The Issue Whether the proposed amendment to the St. Johns County 2015 Future Land Use Map (FLUM), adopted by Ordinance No. 2002-31, is "in compliance" with the relevant provisions of the Local Government Comprehensive Planning and Land Development Regulation Act, Chapter 163, Part, II, Florida Statutes. A second issue raised by St. Johns County (County) and The Estuaries Limited Liability Company (Estuaries) is whether, if the proposed amendment is not "in compliance," it is nevertheless valid and authorized pursuant to Chapter 70, Florida Statutes, the Bert J. Harris, Jr., Private Property Rights Protection Act.
Findings Of Fact The Parties Petitioner, Julie Parker, resides in St. Augustine, Florida, less than one and one-half miles from the proposed project site. Parker also owns other property in St. Johns County. Parker submitted oral comments to the County at the adoption hearing on May 28, 2002, regarding the FLUM Amendment and Ordinance No. 2002-31. The parties agreed that Parker has standing in this proceeding. The County is a political subdivision of the State of Florida. The County adopted its Comprehensive Plan in 1990. The County proceeded with the evaluation and appraisal report process in 1997 and 1998. This process ultimately resulted in the adoption of the 2015 Comprehensive Plan Amendment, Goals, Objectives, and Policies, and Adopted EAR-Based Comprehensive Plan Amendment in May 2000 (May 2000 EAR-Based Plan Amendment), which was subjected to a sufficiency review by the Department and found "in compliance." Estuaries owns the 9.99 acres (the Property) that is the subject of the FLUM Amendment. Estuaries also owns approximately 8.5 acres outside, adjacent to, and west of the Property. The 8.5 acres are subject to a Conservation Easement, which prohibits any development activity thereon. (The total contiguous land owned by Estuaries is approximately 18.5 acres.) The parties stipulated that the legal description of the Property attached to Ordinance No. 2002-31 contains less than 10 acres. Estuaries submitted comments to the County at the adoption hearing on May 28, 2002, regarding the FLUM amendment. Estuaries has standing to participate as a party in this proceeding. The Property The Property is part of a larger tract owned by Estuaries, i.e., approximately 9.9 acres out of a total tract of approximately 18.5 acres. The entire 18.5 acre tract is located on Anastasia Island, a barrier island, which extends from the St. Augustine Inlet to the Matanzas Inlet. According to the 2000 Census, there are approximately 12,000 dwelling units on Anastasia Island. This includes condominium units and single-family units. The approximately 18.5-acre site is also located in the Coastal High Hazard Area under the County May 2000 EAR-Based Plan Amendment. The Property is part of Butler Beach (bordering the Atlantic Ocean), which is an historic area because it was settled in the early 1900's by black citizens and provided them with access to the beach, which was previously unavailable. However, no historic structures or uses have occurred on the Property. The entire 18.5 acre tract is located on the south side of Riverside Boulevard. The Property is located approximately 300 feet west of Highway A1A South (A1A runs north and south). The Intracoastal Waterway and the Matanzas River are west and adjacent to the 18.5 acres. The Estuaries site is also located adjacent to the Guana Tolomato Matanzas National Estuarine Research Reserve (NERR). The Property is vacant, partially wooded, and also consists of undeveloped wetlands. Of the 9.99 acres, approximately 6.7 acres are uplands and developable, and 3.29 acres are wetlands. As noted, the remaining approximately 8.5 acres of the Estuaries' property, and to the west of the Property, is subject to a Conservation Easement in favor of the County. The properties adjacent to the Property include the following: Single-family residential units are located along and on the north side Riverside Boulevard. The existing FLUM designations for this area are Residential Coastal Density A and C, with the existing zoning of open rural (OR). (Residential Coastal Density C permits 2.0 to 4.0 units per acre.) The Intracoastal portion of Butler State Park is to the south of the Property, with a FLUM designation of parks and open space and existing zoning of OR and is not in a conservation area. To the east of the Property is a utility substation site, Butler Avenue, various commercial uses, Island House Rentals or Condominiums (three-story oceanfront condominiums), and the Mary Street Runway. There is another condominium called Creston House, directly south of the Butler Park (ocean portion) area (distinguished from the Butler State Park), consisting of three stories. (Butler Park and Creston House are located east of A1A and southeast of the Estuaries property.) The existing FLUM designations are Coastal Residential Coastal Density A and C, and have existing zoning designations of Residential General (RG)-1 and Commercial General (CG). There are no Residential Density D FLUM land use designations in the contiguous area. In short, the Property is proximate to a state park, a densely developed area comprised of small residential lots of 25 by 100 feet lots, and the two three-story condominiums, which were built prior to the adoption of the County's 1990 Comprehensive Plan. The County's Comprehensive Plan and EAR-Based Amendments On September 14, 1990, the County adopted a Comprehensive Plan-1990-2005, with amendments (the 1990 Plan). Under the 1990 Plan, the Property was assigned a Residential Coastal-A land use designation under the existing FLUM, which meant that residential development was restricted to no more than one residential unit per upland (non-wetland jurisdictional) acre. Under this designation, approximately seven units could have been built on the Property. The zoning on the Property was and is RG-1. According to the County, at least as of a June 11, 1999, letter from the County's principal planner, Timothy W. Brown, A.I.C.P., to Kevin M. Davenport, P.E., the total units which would be allowed on the Property were 116 multi-family units, derived after making a detailed density calculation based in part on using 40 percent of the wetlands used for the density calculation. In May 2000, the County adopted the EAR-Based Plan Amendment, with supporting data and analysis, which the Department of Community Affairs found to be "in compliance." As required by Chapter 163, Part II, Florida Statutes, this would have included data and analysis for the Future Land Use Element (FLUE), which was adopted as part of these plan amendments. This is part of the data and analysis which supports the FLUM Amendment at issue in this proceeding. The May 2000 EAR-Based Plan Amendment continued the Residential Coastal A land use designation of the Property, which allows 0.4 to 1.0 units per acre. (Residential Coastal B allows 2.0 units per acre; Residential Coastal C allows 2.0 to 4.0 units per acre; and Residential Coastal D allows 4.0 to 8.0 units per acre.) The Residential Coastal A designation authorizes residential and non-residential uses, such as schools, public service facilities, police, fire, and neighborhood commercial. Restaurants and banks without drive-thru facilities, gasoline pumps, and professional office buildings are examples of neighborhood commercial uses. The May 2000 EAR-Based Plan Amendment does not limit the lot size, subject to limitations on, for example, impervious surface ratios, which do not change regardless of whether the land use designation is Residential Coastal A or D. Also, any development would also have to comply with the textural provisions of the May 2000 EAR- Based Plan Amendment, including the coastal and conservation elements. The Circuit Court Litigation There are many documents in this case which pertain to the litigation between Estuaries and the County. The civil action was filed in the Circuit Court of the Seventh Judicial Circuit, in and for St. Johns County, Florida, and styled The Estuaries Limited Liability Company v. St. Johns County, Florida, Case No. CA-00271. On February 11, 2000, Estuaries filed a Complaint against the County "relating to certain representations made by the County in connection with the development of certain real property located south of St. Augustine Beach in St. Johns County, Florida." A Second Amended Complaint was filed on or about May 30, 2001. Estuaries claimed that County staff made representations to Estuaries, which resulted in Estuaries having a vested right to develop its Property up to a maximum of 116 multi-family residential units. (The County took the position that Estuaries could build no more than 25 units on the Property.) Estuaries claimed that it had vested rights based upon a claim of equitable estoppel against the County. (One of Estuaries' claims was brought pursuant to the Bert Harris, Jr., Private Property Rights Protection Act, Chapter 70, Florida Statutes.)1 After discovery and the denial of motions for summary judgment, the parties entered into a "Settlement Agreement and Complete Release" (Settlement Agreement). The "General Terms of Settlement" in the Settlement Agreement provided in part: Estuaries shall prepare and file an application to amend the future land use map of the St. Johns County Comprehensive Plan to amend the designation of only that portion of the Property such that Estuaries may build 56 multi-family residential units on the Property and such that the amendment be a "Small-scale Amendment" as defined by the Local Government Comprehensive Planning Act. Estuaries agrees on behalf of itself, its successors and assigns to build not more than 56 units on the Property. County will waive or pay the application fee and will expedite its processing. The parties will forthwith prepare and submit to the Court a joint motion for the approval of this Agreement pursuant to the Bert J. Harris, Jr., Private Property Rights Protection Act, §70.001(4)(d)2. During the review and consideration of the amendment application, the County will expeditiously process the Estuaries' revised construction plans and, in connection therewith, the construction codes in effect as of November 13, 2001 (to the extent the County may do so without violating county, state or federal law), the existing certificate of concurrency and the terms of the vesting letter as it relates to the Land Development Code, of Sonya Doerr dated September 27, 1999, shall continue to apply. In all other respects, the revised construction plans shall comply with all other Comprehensive Plan and County ordinances and regulations. On or about November 16, 2001, counsel for the parties signed a Joint Motion, requesting the circuit court to approve the Settlement Agreement pursuant to Section 70.001(4)(d)2., Florida Statutes. On November 16, 2001, Circuit Judge John Michael Traynor, entered an "Order Approving Settlement Agreement pursuant to Bert J. Harris, Jr. Private Property Rights Protection Act." Judge Traynor stated in part: The central issue in this litigation has been the number of dwelling units that would be permitted on the Property. The issues in the case are legally complex and, although the credibility of the testimony and authenticity of the exhibits expected to be introduced was not expected to be substantially in dispute or challenged, the meaning of the testimony and the meaning and inferences to be drawn from such evidence was very much in dispute. The issues included the extent of vested rights, the extent to which estoppel may be applied to the County, contractual liability, and potential liability under the Bert J. Harris, Jr. Private Property Rights Protection Act . . . and the relief requested included the request for a declaration that the Plaintiff is entitled to build up to 116 dwelling units on the Property and damages against the County. Judge Traynor also "Ordered and Adjudged," in part: Pursuant to Florida Statute § 70.001(4)(a) & (c) and applicable law, this Court finds that proper notice of a Bert Harris Act claim was timely provided to the County, and other governmental entities, and the County did make a written settlement offer to the Plaintiff, in accordance with the Bert Harris Act, that was accepted by Plaintiff. Florida Statute § 70.001(4)(c) permits, inter alia, for an adjustment of land development provisions controlling the development of a plaintiff's property; increases or modifications in the density, intensity, or use of areas of development; the transfer of development rights; conditioning the amount of development or use permitted; issuance of a development order, a variance, special exceptions, or other extraordinary relief; and such other actions specified in the statute. While the parties may dispute whether an amendment is necessary to the County's Comprehensive Plan, the parties have agreed that the Plaintiff shall submit a small-scale amendment to the County for consideration and approval pursuant to the Local Government Comprehensive Planning and Land Development Regulation Act. . .; without waiver of either party's rights to contest and defend the necessity of submitting such an amendment, in light of this Court's approval of the settlement agreement pursuant to the Bert Harris Act and applicable law. The Court finds that the Settlement Agreement and Complete Release is fair, reasonable and adequate; is in the best interests of the parties and protects the public interest served by the Local Government Comprehensive Planning and Land Development Regulation Act. . .; and is the appropriate relief necessary to prevent the County's regulatory efforts from inordinately burdening the Property with regard to density, impact on public services, the environment and the public health, safety and welfare of the community and the rights of individuals to reasonably utilize their property and to rely on the representations of government, taking into consideration the risks that both parties had in this litigation. This litigation has been ongoing for more than 18 months, and substantial discovery and record has been presented to the Court that provides ample basis for this Court's approval of this settlement as being fair, reasonable and adequate and appropriate under the Bert Harris Act. There is no evidence before the Court that would suggest that the proposed settlement is the result of any collusion among the parties or their counsel. In fact, the record is to the contrary, whereby counsel on both sides have aggressively and zealously pursued the interests of their respective clients. . . . Judge Traynor directed the parties to implement the terms of the Settlement Agreement, "subject to the right of the public to comment at an appropriate public hearing pertaining to the above referenced small scale amendment to the County's Comprehensive Plan, and shall cooperate to accomplish in good faith the responsibilities under the Settlement Agreement and Complete Release." There is no evidence that Judge Traynor's Order has been rescinded or otherwise modified. There is no statutory authority to collaterally attack Judge Traynor's Order in this proceeding nor is there any authority which provides that this Order can be ignored. Also, this is not the appropriate proceeding to determine whether Estuaries has, in fact, vested rights. Accordingly, Judge Traynor's Order, approving the Settlement Agreement, is accepted as binding authority. The Small Scale Development Application In compliance with Judge Traynor's Order and the Settlement Agreement, on March 26, 2002, Estuaries filed a "Small Scale Amendment Comprehensive Plan Amendment Application Form" with the County. Estuaries requested a change in the Property's FLUM designation from Residential Coastal A, Zoning RG-1 to Residential Coastal D, Zoning RG-1. Estuaries represented, in part, that the Property consisted of 9.99 acres of vacant land, including 3.2 acres of wetlands and approximately 6.7 acres of developable land (uplands) "which will be developed into a 56 unit Multi-Family Condominium." County staff reviewed the application and recommended approval. As part of the agenda item for consideration by the St. Johns County Board of County Commissioners, County staff, in light of the criterion of "Consistency with the Goals, Objectives and Policies of the Comprehensive Plan, State Comprehensive Plan and the Northeast Florida Regional Policy Plan," stated: "[t]he approved Settlement Agreement was filed pursuant to Chapter 70.001." With respect to "Impacts on Public Facilities and Services," County staff stated: "The project has received a Certificate of Concurrency addressing the impacts on transportation, water, sewer, recreation, drainage, solid waste and mass transit. The Certificate of Concurrency is based on impacts of 84 multi-family dwelling units. Pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, the project contains 56 multi-family dwelling units. St. Johns County provides central water and sewer." With respect to "Compatibility with Surrounding Area," County staff stated: "The area is developed with a mixture of residential, commercial, park (Butler Park), and vacant land of various zoning." According to Mr. Scott Clem, the County's Director of Growth Management Services, County staff felt that there were adequate public facilities for a 56-unit project, because Estuaries had previously demonstrated that facilities were available for an 84-unit project. However, County staff expressly noted in the Planning Department Staff Report submitted to the Planning and Zoning Agency that "[t]here are no development plans included in the Application. However, all site engineering, drainage and required infrastructure improvements will be reviewed pursuant to the Development Review Process to ensure that the development complies with all applicable federal, state and local regulations and permitting requirements. No permits shall authorize development prior to compliance with all applicable regulations." At this point in time, County staff were "analyzing the potential for 56 units to be on the property. It was a site specific analysis at that point." On April 18, 2002, the Planning and Zoning Agency unanimously recommended approval of the FLUM amendment. After a properly noticed public hearing, on May 28, 2002, the County approved the FLUM Amendment in Ordinance 2002- 31. In Ordinance 2002-31, the County approved the FLUM Amendment at issue, which changed the FLUM land use classification of the Property from Residential Coastal A to Residential Coastal D. Ordinance 2002-31 also provided: "The Land Uses allowed by this Small Scale Comprehensive Plan Amendment shall be limited to not more than 56 residential units, built in not more than four buildings with residential uses, not more than 35 feet in height." The Challenge Parker filed an Amended Petition challenging the lack of data and analysis to support the FLUM Amendment; challenging the increase in density of the Property located in a Coastal High Hazard Area; challenging the internal consistency of the FLUM Amendment with the May 2000 EAR-Based Plan Amendment; challenging the decision by the County to process the application as a small scale development amendment; and challenging the failure to provide Parker with adequate notice of a clear point of entry to challenge Ordinance No. 2002-31. Notice The County provided notice, by newspaper, of the Board of County Commissioners' meeting of May 28, 2002. Before this meeting, a sign was placed on the Property, providing notice of the meeting. Parker personally attended the May 28, 2002, meeting and addressed the Commission regarding the FLUM Amendment. Ordinance No. 2002-31 provided: "This ordinance shall take effect 31 days after adoption. If challenged within 30 days after adoption, this ordinance shall not become effective until the state land planning agency or the Administration Commission issues a final order determining the adopted small scale amendment is in compliance." This Ordinance does not advise a person of the right to challenge the Ordinance pursuant to Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, the Uniform Rules of Procedure, or Section 163.3187(3)(a), Florida Statutes. This type of notice is not required for the reasons set forth in the Conclusions of Law. Does the FLUM Amendment, covering 9.99 acres, involve a "use" of 10 acres or fewer, pursuant to Section 163.3187(1)(c)1., Florida Statutes? "A small scale development amendment may be adopted only [if] [t]he proposed amendment involves a use of 10 acres or fewer." Section 163.3187(1)(c)1., Florida Statutes.2 In the Amended Petition and in her Prehearing Stipulation, Parker contends that the "use," which is the subject of the FLUM Amendment, relates to more than the 9.99 acre parcel and, therefore, the FLUM Amendment is not a small scale development amendment defined in Section 163.3187(1)(c)1., Florida Statutes. Parker contended that because the FLUM Amendment authorizes a maximum of 56 residential units to be developed on the Property, and the maximum density under the Residential Coastal D and RG-1 zoning designations is 42.12 units, using the on-site wetlands density bonus, that Estuaries "must be using the off-site wetlands that are contained within the 18.5 acre parcel to obtain the density credit necessary to reach 56 units for the site under" the FLUM Amendment. The 56 residential unit maximum was the product of the circuit court litigation and Settlement Agreement, as approved by Judge Traynor, which resolved the differences between the County and Estuaries regarding the maximum residential density which could be authorized on the Property. Parker also contended that because Estuaries may use a proposed lift station owned by the County off-site, that this causes the proposed "use" of the Property to exceed 10 acres. It appears that at some prior time in the "vesting rights" chronology of events, Magnolia S Corporation, in order to downscale the project, agreed to sell a 40' by 80' parcel to the County, located adjacent to the Property and in the northeast portion, to expand the existing County lift station on Riverside Boulevard. There is a lift station adjacent to the Property that serves as "a repump station that serves the development along Riverside [Boulevard] west of the lift station and serves all the development in St. Johns County on the island south of Riverside Boulevard." It is proposed that sewage effluent from development on the Property would be deposited on site and then pumped into an adjacent force main which eventually ends up in the station. According to Mr. Kevin Davenport, Estuaries' civil engineer, "56 units added to that pump station would be extremely miniscule in the overall amount of sewage that goes through it." Thus, Estuaries anticipates having their own on-site lift station, which "would be pumped through a pipe to the Riverside right-of- way, where it would connect to an existing county-owned pipe which currently goes to the lift station." Mr. Clem stated that "[u]tilities are very commonly done off site where water or sewer distribution or transmission lines are constructed to the site." This would include the use of off- site lift stations. However, the proposed use of the lift station does not necessarily compel the conclusion that the FLUM Amendment exceeds 9.99 acres. If this were so, any proposed use of any off-site utilities would cause a pro rata calculation and increase of the size of the site providing the service, then be added to the 9.99 acres. This is not a reasonable construction of Section 163.3187(1)(c)1., Florida Statutes. Parker also claimed that when the Estuaries granted the County a Conservation Easement for the approximately 8.5 acres (out of 18.5 acres) of wetlands adjacent to the Property, Estuaries "used" this property to secure the FLUM Amendment, and therefore, exceeded the 9.99 acres. The Conservation Easement precludes development activity on the approximately 8.51 acres. ("The purpose of this Conservation Easement is to assure that the Property will be retained forever in its existing natural condition and to prevent any use of the Property that will impair or interfere with the environmental value of the property." Prohibited uses include "[a]ctivities detrimental to drainage, flood control, water conservation, erosion control, soil conservation, or fish and wildlife habitat preservation.") The "use" of the 8.51 acres as a potential visual amenity for potential residents on the Property is not a "use" within a reasonable reading of Section 163.3187(1)(c)1., Florida Statutes. Parker also suggested that Estuaries will need to improve Riverside Boulevard (paving and drainage) and the public right-of-way consisting of approximately 1.51 acres, which is not owned by Estuaries. It appears that Riverside Boulevard is already open, improved, and paved. Also, Mr. Clem stated that it is common to have off-site improvements associated with a project, which might include intersection or roadway improvements that are not on or within the project site. Mr. Clem opined that while these improvements would be required for the project, they would have been off-site. Some improvements, such as improvements to Riverside Boulevard, would most likely benefit the general public, and not be limited to the future residents on the Property. It is common for local governments to require improvements to public infrastructure as a condition of development. These off-site improvements do not necessarily make the "development activity" larger than the size of the landowner's site, here the Property. Data and Analysis Parker contended that the FLUM Amendment is not supported by appropriate data and analysis. As noted herein, Estuaries sought approval of a FLUM Amendment for its Property, i.e., a land use change to the FLUM. No text (goals, objectives, and policies) changes to the May 2000 EAR-Based Amendment were requested nor made. This is normal for a "site-specific small scale development activity." Section 163.3187(1)(c)1.d., Florida Statutes. Consideration of the FLUM Amendment in this proceeding is unusual for several reasons. First, the necessity for the FLUM change arose as a result of the Settlement Agreement, approved by Judge Traynor, which resolved the differences existing between the County and Estuaries regarding the number of units which could, as a maximum number, be developed on the Property. Second, the data and analysis, which normally is presented to the local government, here the County, at the time the plan amendment is adopted, is not in its traditional format here, largely, it appears, because of the manner in which consideration of the FLUM Amendment arose. Nevertheless, this situation is not fatal for, under existing precedent, see, e.g., Conclusion of Law 96, data, which was in existence at the time the FLUM Amendment was adopted by the County, may be considered in determining whether there is, in fact, adequate data supporting the FLUM Amendment. The data relied on by the County and Estuaries to support the FLUM Amendment was compiled and initially presented to the County on or about July 6, 1999, when Estuaries sought authorization from the County for a proposed project to construct 84 multi-family residential units on the same general area as the Property. This started the County's development review process. Estuaries began the process at this time, believing that it had "vested rights" to develop the Property. Mr. Clem explained that the development review process is "extremely detailed. It involves 11 or 12 different programs within the [C]ounty, looking at everything from the actual site plan itself, water and sewer provision, for all the things that would go into site construction, roadway design, the environmental considerations. We basically look at how this site will be developed in accordance with the land development code and any other regulations. We ensure that the water management district permits are obtained, if applicable, or other state agencies." This record contains County Department comments which pertain to a host of issues, including but not limited to, drainage, traffic, fire services, urban forestry (trees and landscape on-site), utilities, zoning (e.g., buffers, setbacks), concurrency requirements, etc. County staff raised questions (identified as submittals) on at least four separate occasions followed by written responses by the applicant on at least three occasions. However, not all issues were resolved. A July 1999, Land Development Traffic Assessment, prepared by Beachside Consulting Engineers, Inc., was submitted to the County as part of the request for a concurrency determination. The analysis "indicates that the roadway segments within the impact area will continue to operate at an acceptable LOS through the construction of this project." The "Summary" of the assessment states: "This project meets traffic concurrency standards, as defined by the St. Johns County Concurrency Management Ordinance, for all roads within the traffic area." "Stormwater Calculations" for the 84-unit, multi-family housing development were also provided in a report dated July 7, 1999. The applicant also furnished the County with a "geotechnical report," which analyzed the soil conditions related to storm water ponds and to the placement of the buildings and the support of the buildings on the site. Soil borings and other testing revealed the capabilities of the soil for, for example, percolation rates for the storm water ponds. There is no evidence that there are any specific historic buildings or geological or archeological features on the Property. In July 1999, the applicant submitted an application for concurrency. At that time, County staff analyzed this information to ensure that public facilities and services were in place to serve the project. This application was reviewed in relation to the County's concurrency management provisions of the County's Land Development Code. On September 3, 1999, the County's Planning Department prepared a report regarding this application and recommended "approval of a Final Certificate of Concurrency with Conditions for the development of 84 residential condominium units." (Staff made findings of fact, which included a discussion of traffic, potable water/sanitary sewer, drainage, solid waste, and mass transit.) On September 8, 1999, the Concurrency Review Committee met and adopted the Staff's Findings of Fact with conditions, including but not limited to, the applicant providing a copy of the Department of Environmental Protection permits "necessary for connection to central water and wastewater service prior to Construction Plan approval," and "[t]he applicant receiving approval of construction/drainage plans from the Development Services Department prior to commencement of construction." The Final Certificate of Concurrency with Conditions was issued on October 1, 1999, and was due to expire on September 8, 2001. However, the Settlement Agreement provided, in part, that "the existing certificate of concurrency and the terms of the vesting letter as it relates to the Land development Code, of Sonya Doerr dated September 27, 1999, shall continue to apply." (Emphasis added.) (Ms. Teresa Bishop's (County Planning Director) November 7, 2001, letter indicated, in part, that Estuaries' request for "tolling [of the Final Certificate of Concurrency] cannot be reviewed until the outcome of the pending litigation is known. . . . After the litigation is concluded, your request for tolling may be resubmitted for review." The Settlement Agreement post-dates this letter.) In evaluating a small scale plan amendment, County staff evaluates the availability of public services which, according to Mr. Clem, is "one of the major components," and County staff "is looking at virtually the same issues that [the County] would look at in concurrency to evaluate and make recommendations on small scale amendments." Mr. Clem also advised that the County's analysis of the 84-unit project did not involve, and was not based on, "a specific site plan with buildings at a certain location or parking in a certain location. It was more an 84- unit project with certain data and analysis associated with that site or project." By letter dated October 4, 1999, the Department of Environmental Protection indicated that it had received a "Notification for Use of the General Permit for Construction of an Extension to a Drinking Water Distribution System" submitted for the Estuaries project. The Department stated further: "After reviewing the notice, it appears that your project will have minimal adverse environmental effect and apparently can be constructed pursuant to a general permit as described in Chapter 62-555, F.A.C." The permit expires on October 4, 2004. This permit allows the applicant to demonstrate that it will offer a central water service, available to be served through the County's utility department. This would ensure that there is sufficient potable water available. By letter dated October 6, 1999, the Department of Environmental Protection also issued a permit for the construction of a sewage collection/transmission system (domestic waste). By letter dated November 11, 1999, the St. Johns Water Management District issued a "formal permit for construction and operation of stormwater management system." This permit authorized "[a] new stormwater system with stormwater treatment by wet detention to serve Estuaries Multi-family Development, a 5.88 acre project to be constructed as per plans received by the District on 7/12/1999." This permit did not relieve the applicant "from the responsibility for obtaining permits from any federal, state, and/or local agencies asserting concurrent jurisdiction over this work." Mr. Clem believed that this permit was evidence that "the state agencies ha[d] considered the environmental issues relating to storm water and all the issues that they deal with in issuing a permit." The Property is located in a "development area boundary" as indicated on the FLUM, which means that these areas allow "development potential." Other areas, such as rural silviculture and agricultural lands, are outside the development area and only limited and low density development is allowed. Conservation areas are also designated on the FLUM. Given the location of the Property within the development area boundary, the County thereby eliminated the necessity of producing some of the data normally required.3 Mr. Clem explained: So by being within a development area boundary it's in essence already had rights to develop, depending on the classification what those rights are, whether it's residential, commercial, industrial. So by virtue of the fact that this site [the Property] was already in the developmental boundary, we didn't deal with issues such as need, which is a big issue in the county when we add developmental boundary. Is there need for additional residential units, and so forth. So that is one part of the answer. The other part is when we're looking at changing from one residential classification to another, we're not dealing with the same issues we might have if it was going from residential to commercial or residential to industrial. So in the context of a plan amendment like this, we're looking at what can this land support in terms of density and are there public facilities available? Is it generally compatible with the surrounding area? What are the potential impacts to natural resources? So those things are still analyzed, but they're done in a probably more confined context. And then the other factor is this being a small scale amendment further reduces the amount of data that is typically done. And if it was a major amendment, there's a whole new range of issues when we deal with major amendments. By definition, they can cause more of an impact. For Mr. Clem, the data and analysis which was generated during the concurrency process for the proposed 84-unit project was significant and would be applicable to a proposed 56-unit project. Mr. Clem opined that the data for this small scale amendment was "[f]ar in excess of anything [he had] seen in the county." Environmental Impacts of the FLUM Amendment The area on and around the Estuaries' property is an area of tidal marsh intermixed with upland scrub. Many wildlife species have been seen utilizing the wetlands on and adjacent to the Estuaries' site (the 18.5 acre parcel). These include woodstorks, snowy egrets, roseate spoonbills, little blue herons, tri-colored herons, white ibis, and ospreys. Owls, foxes, raccoons, opossums, fiddler crabs, clams, fish, shrimp, and turtles also frequent the area. Parker's environmental scientist and ecologist, Mr. Robert Burks, testified to the environmental effects of any development of the Property subject to the FLUM Amendment. Mr. Burks has worked with American Institute of Certified Planners (A.I.C.P.) designated planners, providing them with opinions with respect to environmental issues. But he is not an expert in land use planning. The National Estuarine Research Reserve (NERR) is a program of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, a federal program administered by the Department of Environmental Protection. It is a program to do research and education on estuarine systems. The estuarine ecosystem composed of the Guana, Tolomato, and Matanzas Rivers has been designated as a NERR. There is testimony that development and increases in population in the area, in general, have been responsible for, for example, the decline and closure of shell-fishing and decline of water quality in the area. Conservation Goal E.2 provides: The County shall conserve, utilize, and protect the natural resources of the area, including air, water, wetlands, water wells, estuaries, water bodies, soils, minerals, vegetative communities, wildlife, wildlife habitat, groundwater recharge areas and other natural and environmental resources, insuring that resources are available for existing and future generations. Objective E.2.2 provides: Native Forests, Floodplains, Wetlands, Upland Communities, and Surface Water The County shall protect native forests, floodplains, wetlands, upland communities, and surface waters within the County from development impacts to provide for maintenance of environmental quality and wildlife habitats. Policy E.2.2.5.(a)(1)(b) provides: The County shall protect Environmentally Sensitive lands (ESLs) through the establishment of Land Development Regulations (LDRs) which address the alternate types of protection for each type of Environmentally Sensitive Land. Adoption and implementation of the Land Development Regulations shall, at a minimum, address the following issues: For Wetlands, Outstanding Florida Waters (OFW), and Estuaries: establish and modify buffers between the wetlands/ OFW/ estuaries and upland development as stated in the County's Land Development Regulations (LDRs), and as follows: * * * Except a minimum of a 50 ft. natural vegetative upland buffer shall be required and maintained between the development areas and the St. Johns, Matanzas, Guana and Tolomato Rivers and their associated tributaries, streams and other interconnecting water bodies. Policy E.2.2.13(b)(6) provides: By December 1999, the County shall develop and adopt guidelines and standards for the preservation and conservation of uplands through various land development techniques as follows: (b) The County shall recognize the following vegetative natural communities as Significant Natural Communities Habitat. Due to the rarity of these vegetative communities, a minimum of 10 percent of the total acreage of the Significant Natural Communities Habitat (excluding bona fide agriculture and/or silviculture operations) shall be preserved and maintained by the development. * * * (6) Scrub. Where on-site preservation of the native upland communities are not feasible, the County as an alternative shall accept a fee in lieu of preservation or off-site mitigation in accordance with the County Land Development Regulations. Mr. Burks opined that "generally," and if Goal E.2 is read "literally", the FLUM Amendment did not meet this Goal and afford protection for wetlands, vegetative communities, estuaries, wildlife and wildlife habitat. He perceives that "[a]nytime there's a development there will be impacts to the estuarine--the water bodies because of surficial runoff from the parking lots, from the impervious surfaces, and it will carry pollutants into those areas. And that includes soils also. . . . As far as upland habitat, when you develop an area like this, unless you leave certain parts, the upland habitat will be negatively impacted obviously. There won't be the trees there, the vegetation that was normally there before the development." For Mr. Burks, any development of the Property would generally be inconsistent with the Plan provisions recited above. But, his opinion is specifically based on how each system or plan for the site, or here, the Property, is actually designed--"it would depend on the design of the housing structures themselves and where they were placed. If you design anything in a manner which is going to protect that buffer and literally protect the water quality and the runoff in that area, then you may--it may not violate it." For example, if the Property were developed with 25-foot buffers instead of 50-foot buffers, Mr. Burks says that, from an ecology standpoint, there would be insufficient protection for wildlife, including threatened and endangered species. He offered the same opinion if the FLUM Amendment did not require a minimum ten percent set aside of the total acreage for significant natural communities habitat on the Property, such as, scrub of approximately 6.7 acres, a protected vegetative community existing on the upland portion of the Property. Furthermore, Parker introduced into evidence proposed site plans for the Property dated May 24, 2002, which show, in part, a 25-foot buffer, not a 50-foot buffer.4 Parker contends that these site plans are the best available data and analysis regarding whether the FLUM Amendment is "in compliance." However, the purpose of this proceeding is to determine whether the FLUM Amendment is "in compliance," not whether specific draft, and not approved, site plans are "in compliance" with the May 2000 EAR-Based Plan Amendment or the LDRs. If site plans are approved and a development order issued by the County, Parker, and any other aggrieved or adversely affected party may file a challenge pursuant to Section 163.3215, Florida Statutes. But, this is not the appropriate proceeding to challenge proposed site plans. This is not to say that proposed site plans cannot be considered data and analysis; only that they are not incorporated in the FLUM Amendment and are not subject to challenge here. See The Sierra Club, et al. v. St. John County, et al., Case Nos. 01- 1851GM and 01-1852GM (Recommended Order May 20, 2002; Final Order July 30, 2002). Internal Consistency Parker contended that the FLUM Amendment is inconsistent with several provisions of the May 2000 EAR-Based Plan Amendment. Some of these issues have been discussed above in Findings of Fact 68 to 80, pertaining to environmental considerations. Another issue is whether the FLUM Amendment, which changes the maximum density on the Property, is inconsistent with Policy E.1.3.11 which provides: "The County shall not approve Comprehensive Plan Amendments that increase the residential density on the Future Land Use Map within the Coastal High Hazard Area." See also Policy A.1.5.6 which offers almost identical language. The FLUM Amendment changes the land use designation of the Property, and allows a land use "limited to not more than 56 residential units, built in not more than four buildings with residential uses, not more than 35 feet in height," and thus allows a potential increase in the density of the Property, located in the Coastal High Hazard Area. This resulted from the Settlement Agreement. In Policy A.1.11.6, [t]he County recognizes that the Plan's Objectives and Policies sometime serve to support competing interests. Accordingly, in such instances, and in the absence of a mandatory prohibition of the activity at issue, it is the County's intent that the Plan be construed as a whole and that potentially competing Objectives and Policies be construed together so as to render a balanced interpretation of the Plan. It is the further intent that the County interpretation of the Plan, whether by County staff, the Planning & Zoning Agency, or the Board of County Commissioners, shall be afforded appropriate deference. County interpretations of the Plan which balance potentially competing Objectives and Policies shall not be overturned in the absence of clear and convincing evidence that the County interpretation has misapplied the Plan construed as a whole. The May 2000 EAR-Based Plan Amendment Goals, Objectives, and Policies must be read in their entirety and individual provisions cannot be read in isolation. Objective E.1.3 requires the County to engage in "post disaster planning, coastal area redevelopment, and hurricane preparedness. The County shall prepare post-disaster redevelopment plans which reduce or eliminate the exposure of human life and public and private property to natural hazards." Mr. Clem opined that Policy E.1.3.11, see Finding of Fact 81, expressed "the general intent of limiting population increases that would result in adverse impacts to hurricane evacuation of the coastal areas," and, in particular, the "barrier islands." (Policy E.1.9.5, under Objective E.1.9 Hurricane Evacuation Time, provides: "St. Johns County shall attempt to limit the density within the Coastal High Hazard Area as allowed by law.") Mr. Clem further stated that the FLUM Amendment, which restricted the Property to a maximum of 56 residential units, from a possible 116 unit maximum, was consistent with the Policy which restricts density within the coastal hazard zone. In rendering his opinions, Mr. Clem balanced the above- referenced Policies with Objective A.1.16, pertaining to "private property rights." When these May 2002 EAR-Based Plan Amendment provisions are read together, it appears that Mr. Clem's interpretations are not unreasonable.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be issued by the Department of Community Affairs concluding that the FLUM Amendment adopted by St. Johns County in Ordinance No. 2002-31 is "in compliance" as defined in Chapter 163, Part II, Florida Statutes, and the rules promulgated thereunder. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of December, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CHARLES A. STAMPELOS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of December, 2002.
The Issue The issue is whether a text amendment to the general description of the Commercial land use designations of the Comprehensive Plan (Plan) of Respondent, City of Jacksonville (City), adopted by Ordinance No. 2010-401-E on June 22, 2010, is in compliance.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: The Parties The City is a municipal entity and is responsible for enacting and amending its Plan. Since 2007, the City has participated in the Pilot Program for adoption of comprehensive plan amendments. Except for amendments based on the Evaluation and Appraisal Report or amendments based on new statutory requirements that specifically require that they be adopted under the "traditional" procedure described in section 163.3184, and small-scale amendments, all other amendments must be adopted under that process. Under the Pilot Program, municipalities have "reduced state oversight of local comprehensive planning," and plan amendments may be enacted in "an alternative, expedited plan amendment adoption and review process." § 163.32465, Fla. Stat. Although the City must send a transmittal package to the Department of Community Affairs (Department) and other designated agencies for their preliminary review, the Department does not issue an Objections, Recommendations, and Comments Report or a notice of intent. Instead, the Department "may provide comments regarding the amendment or amendments to the local government." Id. It may also initiate an administrative proceeding to challenge whether an amendment is in compliance. Id. In this case, the Department did not file adverse comments or initiate a challenge to the City's amendment. Clifton Curtis Horton owns real property located at 7175 Blanding Boulevard, Jacksonville, Florida. Horton Enterprises, Inc., is a Florida corporation that owns and operates a "strip club" known as "New Solid Gold" located on Mr. Horton's property. The club is an "adult entertainment establishment" as defined by the Jacksonville Municipal Code (JMC). See §§ 150.103(c) and 656.1101, JMC. History Preceding the Amendment In order to operate an adult entertainment facility within the City, the facility must have both a correct land use and zoning classification. The location must also satisfy certain distance limitations from schools (2,500 feet), other adult entertainment businesses (1,000 feet), churches (1,000 feet), residences (500 feet), and businesses selling alcohol (500 feet). See § 656.1103(a)(1)-(4), JMC; § 847.0134, Fla. Stat. Prior to 2005, adult entertainment facilities were an authorized use in the Heavy Industrial (HI) land use category. In 2005, the City adopted Ordinance No. 2005-1240-E, which approved a text amendment to the Future Land Use Element (FLUE) of the City's 2010 Plan adding the following language to the Community/General Commercial (C/GC) land use category: "Adult entertainment facilities are allowed by right only in Zoning District CCG-2." See Respondent's Exhibit D. That classification is the primary zoning district within the C/GC land use category. The Ordinance also deleted the following language from the HI land use category: "Adult entertainment facilities are allowed by right." Id. The purpose of the amendment was to change the permissible land use designation for adult entertainment facilities from HI to C/GC with a further condition that the property must also have a CCG-2 zoning classification. At the same time, the City enacted Ordinance No. 2005-743-E, which adopted a new zoning requirement that any adult entertainment facility whose location was not in conformity with the revised land use/zoning scheme must close or relocate within five years, or no later than November 10, 2010. See § 656.725(k), JMC. Because New Solid Gold did not conform to these new requirements, it would have to close or relocate within the five-year timeframe. On an undisclosed date, Horton Enterprises, Inc., and two other plaintiffs (one who operated another adult entertainment facility in the City and one who wished to open a new facility) filed suit in federal court challenging the constitutionality of the City's adult zoning scheme and seeking to enjoin the five-year amortization requirement, as applied to them. See Jacksonville Property Rights Ass'n v. City of Jacksonville, Case No. 3:05-cv-1267-J-34JRK (U.S. Dist. Ct., M.D. Fla.). On September 30, 2009, the United States District Court entered a 33-page Order generally determining that, with one exception not relevant here, the City's zoning and land use scheme was permissible. See Petitioners' Exhibit V. On November 3, 2009, that Order was appealed by Petitioners to the United States Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit where the case remains pending at this time. The parties' Stipulation indicates that oral argument before that Court was scheduled during the week of December 13, 2010. An Order of the lower court memorialized an agreement by the parties that the five- year time period for complying with the new requirements are stayed until the federal litigation is concluded. See Petitioners' Exhibit JJ. The Court's Order also noted that an "ambiguity" in the Plan arose because the City failed to "remove the language in the general description of the Commercial land use designations acknowledging its intention to locate adult entertainment facilities in the HI category." Id. at 19. This occurred because when adopting the new amendments, the City overlooked conflicting language in the general description of the Commercial land use designations in the FLUE. However, the Court resolved the ambiguity in favor of the City on the theory that the conflicting language was contrary to the City's overall legislative intent in adopting the new land use/zoning scheme and could be disregarded. Id. Thereafter, a new amendment process was begun by the City to delete the conflicting language. This culminated in the present dispute. The Transmittal Amendment - 2010-35-E To eliminate the ambiguity, the City proposed to amend the FLUE by deleting the following language from the general description of the Commercial land use designations: "Adult entertainment facilities are allowed by right in the heavy industrial land use category, but not in commercial." This amendment was numbered as Ordinance No. 2010-35-E. A public workshop was conducted by the City's Planning and Development Department on December 14, 2009. Thereafter, public hearings were conducted by the City Planning Commission on February 11, 2010; by the City Council Land Use and Zoning Committee on February 17, 2010; and by the full City Council on February 9 and 23, 2010. It became effective upon the Mayor signing the Ordinance on February 26, 2010. Although the Ordinance inadvertently referenced section 163.3184 as the statutory authority for its adoption, it also stated that the amendment was being transmitted for review "through the State's Pilot Program." See Petitioners' Exhibit E. As required by the Pilot Program, copies of the amendment were then transmitted to the Department and seven other agencies. No adverse comments were received from any agency. It is undisputed that Petitioners did not attend the the workshop or any hearing, and they did not submit written or oral comments concerning the proposed amendment. When the process for adopting Ordinance No. 2010-35-E began, the City's 2030 Plan was still being reviewed by the Department and had not yet become effective. Consequently, at the Department's direction, the Ordinance referenced the City's then-effective 2010 Plan as the Plan being amended. On February 3, 2010, the City's 2030 Comprehensive Plan became effective, replacing the 2010 Plan. However, the 2030 Plan contained the same conflicting language. Notice of the public hearings for Ordinance No. 2010- 35-E (and other plan amendments adopted at the same time) was published in the Daily Record on January 29, 2010, a local newspaper that the City has used for advertising plan amendments since at least 2003. The parties agree that the legal advertisements complied with the size, font, and appearance requirements of section 166.041(3)(c)2.b. Besides the above notice, an additional notice regarding Ordinance No. 2010-35-E was published in the Florida Times Union on January 31, 2010. The parties agree that this advertisement did not meet the size, font, and appearance requirements of section 166.041(3)(c)2.b. but was published by the City for the purpose of providing additional public notice and to broaden the coverage of the plan amendment. The Adoption Amendment - 2010-401-E Because the 2030 Plan contained the same conflicting language in the Commercial land use descriptions, on May 25, 2010, a draft of Ordinance No. 2010-401-E was introduced at City Council for the purpose of deleting this language. Except for referencing the latest Plan, the language in Ordinance Nos. 2010-35-E and 2010-401-E was identical. While somewhat unusual, this procedure was authorized by the Department because the 2030 Plan became effective during the middle of the amendment process. A copy of the draft Ordinance and schedule for the upcoming hearings on that Ordinance was emailed by the City's counsel to Petitioners' counsel on June 4, 2010. See Petitioners' Exhibit FF. Public hearings on Ordinance No. 2010-401-E were conducted by the Planning Commission on June 10, 2010; by the City Council Land Use and Zoning Committee on June 15, 2010; and by the full City Council on June 8 and 22, 2010. All of the meetings occurred after Petitioners' counsel was given a schedule of the hearings. The amendment became effective upon the Mayor signing the Ordinance on June 24, 2010. Notice of the public hearings for Ordinance No. 2010- 401-E was published in the Daily Record on May 28, 2010. The parties agree that the size, font, and appearance requirements of section 166.041(3)(c)2.b. were met. An additional notice of the public hearings was published in the Florida Times Union on May 30, 2010. The parties agree that this legal advertisement did not meet the size, font, and appearance requirements of section 166.041(3)(c)2.b., but was published by the City for the purpose of providing additional public notice and to broaden the coverage of the plan amendment. Ordinance No. 2010-401-E, as originally proposed, incorrectly referenced section 163.3184, rather than the Pilot Program, as the statutory authority for adopting the amendment. During the hearing conducted by the City Council Land Use and Zoning Committee on June 15, 2010, an amendment to Ordinance No. 2010-401-E was proposed changing the statutory authority to section 163.32465. The City proposed the same amendment for 19 other plan amendments being considered at the same hearing. The amendment was minor in nature and had no effect on the substance of the Ordinance. It is undisputed that Petitioners did not appear or submit written or oral comments at any public hearing regarding Ordinance No. 2010-401-E. On July 21, 2010, Petitioners timely filed their Petition with DOAH challenging Ordinance No. 2010-401-E. Their objections, as later refined in the Stipulation, are both procedural and substantive in nature and are discussed separately below. Petitioners' Objections Substantive Objections As stated in the Stipulation, Petitioners contend that the amendment is not in compliance because it "is inconsistent with the balance of the 2030 Comprehensive Plan, and underlying municipal policies, since it forces adult uses into zones which permit residential and educational uses." To support this claim, Petitioners point out that the C/GC land use category permits a wide range of uses, including commercial uses in close proximity to sensitive uses, such as schools, churches, and residential areas. Petitioners characterize the current range of uses in C/GC as "an excellent planning approach to downtown Jacksonville" and one that promotes a well-reasoned, mixed-use development in the urban area. Because Ordinance No. 2010-401-E "forces" adult uses into the C/GC category where, despite the distance limitations, they will have to co-exist with sensitive uses, Petitioners contend the amendment is inconsistent with Policy (15)(b)3. and Goal (16) of the State Comprehensive Plan, which generally encourage orderly, efficient, and functional development in the urban areas of the City. Further, they assert it would contradict the City's "policy" of separating adult uses from residences, businesses, and schools. Petitioners' primary fear is that if they are required to relocate from HI to C/GC where sensitive uses are allowed, this will generate more complaints from schools, churches, and residents, and result in further zoning changes by the City and more forced relocations. As explained by Mr. Killingsworth, Director of the City's Planning and Development Department, Ordinance No. 2010- 401-E does not change the permitted uses in the Commercial or HI land use categories. Those changes in permitted uses were made by Ordinance No. 2005-1240-E in 2005 and are now being litigated in federal court. The purpose of the new amendment is simply "to clear up an inconsistency [noted by the federal court but told that it could be disregarded] that existed in the comprehensive plan." Mr. Killingsworth added that even if the language remained in the Plan, it would have no regulatory weight since the actual language in the C/GC and HI categories, and not the "header" or general description that precedes the category, governs the uses allowed in those designations. Assuming arguendo that the new amendment constitutes a change in permitted uses, the City established that from a use standpoint, adult entertainment facilities (like businesses selling alcohol) are more consistent with the C/GC land use category with the appropriate distance limitations from schools, churches, and residential areas. Further, the placement of adult entertainment facilities on property with a C/GC designation will not necessarily result in their being closer to residential property, as the City currently has a "great deal" of HI land directly adjacent to residential properties, as well as grandfathered enclaves of residential areas within the HI category. The City also established that the HI category is set aside for uses that generate physical or environmental impacts, which are significantly different from the "impacts" of a strip club. Finally, while a plan amendment compliance determination does not turn on zoning issues, it is noteworthy that the CCG-2 zoning district is the City's most intensive commercial district, and that very few schools (all grandfathered) remain within that zoning classification. The preponderance of the evidence supports a finding that the amendment is consistent with the State Comprehensive Plan and internally consistent with the "balance of the 2030 Comprehensive Plan." Procedural Objections Petitioners' principal argument is that the City did not publish a notice for either Ordinance in a newspaper of general circulation, as described in section 166.041(3)(c)2.b., or in the proper location of the newspaper; that these deficiencies violate both state law and a Department rule regarding notice for the adoption of this type of plan amendment; and that these procedural errors require a determination that the amendment is not in compliance. They also contend that because the legal notice did not strictly comply with sections 163.3184(15)(e) and 166.041(3)(c)2.b., both Ordinances are void ab initio.2 As noted above, the City has published legal notices for plan amendments in the Daily Record since at least 2003. The newspaper is published daily Monday through Friday; it has been published continuously for 98 years; it is published wholly in English; it is mailed to 37 zip codes throughout the City and around 20 zip codes outside the City; most of its revenue is derived from classified and legal advertisements; it is considered by the United States Postal Service to be a general circulation newspaper; it is available in newsstands throughout the City; and although much of the newspaper is directed to the business, legal, and financial communities, the newspaper also routinely contains articles and editorial content regarding special events, sporting news, political news, educational programs, and other matters of general interest pertaining to the City that would be of interest to the general public and not just one professional or occupational group. Its publisher acknowledges that the newspaper is a "Chapter 50 periodical," referring to chapter 50 and specifically section 50.031, which describes the minimum standards for newspapers that can be utilized for publishing certain legal notices. Also, its website states that it covers political, business, and legal news and developments in the greater Jacksonville area with an emphasis on downtown. Although Petitioners contend that the legal notice was published in a portion of the Daily Record where other legal notices and classified advertisements appear, as proscribed by section 166.041(3)(c)2.b., and is thus defective, this allegation was not raised in the Petition or specifically in the parties' Stipulation. Therefore, the issue has been waived. Both proposed recommended orders are largely devoted to the issue of whether the Daily Record is a newspaper of general paid circulation as defined in section 166.041(3)(c)2.b. For the reasons expressed in the Conclusions of Law, it is unnecessary to decide that question in order to resolve the notice issue. Petitioners received written notice that the City intended to adopt Ordinance No. 2010-401-E prior to the public hearings, along with a copy of the draft Ordinance and "everything" in the City's file. They also received a copy of all scheduled hearings during the adoption process. See Petitioners' Exhibits EE and FF. Therefore, notwithstanding any alleged deficiency in the published legal notice, they were on notice that the City intended to adopt the plan amendment; they were aware of the dates on which public hearings would be conducted; and they had an opportunity to submit oral or written comments in opposition to the amendment and to otherwise participate in the adoption process. Given these facts, even assuming arguendo that the publication of the legal notice in the Daily Record constitutes a procedural error, there is no evidence that Petitioners were substantially prejudiced in any way. Petitioners also contend that reference by the City to section 163.3184, rather than the Pilot Program, in the draft ordinance during the preliminary stages of the amendment process is a procedural error that rises to the level of requiring a determination that the amendment is not in compliance. This argument is rejected as the error was minor in nature, it was corrected shortly after Ordinance No. 2010-401-E was introduced, it did not affect the substance of the amendment, and it would not confuse a member of the public who was tracking the amendment as to the timing and forum in which to file a challenge. In Petitioners' case, they cannot claim to be confused since they timely filed a Petition with DOAH, as required by section 163.32465(6)(a). Finally, intertwined with the procedural arguments is the issue of whether Petitioners are affected persons and thus have standing to challenge the plan amendment. The parties have stipulated that Petitioners (or their representative) did not attend any meeting regarding the adoption of either Ordinance. Petitioners argue, however, that emails between the parties in May and June 2010, and a telephone conference call on June 3, 2010, involving Petitioners' counsel and the City's then Deputy General Counsel, equate to the submission of written and oral comments regarding the amendment. The parties have stipulated that the following written communications between Petitioners and the City occurred in May and June 2010: Petitioners made a public records request regarding the amendment on May 21, 2010, to Cheryl Brown, Council Secretary/Director, seeking various public documents relating to Ordinance No. 2010-35-E, transmitted by electronic mail and facsimile. On May 27, 2010, counsel for Petitioners exchanged emails with Assistant General Counsel Dylan Reingold regarding pending document requests relating to Ordinance No. 2010-35-E, and Mr. Reingold provided a number of responsive documents. On June 3, 2010, Cindy A. Laquidara, then Deputy General Counsel (but now General Counsel), sent an email to Petitioners' counsel stating: "Below please find the schedule for the passage of the comp plan changes. Call me with questions or to discuss. Take care." On June 4, 2010, counsel for Petitioners exchanged a series of emails with Assistant General Counsel Reingold regarding the status of Ordinance Nos. 2010-35-E and 2010-401-E, as well as the review of the proposed plan amendment by the Department of Community Affairs. On June 4, 2010, Jessica Aponte, a legal assistant with counsel for Petitioners' office, exchanged emails with Jessica Stephens, legislative assistant, regarding the proofs of publication for the legal advertisements relating to Ordinance No. 2010- 35-E. The affidavits of Petitioners' counsel (Petitioners' Exhibits KK and LL) regarding a conversation with the City's then Deputy General Counsel would normally be treated as hearsay and could not, by themselves, be used as a basis for a finding of fact. See § 120.57(1)(c), Fla. Stat. However, the parties have stipulated that they may be used in lieu of live testimony by Petitioners' counsel. See Stipulation, p. 17. The affidavits indicate that the reason for the conference call was "that [Petitioners] were trying to reach a mutually acceptable approach with the City by which enforcement of the City of Jacksonville's amortization ordinance against [them] . . . would be deferred pending the outcome of the appeal to the Eleventh Circuit." Petitioners' Exhibits KK and LL. During that call, counsel also advised the City's counsel that "there were [procedural] problems with the enactment of the subject Comprehensive Plan Amendment and that they would likely be filing challenges to its enactment." Id.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Community Affairs enter a final order determining that the plan amendment adopted by Ordinance No. 2010-401-E is in compliance. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of January, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S D. R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of January, 2011.
The Issue The Appellants raise several issues on appeal, including: whether Ordinance 003-2015 did not comply with the constitutional single subject rule and did the County’s application of the Ordinance violate the Florida Constitution; whether the County exceeded its police power in enacting Ordinance 003-2015 and failed to follow the essential requirements of the law when it applied the ordinance to the Appellants’ property; (3) whether the Planning Commission’s decision violated its obligations to support, protect, and defend the Unites States and Florida Constitutions; and (4) whether the Appellants were deprived of their fundamental due process rights during the Commission hearing.
The Issue The issue before the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission (FLWAC) is whether to grant the Petition to Establish the Madeira Community Development District (Petition). The local public hearing was for the purpose of gathering information in anticipation of quasi-legislative rulemaking by FLWAC.
The Issue Whether the Miami-Dade County Comprehensive Plan Amendment adopted by Ordinance 2018-109 on September 27, 2018 (the “Plan Amendment”), is “in compliance,” as that term is defined in section 163.3184(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2018).1
Findings Of Fact The Parties and Standing Respondent, Miami-Dade County (“the County”), is a political subdivision of the State of Florida with the duty and authority to adopt and amend a local government comprehensive plan, pursuant to section 163.3167, Florida Statutes. The Limonar Petitioners are limited liability companies under the laws of the State of Florida whose principal places of business are in Florida. The Limonar Petitioners own property within the area affected by the Plan Amendment. Petitioner, Michelle Garcia, resides and owns property in the County near the area affected by the Plan Amendment. Petitioner, Tropical Audubon Society (“Tropical”), is an environmental organization in South Florida dedicated to conserving and restoring South Florida ecosystems, focusing on birds and other wildlife, as well as their habitats. Tropical owns property in the County. Each of the Petitioners submitted oral or written comments, recommendations, or objections concerning the Plan Amendment to the County during the time period beginning with the Plan Amendment adoption hearing and ending with the Plan Amendment transmittal hearing. The parties stipulated that Ms. Garcia’s substantial interests will be adversely affected by the Plan Amendment given that her property is located in the County near the area affected by the Plan Amendment. The Plan Amendment The Plan Amendment amends the Plan to allow an extension of State Road 835 (also known as the Dolphin Expressway) from its current terminus at Northwest (NW) 137th Avenue and NW 12th Street to the West Kendall suburban area of the County. The approximate 13-mile extension is planned as a six-lane expressway from its current terminus to Southwest (SW) 8th Street and SW 167th Avenue, then continuing as a four-lane expressway to connect with SW 136th Street in Kendall. The proposed extension is referred to herein as the “new corridor.” The Plan Amendment incorporates the new corridor on the County’s Future Land Use Map (“FLUM”), as well as the Transportation Element map series, including both the traffic circulation and Mass Transit subelements. Additionally, the Plan Amendment changes some existing, and adds several new, policies in the Land Use, Transportation (including Traffic Circulation and Mass Transit subelements), Open Space, and Intergovernmental Coordination Elements. The new corridor was first envisioned in 2012, when the Miami-Dade Metropolitan Planning Organization (“MPO”), since renamed the Transportation Planning Organization (“TPO”), added the southwest extension of SR-836/Dolphin Expressway to its Long-Range Transportation Plan (“LRTP”) as a “partially funded project.” “Partially funded” means that the TPO authorized the project to move forward for study—in the case of the new corridor, to undertake a Project Development and Environment (“PD&E”) Study—but that the project is not yet approved for construction funding. The LRTP describes the purpose and need for the new corridor as follows: The new extension will address existing highway congestion and enhance mobility in the fastest growing area of the county. The purpose of the SR- 836 (Dolphin) SW Extension is to: Improve system connectivity, Improve access to and from the area to major employment centers such as the MIA, the MIC, the Port of Miami, Downtown Miami, Doral, as well as educational and commercial centers within the study area, Provide north south expressway access to serve existing and future travel demand, Improve hurricane/emergency evacuation routes and travel times, Evaluate multimodal transportation opportunities to improve connectivity to the fast growing southwest area of Miami-Dade County, Evaluate the best alternative for the SR-836 (Dolphin) SW Extension that is technically sound, environmentally sensitive and publicly acceptable. The new corridor is to be funded by the Miami-Dade Expressway Authority (“MDX”).3 UDB and UEA The entirety of the new corridor will be located outside of the County’s urban development boundary (“UDB”). Some portions of the new corridor lie within the area known as the urban expansion area (“UEA”), but the majority of the new corridor lies outside the UEA. The UDB is a defining feature of the Plan, which distinguishes the area where urban development may occur through the year 2020 from areas where it should not occur. The County’s plan accommodates urban development within the UDB by increasing development densities and intensities inside the UDB. The UDB was originally established in 1975 and comprised 233,000 acres. The UDB boundary was significantly amended in 1988, following enactment of Florida’s Growth Management Act, by the addition of 16,000 acres. Between 1990 and 2012, only about 2,400 acres have been added to the UDB, most of which was added by a 2006 amendment to the Plan. At least in part, the UDB operates to limit development pressure on the County’s agricultural lands located to the west of the UDB between the urbanized area and the Everglades National Park. A 2012 Environmental 3 MDX was dissolved by chapter 2019-169, Laws of Florida. The legislation has been challenged and a current appeal is pending before the First District Court of Appeal. See Fla. Dep’t of Transp. v. MDX, Case No. 19-3625 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019). Protection Agency study noted, “the dwindling supply of agricultural land is an especially urgent issue.” The study characterized the County as “dangerously close” to losing its “critical mass” of land in active agriculture usage. The Plan provides for expansion of the UDB to provide additional countywide development capacity “when the need for such change is determined to be necessary through the Plan review and amendment process.” The UEA was established in 1993 and is the area currently projected to be needed to accommodate development in the area between the 2020 UDB boundary and 2030 UEA boundary. Until this area is brought into the UDB through an amendment to the Plan, development within the UEA is limited to uses consistent with “Agriculture” and “Open Land” areas, as defined in the Plan. Residential development outside the UDB is limited to one dwelling unit per five acres (1du/5acres). New Corridor Path The new corridor is planned to pass through lands that are protected by a variety of regulations and development limitations. Figure 1 depicts the location of the new corridor on the Plan Land Use Map, identified as the solid black line beginning at the western end of NW 12th Street and following a winding path west and southwest to its termination at SW 136th Street. [Remainder of page intentionally blank] Figure 1 From its connection with the existing SR 836 corridor, the new corridor will first traverse an area designated “Open Land,” which, according to the Plan is “set aside for uses other than urban development.” It is more than “simply surplus undeveloped land,” and is intended to serve resource- based functions like agriculture or development of potable water supply. According to the Plan, “Open Land areas primarily consist of wetlands.” The only use definitively allowed in this subarea is rural residential. The Plan provides that all other proposed uses will be reviewed on a case-by-case basis. More particularly, the new corridor will traverse the County’s Open Land Subarea 3, which contains the Tamiami-Bird Canal Basins and the eastern portion of the North Trail and Bird Drive Everglades Basins. The basins are recharge areas for the Biscayne Aquifer, the primary source of the County’s drinking water. The Plan provides that the following land uses may be considered for approval in this subarea: [R]ural residences at one dwelling unit per 5 acres (“1 du/5”), compatible institutional uses, public facilities, utility and communications facilities, seasonal agricultural use, recreational use, or limestone quarrying and ancillary uses. Uses that could compromise groundwater quality shall not occur in this area. Any land alteration and development in the Bird Drive or North Trail basins shall conform to the wetland basin plans adopted for those basins pursuant to policies of [the Plan]. The new corridor will traverse a portion of the Bird Drive Basin outside the UDB. Existing development in that area is limited to agriculture and the C-4 detention basin. The detention basin is utilized by the South Florida Water Management District (“District”) to hold water drained from the C-4 canal prior to storm events in order to prevent flooding of the Sweetwater residential community lying to the north. A majority of the new corridor will be located within the County’s West Wellfield protection area, and a portion will run through the 30-day and 100- day travel-time contours. The contours represent the time it takes for a substance released at the contour line to travel to a production well.4 A short segment of the new corridor, approximately three-quarters of a mile, will traverse the Pennsuco wetlands, characteristically high-quality swamps and wet prairies not suited for agriculture or urban development. It is a restored wetland area that has been used as a mitigation project for developers and rock miners over the last 20 to 30 years (i.e., a “mitigation bank”). The mitigation project is under the jurisdiction of the District and other environmental agencies, and is almost complete. The Pennsuco wetlands are also designated as critical habitat for endangered species, including the wood stork, the Florida bonneted bat, the Everglades snail kite, and the Florida Panther. The Pennsuco wetlands are designated on the FLUM as Environmental Protection (“EP”). According to the Plan, the EP designation applies to those areas in the County “most environmentally significant, most susceptible to environmental degradation, and where such degradation would adversely affect the supply of potable fresh water or environmental systems of County, regional, State, or national importance.” The final stretch of the new corridor will traverse Agriculturally- designated lands, mostly within the UEA. Land with this designation “contains the best agricultural land remaining in [the County].” The Plan provides that protection of viable agriculture is a priority of the County. Principle uses allowed in this category “should be” agriculture and uses ancillary to,5 and directly supportive of, agriculture and farm residences. Notably, the Plan provides that, in order to protect the 4 The times are calculated based on a non-reactive substance, i.e., water. Chemicals and other contaminants may have different actual travel times. 5 Uses ancillary to agriculture are those related to preserving, processing packaging, or selling agricultural products; farm supplies; and sale and service of farm machinery and implements. agricultural industry, “uses and facilities that support or encourage urban development are not allowed in this area.” The Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan The Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan (“CERP”) is an extensive environmental restoration project primarily aimed at restoring as much natural Everglades wetland habitat as possible and re-establishing healthy freshwater flows to parts of the Everglades which have suffered from historic alteration of its hydrology, a result of fragmentation of the ecosystem for urban development and agriculture. CERP is a multi-decade, inter-agency process implemented primarily by the District and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (“the Corps”). CERP includes approximately 68 individual projects, approved by a formal process set out in federal law. The projects are compiled in a “yellow book,” originally produced in 1999 and delivered to Congress for approval. Some projects are set forth in great detail, while others are conceptual, but each project identifies a set of hydrologic or ecologic objectives that it is proposed to meet. Restoring surface water flows to the Everglades is a balancing act. While the Everglades is in need of more fresh water, allowing unregulated flows to the Everglades means flooding urban and agricultural properties which were once part of the Everglades system. On the other hand, the urban and agricultural areas depend on surface water flows for water supply, directly or indirectly through groundwater recharge (to prevent saltwater intrusion), for drinking water and agricultural production. CERP regulates the free flow of surface water to provide needed water for urban and agricultural uses, and avoid flooding those areas, while providing as much fresh water to the Everglades as possible. Large portions of the four-square mile Bird Drive Basin have been acquired by the District and the Department of the Interior (“DOI”) to implement a CERP project known as Component U. Component U has several major objectives, including goundwater recharge, reducing seepage from the Everglades National Park buffer areas, enhancing and maintaining wetland viability within the basin, flood attenuation, water treatment of outflows from west Dade wastewater treatment plant, and supplying water to meet demands of the downstream conveyance systems. The state conservation lands north and east of the basin, particularly conservation area 3A, are, at times, inundated with so much water that the wetland literally drowns. CERP projects, including the L31 canal (adjacent to Krome Avenue) and the small canal associated with the Dade/Broward levee, were designed to “shuttle” collected water from the conservation areas and store it for proportionate distribution to both urban areas and the Everglades National Park. Component U is envisioned as both a surface water storage and treatment area, to assist in regulation of water flowing to both the Everglades and the urban areas from the conservation areas to the north and north east. It is related to a larger project to reroute water flowing through the L31 canal, west of Krome Avenue, to the east side of the Bird Drive Basin and eventually into the Bird Drive Canal, utilizing the large, undeveloped basin for storage and treatment, as well as flood control. Additionally, Component U would provide an aquifer recharge function while storing excess water, which would benefit the West Wellfield lying due south. Because of its location relative to several other CERP projects, the Bird Drive Basin plays a critical strategic role in the overall plan for restoration of the southern Everglades. The water quality, conveyance, and storage objectives it is required to meet, along with its flood-attenuation objectives, are relied upon as part of the planning and operation of the other CERP projects in the region to restore the hydrology of the state-owned Water Conservation Areas, Everglades National Park and Florida Bay, and Biscayne Bay. The Bird Drive Basin project is a necessary flow way for restored water levels along the eastern edge of the Everglades, necessary to prevent the flow of too much water through the more central portions of the Everglades, which results in drowning out native plant and animal species. Among the goals of the project is to recharge groundwater and drinking water supplies, and to buffer developed areas in the County from flooding that would result from the higher restored water levels into Everglades National Park. The Bird Drive Recharge project is important to the County as a seepage management project to ensure that restoration of water levels does not affect County landowners and to provide the County with water supply to nearby wellfields. These wetlands are a hydrological buffer between the high water table of Everglades National Park and the much lower water table of the developed areas east of Krome Avenue. This buffer reduces the hydrological gradient of the area, thereby reducing groundwater seepage from the park. Challenges to the Plan Amendment Petitioners allege (as stipulated by the parties) that the Plan Amendment: (1) creates internal inconsistencies with numerous existing Plan goals, objectives and policies, in contravention of section 163.3177(2); (2) fails to discourage the proliferation of urban sprawl, as required by section 163.3177(6)(a)9.; (3) violates the requirement in section 163.3177(6)(d)2.k., that the Plan maintain a conservation element that directs incompatible “future land uses” away from wetlands; (4) violates the requirements in section 163.3177(6)(b)2.a., e., and 3.a., that the Plan maintain a transportation element “to plan for a multimodal transportation system,” address “[a]ll alternative modes of travel,” “identif[y] . . . land use densities, building intensities, and transportation management programs to promote public transportation systems in designated public transportation corridors,” and address “provision of efficient public transit services” and the requirement in section 163.3177(6)(b)1. that the element reflect certain “data, analysis, and associated principles and strategies”; (5) fails to be “based upon relevant and appropriate data and analysis,” as required by section 163.3177(1)(f); (6) fails to “be based upon surveys, studies, and data regarding the area, as applicable, including the character of undeveloped land,” as required by section 163.3177(6)(a)2., and to be based on an “analysis of the suitability of the plan amendment for its proposed use considering the character of the undeveloped land, soils, topography, natural resources, and historic resources on site,” as required by section 163.3177(6)(a)8.; and (7) violates the requirement of section 163.3177(1) that the Plan “maintain[] meaningful and predictable standards for the use and development of land and provide[] meaningful guidelines for the content of more detailed land developments and use regulations.” Petitioners’ umbrella contention is that the Plan Amendment is contrary to the Plan as a whole—which limits urban services and development to within the UDB, prioritizes implementation of CERP, seeks to preserve remaining agricultural areas and a viable agriculture industry, and is completely dependent on a sensitive aquifer for drinking water—by allowing a four- and six-lane expressway outside of the UDB, through an area identified for a CERP project, bisecting agricultural areas, through a wetland preservation area, and within the West Wellfield. Petitioners’ arguments can be categorized generally as concerns with land use, environment, CERP, agriculture, and transportation. UDB and Land Development Issues Petitioners contend that constructing the new corridor outside of the UDB is inconsistent with the purpose of the UDB, and with the overarching construct of the Plan to achieve the desired development form while protecting both sensitive natural resources and agriculture. The Plan provides that the UDB distinguishes “the area where urban development may occur through the year 2020 from areas where it should not occur.” Translating this concept to infrastructure investment, the Plan provides that “public expenditures for urban service and infrastructure improvements shall be focused on the area within the UDB, and urban infrastructure is discouraged outside the UDB.” (emphasis added). The Plan further provides, “Critical in achieving the desired pattern of development is adherence to the 2020 UDB and 2030 UEA boundary,” and that “since its inception [the Plan] has provided that the UDB serve as an envelope within which public expenditures for urban infrastructure will be confined.” Petitioners’ expert planning witness, Mr. Hawkins, explained that “this regulatory line is not one that just says we are going to have urban land uses on one side and not on the other. We are also going to limit the provision of urban services across the line.” The County offered little response to this allegation. In a series of leading questions on direct examination, Mr. Woerner was asked whether the Plan Amendment is inconsistent with policy language that begins, “Given the fundamental influences of infrastructure and service availability on land markets and development activities …” Mr. Woerner gave a conclusory “no” answer, to which Mr. Kerbel asked, “And is that for the reasons you’ve already addressed?” Mr. Woerner agreed. However, none of the prior questions addressed anything regarding public expenditures for urban infrastructure. The Plan Amendment proposes development of urban infrastructure outside the UDB, and thus, outside of the envelope within which the Plan dictates public expenditures for urban infrastructure “will be confined,” in contravention of the Plan’s direction that adherence with the UDB/UEA construct is “critical” to achieve the desired pattern of development for the County. The County contends that the new corridor is not “development,” a position which is untenable and is addressed in the Conclusions of Law. Petitioners proved the Plan Amendment is inconsistent with the unnumbered policy statements in paragraph 46 appearing on pages I-60, I-61, and I-74 of the Plan.6 Petitioners further allege the Plan Amendment is inconsistent with Plan policies that discourage urban sprawl, “emphasize[] concentration and intensification of development around centers of activity” and “high intensity, well-designed urban centers,” and “seek to prevent discontinuous, scattered development at the urban fringe,” such that “[u]rban services and facilities which support or encourage urban development in Agriculture and Open Land areas shall be avoided . . . [and] [a]reas designated Environmental Protection shall be particularly avoided.” Petitioners identify the following goals, objectives, and policies in support of these objections: Land Use Element Objective LU-1 and Policies LU-1B and LU-1O; Objective LU-2 and Policy LU-2B; Policy LU-8G; Policy LU-10A; Transportation Policy TC-6A; and Capital Improvement Element Objective CIE-5 and Policy CIE-5A. Petitioners’ arguments that the Plan Amendment fails to discourage urban sprawl are based on many of the same Plan policies. Petitioners contend that the mere existence of the new corridor will increase development pressure, and induce sprawl development, outside of the UDB contrary to Plan policies promoting compact, high-intensity developments in urban centers. This argument is not novel and can be summarized as, “If you build it, they will come.” Petitioners are not wrong, and the expert County planning staff raised the same concern during review of the Plan Amendment application, stating: While roadways facilitate long-distance and local travel and provide access to real property, they also 6 Provisions such as these, which are referred to as “interpretive text,” are contained in the Land Use Element section titled, “Interpretation of the Land Use Plan Map: Policy of the Land Use Element.” Although not among the element’s numbered goals, objectives, and policies, the interpretive text is expressly “adopted as County policy.” Furthermore, LU-5C requires “planning activities pertaining to development or redevelopment and the provision of public services and facilities in [the County] shall be consistent with … the locations and extent of future land uses as identified by the [FLUM] map and its interpretive text.” significantly affect the use and development of land in their immediate vicinity. In high growth areas such as [the County], any reduction in travel time between centers of population and commerce directly increases competition in the land market between urban uses, including residential and commercial uses. This could generate increased demand for development of land adjacent to the proposed expressway corridor. Because the proposed alignment is generally adjacent to but outside the UDB, the [new corridor] could have the unintended consequence of increasing development pressure on land outside the UDB, including current agricultural lands, if the proposed amendment only addressed the future construction of the roadway. In response to this concern, staff recommended adoption of, and the Plan Amendment was adopted with, the following new Policy: Traffic Circulation Subelement Policy TC-1M. [The County] approves the [new corridor] only to the extent necessary to relieve existing traffic congestion in the southwestern part of the County and to provide a reliable, robust, and faster connection to Downtown Miami and other major trip attractors across the County. To discourage urban sprawl within the Area of Impact of [the new corridor] … the County’s Concurrency Management System shall be amended to remove the additional LOS/capacity that the roadways in the Area of Impact would experience due to the diversion of trips resulting from the construction of [the new corridor] could not be used to demonstrate concurrency. The purpose of this policy is to assure that the additional capacity attributable to the [new corridor] cannot be used to support further development in the Area of Impact. In other words, “If you build it, they cannot come.” Petitioners raised many arguments to demonstrate that this language would not be effective to truly prevent urban sprawl outside the UDB. They introduced the testimony of Walter Kulash, who exclaimed that it would “be absurd” to create excess roadway capacity that could not be used by developers, and that, as a transportation engineer, “it is not at all clear to me how the chain of computation would work here.” However, as explained by Mr. Sandanasamy, the County’s expert transportation planner, the concurrency restriction will be implemented by comparing the roadway capacity figures prior to the opening of the roadway to any future traffic counts, to determine how much those traffic counts have been reduced. He gave the following example: Assume an arterial with a capacity of 35,000 trips, and before the new corridor opened, the actual amount of traffic counted is 30,000 trips. That means the arterial had a remaining capacity of 5,000 trips before the opening of the new corridor. Assume that when traffic is counted after the opening of the new corridor, the number of vehicles on that arterial drops to 28,000 trips—a reduction of 2,000 trips attributed to the new corridor—meaning that the remaining capacity of the arterial has increased from 5,000 trips to 7,000. Policy TC-1M would require the Concurrency Management System to log the capacity of the arterial as reduced by 2,000 trips, so that future applications would be measured against a roadway capacity of 33,000 trips. Mr. Sandanasamy concluded that the policy is intended to “prevent urban sprawl [and] allow development to go on as it was, like this roadway doesn’t exist.” The parties introduced the testimony of competing expert transportation planners on this subject; but, in the end, Petitioners’ expert, Juan Mullerat, conceded the issue, as follows: Q. [Mr. Kerbel] And in the event that there is a process in which someone seeks to amend their land uses, they would have to address the fact that the road can't be used to show concurrency, right? A. [Mr. Mullerat] Correct. * * * So at the end of the day that is why I am saying it is the same. Right now you don't have infrastructure, so you can't use it for concurrency. Once you put the infrastructure, this says that you won't be able to use that as -- in order to change the land use. Q. Okay. So it is a wash? A. It is a wash. It doesn't make—it is neither harder nor easier. New Policy LU-3Q was added to further ensure the Plan Amendment did not encourage development in the agriculturally-designated lands. The policy reads as follows: Any zoning action or amendment to [the Plan] that would approve any use other than direct agricultural production, the sale of agricultural produce, and permitted residential and Bed and Breakfast uses of property, in an area designated as Agriculture, whether as a primary use or as an accessory or subordinated use to an agricultural use, or action that would liberalize standards or allowances governing such other uses on land that is a) outside the [UDB] and b) within one mile of the right-of-way line of any portions of [the new corridor], shall require an affirmative vote of not less than five members of the affected Community Zoning Appeals Board and two-thirds of the total membership of the Board of County Commissioners then in office, where the applicable board issues a decision. Petitioners claimed this policy was not based on data and analysis to demonstrate its effectiveness. To the contrary, the language of new Policy LU-3Q was modeled on language utilized when the County adopted the Plan to allow widening of Krome Avenue, which lies outside the UDB, farther west than the new corridor. Even a cursory review of the FLUM reveals that the land uses adjacent to Krome Avenue remain agriculture. The County’s experience with development surrounding Krome Avenue is data that has been available to, and was relied upon by, the County in adopting the subject Plan Amendment. Petitioners did not prove that the Plan Amendment would induce additional urban development outside the UDB and in environmentally sensitive areas. Thus, Petitioners did not prove the Plan Amendment is inconsistent with Objective LU-1, which requires “the location and configuration of [the County’s] urban growth through the year 2030 shall emphasize concentration and intensification of development around centers of activity”; Policy LU-1O, which requires the County to “seek to prevent discontinuous, scattered development at the urban fringe in the Agricultural Areas outside the UDB”; Objective LU-2, which provides that “[d]ecisions regarding … urban expansion … shall be based on the physical and financial feasibility of providing, by the year 2020, all urbanized areas with services at levels of service (LOS) which meet or exceed the minimum standards” in the CIE; Policies LU-2B, TC-4C, and CIE-5A, which provide that urban services and facilities, including roadways, which support or encourage “urban development in Agriculture and Open Land areas shall be avoided”; Policy LU-10A, which requires the County to “facilitate contiguous urban development, infill [and] redevelopment”; and TC-6A, which mandates that the County “shall avoid transportation improvements which encourage or subsidize increased development in … environmentally sensitive areas.” The remaining policies implicated by Petitioners are irrelevant to the Plan Amendment: Policy LU-1B, which provides that “major centers of activity” and “other concentrations of significant employment … shall be sited on the basis or metropolitan scale considerations at locations with good countywide, multi-modal accessibility”; Policy LU-1S, which requires the County Strategic Plan to be consistent with the Plan; Objective LU-5 and Policy LU-5B, which pertain to the consistency of development orders with the Plan; and LU-8G, governing considerations for adding land areas to the UDB. Environmental Considerations Wellfields Petitioners allege the Plan Amendment is inconsistent with the following objectives and policies of the Conservation Element relating to protection of wellfields: CON-3, 3A, 3B; and CON-5F. CON-3, 3A, and 3B provide, in relevant part, as follows: Objective CON-3. Regulations governing approved wellfield protection areas shall be strictly enforced …. CON-3A. No new facilities that use, handle, generate, transport or dispose of hazardous wastes shall be permitted within wellfield protection areas[.] CON-3B. The water management systems that recharge regional wellfields shall be protected and enhanced. The Plan Amendment does not adversely affect the County’s ability to enforce its approved wellfield regulations. The new corridor is not a facility that uses, handles, generates, or disposes of hazardous wastes. Petitioners introduced testimony regarding the threat to the West Wellfield posed by trucks, carrying hazardous substances via the new corridor, potentially (and speculatively) spilling chemicals in an accident. Nevertheless, the greater weight of the evidence supports a finding that the new corridor is not a “facility” that transports hazardous wastes as contemplated by the policy. The meaning of “water management systems” used in Policy CON-3B, was disputed by the parties. Petitioners introduced the testimony of Dr. McVoy, who testified that he considered the wetlands of the Bird Drive Basin as the water management system that recharges the regional wellfield. Respondent introduced the testimony of Wilbur Mayorga, chief of the County’s environmental monitoring and restoration division, who is responsible for the wellfield protection areas and the boundaries thereof, and who was admitted as an expert in wellfield protection and contamination. Mr. Mayorga gave a broader, more general definition, which is ultimately not in conflict with Dr. McVoy’s definition. The Bird Drive Basin is one part of the larger system managing and conveying freshwater from Lake Okeechobee through various natural and man-made components that store, treat, and deliver water to the urban and agricultural uses, as well as the Everglades. Respondent’s hydrogeology expert, Dr. Virginia Walsh, confirmed that the Bird Drive Basin wetlands serve to recharge the County’s production wells. Dr. McVoy’s opinion was hedging—“I find it hard to see how [the system] would be enhanced and I find it hard to see how [the system] would be protected … I can’t see any way that I, as a scientist, can say that by putting a roadway on [the system] it is going to increase protection ….” Mr. Mayorga was asked directly, “In your professional opinion, would the plan amendment pose any threat to these water management systems?” Mr. Mayorga answered, “That I’m not familiar with.” His answer was puzzling and unhelpful. Significantly, both Dr. McVoy and Mr. Mayorga preferred to answer the question based on the degree of risk created. Dr. McVoy testified that building the tollway certainly increases risk of contamination to the system. Mr. Mayorga opined that removing all uses within the wellfield is the only way to achieve zero risk. He further opined that any roadway carries an inherent risk of contamination, which can be attenuated by the location of uses at the higher contour lines. As Mr. Mayorga explained, “The closer you are to the production wells, the [fewer] alternatives you have in how you manage stormwater.” In an effort to demonstrate compliance with the requirement to “protect the water management systems that recharge” the regional wellfield, Respondent points to new policy LU-1W, which requires that alignment of the new corridor remain “outside and to the east of the boundary of the 10- day travel time contour” of the West Wellfield area. In the end, Respondent’s expert witness confirmed that building the new corridor will neither protect nor enhance the water management systems that recharge the West Wellfield. Petitioners did not prove the Plan Amendment is contrary to Objective CON-3 or Policy CON-3A. However, they did prove the Plan Amendment is inconsistent with Policy CON-3B. 7 Policy CON-3F requires the County to implement cut and fill criteria for land in the North Trail and Bird Drive basins, among others. The County has already implemented those criteria and the Plan Amendment does not implicate that policy in any way. The remainder of Petitioners “wellfield” allegations overlap with alleged wetland impacts and are addressed in the following section. Wetlands Petitioners next contend the Plan Amendment is inconsistent with the following objectives and policies related to wetlands and wetland functions: CON-4 and 4A, and CON-7, 7A, and 7J, which read, in pertinent part, as follows: Objective CON-4. The aquifer recharge and water storage capacity of the presently undeveloped areas in the western and southern Miami-Dade County shall be maintained or increased. 7 In addition, to the extent Petitioners challenged the Plan Amendment as inconsistent with the interpretive text in the Land Use Element relating to Open Land Subarea 3 (North Trail and Bird Drive Basins), which reads, “Uses that could compromise groundwater quality shall not occur in this area,” that allegation was proven as well. Mr. Mayorga’s testimony that “any roadway carries an inherent risk of contamination” conceded the point that the Plan Amendment creates a risk of contamination to the wellfields. Policy CON-4A. The aquifer-recharge values of undeveloped land and the water storage values of wetland areas shall be maintained and, where feasible, enhanced or restored. Objective CON-7. [The County] shall protect and preserve the biological and hydrological functions of Future Wetlands identified in the Land Use Element. Future impacts to the biological functions of publicly and privately owned wetlands shall be mitigated.… Publicly acquired wetlands shall be restored and managed for their natural resource, habitat, and hydrologic values. Policy CON-7A. The degradation or destruction of wetlands shall be limited to activities that 1) are necessary to prevent or eliminate a threat to public health, safety or welfare; 2) are water dependent, clearly in the public interest and no other reasonable alternative exists; 3) are carried out in accordance with a basin management plan; or 4) are in areas that have been highly disturbed or degraded and where restoration of a wetland with an equal or greater value in accordance with federal, State, and local regulations if feasible. Habitats critical to endangered or threatened species shall not be degraded or destroyed. CON-7J. In evaluating applications that will result in alterations or adverse impacts to wetlands, [the County] shall consider the application’s consistency with [CERP] objectives. Wetlands play an important part in recharging the Biscayne Aquifer. They filter stormwater to remove pollutants and nutrients prior to the water’s eventual entry into the aquifer. As discussed above, wetlands can also perform the important function of storing stormwater to prevent flooding of adjacent properties, and for use in dryer seasons, if they have a confining clay (or other soil) layer above the aquifer. The new corridor is expected to destroy over 300 acres of wetlands in the Bird Drive and North Trail basins, although the exact number is unknown. Petitioners contend that violates Policy CON-7A because the project does not meet any of the four criteria. The County introduced evidence that the wetland impacts will be carried out in accordance with Bird Drive Basin management plan, thus meeting criteria three of Policy CON-7A. The final sentence of Policy CON-7A prohibits destruction of wetlands in habitats critical to threatened or endangered species. The Pennsuco wetlands are designated critical habitat to several endangered species, but the Plan Amendment implicates wetland impacts in that area. The County maintains that it has addressed this issue through an interlocal agreement with MDX, which requires that the entire span of the new corridor traversing the Pennsuco wetlands be elevated. However, the interlocal agreement is not incorporated into or adopted by reference in the Plan Amendment; thus, is not enforceable through the Plan. To the contrary, the interlocal agreement may be modified or amended upon mutual agreement of the parties.8 Petitioners proved the Plan Amendment is inconsistent with Policy CON-7. Because the new corridor will traverse the Pennsuco wetlands, an area designated as critical habitat for threatened and endangered species, the Plan Amendment violates this policy. Petitioners did not prove the Plan Amendment is inconsistent with this part of CON-7J. As discussed in the Findings of Fact 104 and 107, the County did consider the impact of the new corridor on CERP. Petitioners’ allegations of inconsistency with Objective CON-4, Policy CON-4A, and Objective CON-7, all relate to the impact of the new corridor on aquifer recharge and storage capacity of wetlands in the path of the new corridor. 8 Even if the interlocal agreement were incorporated into the Plan Amendment, this inconsistency would not be completely resolved because the interlocal agreement allows pilings or other support structures for the elevated section to be located in the Pennsuco wetlands. Dr. McVoy opined that the aquifer recharge capacities of the Bird Drive Basin, the West Wellfield, and the Pennsuco Wetlands will not be increased as a result of the Plan Amendment, but he did not testify that the Plan Amendment would inherently decrease those capacities, nor did he testify that the Plan Amendment would prevent those capacities from being maintained. Again, County staff recognized the inherent conflict between wetland functions and development of the roadway corridor, and recommended the Plan Amendment include the following new policies, which read, in pertinent part, as follows: LU-1W. [P]rior to the construction of the roadway, or any phase thereof, MDX shall prepare a surface water sheet flow analysis to demonstrate that the wetlands hydrology in this area shall be adequately retained. LU-3T. The [new corridor] is planned to traverse and impact wetlands within the Bird Drive Basins and elsewhere along its alignment and will require environmental approval and wetland mitigation. To the maximum extent feasible, mitigation for the [new corridor] shall be accomplished through acquisition, preservation, and restoration of wetlands within the Bird Drive and North Trail Basins outside the [UDB]. At a minimum, preservation of wetlands within the Bird Drive Basin shall be included as a component of the wetlands mitigation for this project. The mitigation shall also include a plan to preserve the hydrological connection and surface water flow of the wetlands remaining in these basins through the use of culverts or bridges. (emphasis added). Petitioners have two objections to this language. First, Petitioners argue the only way to preserve the hydrologic connection of the wetlands severed by construction is by bridging, rather than use of culverts. Dr. McVoy expressed the opinion that, if a wetland has water storage capacity, the roadway will need to be elevated to prevent flooding of the roadway. If the County only uses culverts, the road will still be subject to flooding in the areas where it is not culverted. Moreover, the hydrologic function of the wetlands will not be maintained because the wetlands will be disconnected in those areas. The County’s wetland expert explained that while some wetland vegetation is removed for a culverting project, the culvert allows wetland hydrology to be maintained. He gave examples of other roadways, notably Krome Avenue, where culverts have been used to maintain the hydrologic connection of wetlands severed by the roadway. Both Dr. McVoy and Mr. Spinelli have expertise in wetlands and wetland hydrology and hold different opinions on the issue. Neither witness’s testimony was more compelling than the other. Second, Petitioners attack the use of the phrase, “to the maximum extent feasible” to modify the requirement that mitigation of wetland impacts be accomplished within the Bird Drive and North Trail basins. Petitioners contend that this phrase does not provide a meaningful and predictable standard. But this is a common phrase that has been used throughout comprehensive plans that have been found in compliance, including ones prepared by Petitioners’ planning expert, Mr. Iler, and as acknowledged by Mr. Hawkins. Moreover, Mr. Woerner noted that at least three other policies in the Plan use the phrase “to the maximum extent feasible,” and he emphasized that this language provides some flexibility as to how an otherwise mandatory directive can be accomplished. As Mr. Spinelli and Mr. Woerner explained, the phrase “to the maximum extent feasible” in new Policy LU-3T is appropriate because it provides some flexibility as to the location of wetland mitigation, because, as the County’s wetland mitigation estimates showed, there were limits on the amount of available land within the Bird Drive and North Trail Basins to address the entire amount of mitigation that would likely be required. Mr. Hawkins further opined that the standard “is so deferential to the opinions stated by whoever the applicant or the developer might be in the future as to not provide a real standard that we can use today to anticipate whether we can measure compliance of this policy in the future.” However, nothing in Policy LU-3T vests discretion in, or suggests deference to, a permit applicant with respect to the issue of feasibility. It is plain that, as with other policies in the CDMP, the County would ultimately determine feasibility. In summary, the Plan does not prohibit destruction of all wetlands in environmentally-sensitive areas. Rather, it limits damage to projects meeting certain criteria, at least one of which is met by this project. The Plan anticipates mitigation of wetland acreages lost due to development, and requires the water storage, recharge capacity, and hydrology of wetlands be maintained or increased. Finally, the Plan requires restoration of publicly- acquired wetlands “managed for their natural resource, habitat, and hydrologic values.” The Plan Amendment will disturb and destroy wetlands, which will be undertaken in accordance with the basin management plans for the Bird Drive and North Trail basins. The Plan Amendment requires MDX to demonstrate that the wetland hydrology can be maintained by submitting sheet flow analysis prior to construction. Mitigation of wetlands acquired can increase storage capacity by removal of melaleuca and restoration of the confining layer. Petitioners did not prove that the Plan Amendment violates any of the cited Conservation Element policies, with the exception of CON-7A, because it allows destruction of portions of the Pennsuco wetlands. CERP Protection of the Everglades is one of the highest priorities of the Plan. The Land Use Element provides that the County’s “growth policy includes … that the intensification of physical development and expansion of the urban area should be managed … in recognition of the County’s physical limitations to horizontal expansion due to the location of the Everglades National Parks[.]” Land Use Policy LU-3S states that “[The County] continues to support the [CERP] and related regional and local habitat restoration and preservation initiatives through its … long-range land planning initiatives.” Future Land Use Element Figure 14 clearly depicts the Bird Drive Basin as “Future Wetlands and CERP Water Management Areas.” The Conservation Element “builds upon past and present initiatives such as … planning for the Bird Drive-Everglades [and other] basins.” Petitioners contend the Plan Amendment is contrary to Policy CON-7J, which provides, as follows: In evaluating applications that will result in alterations or adverse impacts to wetlands[,] [the County] shall consider the applications’ [sic] consistency with [CERP] objectives. Applications that are found to be inconsistent with CERP objectives, projects or features shall be denied. (emphasis added). Petitioners maintain the Plan Amendment will adversely impact wetlands in the Bird Drive Basin, which is designated as CERP Component U, and should be denied as inconsistent with that CERP project and its related objectives. 9 All parties agreed that only the District has authority to determine whether the Plan Amendment is consistent with CERP. As part of the required review of the Plan Amendment, the District commented on the proposed Plan Amendment. In its comment letter, the District noted that “[a] portion of the lands within the proposed study area for the expressway extension have been identified as having potential use with regard to Everglades restoration projects.” The District advised that the 9 The County introduced evidence, all of which constituted hearsay, to prove that the District has determined Component U to be infeasible and has instead moved toward a conveyance concept for the Bird Drive Basin, which, ostensibly requires less property. The issue is a red herring. No matter the size or scale of the CERP project, the District remains the agency with authority to determine whether the Plan Amendment interferes with the project. County had not supplied enough information “that would help the District evaluate the proposed project’s compatibility with the CERP [project],” and directed that County staff “coordinate with appropriate District staff to provide sufficient information.”10 The County did not provide additional information to the District and did not receive any determination from the District regarding the Plan Amendment’s consistency with CERP. Petitioners did not prove that the Plan Amendment is inconsistent with CERP, or that the County failed to consider consistency with CERP, thus, they did not prove the Plan Amendment is internally inconsistent with Policy CON-7J. However, Petitioners did prove the Plan Amendment is not supported by data and analysis on this point. Rather than providing the District with the additional information it requested to determine consistency with CERP, the County replied that it would continue to work with the District during the permitting process and “may be able to include features … that provide benefits that are both compatible and consistent with the intent of the CERP.” While only the District has the authority to determine consistency of the Plan Amendment with CERP, the County, not the District, has the duty and authority to determine consistency with its own Plan, including Policy CON-7J. 10 The District’s letter constitutes hearsay evidence for which there is no applicable exception in section 90.803, Florida Statutes. See Ehrhardt’s Florida Evidence § 803.8 (“A third kind of public record is admissible under [the Federal Evidence Code], but was intentionally omitted from section 90.803(8)”—“records and reports by a public official when the official is required to interpret and evaluate facts and information supplied by persons outside the agency.”). If the letter addressed the material disputed fact of whether the Plan Amendment was inconsistent with CERP, those statements would be inadmissible. However, the undersigned determined that statements regarding the need for more information on the issue are admissible, because they do not go to a material disputed fact. The County introduced the testimony of expert planning witness, Mark Woerner, in an attempt to prove that the County need not have a final determination of consistency with CERP prior to adopting a plan amendment. Mr. Woerner testified that the Plan merely requires the County to be aware of particular CERP projects when staff reviews plan amendments.11 Mr. Woerner’s testimony is contrary to the plain language of the policy, which requires the denial of a plan amendment that is found to be inconsistent with a CERP project or objective. Notwithstanding the previous finding that Petitioners did not prove that the Plan Amendment was inconsistent with CERP, because the Plan Amendment was adopted absent a determination of consistency with CERP, the Plan Amendment is not based upon adequate data or analysis. To be “based upon data” means “to react to it in an appropriate way and to the extent necessary[.]” § 163.3177(f), Fla. Stat. The County did not react appropriately to the data and analysis available—that the District needed more information in order to determine consistency—by adopting the Plan Amendment without such needed information. Agriculture Next, Petitioners contend that the Plan Amendment is inconsistent with policies specifically addressing the preservation of agriculture. The Plan provides the following with respect to lands in the Agriculture category: The area designated as “Agriculture” contains the best agriculture land remaining in [the County]. As 11 Mr. Woerner’s testimony was hedging, at best: “I believe that you can still provide an analysis and address the issues that may be surrounding a particular CERP project or a CERP issue. But I don’t think you need to have to finally finalize that. You have to—the comp plan—the policies that we put in the comp plan regarding CERP were to ensure that in the planning process, the County’s aware of the importance of CERP in its projects and that we have to be aware of that as we review different plan amendments or other permitting issues that might arise for the County.” stated in the [County’s] strategic plan, approved by the Board of County Commissioners, protection of viable agriculture is a priority. The principle uses in this area should be agriculture, uses ancillary to and directly supportive of agriculture and farm residences.[12] The Plan continues, “In order to protect the agricultural industry, uses incompatible with agriculture, and uses and facilities that support or encourage urban development are not allowed within [the Agriculture land use category].” The mandate to protect agriculture is reiterated in the section on Concepts and Limitations of the Land Use Plan Map, which provides, “Among the long-standing concepts embodied in the [County’s Plan] are … encourage agriculture as a viable economic use of suitable lands.” In addition to the foregoing Plan provisions, Petitioners cite the following goals, objectives, and policies with which the Plan Amendment conflicts: the Land Use Goal, which calls for “preserv[ing] Miami-Dade County’s unique agricultural lands” and Land Use Policies LU-1R, LU-1S, LU-8C, and LU-8E. Policy LU-8C requires the County to “continue to protect and promote agriculture as a viable economic use of land[.]” The Plan Amendment will displace approximately 300 acres of Agriculturally-designated land which is in active agricultural use. The amount of land that is needed to maintain a viable agricultural industry is approximately 50,000 acres. According to the Environmental Protection Agency’s December 2012 report titled “Growing for a Sustainable Future: Miami-Dade County Urban Development Boundary Assessment,” approximately 67,000 acres outside the UDB are in active agricultural use. 12 Uses ancillary to agriculture are those related to preserving, processing packaging, or selling agricultural products; farm supplies; and sale and service of farm machinery and implements. The Plan Amendment will not reduce the amount of agriculture land to below the threshold required for a viable agriculture industry. Therefore, Petitioners did not prove the Plan Amendment is inconsistent with either the Concepts and Limitations interpretive text or LU-8C. Policy LU-8E provides, in pertinent part, as follows: Applications requesting amendments to [the Plan] Land Use map shall be evaluated for consistency with the Goals, Objectives, and Policies of all Elements, other timely issues, and in particular the extent to which the proposal, if approved, would: Satisfy a deficiency in the Plan map to accommodate projected population or economic growth of the County; Enhance or impeded provision of services at or above adopted LOS standards; Be compatible with abutting and nearby land uses and protect the character of established neighborhoods, and; Enhance of degrade environmental or historical resources, feature, or systems of County significance[.] There is ample evidence that the Plan Amendment was evaluated for consistency with every aspect of the Plan. As it pertains to Agriculture, County staff specifically recognized potential conflict with the Plan’s directives to protect agricultural land. To address that concern, staff recommended that “MDX be required to preserve agricultural lands that are currently being used for agricultural production, commensurate with the amount of such lands that would be impacted by the roadway extension.” Staff recommended addition of, and the Plan Amendment was adopted with, the following new future land use policies: Policy LU-1U. Notwithstanding the designation of the [new corridor] as an Expressway on the [Plan] Land Use Plan map … no construction associated with the [new corridor] shall occur that would restrict farm vehicle and equipment access to agricultural properties adjacent to the [new corridor]. Moreover, to minimize the impacts of the [new corridor], the design and construction shall be conducted in a manner that does not cause drainage or the spillage of lighting from the [new corridor] onto adjacent agricultural lands. Policy LU-1V. To mitigate the impacts of the [new corridor] on the agricultural area, [MDX] shall preserve agricultural lands outside the UDB commensurate to impacts to agricultural lands that would be taken out of production by the project. Said preservation may be through participation in the County’s Purchase Development Rights program or other mechanism acceptable to the [County] Department of Regulatory and Economic Resources (or successor Department). The Plan Amendment addresses both the direct and indirect impacts the new corridor may have on agriculture. Policy LU-1V mitigates the loss of directly impacted acreage by requiring preservation of land for agricultural land outside the UDB through a purchase of development rights program on an acre-for-acre basis. Under the Plan Amendment, all direct impacts to agricultural lands will require preservation of a commensurate amount of agricultural land outside the UDB. Approximately 188 acres of the impacted agricultural acres are located within the UEA, which are already projected to be removed from agricultural production in the future. Policy LU-1V will, arguably, increase the amount of land available for agriculture following the eventual development of the UEA for urban development. Policy LU-1U addresses the indirect impacts to agriculture, by requiring the expressway to be designed in a manner that protects farm vehicle and equipment access and that does not cause drainage or lighting spillage onto agricultural lands. With the addition of the cited policies, it is at least arguable that the Plan Amendment is not inconsistent with Plan directives to protect agricultural lands or Policy LU-8E. At first blush, Policy LU-1R appears to be relevant because it begins by mandating the County to “reserve the amount of land necessary to maintain an economically viable agricultural industry.” However, the remainder of the policy mandates the County to adopt a transfer of development rights (“TDR”) program and provides more detail on how TDR will be implemented. The policy must be construed as a whole. The Plan Amendment included no provisions regarding the development, adoption, or implementation of the TDR program. Thus, the Plan Amendment is inconsistent with this policy. LU-1S is inapplicable, again, because it addresses the consistency of the County’s Strategic Plan, rather than plan amendments, with the Plan. The Plan Amendment is not inconsistent with the interpretive text describing the Agriculture land use category because, as detailed in Findings of Fact 59 through 62, the Plan Amendment does not support or encourage urban development in the Agriculture land use category. Finally, Petitioners argue that the Plan Amendment is not supported by data and analysis, specifically regarding the amount of agricultural land impacted by the new corridor and the amount of land needed to maintain a viable agriculture industry. Mr. Hawkins opined that the County did not identify the impacts, which is not a professionally acceptable planning practice. However, the evidence adduced at the final hearing revealed that data was available to, and was considered by, the County, and which supports the Plan Amendment. Petitioners did not prove this aspect of the Plan Amendment was not supported by appropriate data and analysis. Transportation The PD&E Study In 2013, following TPO approval, MDX commenced the PD&E process for the new corridor. MDX engaged consultants, overseen by the project manager, Albert Sosa, on behalf of general engineering consulting firm HNTB, to undertake the PD&E process for what was referred to as “MDX Project 836-18.” The PD&E process is the State of Florida’s process by which infrastructure projects demonstrate compliance with federal and state environmental and other regulatory standards. A PD&E study involves roadway engineering, structural work, stormwater drainage work, traffic engineering, transportation engineering, and analysis of the project’s impacts on both the natural and the built environment and on the people in the affected community. Mr. Sosa personally supervised the development of, and reviewed and approved, all methodologies for collection and analysis of data, reviewed the results of the collection and analysis for conformance with the approved methodologies, and reviewed and approved all reports produced as part of the overall PD&E Study for MDX Project 836-18. The first step in the PD&E Study was to develop an evaluation methodology, which, in this case, was the Alternative Corridor Evaluation (“ACE”), whereby several alternative corridors were analyzed and compared based on their relative impacts and benefits to the natural and built environment and to the transportation needs of the affected community, among other criteria. The ACE for MDX Project 836-18 ultimately considered 10 corridor alignments. The analysis began by measuring existing traffic conditions in 2014 to identify existing operational deficiencies along critical roadway facilities. From there, the analysis projected traffic impacts out to the year 2050. The 2050 projections used as a baseline a “no-build” model that incorporated highway, transit, roadway, and other transportation improvements programmed in the LRTP “Cost Feasible Plan” to be constructed by 2050, as well as updated population and other socio-economic projections. The alternative corridor alignments for the proposed expressway were compared against the “no-build” model in the year 2050, to determine whether the existing traffic conditions observed in 2014 remained or worsened even after accounting for future planned transportation improvements; and if so, whether the proposed expressway improved the projected conditions. The ACE analyzed traffic impacts over a broader study area than it used for impacts to the natural and built environment. The traffic study area is based on a model that incorporates the different corridors, and turns those corridors on and off to see where significant impacts to traffic stop appearing. That model is known as the Southeast Regional Planning Model (“SERPM”), which is owned by the TPO and includes: planned transportation projects, existing and future land use designations, existing and future population projections, and existing and future employment projections for different areas of the County. It is, therefore, used to analyze every transportation project in the County for impacts to both the existing and future planned environment. The traffic study area for the SR-836 southwest extension project was established as a 75-square-mile area bounded on the north by NW 12th Street, on the east by SW 97th Avenue, on the south by SW 152 Street/Coral Reef Drive, and on the west by SW 177 Avenue/Krome Avenue (see Figure 2). [Remainder of page intentionally blank] Figure 2 Of the original 10 ACE corridors, the closest to the final adopted alignment was Corridor 6. Between NW 12th Street and SW 88th Street, Corridor 6 matches the alignment presented in the Plan Amendment. The main difference is that the southern portion of ACE Corridor 6 lies further west of the UDB and further away from the residential development in West Kendall south of SW 104th Street than the Application alignment did. Petitioners challenged the PD&E study, and the ACE Report specifically, as insufficient data to support the Plan Amendment because the final adopted alignment of the new corridor differed from any of the 10 the alignments studied. The undersigned finds the PD&E study, including the ACE Report, provides significant data compiled by a professionally-accepted methodology and taken from professionally accepted sources.13 Thus, while none of the 10 ACE corridors exactly matched the final adopted alignment, the PD&E Study ultimately analyzed all of the variations that the County considered, and as of the Plan Amendment’s adoption, the PD&E Study had obtained data for the final adopted alignment. Mobility Approximately 600,000 people live in the West Kendall area (including areas between the UDB and SW 177th Avenue/Krome Avenue), and each weekday, 150,000 of those people commute to work in other areas of the County. The need for increased mobility in West Kendall is well documented by the PD&E Study. In general, the peak travel direction through the study area is eastbound/northbound in the morning peak period, or rush hour (6:00 am to 9:00 am), and southbound/westbound during the evening rush hour (4:00 pm to 7:00 pm). Travel speeds within the study area were found to be lower in the morning rush hour compared to the evening rush hour. Travel speeds lower than 18 mile per hour (“mph”) were documented on Bird Road, Kendall Drive, Coral Reef Drive, SW 137th Avenue, and SW 107th Avenue, during the evening rush hour. The capacity of a roadway is identified by the level of service (“LOS”) standards. The County has adopted LOS D for roadways within the UDB, 13 The ACE Report was originally published in February 2017, but the data and analysis was updated beginning in the summer of 2017 and throughout the Plan Amendment process. and LOS C for roadways outside of the UDB. The roadways listed above are operating at LOS E and F, indicating the level of congestion in the area. In addition to measuring average travel speeds, which incorporate delays at intersections, another planning-level measurement of surface streets is their volume over capacity (V/C) ratio, where volume (V) is the number of vehicles and capacity (C) is the maximum number of vehicles that can pass a point on a roadway in a given amount of time under normal conditions. A roadway is considered to be failing if it has a V/C ratio of 1.0 or more, and it is near failure if it has a V/C ratio between 0.9 and 1.0. During the morning rush hour, 20 roadway segments within the study area had V/C ratios over 1.0, and 15 segments were approaching failure. During the afternoon rush hour, 13 segments had a V/C ratio greater than 1.0, and another 16 were approaching failure. In sum, during the morning rush hour today, roughly 50 percent of the roadway segments operate at substandard speeds, and 33 percent are either already over capacity or near capacity. Additional transportation capacity is needed to accommodate the current residential development in West Kendall, as the existing roadway network cannot effectively serve the area’s current transportation demands, and that population is only expected to increase based on current land use and zoning designations. Petitioners’ overarching challenge relating to transportation is that the Plan Amendment is not supported by the data and analysis from the PD&E study, which demonstrates construction of the new corridor will result in minimal mobility increases in the study area and actually reduce the LOS on some roadway segments. The purpose of the Plan Amendment is two-fold: to improve mobility in West Kendall; and to decrease the commute times to downtown and other employment centers. 14 While the study does reveal significant reduced congestion on certain roadway segments in the West Kendall area during morning and evening rush hours, overall the study supports a finding of minimally increased mobility in the study area. For example, analysis of the alignment most closely approximating the new corridor, scenario 2.1D, results in a reduction of 6,988 vehicles on SW 8th Street, and reduction of 6,264 vehicles on SW 88th Street. But, the impact on daily traffic volumes is minor. The total reduction in vehicle hours traveled (“VHT”) for morning rush hour is four percent, and for evening rush hour is five percent. The average annual daily reduction in VHT is just over three percent (a reduction from 226,033 to 218,803), and an average daily increase in travel speed from 27.72 mph to 29.34 mph. The data also shows the greatest reduction in vehicle miles travelled (“VMT”) is six percent. Notably, the new corridor would result in an improvement of the LOS for less than half of the roadways within the study area. 8th Street, east of 157th Avenue, would improve from LOS D to C; Bird Road would improve from LOS E to D; 120th Street would improve from LOS D to C; and 157th Avenue, north of 136th Street, would improve from LOS F to C. The remaining seven segments studied would remain at their existing LOS, 14 The LRTP identifies “[i]mprove[ment] [of] access to and from the area to major employment centers such as the MIA, the MIC, the Port of Miami, Downtown Miami, Doral, as well as educational and commercial centers within the study area,” as one of the primary purposes of the project, in addition to improving mobility in the Kendall area. The Plan Amendment includes new Policy TC-1M, which provides that the County approves the new corridor “only to the extent necessary to relieve existing traffic congestion in the [West Kendall] area of the County and to provide a reliable, robust, and faster connection to Downtown Miami and other major trip attractors across the County.” including 137th Avenue, south of the new corridor, which would continue to operate at LOS F. Not only does the data reveal that the improvements in West Kendall congestion would be, as Petitioner’s expert described, “meager,” but also they provide no support for a finding that the Plan Amendment will accomplish its second objective—improving the commute time to downtown and other employment centers. The County relies upon the PD&E study, the goal of which is to identify an appropriate corridor for the southwest extension of the Dolphin Expressway, which does not include downtown, the airport, or other employment centers, within either the study area or the impact area. Mr. Mullerat, Petitioner’s expert transportation planner, described the problem as follows: [I]f the intent of this project is to solve in part the commuter issues for commuters, the whole path of the commuter should have been looked at … [the study] doesn’t look at some of the destinations—not just downtown and to the east, but also to the north. … And both origin and destination should have been looked at. Mr. Mullerat testified, credibly, that it was not an acceptable planning practice to have ignored origin and destination trips. The majority of the commuters who utilize the new corridor will be traveling beyond this three-mile stretch on to downtown, the hospitals, the airport, and other major trip attractors, yet the study contains no information about impact on commute times to those destinations. The data is silent on whether the time to those destinations will increase, decrease, or stay the same. Furthermore, the existing segment of the Dolphin Expressway operates at a LOS C, at least for the first three miles traveling east from its current termination point. The data shows that, after the new corridor is built, the LOS drops to D in that three-mile stretch. So, commuters will drive 13 miles, outside of the UDB, through active agricultural lands, through environmentally-sensitive lands, and through the West Wellfield, only to connect with the existing expressway operating at an LOS lower than it operates at today.15 Relating to transportation issues, Petitioners allege the Plan Amendment is inconsistent with the following goals, objectives, and policies in the Plan: TC-1A; TC-4A and F; and TC-6 and 6B. TC-1A requires the County to update and readopt the LRTP to achieve the objective of TC-1, which requires the County to operate its roadways at the adopted LOS, and strive to achieve a better LOS, in a manner consistent with the other objectives of the Plan. It requires the County to prepare proposals to enhance the Traffic Circulation and Mass Transit subelements following each LRTP update. The Plan Amendment is not inconsistent with this policy. The Plan Amendment will assist in achievement of the adopted LOS D on at least some roadway segments within the study area, and achieve a better LOS on others. While it will not improve the LOS on all segments, including at least one that is operating at LOS F, it is at least fairly debatable that the Plan Amendment is consistent with this policy. Policy TC-6A requires the County to “avoid transportation improvements which encourage or subsidize increased development in … environmentally sensitive areas[.]” For the reasons discussed in Findings of Fact 59 through 62, the Plan Amendment does not “encourage increased development” and is not inconsistent with this policy. TC-6B requires that land access interchanges “shall not be placed or constructed in a manner that would provide access to environmental 15 A project to widen the existing segment of the Dolphin Espressway from four to six lanes is expected to re-establish the higher functioning LOS C. However, no evidence was introduced at final hearing to establish the timeframe for that project. protection areas or other areas to be conserved” in order to prevent undue pressure for development in those areas. There is no evidence that the interchanges proposed for the new corridor to connect with existing roads in West Kendall would provide “land access.” Further, the Plan Amendment is not inconsistent with the policy for the same reasons it is not inconsistent with TC-6A. TC-4C provides, “Areas designated Environmental Protection shall be particularly avoided” when the County prioritizes construction of roadways, and allocation of financial resources for said construction.16 At first, it appears the Plan Amendment may be inconsistent with this policy because it allows construction of the new corridor in the Pennsuco wetlands. However, the Plan must be construed as a whole. This policy must be read in conjunction with Policy TC-6C, which provides that “[i]f no feasible alternative exists,” roadways may traverse environmental protection or conservation areas, “however such access should be limited and design techniques should be used to minimize the negative impact upon the natural systems.” Petitioners argue that alternatives to the new corridor exist which would accomplish the objective of relieving congestion in West Kendall. Mr. Kulash opined that congestion could be relieved by lane widening, extending turn lanes, and other roadway improvements; alternately, he expressed an opinion that congestion could be relieved by mass transit improvements. The County experts demonstrated that the alternatives proposed by Petitioners were not feasible, due to costs of land acquisition in the urban area, and the limitations of transit service. 16 The same language is expressed in CIE-6A. For the reasons stated herein, the Plan Amendment is not inconsistent with that policy. Petitioners did not carry their burden of proof with regard to Policy TC-4C. Petitioners must have done more than suggest alternatives exist, they must have proven the feasibility of those alternatives. Petitioners also raised concerns with the energy inefficiency of a new expressway and increased emissions and greenhouse gases. They identified Intergovernmental Coordination Element (”ICE”) policies ICE-5F and 5G as policies with which the Plan Amendment conflicts. ICE-5F requires the County to participate in the Southeast Florida Regional Climate Change Compact and to coordinate with other agencies in developing initiatives to address climate change mitigation and adaption. Policy ICE-5G requires County departmental master plans to “include and prioritize climate change mitigation and adaptation strategies.” The Plan Amendment has no impact on the County’s ability to implement either of those policies. Mass Transit The County has adopted the Strategic Miami Area Rapid Transit (SMART) Plan (see Figure 3). [Remainder of page intentionally blank] Figure 3 The SMART plan includes two east/west corridors, including the Kendall Corridor, which will connect residents in West Kendall from 167th Avenue east to existing lines serving downtown, and two planned north and northeast corridors. Transportation Element Policy TE-3C states, “It is the policy of [the County] to develop all the transportation facilities identified in the MPO’s [LRTP] … as soon as feasible, in accordance with the LRTP phasing program.” The Goal of the Mass Transit Subelement is to “[m]aintain, operate, and develop a mass transit system in [the County] that provides efficient, convenient, accessible, and affordable service to all residents and visitors,” and it adopts the corridors identified by the SMART plan as Figure 2 in the element’s map series. Policy TE-1A provides that “the County shall promote mass transit alternatives to personal automobile.” The overarching Goal of the Traffic Circulation Element includes developing and operating a traffic circulation that “supports the usage of transit,” among other broad goals. Petitioners challenge the Plan Amendment as inconsistent with several existing Plan provisions regarding mass transit service and prioritizing alternatives to private vehicle travel. Primary among them are Transportation Element TC-1A and Traffic Circulation Subelement TC-4F. Based on the same arguments, Petitioners also contend that the Plan Amendment is inconsistent with section 163.3177(6)(b), which requires a transportation element “to plan for a multimodal transportation system that places emphasis on public transportation systems, where feasible” and to “provide for a safe, convenient multimodal transportation system, coordinated with the future land use map . . . and designed to support all elements of the comprehensive plan,” as well as section 163.3177(6)(b)2.a, which requires that a transportation element address “[a]ll alternative modes of travel, such as public transportation, pedestrian, and bicycle travel.” Policy TC-4F provides, as follows: The County shall consistently improve strategies to facilitate a Countywide shift in travel modes from personal automobile use to pedestrian, bicycle and transit modes. The priority for transportation infrastructure expenditures shall be to insure that pedestrian, bicycle, and transit features are incorporated into roadway design. (emphasis added). Policy TE-1A provides, as follows: As provided in this section and the Mass Transit Subelement, the County shall promote mass transit alternatives to the personal automobile, such as rapid transit, (i.e. heavy rail, light rail, and bus rapid transit, premium transit (enhanced and/or express bus)), local route bus and paratransit services. (emphasis added). Petitioners’ experts testified that the new corridor will accomplish the opposite of what is required by the Plan—it will incentivize the use of personal vehicles by residents of West Kendall, who will take the expressway to escape the congestion of the roadways within the UDB. Respondent countered that the Plan Amendment is consistent with the Plan’s emphasis on alternative mass transit because it requires the new corridor to be built as a multi-modal facility, and will provide connections between the planned new east/west corridors. The Plan Amendment includes the following new policies in the Mass Transit Subelement of the Transportation Element: Mass Transit Subelement Policy MT-4D. Pursuant to Traffic Circulation Subelement Policy TC-4F, [MDX] (or successor agency) shall provide for mass transit service in the [new corridor], to be funded by MDX. The mass transit service shall incorporate lanes having technologies that facilitate the safe travel of automated vehicles, including mass transit vehicles, at high rates of speed for a connection with the transit service being implemented as part of the current SR 836 reconstruction generally east of the Turnpike. MDX shall coordinate the mass transit service with [the County] through the Department of Transportation and Public Works (or successor department). Said coordination shall occur prior to the earlier of the issuance of the first permit for construction of the expressway extension or prior to the commencement of any construction of the expressway extension. Mass Transit Subelement Policy MT-4E. In coordination with [the County] Parks, Recreation and Open Space Department and [the County TPO], [MDX] shall design a multi-use recreational trail within the corridor of the [new corridor]. Additionally, to the maximum extent feasible, the multi-use recreational trail shall be designed to provide for seamless connections to the County’s existing and planned trails and greenways network proximate to the corridor. Said coordination shall occur prior to the earlier of the issuance of the first permit for construction of the expressway extension or prior to the commencement of any construction of the expressway extension. These policies satisfy the requirements in Policies TC-3D to “design new roadways in a way that … incorporates planned rapid transit corridors,” and TC-4F to “insure that … transit features are incorporated into roadway design.” The question is whether the Plan Amendment satisfies the Plan requirement to “promote mass transit use.” Petitioner’s expert planners maintained it will not. Mr. Hawkins explained: The expressway is located outside of the Urban Development Boundary to the west of the urbanized area. For folks to use a transit corridor or a transit route that runs along the expressway corridor, they would have to travel by automobile outside the UDB to the west, to access a park-and-ride facility, and then get on a transit facility—a transit vehicle that operates in that corridor. It would not be back in an urbanized area until it is in the area of Northwest 12th Street and back in the UDB. If you were going to plan a corridor for a transit facility, you would have a much more direct line. You would run a transit facility through the developed area. Why? One is so that people can get to it more quickly. And two, so that all of the stops along its way are functional. When you are running through an agricultural area, you can't have any functional stops until you are all the way back in the UDB. It is just—the suggestion that this is a functional transit corridor or that this was designed with transit in mind is—I will use the word farcical. Respondent’s own planning expert, Mr. Woerner, agreed that the Plan Amendment “does not shift the travel mode from single occupancy vehicle to mass transit,” and “does not reduce dependence on the use of personal vehicles.” The County introduced no data on ridership for the transit lanes or other data to support that the mass transit option incorporated in the Plan Amendment would actually promote use of that option. Mr. Woerner seemed to recall some figures on ridership from the PD&E study, which evaluated a mass transit alternative to the new corridor. The figure Mr. Woerner referenced was an estimated 2,772 transit boardings from the alternative corridor analysis conducted during the PD&E study. However, that study was a mass-transit-only alternative to the new corridor. That ridership number is an estimate of the number of West Kendall residents who would choose to take mass transit if that were the only option in the new corridor. It does not reflect the number of users who, given an option between driving their personal vehicle along the new corridor or boarding a bus along that corridor, would choose the bus. In response, Mr. Woerner responded that, in his opinion, the most important data the County needed was the corridor connections. (See Figure 3 depiction of the approximate location of the new corridor, hand drawn in red, in relation to the planned east/west SMART corridors). In this case, Mr. Woerner considered the connections with Kendall Drive and Tamiami Trail bus lines to be important connections for users. But, when asked directly whether the County needed ridership information to support new Policy MT-4D, Mr. Woerner said, “No. I don’t believe we needed it, but it certainly was helpful to know that there had been a projection made.” Mr. Woerner’s testimony was not credible. As discussed above, the projection Mr. Woerner referred to was never made. There is no data to determine whether the County’s directive to another agency to fund and build 13 miles of mass transit service along the expressway route, will actually “promote mass transit use,” as required by the Plan. The burden was on Petitioners to prove that the Plan Amendment is inconsistent with the cited goals and policies. Petitioners did prove that the Plan Amendment is inconsistent with Policy TC-4F, because all the experts agreed that the Plan Amendment does not “shift the travel mode” in this part of the County “from single occupancy vehicle to mass transit.” However, Petitioners did not prove the Plan Amendment is inconsistent with the Plan’s provisions to: “promote mass transit use,” as required by Policy TE-1A; “support[] use of transit,” as required by the Transportation Element Goal; “significantly enhance public transit services and implement transportation system management programs … to provide feasible alternatives to private automobile use,” as required by CON-1B; or maintain an “efficient” mass transit system, as required by the Goal of the Mass Transit Subelement. Petitioners did prove that the Plan Amendment is not supported by data and analysis to determine whether it is internally consistent with the cited goals and policies.
Conclusions For Petitioners, Limonar Development, LLC; Wonderly Holdings, LLC; and Mills Family, LLC: John C. Lukacs, Esquire John C. Lukacs, P.A., Trial Lawyers 75 Valencia Avenue, Suite 600 Coral Gables, Florida 33134 Francisco J. Pines, Esquire Francisco J. Pines, P.A. 3301 Ponce de Leon Boulevard, Suite 220 Coral Gables, Florida 33134 For Petitioners, Tropical Audubon Society and Michelle Garcia: Paul J. Schwiep, Esquire Coffey Burlington, P.L. 2601 South Bayshore Drive, Penthouse 1 Miami, Florida 33133 Richard J. Grosso, Esquire Richard Grosso, P.A. 6511 Nova Drive, Mail Box 300 Davie, Florida 33317 For Respondent, Miami-Dade County: Dennis Alexander Kerbel, Esquire Christopher J. Wahl, Esquire Miami-Dade County Attorney’s Office 111 Northwest First Street, Suite 2810 Miami, Florida 33128
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Administration Commission enter a final order determining that the Miami-Dade County Comprehensive Plan Amendment adopted by Ordinance 2018-109 on September 27, 2018, is not “in compliance,” as that term is defined in section 163.3184(1)(b). DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of March, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE VAN WYK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of March, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Carlos A. Gimenez, Mayor Miami-Dade County Stephen P. Clark Center, 29th Floor 111 Northwest First Street Miami, Florida 33128 Dennis Alexander Kerbel, Esquire Miami-Dade County Suite 2810 111 Northwest First Street Miami, Florida 33128 (eServed) John C. Lukacs, Esquire John C. Lukacs, P.A., Trial Lawyers Suite 600 75 Valencia Avenue Coral Gables, Florida 33134 (eServed) Francisco J. Pines, Esquire Francisco J. Pines, P.A. Suite 220 3301 Ponce de Leon Boulevard Coral Gables, Florida 33134 (eServed) Christopher J. Wahl, Esquire Miami-Dade County Attorney's Office Suite 2810 111 Northwest First Street Miami, Florida 33128 (eServed) James Michael Porter, Esquire James M. Porter, P.A. 10th Floor 9350 South Dixie Highway Miami, Florida 33156 (eServed) Paul J. Schwiep, Esquire Coffey Burlington, P.L. Penthouse 1 2601 South Bayshore Drive Miami, Florida 33133 (eServed) Richard J. Grosso, Esquire Richard Grosso P.A. Mail Box 300 6511 Nova Drive Davie, Florida 33317 (eServed) William Chorba, General Counsel Department of Economic Opportunity Caldwell Building, MSC 110 107 East Madison Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-4128 (eServed) Ken Lawson, Executive Director Department of Economic Opportunity Caldwell Building 107 East Madison Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-4128 (eServed) Janay Lovett, Agency Clerk Department of Economic Opportunity Caldwell Building 107 East Madison Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-4128 (eServed) James Uthmeier, Esquire Office of the General Counsel Executive Office of the Governor Suite 209, The Capitol 400 South Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-001 (eServed) Barbara Leighty, Clerk Transportation and Economic Development Policy Unit Room 1802, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0001 (eServed)
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, including the stipulation of counsel, the following findings of fact are determined: Background The parties Respondent, Jefferson County (County), is a local governmental unit subject to the land use planning requirements of Chapter 163, Florida Statutes. That chapter is administered by respondent, Department of Community Affairs (DCA). The DCA is charged with the responsibility of reviewing comprehensive growth management plans and amendments thereto. At issue in this case is a plan amendment adopted by the County. Petitioner, Jack Hamilton, is a resident of Jefferson County. He owns and operates a nursery, orchard and cattle operation on his property on the east side of Highway 19, approximately two miles north of Monticello, Florida. The land, which is approximately 135 acres in size, is presently designated in a land use category known as Agriculture 2. For the last twenty years or so, the Jefferson Nursing Center (JNC), a nursing home, has been situated on a seven acre parcel of land surrounded on three sides by petitioner's property. Here, petitioner challenges a plan amendment which allows nursing homes, including JNC, in the Agriculture 2 category. The parties have stipulated that petitioner is an affected person within the meaning of the law and thus he has standing to bring this action. The nature of the dispute The County adopted its comprehensive plan (plan) on July 19, 1990. Through inadvertence, in the original plan, institutional uses such as churches, schools, nursing homes, parks and recreation areas were not specifically allowed as permitted uses in any residential or agriculture district even though such uses were commonly found in both types of districts. Even so, on an undisclosed date, the plan was determined by the DCA to be in compliance. On April 1, 1994, the County submitted to the DCA various amendments relating to a proposed petroleum pipeline project. During the course of preparing those amendments, the County became concerned for the status of all of the existing churches, nursing homes, schools, and other institutional uses in the County, because of their not being specifically mentioned in the plan. To avoid any question about the status of these uses and their treatment in the Land Development Code, which implements the plan, the County included an amendment to Future Land Use Element (FLUE) Policy 5-9 to provide for the adoption of land development regulations to permit all public land uses. On June 8, 1994, the DCA issued its Objections, Recommendations, and Comments (ORC) Report concerning the proposed public land uses amendment. Among other things, the DCA determined that the language in the amendment was too broad. In response to the ORC, on August 3, 1994, the County adopted revised Ordinance 94-10, which amended the comprehensive plan to add a Public Facilities Land Use District, adopt a Public Facilities Land Use Map, and adopt a List of Public Facilities. Under this amendment, only existing public uses were included within the district, and these were specifically identified on a series of maps and a List of Public Facilities, both of which were included as part of the plan amendment. On September 26, 1994, the DCA issued its Notice of Intent to find Ordinance No. 94-10 not in compliance with Chapter 163, Florida Statutes. This determination was based in part on the fact that the amendment did not sufficiently detail what land use regulations and restrictions would apply in the district. On March 28, 1995, the County submitted to the DCA for its review a proposed ordinance repealing Ordinance 94-10 and amending the County's comprehensive plan to add a Public Facilities Land Use Overlay District, adopt a Public Land Use Map, and adopt a List of Public Facilities. This proposed amendment provided that the current land use district designation, and all applicable regulations for that district, would continue to apply to lands included within the overlay district. It also provided standards for any future additions to the overlay district. On June 2, 1995, the DCA issued its ORC Report concerning the proposed Public Facilities Land Use Overlay District amendment in which it continued to object to the proposed district. In response to the ORC, and after consulting with the DCA, on July 20, 1995, the County adopted Ordinance No. 95-07. That ordinance repealed Ordinance No. 94-10 and amended the comprehensive plan to allow (a) churches in all land use categories except Conservation District and (b) adult care facilities, day care facilities, and nursing homes in any land use district that allows residential use. Ordinance No. 95-07 was not adopted pursuant to a compliance agreement. On September 7, 1995, the DCA issued its Notice of Intent to find Ordinance No. 95-07 in compliance. Petitioner timely filed his appeal of the DCA's determination that Ordinance No. 95-07 was in compliance. As amended, the petition contends that the plan amendment is not supported by adequate data and analysis, lacks standards pertaining to density and intensity of development for nursing homes, and is internally inconsistent with the plan. As such, he contends the amendment is arbitrary and capricious, and not fairly debatable. Although the issues in the case have been framed by petitioner in this manner, in simple terms his primary concern is that nursing homes, and specifically JNC, are incompatible with agricultural uses and do not belong in the Agricultural 2 land use category. The Plan Amendment Identification and adequacy of data and analysis When it forwarded Ordinance No. 95-07 to the DCA for review, the County did not specify in its transmittal letter what data and analyses it was relying on to support the amendment. In an earlier telephone conversation between the County planner and the DCA, however, the County indicated that it was relying on the existing data and analysis originally submitted with its comprehensive plan. The DCA established that this is not unusual and is an acceptable practice for smaller counties. Indeed, there is nothing in Chapter 9J-5, Florida Administrative Code, which requires that the identification of the supporting data and analysis be conveyed to the DCA in writing. Jefferson County is a small, rural county with only one person in its planning department. For counties with limited technical staff, the DCA normally provides technical support, and it customarily reviews the plan and existing data and analysis to identify those portions of the documents which are relevant to, and support, a plan amendment. Thus, in accordance with its practice for smaller counties, the DCA did not require the County to make a complete assessment of the plan and point out various page and reference numbers, but instead it performed that task. There was no showing that petitioner, or any other member of the public, was prejudiced in any respect by the DCA doing this. Besides the existing plan data and analysis, the DCA also had in its files the map and list specifically identifying each public use existing in the County and its location, including all churches, day care facilities, and nursing homes. The map and list were available at the public hearings which culminated in the adoption of Ordinance 95-07, and identified JNC within the Agriculture 2 district. Petitioner, who was a long-time member of the County Planning Commission, attended those hearings. There is no evidence that he, or any other member of the public, was unable to participate in the amendment process in a meaningful way. In determining the text amendments to be in compliance, the DCA relied upon certain data in the plan, including the existing population survey, soil survey and soil suitability data; a table comparing population composition showing the population existing and the need for elderly housing; the silviculture map as a factor in determining site suitability; the land use map showing the general overview of all land use types in the County; an analysis of the uses in the different land use categories; and a map plat showing petitioner's property, the location of the JNC, the proximity of two mixed-use business/residential areas to the north and south, and the residential densities in the area. The DCA also considered policies in the traffic circulation and transportation elements of the plan, a table of existing traffic conditions, existing housing data, an inventory of group homes, and special housing needs within the County, including housing for the elderly. Finally, the DCA considered Housing Element Policy 5-3 and Objective The policy provides that the County shall establish nondiscriminatory standards and criteria addressing the location of group homes and foster care facilities as well as other special needs housing. The objective calls for adequate sites for group homes and facilities in residential areas or other appropriate areas of residential character. Petitioner's expert concedes that nothing prohibits the County from adopting an amendment which allows nursing homes in an agricultural district so long as adequate data and analysis are present, and appropriate nonresidential intensity standards are found in the plan. Given the foregoing data and analysis, it is found that petitioner has failed to prove to the exclusion of fair debate that the plan amendment lacks adequate data and analysis. Compatibility of uses Petitioner has also contended that the plan amendment allows uses (nursing homes) which are incompatible with agricultural uses. In this regard, petitioner offered his lay opinion that nursing homes are incompatible with agriculture uses because in the event of a problem during normal agricultural operations, such as a shift in the wind direction during burning or crop spraying, bedridden nursing home patients cannot be easily transported out of harm's way. With appropriate site planning features, petitioner's expert agreed that nursing homes are not inherently incompatible with agricultural land uses. The Code contains such site design criteria which are designed to eliminate or minimize incompatibilities. For example, it contains provisions regarding setbacks, a site planning process, and screening and buffering requirements. The fact that petitioner's agricultural operation and JNC have coexisted for more than twenty years is some evidence that the uses are or can be compatible. The County's proposed amendment to allow adult care facilities, day care facilities and nursing homes in the Agriculture 2 land use category is not inconsistent with any other objective or policy, is found to be fairly debatable, and is therefore in compliance. Density and intensity standards The law (s.163.3177(6)(a), F.S.) requires that comprehensive plans contain density and intensity standards for each land use. Petitioner contends that, notwithstanding this statutory requirement, there are no standards in the amendment or the comprehensive plan for density or intensity of development of nursing homes in the Agriculture 2 land use category. It is noted that the Agriculture 2 land use district description in Policy 1-3 of the FLUE provides a residential density but does not contain an intensity standard. FLUE Objective 1 provides, however, that "(f)uture growth and development shall continue to be managed using the County Development Code," which was adopted in April 1981. That Code spells out densities and intensities for each area. The objective further directs that the regulations be revised to address issues identified in Section 163.3203, Florida Statutes, compatibility of uses, and incentives to upgrade infrastructure. In addition, FLUE Policy 6-2 provides that the development review and approval process in the Code be the vehicle for limiting densities and intensities of development consistent with the availability of infrastructure. This policy has already been determined to be "in compliance" with Chapter 163, Florida Statutes. Rule 9J-5.005(8)(j), Florida Administrative Code, authorizes a local government to include in its comprehensive plan documents adopted by reference but not incorporated verbatim into the plan. In this case, the County adopted in its Code specific land development regulations governing growth and development, including density and intensity standards. There was no evidence that the Code fails to meet the statutory requirement that densities and intensities be included in the plan. Indeed, as a general rule, comprehensive plans in Florida either specifically describe all of the particular uses allowed in each district, or they generally describe such uses and let the particular uses to be allowed be determined in land development regulations. Here, the County has opted for the second type. This being so, it is found that petitioner has failed to establish to the exclusion of fair debate that the plan and plan amendment lack appropriate standards governing densities and intensities.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Community Affairs enter a Final Order determining the County plan amendment adopted by Ordinance No. 95-07 to be in compliance. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of October, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of October, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: James F. Murley, Secretary Department of Community Affairs 2555 Shumard Oak Boulevard, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Vance W. Kidder, Esquire 149 Carr Lane Tallahassee, Florida 32312-9032 Sherry A. Spiers, Esquire Department of Community Affairs 2555 Shumard Oak Boulevard, Suite 315 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Stephanie M. Gehres, Esquire Department of Community Affairs 2555 Shumard Oak Boulevard, Suite 325-A Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 David La Croix, Esquire 521 West Olympia Avenue Punta Gorda, Florida 33950-4851
The Issue The issue is whether the Land Development Code (LDC) adopted by Ordinance No. 2007-12 on August 22, 2007, as amended on February 27, 2008, is inconsistent with the effective comprehensive plan for the City of Doral (City), which is the Miami-Dade Comprehensive Development Master Plan (County Plan).
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: The Parties Section 64 is a Florida corporation. The Grand is a Florida limited partnership. Both entities are owned by the same individual. On September 25, 2001, Section 7 acquired ownership of an approximate ten-acre tract of property in the County (now the City) located along the southern boundary of Northwest 82nd Street, between 109th and 112th Avenues. See Petitioners' Exhibit 416. On December 16, 2005, title in one- half of the property was conveyed to The Grand in order to divide the property into two different ownerships. Id. It was Petitioners' intent at that time to build two hotels on separate five-acre tracts, one owned by Section 7 and the other by The Grand. The City is located in the northwestern part of Dade County and was incorporated as a municipality in June 2003. At the time of incorporation, the County's Plan and Land Use Code were the legally effective comprehensive plan and land development regulations (LDRs), respectively. On April 26, 2006, the City adopted its first comprehensive plan. After the Department determined that the Plan was not in compliance, remedial amendments were adopted on January 10, 2007, pursuant to a Stipulated Settlement Agreement. Although the Department found the Plan, as remediated, to be in compliance, it was challenged by a third party, and the litigation is still pending. See DOAH Case No. 06-2417. Therefore, the County Plan is still the legally effective Plan. See § 163.3167(4), Fla. Stat. The Department is the state land planning agency charged with the responsibility of reviewing LDRs whenever the appeal process described in Section 163.3213, Florida Statutes, is invoked by a substantially affected person. History of the Controversy When Petitioners' property was purchased in 2001, the County zoning on the property was Light Industrial (IU-1), having been rezoned by the County to that designation on October 9, 1984. See Petitioners' Exhibit 5. One of the uses permitted under an IU-1 zoning classification is a hotel with up to 75 units per acre. See Petitioners' Exhibit 6. The land use designation on the County's LUP map for the property is Low- Density Residential (LDR), with One Density Bonus, which allows 2.5 to 6 residential units per acre with the ability for a "bump-up" in density to 5 to 13 units per acre if the development includes specific urban design characteristics according to the County urban design guide book. Language found on pages I-62 and I-63 of the Future Land Use Element (FLUE) in effect at the time of the incorporation of the City (now found on pages I-73 and I-74 of the current version of the FLUE) provides in relevant part as follows: Uses and Zoning Not Specifically Depicted on the LUP Map. Within each map category numerous land uses, zoning classifications and housing types may occur. Many existing uses and zoning classifications are not specifically depicted on the Plan map. . . . All existing lawful uses and zoning are deemed to be consistent with the [Plan] unless such a use or zoning (a) is found through a subsequent planning study, as provided in Land Use Policy 4E, to be inconsistent with the criteria set forth below; and (b) the implementation of such a finding will not result in a temporary or permanent taking or in the abrogation of vested rights as determined by the Code of Metropolitan Dade County, Florida. As noted above, if there is a concern that zoning might be inconsistent with land use, using the criteria described in the provision, the County may initiate a planning study to analyze consistency and down-zone the property to a less intense use if an inconsistency is found. Although the County initiated a number of planning studies after it adopted its Plan in 1993, and ultimately down-zoned many properties, none was ever initiated by the County for Petitioners' property. Essentially, when existing uses and zoning are not depicted on the County LUP map, the language in the FLUE operates to deem lawfully existing zoning consistent with the land use designation on the property. In this case, the parties agree that the zoning of Petitioners' property is not depicted on the County LUP map. Therefore, absent a planning study indicating an inconsistency, the zoning is deemed to be consistent with the land use category. On August 22, 2007, the City adopted Ordinance No. 2007-12, which enacted a new LDC, effective September 1, 2007, to replace the then-controlling County Land Use Code. Although the LDC was adopted for the purpose of implementing the new City Plan, until the new Plan becomes effective, the LDC implements the County Plan. Amendments to the LDC were adopted by Ordinance No. 2008-1 on February 27, 2008. The LDC does not change the zoning on Petitioners' property. However, it contains a provision in Chapter 1, Section 5, known as the Zoning Compatibility Table (Table), which sets forth the new land use categories in the City Plan (which are generally similar but not identical to the County land use categories) and the zoning districts for each category. Pertinent to this dispute is an asterisk note to the Table which reads in relevant part as follows: Under no circumstances shall the density, intensity, or uses permitted be inconsistent with that allowed on the city's future land use plan. . . . Zoning districts that are inconsistent with the land use map and categories shall rezone prior to development. See Petitioners' Exhibit 27 at p. I-3. Under the Table, only residential zoning districts (with up to ten dwelling units per acre and no density bonus) are allowed in the City's proposed LDR land use category. Therefore, if or when the City Plan becomes effective, before Petitioners can develop their property, they must rezone it to a district that is consistent with the land use designation shown on the Table. There is no specific requirement in the LDC that the City conduct a planning study when it has a concern that the zoning is inconsistent with the relevant land use category in the new City Plan. Petitioners construed the asterisk note as being inconsistent with the text language on pages I-62 and I-63 of the County Plan. See Finding of Fact 5, supra. Accordingly, on August 21, 2008, Petitioners submitted a Petition to the City pursuant to Section 163.3213(3), Florida Statutes, alleging generally that they were substantially affected persons; that the LDC was inconsistent with the County Plan; that the LDC changes the regulations regarding character, density, and intensity of use permitted by the County Plan; and that the LDC was not compatible with the County Plan, as required by Florida Administrative Code Rule 9J-5.023.2 See Petitioners' Exhibit 103. The City issued its Response to the Petition on November 20, 2008. See Petitioners' Exhibit 104. The Response generally indicated that Petitioners did not have standing to challenge the LDC; that the Petition lacked the requisite factual specificity and reasons for the challenge; that the LDC did not change the character, density, or intensity of the permitted uses under the County Plan; and the allegation concerning compatibility lacked factual support or allegations to support that claim. On December 22, 2008, Petitioners filed a Petition with the Department pursuant to Section 163.3213(3), Florida Statutes, alleging that the LDC implements a City Plan not yet effective; that the LDC changes the uses, densities, and intensities permitted by the existing County Plan; and that the LDC changes the uses, densities, and intensities permitted by the not yet effective City Plan. See Petitioners' Exhibit 105. After conducting an informal hearing on April 7, 2009, as authorized by Section 163.3213(4), Florida Statutes, on July 23, 2009, the Department issued a Determination of Consistency of a Land Development Regulation (Determination). See Petitioners' Exhibit 102. See also Section 7 Tract 64 Property, Inc., et al. v. The City of Doral, Fla., Case No. DCA09-LDR-270, 2009 Fla. ENV LEXIS 119 (DCA July 23, 2009). In the Determination, the Department concluded that Petitioners were substantially affected persons and had standing to file their challenge; that the provision on pages I-62 and I-63 of the County FLUE did not apply to Petitioners' property because the uses and zoning of the property are specifically designated on the LUP map; that the law does not prohibit the Department from reviewing the LDC for consistency with the not yet effective City Plan; and that because the LDC will require Petitioners to rezone their property to be consistent with the City Plan, the challenge is actually a challenge to a rezoning action and not subject to review under this administrative process. See § 163.3213(2)(b), Fla. Stat. On August 13, 2009, Petitioners filed their Petition for Formal Proceedings with DOAH raising three broad grounds: that the LDC unlawfully implements a comprehensive plan not yet effective; that it changes the uses, densities, and intensities permitted by the County Plan and is therefore inconsistent with the County Plan; and that it changes the uses, densities, and intensities permitted by the not yet effective City Plan and is inconsistent with that Plan. See Petitioners' Exhibit 39. These issues are repeated in the parties' Stipulation. As to other issues raised by Petitioners, and evidence submitted on those matters over the objection of opposing counsel, they were tried without consent of the parties, and they are deemed to be beyond the scope of this appeal. The Objections Petitioners first contend that the LDC unlawfully implements a comprehensive plan not yet in effect, in that it was specifically intended to be compatible with, further the goals or policies of, and implement the policies and objectives of, the City Plan. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 9J-5.023. But Petitioners cited no statute or rule that prohibits a local government from adopting LDRs before a local plan is effective, or that implement another local government's plan (in this case the County Plan). While the LDC was adopted for the purpose of implementing a City Plan that the City believed would be in effect when the LDC was adopted, the City agrees that until the new City Plan becomes effective, the LDC implements the County Plan. Even though the two Plans are not identical, and may even be inconsistent with each other in certain respects, this does automatically create an inconsistency between the LDC and County Plan. Rather, it is necessary to determine consistency between those two documents, and not the City Plan. Except for testimony regarding one provision in the LDC and its alleged inconsistency with language in the County FLUE, no evidence was presented, nor was a ground raised, alleging that other inconsistencies exist. The Table note and the County Plan do not conflict. The LDC is not "inconsistent" merely because it was initially intended to implement a local plan that has not yet become effective. Petitioners next contend that the LDC changes the uses, densities, and intensities permitted by the County Plan and is therefore inconsistent with that Plan. Specifically, they contend that the note following the Zoning Compatibility Table in Chapter 1, Section 5 of the LDC is inconsistent with the language on pages I-62 and 63 (now renumbered as pages I-73 and I-74) of the County Plan. In other words, they assert that an inconsistency arises because the note requires them to down- zone their property before development, while the County Plan deems their zoning to be consistent with the County LUP map unless a special planning study is undertaken. The evidence establishes that if there is a conflict between zoning and land use on property within the City, it is necessary to defer to the language on pages I-62 and I-63 of the County FLUE for direction. This is because the County Plan is the effective plan for the City. Under that language, if no planning study has been conducted, the zoning would be deemed to be consistent with the land use. On the other hand, if a planning study is undertaken, and an inconsistency is found, the property can be rezoned in a manner that would make it consistent with the land use. Therefore, the LDC does not change the use, density, or intensity on Petitioners' property that is permitted under the County Plan. It is at least fairly debatable that there is no conflict between the Table note and the County Plan. Finally, Petitioners contend that the LDC changes the uses, densities, and intensities permitted by the not yet effective City Plan because the current industrial zoning designation will be inconsistent with the LDR land use designation. Petitioners argue that once the new City Plan becomes effective, the LDC requires them to down-zone their property before development. However, this concern will materialize only if or when the new City Plan, as now written, becomes effective; therefore, it is premature. Further, the definition of "land development regulation" specifically excludes "an action which results in zoning or rezoning of land." See § 163.3213(2)(b), Fla. Stat. Because the challenged regulation (the note to the Table) is "an action which results in zoning or rezoning of land," the issue cannot be raised in an administrative review of land development regulations. Id. The other contentions raised by Petitioner are either new issues that go beyond the scope of the Petition filed in this case or are without merit.
The Issue Whether Petitioners have standing to initiate formal proceedings under the City of Tallahassee Code of Ordinances. Whether the Planning Commission has jurisdiction to consider a challenge to the City's vested rights determination. Whether the Respondents Barnette W. Allen and Sally P. Allen's (Allens) proposed development, known as the Allenwoods Apartments project, is exempt from the consistency and concurrency requirements of the City of Tallahassee's (City) Comprehensive Plan.
Findings Of Fact Parties Petitioner Downtown Park Avenue Neighborhood Association (Neighborhood Association), Inc., is not-for-profit corporation organized on August 18, 1997, and existing under the laws of the State of Florida. The Neighborhood Association's principal office is located at 858 East Call Street, Tallahassee, Florida. The purpose of the Neighborhood Association is to preserve the residential nature and stability of the members' neighborhood. The members of the Neighborhood Association reside in close proximity to the property upon which the Allenwoods Apartments project is proposed to be constructed. Some members of the Neighborhood Association own property within 500 feet or less of the subject property. Petitioner Dana Plummer resides at 133-9 Oak Street, Tallahassee, Florida, which is in close proximity to the property upon which the Allenwoods Apartments project is proposed to be constructed. Mr. Plummer owns property less than 300 feet from the subject property. Plummer is the President of the Neighborhood Association. Respondent City of Tallahassee is a municipal corporation of the State of Florida. The City's DRC approved a Type B Site Plan application for the Allenwoods Apartments project. Respondents Allens are the owners of the property on which the proposed Allenwoods Apartments are to be located, and which property is designated as Blocks D and F in the Magnolia Heights Addition of the Hays Division. Allenwoods Apartments The Allenwoods Apartments is proposed to be constructed in approximately 8.64 acres, and is located on the north side of Call Street. The Allenwoods Apartments is proposed to consist of 88 apartment units. The apartments will be located within three three-story buildings and one two-story building, with a total of 202 parking spaces. The density of the proposed Allenwoods Apartments project is approximately ten units per acre. On October 24, 1996, the Planning Department issued Land Use Compliance Certificate No. CC960429 which stated that: This site is eligible for development of 110 multi-family dwelling units developed at the RM-1 standards in Hays Subdivision, an exempt subdivision. Type B review required in proximity with existing low density residential uses. Notice of the Planning Department's decision to issue Land Use Compliance Certificate No. CC960429 was not provided to any members of the Neighborhood Association nor to Plummer. In May 1997, the Allens submitted a Type B Site Plan application for the Allenwoods Apartments project. In mid-June 1997, during the City's review of the proposed project, the City determined that the Allens' two lots qualified as lots located within a subdivision recorded as of July 16, 1990, and all infrastructure required for the development of the property was completed prior to that date. Accordingly, the City staff determined that, pursuant to Section 18-103(1)(a)(1) of the City's Vested Rights Review Ordinance, the proposed Allenwoods Apartments project did not have to comply with the concurrency and consistency requirements of the City's 2010 Comprehensive Plan. Consequently, the City staff did not review the Allenwoods Apartments project for consistency with the City's 2010 Comprehensive Plan, nor did the City review the project for concurrency. On August 11, 1997, the City's Development Review Committee approved the Type B Site Plan application for the Allenwoods Apartments project. Single-family residences are the primary use of the properties immediately adjacent to the Allens property. All existing multi-family units that have been constructed in the neighborhood were constructed prior to the adoption of the City's 2010 Comprehensive Plan. History of the Subject Property On May 1, 1910, J. L. Hays recorded a subdivision known as the Magnolia Heights Addition of the Hays Division. The plat for the Magnolia Heights Addition of the Hays Division is recorded at Deed Book "KK," page 600, of the Public Records of Leon County. The plat depicted a street running between Blocks F and G. The plat also depicted a street between Blocks D and F. These streets were never constructed. On January 15, 1946, H. H. Wells acquired certain Blocks of the Magnolia Heights Addition of the Hays Division, including all of Blocks D and F, and a portion of Block E. On March 11, 1946, H. H. Wells and Susye Bell Wells replated all of Block C and a portion of B, D, E, F, and G. The new subdivision was named "Magnolia Manor," and is recorded at Plat Book 3, page 6, of the Public records of Leon County. On January 6, 1948, H. H. Wells and Susye Bell Wells sold all of Blocks F and G, and Lots 9, 10, and 11 in Block D, of the Magnolia Heights Addition of the Hays Division to the Glover Construction Company. On July 22, 1948, the Glover Construction sold its portion of Blocks D and F of the Magnolia Heights Addition of the Hays Division to Willie Mae Hampton. On November 1, 1963, Glover Construction Company sold a portion of Blocks D and F of the Magnolia Heights Addition of the Hays Division to Harlem J. Allen, Clyde P. Allen, Barnette W. Allen, and Sally Procter Allen. On February 13, 1964, Willie Mae Hampton sold her portion of Blocks D and F of the Magnolia Heights Addition of the Hays Division to Canal Timber Corporation. On December 2, 1964, Barnette W. Allen and Sally Procter Allen entered into an agreement to purchase that portion of Blocks D and F of the Magnolia Heights Addition of the Hays Division owned by the Canal Timber Corporation. On November 20, 1972, Canal Timber Corporation sold its portion of Blocks D and F of the Magnolia Heights Addition of the Hays Division to Grace H. Gibson. On December 26, 1974, Grace H. Gibson transferred her portion of Blocks D and F of the Magnolia Heights Addition of the Hays Division to Barnette W. Allen and Sally Procter Allen. On December 15, 1976, Barnette W. Allen and Sally Procter Allen acquired whatever property interests that Harlem J. Allen and Clyde P. Allen possessed by virtue of the acquisition that occurred on November 1, 1963. The City's Vested Rights Review Ordinance The City adopted its 2010 Comprehensive Plan on July 16, 1990. Concurrently with the adoption of its 2010 Comprehensive Plan, the City adopted its Vested Rights Review Ordinance, Ordinance No. 90-O-0043AA. This ordinance was codified as Article VII of Chapter 18 of the Code of Ordinances. Article VII (Sections 18-101 through 18-106) of the Tallahassee Code of Ordinances establishes the standards by which a property owner may demonstrate that private property rights have vested against the provisions of the 2010 Comprehensive Plan. Section 18-101 of the Code is a statement of intent in regard to the Vested Rights Ordinance, which reads: This article establishes the sole administrative procedures and standards by which a property owner may demonstrate that private property rights have vested against the provisions of the 2010 Comprehensive Plan. Said administrative procedures shall provide determinations of consistency of development with the densities and intensities set forth in the 2010 Comprehensive Plan and that development is not subject to the concurrency requirements of the 2010 Comprehensive Plan. The City established three categories for which property owners could apply to establish their vested rights to continue development of their property without complying with the consistency and concurrency requirements of the 2010 Comprehensive Plan. These categories are contained in Sections 18-104(1) and (2), Code of Ordinances. The three categories were denominated as "common-law vesting," "statutory vesting," and developments of regional impact, which were approved pursuant to Chapter 380, Florida Statutes. Pursuant to Section 18-103(2), property owners who contended that they had vested rights pursuant to one of these three categories were required to request a determination of vested rights by filing an application with the Planning Department within 120 calendar days of July 16, 1990. The failure to timely file an application for a vested rights determination within the prescribed time limits constituted a waiver of any vested rights claims. The city's Vested Rights Review Ordinance also expressly states that a property owner cannot receive vested rights based upon a zoning classification. In addition to the three categories for which property owners could apply to establish vested property rights, the City's Vested Rights Review Ordinance included a provision by which certain property owners were presumptively vested and, therefore, were not required to file an application for a vested rights determination. Section 18-103(1) reads, as follows: The following categories shall be presumptively vested for the purposes of consistency with the 2010 Comprehensive Plan and concurrency as specified in the 2010 Comprehensive Plan and shall not be required to file an application to preserve their vested rights status: All lots within a subdivision recorded as of July 16, 1990, or lots in approved subdivisions for which streets, stormwater management facilities, utilities, and other infrastructure required for the development have been completed as of July 16, 1990. The Tallahassee-Leon County Planning Department shall maintain a listing of such exempt subdivisions. All active and valid building permits issued prior to July 17, 1990. All technically complete building permit applications received by the building inspection department on or before July 2, 1990, and subsequently issued, shall be vested under the provisions of the 2010 Comprehensive Plan, regardless of date of issuance. Any structure on which construction has been completed and a certificate of occupancy issued if a certificate of occupancy was required at time of permitting. All lots of record as of July 1, 1984, not located within a subdivision, but only to the extent of one (1) single-family residence per lot. If a property qualifies as an exempt or vested property pursuant to the City's Vested Rights Review Ordinance, the property owner does not have to comply with the consistency and concurrency provisions of the City's 2010 Comprehensive Plan. Such properties are allowed to be developed pursuant to the 1971 zoning code that was in effect until the City's 2010 Comprehensive Plan was adopted. The City staff and DRC determined that the subject property was vested because it fulfilled the requirements of Section 18-103(1)(a)(1) as a lot "within a subdivision recorded as of July 16, 1990." The basis for this determination was that the property was located within the plat for the Magnolia Heights Addition of the Hays Division which was recorded in 1910. The plat does not contain any statements as to use or density, however. The subdivision, known as Magnolia Manor, plated in 1946, has its own separate subdivision number, and consists of a portion of property that was originally part of the Magnolia Heights Addition to the Hays Division. A small portion of the Allens' property is located within the Magnolia Manor subdivision. Although from 1948 to 1974, Blocks D and F were both divided and transferred in a manner differently than that depicted on the 1910 Plat, all conveyances of the property subject to the Site Plan have been by reference to the lot and block of Magnolia Heights Addition. Subsequent purchasers of the property conveyed the lots subject to the Site Plan to the Allens, and described the lots as part of the original subdivision rather than by any reference to "Magnolia Manor." The replatting of certain lots within the subdivision to create "Magnolia Manor" did not affect or otherwise change any of the property subject to the Site Plan. On August 20, 1990, the City determined that the Magnolia Heights Addition was an exempt subdivision pursuant to the provisions of Section 18-103(1)(a)(1) of City Code of Ordinances, and was placed on the Planning Department list of exempt subdivisions. As such, the subdivision was exempt from the consistency and concurrency requirements of the Comprehensive Plan. The subdivision is one of more than 300-350 subdivisions determined to be exempt as recorded subdivisions. The exemption was based upon the fact the project was located in a subdivision recorded as of July 16, 1990, and all infrastructure required for the subdivision and for development of the property was in place and complete as of that date. The City staff has been guided in its interpretation and application of the City's Vested Rights Review Ordinance by a memorandum dated August 27, 1990, written by then Assistant City Attorney John Systma. The August 27 memorandum states, in pertinent part, that: This memo is in response to your questions about the proper procedure to follow in determining if a subdivision recorded in 1906 should be declared exempt under the provisions of the Vested Rights Review Ordinance. The critical element that must exist for the subdivision to be exempt is that the current subdivision must be identical to the plat that was created when the subdivision was initially recorded. Any resubdivision, replatting or other changes made to the original recorded plat invalidates that plat. An excellent example of an invalid plat is the original plat recorded for the Pecan Endowment, which has subsequently been changed many times, thereby invalidating it. The subdivision was recorded as of July 16, 1990. The resubdivision of a part of an exempt recorded subdivision, which does not affect the property under review and subject to development approval, has never been the basis of denial of the recorded subdivision exemption provisions of the Vested Rights Ordinance. City staff have never denied the exemption or vesting based upon a replatting of other lots in a subdivision which were not included in the proposed exempt development. Respondents clearly established that such replatting has not been a basis for denial of the exemption by City staff in applying the Vested Rights Ordinance since its adoption in 1990. The development approvals for the Allenwoods Apartments are valid if it is determined that the project is exempt or vested under the Vested Rights Ordinance. The property, at the time of adoption of the 2010 Comprehensive Plan, was zoned RM-1, and allowed development of a multifamily project at the density approved for the Allens. The current zoning of the property is MR1 and would permit the development of the property as a multifamily project at the density approved for the Allens.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of RECOMMENDED that the Planning Commission find that Respondents Allens' lots are vested for the purposes of consistency and concurrency with the 2010 Comprehensive Plan, and, it is further RECOMMENDED that the Planning Commission approve the Site Plan for the Allenwoods Apartment Project, as consistent with the requirements of Chapter 27, Article XXI, Section 21.4.G.8. of the Code of Ordinances. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of May, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of May, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles A. Francis, Esquire Francis & Sweet, P.A. Post Office Box 10551 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 David A. Theriaque, Esquire 909 East Park Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Linda R. Hurst Assistant City Attorney City Hall 300 South Adams Street Second Floor Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mark Gumula Director of Planning Tallahassee-Leon County Planning Department 300 South Adams Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Jean Gregory Clerk of the Planning Commission Tallahassee-Leon County Planning Department 300 South Adams Street, City Hall Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Robert B. Inzer City Treasurer-Clerk 300 South Adams Street, City Hall Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Seminole Raceway, as proposed in Charles and Linda Wimberlys' Site and Development Plan and approved with conditions by the Leon County Development Review Committee (DRC), is consistent with the requirements of the 2010 Tallahassee-Leon County Comprehensive Plan (Comprehensive Plan) and is a permissible land use under applicable provisions of Chapter 10, Leon County Code (the Code).
