty of three counts of violating sections 626.611(9) and 626.9541(1)(b), Florida Statutes. The Petitioner's exceptions to conclusions of law 30 and 31 are hereby GRANTED. RULING ON EXCEPTIONS TO RECOMMENDATION The Petitioner takes exception to the recommendation that the Administrative Complaint be dismissed. The Penalty Guidelines contained in Chapter 4-231, Florida Administrative Code, should be applied in this case. There are three documented violations (one for each count) of engaging in fraudulent and dishonest practices as prohibited in section 626.611 (9), Florida Statutes, and placing before the public a representation or statement which is untrue, deceptive or misleading in violation of section 626.9541(1)(b), Florida Statutes. Under the penalty guidelines, a violation of section 626.611(9), Florida Statutes, requires a suspension of 9 months per count. Under the penalty guidelines, a violation of section 626.9541(1)(b), Florida Statutes, requires a suspension of 6 months per count. Based on Rule 4-231.040, Florida Administrative Code, the highest penalty per count should be assessed, therefore the appropriate penalty is three counts at 9 months for a total suspension period of 27 months. Since the total required suspension exceeds 2 years, the appropriate sanction is the revocation of the Respondent's licenses in accordance with section 626.641(1), Florida Statutes. The violation of section 626.9541(1)(b), Florida Statutes, permits the assessment of an additional fine on top of any other administrative sanction, pursuant to section 626.9521, Florida Statutes. This section permits fines for wilful violations of up to $10,000 per violation not to exceed $100,000. The Petitioner recommends that a fine of $3,000 be assessed against the Respondent. However, insufficient grounds have been demonstrated to justify the assessment of a $3,000 administrative fine. Therefore, Petitioner's exceptions to the recommendation are hereby GRANTED, except for the Petitioner's argument for an additional sanction in the form of a $3,000 administrative fine which is hereby DENIED. PENALTY Rule 4-231.160, Florida Administrative Code, prescribes the aggravating and mitigating factors which the Department shall consider and, if warranted, apply to the total penalty in reaching the final penalty. Aggravating factors in this matter, as delineated in Rule 4-231.160, Florida Administrative Code, are the willfulness of the Respondent's conduct and the existence of secondary violations established in Counts I-III of the Administrative Complaint. Only minimal mitigating factors exist which are outweighed by the aggravating factors. The existence of these aggravating factors would increase the Respondent`s total penalty, thereby resulting in a higher final penalty. Increasing the Respondent's total penalty would be pointless, however, for section 626.641(1), Florida Statutes, limits a licensee's period of suspension to a maximum of 2 years. The Respondent's 27-month total penalty already exceeds the two-year statutory limit. Consequently, the Department has determined that a revocation of the Respondent's insurance agent license is warranted and appropriate in this matter, and is necessary to adequately protect the insurance-buying pubic. IT IS THEREBY ORDERED: All licenses and eligibility for licensure held by TARA JEANNE SMITH, are hereby REVOKED, pursuant to the provisions of sections 626.611, 626.621, 626.641(2) and 626.651(1), Florida Statutes, effective the date of this Final Order. As of the date of this Final Order, the Respondent shall not engage in or attempt or profess to engage in any transaction or business for which a license or permit is required under the Florida Insurance Code, or directly or indirectly own, control or be employed in any manner by an insurance agent or agency. Any party to these proceedings adversely affected by this Final Order is entitled to seek review of this Final Order pursuant to section 120.68, Florida Statutes, and Rule 9.110, Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. Review proceedings must be instituted by filing a Notice of Appeal with the General Counsel, acting as the agency clerk, at 612 Larson Building, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333, and a copy of the same and the filing fee with the appropriate District Court of Appeal within thirty (30) days of rendition of this Order. DONE and ORDERED this 4th day of September, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. BILL NELSON Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner COPIES FURNISHED: Tara Jeanne Smith 2588 Panther Creek Road, Apt. A Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5628 Charles J. Grimsley, Esquire Charles J. Grimsley and Associates, P.A. 1880 Brickell Avenue Miami, Florida 33129 Diane Cleavinger, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Stephen C. Fredrickson, Esquire Division of Legal Services 200 E. Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and the conclusions of law, it is, RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Insurance enter a Final Order finding Respondent not guilty of violating Chapter 626, Florida Statues and dismissing the Administrative Complaint. DONE and ENTERED this 12th day of July, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 SunCom 278-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of July, 1996. APPENDIX The facts contained in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8 and 16 of Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact are adopted. The facts contained in paragraphs 5, 6 and 9 of Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact are subordinate. The facts contained in paragraphs 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23 of Petitioners' Proposed Findings of Fact were not shown by the evidence. The facts contained in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25 and 26 of Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact are adopted. The facts contained in paragraph 23 of Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact are subordinate. COPIES FURNISHED: Stephen C. Frederickson, Esquire Division of Legal Services 645A Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Charles J. Grimsley, Esquire Charles J. Grimsley and Associates 1880 Brickell Avenue Miami, Florida 33129 Bill Nelson Commissioner Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Dan Sumner Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue Whether Respondents committed the offenses set forth in the Administrative Complaint and, if they did, the penalties, if any, which should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact On May 15, 1989, Petitioner filed an Order to Cease and Desist, Administrative Charges and Complaint with Notice of Rights against several parties including the following Respondents to the instant proceeding: Habersheir Securities, Inc. (Habersheir); Raymond Hayden (Hayden); Sharieff Mustakeem (Mustakeem); and Frank J. Hurt, III (Hurt). By Order Imposing Sanctions entered November 30, 1989, a default pursuant to Rule 1.380(b)(2)(C), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, was entered against Habersheir, Hayden, and Mustakeem. No appearance was made by Habersheir, Hayden, or Mustakeem at the formal hearing, although Notice of Hearing was served upon them. Habersheir is a corporation whose main office in Atlanta, Georgia, has been registered with Petitioner as a broker/dealer since June 22, 1987. The Florida branch office of Haersheir was located at 100 West Cypress Creek Road, Suite 810, Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33309. The branch office was registered with Petitioner on September 29, 1988. At all times pertinent hereto, Mustakeem was the president of Habersheir and the majority owner of its stock, while Hayden was a vice- president of Habersheir. At the time of the final hearing, neither Mustakeem nor Hayden was registered with Petitioner. At all times pertinent hereto, Hurt was qualified for registration with Petitioner as a principal. Hurt's registration with Petitioner had not, prior to the filing of this matter, been disciplined. The application submitted by Habersheir to Petitioner on September 7, 1988, listed Hurt as the "Designated Manager in Charge Registered as Principal in Florida". Form BD is a form required by Petitioner in the application process. On Schedule E of the Form BD filed by Habersheir on November 14, 1988, Hurt is listed as the "Supervisor" of the Florida Branch. Hurt's name and his registration with Petitioner as a principal were used in connection with the registration of the Florida Habersheir branch to gain a favorable review of the application by Petitioner. Such use was without compensation to Hurt, but was with his knowledge and permission. Hurt was a salesman who had been employed by Habersheir for a short period of time when the application for the Florida branch office was filed. He was not an officer of Habersheir and had no managerial authority. At no time did Hurt intend to serve the Florida branch office of Habersheir in any capacity and at no time did he have any authority to supervise or otherwise manage that office. Representatives of Habersheir transacted business in Florida between September 7, 1988 and September 28, 1988, prior to Habersheir's branch office being registered in Florida with Petitioner on September 29, 1988. Associated persons working for Habersheir sold securities in or from the branch office in Fort Lauderdale, Florida prior to the associated persons being registered with the Petitioner. Habersheir's branch office in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, failed to maintain records and make available for Petitioner's inspection its cash receipt and disbursement blotter, securities received and delivery blotter, order tickets, and customer confirmations on all transactions as required by Section 517.121, Florida Statutes, and by Rule 3E-600.014(4), Florida Administrative Code. Habersheir also failed to maintain copies of its associated persons files as required by Rule 3E- 600.0014 (5)(a), Florida Administrative Code. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Habersheir was a member of the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD). Between November 7, 1988, and November 30, 1988, Habersheir's authority to transact business was suspended by NASD. Habersheir failed to notify its Fort Lauderdale, Florida, branch office of its suspension by NASD. Consequently, business was transacted by that branch office while Haersheir's authority to transact business was suspended by NASD.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of facts and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the State of Florida, Department of Banking and Finance, Division of Securities, enter a final order which: Revokes all registrations presently held by Habersheir Securities, Inc., and which assesses an administrative fine against Habersheir Securities, Inc. in the amount of $10,000.00 for its violations of Sections 517.12(5), and 517.121(1), Florida Statutes; and Which dismisses the administrative complaint against Sharieff Mustakeem, Raymond Hayden, and Frank J. Hurt, III. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of February, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of February, 1990. APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE 89-3886 The following rulings are made on the findings of fact submitted by Petitioner: The proposed findings of fact In paragraphs 1-10 are adopted in material part by the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact In paragraph 11 are adopted in part by paragraph 1 of the Recommended Order, and are rejected in part as being unnecessary to the findings made. COPIES FURNISHED: Randall L. Rubin, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Office of Comptroller 401 N.W. 2nd Avenue Suite N-708 Miami, Florida 33128 Oliver Lee, Esquire Troutman, Sanders, Lockerman & Ashmore Candler Building, Suite 1400 127 Peachtree Street, N.E. Atlanta, Georgia 30303-1810 Frank J. Hurt, III 6666 Powers Ferry Road Suite 202 Atlanta, Georgia 30339 Preston Spears 91 Farmington Drive Woodstock, Georgia 30188 Rahim Davoudpour 1972 Benthill Drive Marietta, Georgia 33062 Honorable Gerald Lewis Comptroller, State of Florida Department of Banking and Finance The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 William G. Reeves General Counsel Department of Banking and Finance The Capitol Plaza Level, Rm. 1302 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 =================================================================
Findings Of Fact 1. Emmons was a Residential Services Supervisor who had a predetermination/liberty interest (name clearing) hearing held on August 24, 2012. After that hearing, he was terminated effective at the close of business on August 24, 2012 and notified of that fact via correspondence dated August 27, 2012. (See, e.g., Exhibit 4). 2. On September 4, 2012, Emmons submitted a written request to ECUA’s Director of Human Resources and Administrative Services (hereinafter “HR Director”) appealing disciplinary action taken against him in his employment with ECUA. 3. That same date, ECUA requested the services of an Administrative Law Judge (hereinafter “ALJ”) from the Florida Division of Administrative Hearings (“DOAH”) to conduct an evidentiary hearing and issue a Recommended Order to ECUA’s Executive Director pursuant to the Administrative Law Judge Services Contract previously entered into between ECUA and DOAH. 4. DOAH assigned an ALJ to preside over the matter, who in turn issued a Notice of Hearing scheduling an evidentiary hearing to take place beginning at 10:00 a.m. on October 15, 2012 in ECUA’s Board Room. 5. ECUA was present and ready to proceed with the evidentiary hearing at the appointed time and place, yet neither Emmons nor anyone acting on his behalf appeared. Furthermore, no one had heard from Emmons. 6. After waiting fifteen (15) minutes after the designated start-time for the hearing, neither Emmons nor anyone acting on his behalf had been heard from. 7. Thereafter, the ALJ called the hearing to order, and ECUA proffered witness testimony and admitted exhibits into the record. The record established the following: a. Emmons was a Residential Services Supervisor in ECUA’s Sanitation Department. b. On March 28, 2012 Emmons was notified by a Sanitation Equipment Operator under his supervision that his truck (Truck #43B), had broken down. After Emmons arrived on the scene in ECUA Truck #11C, he went to sleep while on duty. c. Emmons slept for approximately twenty to thirty minutes, and his vehicle, Vehicle #11C, was idling with the air conditioner on throughout this time. d. While Emmons slept, an ECUA employee photographed him. e. This was not the first time Emmons had slept while on duty; instead, in the Summer of 2011 Emmons was observed sleeping in his ECUA-assigned vehicle by another ECUA employee. f. Furthermore, within the past twelve months Emmons was observed by ECUA employees reclined with his eyes closed for an extended period of time on two other occasions during the past twelve months. g. Additionally, in 2010 a photograph of Emmons apparently sleeping on duty was brought to one of his superiors’ attention. In this instance, Emmons was cautioned that it was completely unacceptable for a supervisor to be sleeping anywhere 3 at any time while on duty and that if this were to happen again disciplinary action would be imposed. h. ECUA issued a written notice of predetermination hearing to Emmons on August 21, 2012 regarding contemplated disciplinary action for violations of Section B-13A(4), [Conduct Unbecoming an ECUA Employee], Section B-13A(18) [Loafing], Section B-13A(21) [Neglect of Duty], Section B-13A(25) [Sleeping on Duty], and Section B-13A(33) [Violation of ECUA rules or policies] of ECUA’s Human Resources Manual. i. Section B-37(A) of ECUA’s Human Resources Manual additionally provides that ECUA employees shall avoid unnecessary vehicle idling and prohibits allowing a vehicle to idle solely to operate the air conditioner for the comfort of the vehicle’s occupants. j.._ Emmons knew of the above-referenced provisions of ECUA’s Human Resources Manual by virtue of the fact that he had received it, as well as the fact that the substantive provisions of it applicable to his sleeping on duty had been previously discussed with at least one of his superiors. k. Upon proper notice a predetermination hearing was held on August 24, 2012, and thereafter a written notice of disciplinary action was issued to Emmons on August 27, 2012 notifying him that his conduct violated Sections B-13A(4), (18), (21), (25), and (33) of ECUA’s Human Resources Manual. 8. The hearing was closed at approximately 10:27 a.m. 9. Based upon a review of the record, the evidence shows that Emmons’ conduct was violative of Sections B-13A(4) [conduct unbecoming an ECUA employee], 4 Section B-13A(8) [loafing], Section B-13A(21) [neglect of duty], Section B-13A(25) (sleeping while on duty], Section B-13A(33) [violation of ECUA rules or policies], and Section B-37 [vehicle and equipment idle reduction] of ECUA’s Human Resources Manual. (See ECUA ex. 5, 6). The evidence further shows that you were aware of these provisions within the Human Resources Manual. (See ECUA ex. 7). 10. Two days later, on September 17, 2012, R. John Westberry, Esq., entered an appearance on behalf of Emmons and filed a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal on his behalf. In neither of these filings was any justification proffered for Emmons’ having failed to appear at the scheduled evidentiary hearing. Additionally, good cause was not shown for Emmons’ attorney having failed to appear at the hearing (although it is unclear whether the attorney had been retained at that time). 1. Nevertheless, on October 18, 2012 the ALJ rendered an Order Closing File ostensibly dismissing the matter.
Conclusions Petitioner, Emerald Coast Utilities Authority (hereinafter either "ECUA" or “Petitioner”), terminated Respondent, Michael A. Emmons (hereinafter either "Emmons" or “Respondent”), from his employment with ECUA effective at the close of business on August 24, 2012. Emmons timely requested a hearing in order to appeal his termination, and his case was forwarded to Florida Division of Administrative Hearings to conduct a hearing and issue findings of fact and recommended conclusions of law. After being properly noticed, a formal hearing was held in this cause on October 15, 2012 in Pensacola, Florida, before Diane Cleavinger, Administrative Law Judge with the Florida Division of Administrative Hearings, which Emmons elected not to attend. . Three days later, on October 18, 2012, Judge Diane Cleavinger submitted an Order Closing File, which for reasons set forth below is deemed a Recommended Order. Pursuant to Section 120.57(1)(10, Florida Statutes, the Parties had 15 days within which to submit written exceptions to the Recommended Order. That time-frame has expired, with only Petitioner’s having filed a submission. Emmons also filed no response to Petitioner’s exceptions. See Rule 28-106.217(3), Florida Administrative Code (affording a party 10 days from the filing of the other party’s exceptions to respond to those exceptions).
The Issue The issue addressed in this proceeding is whether Petitioner was the subject of an unlawful employment practice.
Findings Of Fact Baypoint Hotel Associates operates a hotel at Marriott's Bay Point Resort in Panama City, Florida. Petitioner, Jerry D. Hicks, was employed by Respondent, Baypoint Hotel Associates, for approximately five and one Petitioner worked as a bell captain at Respondent's Panama City Beach, Florida, hotel for approximately two and one termination of his employment with Respondent. The bell captain's job required some heavy lifting. There was no dispute regarding the fact that Respondent is an employer within the meaning of the Florida Human Rights Act, and that all jurisdictional requirements have been met. Petitioner requested, and was granted, a leave of absence from his job effective December 17, 1991, in order to have back surgery to repair a herniated disc. By electing to take a leave of absence, Petitioner understood that he was not guaranteed his bell captain's job upon his return. In fact, he was not guaranteed any job upon his return, but would be given preference should there be an opening in any employment position for which he was qualified. There was no evidence that Respondent's leave of absence policy was not consistently applied or applied in a discriminatory manner. As a result of his surgery, Petitioner was unable to work from December 17, 1991, until April 9, 1992, when he was released by his doctor to return to work. No medical evidence was presented that Petitioner's "back problem" constituted a handicap or was perceived as a handicap by his employer. During Petitioner's absence from work, his job duties were reassigned to two assistant bell captains. After being released by his doctor to return to work, Petitioner informed Respondent's Human Resources Department, on or about the week of April 13, 1992, that he was ready to return to work, but that he would temporarily not be able to perform all of the duties, namely heavy lifting, of his former job as bell captain because of his surgery. After Petitioner requested to return to his job as a bell captain, Respondent's Director of Human Resources informed Petitioner that his former job was no longer available because Respondent's management had reassigned the bell captain's duties to two assistant bell captains and that Respondent did not plan to refill the job of bell captain under a reorganization of that service area. In lieu of returning Petitioner to his former job as bell captain, Respondent's human resource director informed Petitioner that he could interview for several available jobs at Respondent's hotel, including the jobs of telephone operator/supervisor, front desk clerk or reservation sales agent. Petitioner testified that he was unwilling to consider any job that paid less money than he was paid in his former job as a bell captain. By the time Petitioner informed Respondent's human resource director on April 28, 1992, that he was ready to interview for the reservation job; however, the reservations job had already been filled. Petitioner had waited an inordinate amount of time in advising Respondent of his interest in the reservations job and therefore lost his opportunity to apply. There was no evidence of any discrimination on the part of Respondent.
Recommendation It is accordingly, RECOMMENDED: Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a Final Order dismissing Petitioner's complaint. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 29th day of October, 1993. DIANE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of October 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-1504 The facts contained in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact are adopted in substance, insofar as material. COPIES FURNISHED: Jerry D. Hicks 1202 Parker Drive Panama City, Florida 32401 Michael D. Giles, Esquire 1410 AmSouth Harbert Plaza 1901 Sixth Avenue North Birmingham, Alabama 35203-2602 Dana Baird, General Counsel Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road, Building F (Suite 240) Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1570 Ms. Sharon Moultry Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Building F Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee Florida 32303-4149
