The Issue The issue to be determined in this proceeding is whether Escambia County School Board (“School Board”) Rule 2.04 (2017- 2018)1/ is an invalid exercise of delegated authority, as defined in section 120.52(8)(b), (c), (d), and (e).
Findings Of Fact At hearing, the parties stipulated to adopting the findings of fact from DOAH Case No. 17-4220, which are incorporated herein as follows: Petitioner is the constitutional entity authorized to operate, control, and supervise the system of public schools in Escambia County, Florida. Art. IX, § 4(b), Fla. Const.; § 1001.32, Fla. Stat. The School Board has the statutory responsibility to prescribe qualifications for positions of employment and for the suspension and dismissal of employees subject to the requirements of chapter 1012. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Respondent is a noninstructional support employee, who has been employed as a Custodial Worker I by the School Board since October 13, 2014. Mr. Warren worked 40 hours a week at Pine Forest High School. Mr. Warren’s position with the School Board is annual, rather than based on the academic school year calendar. During the regular school year, students are required to be on campus from 8:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. After the school day, there are students who remain at the school for various activities with clubs and organizations. While students are present, custodial workers complete their duties and work assignments throughout the school. On a regular school day students may be present at the school for clubs and organizations until as late as 9:00 p.m. Respondent works the 2:00 p.m. to 10:30 p.m. shift and would be present when students are present. The background regarding Respondent’s arrest arises from a dispute where it was alleged that he forged a quitclaim deed, transferring property from his uncle to himself. On May 9, 2017, Respondent was arrested. Thereafter, an information was filed against Respondent by the State Attorney’s Office alleging that he knowingly obtained or endeavored to obtain certain property of another valued at $20,000.00 or more, but less than $100,000.00, in violation of section 812.014(1)(a) and (1)(b), and (2)(b)1., a second degree felony. At the time of the final hearing, Respondent’s criminal case was pending final disposition. On May 18, 2017, Superintendent of the School Board, Malcolm Thomas, provided written notice to Respondent that he was suspended “with pay effective immediately . . . pending the outcome of an arrest for §812.014.2b1 [sic], F.S., a disqualifying offense.” The Superintendent’s letter did not provide authority for the Superintendent’s action. The Superintendent also cited no authority for his position that the alleged offense was a “disqualifying offense.” Also, on May 18, 2017, the Superintendent notified Respondent of his intent to recommend to the School Board that Mr. Warren be placed on suspension without pay beginning June 21, 2017. In his request to the School Board, the Superintendent stated that his recommendation was “based on conduct as more specifically identified in the notice letter to the employee.” Similar to the notice regarding the intended recommendation, the Superintendent cited no authority for his recommendation, nor his position that the alleged offense was a “disqualifying offense.” By letter dated June 21, 2017, Dr. Scott advised Respondent that the School Board voted to accept the Superintendent’s recommendation placing him on suspension without pay, effective June 21, 2017. As cause for Mr. Warren’s suspension without pay, Dr. Scott’s letter stated that it is “based on conduct as more specifically identified in the [Superintendent’s] notice letter to the employee.” Dr. Scott’s letter did not use the term “disqualifying offense,” nor did it cite any authority for the School Board’s action. Respondent had no history of disciplinary action during his employment by the School Board. In addition, Ms. Touchstone testified that Respondent “has been a good employee for us.” As a noninstructional employee, Mr. Warren is covered by the Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”) between the School Board and the ESP. In addition, the School Board, in part, relied upon rule 2.04 (2017), when it approved the recommendation to suspend Mr. Warren without pay for a criminal arrest. If Mr. Warren had been convicted of the alleged crime, he would have been disqualified from employment with the School Board. While the issue of whether the School Board had authority to suspend Mr. Warren’s license was addressed in DOAH Case No. 17-4220, that matter did not address the issue of the method of reinstatement and back pay for existing employees. As will be further discussed in the Conclusions of Law below, Mr. Warren has standing to challenge the rules in an individual capacity. A Recommended Order upholding Mr. Warren’s suspension without pay was issued on December 22, 2017. The School Board issued a Final Order adopting the Recommended Order in toto, issued on February 23, 2018. Since the Final Order was filed in DOAH Case No. 17-4220, Mr. Warren pled no contest to Filing a False Document, a non-disqualifying offense, pursuant to section 435.04, Florida Statutes, and the court withheld adjudication.3/ Other charges, including the alleged disqualifying offense, were nolle prossed. On December 22, 2017, as a result of the plea agreement, the School Board voted to reinstate Mr. Warren to work, effective November 17, 2017. Mr. Warren’s suspension without pay was formally rescinded, and he was reinstated to his position as a custodial worker. However, in reliance on School Board Policy 2.04, the School Board has refused to pay him back pay and benefits for the roughly five-month period of suspension without pay. Mr. Warren timely appealed the School Board’s decision to deny him back pay and benefits. The case is currently pending at the Division (DOAH Case No. 18-2270). Petitioner, ESP, is the union that solely and exclusively serves as the bargaining agent for collective bargaining on behalf of employees employed by the School Board. ESP has associational standing to represent members of the bargaining unit and to challenge rules that may affect employees covered by the CBA. School Board rule 2.04 is entitled “Recruitment and Selection of Personnel” and provides, in pertinent part, as follows: Guidelines which may disqualify from employment: A. Conviction (as defined in Sections 435.04, F.S., and/or 1012.315, F.S.) of a crime of moral turpitude (Section 1012.33, F.S.). Moral turpitude as defined by the District includes, but is not limited to, crimes listed in Sections 435.04, F.S., and/or 1012.315, F.S. * * * D. Any other felony crime not listed in Sections 435.04, F.S., or 1012.315, F.S., with a final disposition of guilt or plea of nolo contendere (no contest), regardless of adjudication of guilt. * * * J. Noncompliance with the District hiring requirements under Sections 435.04, F.S., 1012.465, F.S., 1012.315, F.S., and 1012.56, F.S. A record clear of disqualifying offenses as defined in Section A above is required for employment and continued employment with the District. Individuals who have pending criminal charges for an offense which would disqualify from employment or who are currently on probation or participating in a program for first-time offenders as a result of the offense will be automatically disqualified from employment or continued employment until resolution of the charge(s). * * * All applicants and vendors have the right to appeal before the Human Resources Appeals Committee. The Assistant Superintendent of Human Resource Services or designated representative will select the members of this committee to ensure diversity. The Committee is responsible for following and abiding by all local, state, and federal employment procedures and laws. A second applicant or vendor appeal will be granted only when new facts or additional information has been presented that was not considered in the first appeal hearing. The Superintendent shall review decisions made by the Human Resources Appeals Committee and has the authority to overturn decisions made by the Committee, excluding appeals from offenses listed in Sections 435.04, F.S., and/or 1012.315, F.S., and/or 1012.467, F.S. Rule 2.04 lists as its statutory authority sections 1001.41, 1001.42, and 1001.43, Florida Statutes, and lists sections 112.3173, 435.04, 440.102, 800.04, 943.051, 1001.01, 1001.10, 1001.42, 1001.43, 1003.02, 1003.32, 1003.451, 1012.22, 1012.27, 1012.32, 1012.335, and 1012.39, Florida Statutes, as the law it implements. The rule does not cite section 435.04 as statutory rulemaking authority. The rule does not list any reference to 1012.315 or 1012.465 as rulemaking authority or as law implemented. Rule 2.04 provides that an individual may be disqualified from employment or continued employment if he or she has pending criminal charges. The rule requires compliance with sections 435.04, 1012.465, and 1012.315. Section 1012.465 provides that noninstructional employees who have direct contact with children must meet the level 2 requirements described in 1012.32, which references section 1012.315 as the list of disqualifying offenses. Moreover, rule 2.04 allows for an employee to be disqualified, i.e., suspended from employment until resolution of the alleged charges, without providing a method for reinstatement or back pay should the allegations be resolved favorably for the employee. The School Board asserts that it has a duty and statutory authority to adopt and implement rules to facilitate the level 2 background screening required by 1012.465. However, there is no such authority in section 1012.465, 1012.315, or 1012.32, by reference or otherwise. Rule 2.04 also does not indicate the criteria that would be used for determining whether an employee should be reinstated with back pay. Dr. Scott testified that, “generally, the decision to award back pay is made on a case-by-case basis. It has been a general ‘practice’ to not award back pay for private conduct which resulted in criminal charges.” Ms. Waters agreed with Dr. Scott that back pay may be awarded based on the circumstances. Ms. Waters testified that the superintendent determines whether a reinstated employee should be awarded back pay, completely, partially, or not at all. Nothing in rule 2.04 provides Mr. Warren, or any other existing employee in his circumstances, with notice that suspension without pay for pending criminal charges for a disqualifying offense may result in the employee being awarded back pay upon reinstatement. The School Board’s determination that back pay would not be awarded following resolution of pending criminal charges was based solely on the superintendent’s discretion. If an employee is suspended without pay based on criminal charges related to the employee’s position and the charges are subsequently resolved, the employee may be awarded back pay.
The Issue Whether just cause exists for Petitioner to suspend Respondent without pay and terminate her employment as a teacher.
Findings Of Fact The Parties Petitioner is a duly constituted school board charged with operating, controlling, and supervising all free public schools within the School District of Miami-Dade County, Florida, pursuant to Florida Constitution Article IX, section 4(b), and section 1012.23, Florida Statutes. At all times relevant to these proceedings, Respondent was employed as a teacher in the Miami-Dade County Public Schools District pursuant to a professional services contract. In the 2011-2012 school year, Respondent was employed as a science teacher at Homestead Middle School. In the 2012-2013 school year, until she was suspended pending the outcome of this proceeding, Respondent was employed as a math teacher at the Alternative Outreach Program, 5000 Role Models location.1/ At all times relevant to these proceedings, Respondent's employment with Petitioner was governed by Florida law, Petitioner's policies, and the collective bargaining agreement between Miami-Dade County Public Schools and the United Teachers of Dade ("UTD Contract"). Events Giving Rise to these Proceedings The 2011-2012 School Year Respondent began teaching eighth grade science at Homestead Middle School ("HMS") in August 2011. The 2011-2012 school year for students began on August 22, 2011. The workday hours for teachers at HMS for the 2011-2012 school year were from 7:25 a.m. to 2:45 p.m., Monday through Friday. The persuasive evidence establishes that Respondent was informed of this schedule when she was interviewed for her teaching position, and again so informed during the first faculty meeting of the school year. Pursuant to the UTD contract, the teacher work hours per day in the Miami-Dade Public Schools consist of seven hours and 20 minutes, including a one-hour planning period. The UTD Contract provides that teachers may, with the approval of the work-site administrator (i.e., the principal) modify their workday schedule, such as adjusting the beginning time of the teacher's workday, provided that such modification does not interfere with the overall number of hours worked. This provision affords a principal the authority and discretion to modify a teacher's workday schedule. The student school day hours for HMS began at 7:35 a.m., when the first bell rang and students began entering their classrooms, and ended at 2:20 p.m. Students were to be in their classrooms by 7:40 a.m. for a homeroom period, immediately followed by the first instructional period consisting of a literacy block. The student school day schedule is set by the Miami-Dade County School Board and the school principal is not authorized to change it. Pursuant to HMS's established procedure, if a teacher was going to be absent, he or she must call the absence hotline at least 30 minutes prior to the start of the teacher workday. Shortly after the beginning of the 2011-2012 school year, Respondent began being tardy to work. HMS Principal Rachelle Surrancy or one of the HMS assistant principals would note Respondent's arrival time, either by being in the front of the school when she arrived2/ or by having to open the door to her classroom to let her homeroom class students in if she arrived after the late bell had rung. Surrancy verbally reminded Respondent of the school's starting time, then held an informal meeting with her on or about September 7, 2011, to remind her of the same. Respondent's young son suffers from a range of significant health conditions, including asthma, gastrointestinal reflux, apnea, pneumonia, lactose intolerance, allergic rhinitis, and eczema. He requires extensive care for these conditions, and Respondent was required to administer breathing treatments and other care on a daily basis. During flare-ups of her son's conditions, Respondent needed to take medical leave to provide that care. On or about September 20, 2011, Respondent submitted to Surrancy an Intermittent Leave Request Medical Certification form under the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA") (hereafter "FMLA Form")3/ requesting approval for Respondent to periodically take leave due to the intermittent illness of her young son. The FMLA form was completed and signed by Respondent's son's physician. Based on the child's medical history, the physician estimated that Respondent would need to take FMLA leave every two to three months, for a period lasting two to three days. Notwithstanding Surrancy's admonitions, Respondent continued to be tardy to work. During the first 25 days of the school year, Respondent was tardy 16 of those days. Most of the tardies entailed an arrival time of between two and five minutes late, but some entailed arrival times as much as 25 to 35 minutes late. When Respondent arrived after 7:40 a.m. (15 minutes late), her colleagues in the science department were placed in the position of having to cover her class until she arrived. As a result of Respondent's continued tardiness, on September 28, 2011, Surrancy issued a Punctuality to Work Directive ("Directive") to Respondent regarding her punctuality and attendance.4/ The Directive reminded Respondent that punctuality and attendance were essential components of her teaching position, and that as a faculty member, she served as a role model to other employees and student. Respondent was apprised that she was to arrive at work on time and sign in daily by 7:25 a.m. If she was going to be tardy, she was to communicate that to an assistant principal or to Surrancy. Surrancy explained that compliance with these directives was necessary to prevent adverse impact to the students and their academic progress, to ensure continuity of the educational program, and to maintain effective worksite operations. The memo advised Respondent that she could obtain assistance to facilitate her punctuality. Respondent was notified that noncompliance with the directives would be considered a violation of professional responsibilities and insubordination. Respondent told Surrancy that the reason she was tardy was that she had to take her son to his daycare center. The daycare center did not open until 7:00 a.m., making it difficult for her to arrive at HMS by 7:25 a.m. due to the commute in morning traffic. On October 5, 2011, Surrancy evaluated Respondent's instructional performance for the 2011-2012 school year pursuant to the Instructional Performance Evaluation and Growth System ("IPEGS"), the system used in the Miami-Dade County Public School District to evaluate instructional personnel. Surrancy rated Respondent as "effective" for each IPEGS standard other than Performance Standard ("PS") 7, "Professionalism."5/ For that standard, she rated Respondent's performance as "unsatisfactory" on the basis that due to her tardies, Respondent violated the School Board's Code of Ethics and Standards of Ethical Conduct policies.6/ After the September 28 meeting, Respondent continued to be tardy, so on October 10, 2011, Surrancy again met with her. Respondent explained that each day, her son required a breathing treatment regimen that she had to administer and that she had to take her son to daycare. Respondent told Surrancy that she planned to enlist the assistance of a friend to take her son to daycare so that may assist her to arrive on time.7/ Surrancy offered to adjust Respondent's workday schedule to allow her to arrive five minutes later to accommodate her travel time from her son's daycare to HMS, contingent on Respondent arriving at work by 7:30 a.m. However, Respondent continued to be tardy, at times arriving later than 7:30 a.m. Surrancy held a follow-up meeting with Respondent on October 25, 2011, at which she notified Respondent that the adjusted workday schedule no longer was in effect and that she was again required to arrive at 7:25 a.m.8/ In the meantime, Respondent sought to transfer to a school having a workday schedule with which she could more easily comply, given her son's daycare start time and her travel time. She was offered, but declined, a position at Redland Middle School, which entailed a teaching assignment that was out of her field of certification. Respondent declined the position because it did not meet the condition of her loan forgiveness program that the assignment be in a critical subject area——such as science and math——and because she did not believe she would be as proficient a teacher in teaching out of her subject area. Following the October 25 meeting, Respondent continued to be tardy. Several of these tardies necessitated coverage for her homeroom class. On December 14, 2011, Surrancy held a Conference-for- the-Record ("CFR") with Respondent to address her continued tardiness. By that time, Respondent had been tardy 45 days since the beginning of the school year, and several of these tardies necessitated coverage of her homeroom class by her colleagues. Surrancy informed Respondent that her tardies had adversely affected the educational program and services provided to students. Respondent was again directed to be punctual and in regular attendance, to communicate any intent to be tardy before 7:00 a.m. by calling the assistant principals or her, and to provide physician documentation and/or recertification of her FMLA form as needed if she was going to use FMLA leave to cover her tardies. Respondent was provided copies of Petitioner's policies on Standards of Ethical Conduct, Code of Ethics, and Leaves of Absence; Department of Education rules 6B-1.001 and 6B- 1.006; another copy of the FMLA for recertification by her physician; and other documents to inform and assist Respondent in addressing her tardiness problem. Respondent was informed that noncompliance with the directives would constitute insubordination and compel district disciplinary action. Respondent continued to be tardy. Again, several of these tardies necessitated coverage of her homeroom class. On February 13, 2012, Surrancy conducted another CFR with Respondent. As of that date, Respondent had been tardy 69 days since the beginning of the 2011-2012 school year. Surrancy issued Respondent the same directives previously given and again furnished Respondent copies of pertinent School Board policies, applicable Department of Education rules, and other informational documents. Surrancy informed Respondent that failure to comply with these directives would constitute gross insubordination and necessitate further disciplinary action. Respondent explained that her tardiness was due to a variety of factors, including having to perform breathing and other medical treatments on her son and taking him to daycare. She expressed concern at having to call in by 7:00 a.m. if she was going to be tardy because, for unforeseen reasons such as her son's daycare being late in opening, she may not know whether she was going to be tardy until after 7:00 a.m. Surrancy informed Respondent that under any circumstances, calling in did not excuse tardiness. Respondent requested that Surrancy assign her homeroom to another teacher and allow her to report at 7:45 a.m., when her science classes commenced. Surrancy refused. As a result of Respondent's continued tardies, Surrancy determined that her conduct constituted insubordination and noncompliance with applicable School Board policies. Surrancy issued a written Reprimand to Respondent on March 5, 2012. The Reprimand directed Respondent to adhere to school board policies, be punctual, and call Surrancy or an assistant principal before 7:00 a.m. if she were going to be tardy. Respondent nonetheless continued to be tardy, necessitating another CFR, which was held on March 29, 2012. By this time, Respondent had been tardy 86 days and absent 8.5 days in the 2011-2012 school year. During the CFR, Respondent provided two FMLA leave request forms completed by her son's treating physicians certifying the frequency and duration of her son's flare-ups that necessitated leave. One of these, dated March 6, 2012, stated that flare-ups occurred at a frequency of every one to two months for a duration of two to three days, while the other, dated February 20, 2012, stated that the flare-ups occurred approximately once a month and did not specify a duration. Under any circumstances, Respondent was tardy more frequently than the number of days of leave documented as necessary by either of these FMLA forms. Respondent again was given directives, which included those previously provided regarding punctuality and attendance, calling in by 7:00 a.m. if tardiness was anticipated, physician documentation for leave requests, performance of her teaching duties, comporting herself in a manner that reflected credit on herself and Miami-Dade County Public Schools, and adherence to School Board policies and applicable Department of Education rules. Respondent was again provided copies of the policies, rules, and other documents previously given to her. Respondent was offered the option of resigning her position but declined. Surrancy recommended that Respondent be suspended from her teaching position. However, Respondent was not suspended during the 2011-2012 school year.9/ Although Respondent's tardiness during the 2011-2012 school year required coverage of her homeroom class by colleagues on several occasions, she did not miss any classroom instructional time.10/ 2012-2013 School Year For the 2012-2013 school year, Respondent was hired as a math and science teacher in the Educational Alternative Outreach Program's ("EAO") credit recovery program. She was assigned to the EAO's 5000 Role Models location. In this assignment, Respondent taught between 12 and 15 students in grades six through eight. The 5000 Role Models facility was located between 35 and 40 miles from Respondent's home. She had a commute of between one hour ten minutes and two hours one way from her home to 5000 Role Models. The teacher workday hours for this location were 8:20 a.m. to 3:40 p.m. Respondent was informed of this schedule when she was interviewed by EAO Principal Claire Warren, and by letter from Warren regarding her projected teaching assignment for the 2012-2013 school year. Warren credibly testified that at the time she was interviewed, Respondent did not express any concerns regarding this schedule. The student school day at 5000 Role Models started at 9:00 a.m. Shortly after the school year commenced, Respondent began being tardy. During the first week of the students' school year, Respondent was tardy twice, approximately 20 minutes each time. On August 31, 2012, Warren issued Respondent a written memorandum reminding her of the directives that were issued the previous school year and directing her to be punctual and in regular attendance; call before 8:00 a.m. to notify either Warren or the assistant principal if she was going to be absent or tardy; provide physician documentation for absences and tardies due to illness; timely submit updated FMLA forms if anticipated illness or tardies covered under the FMLA are anticipated; adhere to all School Board policies; and perform her job responsibilities. Respondent was placed on notice that noncompliance with these directives would constitute gross insubordination and would necessitate notification of the Office of Professional Standards for the imposition of discipline. Respondent continued to be tardy. As of October 1, 2012, Respondent had been tardy eight times11/ and absent three days.12/ On some of the days she was tardy, Respondent did not call to notify the administration, as she had been directed to do; on other days, she sent text messages but did not call. Warren conducted another conference with Respondent on October 1, 2012. She issued another memorandum documenting Respondent's tardies since the beginning of the 2012-2013 school year, reiterating the directives previously issued on August 31, and notifying Respondent that failure to comply with the directives would constitute gross insubordination. Warren also provided a letter to Respondent regarding FMLA coverage of her tardies and absences. The letter informed Respondent that only absences, i.e., time away from the worksite, and not tardies were covered by the FMLA, and that it was her responsibility to notify the school if she were going to be absent pursuant to an FMLA-certified illness event. Attached to the letter was an FMLA Form to enable Respondent to update her FMLA-covered illness certification as necessary. Respondent's tardies continued. She was tardy on October 2, 5, 8, and 9——on some of these days as much as 45 to 70 minutes late. On the days when she was tardy by 40 or more minutes, she missed classroom instructional time and her students had to be placed in another teacher's classroom. On October 10, 2012, Petitioner took action to suspend Respondent for 30 workdays without pay,13/ for gross insubordination and for violating School Board policies regarding the Code of Ethics (policy 3210), Standards of Ethical Conduct (policy 3210.01), and Leaves of Absence (policy 3430), and rules 6B-1.001, 6B-1.006, and 6B-4.009.14/ Respondent served her suspension and returned to work on November 26, 2012. On that day, she was 11 minutes tardy; the following day, she was 40 minutes tardy. On November 29, 2012, Warren issued another memorandum to Respondent reiterating the directives previously given on August 31 and October 1. Respondent was informed that her failure to comply with the directives would constitute gross insubordination and would necessitate referral to the Office of Professional Standards for further discipline. Respondent continued to be tardy. In December 2012 and January 2013, Respondent was tardy 13 days, two of which required coverage of her class. Respondent did not call in to the school to notify them of her anticipated tardiness but she did notify the school by text message on some of these occasions. On February 1, 2013, Respondent was notified of a CFR scheduled for February 5, 2013. On February 4, 2013, Respondent notified Warren by electronic mail that she would not be at school that day or the following day. On February 6, 2013, Respondent notified Warren by electronic mail that she was taking a leave of absence "for at least the next few weeks." She also informed Warren that her absences the previous two days had been due to her own illness. Respondent did not submit a leave request form to Warren prior to taking sick leave. Respondent did submit a Leave of Absence Medical Documentation Form to the Miami-Dade County Public Schools Office of Retirement/Leave/Unemployment Compensation ("Leave Office") on February 5, 2013, containing her physician's certification that she was ill and recommending a leave of absence from February 4, 2013, to March 1, 2013. Because she was requesting approval of leave for less than 30 days' duration, under the UTD Contract, Respondent should have filed her leave request with Warren rather than with the Leave Office. UTD Contract Article XIV, section 2, paragraph A., governing notification in the event of teacher absence, states in pertinent part: When a teacher, for whom an emergency temporary instructor is employed, will be absent from work, due to illness or injury or due to personal reasons, he/she shall notify the supervising administrator (or designee), as soon as possible, but no later than one hour before the start of his/her scheduled workday, in order that an emergency temporary instructor can be employed or other arrangements made. If said absence/leave is for a specified period of time, no further notice is necessary. In the event of a change in this specified period of absence, the employee will proceed, pursuant to the stipulations herein. Where an absent teacher does not notify his/her supervising administrator, as stipulated herein, and where there are not extenuating circumstances, as determined by the supervising administrator, such teacher will have the option to utilize personal leave or leave without pay. However, such determination by the supervising administrator shall not be made arbitrarily. UTD Contract, art. XIV, § 2.A. (emphasis added). Article XIV, section 10, governs sick leave without pay for illness. Paragraph C. of that section states: "[e]mployees whose illness requires an absence of over 30 days must file an application for extended sick leave indicating the anticipated length of such absence and supported by a statement from competent medical authority." This leave request would be filed with the Leave Office. However, because Respondent did not request sick leave for a period exceeding 30 days, this provision was not applicable to her leave request. Notwithstanding, Respondent's leave request was reviewed by a medical consultant for Miami-Dade County Public Schools and ultimately was denied. Apparently, some time elapsed before the Leave Office forwarded Respondent's leave request and denial decision to Warren. Warren testified: "I didn't get the request until much afterwards, you know, after she had been out several days " Even after Warren received Respondent's leave request form and denial from the Leave Office, more time passed before she notified Respondent. It was not until March 1, 2013, that Warren sent Respondent a letter informing her that her leave request had been denied and that her absences for the entire month of February were unauthorized, thus warranting her dismissal on the basis of job abandonment. At approximately the same time Warren notified Respondent that her leave request was denied, Warren also notified Respondent, by separate email, that she had incorrectly submitted her leave request to the Leave Office, instead of submitting it to her (Warren). On the same day that Warren notified Respondent that her leave request had been denied, Respondent submitted another leave request form and a medical documentation form to Warren, retroactively requesting approval of her sick leave taken between February 4 to March 18, 2013, due to her own illness. Warren denied the request that same day, citing the medical consultant's determination as the basis for the denial. Warren's letter did not cite an independent basis for the denial. Petitioner did not present any competent evidence regarding the specific basis for the medical consultant's determination to deny the request. Respondent returned to work on March 4, 2013. She was tardy that day and the following day. On March 6, 2013, a CFR was held. The CFR originally had been scheduled for February 5, 2013, but when Respondent took leave, it was rescheduled. At the meeting, Respondent was apprised that her tardies and absences were excessive and that they, along with her failure to adhere to the other previously issued directives, constituted gross insubordination. On March 13, 2013, Petitioner took action to suspend Respondent without pay and terminate her employment as a teacher. Respondent's Criminal History Petitioner presented evidence that in August 2012, a records check for Respondent was generated after information was received from Petitioner's Fingerprinting Office indicating that Respondent had been arrested in January 2011 for violation of a protective injunction and in July 2011 for battery. However, this evidence consisted solely of hearsay. Petitioner did not present any non-hearsay evidence establishing that these arrests occurred. Respondent denied that she was arrested in January 2011. She acknowledged that she was arrested for battery in July 2011. She testified, credibly, that the arrest occurred over the July 4th holiday and that she timely reported this arrest by calling Petitioner's instructional staffing office. Respondent credibly testified that the charge was not prosecuted and ultimately was dismissed. Petitioner did not present any competent or credible evidence to refute Respondent's testimony on these points. Respondent's Defenses Respondent asserts that she was not tardy as frequently in the 2011-2012 school year as Petitioner asserts. She questions the accuracy of Surrancy's and others' recordkeeping regarding her tardiness. However, she did not present any specific evidence to show that Petitioner's records of her tardiness in the 2011-2012 were inaccurate; thus, her position on that point is essentially speculative. She also claims that Surrancy did not treat her fairly or equitably during the 2011-2012 school year. Specifically, she asserts that Surrancy had the authority and flexibility to adjust her workday schedule so that she did not have to cover a homeroom class, thus allowing her to arrive at work later, but that Surrancy unfairly chose not to do so. Respondent further asserts that Surrancy had provided such accommodation to another teacher in a previous school year. Thus, Respondent claims that Surrancy treated her unfairly.15/ However, Surrancy testified, persuasively, that she could not have relieved Respondent of having a homeroom in order to enable her to arrive later in the workday because instructional personnel, other than coaches and co-teachers, were assigned homeroom or other professional duties that required them to be at school during regular workday hours. Thus, there was no one else available to assume Respondent's homeroom class responsibilities.16/ Respondent also asserts that Surrancy treated her disparately and unfairly by singling her out for discipline for her tardies, while not disciplining others who also were often tardy. However, even if that were the case, it does not excuse Respondent's tardies or provide a basis for Surrancy to decline to enforce school policies with respect to Respondent. Respondent also asserts that she was not afforded the FMLA leave to which she was legally and contractually entitled. Specifically, she argues that she filed FMLA leave forms stating the need for intermittent leave to care for her son, so that for the days on which she was tardy, the number of minutes by which she was tardy should have been counted as leave under the FMLA. Respondent testified, credibly, that she did not purposely refuse to follow the directives given her by Surrancy, Warren, and the Office of Professional Standards, and that her tardies during both school years were the result of her having to provide medical care for her young son and take him to daycare, then commute in heavy traffic to the worksites. Moreover, to the extent Petitioner claimed that Respondent was insubordinate because she did not adhere to directives to call the school if she was going to be tardy, Respondent credibly countered that she often would call in, only to be put on hold for some time and then told that the administrator she was attempting to reach was not available; thus, she started sending text messages instead to ensure that her message was received. Regarding the arrest reporting issue, Respondent denied that she was arrested in January 2011, and testified that she timely reported her July 2011 arrest to the appropriate authority. Findings of Ultimate Fact In these consolidated proceedings, Petitioner seeks to suspend Respondent without pay and terminate her employment17/ as a teacher on the basis of just cause——specifically, gross insubordination and misconduct in office.18/ As more fully addressed below, Petitioner bears the burden of proof, by a preponderance of the evidence, to show that Respondent committed the violations of section 1012.33 and rules 6A-5.056; and 6B-1.001 and 6A-10.080; and 6B-1.006 and 6A-10.081. Gross Insubordination Pursuant to the foregoing findings of fact, it is determined that Petitioner proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Respondent's conduct in accruing an extensive number of tardies during the 2011-2012 and 2012-2013 school years constituted gross insubordination. Although Respondent did submit leave request forms estimating the frequency and duration of FMLA-covered leave she would need in order to care for her son, the evidence shows that she was tardy far more frequently than supported by any of the forms she submitted. In order to accommodate an employee's FMLA request, Petitioner must be able to rely on the information the employee provides on the FMLA leave form. If the information provided on the form is inaccurate, Petitioner is neither required nor authorized to consider undocumented time away from the work site as leave covered under the FMLA.19/ While it is admittedly difficult to precisely predict when illness will occur, under any circumstances, the forms Respondent submitted did not cover the frequency of her tardies incurred in the 2011- 2012 and 2012-2013 school years.20/ As addressed above, it appears that Respondent was the victim of a coalescence of unfortunate personal circumstances that interfered with her employment. Nonetheless, the fact remains that she was repeatedly put on notice by Surrancy, Warren, and the Office of Professional Standards that her continued tardiness would constitute gross insubordination. Any measures that Respondent purportedly took to rectify the circumstances, such as enlisting the help of a friend to take her son to daycare, apparently were unsuccessful. Respondent had the option in the 2011-2012 school year to transfer to another school to address the morning commute issues, but she chose not to. Although she had legitimate personal and professional reasons for choosing to remain at HMS, the fact remains that she elected not to pursue a course of action that may have addressed the problematic circumstances she found herself in. Under these circumstances, the undersigned concludes, albeit reluctantly, that Respondent's conduct——which took place over a period of two school years, after frequent admonitions, and after she had been placed on notice several times that her continued conduct would constitute gross insubordination——does, in fact, constitute gross insubordination. With respect to Respondent's absences in February 2013, the evidence indicates that Petitioner's Leave Office and Principal Warren unnecessarily delayed notifying Respondent that her leave request for February 2013 had been denied. The evidence gives rise to the inference that Respondent may have cut her leave short and returned to the work site had she been timely informed that her request had been denied. Moreover, Petitioner presented no competent evidence regarding the specific basis for the Leave Office's denial of Respondent's request, or for Warren's denial of Respondent's retroactive request on the same basis. Under these circumstances, the undersigned determines that Respondent's absences for the month of February 2013 should not be considered unexcused. However, even without considering these absences, Respondent's repeated tardiness over an extended period of time without proper leave documentation and after extensive prior notice of the consequences, is sufficient to establish gross insubordination. Misconduct in Office As more fully discussed below, Petitioner proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Respondent committed misconduct in office under both versions of rule 6A-5.056 in effect in the 2011-2012 and 2012-2013 school years, respectively. Specifically, Respondent's frequent and repeated tardiness during the 2011-2012 school year violated the Code of Ethics in the Education Profession because her conduct caused her to lose the respect and confidence of her colleagues. In particular, Respondent's frequent tardiness substantially undermined Surrancy's confidence in her reliability, and, thus, impaired her effectiveness in the school system. Respondent's frequent and repeated tardiness over the course of the 2012-2013 school year also constituted misconduct in office. Again, she violated the Code of Ethics in the Education Profession by failing to maintain the respect and confidence of her colleagues. Respondent's frequent tardiness adversely affected Warren's confidence in her reliability. Additionally, on the days when Respondent's tardiness necessitated her students being moved to another teacher's classroom, her students' learning environment was disrupted, and her own ability and that of her colleagues to effectively perform their duties was reduced. As a result, Respondent's effectiveness in the school system was impaired. Petitioner also charged Respondent with violating Policy 3210, Standards of Ethical Conduct, which provides that all employees are representatives of the Miami-Dade County School District and requires employees to conduct themselves in a manner that will reflect credit upon themselves and the school system. Respondent's frequent tardies over an extended period of time gave the appearance of disregard for school policies and did not reflect credit on her or on the school district. Moreover, Respondent did not protect her students from conditions harmful to learning on the days when they had to be moved to another teacher's classroom due to her tardiness.21/ Accordingly, Respondent violated Policy 3210. Respondent also violated Policy 3210.01, Petitioner's Code of Ethics. As found above, she did not protect her students from conditions harmful to learning on the days when she was so tardy that they had to be moved to another classroom. However, Respondent did not violate Policy 3430, Leaves of Absence. For the reasons discussed above, Respondent's absences in February 2013 should not have been determined unexcused; thus, she did not violate Policy 3430. Respondent also did not violate Policy 3121.01, Employment Standards and Fingerprinting of Employees. To the extent Petitioner argues that Respondent lacks good moral character based on having been arrested, Petitioner did not present any competent evidence regarding her arrests or failure to timely report them as required by school board policy. Respondent acknowledged that she had been arrested in July 2011 but testified that she had timely reported it, and that the charge ultimately was dismissed. Petitioner did not offer any competent evidence22/ to counter Respondent's testimony, which is deemed credible and persuasive. Factual Basis for Recommended Sanction The persuasive evidence establishes that Respondent did not purposely set out to violate school policies and Department of Education rules, but that circumstances coalesced such that Respondent found herself in the extremely difficult position of having to care for her very ill son and take him to daycare, then undertake a lengthy commute in morning traffic, without enough time to accomplish both. As unfortunate and trying as those circumstances were, they do not excuse Respondent from complying with the crucial and reasonable requirement that employees arrive to work on time.23/ Nonetheless, the evidence establishes that Respondent is an innovative, proficient teacher in the critical subject areas of science and math, and that she cares about performing her job well——to the extent that she declined an out-of-field teaching assignment, in part due to concern that she would not perform effectively in that assignment. As such, it is reasonable to infer that under less demanding circumstances, such as having a shorter commute or a later workday starting time, Respondent would perform her teaching duties proficiently and professionally. The circumstances in this case warrant upholding Respondent's suspensions without pay commencing on October 11, 2012, and ending on November 26, 2012, and commencing on March 13, 2013, through the summer vacation following the 2013- 2014 school year, and denying back pay for the full period of her suspension. However, given the very trying circumstances Respondent faced in the 2011-2012 and 2012-2013 school years, and because the evidence indicates that under less oppressive circumstances Respondent likely would be an innovative, proficient, and professional teacher, the undersigned believes that terminating Respondent's employment would be excessively harsh and that Petitioner would lose a good teacher.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner, Miami-Dade County School Board, enter a final order upholding Respondent's suspensions without pay commencing on October 11, 2012, and ending on November 26, 2012, and commencing on March 13, 2013, through the summer vacation following the 2013-2014 school year; denying back pay for the full period of her suspension; and reinstating Respondent's employment as a teacher at the start of the 2014- 2015 school year. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of March, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CATHY M. SELLERS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of March, 2014
Conclusions This cause coming on to be heard before THE SCHOOL BOARD OF BROWARD COUNTY, FLORIDA, at its meeting conducted on January 18, 2012, to consider (1) the Recommended Order of Dismissal rendered on November 16, 2011, by the Honorable Jessica E. Varn, Administrative Law Judge of the State of Florida, Division of Administrative Hearings, consisting of Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and a Recommendation; (2) Petitioner’s Exceptions to Recommended Order of Dismissal; (3) Respondent’s Response in Opposition to Petitioner’s Exceptions; and (4) Costs Affidavit. THE SCHOOL BOARD OF BROWARD COUNTY, FLORIDA, having reviewed the entire record and transcript, and having heard oral arguments presented by representatives on behalf of the parties, and being fully advised in the Premises: IT IS THEREUPON ORDERED AND ADJUDGED BY THE SCHOOL BOARD OF BROWARD COUNTY, FLORIDA, that: 1. With Petitioner’s consent, THE SCHOOL BOARD does not rule upon paragraphs | through 13 and paragraphs 17 through 27 of Petitioner’s Exceptions to Recommended Order of Filed January 23, 2012 4:44 PM Division of Administrative Hearings After Schoo! Programs, Inc. vs. Broward County School Board DOAH Case Number: 11-5458BID SBBC AGENDA 011812HH1 Final Order Dismissal as they do meet the requirements for exceptions as such are outlined in Section 120.57(1)(k), Florida Statutes. 2. Paragraphs 14 through 16 inclusive of Petitioner’s Exceptions to Recommended Order of Dismissal are denied by THE SCHOOL BOARD to the extent that such paragraphs assert exceptions to findings of fact. 3. Paragraphs 14 through 16 inclusive of Petitioner’s Exceptions to Recommended Order of Dismissal are denied by THE SCHOOL BOARD to the extent that such paragraphs assert exceptions to conclusions of law. 4. The prayer for relief within Petitioner’s Exceptions to Recommended Order of Dismissal is denied by THE SCHOOL BOARD to the extent that it asserts an exception to the recommended penalty contained within the Recommended Order of Dismissal. 5. THE SCHOOL BOARD OF BROWARD COUNTY, FLORIDA accepts, approves and adopts in its entirety the Recommended Order of Dismissal and dismisses the bid protest of Petitioner AFTER SCHOOL PROGRAMS, INC. for lack of standing. 6. Costs in the amount of $2,255.57 are hereby awarded in favor of THE SCHOOL BOARD OF BROWARD COUNTY, FLORIDA and against the Petitioner, AFTER SCHOOL PROGRAMS, INC. DONE AND ORDERED in Fort Lauderdale, Broward County, Florida this_23 day of - 2012. THE SCHOOL BOARD OF BROWARD COYNTY, FLORIDA By: Ann Murray, Chair Page 2 of 4 After School Programs, Inc. vs. Broward County Schoo! Board DOAH Case Number: 11-5458BID SBBC AGENDA 011812HH1 Final Order JA A Supervisor, Officia Copies furnished to: ROBERT W. RUNCIE, Superintendent of Schools Office of the Superintendent The School Board of Broward County, Florida 600 Southeast Third Avenue — 10" Floor Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 HARRIS K. SOLOMON, ESQUIRE Brinkley Morgan Attorneys for Petitioner After School Programs 200 East Las Olas Boulevard — 19"" Floor Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 ROBERT PAUL VIGNOLA, ESQUIRE Office of the School Board Attorney Attorneys for Respondent School Board Kathleen C. Wright Administrative Building 600 Southeast Third Avenue - 11th Floor Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 STATE OF FLORIDA, DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 Page 3 of 4 After Schooi Programs, Inc. vs. Broward County School Board DOAH Case Number: 11-5458BID SBBC AGENDA 011812HH1 Final Order APPEAL OF FINAL ORDER Pursuant to Section 120.68, Fla. Sta., a party to this proceeding may seek judicial review of this Final Order in the appropriate district court of appeal by filing a notice of appeal with Noemi Gutierrez, Agency Clerk, Official School Board Records, The School Board of Broward County, Florida, 600 Southeast Third Avenue — gn Floor, Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301, on or before thirty (30) days from the date of this Final Order. A copy of the notice and a copy of this Final Order, together with the appropriate filing fee, must also be filed with the Clerk, Fourth District Court of Appeal, 1525 Palm Beach Lakes Boulevard, West Palm Beach, Florida 33401- 2399. If you fail to file your notice of appeal within the time prescribed by laws and the rules of court, you will lose your right to appeal this Final Order. fritz allwork doah bidprotest afterschoolprograms ASP-Final Order- 2012.1,18.final.doc Page 4 of 4
The Issue The Respondent seeks to cancel and/or rescind the continuing contract of the Petitioner based on the fact that she refused to report to work as requested. The issue to be resolved is whether the Respondent may refuse to grant an instructor who is the holder of a continuing contract a consecutive fifth year of personal leave and secondly whether or not the Respondent may properly dismiss its instructional employee who has requested and has been denied such leave and thereafter refuses to report to work as directed.
Findings Of Fact The testimony of Wilbur S. Franklin, Principal, and Armando Henriquez, Superintendent, District School Board of Monroe County and other documentary evidence reveals that the Petitioner was granted personal leave for four consecutive school years beginning with the 1971-72 school year. The Petitioner also requested personal leave for a fifth year (school year 1975-76) and the principal of the school to which she was last assigned and who was responsible for approving such requests denied it. Messr. Franklin, Principal, testified that his reason for denying the Petitioner a fifth year of personal leave was based on the fact that he needed to make permanent staffing recommendations and the situation in which the Petitioner presented posed a problem in that from year to year he did not know whether or not she would return to school or whether she would again request an additional year of personal leave. He testified that in making his staff recommendations, he sought the best instructors in order to have a sound overall educational program and in order to fulfill that goal, he sought to utilize the services of the most qualified instructors available. The Petitioner testified that during the four years of annual leave which she was granted, she obtained a masters degree in guidance and counseling and that she thought that her training and educational background was more attuned to that type position and that was the position in which she was seeking with the Respondent. She testified that she was certified and was holder of a continuing contract as a classroom teacher and that her employment with the Respondent was in the areas of elementary education, i.e., fourth grade and below. She further testified that she made application for part-time and full- time positions in the areas of guidance and counseling and while vacancies have occurred during those times in which she had an application pending, she was bypassed and she voiced her opinion that based on her education and tenure, she has been discriminated against. In this regard the undersigned asked her to point to specific instances which would substantiate her position and she was unable to do so during the course of the hearing. She testified that vacancies occurred and were filled but she did not know what the educational background of the person(s) who was selected to fill these positions. The Petitioner has been an instructor within the county for more than fifteen years and she, as earlier stated, is the holder of a continuing contract. During March, 1975, she requested by letter a fifth year of annual leave and the Respondent, through its Principal, Messr. Franklin, advised that a fifth year of annual leave would not be granted to her. The Petitioner appealed this denial up to the level of superintendent and he sustained the Principal's recommendation. Messrs. Arthur, Assistant Superintendent Monroe County School District, Armando Henriquez and Wilbur Franklin, Principal, all testified that when the school year 1975-76 began, the Petitioner did not report for duty and has not reported during the current school year. They all testified that while they had no direct conversations with the Petitioner, they have corresponded through written communiques. The Petitioner was given 10 days following the conclusion of the hearing to submit any supporting memoranda which would tend to substantiate her claim that her denial of a position in guidance and counseling was done for ulterior and other unlawful reasons. Respondent's counsel asked the undersigned to take official notice of Section 231.43,44, Florida Statutes, regarding absence without leave and school board rules and regulations 1.4.13 dealing with absence without leave and 1.4.14, personal leave without pay as to the discretion vested in the Respondent with regard to setting school policies. The Petitioner in accordance with her request for ten days leave to file a written statement and/or other documentary evidence supportive of her position, has submitted such and it has been duly considered. Section 231.43, F.S., states, in pertinent part, that the school board shall adopt regulations prescribing conditions under which the instructional staff shall be granted personal leave which when granted shall be approved by the superintendent. In keeping with this dictate, the Respondent promulgated certain guides for the granting of leave (See Board's Exhibit No. 9 received in evidence and made a part hereof). Section 231.44, F.S., dealing with "Absence without leave" states pertinently that any instructor who is willfully absent from duty without leave shall forfeit compensation...and his contract shall be subject to cancellation...(Emphasis added). It is true that the Petitioner has requested positions in areas which she was certified and the evidence indicates that, at least on one occasion, a vacancy existed and was filled by another applicant. However absent any evidence that the successful applicant was selected based on an arbitrary or capricious method or that the Petitioner was not selected due to some discriminatory or other unlawful means, it must be inferred that the Respondent employment selection process was fair. Nor was any evidence submitted which tends to show that the Respondent's attempt to dismiss the Petitioner was initiated for any reason other than the stated reason advanced by Messr. Franklin to the effect that he was desirous of establishing a stable and efficient complement of instructors. It is only logical that an administrator would seek to achieve this. Based on the above and the entire record, it is recommended that the Respondent be permitted to terminate the employment of the Petitioner, Betty Suarez Patterson for failing to report for work and continuing to do so at her assigned position at Truman Elementary School, Key West, Florida. DONE and ORDERED this 28th day of January, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of January, 1976. COPIES FURNISHED: Hilary U. Alberry, Esquire 310 Fleming Street Post Office Drawer 1430 Key West, Florida 33040 Betty Suarez Patterson 3712 Donald Avenue Key West, Florida 33040
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner has just cause to terminate Respondent's employment.
Findings Of Fact Ms. Williams has been employed by the School Board for 15 years and is currently a 12-month custodian at Longwood Elementary School (School), located in Seminole County, Florida. As a 12-month custodian, Ms. Williams is allowed sick and annual leave. Ms. Williams requested leave beginning July 7, 2010, to September 29, 2010, for back surgery. On August 10, 2010, the School received a letter dated July 8, 2010, from Ms. Williams's physician, advising that Ms. Williams had undergone surgery for a spinal disorder on July 7, 2010, and would need 12 weeks to recover prior to returning to work. On October 1, 2010, Ms. Williams called the School and advised that she was not able to return to work and requested leave from September 30, 2010, through October 28, 2010. Her physician sent a letter dated September 30, 2010, to the School, advising that Ms. Williams would need an additional four weeks for recovery. By this time, Ms. Williams had exhausted all her paid leave and was on leave without pay. Ms. Williams was unable to come to the School to sign the application for leave; however, the leave was approved by the principal of the School, Virginia Fisher (Ms. Fisher), who was Ms. Williams's direct supervisor. By November 2, 2010, Ms. Williams was still unable to return to work, and her physician sent another letter to the School, advising that Ms. Williams would need an additional four weeks for recovery. Ms. Williams requested leave from November 2, 2010, to November 30, 2010. Again, Ms. Williams was unable to come to the School to sign the application for leave, but it was approved by Ms. Fisher. By December 1, 2010, Ms. Williams was still unable to return to work and requested leave from December 1, 2010, through January 3, 2011. Her physician sent a letter to the School, stating that Ms. Williams needed an additional four weeks for recovery. Ms. Williams was unable to come to the School to sign the application, and the leave request was approved by Ms. Fisher. Ms. Williams's physician sent a letter dated December 27, 2010, to the School, stating that Ms. Williams had not quite reached maximum medical improvement with respect to her recovery and that he would need to see her in four weeks for reevaluation. Ms. Williams signed and submitted an application for leave for January 4, 2011, through January 24, 2011. The leave was approved. Ms. Williams's physician submitted a Return to Work/School Certificate dated January 21, 2011, to the School, stating that Ms. Williams would be able to return to work on January 24, 2011, with the following restrictions: "light duty with no repetitive lifting over her head, lifting restriction of = 30 lbs." Ms. Williams discussed the issue of light duty with Steve Bouzianis (Mr. Bouzianis), director of Human Resources, Staffing and Operations for the School Board. She told him that she had been advised by staff at the School that she needed to come back to work or submit a request for additional leave. Mr. Bouzianis informed her that she could not do the custodial job with the restrictions set by her physician. Ms. Williams was advised to submit a request for leave and was told that it would be approved. By February 18, 2011, Ms. Williams had not submitted a request for leave or submitted a letter from her physician stating that she needed to be absent from work due to an illness. By letter dated February 18, 2011, Ms. Fisher enclosed a leave request form and directed Ms. Williams to complete the form and return it to her, along with a physician's statement substantiating Ms. Williams's need for her absences no later than February 23, 2011. Ms. Fisher further advised that, if Ms. Williams could not obtain a physician's statement, Ms. Fisher would approve the leave for the remainder of the year as personal leave without pay. Ms. Fisher advised in the letter of the consequences for failure to request leave and stated: Should you fail to return to me your signed request for leave form and the supporting physician's statement (if applicable) by the date identified above [February 23, 2011], you will be considered as absent from duty without approved leave, and in violation of adopted School Board policy. In that event, the Superintendent of Schools will recommend to the School Board that you be suspended from your duties and further that your employment with the School Board of Seminole County, Florida[,] be terminated. The School received a letter dated February 22, 2011, from Ms. Williams's physician, who stated that Ms. Williams could return to work on January 24, 2011, with the same restrictions previously listed on the Return to Work/School Certificate. On February 23, 2011, Cynthia Frye (Ms. Frye), who is Ms. Fisher's assistant, attempted to call Ms. Williams at her sister's telephone number, which is the number that Ms. Williams had given the School to contact in case of an emergency. At the time, Ms. Williams was living with her sister and staying some of the time with her son. Ms. Frye called at 2:37 p.m., and got no answer, and called again at 3:15 p.m., at which time she spoke to Ms. Williams's sister. Ms. Frye told the sister that it was important that Ms. Williams call Ms. Frye. Ms. Williams had not called Ms. Frye by the morning of February 24, 2011. Ms. Frye attempted to call Ms. Williams twice during the morning of February 24, 2011, and three times during the afternoon. On the last call, she left a message with Ms. Williams's sister that it was imperative that Ms. Williams call Ms. Frye that night or Ms. Frye could not help Ms. Williams. By March 4, 2011, the School still had not heard from Ms. Williams. Ms. Fisher sent Ms. Williams a letter dated March 4, 2011, stating that, because Ms. Williams had not contacted the School to request leave, Ms. Williams's absences since January 25, 2011, were considered as absences from duty without approved leave. Ms. Fisher advised Ms. Williams that, based on Ms. Williams's third and continuing absences, Ms. Fisher would recommend to the superintendent of schools that Ms. Williams's employment with the Seminole County Public Schools be terminated. When questioned at the final hearing concerning her reasoning for not requesting leave, Ms. Williams indicated that she wanted to work, but the School would not let her come back to work with light duty restrictions. She contacted her attorney and, based on his advice, did not request leave. Ms. Williams's employment is governed by the Official Agreement between the Non-Instructional Personnel of Seminole County Board of Public Instruction Association, Inc., and the School Board (Agreement). Article VII of the Agreement provides: Section 4. * * * B. A regular employee who has been hired for four (4) or more years may only be terminated for just cause except as otherwise provided in A. above. * * * Section 5. A. Regular employees who have been hired for a minimum of three (3) continuous years (without a break in service) shall not be disciplined (which shall include reprimands), suspended or terminated except for just cause. * * * C. An employee may be suspended without pay or discharged for reasons including, but not limited to, the following provided that just cause is present: Violation of School Board Policy Violation of work rules Insubordination--Refusal to follow a proper directive, order, or assignment from a supervisor While on duty, the possession and/or the use of intoxicating beverages or controlled substances after reporting for work and until after the employees leaves the work site after the equipment, if applicable, has been checked in Endangering the health, safety or welfare of any student or employee of the District The conviction of a felony in the State of Florida or notice of conviction of a substantially parallel offense in another jurisdiction An act committed while off duty, which because of its publication through the media or otherwise adversely affects the employee's performance or duties, or disrupts the operations of the District, its schools, or other work/cost centers Excessive tardiness Damage to School Board property Improper use of sick leave Failure to perform assigned duties Other infractions, as set forth from time to time in writing and disseminated by the Superintendent or designee. * * * Section 11. Absence Without Leave Employees will be considered absent without leave if they fail to notify their principal, appropriate director or supervisor that they will be absent from duty and the reason for such absence. Absence without leave is a breach of contract and may be grounds for immediate dismissal. * * * Section 15. Employees shall report absences and the reason for such absences prior to the start of their duty day in accordance with practices established at each cost center. An employee who has been determined to have been AWOL shall be subject to the following progressive discipline procedures: 1st Offense--Written reprimand and one day suspension without pay. 2nd Offense--Five day suspension without pay. 3rd Offense--Recommendation for termination. Each day that an employee is AWOL shall be considered a separate offense. However, any documentation of offenses in this section shall be maintained in the employee's personnel file.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered terminating Ms. Williams's employment with the School Board. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of July, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUSAN B. HARRELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of July, 2011.
The Issue Whether Respondent should be dismissed from employment with the Sumter County School Board pursuant to Chapter 221, Florida Statutes, as set forth in petition and notice of charges dated July 16, 1979, and amendment to petition, dated November 6, 1979. In this proceeding, Petitioner alleges that Respondent has committed acts rendering him subject to termination of employment as a member of the instructional staff of the School Board of Sumter County, and cancellation of his continuing contract. The alleged acts are willful absence from duty without leave, misconduct in office, and willful neglect of duty in violation of Chapter 231, Florida Statutes. The charges stem from three alleged instances in January and February, 1979, of improper use of sick leave. The petition and charges were filed by the District School Superintendent and were referred by the Petitioner to the Division of Administrative Hearings on August 28, 1979. Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the charges with the School Board prior to referral to this Division, alleging that he had not been given an opportunity to appear before the Board when it had considered the charges, and that the charges had been untimely filed. The motion was denied by the Hearing Officer on the merits and because Section 231.36(6), Florida Statutes, which governs such disciplinary actions, does not require any specific procedures in processing cases prior to a final determination. On November 6, 1979, Petitioner amended its petition to add an additional allegation of misuse of sick leave on January 12, 1979. Respondent opposed the amendment on the ground the allegation had not been brought before the School Board for action, and therefore should not have been referred to hearing. The Hearing Officer granted Petitioner's motion to amend the petition for the same reasons stated in the preceding paragraph. However, the scheduled date of final hearing was continued from November 29, 1979 to January 9, 1980 to provide Respondent an opportunity to adequately prepare his defense.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Arnold James Constable, holds Florida Teaching Certificate Number 330507, Graduate Rank III, and is a member of the instructional staff of Petitioner School Board of Sumter County. He is employed pursuant to continuing contract as a physical education teacher at the North Sumter Intermediate School, Wildwood, Florida, and has been so employed since the beginning of the 1978-1979 school year. (Testimony of Respondent, Petitioner's Exhibit 1, Case pleadings.) On December 30, 1978, Respondent was arrested in Altamonte Springs and charged with petit theft of merchandise from a department store. Respondent informed the police booking officer that his occupation was "fast order cook" and that he had a twelfth grade education. Respondent was employed as a short- order cook during the Christmas holidays in 1978. On the evening of January 11, 1979, Respondent telephoned a substitute teacher, told her that he had gastro-intestinal flu, and asked if she would substitute for him at the school on the next day. She agreed and did substitute for Respondent at the North Sumter Intermediate School on January 12. Respondent also called the school secretary on the evening of January 11, and told her that he had severe stomach pains and would not be able to be at school the following day, but that he had arranged for a substitute teacher. On January 15th, Respondent told his school principal, Mrs. Josephine Strong, that he had been ill on January 12th and also during the preceding weekend. (Testimony of Davis, Respondent, Winkles, Strong, Petitioner's Exhibit 3.) On January 12, 1979, Respondent was present at the Seminole County Court, Sanford, Florida, for arraignment on the pending charge against him. He pleaded not guilty to the charge. Thereafter, he was notified to be present at the County Court on February 5, 1979 with jury trial scheduled to be held during that week. (Testimony of Horneffer, Kugler, Sundvall, Petitioner's Exhibits 8- 9.) On Sunday, February 4, 1979, Respondent asked his mother, Mrs. Elva Constable, to call the secretary at the North Sumter Intermediate School and tell her that he would not be present at the school the following day, but he said not to tell her that he was sick. Mrs. Constable called the school secretary that evening and told her that Respondent was sick and would not be at school the next day, and would need a substitute teacher. Respondent was not at the school on the following day, February 5, and a substitute teacher was obtained. On February 5, Mrs. Constable again called the school secretary and told her that her son was still sick, would not be at school on the following day, and would again need a substitute. Respondent was not present at the school on February 6, and a substitute was again obtained as a result of his absence. Mrs. Constable was aware of the pending criminal charge against her son in Seminole County. She admitted at the hearing that her son was not ill on February 5th and 6th, and that he lied to the school secretary concerning the reason for his absences because she was apprehensive that if school officials learned of such charge, Respondent might be suspended or dismissed from his employment. (Testimony of E. Constable, Winkles, Respondent, Petitioner's Exhibit 4.) On February 5, 1979, Respondent appeared in the Seminole County Court and his trial was scheduled for the following day. On February 6, he represented himself at a jury trial and was acquitted of the pending charge. During the trial, Respondent appeared to be in good health. (Testimony of Horneffer, Kugler, McClug, Cadavid, Petitioner's Exhibit 8.) The standard procedure to record absences for sick leave is for the school secretary to maintain a Sick Leave Compensation Application for the employee each school month. Absences for sick leave are recorded on the form which is signed by the employee and the school principal after the first absence. Subsequent absences are noted on the form but it is not signed again by the applicant. At the end of the month, the number of days absent are totaled, and the sick leave form is submitted to the County School Board office, along with the payroll. In January, 1979, Respondent's sick leave form reflects that he was absent on January 2 and January 12. The date of his signature thereon is January 2. In February, 1979, the form shows that Respondent was absent on February 5 and 6. His signature and that of the principal on the form are dated February 5 although they did not sign the form until some day subsequent to February 6. (Testimony of Winkles, Strong, Petitioner's Exhibits 3-4,190.) The collective bargaining agreement between Petitioner and the Sumter County Educational Association provides that instructional personnel may use up to a maximum of four days per year for personal leave chargeable to accumulated sick leave provided the request submitted for such leave contains a statement setting forth reasons to substantiate the nature of the extenuating circumstances requiring the employee to be absent from his duties. The agreement provides that a request for such leave should be submitted to the county office through the principal at least 2 hours prior to the effective date of leave. The form for such personal leave with pay used in the Sumter County school system provides that application should be submitted to the county office one week prior to the effective date of leave. The teaching association has sought in past years to eliminate the requirement that a reason be stated in an application for personal leave. Discussions between both county officials and teacher representatives during bargaining sessions have included the subject of sick leave abuse by employees in utilizing such leave for personal purposes. However, there is no evidence that such abuse was a common practice by county school board personnel. In January and February, 1979, Respondent had four days of personal eave available for authorized use. (Testimony of Winkles, Strong, Foster, Harner, Edwards, Petitioner's Exhibits 7, 10-11.) In 1976, while Respondent was teaching at Webster Elementary School, Webster, Florida, he received letters of admonition concerning improper paddling of students from Principal R. C. Foote. As a result of another paddling incident in February, 1978, the principal again censured Respondent in a letter, dated February 24, 1978. Further paddling incidents in early May, 1978, wherein Respondent purportedly used excessive force, resulted in a recommendation by the principal to the County School Superintendent, Joe R. Strickland, on May 8, 1978, that Respondent be suspended from teaching. Superintendent Strickland notified Respondent in a letter dated May 9, 1978, that he had requested the State Professional Practices Council to investigate the matter and make a recommendation concerning dismissal based on gross insubordination and conduct unbecoming a public officer. Thereafter, Respondent and a group of other teachers at Webster Elementary School brought allegations of misconduct against Principal Foote to the attention of the Professional Practices Council which ultimately led to an administrative proceeding and consequent disciplinary action against him. On June 15, 1978, Respondent was advised by the Superintendent that the School Board had assigned him to the North Sumter Intermediate School for the 1978-1979 school year. By letter of August 11, 1978, the Superintendent reprimanded Respondent and directed him to adhere to school board policies regarding corporal punishment in the future. (Testimony of Strickland, Respondent, Petitioner's Exhibits 14, 16-21) The Foote incident was the subject of wide notoriety in the county and led to controversy within the black-white community. Respondent and the other teachers, who had made charges against the principal and later testified at his administrative hearing, were the subject of much newspaper and television coverage during the period May-December, 1978. Respondent was identified in the media as the leader of the group, based on statements attributed to various individuals including members of the School Board. The group of teachers, including Respondent, was apprehensive concerning possible repercussions against them with respect to their employment as a result of their participation in the matter. Respondent and one of the other teachers received anonymous threatening phone calls at night during this period. (Testimony of Respondent, Stephens, M. Everett, Newell, Rigsby.) Respondent testified at the hearing and admitted that he had requested sick leave for his absences on January 12 and February 5-6, 1979, and that he was not ill on those particular days. His reason for not taking personal leave was to avoid the necessity of disclosing the fact of his arrest for petit theft in Altamonte Springs on a personal leave application. He feared that if his arrest became known, he would have been suspended from his instructional duties without pay, and having been previously suspended in 1977 on charges which later proved to be unfounded, he wished to avoid such a status again. He explained that he planned to have his mother call the school on February 4 and simply say that he would not be in the next day. Then, after his criminal trial, he intended to apply for personal leave for his absences. However, since his mother informed the school authorities that he was ill, Respondent was unable to later request personal leave. He also gave as a reason for taking sick leave for the absences that "he might as well use it" since he had to make court appearances. (Testimony of Respondent.) Respondent was employed as physical education instructor at Webster Elementary School from school year 1973-1974 until the summer of 1978, when he was transferred to North Sumter Intermediate School. During the five year period at Webster, Respondent received satisfactory performance evaluations from Principal Foote, although several evaluations noted that Respondent did not accept constructive criticism in the proper perspective and that he needed to follow instructions in a more satisfactory manner. Respondent testified that he and Foote had opposite views as to the manner in which children should be treated, and that they argued frequently. Several teachers who were among the group who joined in allegations against Foote are of the opinion that Respondent was dedicated, had excellent rapport with children, and was concerned for their welfare. A parent of one of Respondent's students at Webster is of the opinion that he was well liked and respected by his students. (Testimony of Stephens, Everett, Newell, Williams, Lee, Respondent, Respondent's Exhibit 6.) Respondent received a satisfactory evaluation rating at North Sumter Intermediate School during the school year 1978-1979. His principal is of the opinion that the Respondent "involved" the children better than his predecessors and that he had good relations with his students. Several teachers at North Sumter and a parent of students there are of the same opinion concerning Respondent's good relationship with his pupils. (Testimony of Strong, David, Rigsby, Wrigth, Knuth.) Superintendent Strickland considers Respondent to have been an average teacher. Bernard R. Shelnutt, Jr., county school board instructional supervisor, has written performance evaluations concerning Respondent for the past four or five years and has consistently rated Respondent as a fine teacher who works well with children. (Testimony of Strickland, Shelnutt, Respondent's Exhibit 6.) Respondent has been the county coordinator of the Special Olympic Program for handicapped children for a number of years. He has voluntarily spent a great amount of his own time in fund raising and supervision of the program with commendable results. His efforts in this respect were the subject of favorable testimony at the hearing from teachers and parents in the community. (Testimony of Respondent, Small, F. Everett, Smart.)
Recommendation That Petitioner School Board of Sumter County suspend Respondent Arnold James Constable from his employment as a member of the instructional staff for a period of six (6) months without pay, and effect forfeiture of compensation for his unauthorized absences from duty on January 12 and February 5-6, 1979, pursuant to Section 231.36(6) and 231.44, Florida Statutes. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 27th day of May, 1980. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 101 Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of May, 1980. COPIES FURNISHED: C. John Conigilio, Esquire Post Office Box 26 Wildwood, Florida 32785 John F. Wendel, Esquire Post Office Box 5378 Lakeland, Florida 33803 Joseph Egan, Jr., Esquire Post Office Box 2969 Orlando, Florida 32802
The Issue Whether Respondent's employment should be terminated "for being absent without approved leave," as recommended in the Superintendent of Schools of the School District of Palm Beach County's Petition for Involuntary Resignation.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at the final hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: The School Board is responsible for the operation, control and supervision of all public schools (grades K through 12) and support facilities within the jurisdictional boundaries of the School District. Systemwide testing programs in the School District are coordinated by the School District's Department of Research, Evaluation, and Accountability (DREA). At all times material to the instant case, Marc Baron headed DREA. DREA operates a test distribution center. Cherie Boone is now, and was at all times material to the instant case, in charge of the DREA test distribution center. Ms. Boone supervises four employees. As their supervisor, she is "responsible for [among other things, their] time and attendance." Respondent is employed as a materials handling technician with the School District. At all times material to the instant case, he was assigned to work in the DREA test distribution center under the direct supervision of Ms. Boone. As a materials handling technician employed by the School District, Respondent is a member of a collective bargaining unit represented by the National Conference of Firemen & Oilers, Local 1227 (NCF&O) and, at all times material to the instant case, has been covered by a collective bargaining agreement between the School District and NCF&O (NCF&O Contract). Article 7 of the NCF&O Contract discusses "employees['] contractual rights." It provides as follows: SECTION 1. Probationary Employees All newly hired or rehired employees may be subject to a probationary period of ninety (90) workdays. Employees who have not completed such period of employment may be discharged without recourse. Probationary employees shall not be eligible for any type of leave except accrued sick leave, annual leave, or short term unpaid leave (due to illness) not to exceed five (5) days. SECTION 2. Permanent Employees Upon successful completion of the probationary period by the employee, the employee status shall be continuous unless the Superintendent terminates the employee for reasons stated in Article 17 - Discipline of Employees (Progressive Discipline). In the event the Superintendent seeks termination of a continuous employee, the School Board may suspend the employee with or without pay. The employee shall receive written notice and shall have the opportunity to formally appeal the termination. The appeals process shall be determined in accordance with Article 17 - Discipline of Employees (Progressive Discipline). Article 8 of the NFC&O Contract addresses the subject of "[m]anagement [r]ights." It provides as follows: NCF&O and its members recognize the responsibility of the District to operate and manage its affairs in all respects in accordance with its responsibilities as established by law and as delegated by the State Board of Education; and the powers of authority which the District has not officially agreed to share by this agreement, are retained by the District. It is the right of the District to determine unilaterally the purpose of each of its constituent agencies, set standards of services to be offered to the public, and exercise control and discretion over its organization and operations. It is also the right of the District to manage and direct its employees, establish reasonable rules and procedures, take disciplinary action for proper cause, and relieve its employees from duty because of lack of work or for other legitimate reasons, provided, however, that the exercise of such rights shall not preclude employees or their representatives from raising grievances, should decisions on the above matters have the practical consequences of violating the terms and conditions of this agreement in force. The District has the sole authority to determine the purpose and mission and the amount of the budget to be adopted by the School Board. The District and NCF&O agree that the District has and retains unaltered, its legal right to select, assign, reassign, or relocate any of its employees, and to carry out its mission under the law and State Board of Education Regulations, unless otherwise specifically enumerated herein. Except to the extent it has been done prior to May 26, 1998, no bargaining unit work which would result in the loss of jobs by members of the bargaining unit, shall be contracted out without prior consultation with the Union. It is understood that changes under this Article may not be arbitrary and capricious, and it is agreed that the District has those rights which are enumerated within Florida Statute 447; however, nothing herein shall relieve the parties of their ability to request impact bargaining. Among the "rules and procedures" that the School District, through the School Board, has established in exercising its "[m]anagement [r]ights" are School Board Directive 3.27 and School Board Policy 6Gx50-3.80, which provide, in pertinent part, as follows: School Board Directive 3.27 * * * Resignations. If employees desire to be released from their employment contract the following procedures are to be followed: * * * c. When employees do not report for duty for three (3) consecutive days without notifying their supervisor, the principal/department head will initiate a certified letter to the employee stating that their resignations will be recommended to the School Board at its next regularly scheduled meeting. * * * Suspension/Termination. The Principal/Department Head may recommend to the Assistant Superintendent for Personnel Relations disciplinary action against an employee if the employee commits one or more of the following offenses, including but not limited to: * * * b. Willful absence from duty without leave in violation of Section 231.44, Florida Statutes.[2] * * * Employees included in a bargaining unit are subject to suspension/dismissal provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. * * * 6. When a recommendation for suspension and termination is made, the procedures listed in School Board Policy 3.27 shall be followed. * * * School Board Policy 6Gx50-3.80 A leave of absence is permission granted by the Board, or allowed under its adopted policies, for an employee to be absent from duty for specified periods of time with the right of returning to employment on the expiration of the leave. All absences of School Board employees from duty shall be covered by leave duly authorized and granted. Leave shall be officially granted in advance by the School Board and shall be used for the purposes set forth in the leave application. Leave for sickness or other emergencies may be deemed to be granted in advance if prompt report is made to the proper authority. No leave except military leave shall be granted for a period greater than one (1) year. A new leave application may be filed and granted at the expiration of leave, but automatic renewals of leave shall not be allowed. Leave may be with or without pay and provided by law, rules of the State Board of Education, School Board policy, and negotiated contracts. If the terms of the collective bargaining agreement differ from this Policy, the language of the employee's agreement will take precedence. The following types of leave are available for School District employees: Leave for personal reasons Annual leave for 12-month personnel Sick leave Catastrophic leave Injury or illness in-line-of-duty leave Sabbatical leave Temporary military leave Regular military service leave Professional leave and extended professional leave Charter school leave Voluntary/extended military leave Leave of absence for the purpose of campaigning for political office Personal leave including maternity/ recovery and child care Paid Leaves * * * c. Sick Leave * * * iv. An employee requiring more than thirty (30) working days of paid leave for recovery may be required to submit medical evidence at reasonable intervals supporting the need for additional leave. * * * Sick leave claims shall be honored as submitted by the employee for personal illness, as well as illness or death of father, mother, brother, sister, husband, wife, child or other close relative or member of the employee's own household. Sick leave without pay may be granted for employees who have used all accumulated sick leave, but who would otherwise qualify for sick leave. The Superintendent may require a doctor's statement of verification of illness. A request to the Superintendent for a verification of claim may be initiated by the principal or supervisor. * * * Unpaid Leaves * * * e. Personal Leave -- An employee requesting short-term or long-term personal leave shall make written application to the supervisor, stating reasons for such leave. The Board shall satisfy itself in terms of the need of the requested leave. Personal leave may be used to extend a leave of absence due to sickness when that sickness has extended beyond all compensable leave for the duration of up to one (1) calendar year when supported by doctor's statements verifying the necessity of the extended leave. An employee requesting return to duty who has served efficiently and exhibited those qualities called for in the position held prior to such leave will be given every consideration for reemployment provided the conditions of employment have been met and the request is supported by a doctor's statement certifying that his physical condition is satisfactory to return to normal duties. * * * Article 17 of the NCF&O Contract, as noted in Article 7 of the contract, deals with the "[d]iscipline of [e]mployees." It provides as follows: Without the consent of the employee and the Union, disciplinary action may not be taken against an employee except for just cause, and this must be substantiated by clear and convincing evidence which supports the recommended disciplinary action. All disciplinary action shall be governed by applicable statutes and provisions of the Agreement. Further, an employee shall be provided with a written charge of wrongdoing, setting forth the specific charges against that employee as soon as possible after the investigation has begun. Any information which may be relied upon to take action against an employee will be shared promptly with said employee and his/her Union representative as soon as possible. Copies of any written information/correspondence that is related to the action of the employee or the investigating administrator(s) will be provided promptly to the employee and his/her Union representative. An employee against whom action is to be taken under this Article and his/her Union representative shall have the right to review and refute any and all of the information relied upon to support any proposed disciplinary action prior to taking such action. To this end, the employee and the Union representative shall be afforded a reasonable amount of time to prepare and present responses/refutations concerning the pending disciplinary action and concerning the appropriateness of the proposed disciplinary action. This amount of time is to be mutually agreed upon by the parties. Only previous disciplinary actions which are a part of the employee’s personnel file or which are a matter of record as provided in paragraph #7 below may be cited if these previous actions are reasonably related to the existing charge. Where just cause warrants such disciplinary action(s) and in keeping with provisions of this Article, an employee may be reprimanded verbally, reprimanded in writing, suspended without pay, or dismissed upon the recommendation of the immediate supervisor to the Superintendent and final action taken by the District. Other disciplinary action(s) may be taken with the mutual agreement of the parties. Except in cases which clearly constitute a real and immediate danger to the District or the actions/inactions of the employee constitute such clearly flagrant and purposeful violations of reasonable School Board rules and regulations, progressive discipline shall be administered as follows: Verbal Reprimand With A Written Notation. Such written notation shall be placed in the employee’s personnel file and shall not be used to the further detriment of the employee, unless there is another reasonably related act by that same employee within a twenty-four (24) month period. Written Reprimand. A written reprimand may be issued to an employee when appropriate in keeping with provisions of this Article. Such written reprimand shall be dated and signed by the giver of the reprimand and shall be filed in the affected employee’s personnel file upon a receipt of a copy to the employee by certified mail. Suspension Without Pay. A suspension without pay by the School Board may be issued to an employee, when appropriate, in keeping with provisions of this Article, including just cause and applicable laws. The length of the suspension also shall be determined by just cause as set forth in this Article. The notice and specifics of the suspension without pay shall be placed in writing, dated, and signed by the giver of the suspension and a copy provided to the employee by certified mail. The specific days of suspension will be clearly set forth in the written suspension notice which shall be filed in the affected employee’s personnel file in keeping with provisions of Chapter 119 and 231.291 of the Florida Statutes. An employee may be dismissed when appropriate in keeping with provisions of this Article, including just cause and applicable laws. An employee against whom disciplinary action(s) has/have been taken may appeal through the grievance procedure. However, if the disciplinary action(s) is/are to be taken by the District, then the employee shall have a choice of appeal between either the Department [sic] of Administrative Hearings in accordance with Florida Statutes or the grievance procedure outlined in the collective bargaining agreement. Such choice must be exercised within fifteen (15) days of receipt of written notification of disciplinary action being taken, and the District notified accordingly. If the grievance procedure is selected, the grievance shall be initiated at Step Three. Article 18 of the NCF&O Contract describes the grievance procedure available to bargaining unit members who allege a "misapplication or misinterpretation of the agreement." The described procedure consists of an "informal level" and four formal "levels," the final one being "arbitration before an impartial arbitrator, using the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Services." Pursuant to Section 4B. of Article 18, "if NCF&O decides to withdraw its support of an alleged grievance, the individual may continue to process the claim on his/her own, so long as all costs are borne by that individual"; however, according to Section 4E. of Article 18, "[a]grievance, once [actually] withdrawn, may not be reopened without the mutual written agreement between the [School District] and [the] NCF&O." "[L]eave [w]ithout [p]ay" is the subject of Article 25 of the NCF&O Contract, which provides as follows: SECTION 1. Personal Leave of Absence Personal leave of absence as described herein is leave without pay and may be requested by a member of the bargaining unit for purely personal reasons. A member of the bargaining unit may request short-term personal leave of absence within the school or department to which the employee is assigned. Personal leave as described herein shall be requested through the principal or department head for his/her approval and subsequently approved by the Superintendent. An employee granted an unpaid leave of absence shall be returned to his/her former classification if the leave is less than ninety (90) days, notwithstanding the layoff provisions contained in this agreement. An employee granted a leave of absence and who wishes to return before the leave period has expired, may submit a request to return to the principal/department head. An employee granted a leave of absence in excess of ninety (90) days will be permitted to return to work provided there is an opening in the same job classification in the work unit. If the former position is not available, the employee, upon written request, shall be listed as an eligible applicant for a period of six (6) months. Group Life and Hospitalization Insurance coverage may be continued for a period equal to the authorized leave of absence, provided full premium payments, including the Board's payment, are kept current by the employee. SECTION 2. Return from Leave Failure to return to work at the expiration of approved leave shall be considered as absence without leave and grounds for dismissal.[3] This section should be subject to extenuating circumstances preventing timely return, as determined by the Superintendent.4 Section 2 of Article 35 of NCF&O Contract protects employees from "[h]arassment." It provides as follows: No employee shall be subjected to or be part of: Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, offensive, lewd or suggestive comments. Also includes the creation of a hostile, intimidating, or offensive work environment. Verbal or physical abuse is submitted to by an employee. An adverse decision is made against an employee after such abuse is rejected. Racial/ethnic slurs, jokes, or other inappropriate conduct. Verbal or physical abuse. An adverse decision shall not be made against an employee after such abuse is rejected. Racial/ethnic slurs, jokes, or other inappropriate conduct. There came a time when Respondent claimed, in a Level One grievance filed under the NCF&O Contract, that he was a victim, at the hands of Ms. Boone, of the "[h]arassment" proscribed by Section 2 of Article 35 of the contract. The grievance was filed (with the support of NCF&O) on or about April 8, 2004, several weeks following an incident in which Ms. Boone "yell[ed]" at Respondent for returning "a little bit late[]" from a delivery run. It contained the following "[g]rievance [s]tatement" and description of the "[r]elief [s]ought": Grievance Statement: (Include Date of Occurrence) Mr. Ellis fe[e]ls that he is working in a hostile work environment. He had meeting with the Dept. Head to express his feelings. On March 31, the employee was issued a written reprimand when there has never been any discipline for the employee. Relief Sought: The reprimand is withdrawn from all personnel files. All intimidation of the employee to cease immediately. Ms. Boone, on behalf of the School District, responded to the grievance by providing Respondent with the following written "disposition": After careful consideration of all available information, it has been determined that there has not been a violation, misapplication, or misinterpretation of the collective bargaining procedures. The grievance was not pursued beyond Level One. Since March 16, 2004, Respondent had not been reporting to work, notwithstanding that he had not received authorization to be absent. On or about April 5, 2004, Respondent submitted a request for leave of absence without pay for the period from April 5, 2004, to July 5, 2004. The type of leave without pay he requested was personal leave. By letter dated April 8, 2004, Mr. Baron advised Respondent that Respondent's request was being denied. In his letter, Mr. Baron wrote: You were absent without approved leave on April 5, 2004, April 6, 2004, and April 8, 2004. On Monday, April 5, 2004, you reported your intended absences and requested personal leave of absence starting April 5, 2004 through July 5, 2004. Pursuant to Article 25, Section 1, of the Agreement between The School District of Palm Beach County and National Conference of Firem[e]n & Oilers, "Personal leave of absence as described herein is leave without pay and may be requested by a member of the bargaining unit for purely personal reasons. A member of the bargaining unit may request short-term personal leave of absence within the school or department to which the employee is assigned. Personal leave as described herein shall be requested through the principal or department head for his/her approval and subsequently approved by the Superintendent." Your request for personal unpaid leave is denied. You are directed to return to work on Monday, April 12, 2004. Continued unapproved absences will result in further disciplinary action up to and including termination. Respondent did not return to work on April 12, 2004, as directed. The matter of Respondent's unauthorized absences was then "turn[ed] . . . over to [the School District's] personnel [office]" to "deal with." The personnel office decided to ask the School Board to terminate Respondent's employment for his having been absent without authorization. Before the School Board took any action, Respondent submitted another request for leave of absence without pay. The type of leave without pay he requested this time was sick leave. On the request form, Respondent indicated that he wanted the leave period to begin on April 16, 2004, "but there was no end date" written in anywhere on the form. Without an "end date," the form could not be processed. Sherry Kleinman, a School District analyst assigned to the personnel office (whose job duties include processing "all the leaves of absence for School [District] employees"), telephoned Respondent and "asked him what end date he wanted" her to place on the form for him. During their telephone conversation, Ms. Kleinman and Respondent "agreed upon" a May 17, 2004, "end date." Ms. Kleinman inserted this "end date" in the appropriate space on the form and then completed processing Respondent's leave request. Respondent was granted leave without pay for the period starting April 16, 2004, and ending May 17, 2004. Moreover, the personnel office "pulled" its recommendation that the School Board terminate Respondent for his having been absent without authorization. Respondent did not report to work at any time following the expiration of his authorized leave on May 17, 2004, nor did he seek an extension of this leave. There has been no showing made that there were extenuating circumstances present preventing Respondent's timely return to work; nor has it been shown that the issue of whether such extenuating circumstances existed has ever been presented to the Superintendent for determination. Personnel office staff attempted to reach Respondent by telephone to encourage him to seek an extension of the authorized leave that had expired. These efforts were unsuccessful. Upon being advised of the situation by Ms. Kleinman, NCF&O business agent Carolyn Killings, who had helped Respondent in filing his "[h]arassment" grievance, offered to try to contact Respondent, but she too was unable to "reach him." By letter dated June 14, 2004, Ernie Camerino, the assistant director of the personnel office, advised Respondent of the following: You were recently notified by your supervisor of your failure to return to work. As a result of such action, Personnel is currently processing your involuntary resignation from employment with the School District. Please be advised that I will recommend at the July 21, 2004 meeting of the School Board of Palm Beach County, Florida, your involuntary resignation. Subsequent to the July 21, 2004 Board meeting you will have fifteen (15) days to file an appeal under Section 120.[6]8, Florida Statutes. Unless a timely request for an administrative hearing (DOAH) is made within fifteen (15) days stated herein pursuant to Section 120.569 and 120.57, Florida Statutes the District will consider this matter closed. This action is taken in accordance with Section 1001.42 and 1001.51, Florida Statutes. Failure to timely request an administrative hearing shall waive all rights to request a DOAH hearing on such matters and shall be subject only to appeal rights under Section 120.[6]8, Florida Statutes. You have a choice of filing a grievance or requesting a hearing before the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH). Questions regarding the appeals process should be referred to the District's Legal Department. If you find this letter inconsistent with the action taken above, you may contact Mr. Camerino immediately at . . . to resolve this matter prior to School Board Action. By letter dated July 8, 2004, Respondent informed the School District's legal department that he was "requesting an appeal" of Mr. Camerino's "involuntary resignation" recommendation. On August 23, 2004, the same day the Superintendent filed his Petition for Involuntary Resignation recommending that the School Board terminate Respondent's employment, the School District referred Respondent's appeal to DOAH.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the School Board issue a final order terminating Respondent's employment based on his failure to return to work following the expiration of his leave without pay on May 17, 2004. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of February, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of February, 2005.
