The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Petitioner’s application for licensure as a mortgage broker should be approved.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner resides in Riverwoods, Illinois. He has four children, and is married to Sharon Wheat-Hester. Petitioner received his undergraduate degree from Wake Forest University in North Carolina. Petitioner also received a master’s degree and doctorate degree in theology from Share-A- Prayer and Word Theological School in Whitewater, Wisconsin. Petitioner is currently employed as the director of a ministry called Marketplace Movement Network. The ministry provides advice to businesses on Chritian business ethics. In that regard, Petitioner has published one book on the subject of Christian ethics in business. Petitioner is also the President and shareholder of Hester International, Inc., a Florida Corporation that since 1995, provides mortgage brokerage services in the State of Illinois and several other states. The corporation’s principal office is located in Illinois. The business has an established client list and referral list. Additionally, Petitioner is currently licensed as a mortgage broker in the Illinois, California, North Carolina and Hawaii. He has not had any disciplinary action taken against him in those states. On January 25, 1996, prior to the present license application at issue here, Petitioner sought licensure as a mortgage broker in Florida with the Florida Department of Banking and Finance, Respondent’s predecessor agency. On the 1996 application Petitioner answered “no” to a question that asked whether he had ever had a license revoked. Petitioner’s 1996 application was denied for a material misrepresentation or omission. Petitioner did not challenge the 1996 denial. On February 16, 2004, also prior to the present application, Petitioner again applied for a mortgage broker license. On this application, question number six asked: Have you had a license, or the equivalent, to practice any profession or occupation denied, revoked, suspended, or otherwise acted against which involved fraud, dishonest dealing, or any other act of moral turpitude? Yes No A “Yes” answer to question six required the applicant to attach details, provide a copy of allegations, and also supply documentation of the final disposition of the case. In response to question number six, Petitioner appeared to have marked both the answers “yes” and “no”, but then circled “yes.” On the second page of the application, Petitioner explained his answer to question number six, stating that he had had a real estate license ten years ago and that he had been involved with a dispute for $2,500 and lost the case. The explanation further stated that Petitioner was moving to Illinois at the time, so he voluntarily surrendered his license. On April 1, 2004, without investigating the facts to refresh his memory, Petitioner provided the requested signed letter of explanation. Subsequently, he withdrew his February application because he did not have time to deal with the ongoing questions the agency had regarding his application. Around July 13, 2004, after discussing the February 2004 application with Respondent, Petitioner submitted a revised Application for Licensure as a Mortgage Broker in the State of Florida. In response to question six, Petitioner marked “no” based on his memory that his real estate agent’s license had been “voluntarily surrendered.” Petitioner also submitted character reference letters. Additionally, Petitioner discussed with Respondent any proof of rehabilitation since the “voluntary surrender” of his real estate license. On page two of the July application, Petitioner wrote that his “only blemish” was a voluntary surrender of a real estate license in 1992. Petitioner stated, “[t]his was ‘not’ an act of moral turpitude or fraud.” In a deficiency letter dated July 28, 2004, the Office requested additional information from the Petitioner, including a signed statement explaining his side of the occurrence. On September 30, 2004, the Office received the same statement the Petitioner had previously forwarded to the Office for his February 2004 application. Petitioner again did not avail himself of the opportunity to discover the true facts surrounding the claimed surrender of his license. In the second paragraph of this explanatory letter Petitioner stated that the disciplinary action that led to surrender of his real estate license arose out of a transaction involving one of his customers who rented property to a third- party renter. Petitioner stated that the rental transaction between his customer and the third-party renter occurred in the lobby of Petitioner’s office without his knowledge or help. According to Petitioner’s, somewhat confusing, explanatory letter, the customer did not have the right to rent the house, but collected $2,500 from the renter and then left the state. Later, Petitioner discovered that the customer had closed in escrow and gained temporary occupancy of the home, thereby enabling the customer to ostensibly rent the home. Petitioner further explained that the renter sued him for the $2,500 and prevailed because the transaction took place in Petitioner’s lobby. Petitioner stated he lost the case because his attorney, Scott Hester (also his brother), was unavailable to make the closing argument and Petitioner had to do his own summation. In fact, Petitioner’s brother never represented Petitioner in the renter’s case because he did not have time to undertake the case. Petitioner did not supply the names of the people referenced in the letter because he did not remember them. As will be seen, at the time of the explanatory letter, Petitioner’s memory of the facts surrounding his license surrender is, at best, faulty. On April 19, 2005, the Office issued its Denial Letter, denying Petitioner’s application for licensure as a mortgage broker. As grounds for denial under Section 494.041(2)(c), (g), (i) and (q), Florida Statutes, the letter stated in relevant part: The Office’s background investigation and information you provided revealed the following: You answered Question #6 on your application as “no”, when it asks if you have had a license, or the equivalent, to practice any profession or occupation denied, revoked, suspended, or otherwise acted against which involved fraud, dishonest dealing, or any other act of moral turpitude. On or about May 7, 1996, the Florida Department of Banking and Finance, Division of Finance, denied your application for a license as a mortgage broker for making a material misstatement of fact on their application. On or about December 8, 1992, after the State of Florida, Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate conducted an investigation, you surrendered your license with that agency and entered into a written agreement stating that you agreed to have your license revoked. Accordingly, the Real Estate Commission did revoke your license in their meeting of January 19, 1993 effective December 8, 1992. The Investigative Report attached to the Final Order to revoke reveals that you were sued for dishonest conduct and subsequently, on March 25, 1992, ordered to pay Johannes Fruhwirt $7,800 plus post- judgment interest. This order was by the County Court of Broward County as a result of a Final Judgment, Case #9103333 CC53 and a Writ of Execution. The investigation revealed that Hester left the State of Florida without leaving word of his whereabouts. Apparently, that judgment was never satisfied. On May 14, 1991 you promised to pay $3000 to Leonard Schoenfeld when closing occurred on a home Mr. Schoenfeld was purchasing. Closing occurred shortly afterward, and you have never made that payment. On or about July 17, 1995, the State of Illinois received an Application Form to Operate as a Residential Mortgage Licensee in the name of Hester International, Inc. on which you were listed as 50% owner. You signed the “Verification” portion of that form and your signature was notarized on June 20, 1995 indicating that you verified as being true all data entered onto that form. However, you responded “N/A” to Part III, Question #10 which asks that you list all licenses which you or your firm have applied for and been denied and/or any and all licenses issued to you or your firm which were subsequently suspended or revoked. You therefore failed to disclose the revocation of your license with the Florida Division of Real Estate that occurred in 1992. On the same application filed with the State of Illinois, in response to Part III, question 19(m), you did not disclose that a judgment had been entered against you on grounds of fraud, misrepresentation, or deceit. The renewal for Hester International Inc., with the State of Illinois, states under the section labeled, “Averment of License” in item “s” that the licensee will advise the Commissioner in writing of any changes to the information submitted on the most recent application for license within 30 days of said change. The State of Illinois reports that you never disclosed the denial of a mortgage broker license in 1996 with the State of Florida . (i) On November 18, 2004 in an electronic filing for corporation reinstatement for Hester International, Inc., you certified that as Registered Agent you maintained an office at 6278 N. Federal Highway, Suite #305 in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida. In fact, that address is a mail drop leased to one Carl Thames, CPA. The signage required by Section 48.091(2), Florida Statutes, does not appear, and you and Hester International, Inc. are unknown at this location. In pre-hearing interrogatories, the Office asked Petitioner to provide more information about the transaction involving the transaction that had led to the revocation of his real estate license, including the identity of those individuals. Even though the importance of accuracy was apparent since Petitioner was now in litigation, Petitioner, again, without investigating the facts and relying solely on his improving memory answered the interrogatories posed to him. In his answers, Petitioner identified the “customer” who had collected the money as Leonard Schoenfeld and the “renter” as Johannes Fruhwirt. Petitioner went on, in his answers, to describe the transaction with Mr. Schoenfeld and Mr. Fruhwirt. This description is similar to the explanation offered in the explanatory letters supplied for his earlier applications. In his response to Requests for Admissions, Petitioner denied that in May of 1991 he acted as a real estate broker in the auction of a home located at 14884 Equestrian Way in Wellington, Palm Beach County, Florida, and that he had been unable to deliver a mortgage at an agreed interest rate. Petitioner also denied that he had agreed to pay $3,000 for closing costs as deferred interest payments. Despite these denials, Petitioner admitted that he had signed an agreement to pay $3,000 to Mr. Schoenfeld. Petitioner explained these denials by claiming that these funds were never due because the agreement to pay $3,000 was contingent on closing. Since the real estate deal never closed, the $3,000 was never due. At his July 15, 2005, deposition, Petitioner essentially reaffirmed the inaccurate account of events in his interrogatory answers. At the deposition, Petitioner was asked to review documents related to the Schoenfeld transaction. Those documents included: (1) a copy of the May 14, 1991, agreement wherein he agreed to pay Mr. Schoenfeld $3,000, (2) a handwritten letter wherein he agreed to pay Mr. Schoenfeld the money that he owed him, and (3) a warranty deed on property purchased by Mr. Schoenfeld. When he was shown the May 14, 1991, agreement, Respondent testified that he did not know why he would have agreed to pay Mr. Schoenfeld $3,000. Even when he was shown the deed on the property and even though he had notarized the signatures on that deed, Petitioner maintained that the deal never closed and he never owed the $3000. At hearing, Petitioner’s various and growing explanations during discovery significantly differ from his testimony. Petitioner testified that throughout his various explanations he had confused and combined several individuals into one transaction. Even though he knew that the true facts of these transactions were important to consideration of his application and in answering discovery in this case, Petitioner did not make any real attempt to refresh his memory of these transactions until shortly before the hearing. In fact, the Schoenfeld and Fruhwirt transactions involved different real estate deals and had nothing to do with each other. The Schoenfeld transaction occurred in 1991 and involved the sale of real property located at 14884 Equestrian Way in Wellington, Florida. Mr. Schoenfeld was Petitioner’s customer. As part of the transaction, Petitioner guaranteed he could get a mortgage at a certain rate. After failing to get Mr. Schoenfeld a mortgage at a certain rate, Petitioner agreed to pay Mr. Schoenfeld $3,000 upon closing. When Petitioner failed to pay Mr. Schoenfeld the $3,000 on closing, he asked Mr. Schoenfeld if he could make payments of $200 a month. In a letter to Mr.Schoenfeld, Petitioner confirmed that he would pay Mr. Schoenfeld the amount that was owed. Petitioner made two payments and then stopped making payments. In a letter dated July 1, 1991, Mr. Schoenfeld complained about his dealings with Petitioner to the Division of Real Estate. A few days before Mr. Schoenfeld’s deposition on July 25, 2005, Petitioner paid Mr. Schoenfeld $2,600. Mr. Schoenfeld accepted the payment since the money was still owed to him. However, the payment had been delayed for 14 years and did not include interest for those years. Petitioner testified that he made the payment because, once he remembered the details of the transaction, he felt morally obligated to pay Mr. Schoenfeld what he had promised. However, fulfillment of this obligation also occurred with this litigation pending and after denials that any money was due Mr. Schoenfeld. In short, Petitioner did not pay Mr. Schoenfeld the money that was due him for 14 years until Petitioner was forced to acknowledge the true facts of the Schoenfeld transaction in this litigation. The Fruhwirt transaction involved a man named Mark Ritter who was a client of Petitioner. Mr. Fruhwirt met with Mark Ritter at a house he wanted to rent. Eventually, Mr. Ritter sent him to Petitioner to complete a lease agreement. Mr. Ritter did not know about leases and said Petitioner was a friend whose real estate office could set up the lease contract. Mr. Fruhwirt met Petitioner at his real estate office. Since it was lunchtime, they went to a nearby Burger King to finalize the lease. While at Burger King, Mr. Fruhwirt paid Petitioner $2,850 on the lease. Petitioner’s testified that he did not receive any money from Mr. Fruhwirt and did not accompany Mr. Fruhwirt to Burger King. Petitioner testified that Mr. Ritter and Mr. Fruhwirt met in his lobby and both went to Burger King to finalize the lease arrangement. However, given Petitioner’s past faulty memory, Petitioner’s testimony is not credible. At some point, Mr. Fruhwirt moved into the house. Subsequently, Mr. Fruhwirt received a letter from an attorney representing the real owner demanding that he vacate the premises. Mr. Fruhwirt then discovered that Mr. Ritter was not the owner and had to hire an attorney to sort out his continued occupancy of the property. Eventually Mr. Fruwhirt bought this property. Mr. Fruhwirt sued Petitioner and the real estate office for the recovery of the $2,850 he had paid to rent the house. Petitioner was found liable, but the real estate office was found not liable because the transaction happened off its premises at Burger King. On March 25, 1992, the Broward County Court entered a judgment of $7,800 against Petitioner, finding that Petitioner had “breached his duty to disclose that Mark Ritter was not the owner of the involved property.” After Mr. Fruhwirt obtained the judgment, Petitioner declared bankruptcy. Mr. Fruhwirt pursued an adversary action in Petitioner’s bankruptcy proceedings. Subsequently, the Bankruptcy Court cited “11 U.S.C. 523 A(2) and 11 U.S.C. 523 A(4)” and refused to discharge the judgment debt. The Bankruptcy Court’s Order refusing to discharge the debt clearly conflicts with Dr. Hester’s repeated implications and statements that this debt was discharged in bankruptcy. Unable to collect from Petitioner, Mr. Fruhwirt filed with the Florida Real Estate Recovery Fund. The fund paid $2,850 to Mr. Fruhwirt and suspended Petitioner’s license. Mr. Fruhwirt used the money to defray some of his legal expenses. To date, Petitioner has not paid Mr. Fruhwirt any money on the judgment. The Fruwhirt transaction led to the revocation of Petitioner’s real estate license and, on January 19, 1993, the Florida Real Estate Commission entered a final order revoking Petitioner’s real estate license. Despite Petitioner’s testimony that he never received a copy of the documents, the certificate of service for the final order indicates it was sent to Petitioner at 1101 Hidden Cove, Salem, SC 29676, which was the address where Petitioner was living at that time. Again, Petitioner’s testimony is not credible. The Final Order referenced a December 8, 1992, agreement in which Petitioner agreed that his license would be revoked. In the December 8, 1992 agreement, entitled “Affidavit for the Voluntary Surrender of License, Registration, Certificate/Permit for Revocation,” signed by Petitioner, he agreed to the revocation of his license and to not apply for a new real estate license for ten years from the effective date of revocation. In particular, the December 8, 1992 agreement stated, “[t]he effective date of the revocation shall be upon signing this document.” Notwithstanding the clear language revoking the license, at the hearing, Petitioner maintained that because he had voluntarily surrendered his license, he did not believe his license had been revoked. In referring to the agreement he had signed, he testified that the agreement said, “that my license will be inactive, not revoked” and denied ever seeing the other documents revoking his license. This testimony is simply not credible and demonstrates Petitioner’s propensity to see or remember things in a way that is more flattering to him, irrespective of reality. The affidavit signed by Petitioner clearly stated that Petitioner’s license would be and was revoked upon signing. In 1995, Hester International applied to operate as a residential mortgage licensee in Illinois. The application identified Petitioner as the vice president and Sharon Hester as the president. Page one of the application indicated the application had to be executed “by two officers or all directors if the applicant/licensee is a corporation.” The application was signed by Petitioner and his wife. Petitioner did not disclose to Illinois that a judgment had been entered against him in Florida or that his real estate license had been revoked or suspended. Question 10 in Part III of the Application asked: “LIST ALL LICENSES WHICH YOU OR YOUR FIRM HAVE APPLIED FOR AND BEEN DENIED AND/OR ANY AND ALL LICENSES ISSUED TO YOU OR YOUR FIRM WHICH WERE SUBSEQUENTLY SUSPENDED OR REVOKED.” Petitioner responded “N/A.” (Id.). Question 19(m) in Part III of the Application asked: UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY, I(WE) STATE THAT ALL OF THE FOREGOING IS TRUE AND CORRECT TO THE BEST OF MY (OUR) KNOWLEDGE AND FURTHER STATE THAT AS THE APPLICANT/LICENSEE: . . . (m) Has not committed a crime against the law of this State, any other state or the United States, involving moral turpitude, fraudulent or dishonest dealing, and that no final judgment has been entered against it in a civil action upon grounds of fraud, misrepresentation or deceit which has not previously been reported to the Commissioner. The evidence did not demonstrate that the emphasized clauses in question 10 or the “I(WE)” in 19(m) direct such questions to individuals signing the application. One reasonable interpretation of the language is that the questions are directed to the business entity applying for the license. In short, the I(WE) language is simply language in a form meant to cover multiple types of business entities ranging from sale proprietorships to corporations. Therefore, Petitioner was not required by Illinois to disclose matters which involved him personally. To date, Illinois has not filed any disciplinary action against Petitioner or Hester International. Thus, the failure to disclose personal judgments or license actions to Illinois in a corporate application for licensure does not support a finding of dishonesty or denial of Respondent’s application at issue here. At some point, Hester International’s corporate status had to be reinstated in Florida. Petitioner reinstated the company’s corporate status in November of 2004. Petitioner filed as registered agent at 6278 North Federal Highway #305, Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Petitioner had not lived at this address for some 15 years, but had lived there for seven years with his girlfriend. The evidence showed that Petitioner simply forgot to change the registered agent’s address and was not acting dishonestly. Once he discovered his mistake, Petitioner amended his filing to reflect the appropriate address. Again, these facts do not form a basis to deny Petitioner’s license application. Finally, Petitioner testified that until Spring 2005, he and his wife were 50/50 owners of Hester International, Inc., as reflected on the application and license renewals in Illinois. In September 2004, Ms. Hester submitted Hester International, Inc.’s application for Florida licensure as a mortgage broker business. The Hester International business application was submitted after the Office had denied Petitioner’s license application in 1996 and was scrutinizing his July 2004 application. In the application, Ms. Hester identified herself as 100 percent owner of the Hester International. Petitioner did review this application, but he intentionally did not take part in its filing. The purported change in ownership was not adequately explained at hearing and appears to have been done in order to forestall any problems with licensure of the corporation due to Petitioner’s participation in the corporation. While the change of ownership is troubling, given Petitioner’s history, and also adds to the evidence that Petitioner is less than forthright in his memory and past business dealings, the change of ownership for the corporation’s licensure application does not, by itself, support a denial of Petitioner’s application. On the other hand, too many inconsistencies exist between Petitioner’s hearing testimony and his earlier accounts to conclude that Respondent can be trusted to hold a mortgage brokerage license. At worst, the evidence shows that Petitioner is not truthful or acts with integrity. At best, the evidence shows that Respondent has the ability to convince himself of facts that do not quite fit the truth, but are more flattering to him. Under either scenario, Petitioner’s appreciation of honesty, truthfulness and integrity are suspect. Neither Petitioner’s letters supporting his good character, nor his success in his ministry demonstrates sufficient rehabilitation to overcome what appears to be long-time evasive behavior. Therefore, Petitioner’s application for licensure as a mortgage broker should be denied.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: A Final Order be entered denying Petitioner’s application for licensure as a mortgage broker. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of November, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of November, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: C. Scott Hester, Esquire 13843 Longs Landing Road East Jacksonville, Florida 32225 Robert H. Schott, Esquire Gregg Morton, Esquire Department of Financial Services 200 East Gaines Street Fletcher Building, Suite 526 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0376 Carlos G. Muniz, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0307 Honorable Tom Gallagher Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Wilbur Lewis Hallock, at all times relevant thereto, was a licensed real estate broker-salesman having been issued license number 0035549 by Petitioner, Department of Professional Regulation, in 1971. He also has the designation of a Graduate of the Realtors Institute (GRI), having successfully completed its requirements. At the time the events herein occurred, Hallock was a salesman for Don Asher and Associates in Orlando, Florida. On or about August 8, 1980, Respondent, through reading the Orlando Sentinel Star, became aware of a mortgage foreclosure proceeding by Winter Park Federal Savings and Loan Association 1/ pending against James A. and Jeanie Lockwood, husband and wife, who owned a home located at 4813 and 4815 Basswood Lane, Orlando, Florida. 2/ Hallock had been told to vacate his apartment, and was in the process of finding a new home. He was "looking for a bargain" and believed he found one when he read of the Lockwoods' plight. The Lockwoods were separated at that time and only James Lockwood lived in the house on Basswood Lane. Hallock telephoned James Lockwood on Friday evening, August 8, 1980, and told him he was aware of the foreclosure proceeding and wished to meet with him to discuss a possible sale or way to avoid foreclosure proceedings. Lockwood, who was in the process of moving to Winter Haven and wished to immediately sell the property, was receptive and invited Respondent to meet with him that evening. Respondent and a lady friend (Mrs. Florence Harrison) then visited James that night. Hallock introduced himself, and showed two cards to prove his identity. Hallock made clear he did not represent his employer, Don Asher and Associates, but was simply representing himself. Although conflicting stories as to what happened during and after this first meeting were given by the various witnesses, the undersigned finds the following to be the more credible version of the sequence of events. Upon meeting Lockwood, Hallock proceeded to discuss the various alternatives available to Lockwood. These included selling the home to Hallock's brother, who lived in Miami, allowing Hallock himself to purchase the house, or simply letting the lending institution foreclose. Because the mortgage payments were in arrears and a foreclosure proceeding in progress, Lockwood offered to give the house to Hallock if he would bring the payments current. Hallock, who knew consideration for a real estate transaction was required, declined the offer and instead offered James "a minimum of $50 equity." No total purchase price was discussed since the balances on the first mortgage, and a second mortgage held by Freedom Federal Savings and Loan of Tampa, were unknown. Neither was the agreement reduced to writing. James also wished to avoid paying a commission on the sale of the house that might be due since another realtor, Area One West, Inc., held a listing. However, Hallock advised James that because Jeanie Lockwood had not signed the agreement, the listing realtor would have "no claim whatsoever." Hallock also told James that his wife needed to concur in their agreement. That same evening, Hallock telephoned Jeanie Lockwood, who resided in an apartment in Orlando. He told her he had just talked with her husband concerning a possible sale of their house, and wished to discuss the matter with her that evening. She agreed, and subsequently met Hallock and Mrs. Harrison later that evening. Also present was Jeanie's neighbor, Carol Gordon, who had been asked by Jeanie to sit in on the discussions. Hallock identified himself to the ladies, told them that he had become aware of the foreclosure proceeding by reading a newspaper, and had discussed a possible sale with the husband. He briefly described the same alternatives available to her as he had with James. When asked by Hallock whether she wished to keep the house or move into it, Jeanie stated she did not. No purchase price or equity payment was discussed that evening. However, Hallock requested Jeanie to call the two lending institutions on the following Monday morning to authorize him to ascertain the balances owed on the mortgages. He also advised her that the listing then held on the property by the other realtor was not valid because Jeanie had failed to sign the listing agreement. Hallock called James early the next morning (Saturday) and asked to meet with him. James was moving his possessions out of the home that day and told Hallock to come over right away. Upon arriving at the home, Hallock told James he had a deed prepared that conveyed the property to him and wished to have James sign it that day before he moved to Winter Haven. However, he indicated he would not record it or pay any consideration until the mortgage balances were ascertained, the chain of title checked, and final confirmation received from the Lockwoods. James agreed to meet Hallock at 10:00 a.m. that morning to sign the deed. Hallock then telephoned Jeanie and asked to meet her that morning. When they met, Hallock explained he wished her to sign the deed that day so he would not have to interrupt her work schedule during the following week. Hallock told her to meet James and himself at Wescott Realty at 10:00 a.m. to sign the papers. He also told her that "the least you will get is $100 for the house." At approximately 10:00 a.m. that morning, the Lockwoods and Hallock met at Wescott Realty in Orlando. There they executed a warranty deed conveying the property in question from the Lockwoods to Hallock (Petitioner's Exhibit 3). It was notarized by Barbara Boehmer, an employee of Wescott. Also present was Mary Black, another employee of Wescott. Prior to their signing the document, the Lockwoods were asked by Hallock if they were of legal age, were husband and wife, were under duress or threat to sign, or were subject to the influence of drugs or alcohol. Although the signing was done in a rather hasty fashion, there was no effort by Respondent to cover or conceal any portion of the document. The word "deed" was not mentioned at any time during the transaction, nor were the Lockwoods verbally advised at that time as to the nature of the document being signed. Neither was any money or other consideration exchanged. On Monday, August 11, 1980, Jeanie Lockwood called Margaret M. Norman at Winter Park Federal Savings and Loan to request the balance on the mortgage held by that institution. Mrs. Norman advised Jeanie to make the request in writing; Jeanie then prepared a letter requesting that the institution give Hallock "any information he requires regarding the foreclosure on our house at 4815 Basswood Lane." (Respondent's Exhibit 2). Hallock telephoned Jeanie on Monday evening and told her he would give her $65 equity instead of $50.00. She concurred with this amount. He also told her he was in the process of having the title checked and would not record the deed unless the title was clear. On Tuesday morning, Hallock telephoned Mrs. Norman to ascertain the balance on the mortgage held by Winter Park Federal Savings and Loan. Upon receiving preliminary information concerning the mortgage, Hallock called James in Winter Haven and advised him the wife had accepted the $65 equity offer on Monday night. The husband complained he wanted an amount closer to $100; Respondent said he would "split the difference" and upped the equity payoff to $75. The husband then gave his concurrence. At 11:43 a.m. on August 12, 1980, Hallock recorded the warranty deed signed by the Lockwoods in the Orange County Courthouse and paid $232 for documentary stamps affixed to the deed (Petitioner's Exhibit 3). He later requested and obtained from the Department of Revenue a partial refund of the stamp tax after he determined the stamp tax paid exceeded the amount actually required. After recording the deed he obtained a cashier's check in the amount of $75 and mailed it to James in Winter Haven. However, James never cashed the check and returned it to Hallock. On that same Tuesday, Jeanie called Area One West, Inc., the listing realtor, to let them know she had received foreclosure papers on the second mortgage. A salesperson told Jeanie that she had a prospective buyer for the house, and suggested they view the property that afternoon. Thereafter, two representatives of Area One West, the prospective buyer and Jeanie all met at 4815 Basswood Lane. Upon reaching the premises, they found the realtor's sign and multilock in the carport, the front door unlocked, and Hallock's car in the driveway. Inside was Hallock showing the house to a prospective buyer. Jeanie told Hallock she now had a buyer and would not sell the house for $65. Hallock told her he had bought the home, already recorded the deed she had previously signed on Saturday, and had mailed James a check for $75. Jeanie then accused Hallock of being "in cahoots" with James. On August 14, 1980, Respondent telephoned James Lockwood in Winter Haven to inquire about a lawnmower, edger and books that James had left in his house. James told Hallock to keep his books but stated he wished to keep the lawnmower and edger. During the next day or two, James came and took the lawnmower, drapes and oven racks from the house. Thereafter, Hallock called James and asked if he would swap the edger for the missing oven racks; James agreed. Hallock ultimately changed the locks on the house on Saturday, August 16, 1980. James Lockwood is a 29-year-old stockholder employed by Merrill Lynch in Winter Haven, Florida. Prior to his present employment, he worked for an Orlando automobile dealership. His wife is a secretary with the State of Florida. Although their formal education was not disclosed, James did attend college for an undisclosed period of time. Jeanie described her husband as being as honest and truthful "as the next person" but acknowledged he sometimes lied. The listing agreement with Area One West, Inc., was signed by James Lockwood and Carol Lockwood on July 3, 1980 (Petitioner's Exhibit 4). 3/ Carol is his second wife. Jeanie did not sign the agreement. The house was originally listed for $56,900 on the agreement but that figure was marked through and replaced with a figure of $49,900. Hallock purchased the house for approximately $39,600.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the complaint against Respondent Wilbur Lewis Hallock be DISMISSED. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of June, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of June, 1981.
The Issue The issue for determination in this bid protest proceeding is whether the Florida Housing Finance Corporation’s (“Florida Housing”) intended award of tax credits for the preservation of existing affordable housing developments was clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at hearing, and the entire record in this proceeding, the Findings of Fact are as follows: Parties Petitioner, Madison Point, is a Florida limited liability company and the designated applicant for funding through the RFA to construct an 85-unit development for low- income elderly persons in Pinellas County, Florida. Petitioner, American Residential Development, LLC, is the designated developer for the proposed development. Intervenor, Heritage Oaks, is a Florida limited liability limited partnership in the business of providing affordable housing. Heritage Oaks is an applicant for financing in response to the RFA to construct an 85-unit development for low-income elderly persons in Pinellas County, Florida. Intervenor, HTG Hudson, is a Florida limited liability company in the business of developing affordable housing. HTG Hudson was an applicant for financing in response to the RFA to construct an 87-unit development for low-income elderly persons in Pinellas County, Florida. However, all issues regarding HTG Hudson have been resolved pursuant to a settlement agreement which was attached as Exhibit “A” to the Joint Prehearing Stipulation. Pursuant to the settlement agreement, HTG Hudson’s application is ineligible for funding. Florida Housing is a public corporation created pursuant to section 420.504, Florida Statutes, and for the purpose of this proceeding, an agency of the State of Florida. Its purpose is to promote public welfare by administering the governmental function of financing affordable housing in Florida. Pursuant to section 420.5099, Florida Housing is designated as the housing credit agency for Florida within the meaning of section 42(h)(7)(A) of the Internal Revenue Code and has the responsibility and authority to establish procedures for allocating and distributing low income housing tax credits. Affordable Housing Tax Credits The low-income housing tax credit program (commonly referred to as “tax credits” or “housing credits”) was enacted to incentivize the private market to invest in affordable rental housing. These tax credits are awarded competitively to housing developers in Florida for rental housing projects which qualify. These credits are then normally sold by developers for cash to raise capital for their projects. The effect is that it reduces the amount that the developer would have to borrow otherwise. Because the total debt is lower, a tax credit property can (and must) offer lower, more affordable rents. Developers also covenant to keep rents at affordable levels for periods of 30 to 50 years as consideration for receipt of the tax credits. The demand for tax credits provided by the federal government exceeds the supply. Florida Housing is authorized to allocate tax credits, State Apartment Incentive Loan (“SAIL”) funding, and other funding by means of request for proposal or other competitive solicitation in section 420.507(48), and adopted Florida Administrative Code Chapter 67-60, to govern the competitive solicitation process for several different programs, including the program for tax credits. Chapter 67-60 provides that Florida Housing allocate its tax credits, which were made available to Florida Housing on an annual basis by the U.S. Treasury, through the bid protest provisions of section 120.57(3). Application Process In their applications, applicants request a specific dollar amount of housing credits to be given to the applicant each year for a period of 10 years. Applicants will normally sell the rights to that future stream of income tax credits (through the sale of almost all of the ownership interest in the applicant’s entity) to an investor to generate the amount of capital needed to build the development. The amount which can be received depends upon the accomplishment of several factors such as a certain percentage of the projected “total development cost” (total costs incurred in the completion of a development); a maximum funding amount per development based on the county in which the development will be located; and whether the development is located within certain designated areas of some counties. This, however, is not an exhaustive list of the factors considered. Tax credits are made available through a competitive application process commenced by the issuance of an RFA. An RFA is equivalent to a “request for proposal” as indicated in rule 67-60.009(3). The RFA at issue here is RFA 2016-113, Housing Credit Financing for Affordable Housing Developments Located in Broward, Duval, Hillsborough, Orange, Palm Beach, and Pinellas counties. The RFA was issued on October 28, 2016, and responses were initially due December 8, 2016. The RFA was modified on November 10, 2016, and, among other revisions, the application deadline was extended to December 30, 2016. Through the RFA, Florida Housing seeks to award up to an estimated $14,669,052 of housing credits to qualified applicants in Broward, Duval, Hillsborough, Orange, Palm Beach, and Pinellas counties. In response to RFA 2016-113, 43 applications were submitted for funding, including Madison Point and Heritage Oaks. Madison Point submitted application No. 2017-232C seeking $1,660,000 in annual allocation of housing credits to finance the construction of an 80-unit development in Pinellas County. Heritage Oaks submitted application No. 2017-201C, seeking $1,660,000 in annual allocation of housing credits to finance the construction of an 85-unit development in Pinellas County. The RFA sets forth the information required to be provided by an applicant, which includes a general description of the type of projects that will be considered eligible for funding and delineates the submission requirements. In order to be considered for funding selection, the application must meet all of the eligibility requirements set forth in the RFA. The eligibility requirements include, among other things, “[a]ll “Mandatory Items” described in section five of the RFA.” The RFA sets forth a list of mandatory items that must be included in a response including, but are not limited to, appropriate zoning, site control, development category, and occupancy status of any existing units. As part of the general development information, the RFA requires applicants to select a development category applicable to its proposed development. This is a mandatory item of the RFA. Applicants are instructed to select amongst the following categories: New Construction (where 50 percent or more of the units are new construction) Rehabilitation (where less than 50 percent of the units are new construction) Acquisition and Rehabilitation (acquisition and less than 50 percent of the units are new construction) Redevelopment (where 50 percent or more of the units are new construction) Acquisition and Redevelopment (acquisition and 50 percent or more of the units are new construction) Once disclosed in the application, the development category cannot be changed. In the RFA, “new construction” while capitalized is not a defined term. However, rule 67-48.002(98), defines “redevelopment” as follows: With regard to a proposed Development that involves demolition of multifamily rental residential structures currently or previously existing that were originally built in 1986 or earlier and either originally received financing or are currently financed through one or more of the following HUD or RD programs: Sections 202 of the Housing Act of 1959 (12 U.S.C. §1701q), 236 of the National Housing Act (12 U.S.C. §1701), 514, 515, or 516 of the U.S. Housing Act of 1949 (42 U.S.C. §1484), 811 of the U.S. Housing Act of 1937 (42 U.S.C. §1437), or have PBRA; and new construction of replacement structures on the same site maintaining at least the same number of PBRA units; or With regard to proposed Developments that involve demolition of public housing structures currently or previously existing on a site with a Declaration of Trust that were originally built in 1986 or earlier and that are assisted through ACC; and new construction of replacement structures on the same site, providing at least 25 percent of the total new units with PBRA, ACC, or both, after Redevelopment. Although the Rehabilitation Category is defined, it is not relevant for purposes of this proceeding. Additionally, the RFA requires applicants to answer whether the proposed development consists of: a) 100 percent new construction units; b) 100 percent rehabilitation units; or c) a combination of new construction units and rehabilitation units, and state the quantity of each type. This is a mandatory item of the RFA. Selection Process Florida Housing received 43 applications seeking funding in RFA 2016-113. Florida Housing’s executive director appointed a Review Committee of Florida Housing staff to evaluate the applications for eligibility and scoring and to make recommendations to Florida Housing’s Board of Directors. Pursuant to the terms of the RFA, the applications were received, processed, deemed eligible or ineligible, scored, and ranked. The Review Committee determined that, among other applicants, the applications of Heritage Oaks and Madison Point were eligible for funding. Through the ranking and selection process outlined in the RFA, Heritage Oaks was recommended to the Board of Directors to be selected for funding within Pinellas County. The Review Committee developed a chart listing its funding recommendations for the RFA to be presented to Florida Housing’s Board of Directors. On May 5, 2017, Florida Housing’s Board of Directors met and considered the recommendations of the Review Committee for RFA 2016-113. Also, on May 5, 2017 following the Board meeting, Petitioners, and all other applicants in RFA 2016-113, received notice that Florida Housing’s Board of Directors determined whether applications were eligible or ineligible for consideration for funding, and that certain eligible applicants were selected for award of tax credits. Such notice was provided by the posting of two spreadsheets, one listing the “eligible” and “ineligible” applications in RFA 2016-113 and one identifying the applications which Florida Housing proposed to fund on the Florida Housing website, www.floridahousing.org. Of the 43 applications submitted, 37 were deemed “eligible” and six were deemed “ineligible.” In that May 5, 2017, posting, Florida Housing announced its intention to award funding to seven applications, including Heritage Oaks. Madison Point was deemed eligible but not selected for funding. Madison Point timely filed a Notice of Protest and Petition for Formal Administrative Proceedings. Heritage Oaks intervened as a named party and intervention was granted. The scoring decisions at issue in this proceeding are related to Florida Housing’s decision to award funding to Heritage Oaks based on its responses regarding occupancy status and local government contribution. The RFA specifies an “application sorting order” to rank applicants for potential funding. The first consideration in sorting eligible applications for potential funding is application score. The maximum score an applicant can achieve is 28 points. In the case of a tie score, Florida Housing incorporated a series of “tie breakers” into the sorting process. The tiebreakers for this RFA, in order of applicability, are: First, by Development Category Funding Preference; Second, by a Per Unit Construction Funding Preference; Third, by a Leveraging Classification based on the amount of total Florida Housing funding per set-aside unit; Fourth, by the eligibility for the 75 or More Total Unit Funding Preference; Fifth, by satisfaction of a Florida Job Creation Funding preference, which applies a formula to reflect the estimated number of jobs created per $1 million of funding; Lastly, if necessary, by randomly assigned lottery number. The RFA set out a selection process for eligible applicants, after the sorting and ranking process outlined above. That selection process consisted of selecting the highest ranking eligible application for a proposed development in each of the following counties first: Broward, Duval, Hillsborough, Orange, Palm Beach, and Pinellas. If funding remained after those selections, then the highest ranking eligible unfunded application in Broward would be selected next. Heritage Oaks and Madison Point selected the elderly non-Assisted Living Facility (“ALF”) demographic and the proposed developments were located in Pinellas County. Florida Housing’s preliminary agency action selected Heritage Oaks for funding for Pinellas County. Heritage Oaks’ Application Heritage Oaks’ proposed development site consists of approximately 4.99 acres. Heritage Oaks’ proposed development site contains existing roads owned by Pinellas County. Heritage Oaks indicates that its proposed development site was comprised of scattered sites. There are existing housing units on Heritage Oaks’ development site. However, Heritage Oaks’ application indicates that “there are no existing units.” Heritage Oaks’ application selected “new construction” as its development category. Heritage Oaks’ proposed development involves demolition of currently-occupied, multifamily, public housing rental structures that were originally built in 1986 or earlier and either originally received financing or are currently financed through one or more of the following HUD or RD programs: Sections 202 of the Housing Act of 1959 (12 U.S.C. § 1701 q); 236 of the National Housing Act (12 U.S.C. § 1701); 514, 515, or 516 of the U.S. Housing Act of 1949 (42 U.S.C. § 1484); and 811 of the U.S. Housing Act of 1937 (42 U.S.C. § 1437). Development Category In response to the RFA requirements, Heritage Oaks selected “New Construction” as its development category. Heritage Oaks also indicated that its proposed development consists of 100 percent new construction. Mr. Evjen acknowledged that Heritage Oaks’ proposed development involves the demolition of existing structures on the proposed development site and the construction of 85 new units. Mr. Evjen explained that the proposed development includes 71 senior units in a three-story, mid-rise building, and seven duplex buildings, which would include the other 14 units on the proposed development site. The testimony at hearing indicated that at the time of the application deadline, Heritage Oaks’ proposed development did not satisfy all of the criteria set forth in the definition of redevelopment, as set forth in paragraph 18, supra. At hearing, Mr. Evjen and Ms. Blinderman testified that to qualify as redevelopment, at least 25 percent of the new units must receive Project Based Rental Assistance (“PBRA”). PBRA units are those with a rental subsidy through a contract with the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) or the Rural Development Services (formerly the Farmer’s Home Administration) of the United States Department of Agriculture. See Fla. Admin. Code Rules 67-48.002(72), (85), and (98). Heritage Oaks intends to develop the proposed development with Pinellas County Housing Authority (“Housing Authority”). At the time of the application deadline, the Housing Authority was in discussions with HUD regarding the final count, if any, of PBRA units. The lack of a resolution with HUD is beyond the authority of Heritage Oaks and remains uncertain. As of the application deadline, Heritage Oaks could not know if 25 percent of its new units would receive PBRA and, therefore, could not classify the proposed development as redevelopment. While it may be possible that Heritage Oaks’ proposed development may meet the definition of redevelopment at some point in the future, at the time of the application it did not meet the definition. At hearing, no testimony or documentary evidence was offered to establish that the proposed development currently falls within the definition of redevelopment. Respondent found this classification to be acceptable. Petitioners assert that it is reasonable that Heritage Oaks would meet the threshold to satisfy the criteria for the redevelopment category. However, it was more reasonable that Heritage Oaks would not meet the threshold and be ineligible for funding, if the redevelopment category had been incorrectly selected. Therefore, the evidence supports that it was reasonable for Heritage Oaks to identify its development project as new construction. Occupancy Status Petitioners also argue that Heritage Oaks should not be awarded funding because it failed to disclose the occupancy status of existing units on the proposed development site. In the RFA, the subheading and language for section four (A)(5)(e)(3) provides as follows: Number of Units in Proposed Development: The Applicant must indicate which of the following applies with regard to the occupancy status of any existing units: Existing units are currently occupied Existing units are not currently occupied There are no existing units The section then instructs the applicant to refer to section four (A)(5)(e) of the RFA instructions before answering the occupancy status question. The RFA instructions at section four (A)(5)(e) provide as follows: e. Number of Units in Proposed Development: The Applicant must state the total number of units. Note: The proposed Development must consist of a minimum of 50 total units. Proposed Developments consisting of 75 or more total units will be eligible for the 75 or More Total Unit Funding Preference (outlined at Section Four B.2. of the RFA). If the Elderly Demographic Commitment (ALF or Non- ALF) is selected at question 2.b. of Exhibit A, the proposed Development cannot exceed the maximum total number of units outlined in Item 1 of Exhibit C of the RFA. The Applicant must indicate whether the proposed Development consists of (a) 100% new construction units, (b) 100% rehabilitation units, or (c) a combination of new construction units and rehabilitation units, and state the quantity of each type. The Applicant must indicate the occupancy status of any existing units at question 5.e.(3) of Exhibit A. Developments that are tentatively funded will be required to provide to the Credit Underwriter a plan for relocation of existing tenants, as outlined in Item 2.b.(6) of the Applicant Certification and Acknowledgement form. The plan shall provide information regarding the relocation site; accommodations relevant to the needs of the residents and length of time residents will be displaced; moving and storage of the contents of a resident’s dwelling unit; as well as the approach to inform and prepare the residents for the rehabilitation activities. In response to this RFA requirement and the cited RFA Instructions concerning Occupancy Status, Heritage Oaks indicated that “there are no existing units” in its proposed development. However, Mr. Evjen testified that there were existing units on the development site as of the application deadline and some of those units were occupied. Heritage Oaks pointed out that a review of the RFA reflects that it is organized in an outline format with headings and subheadings. For example, section four concerns information to be provided in the application. Section four A(5) then requests general development information. Section four (A)(5)(e) requests information concerning the number of units in the proposed development. Mr. Evjen further testified that, based on review of the RFA and the instructions, Heritage Oaks took a three-step approach in responding to the occupancy status question. Heritage Oaks properly answered the first two questions. First, Heritage Oaks provided the total number of units as 85. Second, Heritage Oaks indicated that “all 85 units would be new construction.” In the final question, Heritage Oaks considered whether any existing units would remain as a “part of its proposed development.” Because no existing units would be part of its proposed development, Heritage Oaks responded “there are no existing units” in its proposed development. However, the term “proposed” was not used in question 5.e.(3) as was the case in the prior questions in the same subsection. Mr. Evjen also testified that he read the question as “if there are rehab[ilitation] units, are they occupied? Heritage Oaks’ erroneous interpretation of the question resulted in its failure to provide an accurate answer. The question simply requested the “occupancy status of any existing units.” The question was clear and unambiguous. The parties have stipulated that there are existing housing units on the Heritage Oaks proposed development site. However, Heritage Oaks’ application indicates that there are no existing units. The representation that there were no existing units was a false statement of material fact. It is worth noting that the parties stipulated at the beginning of the hearing that there is no allegation of fraud or intentional deception. There is also no evidence in the record of intentional deception and therefore, there is no finding by the undersigned that Heritage Oaks engaged in intentional misconduct. However, whether intentional or not, Heritage Oaks’ representation of no existing units is a false statement. According to Mr. Reecy, Florida Housing asks the question regarding occupancy status of existing units because Florida Housing wants to make sure that the developer can handle the cost issues related to relocation and that the relocation needs of the existing tenants will be met. Additionally, Mr. Reecy testified that Florida Housing relies upon applicants to accurately respond to questions in the RFA because, at the time of scoring, no independent research is conducted to verify responses. Regarding a relocation plan, Heritage Oaks relies on the Declaration of Trust’s requirement to have a tenant relocation plan as a remedy for the failure to properly respond to the occupancy status question. However, the Declaration of Trust is a HUD requirement that is not controlled by Florida Housing. In fact, Mr. Evjen testified that Heritage Oaks’ co-developer was researching terminating the Declaration of Trust. Given the fact that Heritage Oaks could terminate its Declaration of Trust, the Declaration of Trust does not provide adequate assurance that the tenants in the existing housing units will be adequately relocated once Florida Housing allocates its funding. Florida Housing has a material interest in ensuring that tenants located in existing housing units are properly and adequately relocated during the development phase of any Florida Housing-funded development. Accordingly, Florida Housing’s scoring decision with regard to Heritage Oaks’ response to the occupancy status question was contrary to the terms of the RFA and clearly erroneous. Heritage Oaks is ineligible for funding under RFA 2016-113. Local Government Contribution At section four (A)(10)(b), an applicant can obtain 10 points if it can demonstrate a high level of local government interest in its project via an increased amount of local government contribution. To satisfy this requirement, an applicant must attach a properly completed and executable Florida Housing Finance Corporation Local Government Verification of Contribution-Loan Form (“loan form”). The RFA establishes a contribution threshold amount which qualifies an application for the local government area of opportunity points. The RFA defines “local government areas of opportunity” as follows: Developments receiving a high level of Local Government interest in the project as demonstrated by an irrevocable funding contribution that equals or exceeds 2.5 times the Total Development Cost Per Unit Base Limitation (exclusive of any add-ons or multipliers), as provided in Item 7 of Exhibit C to the RFA, for the Development Type committed to for the proposed Development. The minimum local government areas of opportunity funding amounts are outlined in section four A.10.b. of the RFA. A single jurisdiction (i.e., the county or a municipality) may not contribute cash loans and/or cash grants for any other proposed development applying in the same competitive solicitation in an amount sufficient to qualify as Local Government Areas of Opportunity, per the competitive solicitation. In response to this RFA requirement, Heritage Oaks submitted Attachment 15, a loan form from Pinellas County, Florida, in the amount of $551,000. Based upon the minimum local government area of opportunity funding amounts established in the RFA, this amount qualified Intervenor Heritage Oaks for 10 points. Petitioners challenge Intervenor Heritage Oaks’ loan form for two reasons. First, Petitioners opine that the face value of the commitment and the net present value included in the loan form cannot be the same amount and, therefore, a calculation error must have occurred. Petitioners rely on examples of various calculations found in the RFA. Next, Petitioners allege that the loan form was not properly signed and no final approval was given by Pinellas County. Intervenor Heritage Oaks provided a loan form from Pinellas County. The loan form committed Pinellas County to a loan in the amount of $551,000. Mr. Bussey, the individual who processed the application and award of commitment, indicated that the commitment was a loan that would be forgiven as long as certain requirements were met and kept. Mr. Bussey further indicated that there were no loan payments or interest rates associated with the loan. Accordingly, he indicated that the loan value was the net present value of the loan, which means the commitment amount and the net present value for the Pinellas County loan is the same number, $551,000. While Petitioners allege that the loan form was not appropriately signed and no final approval had occurred, the greater weight of the evidence shows otherwise. Specifically, Petitioners opine that either a resolution or some action by the Pinellas County Board of County Commissioners or the County Administrator was necessary as asserted by their witness, Mr. Banach. While Mr. Banach was critical of the loan verification form, he acknowledged that he is not an expert regarding the process for Pinellas County loan contribution and he did not process the loan application. He further acknowledged that Mr. Bussey, the individual who processed the loan, found no error with the form. The evidence shows that the loan form was executed by Charles Justice, who at the time of the loan form’s execution was the Chairman of the Pinellas County Board of County Commissioners. Mr. Bussey explained the process for approving the loan form and indicated that Mr. Justice, as Chairman, had the authority to sign the loan form. Mr. Bussey also pointed out language in the loan form which provides as follows: “This certification must be signed by the chief appointed official (staff) responsible for such approval, . . . Chairperson of the Board of the County Commissioners.” Mr. Justice is one of the designated individuals the form itself indicated is acceptable. Mr. Bussey indicated that no further approvals were necessary. At hearing, Florida Housing indicated that the loan form submitted by Heritage Oaks satisfied the requirements of the RFA and this position was not shown to be erroneous or unreasonable.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Housing Finance Corporation enter a final order rescinding the intended award to Heritage Oaks and designating Madison Point and America Residential Development, LLC, as the recipients of the funding under RFA 2016-113. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of August, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S YOLONDA Y. GREEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of August, 2017. COPIES FURNISHED: Hugh R. Brown, General Counsel Florida Housing Finance Corporation 227 North Bronough Street, Suite 5000 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (eServed) Betty Zachem, Esquire Florida Housing Finance Corporation 227 North Bronough Street, Suite 5000 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1329 (eServed) Marisa G. Button, Esquire Florida Housing Finance Corporation 227 North Bronough Street, Suite 5000 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (eServed) Michael G. Maida, Esquire Michael G. Maida, P.A. 1709 Hermitage Boulevard, Suite 201 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (eServed) Douglas P. Manson, Esquire Manson Bolves Donaldson & Varn, P.A. 1101 West Swann Avenue Tampa, Florida 33606-2637 (eServed) Paria Shirzadi, Esquire Manson Bolves Donaldson & Varn, P.A. 1101 West Swann Avenue Tampa, Florida 33606-2637 (eServed) Craig D. Varn, Esquire Manson Bolves Donaldson Varn, P.A. 204 South Monroe Street, Suite 201 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (eServed) J. Timothy Schulte, Esquire Zimmerman, Kiser, & Sutcliffe, P.A. 315 East Robinson Street, Suite 600 Orlando, Florida 32801 (eServed) Sarah Pape, Esquire Zimmerman, Kiser, & Sutcliffe, P.A. 315 East Robinson Street, Suite 600 Orlando, Florida 32801 (eServed) Maureen McCarthy Daughton, Esquire Maureen McCarthy Daughton, LLC 1725 Capital Circle Northeast, Suite 304 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (eServed) Michael P. Donaldson, Esquire Carlton Fields Jorden Burt, P.A. Post Office Drawer 190 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 500 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0190 (eServed) Kate Flemming, Corporation Clerk Florida Housing Finance Corporation 227 North Bronough Street, Suite 5000 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1329 (eServed)
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Florida Housing's proposed action to deem Madison Landing eligible for an award of housing tax credit funds, as contemplated under Request for Applications 2020-202 Housing Credit Financing for Affordable Housing Developments Located in Broward, Duval, Hillsborough, Orange, Palm Beach and Pinellas Counties ("the 2020 RFA"), is contrary to governing statutes, rules or policies, or the 2020 RFA specifications. The standard of proof is whether Florida Housing's proposed action is clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious.
Findings Of Fact Florida Housing is a public corporation organized pursuant to Chapter 420, Part V, Florida Statutes, whose address is 227 North Bronough Street, Suite 5000, Tallahassee, Florida 32301, and for the purposes of these proceedings, an agency of the State of Florida. Madison Landing is an Applicant requesting an allocation of $1,950,000 in competitive housing credits in in the 2020 RFA. Its application, 2021-021C, was deemed eligible, but was not selected for funding by Florida Housing. Madison Park is an Applicant requesting an allocation of $2,881,960 in competitive housing credits in the 2020 RFA. Its application, 2021-004C, was deemed eligible, but was not selected for funding by Florida Housing. WRDG is an Applicant requesting an allocation of $2,375,000 in competitive housing credits in the 2020 RFA. Its application, 2021-025C, was deemed eligible and was preliminarily selected for funding by Florida Housing. Florida Housing administers various affordable housing programs, including the Housing Credit Program, pursuant to Section 42 of the Internal Revenue Code (the "IRC" or "the Code") and section 420.5099, under which Florida Housing is designated as the Housing Credit agency for the State of Florida within the meaning of Section 42(h)(7)(A) of the IRC, and Florida Administrative Code Chapters 67-48 and 67-60. Florida Housing has established, by rule, a competitive solicitation process known as the Request for Applications ("RFA") to assess the relative merits of proposed developments, pursuant to chapters 67-48 and 67-60. An RFA sets forth the information required to be provided by an Applicant, which includes a general description of the type of projects that will be considered eligible for funding and delineates the submission requirements. While there are numerous references to Florida Housing's rules throughout the RFA, RFAs themselves are not adopted or incorporated by rule. Florida Housing issues many RFAs each year. Although an issued RFA may be similar to these issued in previous years, each RFA is unique. The RFA process begins when Florida Housing requests the Florida Housing Board of Directors ("the Board") to approve Florida Housing's plan for allocating its resources through the various RFAs. If the plan is approved by the Board, Florida Housing begins working on each individual RFA. Florida Housing posts draft documents to its website for public review, such as a draft of the RFA, and holds a workshop in which the RFA is discussed in detail, highlighting language that changed from the previous year. The public is given the opportunity to ask questions and submit written comments for further suggestions and/or additional edits prior to the RFA's issuance. Marisa Button, Director of Multifamily Programs for Florida Housing, credibly and persuasively testified that Questions and Answers are provided as guidance, but do not provide new requirements to override the terms of an RFA. In the event of an inconsistency between Questions and Answers and another form of guidance for applicants, Florida Housing has maintained the position that the least restrictive guidance controls. Rule 67-60.006 provides, in pertinent part, that "[t]he failure of an Applicant to supply required information in connection with any competitive solicitation pursuant to this rule chapter shall be grounds for a determination of non-responsiveness with respect to its Application." By applying, each Applicant certifies that: Proposed Developments funded under this RFA will be subject to the requirements of the RFA, inclusive of all Exhibits, the Application requirements outlined in Rule Chapter 67-60, F.A.C., the requirements outlined in Rule Chapter 67-48, F.A.C. and the Compliance requirements of Rule Chapter 67-53, F.A.C. On August 26, 2020, Florida Housing issued the 2020 RFA, proposing to provide an estimated $18,669,520 of Housing Credit Financing for Affordable Housing Developments Located in Broward, Duval, Hillsborough, Orange, Palm Beach, and Pinellas Counties. Modifications to the 2020 RFA were made on September 11 and October 12, 2020. The Application Deadline for the 2020 RFA was October 20, 2020. On or about October 20, 2020, 35 applications were submitted in response to the 2020 RFA. A Review Committee was appointed to review the applications and make recommendations to the Board. The Review Committee found 34 applications eligible and one application ineligible. Through the ranking and selection process outlined in the 2020 RFA, eight applications were recommended for funding. In accordance with the funding selection process set forth in the 2020 RFA, one application was selected from each of Duval, Palm Beach, Pinellas, Hillsborough, and Orange counties; two applications were selected from Broward County; and one application (WRDG) was selected from any of these counties. On December 4, 2020, the Board approved these recommendations. On December 17, 2020, Madison Landing timely filed a Petition for Formal Administrative Proceedings, which was referred to DOAH and assigned Case No. 21-0146BID. This petition challenged the eligibility of both WRDG and MHP FL II, LLC. On January 13, 2021, Madison Landing dismissed all of its allegations against MHP FL II, LLC. On December 17, 2020, Madison Park timely filed a Petition for Formal Administrative Proceedings, which was referred to DOAH and assigned Case No. 21-0147BID. An amended petition was filed on January 13, 2021. This petition challenged the eligibility of both WRDG and Madison Landing. On January 26, 2021, all parties entered into a Stipulation for Entry of Findings of Fact in which WRDG conceded that its application should have been found ineligible. WRDG is ineligible for funding under the 2020 RFA. With WRDG ineligible for funding, Madison Landing would be selected for funding in place of WRDG. If both WRDG and Madison Landing were found to be ineligible for funding, Madison Park would be selected for funding in place of WRDG and Madison Landing. No other Applicant selected for funding will be impacted regardless of the outcome of this case. No challenges were made to the terms of the 2020 RFA. Madison Landing's application includes an executed Applicant Certification and Acknowledgment Form, which provides, "The Applicant, the Developer and all Principals are in good standing among all other state agencies and have not been prohibited from applying for funding." The phrase "good standing among all other state agencies" is not defined; and no evidence was presented as to the definitive meaning of the phrase. No evidence was presented that Madison Landing's Principals are not in good standing with any state agency or have been prohibited from applying for funding. The 2020 RFA at Section Four A.3.a. provides that Applicants must disclose the name of the Applicant entity and provide evidence that it is legally formed: (2) The Applicant must be a legally formed entity [i.e., limited partnership, limited liability company, etc.] qualified to do business in the state of Florida as of the Application Deadline. Include, as Attachment 2 to Exhibit A, evidence from the Florida Department of State, Division of Corporations, that the Applicant satisfies the foregoing requirements. Such evidence may be in the form of a certificate of status or other reasonably reliable information or documentation issued, published or made available by the Florida Department of State, Division of Corporations. Rule 67-48.002(9) (6/23/2020), defines "Applicant" as follows: (9) "Applicant" means any person or legal entity of the type and with the management and ownership structure described herein that is seeking a loan or funding from the Corporation by submitting an Application or responding to a competitive solicitation pursuant to rule Chapter 67-60, F.A.C., for one or more of the Corporation's programs. For purposes of Rules 67-48.0105, 67-48.0205 and 67- 48.031, F.A.C., Applicant also includes any assigns or successors in interest of the Applicant. Unless otherwise stated in a competitive solicitation, as used herein, a 'legal entity' means a legally formed corporation, limited partnership or limited liability company. The 2020 RFA at Section Four A.3.c. provides that Applicants must disclose Principals of both the Applicant and Developer entities. The 2020 RFA provides in pertinent part: c. Principals Disclosure for the Applicant and for each Developer (5 points) (1) Eligibility Requirements To meet the submission requirements, upload the Principals of the Applicant and Developer(s) Disclosure Form (Form Rev. 05-2019) ("Principals Disclosure Form") as outlined in Section Three above. Prior versions of the Principal Disclosure Form will not be accepted. To meet eligibility requirements, the Principals Disclosure Form must identify, pursuant to Subsections 67-48.002(94), 67-48.0075(8) and 67- 48.0075(9), F.A.C., the Principals of the Applicant and Developer(s) as of the Application Deadline. A Principals Disclosure Form should not include, for any organizational structure, any type of entity that is not specifically included in the Rule definition of Principals. For Housing Credits, the investor limited partner of an Applicant limited partnership or the investor member of an Applicant limited liability company must be identified on the Principal Disclosure Form. Rule 67-48.002(94) defines "Principal" as follows: (94) "Principal" means: For a corporation, each officer, director, executive director, and shareholder of the corporation. For a limited partnership, each general partner, and each limited partner of the limited partnership. For a limited liability company, each manager and each member of the limited liability company. For a trust, each trustee of the trust and all beneficiaries of majority age (i.e., 18 years of age) as of the Application Deadline. Page 10 of 22. For a Public Housing Authority, each officer, director, commissioner, and executive director of the Authority. The requirement to provide evidence that the Applicant is a legally formed entity, as well as the requirement to provide a Principals for Applicant and Developer(s) Disclosure Form, are identified as "Eligibility Items." Section Five A.1. of the 2020 RFA states that "only Applications that meet all of the following Eligibility Items will be eligible for funding and considered for funding selection." Madison Landing submitted Principals of the Applicant and Developer(s) Disclosure Form(s) with its application. Both forms were approved during the Advance Review Process. On the Principals of the Applicant form, Madison Landing II, LLC, was identified as the Applicant entity. The Principals of the Applicant entity were identified as Patrick E. Law, Manager; Madison Landing II Apartments, LLC, Non-Investor Member; and Patrick E. Law, Investor Member. Madison Landing II Apartments, LLC, filed Articles of Organization for Florida Limited Liability Company with the Florida Division of Corporations on January 5, 2021, with an effective date of December 31, 2020. The 2020 RFA requires that the Applicant demonstrate that it is a legally formed entity as of the Application Deadline; however, there is no explicit requirement in the 2020 RFA that each Principal of the Applicant demonstrate that it is a legally formed entity as of the Application Deadline. Ms. Button testified that her initial view was that the failure of Madison Landing's Principal, Madison Landing II Apartments, LLC, to incorporate by the application deadline should render the application ineligible. However, upon further research, she changed her position, believing that Florida Housing was precedentially bound by a previous final order, which found that an application was eligible under similar legal and factual circumstances. The previous case, on which Florida Housing relied, was decided before Florida Housing adopted the current RFA procedures for awarding funding. Ms. Button testified, however, that while some of the processes followed during the Universal Cycle, in place at that time, were different than the RFA process, the requirements for disclosure of Principals were essentially the same. Florida Housing allows interested parties to submit written questions to be answered by Florida Housing staff for each RFA that is issued. The Question-Answer period is referenced specifically within each RFA. The following Question and Answer are posted on Florida Housing's website for RFA 2018-111: Question 12: Do the entities listed on the Principal Disclosure Form have to be active as of the stamped "Approved" date or as of the Application Deadline? Answer: As of the Application Deadline. The Applicant may upload a Principals Disclosure Form stamped "Approved" during the Advance Review Process provided (a) it is still correct as of the Application Deadline, (b) it was approved for the type of funding being requested (i.e., Housing Credits or Non-Housing Credits) The same Question and Answer above are on Florida Housing's website for RFA 2018-110; RFA 2018-112; and RFA 2018-113. The same Question and Answer, however, do not appear in Questions and Answers for the 2020 RFA at issue in this case. Although Questions and Answers from past RFAs remain on the Florida Housing website, they are discrete to the specific RFA for which they were issued. Rule 67-48.002(9) (7/2018) defines Applicant as follows: (9) "Applicant" means any person or legal entity of the type and with the management and ownership structure described herein that is seeking a loan or funding from the Corporation by submitting an Application or responding to a competitive solicitation pursuant to rule chapter 67-60, F.A.C., for one or more of the Corporations programs. For purposes of rules 67-48.0105. 67-48.0205 and 67- 48.031, F.A.C., Applicant also includes any assigns or successors in interest of the Applicant. Unless otherwise stated in a competitive solicitation, as used herein, a legal entity means a legally formed corporation, limited partnership or limited liability company with a management and ownership structure that consists exclusively of all natural persons by the third principal disclosure level. For Applicants seeking Housing Credits, the Housing Credits Syndicator/Housing Credit investor need only be disclosed at the first principal level and no other disclosure is required. The terms "first principal disclosure level" and "third principal disclosure level" have the meanings attributed to them in the definition of "Principal." Rule 67-48.002(9) (11/2011) defines Applicant as follows: (9) "Applicant" means any person or legally formed entity that is seeking a loan or funding from the Corporation by submitting an Application or responding to a request for proposal for one or more of the Corporation's programs. For purposes of Rules 67-48.0105, 67-48.0205 and 67-48031, F.A.C., Applicants also includes any assigns or successors in interest of the Applicant. Madison Park argues that Madison Landing's Principal, Madison Landing II Apartments, LLC, did not demonstrate that it was a legally- formed entity as of the Application Deadline, and therefore, Madison Landing's Principal Disclosure Form did not satisfy the 2020 RFA's requirements. Madison Park argues that Madison Landing's application should be deemed ineligible for funding as a result. Based on the weight of the credible evidence and the language of the 2020 RFA and the governing law, the undersigned finds that Florida Housing did not contravene the 2020 RFA, or any other applicable authority, through the process by which it determined that Madison Landing's application was eligible for the award.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Florida Housing Finance Corporation enter a final order: (1) finding the application of WRDG ineligible for funding; (2) finding the application of Madison Landing eligible for funding; and (3) dismissing the protest of Madison Park. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of March, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: Hugh R. Brown, General Counsel Florida Housing Finance Corporation 227 North Bronough Street, Suite 5000 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1329 Christopher Dale McGuire, Esquire Florida Housing Finance Corporation 227 North Bronough Street, Suite 5000 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1329 Maureen McCarthy Daughton, Esquire Maureen McCarthy Daughton, LLC S BRITTANY O. FINKBEINER Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of March, 2021. J. Timothy Schulte, Esquire Zimmerman, Kiser & Sutcliffe, P.A. 315 East Robinson Street Post Office Box 3000 (32802) Orlando, Florida 32801 Corporation Clerk Florida Housing Finance Corporation 227 North Bronough Street, Suite 5000 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1329 1400 Village Square Boulevard, Suite 3-231 Tallahassee, Florida 32312
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint? If so, what disciplinary action should be taken against him?
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: The Department is a state government licensing and regulatory agency. Respondent is now, and has been at all times material to the instant case, a licensed real estate salesperson in the State of Florida. He holds license number 0497295. The license is "involuntary inactive." Respondent has also held a State of Florida mortgage broker's license issued by DBF. The license had an expiration date of August 31, 1991. On or about May 31, 1989, DBF issued an administrative complaint in DBF Proceeding No. 1307-F-1-1/89 alleging that Respondent and others violated various provisions of the Florida's Mortgage Brokers Act. Not having received a request for hearing from Respondent, DBF, on January 11, 1990, prior to the expiration date of Respondent's mortgage broker's license, issued a default order finding Respondent guilty of the violations alleged in the administrative complaint and permanently revoking his license, as well as ordering him to "tender the payment of an administrative fine in the amount of fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000.00) and a payment of three thousand ($3,000.00) for cost of investigation and prosecution." On or about January 23, 1990, Respondent, through counsel, filed a Motion to Set Aside the default order. In the motion, Respondent asserted that he had "failed to request a hearing [on the administrative complaint] simply because he was not aware of same." He further contended in his Motion to Set Aside that the allegations of wrongdoing advanced in the administrative complaint were "totally erroneous." On or about January 26, 1990, before DBF had ruled upon the Motion to Set Aside, Respondent, again through counsel, appealed the default order to the district court of appeal. On or about October 31, 1991, Respondent and DBF entered into a Stipulation and Consent Agreement which provided, in pertinent part, as follows: In the interest of compromise and settlement, the Department and Reynolds agree to resolve the appeal of the Default Final Order on the following terms and conditions: Reynolds agrees to withdraw his appeal of the Default Final Order and his execution of this Stipulation and Consent Agreement shall constitute a withdrawal of the notice of appeal. Reynolds neither admits nor denies the truth of the allegations in the Complaint and Default Final Order. Reynolds agrees not to reapply for a mortgage broker license under the provisions of Chapter 494, Florida Statutes, for a period of three (3) years retroactive to January 11, 1990. Reynolds further agrees to cease and desist from any and all future violations of Chapter 494, Florida Statutes, and the rules promulgated thereunder. This Stipulation and Consent Agreement and accompanying Final Order supersede the "Default Final Order Revoking Mortgage Broker License and Registration" issued by the Department against Reynolds on January 11, 1990. The Department agrees to reduce the administrative fine imposed by the Default Final Order to One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00). Reynolds agrees to pay an administrative fine of One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) by cashier's check or money order payable to "Gerald Lewis, Comptroller, Department of Banking and Finance, Division of Finance," immediately upon execution of the Stipulation and Consent Agreement. This Stipulation and Consent Agreement is being executed solely for the purpose of resolving and settling Reynolds' appeal of the Default Final Order. . . . 8. Reynolds agrees that the accompanying Final Order, which will incorporate this Stipulation shall constitute final agency action by the Department, for which the Department may seek enforcement pursuant to Chapters 120 and 494, Florida Statutes. Reynolds further voluntarily and knowingly waives: (a) any right to an administrative hearing or issuance of a recommended order as provided by Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, and by Chapters 3-7, 28, or 22, Florida Administrative Code; (b) any right to separately stated findings of fact and conclusions of law; (c) any rights to contest in any judicial or administrative forum the validity of any term, condition, obligation, or duty created by this Stipulation or Final Order; and (d) any rights to object to or to challenge in any judicial proceeding, including, but not limited to, an appeal pursuant to Section 120.68, Florida Statutes, any aspect, provision, or requirement of the Stipulation or Final Order, based upon its content, procedure of issuance, or timeliness. . . . Respondent entered into the Stipulation and Consent Agreement and agreed "to pay an administrative fine of One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00)" and "not to reapply for a mortgage broker license under the provisions of Chapter 494, Florida Statutes, for a period of three (3) years retroactive to January 11, 1990," not because he was guilty of any wrongdoing, but simply as a matter of convenience to avoid, among other things, the expense of litigation. The Final Order incorporating the Stipulation and Consent Agreement was issued by DBF on November 5, 1991. It provided as follows: Petitioner, Department of Banking and Finance, Division of Finance ("Department"), and Respondent, Sherin V. Reynolds ("Reynolds"), having entered into the attached Stipulation and Consent Agreement last dated October 31, 1991, resolving and concluding this matter: IT IS, THEREFORE ORDERED: The Stipulation and Consent Agreement entered into by Reynolds with the Department and attached hereto is incorporated by reference as if set forth herein at length. The Department and Reynolds shall comply with all provisions of the incorporated Stipulation and Consent Agreement. This Final Order supersedes the "Default Final Order Revoking Mortgage Brokerage License and Registration and Imposing Administrative Fines" issued by the Department on January 11, 1990.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby recommended that the Commission enter a final order dismissing the instant Administrative Complaint in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 10th day of February, 1994. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of February, 1994.
The Issue Whether Herbert Lane is guilty of violation of Section 475.25(1)(a) and (2), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Herbert Lane is a registered real estate salesman. Herbert Lane was employed by International Land Services Chartered, Inc. He was paid by International Land Sales Chartered, Inc.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Officer recommends that the Florida Real Estate Commission take no action against the registration of Herbert Lane as a registered real estate salesman. DONE and ORDERED this 7th day of April 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Manuel E. Oliver, Esquire and Charles Felix, Esquire Florida Real Estate Commission 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 Herbert Lane 3890 Swenson Apts. No. 503 Las Vegas, Nevada 89109 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION, Petitioner, vs. CASE NO. 77-208 PROGRESS DOCKET HERBERT LANE, NO. 2960 DADE COUNTY Respondent. /
The Issue The issue in the proceeding was whether the Respondents violated various provisions of Florida Statutes regulating the real estate profession by failing to return a $2,000.00 deposit, failing to notify the Florida Real Estate Commission of a deposit dispute, and failing to maintain the deposit in a trust account or other proper depository.
Findings Of Fact The following findings are facts stipulated by the parties in their Prehearing Stipulation filed on March 31, 1986 That Petitioner is a state government licensing and regulatory agency charged [w]ith the responsibility and duty to prosecute Administrative Complaints pursuant to the laws of the State of Florida, in particular Section 20.30, Florida Statutes, Chapters 120, 455 and 475, Florida Statutes, and the rules promulgated thereto. That Respondent C.P. O'Sullivan is now, and was at all times material hereto, a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida having been issued license number 0144214 in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. The last license issued was as a broker, % Preferred Properties of Lee County, Inc., 311 Homestead Road, Lehigh Acres, Florida 33936. That Respondent, Preferred Properties of Lee County, Inc., is now and was at all times material hereto, a corporation licensed as a real estate broker in the State of Florida having been issued license number 0169117 in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. The last license issued was at the business address of 311 Homestead Road, Lehigh Acres, Florida 33936. At all times alleged herein, Respondent C.P. O'Sullivan was licensed as a real estate broker and sole qualifying broker and officer of Respondent Preferred Properties of Lee County, Inc. That on or about September 25, 1984, the Respondents solicited and obtained a sales contract entered into by Claretha Pinkney, as purchaser, and Elsie Barning, as seller, of certain residential property. That in connection therewith, the Respondents received in trust from Claretha Pinkney, a $2,000.00 earnest money deposit. The contract was contingent upon Claretha Pinkney obtaining a new mortgage loan. Claretha Andrews Pinkney is a school teacher for the Lee County Board of Education. In July 1984, she moved to the Lee County area from Georgia where she had also been a school teacher. (T. 20, 35). She contacted Respondent, Preferred Properties about her desire to purchase a house and began working with Kay Alcantara, a sales associate with Preferred Properties. (T-21, 85). Ray Alcantara introduced Mrs. Pinkney to C. P. O'Sullivan, who did a pre-qualification in his office. That is, he determined, through a series of questions, what price range to look for. During the pre-qualification, Ms. Pinkney gave her profession and her income, said she was from Georgia and said she owned a house in Georgia, which she rented out. She also said she had minimal liabilities. (T-99-100, 107-108). A house was found at 13 Apache Street in Lehigh Acres, and on September 25, 1984, a contract to purchase the house for $39,900.00 was executed. Mrs. Pinkney made deposits of $500.00 and $1500.00 in accordance with the contract. The contract required that she " make immediate application for a mortgage loan, or loans at a local lending institution at the prevailing rate of interest, in the amount of $35,900.00." The remaining $2,000.00 was to be due at the time of closing. (Petitioner's Exhibit #2). Claretha Pinkney applied for mortgage financing, through Columbus Mortgage Company, a Ft. Lauderdale based mortgage broker. She has relatives on the east coast who in the past had dealt with that company. (T-24-25, Respondent's composite Exhibit 2) The company did not maintain an office in Ft. Myers, but conducted business there through advertising WATTS Telephone number. (Deposition of James Gordon, P. 16). A representative of the company came over for the closings which took place in the office of Tri-County Title Company in Lee County, but the level of business never warranted opening a branch office in Ft. Myers. (Deposition of James Gordon, pp. 15-16, 20). In early November, Nancy Leclair, an employee of Columbus Mortgage Company, told Mrs. Pinkney that the company could not go forward with her application until they had verification that she had funds to close on the sale. (T. 43- 44). Mrs. Pinkney planned on using money from the Retirement System of the Georgia Board of Education but the retirement check had been sent to her prior address and was routed back to the Board of Education before it finally reached her in Florida. (T-23, 27) Mrs. Pinkney asked to have the loan application stay open while she was trying to get the funds from the Georgia Retirement System (T-45). Mrs. Pinkney told Kay Alcantara about the problem with getting the loan approved and the lost retirement check (T-27). Kay Alcantara stayed in touch with both Nancy Leclair and Mrs. Pinkney regarding the status of the loan and the retirement check. (T-89). Before November 20, Mrs. Pinkney called Kay Alcantara to say that she received a letter from the Georgia School System that her money was forthcoming but that she was eligible to leave the money in the fund and later receive benefits. If she cashed the check, she would lose her benefits. (T-86-87). The funds from the retirement system amounted to approximately $13,000.00 (T-52, 53, Respondent's Exhibit 43). On November 19, 1984, at Kay Alcantara's Suggestion, Mrs. Pinkney met with Kay, Lynn Aspinwall (the office manager) and C. P. O'Sullivan in Mr. O'Sullivan's office. Mrs. Pinkney informed the realtors that she did not wish to go through with the deal, that she didn't want to lose her retirement benefits and did not want to take the money out of the Georgia Retirement System. Mr. O'Sullivan told her that if she didn't want the house she would lose the $2,000.00 deposit and she should think about it overnight. If she still felt the same way, she could come in the next day and sign a release of the deposit. (T-87, 104-105). On November 20, 1984, Mrs. Pinkney returned to the office and signed the agreement forfeiting her binder deposit of $2,000.00. (T-33, Petitioner's Exhibit #4). At no time prior to, or including that date, did she ask to have her deposit returned. (T-105). On the same date, November 20, 1984, Mrs. Pinkney sent a letter to Nancy Leclair at Columbus Mortgage Company enclosing a copy of another contract for sale for an entirely different property and a different realtor. (T-57, 58, Respondents' composite Exhibit #2). This contract is dated November 4, 1984, and is for a single family residence for a total sales price of $34,900.00. Mrs. Pinkney received her Georgia Retirement fund check and on December 3, 1984, deposited it in Sun Bank/Southwest. (Respondent's Exhibit #3). She later returned the money to the retirement fund and her admitted purpose in making the deposit was to show she had sufficient funds to close and to "fake out" the lender, while waiting for some other funds to materialize. (T-62, 65). Two statements of credit denial were eventually issued by Columbus Mortgage Company. The first, dated January 15, 1985, was clearly for the Apache Street property. The second, dated January 20, 1985, describes the transaction as "First Mortgage financing for a purchase of a home." (Respondent's composite Exhibit #2, Petitioner's Exhibit #3). Neither C. P. O'Sullivan nor Preferred Properties were informed by Columbus Mortgage Company that Mrs. Pinkney's loan was turned down. (T-107, 119). Considered as a whole, the evidence in this proceeding strongly supports the inference that Claretha Pinkney reneged on her contract to purchase the Apache Street property not because she was turned down for the loan, but because she found another house that she preferred. That is why she freely signed the release for the $2,000.00. Respondents didn't know this at the time that the release was discussed and prepared; however, they knew of a different, highly credible basis for Mrs. Pinkney's rejection of the property: to qualify for the loan she would have to use her retirement money; she didn't want to use the money and lose her benefits. This knowledge was sufficient for the Respondents' reasonable and justifiable belief that Mrs. Pinkney was not entitled to return of her deposit.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is, therefore RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered dismissing all counts of the Administrative Complaint. DONE and ORDERED this 13th day of May, 1986, in MARY W. CLARK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of May, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Harold Huff, Executive Director Division of Real Estate 400 W. Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32802 James Gillis, Esquire Division of Real Estate 400 W. Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32802 Simon M. Harrison, Esquire Perch ~ Harrison, P.A. 1820 Colonial Blvd., Ft. Myers, Florida 33907 Fred Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Salvatore A. Carpino, Esquire Department of Professional Regulationff 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to subsection 120.59(2), Florida Statutes on all of the proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. Rulings on Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Adopted in Finding of Fact #l.b. Adopted in Finding of Fact #1.c. Adopted in Finding of Fact #l.d. Adopted in Finding of Fact #1.e. Adopted in Finding of Fact #l.f. Adopted in Finding of Fact #l.g. Rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence. The finding that the loan was applied for is, however, adopted in Finding of Fact #5. Adopted in Finding of Fact #11. Adopted in Findings of Fact #7 and 8. Rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence. Rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence. Rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence. Rejected as unnecessary and, as to entitlement to the money, wholly unsupported by competent evidence. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Respondent 1. Rejected as unnecessary. ·2. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact #1-12 except 2.m and 2.0 which are unsupported by the evidence. The record does not reveal when Mrs. Pinkney attempted to claim the $2,000.00; it does establish that she did not claim the $2,000.00 before or at the time she signed a release. Rejected as a restatement of testimony rather than a finding of fact. Rejected as unnecessary.
