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VERONICA P. HOLT vs DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 04-001046 (2004)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Jacksonville, Florida Mar. 24, 2004 Number: 04-001046 Latest Update: Aug. 09, 2004

The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner is entitled to additional retirement benefits for her years of service between September 1966 and December 1974.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a retired member of the FRS. She began working for the Duval County Juvenile Detention Center (DCJDC) in August 1966. However, Petitioner's name was not placed on the payroll until September 1966 because of the time she was absent. As an employee of the DCJDC, Petitioner was a county employee but also a participant in the FRS. She made contributions in the amount of $1,850.78 to the FRS from September 1966 through December 1974. The FRS became non- contributory for all state and county employees in January 1975. Petitioner terminated her employment with Duval County on June 20, 1977. At that time, Petitioner requested a refund of her accumulated contributions to the FRS. Petitioner acknowledged in her request for refund that she waived her interest in FRS for the refunded service. On or about February 22, 1978, Respondent issued Voucher #273254 and Warrant #0364356 made payable to Petitioner in the amount of $1,850.78. Petitioner's testimony that she never received the refund is not credible. On or about October 16, 1981, Petitioner returned to work at DCJDC. After receiving several promotions, Petitioner transferred to a position at the Department of Health. Petitioner terminated her employment at the Department of Health on November 13, 1998. In August 2000, Petitioner filed an Application for Service Retirement. The application includes the following sworn statement: I understand I must terminate all employment with FRS employers to receive a retirement benefit under Chapter 121, Florida Statutes. I also understand that I cannot add additional service, change options, or change my type of retirement (Regular, Disability, and Early) once my retirement becomes final. My retirement becomes final when any benefit payment is cashed or deposited. Respondent sent Petitioner an Acknowledgment of Service Retirement Application dated August 10, 2000. The acknowledgment indicated that Petitioner's retirement date was June 2000 and that she could purchase credit for refunded service from September 1966 through December 1974 by paying Respondent $7,918.46. The acknowledgment made it clear that Respondent required written notification if Petitioner did not intend to purchase this service. In March 2001, Petitioner executed an Option Selection for FRS Members. She selected Option 1, which provides her a monthly benefit for her lifetime. In a letter dated March 27, 2001, Petitioner advised Respondent that she did not intend to buy back any time. Additionally, she stated as follows: I would like for my retirement application to be accepted/processed as is. The rate quoted was at $517.00. However, if this amount is incorrect, I would like to know as soon as possible. Based upon Petitioner's statement in the letter, Respondent began paying and Petitioner began receiving her retirement benefits effective June 1, 2000.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent enter a final order finding that Petitioner is not entitled to any additional retirement benefits. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of June, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of June, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Larry D. Scott, Esquire Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 260 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Veronica P. Holt 230 East First Street, Apartment 1313 Jacksonville, Florida 32206 Alberto Dominguez, General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Sarabeth Snuggs, Interim Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560

Florida Laws (5) 112.05120.569120.57121.071121.085
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HERMAN H. WILLIAMS vs. DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 77-000982 (1977)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 77-000982 Latest Update: Mar. 08, 1978

Findings Of Fact The Division of Retirement will make no Findings of Fact relating to whether Petitioner's disability was in-line-of-duty. Accordingly, for the reasons mentioned previously, all findings contained in paragraphs 5, 6, 7, and 8, of the recommended order are rejected. However, the Division accepts the remaining Findings of Fact contained in the recommended order. As taken from the order these findings are: Herman Williams was an employee of the Department of Transportation and a member of the Florida Retirement System. The Division of Retirement approved payment of regular disability benefits to Herman Williams. Herman Williams is currently receiving and accepting these benefits. Herman Williams is an illiterate Seminole Indian, 62 years of age. Williams' duties with the Department of Transportation were driving a mowing tractor and cleaning out roadside ditches. Williams worked for the Department of Transportation approximately 21 years 11 months prior to being placed on the retired roles [sic]. On May 1, 1975, Williams was driving his tractor in the course of his regular employment at the Department of Transportation when the power steering of the tractor malfunctioned causing the front wheels to swerve violently, wrenching the steering wheel in Williams' hands and nearly throwing him from the tractor. Repairs had to be made to Williams' tractor by a Department of Transportation mechanic because the tractor was inoperative. The mechanic discovered a loose nut in the power steering assembly when he exchanged the power steering unit in Williams' tractor with another from the maintenance yard. When the new unit was installed in Williams's tractor it functioned normally. When the power steering from Williams' tractor was installed in the other tractor, it also functioned normally. The mechanic stated that the loose nut which he had discovered could cause the tractor to swerve violently in the manner Williams' had described. On the afternoon of May 1, 1975, Williams reported this instant [sic] to his supervisor, David McQuaig. Mr. McQuaig inquired as to any injuries to Williams and the tractor. Williams reported to McQuaig that the tractor had not been harmed and that he was only sore and stiff. No report of injury was prepared by McQuaig whose duty it was to file such reports. Williams' condition did not materially improve after seeking medical treatment by Dr. Albritton. Williams remained on sick leave until August 11, 1975, when it was exhausted. Williams then took annual leave from August 12, 1975 until September 23, 19975, when his retirement became effective. When the Petitioner's sick leave was exhausted, he was contacted by his supervisor in the Department of Transportation. He suggested that Williams could retire on disability if two physicians would state that he was disabled. This letter was read to Williams by his son, Eddie, because Williams is illiterate. Retirement application forms were provided Williams by the Department of Transportation. The physician report forms were completed by Dr. Albritton and Dr. Wilkerson. The statement of disability by employer form was completed by Williams' supervisor, David A. Young, Maintenance Engineer, for the Department of Transportation. Young stated that he completed the Statement of Disability by Employer, indicating that the application was for regular disability benefits because he had determined that no workman's compensation claim had been made by Williams and because Dr. Wilkerson's medical report had stated that the injuries occurred at Williams's home. The determination that the application was for regular disability benefits was solely Young's. The Application for Disability Retirement signed by Williams was prepared by personnel at the Department of Transportation District Office. This form was signed by Herman Williams; however, this form does not make provision for the member to state the nature of the disability benefits sought. Eddie Williams, son of Herman Williams, took his father to sign the forms at the Department of Transportation office. These forms were not explained to Williams, nor did Eddie Williams read them. Herman Williams was also unaware that such a benefit existed. Herman Williams stated he sought disability benefits based upon his injury on the job. Disability retirement was not discussed between Herman Williams and David Young. Based upon the application submitted in his behalf, the Division of Retirement made a determination that Williams was entitled to regular disability benefits. Williams was unaware that he was not receiving the in-line-of-duty benefits until his son inquired as to how much money he was receiving. When he was advised, he told his father that it appeared to be too little money. At this point Eddie Williams discovered that the application had been for regular disability.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Officer RECOMMENDS: That the administrator permit the applicant to file an amended application for disability in-line-of-duty retirement, and, further, that said application be approved. DONE and ENTERED this 8th day of December, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: J. W. Chalkley, III, Esquire Post Office Box 1793 Ocala, Florida 32670 Douglas Spangler, Jr., Esquire Asst. Division Attorney Division of Retirement 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA DIVISION OF RETIREMENT DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION HERMAN H. WILLIAMS, Petitioner, vs. CASE NO. 77-982 STATE OF FLORIDA, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, Respondent. / FINAL AGENCY ORDER A petition for formal proceedings having been duly filed, and a request for hearing officer having been duly made, a hearing was held in the above-styled cause pursuant to the provisions of Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, before the Honorable Stephen F. Dean, Hearing Officer, in Ocala, Florida, on September 15, 1977. The Petitioner requested relief from the Division's determination that Petitioner was not entitled to resubmit an application for disability retirement requesting in-line-of-duty disability retirement benefits because he had previously applied for and accepted regular disability retirement. The purpose of the hearing was to determine the factual basis for Petitioner's claim that he should be allowed to apply for in-line-of-duty disability retirement benefits. APPEARANCES AT THE HEARING: Eric E. Wagner, Esquire J. W. Chalkey, III, Esquire Law Offices of Eric E. Wagner, P.A. Post Office Box 1763 Ocala, Florida 32670 For the Petitioner E. Douglas Spangler, Jr., Esquire Assistant Division Attorney Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center 2639 North Monroe Street Suite 207C-Box 81 Tallahassee, Florida 32303 For the Respondent The Hearing Officer entered his Recommended Order on December 8, 1977, in which he sustained Petitioner's assertion and concluded, on the basis of the findings made as a result of the hearing, that Petitioner should be entitled to resubmit his application and request in-line-of-duty disability benefits. In addition to this determination, the Hearing Officer found that Petitioner was in fact entitled to in-line-of-duty disability retirement benefits. In making this latter conclusion, both as a matter of fact and of law, the Hearing Officer went beyond his scope of authority. As will be developed more fully herein, the Hearing Officer was without jurisdiction to consider the issue of whether Petitioner was in fact entitled to the in-line-of-duty benefits. Therefore, so much of the recommended order as purports to address this issue is of no effect, being the result of a hearing that did not comply with the essential requirements of law.

Florida Laws (3) 120.57121.091121.23
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ROBERT GILMOUR vs. DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 84-004340 (1984)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 84-004340 Latest Update: Aug. 06, 1985

Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Robert Gilmour, was employed by the Dade County School Board until July 2, 1984, when he terminated his employment effective June 15, 1984. Mr. Gilmour terminated his employment by placing a telephone call to his supervisor. At the time of the telephone call, Mr. Gilmour was out of the Miami area on vacation. Mr. Gilmour did not return from vacation until August 8, 1984. On August 9, 1984, Mr. Gilmour went to the Office of Personnel Retirement Section, of the Dade County School Board, where he executed an application for early retirement. Mr. Gilmour's application for retirement was received by the Benefits Calculation Section of the Division of Retirement on August 15, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. The Division of Retirement assigned to Mr. Gilmour an effective date of retirement of September 1, 1984, the first day of the month following the date on which the Division of Retirement received his application for retirement. In May, 1984, Mr. Gilmour, placed a telephone call to Louise Syrcle, an employee of the School Board in the Office of Personnel, Retirement Section. Mr. Gilmour was considering retirement and wanted to discuss the matter with Ms. Syrcle. At the time of the telephone call, Ms. Syrcle was on her vacation and then was subsequently on sick leave because of a broken back. Ms. Syrcle was absent from employment from April 23, 1984 until June 25, 1984. In the course of the telephone call, Mr. Gilmour was told of Ms. Syrcle's broken back and was told that appointments were being made only for those teachers who had already decided to retire. Because he had not yet made that decision, he did not make an appointment. Further Mr. Gilmour did not seek to speak with any other personnel in that office. Art Miles Ms. Syrcle's supervisor, and other personnel were available in the Dade County School Board's Office of Personnel to respond to retirement requests and they did process numerous retirement requests during Ms. Syrcle's absence. At no time did Mr. Gilmour seek, read or receive a copy of the Summary Plan Description brochure which was admitted as Respondent's Exhibit C. Additionally, at no time did Mr. Gilmour make inquiry of anyone at the Division of Retirement regarding his retirement options. Instead, Mr. Gilmour relied on information gleaned from casual conversations with colleagues, which information was not correct. At all time relevant hereto, the Division of Retirement has maintained a staff of counselors who are available to consult with members and agencies on matters concerning retirement, including deadlines for filing applications. As a result of Mr. Gilmour's July 2, 1984, telephone call, in which he terminated his employment, the Dade County School Board sent a certification of service and earnings, Form FT4A, on July 2, 1984. This form was received by the Division of Retirement on July 9, 1984. While this form may have indicated that Mr. Gilmour had terminated his employment with the Dade County School Board, no information contained in that form indicated his intent to retire. When Mr. Gilmour went to the Office of Personnel, Retirement Section, of the Dade County School Board on August 9, 1984, he first learned that the rules of the Division of Retirement required that the application for retirement be filed within 30 days of the termination date in order for the retiree to receive retirement benefits retroactive to the date of termination. Because Mr. Gilmour failed to file his application for retirement until August 15, 1984, he did not receive retirement benefits for the months of July and August, 1984.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Division of Retirement enter a Final Order denying Robert Gilmour retirement benefits for the months of July and August, 1984, and establishing Mr. Gilmour's effective date of retirement to be September 1, 1984, the first day of the month following his application for retirement. DONE and ENTERED this 17th day of May, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE K. KIESLING Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of May, 1985.

Florida Laws (3) 120.57121.025121.091
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NATHANIEL GLOVER, JR. vs DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 04-004157 (2004)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Jacksonville, Florida Nov. 18, 2004 Number: 04-004157 Latest Update: Sep. 16, 2005

The Issue The issue is whether payment of Petitioner's retirement benefits should have commenced after the filing of an application to retire with the Division of Retirement, with an effective date of April 1, 2004, or be retroactively changed to the date of his termination of employment, July 1, 2003.

Findings Of Fact On July 19, 1995, Petitioner applied for membership in the Special Risk Division of the Elected Officers' Class of the Florida Retirement System ("FRS"). On August 14, 1995, Respondent sent Petitioner a letter admitting him into FRS. On September 6, 1995, Sarabeth Snuggs, Chief of the Bureau of Enrollment and Contributions for Respondent, sent Petitioner a letter revoking his membership in FRS. On December 17, 1996, Petitioner wrote to Sarabeth Snuggs responding to Respondent's decision to revoke his membership in FRS. Petitioner cited Section 121.052(2)(d), Florida Statutes, which provides that membership in FRS includes "any constitutional county elected officer assuming office after July 1, 1981, including any sheriff." The Consolidated City of Jacksonville was created by the Florida Legislature with the enactment of Chapter 67-1320, Laws of Florida. Section 1.01 of the Jacksonville Charter provides that the county government of Duval County and the municipal government of the City of Jacksonville are consolidated into a single body politic. The Charter further provides that the consolidated government succeeds to and possesses all of the properties of the former government. After being denied membership in FRS, Petitioner and other members of the consolidated government and its instrumentalities worked diligently to convince Respondent to admit Petitioner into FRS. During Petitioner's attempts to be included in FRS, Respondent repeatedly took the position that Duval County did not exist as a county agency. In a letter to Petitioner dated January 15, 1997, Ms. Snuggs wrote that the consolidated Duval County government "chose to consolidate as a 'city' government." Mr. Keane worked with the Duval County Legislative Delegation to amend Chapter 121 to specifically clarify the fact that the Duval County Sheriff and Clerk of Court are constitutional officers entitled to participate in FRS. In 2002, the Florida Legislature adopted language to clarify the Duval County Sheriff and Clerk of Court's status with respect to FRS. In a letter dated June 24, 2002, Petitioner thanked Ms. Snuggs for recognizing his right to elect membership in FRS. Petitioner observed that, since he was in the last year of his second term as Sheriff (Duval County allows only two consecutive terms), he wanted confirmation of his "right to connect the previous seven (7) years of service as Sheriff." The June 24, 2002, letter also asked for "guidance" from Respondent. The purpose of the June 24, 2002, letter was for Petitioner to learn how Respondent intended to treat his first six years of service. Petitioner sought to avoid any problems since his retirement date was rapidly approaching. On October 10, 2002, Petitioner and Mr. George Dandelake, the Chief of the Budget and Management Division of the Sheriff's Office, wrote to Ms. Snuggs requesting a calculation of the amount of employer contributions required on Petitioner's behalf. The October 10 letter also requested that Respondent "identify what documents are required, in addition to the contribution amount which will be paid by the City, that must be supplied to the Florida Retirement System." Petitioner re-applied for membership in FRS, which was granted on June 1, 2002, after the effective date of the legislation designed to specifically admit the Duval County Sheriff and Clerk of Court into FRS. On June 18, 2003, twelve days before the expiration of his term of office, still not having received confirmation of the status of his prior service, Petitioner sent a letter to Ms. Snuggs advising that FRS had not recognized his service from 1995 through 2002. Petitioner again stated in the letter that he was terminating his position as Sheriff on June 30, 2003. Less than a week prior to the termination of his term, Petitioner received two "Statement[s] of Account" dated June 24, 2003, indicating that "you have until retirement to pay the amount due on your account." The statements further indicated that "when you become vested for monthly benefits, we will provide you an estimate of benefits with and without this service." According to the first Statement of Account, Petitioner was entitled to purchase prior service at the 1.6 percent multiplier rate for the FRS regular class. According to the second Statement of Account, Petitioner was entitled to purchase prior service at the 2.0 percent multiplier rate for the FRS special risk class. Neither Statement of Account was correct, as both failed to permit Petitioner to purchase service at the 3.0 percent rate for special risk, despite the fact that Petitioner had served a continuous and uninterrupted term as Sheriff. The Statement of Account did not advise Petitioner that he must submit a separate retirement application, Form FR-11, in order to preserve his retirement date. The statement did advise Petitioner that interest would be assessed at a rate of 6.5 percent. This warning appeared in bold face on the Statement of Account. The June 24, 2003, statements were the first time that Petitioner was supplied with the amount due to purchase service credit. Since neither statement applied the correct multiplier rate (3.0 percent) for all eight years of Petitioner's service as Sheriff, neither statement was correct. Recognizing that only six days remained prior to the expiration of Petitioner's term as Sheriff, Mr. Keane advised Petitioner to submit payment to Respondent on an expedited basis. After receiving the June 24, 2003, Statements of Account, Petitioner prepared a letter dated June 26, 2003, to Cal Ray, the Director of the Department of Administration and Finance for the Consolidated City of Jacksonville. In this letter, Petitioner requested an employer contribution in the amount of $163,554.32 to purchase his prior service. Petitioner further requested an expedited preparation of the check to ensure delivery to Respondent by July 1, 2003. The letter to Mr. Ray requested payment of the amounts that would have been periodically contributed by the City of Jacksonville if Respondent had been acknowledged as a participant in FRS in 1995. On June 27, 2003, three days prior to the expiration of his term of office, Petitioner drove from Jacksonville to Tallahassee to meet with Respondent's representatives, including Ms. Snuggs, regarding Petitioner's retirement. Mr. Dandelake accompanied Petitioner on this trip. At the June 27, 2003, meeting, Petitioner personally delivered a check to Respondent in the amount of $163,554.32. Respondent accepted the check and issued a written receipt signed by Sarabeth Snuggs. Petitioner was never told during the June 27, 2003, meeting with Respondent that he would forfeit benefits if he failed to complete an application. Respondent knew that Petitioner was leaving office on June 30, 2003. Respondent never discussed the filing of an application for retirement benefits at any time during the course of its conversations and correspondence with Petitioner. Petitioner was never told by Respondent to complete any forms to protect his rights to the 2.0 percent multiplier during the pendency of his dispute with Respondent. Petitioner was never provided any handbook, notice, statutes, or rules indicating he would forfeit benefits under any circumstances. When Petitioner left the June 27, 2003, meeting, both he and Mr. Dandelake understood that he was still engaged in a dispute with Respondent over his entitlement to the 3.0 percent multiplier. Petitioner knew that he was required to file an application in order to receive retirement benefits. Petitioner testified that if he had left the June 27 meeting with any indication that he would forfeit benefits by not filing an application, he would have filed something, with advice of counsel, to preserve his rights. Petitioner received an Estimate of Benefits via fax from Respondent on June 27, 2003, reflecting an annual benefit of $23,105.90. This statement valued 6.92 years of Petitioner's uninterrupted special risk service as Sheriff using the 2.0 percent multiplier, and 1.08 years of service as Sheriff using the 3.0 percent multiplier. The June 27, 2003, statement lists Petitioner's retirement date as July 1, 2003. The estimate does not warn Petitioner that he must do anything in order to preserve his July 2003 retirement date. The estimate states only that it is subject to "final verification of all factors." Petitioner's term of office as elected Sheriff ended on June 30, 2003. Petitioner's employment terminated when his term expired on that date. Respondent was aware of the dates of the expiration of Petitioner's term of office as well as his employment termination date. When Petitioner's employment terminated on June 30, 2003, it was unclear whether he would be credited with the 3.0 percent multiplier for his eight years of special risk service. Petitioner was not notified by Respondent prior to the expiration of his term as Sheriff on June 30, 2003, that he needed to submit a retirement application. The first time Petitioner was advised by Respondent of the need to file an application for retirement benefits was in the comment section of the Estimate of Retirement Benefits provided to him by letter dated March 4, 2004. The warning was printed in bold face type. The Estimate of Retirement Benefits dated June 27, 2003, did not include the bold face warning to file an application. Respondent was not provided with a Division of Retirement publication entitled "Preparing to Retire" prior to his leaving service on June 30, 2003. In fact, the copy of the publication offered into evidence by Respondent is dated "July 2003," subsequent to Petitioner's retirement. As the only member of FRS in his office in Jacksonville, Petitioner had no staff or employees trained in FRS or Florida retirement benefits. Petitioner was provided with a "Preparing to Retire" booklet in March 2004. On November 3, 2003, Florida Attorney General Opinion 2003-46 confirmed that Petitioner, as the elected Sheriff, was eligible for membership in the Elected Officer's Class of the Florida Retirement System. On December 31, 2003, and on January 16, 2004, Petitioner's counsel attempted to obtain clarification from Respondent regarding Petitioner's retirement benefits. The December 31, 2003, letter noted that the "extraordinary delay" in resolving the issue of Petitioner's benefits was at no time due to fault on the part of Petitioner. Respondent never refuted or disputed this statement. By letter dated March 4, 2004, Petitioner was finally advised by Respondent that he was entitled to be credited with the higher 3.0 percent multiplier for all eight years of his service as Sheriff. Petitioner noted that the March 4, 2004, Statement of Account, while properly applying the 3.0 percent multiplier, now had changed Petitioner's retirement date to April 2004 from the previous estimates showing a retirement date of July 2003. The March 4, 2004, statement included the bold face notice to Petitioner that he must file an application for retirement benefits. No prior notices or correspondence from Respondent had informed Petitioner that he must file Form FR-11 in order to retain his retirement date of July 1, 2003. After formally being notified that he would receive the 3.0 percent multiplier for all eight of his years of service as Sheriff, and after having received the notice that he must file Form FR-11, Petitioner submitted the form in April 2004. Respondent is a fiduciary charged with acting in the best interest of participants in FRS. Andy Snuggs, who travels around the state educating employers and employees in FRS, acknowledged that Petitioner was not responsible for the delay by Respondent in recognizing Petitioner's entitlement to the 3.0 percent multiplier. Mr. Snuggs acknowledged that he does not tell employees that they will forfeit benefits if they delay the filing of their applications. Petitioner received his first retirement check in May 2004 which was based upon the benefit established in March 2004 of $32,624.58 annually, not the $23,105.90 previously established by Respondent in June 2003. Petitioner has received no retroactive benefits for the period of July 1, 2003, through April 30, 2004. In a letter dated May 6, 2004, Petitioner stated that his acceptance of the first retirement check was not to be construed by Respondent of a waiver of his rights to retroactive benefits from July 1, 2003, forward.

Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner be awarded retirement benefits at the rate of 3.0 percent per year for his eight years of Elected Officer's Class of service, retroactive to July 1, 2003. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of July, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT S. COHEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of July, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert D. Klausner, Esquire Klausner & Kaufman, P.A. 10059 Northwest 1st Court Plantation, Florida 33324 Robert B. Button, Esquire Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Sarabeth Snuggs, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Post Office Box 9000 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-9000 Alberto Dominguez, General Counsel Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Post Office Box 9000 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-9000

Florida Laws (5) 1.01120.569120.57121.052121.091
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SUSAN ANN CARPENTER vs DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 01-001618 (2001)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tampa, Florida Apr. 30, 2001 Number: 01-001618 Latest Update: Aug. 23, 2001

The Issue Whether deceased retiree's prior selection of Option One retirement benefit pay-out and his receipt and negotiation of retirement several checks should now be set aside, due to his wife's alleged forgery of her signature on the Spousal Acknowledgement (Form FR-11).

Findings Of Fact 1. Irvin M. Carpenter was born November 16, 1934, and died of cancer on November 18, 1997. Mr. Carpenter was employed by the Hillsborough County Aviation Authority as a police officer on September 10, 1984, and attained the rank of police sergeant at the time of his retirement. Mr. Carpenter was a member of the Florida Retirement System. 2. On January 20, 1991, Irvin M. Carpenter and Susan Ann Prescott were married. Susan Ann Carpenter is now, and has been at all time pertinent to these proceeding, employed by the Hillsborough County Aviation Authority as a police officer. Susan Carpenter is a member of the Florida Retirement System. 3. In October of 1996, Irvin Carpenter and Susan Carpenter separated and continued to live separately. Dissolution of marriage proceedings were initiated but was not finalized at the time of Irvin Carpenter's death in November 1997. At all times pertinent to these proceedings, Irvin Carpenter and Susan Ann Carpenter were husband and wife. 4. On July 8, 1997, Irvin Carpenter executed a Florida Retirement System form styled "Application for Service Retirement" (Form FR-11). This form provides the retiree with information pertaining to the four options by which his retirement benefits can be paid. One full page of the form provides an explanation of each option. By use of this form, Irvin Carpenter selected Option One retirement benefit payout plan. The explanation of Option One on Form FR-11 is as follows: Option 1: A monthly benefit payable for my lifetime. Upon my death, the monthly benefit will stop and my beneficiary will receive only a refund of any contributions I have paid which are in excess of the amount I have received in benefits. This option does not provide a continuing benefit to my beneficiary. 5. The FR-11 also contained the following information in bold lettering: THIS SECTION MUST BE COMPLETED IF YOU SELECT OPTION 1 OR 2 MARRIED YES[ ] NO [ ] IF YES, YOUR SPOUSE MUST SIGN BELOW: SPOUSAL ACKNOWLEDGEMENT : I, (Signature) Susan A. Carpenter,’ being the spouse of the above named member, acknowledges that the member has elected either Option 1 or 2. (Signature Irvin Carpenter 11-27-96 Signature of Spouse Date If your spouse does not sign, you must attach a signed statement explaining why your spouse did not acknowledge your selection. 6. The "yes" or "no" blocks requesting marriage status were blank on the FR-11 submitted by the retiree to the Agency. The Spousal Acknowledgement block contained the signature of "Susan Ann Carpenter." Susan Carpenter alleged this signature to be a forgery. 7. The form FPR-11 also contained the following statement in capital letters: I UNDERSTAND I MUST TERMINATE ALL EMPLOYMENT WITH FRS EMPLOYERS TO RECEIVE A RETIREMENT BENEFIT UNDER CHAPTER 121, FLORIDA STATUTES. I ALSO UNDERSTAND THAT I CANNOT ADD ADDITIONAL SERVICE, CHANGE OPTIONS, OR CHANGE MY TYPE OF RETIREMENT (REGULAR, DISABILITY AND EARLY) ONCE MY RETIREMENT BECOMES FINAL. MY RETIREMENT BECOMES FINAL WHEN ANY BENEFIT PAYMENT IS CASHED OR DEPOSITED. 8. Between the date of his retirement and the date of his death, Irvin Carpenter received, cashed, or deposited a minimum of three retirement checks from the Florida Retirement System, pursuant to his selection of Option One benefit payout plan. 9. After the death of Mr. Carpenter, the Agency, by letter dated November 24, 1997, addressed to: FAMILY OF IRVIN M. CARPENTER, 3602 W. Tampa Circle, Tampa, Florida 33629, informed the family of the retirement benefit due beneficiaries for November and the income tax deduction therefrom. 10. By letter to the Agency dated July 13, 2000, Susan Carpenter stated: My Husband, Irvin M. Carpenter, DOB 11/16/34, SSN 263-42-0146, retired from the Tampa International Airport Police Department on 07/31/1997. At the time of his retirement, we were separated but still Married. He passed away less than three months later in November 1997. I inquired as to any benefits and informed by the Hillsborough County Aviation Authority, the parent organization of the Tampa International Airport Police Department, that he had changed his beneficiary to his daughter, Anita Carpenter. Just recently, I became aware of the Florida Retirement System provisions concerning retirement options. I ama police officer with the Tampa International Airport Police Department and these matters were covered in a pre-retirement briefing conducted by Human Resources. It is my understanding that if you are married and select option 1 or 2, the spouse must acknowledge that selection in writing. Since I had not signed any such acknowledgement, it occurred to me that my deceased husband's remaining options both provide for the joint annuitant. I posed this question to the HCAA Human Resources and was informed that my deceased husband did not retire. The Department announced his retirement, his name was added to the plaque listing retired officers and Department personnel files indicate a retirement date of 07/31/1999. I questioned my police captain and Chief of Police and both of them were emphatic that my husband retired on 07/31/1999. With my superiors providing information contrary to Human Resources, I have some doubt as to the status of my deceased husband with regards to the Florida Retirement System. Please confirm the status of Irvin M. Carpenter. Did he retire from FRS? If not, what was his status at the time he passed away? I am sure you understand the significance of my determining the correct status. Thank you for any assistance you can provide. 11. The Agency denied Susan Carpenter's request to void Irvin Carpenter's selection of Option One retirement pay-out. The Agency's letter of November 15, 2000, asserted the position that the selection cannot be changed since the retirement checks were cashed or deposited and cited the following portions of Section 121.091(6) (a), Florida Statutes: "The spouse of any member who elects to receive the benefit provided under subparagraph 1. or subparagraph 2. shall be notified of and shall acknowledge any such election." The law does not require the spouse to agree with the members' retirement option selection. The Form FR-11, Application for Service Retirement, submitted by Irvin Carpenter included Susan Carpenter's signature acknowledging that she was aware of the Option 1 selection. We receive numerous applications monthly and we do not investigate to determine if each signature is authentic. Although Mrs. Carpenter contends that her signature was forged, once a member cashes or deposits a check the option selection cannot be changed. The statutes do not require the spouse to agree with the members option selection, only to be made aware. Your request to void the Option 1 selection is denied. 12. Susan Carpenter denies having signed the Form FR-11, Application for Service Retirement submitted by Irvin Carpenter. Susan Carpenter alleges that the signature, "Susan Ann Carpenter," appearing on the Form FR-11 is a forgery. 13. During the final hearing and in the presence of the undersigned, Susan Carpenter signed "Susan A. Carpenter" three times, Petitioner's Exhibit F. At the request of the undersigned Susan Carpenter signed "Susan Ann Carpenter" once. A review of the four signature samples provided by Susan Carpenter, the sample signature, "Susan Ann Carpenter," proved to the satisfaction of the undersigned evidence of the genuineness of the written signature in dispute. Accordingly, and as a finding of fact, the Form FR-11 signature "Susan Ann Carpenter" is not a forgery. 14. Susan Carpenter's assertion that the Agency is under legal obligation to contact each spouse or otherwise verify the signature of each spouse on the Form FR-11ls received in the Agency's normal course of business is without foundation in law and in fact. 15. Only the circuit court has jurisdiction and authority in dissolution of marriage cases to enter final orders determining property rights of marital assets. Petitioner proffered no such order as evidence. Accordingly, all testimony and evidence based on alleged spousal rights and entitlements pursuant to Chapter 61, Florida Statutes, are not considered

Conclusions For Petitioner: Scott W. Fitzpatrick, Esquire Southeast Building, Suite 1500 St. Petersburg, Florida 33703 For Respondent: Thomas E. Wright, Esquire Department of Management Services Cedars Executive Center, Building Cc 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact an Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order denying Susan Carpenter's request to change the retirement option 13 selected by Mr. Irvin Carpenter, including benefits due, and denying all such other relief. lo& DONE AND ENTERED this = day of July, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division _of Administrative Hearings this J2% day of July, 2001.

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ALBERT F. COOK vs DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 94-002292 (1994)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Marianna, Florida Apr. 26, 1994 Number: 94-002292 Latest Update: Jan. 23, 1995

The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Petitioner, Albert F. Cook, had a relationship with the Department of Corrections (DOC) at any time during the month of April, 1993, and if so, whether he was eligible to receive a retirement benefit for that month, as well.

Findings Of Fact The Petitioner was employed at times pertinent hereto by the Department of Corrections (DOC) at its Baker Correctional Institution facility. On February 19, 1993, he was notified of his transfer to the Florida State Prison, purportedly for disciplinary reasons. Upon learning of this eventuality, the Petitioner immediately went on sick leave. He maintains that it was duly- approved sick leave. No medical evidence to that effect was presented, but the Petitioner suggested that his illness might be of a psychiatric nature. He clearly was disgusted with the action taken by the DOC to transfer him. Subsequently thereto, he decided to apply for retirement, effective March 31, 1993. Shortly thereafter, he sought to have his retirement request rescinded or withdrawn; however, that request was denied. He was thereupon removed from the DOC payroll, effective March 31, 1993, essentially as a termination action. He received a retirement benefit check for the period of April 1-30, 1993 in the amount of $2,324.53 from the Division of Retirement. The Petitioner appealed the DOC employment action to the Public Employees Relations Commission and an administrative proceeding ensued. Ultimately, a settlement agreement was reached in that case which resulted in the Petitioner being allowed to resign, effective April 16, 1993, rather than suffer termination effective March 31, 1993. That agreement entered into by the parties in that case specifically stated that "the agency [DOC] will take whatever action is necessary to return the employee [Cook] to the payroll for the period between March 31, 1993 and April 16, 1993". The Division of Retirement was, of course, not a party to that agreement since it was not a party to the litigation involved. The agreement was incorporated into a Final Order issued by the Public Employees Relations Commission in Case No. CF-93-196, entered June 7, 1993. The Petitioner sent a letter to E.I. Perrin, the Superintendent of Florida State Prison, dated April 12, 1993, in which he stated "that if I am still on the payroll, I hereby resign my position with the Florida Department of Corrections effective April 16, 1993 . . .". According to attendance and leave reports signed by both the Petitioner and Marion Bronson, the Personnel Director of Florida State Prison, the Petitioner was on sick leave for the payroll period of March 26, 1993 through April 8, 1993. While the date of the Petitioner's signature on the relevant time sheet was April 8, 1993, the end of the pay period, the Petitioner testified that the time sheets had actually been submitted earlier. Attendance and leave reports for the following pay period indicated that the Petitioner continued on sick leave status through April 16, 1993. The time sheets for the latter period were not signed by the Petitioner but were signed by Marion Bronson. DOC ordered a manual payroll made up to record payment and to pay the Petitioner through April 16, 1993. He received a salary warrant for $1,234.43 for that period from April 1-16, 1993. That salary check and warrant reflects that retirement contributions were paid as to that April payroll period salary. Because he received additional retirement service credit and a new average final compensation as a result of being in a payroll status and being paid for the period of time in April 1993, the Petitioner's monthly retirement benefits actually now exceed what he would receive as retirement benefit payments had he not been compensated as an employee for his service through April 16, 1993. The Petitioner testified at hearing that he was terminated on March 31, 1993 and not re-hired. He further testified that he neither wanted nor expected payment from DOC for the period of March 31, 1993 through April 16, 1993 and that he "merely wanted to clear his name". Nevertheless, he entered into the settlement agreement which provided for him to be compensated and on payroll status through April 16, 1993, when he entered into the settlement with DOC in the proceeding before the Public Employees Relations Commission. He is presumed to have full knowledge of the content of that settlement agreement, and it reflects that he freely and voluntarily entered into it, as does his testimony. According to Mr. Bronson's testimony, during the relevant period from March 31, 1993 through April 16, 1993, the Petitioner was occupying an authorized and established employment position with DOC. His employment relationship continued with the Department, as a result of the settlement agreement, until April 16, 1993. Because Mr. Bronson and DOC are not parties to the present proceeding and have no financial interest in the outcome of this litigation, Mr. Bronson's testimony is deemed credible and is accepted insofar as it may differ from that of the Petitioner. The Respondent agency learned that a payroll had been prepared for the period of time in April of 1993 in question and that a salary warrant was issued on the basis of the settlement agreement extending the Petitioner's employment with DOC through April 16, 1993. The Division of Retirement thus temporarily reduced the Petitioner's retirement benefits to recover the amount of the resulting, unauthorized April retirement check. It was unauthorized because he remained employed for the period of time in April and was paid as though he were employed, as a result of the settlement agreement. Consequently, he was not entitled to retirement benefits for that period of time in April 1993 ending on April 16, 1993. Mr. Snuggs testified that every retirement applicant, such as the Petitioner, receives a form FRS-TAR, entitled "Retirement System Termination and Re-Employment". The Petitioner did not deny receiving that form (Respondent's Exhibit 4) which advises prospective retirees of their rights and obligations in terms of retirement and retirement benefits as it relates to re- employment.

Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, temporarily reducing the Petitioner's retirement benefits, in the manner already proposed by that agency, until such time as his April 1993 retirement benefit, paid to him previously, has been reimbursed to the agency. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of December, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of December, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-2292 Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact 1-11. Accepted. The Petitioner filed no proposed findings of fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Albert F. Cook Post Office Box 782 Sneads, Florida 32460 Robert B. Button, Esquire Department of Management Services Division of Retirement 2639 North Monroe Street, Bldg. C Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 A.J. McMullian, III, Director Division of Retirement 2639 North Monroe Street, Bldg. C Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 William H. Lindner, Secretary Department of Management Services Knight Building, Ste. 307 Koger Executive Center 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950

Florida Laws (3) 120.57121.021121.091 Florida Administrative Code (1) 60S-4.012
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EVELYN S. DAY vs DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 90-002085 (1990)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Crestview, Florida Apr. 03, 1990 Number: 90-002085 Latest Update: Aug. 17, 1995

The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Petitioner, Evelyn S. Day, is entitled to modify her type of retirement benefits from "early service retirement" to "disability retirement."

Findings Of Fact The Findings of Fact set forth in paragraph 1 are accepted. The Findings of Fact set forth in paragraph 2 are accepted. The Findings of Fact set forth in paragraph 3 are accepted. The Findings of Fact set forth in paragraph 4 are accepted. The Findings of Fact set forth in paragraph 5 are accepted in part. In that paragraph, the Hearing Officer found as follows: Her memory and thought processes had evidentially [sic] already begun deteriorating because Mrs. Day was unable to ask guestions concerning her retirement rights, responsibilities, and entitlements very well. Because of this condition, Ms. Hobby agreed to accompany her to the offices of the Division of Retirement in order to ascertain what her retirement rights, entitlements, and responsibilities might be preparatory to Mrs. Day electing to retire. The above-quoted findings are rejected as conclusory and not supported by competent, substantial evidence. The Findings of Fact as set forth in paragraph 6 are rejected as not supported by competent, substantial evidence, except the finding that Mrs. Day retired and Ms. Hobby filled out her application for retirement. Additionally, the Hearing Officer's findings that petitioner was incompetent and suffering from Alzheimer's disease are rejected as being legal conclusions not supported by any judicial order or by any competent, substantial evidence in the record. The Findings of Fact as set forth in paragraph 7 are accepted. The Findings of Fact as set forth in paragraph 8 are accepted. The Findings of Fact as set forth in paragraph 9 are accepted. That portion of the Findings of Fact in paragraph 10 which concluded the petitioner was incompetent is rejected as not supported by competent, substantial evidence. The petitioner has never been declared incompetent or determined to be incompetent by a medical doctor. Findings of Fact as set forth in paragraph 11 are accepted in part and rejected in part. That portion of the Findings which states that the application for retirement was not filed by Ms. Day is not supported by competent, substantial evidence. In point of fact, the Division has a filed application signed by the petitioner. The portion of the paragraph finding the petitioner incompetent is rejected as not supported by competent, substantial evidence. There has been no legal or medical determination that the Petitioner is incompetent. Additionally, there is no competent, substantial evidence that petitioner is suffering from Alzheimer's disease. The Hearing officer's finding that the petitioner's application was filed in error is not supported by competent, substantial evidence.

Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered by the Department of Administration, Division of Retirement, according the Petitioner, Evelyn Day, the opportunity to change the status of her retirement benefits from early retirement to disability retirement, effective as of the date her earlier retirement application was accepted by the agency. DONE AND ORDERED this 3rd day of January, 1991, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 48B-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of January, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 90-2085 PETITIONER'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT 1-8. Accepted. RESPONDENT'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT Accepted. Accepted to the extent that the record establishes that the Petitioner signed the application. Accepted to the extent that it was established that Petitioner has received the retirement checks. It is not established that the Petitioner cashed or deposited those retirement checks by preponderant evidence of record. Accepted insofar as it recites the Respondent's position in this matter. Accepted. Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Aletta Shutes, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 Augustus D. Aikens, Jr., Esq. General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 Mr. Joseph G. Stokes 911 "B" Street Crestview, Florida 32536 Larry D. Scott, Esq. Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center Building C 1639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560

Florida Laws (5) 120.56120.57120.68121.031121.091
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MIKE TAMBURRO vs DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 03-001347 (2003)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Lauderdale, Florida Apr. 17, 2003 Number: 03-001347 Latest Update: Aug. 29, 2003

The Issue Whether the effective date of Petitioner's retirement should be changed from May 1, 2002, to February 23, 2000, or, in the alternative, August 23, 2000, as requested by Petitioner.1

Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole,2 the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner is a retired member of the Florida Retirement System, who turned 62 years of age earlier this year. He worked for the State of Florida for approximately 11 and a half years. He last worked for the State of Florida in February of 1983. On May 2, 1994, the Division received the following written inquiry, dated April 11, 1994, from Petitioner: I was employed by the state from June 1971 until February 1983. Please advise me when I would be eligible to receive retirement benefits and approximately how much my monthly benefits would be. Your assistance in this matter is greatly appreciated. The Division responded to Petitioner's inquiry by sending Petitioner two "Estimates of Retirement Benefit," one based on a retirement date of May 1, 1994 (hereinafter referred to as the "First Estimate") and the other based on a "deferred retirement at age 62" (hereinafter referred to as the "Second Estimate"), along with a pamphlet entitled, "Preparing to Retire" (hereinafter referred to as the "Pamphlet"). The First Estimate contained the following "comments" (at the bottom of the page): To retain a retirement date of 5/1/94, you must complete and return the enclosed application for service retirement, Form FR- 11, within thirty days of the date this estimate was mailed. The Second Estimate contained the following "comments" (at the bottom of the page): This estimate is based on a deferred retirement at age 62. Refer to the enclosed deferred retirement memorandum, DR-1, for additional information. The Pamphlet read, in pertinent part, as follows: If you are preparing to retire, you should take certain steps to ensure there will be no loss of benefits to you. Following are some suggestions. * * * 3. Apply For Retirement Benefits. Three to six months before your retirement complete an application for retirement, Form FR-11, which is available from either your personnel office or the Division of Retirement. Your personnel office must complete part 2 of the Form FR-11 and then they will forward the application to the Division. The Division will acknowledge receipt of your application for benefits and advise you of anything else needed to complete your application. * * * Effective Retirement Date- Your effective date of retirement is determined by your termination date and the date the Division receives your retirement application. You may make application for retirement within 6 months prior to your employment termination date. If your retirement application is received by the Division prior to termination of employment or within 30 calendar days thereafter, the effective date of the retirement will be the first day of the month following receipt of your application by the Division. You will not receive retroactive benefits for the months prior to the effective date of retirement. Remember, your application can be placed on file and any of the other requirements (such as option selection, birth date verification, payment of amount due your account, etc.) met at a later date. Petitioner did not "complete and return the enclosed application for service retirement." Petitioner next contacted the Division in April of 2002, this time by telephone. During this telephone conversation, he was advised that he could apply for retirement immediately. Petitioner requested a "Florida Retirement System Application for Service Retirement" form from the Division. Upon receiving it, he filled it out and sent the completed form to the Division. The Division received the completed form on April 26, 2002. On April 29, 2002, the Division sent Petitioner a letter "acknowledging receipt of [his] Application for Service Retirement" and advising him that his effective retirement date was "05/2002." In or around December of 2002, after receiving several monthly retirement payments from the Division, Petitioner requested that his retirement date be made retroactive to 1994 because he was not adequately advised by the Division, in 1994, that he was then eligible, upon proper application, to receive retirement benefits. By letter dated February 5, 2003, the Division advised Petitioner that it was unable to grant his request. By letter dated March 6, 2003, Petitioner "appeal[ed]" the Division's decision.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Division issue a final order denying Petitioner's request that the effective date of his retirement be changed. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of July, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of July, 2003.

Florida Laws (9) 120.569120.57121.011121.021121.091121.121121.136121.1905440.13
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RICHARD A. CASTILLO, JR. vs DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 94-001750 (1994)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tampa, Florida Apr. 01, 1994 Number: 94-001750 Latest Update: Apr. 06, 1995

The Issue Whether the purported selection of Option 2 for payment of Florida Retirement System disability retirement benefits to Lon Emory Sweely, now deceased, and his beneficiary, the Petitioner, Richard A. Castillo, Jr., was valid and effective.

Findings Of Fact On or about June 20, 1990, Lon Emory Sweely executed a Division of Retirement Form FR-13 Florida Retirement System Application for Disability Retirement. The application indicated that Sweely's disability resulted from AIDS-related conditions. It selected Option 1, which the application designates as the "Maximum Benefit" and describes as follows: Full benefits payable to the member for his lifetime. If death occurs before the total benefits paid to member equals the contributions made, the difference, if any, is refunded to beneficiary in a lump sum payment. In so doing, Sweely rejected Option 2, which the application designates as "Ten Years Certain," and describes: Lifetime benefit to member, but not less than 120 monthly payments to someone. A decreased retirement benefit payable to a member during his lifetime, and in the event of his death with a period of ten (10) years after his retirement, the same monthly amount shall be payable for the balance of such ten (10) year period to his beneficiary, or in case the beneficiary is deceased, in accordance with Section 121.091(3), Florida Statutes, as though no beneficiary has been named. The application, also designated the Petitioner, Richard A. Castillo, Jr., as Sweely's sole beneficiary. (Sweely previously had designated the Petitioner as his beneficiary, with the Petitioner's mother as the first contingent beneficiary, on a Division of Retirement Personal History Record Form FRS-M10 (Revised 3/89) executed by Sweely on January 25, 1990.) At the time of Sweely's application for disability retirement, Sweely knew that he had full-blown AIDS and that his life expectancy would have to be estimated at approximately two years or less. There also is evidence that Eulah Lee McWilliams, the principal at the elementary school where Sweely taught, counseled Sweely on his options and advised Sweely to select the "Ten Years Certain" option. It is clear that Sweely wanted the Petitioner, and no one else, to be his sole beneficiary and to be provided for after his death in the manner and to the extent to which he decided. McWilliams believed that Sweely wanted the Petitioner to have the benefits of the "Ten Year Certain" Option 2. Based on their conversations, McWilliams believed that Sweely concurred with her recommendation in order to provide the maximum possible benefit to the Petitioner upon Sweely's death. But, in the face of Sweely's knowledge and McWilliams's advice and understanding, the application indicates that Sweely selected Option 1. There was evidence that the Petitioner was present and assisting Sweely when the Form FR-13 was executed and that the Petitioner filled out part of the form at Sweely's direction, as writing was inconvenient and difficult for Sweely at the time. But there was no evidence that Sweely was unable to make informed decisions when he executed Division of Retirement Form FR-13 on or about June 20, 1990. The evidence also did not prove that Sweely's choice of Option 1 was inadvertent error. At that point in time, Sweely may have wanted to be optimistic and to be able to enjoy and share with the Petitioner the maximum possible monthly benefit for as long as Sweely lived. McWilliams testified that, at the time, Sweely was trying to remain "up-beat" concerning his illness, in part thinking that this might extend his lifetime. A decision to choose Option 1, contrary to McWilliams's recommendation, also would not have been inconsistent with an earlier decision by Sweely in April, 1990, (this time in conformance with McWilliams's recommendation) to postpone applying for retirement benefits until he exhausted all of his accumulated fully-paid sick leave. Had Sweely died while on sick leave, the Petitioner would not have received the additional retirement benefits he is seeking in this case. (It is not clear from the record exactly what the benefits would have been, but it seems that the Petitioner would not have been entitled to any of the additional retirement benefits he is seeking in this case. Cf. Section 121.091(7), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1990); F.A.C. Rule 60S-4.008.) A little over a month later, Sweely's condition worsened, and on or about August 14, 1990, he had to be hospitalized again (as already had happened from time to time during Sweely's full-blown AIDS.) On or about August 15, 1990, the Division of Retirement approved Sweely's application for disability retirement, effective July 1, 1990. On the same date, the Division of Retirement also sent Sweely a Division of Retirement Form FST-40c (R5/89) Acknowledgement of Retirement Application and a blank FRS- 11o "Option Selection Form for FRS Members." The Form FST-40c (R5/89) requested that Sweely "review carefully how the option one and two are paid to your beneficiary." The descriptions of the options in the Form FRS-11o were somewhat different from those in the Form FR-13 application. Option 1 was not called the "Maximum Benefit," and it was described as follows: A monthly benefit payable for my lifetime. Upon my death, the monthy benefit will stop and my beneficiary will receive only a refund of any contributionss I have paid which are in excess of the amount I have received in benefits. This option does not provide a continuing benefit to my beneficiary. (Emphasis in the original.) Option 2 was not called "Ten Years Certain," and it was described as follows: A reduced monthly benefit payable for my lifetime. If I die before receiving 120 monthly benefit payments, my designated beneficiary will receive a monthly benefit payment in the same amount as I was receiving until the monthly benefit payments to both me and my beneficiary equal 120 monthly payments. No further benefits are then payable. The FRS-11o "Option Selection Form for FRS Members" also stated in bold and underlined upper case type: "MEMBER MUST SIGN AND DATE IN THE PRESENCE OF A NOTARY PUBLIC." Whenever Sweely was hospitalized, the emotional strain on the Petitioner increased, and the time spent with Sweely in the hospital left the Petitioner less time to accomplish normal household tasks. The Petitioner's life and home usually became disorganized during Sweely's hospitalizations, and the Petitioner often allowed mail to pile up at their home at these times. The Petitioner testified that, notwithstanding Sweely's hospitalization and its disruptive effect on his life and habits, he happened to collect and read the mail on August 16, 1990. He testified that among the items of mail he read that day was the envelope postmarked the day before in Tallahassee, Florida, containing the Division of Retirement Form FST-40c (R5/89) Acknowledgement of Retirement Application and the blank FRS-11o "Option Selection Form for FRS Members." The Petitioner testified that he telephoned McWilliams to discuss the forms with her, and she asked him to bring them to the hospital. He testified, and she confirmed, that she met with the Petitioner at the hospital, looked at the forms, and explained them to the Petitioner. Believing, based on the conversations she had with Sweely before June 20, 1990, that Option 2 was Sweely's actual choice, McWilliams advised the Petitioner to choose Option 2. McWilliams testified that she discussed the matter with Sweely and with the Petitioner in Sweely's presence on August 16, 1990. (It certainly is possible that, had they discussed the matter with Sweely on August 16, 1990, Sweely might have chosen Option 2 at that time.) But the Petitioner testified that they did not discuss the matter with Sweely on August 16, 1990. The Petitioner explained that, although Sweely was oriented and physically able to write his name and, from time to time, was mentally lucid on that day, the Petitioner did not think that Sweely was in a position to give full consideration to the matter at the time they were discussing the forms because he was on morphine, was lethargic, and was having difficulty breathing without a non-rebreather mask. The Petitioner also did not think it was necessary to trouble Sweely with the matter, since the Petitioner believed that the selection of Option 2 on the Form FRS-11o was redundant and also that he was authorized to execute the form for Sweely as his attorney-in-fact under a purported durable power of attorney which Sweely executed on or about February 28, 1990, authorizing the Petitoner to act in Sweely's behalf in all matters. Under the circumstances on the afternoon of August 16, 1990, the Petitioner did not think that Sweely would have wanted to be troubled with the matter unnecessarily. He checked Option 2 and signed Sweely's name to the Form FRS-11o. On numerous previous occasions, the Petitioner had signed Sweely's name on Sweely's personal checks to pay Sweely's bills. In doing so, the Petitioner believed that he was acting properly under the authority of the purported durable power of attorney, and the bank always honored the checks the Petitioner signed this way. But on June 13, 1990, a physician insisted that the Petitioner sign a Division of Retirement medical records release form FR-13b in his own name as attorney-in-fact for Sweely. Himself not thinking well or clearly under the circumstances, the Petitioner assumed that his signature on the Form FRS-11o was valid. The Petitioner testified that it did not occur to him that there were notary services available for his use at the hospital. He testified that, after checking Option 2 and signing the Form FRS-11o, he telephoned his father, who was a notary, and asked him to come to the hospital to notarize something for him. The Petitioner's father confirmed this and also confirmed the Petitioner's testimony that they met in the hallway outside Sweely's hospital room, where the Petitioner gave his father the signed form and asked him to notarize it. Both testified that they did not discuss the form in any detail before the Petitioner returned to Sweely's hospital room. The Petitioner's father testified that he notarized the form thinking that Sweely had signed it. Sweely died two days later on August 18, 1990.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, enter a final order: (1) that the purported selection, on the Form FRS-11o dated August 16, 1990, of Option 2 for payment of Florida Retirement System disability retirement benefits to Lon Emory Sweely, now deceased, and his beneficiary, the Petitioner, Richard A. Castillo, Jr., was invalid and ineffective; and (2) that the previous selection of Option 1 on the Form FR-13 executed on or about June 20, 1990, is valid and shall be given effect. RECOMMENDED this 20th day of January, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of January, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Fla. Stat. (1993), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1.-9. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Last sentence, rejected as not proven. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Last sentence, rejected as subordinate to facts not proven and as hearsay insufficient in itself to support a finding. (Taking as true that Sweely made such a statement to the Petitioner, his actions were not in accordance with the statement.) Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. 12.-14. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Last sentence, rejected as subordinate to facts not proven and as hearsay insufficient in itself to support a finding. (Taking as true that Sweely made such a statement to McWilliams, his actions were not in accordance with the statement, and McWilliams also testified that Sweely tried to remain "up-beat," thinking that this might extend his lifetime.) Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. (Specifically, it was clear that Sweely wanted the Petitioner, and no one else, to be his sole beneficiary and to be provided for after his death in the manner and to the extent to which he decided.) Last sentence, not proven (as to expression of "clear and unqualified acknowledgment and understanding); also rejected as subordinate to facts not proven and as hearsay insufficient in itself to support a finding. (Taking as true that Sweely made such a statement to McWilliams, his actions were not in accordance with the statement, and McWilliams also testified that Sweely tried to remain "up-beat," thinking that this might extend his lifetime.) Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. (Specifically, it was clear that Sweely wanted the Petitioner, and no one else, to be his sole beneficiary and to be provided for after his death in the manner and to the extent to which he decided.) 17.-30. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. 31. "Substantially," rejected as not proven. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. 32.-35. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1.-7. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Ultimate and penultimate sentences, rejected in part as contrary to facts found and to the greater weight of the evidence. (The evidence was that the Patient Care Technician Records were prepared near the beginning of each nursing shift and reflected conditions at that time. Meanwhile, there was evidence that the patient's mental state would "wax" and "wane." When the patient "waned" and was lethargic, it was difficult to communicate with him. Changes during the course of a shift may or may not be noted in the Progress Notes. While the Patient Care Technician Records indicate that the patient was both oriented and lethargic, the 8 a.m. progress notes indicate "lethargic at times." The progress notes also indicate that, earlier in the day, the patient had difficulty breathing without the non-rebreather mask and that, by 2 p.m., he was wearing the mask continuously. Even disregarding the possibility that the morphine dosage was enough to affect his judgment, the patient's lethargy and his difficulty breathing without the mask probably would have made it difficult for him to communicate on legal matters on the afternoon of August 16, 1990.) Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Ultimate and penultimate sentences, rejected in part as contrary to facts found and to the greater weight of the evidence. (He did not allege that Sweely could not communicate or write his name. He testified that he did not think Sweely would have been able to think clearly or want to be troubled with the form unnecessarily. He did not think he had to discuss it with Sweely or have Sweely sign it.) Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. However, Dr. Breen's curt medical evaluation of Sweely's general medical condition on August 16, 1990, was not for the purpose of evaluating whether it was possible or prudent to have him considering legal documents and making important legal judgments. In addition, Dr. Breen saw the patient early in the morning and would not have seen changes during the course of the day. 11.-12. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. 13. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence that Castillo, Jr., "insist[ed] that Sweely was incompetent, unable to provide or receive meaningful communication on August 16--and could not execute the form himself . . .." (Rather, he testified that he did not think Sweely would have been able to think clearly or want to be troubled with the form unnecessarily.) Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. 14.-16. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Keith F. Roberts, Esquire 201 North MacDill Avenue Tampa, Florida 33609 Robert B. Button, Esquire Department of Management Services Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 A. J. McMullian, III, Director Department of Management Services Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 William H. Lindner, Secretary Department of Management Services Knight Building, Suite 307 Koger Executive Center 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Paul A. Rowell, Esquire General Counsel Department of Management Services Knight Building, Suite 312 Koger Executive Center 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950

Florida Laws (2) 120.52121.091 Florida Administrative Code (1) 60S-9.001
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VERNON TAYLOR BELL vs. DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 81-002499 (1981)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 81-002499 Latest Update: Nov. 15, 1982

The Issue May Petitioner make an application with Respondent for disability retirement benefits when he was already applied for and has received regular retirement payments?

Findings Of Fact Mr. Vernon Taylor Bell voluntarily terminated his employment with the Department of Legal Affairs on February 26, 1980. By that date he had accumulated 23.66 years of service for credit in the Florida Retirement System. After his termination Mr. Bell had a conference with a retirement benefits specialist, Ms. Taylor, who is an employee of Respondent. At Mr. Bell's request she gave him an estimate of his retirement benefits for a regular retirement. She did not discuss the benefits which a disabled retiree might receive. The testimony of Ms. Taylor and Mr. Bell is in conflict on whether or not she discussed disability retirement benefits with him. Ms. Taylor's testimony is accepted as being more credible because Mr. Bell was shown throughout his testimony to have a poor memory. Mr. Bell began to receive regular retirement benefits in the monthly amounts of $178.32 on May 30, 1980. Since that date he has continued to receive and accept regular retirement payments. Petitioner has cashed or deposited his first benefit check. If Mr. Bell were to be granted disability retirement benefits rather than regular retirement benefits, his monthly payment would be substantially increased. Petitioner did not present credible evidence that he was misinformed or mislead by Respondent about the relative advantages to him in electing to apply for regular retirement as opposed to applying for disability benefits. On August 26, 1980, Mr. Bell wrote a letter to Mr. Andrew M. McMullian III, who is the State Retirement Director. Mr. Bell stated that he had been given incorrect information about the disability benefits he might be eligible for. He requested that he be allowed to make an application as a disabled retiree. On October 1, 1980, Mr. McMullian responded to Mr. Bell in a letter which states in part: We have reviewed your retirement account and have determined the information provided to you by this office was correct regarding your retirement eligibility. We regret if there was any misunderstanding on your part re- garding disability retirement; however, we cannot honor your request to be retired with disability at this late date, because you applied for regular retirement which was approved for you effective April 1, 1980. Your initial monthly benefit was $178.32 and your July 1980 benefit payment contained a cost-of-living increase, thus your current monthly benefit is $179.73. The Florida Retirement System law requires certification by two licensed physicians in Florida that one is totally and permanently disabled and unable to render any useful and efficient work before this agency can approve an employee for retirement with disability. Apparently, you made no attempt to retire with disability, other than discussing the matter in general with us, and according to our records, you made no application for disability retirement. Further, a retiree is not allowed by law to change his type of re- tirement once he begins drawing monthly re- tirement benefits.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the State Retirement Director enter a Final Order authorizing Mr. Bell is submit an application for disability retirement benefits. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 24th day of August, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida MICHAEL PEARCE DODSON Hearing Officer Department of Administration Division of Administrative Hearings Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24 day of August, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Silas R. Eubanks, Esquire 103 North Gadsden Street Post Office Box 4266 Tallahassee, Florida 32303 William Frieder, Esquire Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center 2639 North Monroe Street Suite 207C - Box 81 Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Daniel C. Brown, Esquire General Counsel Department of Administration 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Nevin G. Smith Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (2) 120.57121.091
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