The Issue The issue presented for decision herein is whether or not Respondent, Walter Pressley, should be expelled as a student from the Palm Beach County Public School System.
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, documentary evidence received and the entire record compiled herein, I hereby make the following relevant factual findings. Walter Pressley, whose date of birth is August 6, 1970, was enrolled as a ninth grader at Lake Worth High School during the 1985-86 school year. On February 12, 1986, Respondent Pressley was suspended from Lake Worth Community High School for violation of Student Conduct Code 5.18 possession and selling drugs on campus. During January, 1986, Officer Jay Spencer was assigned by Lieutenant Ericson as an undercover officer and he (Spencer) was enrolled as a twelfth grade student for the Lake Worth Police Department at Lake Worth High School. On Monday, January 27, 1986, at approximately 11:40 a.m., Officer Spencer asked Respondent if he knew where he could get some "sensebud" (street name for a particular kind of marijuana). Respondent advised Officer Spencer that he did not have any on his person, but offered to take him to someone who did. Officer Spencer and Respondent attempted to locate the other student who supposedly had the sensebud but he could not be found. The time was drawing near for Officer Spencer's fifth period class to begin and he told Respondent that if he found any sensebud that he would be in his fifth period class whereupon Respondent asked him where was his fifth period class. Approximately fifteen minutes later, Respondent appeared at Officer Spencer's class and beckoned for him to come outside into the hallway. Once out in the hallway, Respondent told him that he had some sensebud. Officer Spencer and Respondent went to a bathroom located on the second floor of the south building at the school and Respondent presented a clear sandwich bag containing suspected marijuana. Officer Spencer conducted a field test of the substance which tested positive for the drug marijuana. Respondent told Officer Spencer that "he could have it for free" inasmuch as he was just establishing a business and he wanted to form a good reputation among other students and build a clientele. Officer Spencer refused to accept the suspected marijuana without payment and asked Respondent if $2.00 would cover it. Respondent agreed and Officer Spencer gave him $2.00 in U.S. currency in return for the marijuana. Officer Spencer then left the Lake Worth High School campus and returned to his home with the suspected marijuana. Once at home, Officer Spencer tested the suspected marijuana for the presence of Delta 9-THC with the Duguenois Reagent Test. After testing the suspected marijuana, it was positive for the presence of Delta 9-THC. At approximately 8:00, Officer Spencer met with Lieutenant Ericson at the Lake Worth Police Department and gave him the suspected marijuana which was thereafter placed into the evidence locker. On February 12, 1986, at approximately 9:00 a.m., Officer Spencer and Lieutenant Ericson arrested Respondent at the Lake Worth High School for the sale of 1.25 grams of marijuana. After Respondent was arrested, he was taken to the Lake Worth Police Department for processing and thereafter transported to the Division of Youth Services (DYS). Respondent was found guilty on March 25, in juvenile court, on a charge of sale and possession of a controlled substance; was placed on probation and given 50 hours of community service. (Petitioner's Exhibit 5). Richard Cahill is a guidance counselor at Lake Worth Community High School. Counselor Cahill reviewed Respondent's achievement record and noted that Respondent performed satisfactorily during his eighth grade, passing all of his classes (during the eighth grade) except math. During his first semester of ninth grade, Respondent again passed all of his classes except math. However, during the second semester, he only passed one subject and in all of his remaining classes Respondent earned F's and one incomplete grade. Once Respondent was enrolled in tenth grade, he commenced compiling a record of excessive absences and he was counseled by Counselor Cahill. Counselor Cahill spoke to Respondent's teachers who related that Respondent expended some effort during the first nine weeks of tenth grade, however, during the second semester, Respondent put forth very little effort and began to be disruptive in class. On November 1, 1983, Respondent was suspended for two days for using abusive language. On February 21, 1984, Respondent was suspended for three days for chronic tardiness. On March 27, 1984, Respondent was suspended for three days for excessively reporting tardy to class. On March 7, 1985, Respondent was suspended for seven days for being an accomplice to a robbery of another student. Finally, Respondent was initially suspended on February 12, 1986 based on the instant charge of possession and selling drugs on the campus of Lake Worth Community High School. (Petitioner's Exhibit 1). David Cantley is the principal at Lake Worth. Principal Cantley provides all students at Lake Worth with a copy of the student handbook at the beginning of each school year. Petitioner goes to great pains to advise students of the ill-effects resulting from the usage of drugs. The student handbook contains Petitioner's disciplinary procedures for the possession or sale of mood altering drugs. Petitioner considers the possession and/or selling of drugs on campus to be a serious infraction of the code of student conduct. (Student Code of Conduct, Section 5.18). Students found guilty of either possession, use or sale of drugs on campus are subject to disciplinary measures including expulsion. (Page 66, Student Handbook). Rich Mooney, an intake counselor for Youth and Family Services, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, has been involved in assisting the Respondent since March of 1985 when Respondent was charged with being an accessory to the robbery of another student at Lake Worth Community High School. Since the more recent charge of the sale and possession of marijuana while on the campus of Lake Worth Community High School, Counselor Mooney has enrolled Respondent at the Tri-Center Training and Rehabilitation Day Program (Tri- Center) which is a rehabilitation program operating Monday through Friday during the hours of 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. under the auspices of Petitioner's Alternative School System. Respondent has been enrolled at Tri-Center since he was recommended for suspension on February 12, 1986. During the first week of Respondent's enrollment at Tri-Center, he presented a few problems adjusting to the structured environment at Tri-Center, however, he is conforming and Counselor Mooney has expressed his opinion that Respondent should do well during the remainder of his enrollment at Tri-Center. Respondent's mother, Mrs. Ryna Pressley, has diligently tried to curb Respondent's disruptive conduct since he has been enrolled at Lake Worth Community High School. Her efforts appear to have failed based on the numerous suspensions of Respondent from Lake Worth commencing in November, 1983 through February, 1986.
Conclusions The School Board of Palm Beach County, Florida, has jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties thereto. The School Board of Palm Beach County, Florida, has reviewed and adopts the Hearing Officer's conclusions of law, Section 120.57(1)(b)(9), Florida Statutes, and also adopts the recommendation for expulsion but only in conformance with School Board Policy, D-5.241 (3) which states: "Expulsion prevents a student from enrolling in any school programs offered by the school system for the effective date of the expulsion." and rejects the Hearing Officer's suggestion that an alternative program be provided during expulsion. This Order may be appealed within thirty days by filing a notice of appeal with the district court of appeal. Except in cases of indigency, the court will require a filing fee and payment for preparing the record on appeal. For further explanation of the right to appeal, refer to Section 120.63, Florida Statutes (1985), and the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Respondent, Walter Pressley, is hereby expelled effective this date, from attendance from all programs of the Palm Beach County School System through the end of the 1986/87 school year. DONE AND ORDERED this 23rd day of July 1936. Louis J. Eassa Chairman School Board of Palm Beach County (SEAL) Filed with the Clerk of, the School Board this 23rd day of July, 1986. Clerk
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Respondent be expelled from the regular program at Petitioners School Board of Palm Beach County and that he be provided an education in Petitioner's alternative educational program in an appropriate school setting such as the Tri-Center Training and Rehabilitation Day Program. Recommended this 11th day of June, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of June, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Bernard Shulman, Esquire School Board of Palm Beach County 3323 Belvedere Road West Palm Beach, Florida 33402 Mrs. Ryna Pressley 2073 N.W. Second Street Boynton Beach, Florida 33435 Honorable Ralph D. Turlington Commissioner of Education The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Judith Brechner General Counsel Knott Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Thomas J. Mills Superintendent of Schools School Board of Palm Beach County 3323 Belvedere Road West Palm Beach, Florida 33402 =================================================================
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent should be dismissed from employment with Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact In 1987, Steven E. Belford, hereinafter Mr. Belford, began his employment with the Palm Beach County School Board, hereinafter School Board, as a School Police Officer. From 1991 through April 1995, Mr. Belford considered the conduct of the School Board’s employees, including supervisory and management personnel, towards him to be racially hostile. During this same time period, from 1992 through April 1995, the School Board considered the conduct of Mr. Belford towards co-workers, supervisors, superiors, and students to be inappropriate. On April 10, 1995, a meeting, which could affect Mr. Belford’s employment, was held regarding his job performance. At this meeting, Mr. Belford was represented by counsel from the Police Benevolent Association, hereinafter PBA. Also among those present at the meeting was James Kelly, Chief of the School Police for the School Board. Chief Kelly was concerned with Mr. Belford’s conduct in the performance of his duties. During this meeting, Mr. Belford described the problems that he was experiencing in the work place. After listening to Mr. Belford, Chief Kelly’s concerns extended to the safety of students, staff, and visitors at the school to which Mr. Belford was assigned. As a result of this meeting, Chief Kelly determined that Mr. Belford should and would be required to undergo a fitness for duty examination. Mr. Belford’s PBA counsel advised him to undergo the fitness for duty examination. Even though Mr. Belford’s position was that there was no basis for the examination and that it was, therefore, inappropriate, he agreed to the examination. Mr. Belford was willing to comply with whatever was required of him, even though he may not agree, to keep his job. It is undisputed that the referral of Mr. Belford for a psychological evaluation was reasonable. On April 25 and 26, 1995, Dr. Harley V. Stock performed what he referred to as the “mandatory fitness for duty examination.” In Dr. Stock’s evaluation, dated May 3, 1995,2 he stated, among other things, the following: [Mr. Belford] shows no impairment in relationship to reality. . . . there was no indication of any underlying mood disorder. . . . There is no indication of any underlying thought disorder. . . . In summary this examiner has had the opportunity to review a significant amount of collateral information regarding Mr. Belford’s employment with the Palm Beach School Police Department. It appears that he has had fluctuating reviews, particularly in areas as it relates [sic] to interpersonal interactions. When confronted with documentation, Mr. Belford always has an “excuse”. He essentially feels that most of the problems that he is currently facing are a result of racial discrimination. He takes absolutely no responsibility for his own behavior. He is overly suspicious about other people’s motives towards him. He denies any type of provocative physical action towards the students or others. He believes that he is “misunderstood”. Psychological testing reveals him to be a skeptical, suspicious, over-controlled individual who may have the propensity to lose his “temper” at times when provoked. He, however, will have no insight into this. Instead, he would rather shift the blame, and responsibility to others for any problems that he finds himself in. I find some of Mr. Belford’s explanations for his behavior, as contained in the allegations, incredible. Based on psychological testing, Dr. Stock made the following recommendations in his evaluation: Because of his current psychologic [sic] functioning, his behavior at this time cannot be predicted in terms of his interactions with students and faculty members. He obviously harbors a great deal of hostility towards others, but does not either acknowledge, or recognize it. This can lead to episodes where he may become physically assaultive at the most, or at the very least, verbally aggressive in a way that is inappropriate in a school environment. I would therefore recommend that he is temporarily Unfit For Duty and that he needs mandatory psychologic [sic] counseling. Mandatory psychologic [sic] counseling means that the School Board should be appraised [sic] of his keeping scheduled counseling appointments, and that within a reasonable time, he be re-evaluated to ascertain whether he is making any progress in psychotherapy and gaining any insight into how to both understand his behavior and to modulate his impulses. During the time of treatment, I would recommend that he not engage in any functions that would place him in the role of having any type of “police authority”. This would include coming into contact with students and administrators. However, his psychologic [sic] condition does not render him totally incapable of employment. A “light duty” position would be appropriate in which he can carry on selected roles as described by the School Board while receiving treatment. After treatment is completed, within a reasonable time, Mr. Belford should then be re-evaluated to see if indeed treatment has had any effect on him. At that juncture, a further determination can be made about his work placement. In a meeting held on May 17, 1995, the results of Dr. Stock’s evaluation were discussed with Mr. Belford who was accompanied by his PBA counsel. Mr. Belford was advised that Dr. Stock considered him to be temporarily unfit for duty. In May 1995, in accordance with Dr. Stock’s recommendations, Mr. Belford was removed from duty. He was assigned light duty in the risk management department while he underwent counseling. Mr. Belford’s psychological counseling sessions were conducted by MCC Behavioral Care. His counseling sessions began on May 18, 1995. The School Board coordinated Mr. Belford’s appointments with MCC Behavioral Care and Dr. Stock. Melinda Wong was the coordinator for the School Board. During his last counseling session with MCC Behavioral Care held on August 4, 1995, Mr. Belford and his counselor agreed that he need not return to MCC Behavioral Care for any more counseling sessions. However, the counselor did not indicate to Mr. Belford whether he should or was required to return to Dr. Stock for a final evaluation. In August 1995, a representative from Ms. Wong’s office informed Mr. Belford that his final evaluation with Dr. Stock would be conducted on August 29, 1995. Mr. Belford attended the session with Dr. Stock on August 29, 1995. Mr. Belford departed the session with the understanding that the session was for his final evaluation and that Dr. Stock would submit his final report to the School Board within the next week. However, no final determination was made by Dr. Stock regarding Mr. Belford’s fitness for duty. Dr. Stock had concerns regarding the appropriateness of the counseling provided to Mr. Belford by MCC Behavioral Care. During the month of September 1995 and subsequent months, Mr. Belford periodically inquired of Ms. Wong about the status of Dr. Stock's final determination. Each time, she informed him that no determination had been made by Dr. Stock. Mr. Belford was clearly frustrated. On October 5, 1995, Mr. Belford filed a complaint of discrimination with the Equal Opportunity Employment Commission, hereinafter EEOC, against the School Board. Finally, Dr. Stock's office contacted Ms. Wong and informed her that Dr. Stock needed to have one more session with Mr. Belford in order to make a final evaluation. Ms. Wong arranged for the session to be conducted on January 3, 1996, after Mr. Belford's Christmas vacation. On Friday, December 15, 1995, at approximately 2:40 p.m., Ms. Wong went to Mr. Belford’s workplace which was in the immediate vicinity of her workplace. She advised Mr. Belford that he needed to attend a final session with Dr. Stock on January 3, 1996, in order for Dr. Stock to prepare the final evaluation. Believing that he had attended his final session with Dr. Stock on August 29, 1995, and that Ms. Wong was not aware of the final session, Mr. Belford informed Ms. Wong that he had already completed his final session and requested that she check her records. Mr. Belford was visibly tense and upset. Ms. Wong was surprised by Mr. Belford's reaction. She interpreted Mr. Belford's conduct as refusing to attend his last session with Dr. Stock for a final evaluation. Ms. Wong departed Mr. Belford’s workplace and immediately contacted Chief Kelly. Seeking advice, Chief Kelly telephoned Louis Haddad, the School Board’s Coordinator of Employee Relations. Mr. Haddad advised Chief Kelly to immediately contact Mr. Belford and to arrange a meeting with Mr. Belford that afternoon in Mr. Haddad's office, which was in the same building. Attending the meeting would be Mr. Belford, Chief Kelly, Ms. Wong, and Mr. Haddad. Chief Kelly telephoned Mr. Belford and informed Mr. Belford that he wanted to meet with him in Mr. Haddad's office. Mr. Belford informed Chief Kelly that he was getting-off work in approximately 10 minutes at 3:00 p.m.. At that time, Chief Kelly made it clear that he was giving Mr. Belford a direct order to attend the meeting. Mr. Belford advised Chief Kelly that he wanted his counsel present at the meeting. Chief Kelly did not respond to Mr. Belford's request, but asked him if he was refusing to attend the meeting, thereby disobeying a direct order. Immediately, Mr. Belford became nervous and afraid and felt queasy in the stomach. He inquired as to the location of the meeting. Chief Kelly informed him where the meeting was being held, and they both terminated the telephone conversation. Mr. Belford was on duty when Chief Kelly gave him the direct order to attend the meeting. Mr. Belford did not refuse to attend the meeting. He intended to attend the meeting. When the telephone conversation ended, Chief Kelly had a reasonable expectation that Mr. Belford would obey the direct order and attend the meeting being held that afternoon. Shortly after the telephone conversation with Chief Kelly, Mr. Belford began recalling the events leading up to the telephone conversation, and his nervousness and queasy feeling intensified. Mr. Belford became ill and was unable to attend the meeting. He departed from his workplace without notifying anyone of his sudden illness3 and without attending the meeting. While waiting for Mr. Belford, Chief Kelly, not being aware that Mr. Belford had departed his workplace, telephoned Mr. Belford's PBA counsel and informed him of the meeting and briefly of the underlying circumstances. The PBA counsel considered the meeting appropriate and advised Chief Kelly that he would be available by telephone when Mr. Belford arrived. Immediately after leaving his office, Mr. Belford contacted his new counsel. At approximately 3:25 p.m., a representative from the office of Mr. Belford's new counsel telephoned Chief Kelly. The representative of Mr. Belford's new counsel indicated to Chief Kelly that Mr. Belford would not be attending the meeting due to his sudden illness. Chief Kelly informed the representative that Mr. Belford had disobeyed a direct order and that, among other things, Mr. Belford was relieved of duty and would be recommended for termination due to insubordination. Prior to this telephone call, Chief Kelly had no knowledge that anyone other than the PBA counsel was representing Mr. Belford. Unbeknownst to the PBA counsel and Chief Kelly, Mr. Belford had decided prior to December 15, 1995, that he no longer wanted the PBA counsel's representation and that he wanted new counsel. On Monday, December 18, 1995, the next business day, Chief Kelly received written notification from Mr. Belford's new counsel regarding the reason for Mr. Belford's failure to attend the meeting. It is undisputed that there is no right to consult an attorney before obeying a direct order of a superior officer. Furthermore, it is undisputed that obeying a direct order from a superior officer is a critical and important aspect of the responsibilities of a police officer. On December 20, 1995, Chief Kelly recommended that Mr. Belford be terminated from employment with the School Board for insubordination. Mr. Belford never had a session with Dr. Stock subsequent to August 29, 1995. It was reasonable for Mr. Belford to presume that, since he was being recommended for termination, he was not expected to attend any future session with Dr. Stock. Dr. Stock never made a final determination as to whether Mr. Belford was fit to return to duty. On January 9, 1996, a pre-termination meeting was held with Mr. Belford at which he was represented by counsel. At the meeting, Mr. Belford was notified that he was being terminated for gross insubordination. By letter dated January 26, 1996, the School Board notified Mr. Belford that he was being suspended without pay and that he was being recommended for termination due to gross insubordination. On February 23, 1996, the School Board responded to Mr. Belford's charge of discrimination filed with the EEOC. The School Police for the School Board has a written policy regarding separation from employment. The policy defines gross insubordination in section "IV. C. Suspension/Termination" as "a willful disregard or constant or continuing intentional refusal to obey a direct order, reasonable in nature and given by and with proper authority." Furthermore, section "IV. D." provides that "Employees included in a bargaining unit are subject to suspension/dismissal provisions of the collective bargaining agreement." The School Board and the Palm Beach County PBA have a collective bargaining agreement, hereinafter CBA. Article 7 of the CBA, entitled "Police Officers Bill of Rights," provides in pertinent part as follows: 7.1 All law enforcement officers employed by the School Board shall have the following rights and privileges: Whenever a law enforcement officer is under investigation and subject to interrogation by members of his agency for any reason which could lead to disciplinary action, demotion, or dismissal, such interrogation shall be conducted under the following conditions: * * * I. At the request of any law enforcement officer under investigation, he/she shall have the right to be represented by counsel or any other representative of his/her choice who shall be present at all times during such interrogation when the interrogation relates to the officer's continued fitness for law enforcement service. * * * 5. No law enforcement officer shall be discharged, disciplined, demoted, or denied promotion, transfer, or reassignment, or otherwise be discriminated against in regard to his/her employment, or be threatened with any such treatment, by reason of his/her exercise of the rights granted by this part. Article 29 of the CBA, entitled "Progressive Discipline," provides in pertinent part as follows: This Section covers actions involving oral or written warnings, written reprimands, suspensions, demotions, dismissals, or reductions in grade or pay with prejudice. Disciplinary action may not be taken against an employee except for just cause, and this must be substantiated by sufficient evidence which supports the recommended disciplinary action. * * * 8. The discipline, dismissal, demotion, and suspension of any employee shall be for just cause. Where just cause warrants such action(s), any employee may be demoted, suspended, or dismissed upon recommendation of the Chief of Police to the Superintendent of Schools. Except in cases that constitute a real immediate danger to the District or other flagrant violation, progressive discipline shall be administered as follows: Verbal warning (written notation). Written warning. Written reprimand filed in Personnel. Suspension with or without pay. Dismissal. It is inferred and a finding is made that Mr. Belford is a member of the Palm Beach County PBA and is, therefore, subject to the collective bargaining agreement.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Palm Beach County School Board enter a final order revoking the suspension and dismissal and reinstating Steven E. Belford under terms and conditions as are appropriate. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of October, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of October, 1997.
The Issue The issue for consideration in this case is whether the Cocoa Beach Woman’s Club Foundation, Inc., should be granted an exemption from Florida sales tax under the provisions of Section 212.08(7)(n), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein the Respondent, Department of Revenue, was the state agency responsible for the collection of a sales tax on goods in Florida, and for granting exemptions therefrom to appropriate agencies. The Petitioner, Cocoa Beach Woman’s Club Foundation, Inc. (Foundation) was a charitable organization granted an exemption from federal income tax under Section 501(c)(3) of the United States Internal Revenue Code. The Foundation was formed in May 1995 as a separate organization, but a part of the Cocoa Beach Woman’s Club, by members of the Club. The Foundation was established to raise funds for charitable projects and scholarships for high school graduates and the tutoring of elementary school students. Prior to the formation of the Foundation, its activities were carried out by the Cocoa Beach Woman’s Club from the Club’s founding in 1965 until the formation of the Foundation in 1995. The Foundation is headed by an elected executive officer. On October 11, 1996, Jeanne Zophi, the Foundation’s treasurer, submitted an Application For Consumer’s Certificate of Exemption from Sales and Use tax to the Florida Department of Revenue. Enclosed with the application were the previously mentioned determination of exemption from federal income tax, a statement of purpose required by the Department’s rule, the organization’s Articles of Incorporation, the most current year statement of income, a financial statement for the fiscal year ending April 30, 1996, and the Foundation’s annual financial statement dated April 30, 1997. On December 31, 1996, after review of the application, the Department of Revenue issued its Notice of Intent to Deny, alleging that, based on the information provided, it appeared that while the organization may have provided scholarship money, the funds were given directly to the students and not to the school for the school’s use. A second basis for denial was the Department’s contention that that primary purpose of the Foundation’s charitable activities was not directed toward minors, seventeen and younger. The overall purposes of the Foundation’s activities are to raise funds for the area schools’ wish lists, for Alzheimer’s Disease research and treatment, for the payment of certified teachers to provide a tutor program to students in the local elementary and middle schools, and, since 1965, for college scholarships to any high school senior from Brevard County. Each year the Foundation sponsors a contest to afford area students the opportunity to raise funds for the Foundation’s scholarship and charitable programs. The operation culminates in a Ball, a dinner dance to which tickets are also sold to the public for $35.00. The day before the Ball, the candidates turn their funds in to the Ball chairman. The candidate who raises the most money is named Queen of the Ball. The Ball expenses are paid from the funds raised by the sale of the tickets to the public, not from the money raised by the candidates. The scholarships, in the amount of $3,000 to the Queen and $1,500 to each of the others, are paid from the money raised by the candidates as supplemented by other funds supplied by the Foundation. The scholarship recipients can select their own college, and the money for the scholarship is paid by the Foundation directly to the school. The candidates are chosen from applications submitted by individuals through their respective schools. The Foundation works closely with high school counselors to publicize the opportunity and to encourage applicants. When the applications are received by the Foundation, the scholarship chairman and staff redact the names and gender of the applicants, and the selection of candidates to participate in the fund-raising portion of the procedure is based on the applicants’ SAT scores, their grades, their leadership their extra-curricular activities, and the like. By far the largest number of applicants comes from Cocoa Beach High School. Whereas the scholarship program is the largest user of qualifying funds, another program is the tutoring program wherein certified teachers are hired by the Foundation to provide necessary tutoring to appropriate students in selected public and private schools. The tutoring program is clearly a benefit to minors, and the Department so admits. In addition, each Spring, the Foundation presents a number of $50.00 government bonds, and plaques to deserving students in the Brevard County school system for academic excellence. During the 1995-1996 school season, the Foundation awarded five college scholarships totaling $6,500.00. Though at the time each check was issued, some of the recipients had reached their eighteenth birthday, the determination of recipients, and the notification to them of their selection, were made prior to their eighteenth birthday. In addition to the five scholarships, the Foundation also spent $4,210.50 on the tutor program and $943.70 for other qualifying local contributions. Taken together, the total qualifying contributions amounted to $11,654.20, which constituted 62 percent of the Foundation’s total donations during the period and which were somewhat in excess of $18,000. For the fiscal year ending April 30, 1997, the Foundation received donations totaling $50,597.38. Of that amount, $35,917 was dedicated to minors. This constituted 71 percent of the total. Respondent presented no evidence to contradict the evidence presented by the Petitioner.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Revenue enter a Final Order granting the Cocoa Beach Woman’s Club Foundation, Inc., an exemption from Florida sales tax. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of July, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6947 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of July, 1977. COPIES FURNISHED: John R. Kancilia, Esquire O’Brien, Riemenschneider, Kancilia and Lemonidis, P.A. 1686 West Hibiscus Boulevard Melbourne, Florida 32901 Kevin J. ODonnell, Esquire Department of Revenue Post Office Box 6668 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668 Linda Lettera General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Larry Fuchs Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
The Issue Whether just cause exists to suspend and terminate the employment of Respondent, a teacher, for the reasons set forth in the Administrative Complaint.
Findings Of Fact The Parties The Board is the constitutional entity authorized to operate, control, and supervise the District. Pursuant to Article IX, section 4(b) of the Florida Constitution, and section 1001.32, Florida Statutes, the District has the authority to discipline employees pursuant to section 1012.22(1)(f), Florida Statutes. Respondent began his employment with the District in November 2014. Respondent was employed as a math teacher for grades 9 through 12 at PBLHS until December 12, 2018, which was his last day in a classroom. Respondent is an experienced teacher who was trained on the proper method of interacting with students, exercising best professional judgment, and following policies, rules, and directives. Respondent completed the orientation process for new employees of the District three times. Respondent signed the District’s Code of Ethics each of the three times he received it and was aware it governed his behavior as an employee of the District. Circumstances Giving Rise to Respondent’s Discipline Respondent met former student, S.E., in Haiti in 2015 when she was approximately 15 years old. S.E. and Respondent worked on a political campaign together. While in Haiti, Respondent became friendly with S.E. and her family. Respondent was aware that S.E. was planning to come to the United States to attend high school. In 2018, while S.E. was an 11th grade student at PBLHS, Respondent was a teacher at the same school. Respondent exchanged phone numbers with S.E. so they could communicate outside of school hours. Respondent and S.E. frequently communicated outside of school hours between 5 p.m. and 11 p.m. by telephone and text messages in Haitian-Creole because S.E. did not speak English. According to Respondent, these conversations were primarily personal, as they had “all kind of conversation from family matter[s], from life, from a sexual content, from – you know, everything. Everything like two normal people. Any conversation that two normal people would take. It was about everything.” On or about December 3, 2018, a student reported to school staff at PBLHS that Respondent sent S.E. an inappropriate text stating, “send me a picture in your underwear.” Respondent allegedly also asked S.E. to go to a hotel with him. Detective Eulises Munoz was called to PBLHS to conduct an investigation regarding Respondent. As a part of Detective Munoz’s investigation, he conducted an audio recorded interview with S.E., with the assistance of an interpreter. As part of the investigation, Detective Munoz had the text messages between S.E. and Respondent extracted from S.E.’s phone and transcribed from Haitian-Creole to English. S.E.’s cell phone call log report revealed 48 calls and 94 messages between S.E. and Respondent between October 26, 2018, and December 4, 2018. Respondent admitted to asking S.E. on November 27, 2018, at 8:04 p.m., for “your picture while you are wearing only your underwear.” S.E. refused but instead sent a picture of herself clothed. Respondent told S.E. that she was “mistreating” him because she would not send a naked picture of herself to him. At the final hearing, Respondent admitted that he was aware that it was against Board policy to have asked S.E. for a photograph of her in her underwear while she was a student at PBLHS and he was a teacher at the same school. The investigation also revealed that on December 4, 2018, Respondent told S.E. that she was having headaches because she was not having sex and then sent her an article regarding stress headaches being relieved by sex. Respondent denied asking S.E. to meet him at a hotel. Disciplinary Action After Detective Munoz completed his investigation into the text conversations between Respondent and S.E., he drafted a criminal Probable Cause Affidavit, which was ultimately forwarded to Human Resource Manager Brenda Johnson for further investigation. Ms. Johnson provided Respondent with a letter acknowledging opening an investigative file based on inappropriate interactions with a student. As of December 18, 2018, Respondent was removed from the classroom and directed to have no further contact with students. He was instead assigned to a District warehouse. Respondent was provided with a Pre-Determination Meeting (“PDM”) Notice dated March 9, 2020, signed by Vicki Evans-Pare, Director of Employee & Labor Relations, explaining to him that the investigation was concerning the allegations levied against him and that a meeting was needed to discuss the findings. Prior to the PDM, Respondent was provided with the PDM Notice, as well as a copy of the investigative file. Respondent’s PDM was held on March 13, 2020, at which time he was given the opportunity to provide a response to the allegations against him. After the PDM was completed, Ms. Johnson typed up the notes and summary from the PDM, which were provided to Respondent who was given three business days to review the documents and make any edits or revisions he felt were warranted and add any additional information relative to the investigation. Respondent did not make any changes to the PDM Summary or Notes. After Respondent’s PDM, Ms. Evans-Pare decided to have the investigative file reviewed by the Employee Investigative Committee (EIC), which found the following allegations were substantiated: Soliciting an Inappropriate Relationship with a Student; Ethical Misconduct; Failure to Exercise Best Professional Judgment; and Failure to Follow Policy, Rule, or Directive. The EIC recommendation was that Respondent’s employment be terminated despite Respondent not having any prior discipline history. The EIC proposed skipping the Progressive Discipline steps (verbal reprimand with written notation, written reprimand, and suspension) because Respondent’s inappropriate interactions with the student, his admission that he had the text conversations with the student, and his request to the student for a picture of her in her underwear posed a direct threat to the District and the student. On May 21, 2020, Respondent was notified that Dr. Donald Fennoy, II, the District Superintendent, would recommend Respondent’s termination to the Board at its June 17, 2020, meeting. Termination was the same disciplinary action that was taken against other employees who engaged in the same or similar conduct. Respondent acknowledged that “[a]lmost everybody” at PBLHS found out about the text conversations between Respondent and S.E. Respondent knew that his co-workers knew about the text conversations because people were calling him and asking him about it. Respondent’s co-workers lost confidence in him as a teacher after they learned about the text conversations between him and S.E. Respondent was also aware that S.E.’s guardians lost confidence in him as a teacher as a result of the sexual text conversations he had with S.E. Respondent acknowledged during the final hearing that his conduct was inappropriate and in violation of the Board’s policies. Respondent only contests the level of discipline (termination) as too harsh. He argued that the Board skipped intervening steps of the progressive discipline policy and claimed that his level of discipline was a result of his complaining that he was not physically capable of the work to which he was assigned in the warehouse.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Palm Beach County School Board uphold the suspension and termination of Respondent’s employment. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of March, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S MARY LI CREASY Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of March, 2021. COPIES FURNISHED: V. Danielle Williams, Esquire Palm Beach County School Board Office of the General Counsel 3300 Forest Hill Boulevard, Suite C-331 West Palm Beach, Florida 33406 Jean Marie Middleton, Esquire Palm Beach County School Board Office of the General Counsel 3300 Forest Hill Boulevard, Suite C-331 West Palm Beach, Florida 33406 Richard Corcoran Commissioner of Education Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1514 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Donald E. Fennoy, II, Ed.D. Superintendent Palm Beach County School Board 3300 Forest Hill Boulevard, Suite C-316 West Palm Beach, Florida 33406-5869 Jhonny Felix 5938 Ithaca Circle West Lake Worth, Florida 33463 Matthew Mears, General Counsel Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1244 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400
The Issue Whether the Petitioner is eligible for vested deferred retirement pension benefits payable by the West Palm Beach Police Pension Fund ("Fund").
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing, on the stipulation of the parties, and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Fund is a vested defined benefit pension plan created by Special Act of the Florida Legislature pursuant to Chapter 185, Florida Statutes. See Ch. 24981, Laws of Fla. (1947), as amended by Ch. 88-105, Laws of Fla. ("Fund documents").1 It is funded by contributions from its members; the City of West Palm Beach, Florida; and the State of Florida. Mr. DeLong was employed by the Police Department of the City of West Palm Beach ("Police Department") on November 26, 1979. Mr. DeLong was injured in the line of duty in or about 1987. He submitted an Application for Retirement dated May 26, 1988, under the category of "Duty Disability." Mr. DeLong retired from the Police Department effective November 17, 1988, after the Board approved his application for disability retirement benefits. At the time of his disability retirement, Mr. DeLong had service credit under the Fund of eight years, 11 months, and 21 days. Mr. DeLong received a monthly disability retirement benefit of $1,725.59. In a letter dated April 19, 1989, Mr. DeLong applied for a specialized assignment with the Police Department. He enclosed with the letter an Application for Specialized Assignment, indicating that his "requested assignment" was "helicopter flight officer," and he stated that he believed he could "perform flight operations."2 The opening for specialized assignment for helicopter patrol was advertised in the April 7, 1989, Police Department Bulletin, and the assignment was described in pertinent part as follows: "The position will be considered a Part-time Position that will utilize selected officers both during their On-Duty and Off-Duty hours. Overtime will be afforded those who work while Off-Duty." At its meeting on June 14, 1989, the Board was advised of Mr. DeLong's application for specialized assignment as a helicopter pilot. Questions arose as to whether Mr. DeLong continued to be disabled, as defined in the Fund documents, and entitled to continue receiving disability retirement benefits. In order to determine if Mr. DeLong was still disabled, the Board directed that Mr. DeLong be examined by a physician chosen by the Board "for the purpose of securing a medical opinion as to whether Mr. DeLong is physically able to perform the duties of the position being sought."3 In a letter dated June 20, 1989, Michael F. McClure, the Assistant Chief of the Police Department's Uniform Services Division, advised Mr. DeLong that he could not be considered for the helicopter patrol assignment because he was "not a full-time employee with the police department."4 Chief McClure further stated that "[i]f, at some later date, you are determined by a physician to be capable of returning to full duty, you [sic] application will be considered."5 As reflected in the minutes of the Board's meetings on August 22, 1989; November 8, 1989; and December 7, 1989; the Board was unable to conclude, on the basis of the information provided to it, that Mr. DeLong was physically capable of performing the duties of a police officer. The minutes of the December 7, 1989, meeting reflect that Mr. DeLong's attorney at the time, Scott Richardson, represented to the Board that "Dr. Stone [the physician chosen by the Board to examine Mr. DeLong] stated that while Mr. DeLong is not totally disabled that he would be limited in terms of being prevented from performing the normal duties of a Police Officer."6 The minutes also reflect that Mr. Richardson stated that "the Police Department states that due to these limitations that Mr. DeLong would not be rehired."7 The Board's attorney framed the question before the Board at the December 7, 1989, meeting as follows: "[T]he question is whether Dr. Stone's re-evaluation would warrant the Trustees determining that Mr. DeLong was no longer eligible to receive Disability Benefits." At the conclusion of its discussion of Mr. DeLong's situation, the Board voted unanimously "to accept Dr. Stone's report and to recognize that Mr. DeLong is still eligible to receive Disability Benefits." Mr. DeLong continued receiving disability retirement benefits until the Board decided to discontinue the benefits at its meeting on October 30, 1990. In or about early October 1990, the Board learned that that Mr. DeLong was employed as "a sworn Law Enforcement Officer" with the Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office.8 Mr. DeLong was advised in a letter from the Board's attorney dated October 12, 1990, that “disability retirement is payable only as long as you are totally incapacitated from performing the functions of a police officer." Mr. DeLong was asked to appear at the Board's October 30, 1990, meeting to "show cause why your disability pension should not be terminated."9 In a letter dated October 23, 1990, Mr. DeLong's attorney advised the Board's attorney as follows: "Please be advised that Mr. DeLong, effective immediately, resigns his position with the West Palm Beach Police Department and relinquishes any right that he presently has to the disability pension previously granted. This letter will obviate the need for us to appear at the [Board's] October 30, 1990, meeting."10 In a letter dated October 29, 1990, Mr. DeLong returned his disability retirement benefit check to the Fund and confirmed that he "resigned his job as a police officer and terminated my duty disability pension."11 Because Mr. DeLong began his employment with the Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office effective May 1, 1990, the Board requested that he refund the amount of $10,553.54, which represented the total amount of disability retirement benefits he received between May 1, 1990, and October 1990.12 Mr. DeLong repaid the Fund in full. Mr. DeLong was not entitled to a return of his contributions to the Fund because the amount of disability retirement benefits he received exceeded his contribution. He did, however, receive payment of $5,497.90, which was the balance in his share account as of October 1, 1989.13 Mr. DeLong submitted to the Florida Retirement System Pension Plan a form dated June 24, 2005, requesting that it verify his retirement system service credit. He noted on the form that he had been employed by the West Palm Beach Police Department from November 1979 to April 1990. Mr. DeLong sent a letter to the Fund administrator, which was received on September 29, 2008, inquiring about his eligibility for a pension, the years of service that were credited to him, and any refunds due to him. Although the record is incomplete, it appears that, between July 2009 and February 2010, the Fund's representatives were trying to determine if Mr. DeLong was entitled to vested deferred retirement benefits either upon early retirement or upon normal retirement at age 55 years. Mr. DeLong was notified that his request for vested deferred retirement benefits would be discussed at the March 12, 2010, meeting of the Fund's Board. The minutes of the Board's March 12, 2010, meeting reflect that Mr. DeLong was not present. The issue of Mr. DeLong's eligibility to receive vested deferred retirement benefits was presented to the Board, and the minutes indicate that the Board decided not to "apply any credited service to Mr. DeLong during his time of disability."14 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this proceeding and of the parties thereto pursuant to the contract between the Fund and the Division of Administrative Hearings and Sections 120.565 and 120.57(1), Florida Statutes (2010). Mr. DeLong is seeking to establish his eligibility for vested deferred retirement benefits from the Fund and, therefore, has the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. See Haines v. Department of Children & Families, 983 So. 2d 602, 605 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008)(citing Department of Banking & Fin. v. Osborne Stern & Co., 670 So. 2d 932 (Fla. 1996))(general rule is that party asserting affirmative of issue has burden of presenting evidence as to issue, as well as ultimate burden of persuasion); Florida Dep't of Transp. v. J.W.C. Co., 396 So. 2d 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); see also § 120.57(1)(j), Fla. Stat. ("Findings of fact shall be based upon a preponderance of the evidence, except in penal or licensure disciplinary proceedings or except as otherwise provided by statute "). The preponderance of the evidence standard requires proof by "the greater weight of the evidence," Black's Law Dictionary 1201 (7th ed. 1999), or evidence that "more likely than not" tends to prove a certain proposition. See Gross v. Lyons, 763 So. 2d 276, 289 n.1 (Fla. 2000)(relying on American Tobacco Co. v. State, 697 So. 2d 1249, 1254 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) quoting Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175 (1987)). At the times pertinent to this proceeding, the Fund documents defined the terms under which the Fund operated. Section (2) of the Fund documents included the following definitions, pertinent to this proceeding: "Member" or "participant" means any person who is included in the membership of the fund. * * * (k) "Police officer" means any person who is elected, appointed, or employed full-time by the city . . . . * * * "Retirant" means any member who retires with a pension from the fund. "Retirement" means a member's withdrawal from city employment with a pension payable from the fund. * * * (q) "Service," "credited service," or "service credit" means the total number of years, and fractional parts of years, of service of any police officer omitting intervening years and fractional parts of years, when such police officer was not employed by the city. . . . Section (8) of the Fund documents described the age and service requirements for retirement and provided for normal retirement, vested deferred retirement, and early retirement. Pertinent to this proceeding, "vested deferred retirement" applied to members of the Fund "with 10 or more years of credited service" who "leave the employment of the department for any reason except retirement or death." § (8)(b) of the Fund documents. If a police officer is eligible for vested deferred retirement, the police officer shall be entitled to a pension on early retirement or at the normal retirement age. Id. Mr. DeLong claims that he is entitled to a vested deferred retirement benefit because his years of active employment as a police officer with the Police Department, plus the one year, five months, and 13 days during which he received disability retirement benefits, total slightly more than 10 years. Duty disability retirement pensions are governed by the provisions of Section (11) of the Fund documents, which provided in pertinent part: (a) Retirement.--Any member who becomes physically or mentally, totally and permanently disabled to perform the duties of a police officer, by reason of a personal injury or disease arising out of and in the course of the performance of his or her duties as a police officer, in the employ of the city, shall be retired with a pension provided for in this subsection; provided, that after a medical examination of the member made by or under the direction of the medical committee, the medical committee reports to the board, in writing whether: The member is wholly prevented from rendering useful and efficient service as a police officer; and The member is likely to remain so disabled continuously and permanently. . . * * * (c) Duty disability pension benefits; disability occurs before age and service eligibility.--A member whose retirement on account of disability, as provided in paragraph (a) of this subsection, occurs prior to the date he or she would become eligible to retire under paragraph (8) hereof [normal, vested deferred, or early retirement], shall receive a disability pension The disability pension . . . shall be subject to subsection (12) hereof. Subsection (12) of the Fund documents sets forth "[c]onditions applicable to all disability retirants," and provided in pertinent part: (c) Payment of disability pensions.-- Monthly disability retirement benefits shall be payable as of the date the board determines that the member was entitled to a disability pension; . . . The last payment shall be, if the police officer recovers from the disability prior to his or her normal retirement date, the payment due next preceding the date of recovery, . . . . * * * Reexaminations of disability retirants.--At least once each year during the first 5 years following a member's retirement on account of disability, and at least once in each 3-year period thereafter, the board shall require any disability retirant who has not attained age 50 to undergo a medical examination to be made by a physician designated by the board. . . . If, upon such medical examination of such retirant, the said physician reports to the board that the retirant is physically able and capable of performing the duties of a police officer in the rank held by him or her at the time of his or her retirement, the member shall be returned to employment in the department at a salary not less than the rank held by him or her and his or her disability pension shall terminate. Credited service for disability retirant.-- In the event a disability retirant is returned to employment in the department, as provided in paragraph (e), he or she shall again become a member of the fund and the credited service in force at the time of the member's retirement shall be restored to his or her credit. If he or she retired under a duty disability as provided in paragraph (11)(a) hereof, he or she shall be given service credit for the period he or she was in receipt of a disability pension. . . . Pursuant to Section (12)(e) and (f) of the Fund documents, Mr. DeLong would have been eligible to receive service credit for the period during which he received disability retirement benefits only if it was determined that he was physically capable of performing the duties of a police officer and if he returned to employment with the Police Department. Based on the minutes of the relevant Board meetings, there was no determination by the Board that Mr. DeLong was physically capable of returning to duty as a police officer prior to its learning, in October 1990, that Mr. DeLong had been employed by the Palm Beach County Sheriff's Department since May 1, 1990. In fact, Mr. DeLong's attorney conceded at the Board's December 7, 1989, meeting that Mr. DeLong continued to have limitations on his ability to perform the normal duties of a police officer. The Board voted at that time to continue Mr. DeLong's disability retirement benefits, an implicit finding by the Board that Mr. DeLong remained totally and permanently disabled as defined in Section (11)(a) of the Fund documents. Based on the findings of fact herein, even had the Board concluded that Mr. DeLong was no longer permanently and totally disabled, the Police Department did not refuse to return him to employment. The only application for employment submitted to the Police Department by Mr. DeLong was an Application for Specialized Assignment as a helicopter pilot, which he submitted in April 1989. Mr. DeLong could not be given this "specialized assignment" because he was no longer employed as a full-time police officer by the Police Department, which employment was a prerequisite for consideration for a specialized assignment. Consequently, the Police Department could not hire Mr. DeLong for this position. Mr. DeLong contends in his proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law that his employment with the Police Department actually ended when the Police Department terminated his employment effective May 1, 1990, the day he began his employment with the Palm Beach County Sheriff's Department. To the contrary, in accordance with the definition of "retirement" in Section (2)(o) of the Fund documents, Mr. DeLong withdrew from his employment with the Police Department on November 17, 1988, the effective date of his retirement and his entitlement to disability benefits from the Fund. His purported "resignation” of his position with the Police Department on October 23, 1990, was ineffective and did not alter his termination date under the Fund documents. Based on the pertinent provisions of the Fund documents, as applied to the facts found herein, Mr. DeLong is not entitled to service credit for the period of time he received disability retirement benefits from the Fund. His service credit at the time of his retirement and withdrawal from employment with the Police Department was, pursuant to Section (2)(q) of the Fund documents, eight years, 11 months, and 21 days. Mr. DeLong has fewer than 10 years of service credit with the Police Department, and he has, therefore, failed to meet his burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he is eligible for vested deferred retirement benefits from the Fund.15
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Trustees of the West Palm Beach Police Pension Fund enter a final order finding that Michael L. DeLong did not accrue service credit during the time he received disability retirement benefits and is, therefore, not eligible for vested deferred retirement benefits. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of October, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S PATRICIA M. HART Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of October, 2010.
The Issue The issue in this proceeding is whether Respondent’s employment with Petitioner as a school treasurer II should be terminated.
Findings Of Fact Stipulated Findings of Fact The parties stipulated to the following Findings of Fact in their Joint Pre-hearing Stipulation filed on May 27, 2020: Respondent was hired by the School Board on July 22, 2003. At all times relevant to this Administrative Complaint, Respondent was employed as a school treasurer II at Diamond View Elementary School (“Diamond View”). The job description for school treasurer II provided the following performance responsibilities, among others: maintaining school internal account fiscal records; receiving all funds for school internal accounts; issuing receipts; making deposits and verifying and reconciling bank statements; maintaining budget accounts; verifying and monitoring availability of funds; encumbering accounts and adjusting account balances on receipt of actual charges; preparing, typing and verifying a variety of forms, financial and statistical reports, vouchers, departmental reports and related correspondence; and preparing reports for annual internal account audits. By statute, the School Board “shall be responsible for the administration and control of all local school funds derived by any public school from all activities or sources, and shall prescribe the principles and procedures to be followed in administering these funds consistent with regulations adopted by the State Board of Education.” § 1011.07(1), Fla. Stat. (2009). Further, “[t]he State Board of Education shall adopt rules governing the procedures for the recording of the receipts, expenditures, deposits, and disbursements of internal funds.” Id. at § 1011.07(2). During the relevant time period, Florida Administrative Code Rule 6A-1.085(1) provided as follows: Monies collected and expended within a school … are the responsibility of the school board and it shall be the duty of the school board to see that they are properly accounted for through use of generally recognized accounting procedures and effectively administered through adherence to internal funds policies of the school board, applicable Florida Statutes and provisions of “Financial and Program Cost Accounting and Reporting for Florida Schools” as incorporated by reference in Florida Administrative Code Rule 6A– 1.001. Funds collected in connection with summer program activities, funds derived from school athletic events, gifts, and contributions made by band or athletic booster clubs, civic organizations, parent-teacher organizations, and commercial agencies, and all other similar monies, properties, or benefits may be included in internal funds of the school based upon policies adopted by school districts or as provided in “Financial and Program Cost Accounting and Reporting for Florida Schools.” The Florida Department of Education’s “Financial and Program Cost Accounting and Reporting for Florida Schools,” also known as the Redbook 2001, Chapter 7, School Internal Funds, Section III – Standards Practices and Procedures, Subsection 1.4 Cash Collections and Deposits, provided, in pertinent part: All money collected by the school must be substantiated by pre-numbered receipts, consecutively numbered class receipt records, reports of monies collected, pre-numbered tickets, reports of tickets issued and sold or other auditable records; All money collected must be deposited intact to a depository as frequently as feasible and as dictated by sound business practices. IN ANY EVENT, FUNDS COLLECTED MUST BE DEPOSITED WITHIN FIVE WORKING DAYS AFTER RECEIPT; and All deposits must equal the total amount of money taken in and recorded on receipts for the period covered by the deposit. Deposit slips shall be made in the number of copies necessary to meet the approved accounting procedures. All checks received shall be deposited with a restrictive endorsement of for deposit only and specifying the account title and number. Diamond View had a drop safe, which was a secured containment device. The drop safe at Diamond View could only be opened by the principal, assistant principal, principal’s confidential secretary, and Respondent. The principal was the only person who had the full six-digit combination to the safe and could open it alone. Otherwise, the process for opening the safe at the school required two staff members, each of whom had three digits of a six-digit code. Once the safe was opened, Respondent would take the money to her office to process the dropped funds and record them for deposit. The deposits were placed in sealed bags, prepared by Respondent for the courier. The District, including Diamond View, used a Drop-Safe Log, which is a method for independent confirmation of dollar amounts that are dropped into a school’s drop safe by staff. Monies collected by school staff were to be recorded on Monies Collected Reports (“MCRs”). The MCR contains two parts, a white and yellow copy. The white copy of the MCR is turned in with the drop-off into the safe, and the yellow copy is retained by the individual who dropped the money into the drop safe. Monies accompanying MCRs were to be dropped into the drop safe daily. When dropping money and MCRs into the safe, staff were to enter the record into the Drop-Safe Log for the dollar amount dropped into the safe. During the 2009 Audit of Internal Funds for Diamond View, District auditors identified certain irregularities and money missing from the school. On January 21, 2010, District Auditor Toni Waterman (“Waterman”) reported to Diamond View to perform an exit interview regarding the Audit and an “unannounced cash count” at the school. District auditors also reported to Diamond View again the next day, January 22, 2010. District auditors conducted a review of the school’s financial records from July 1, 2009, through January 21, 2010. The District auditor general referred its findings to employee relations and to school police for investigation. Employee relations commenced an investigation that was assigned case number 09/10-063. Case number 09/10-063 was reviewed by the District’s Employee Investigation Committee (“EIC”) on October 4, 2011. The EIC found that allegations of Misuse of District Time, Property, and/or Resources; Failure to Act in Accordance with Sound Business Practices; Professional Misconduct; and Failure to Follow Policy/Rule or Directive were substantiated. The EIC’s recommendation was that Respondent’s employment be terminated. The EIC concluded that there were grounds for skipping steps of the progressive-discipline provision of the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the District and the Association of Educational Secretaries and Office Professionals (“AESOP CBA”) because Respondent’s conduct presented a real and immediate danger to the District or other flagrant violation. The school police filed an affidavit charging Respondent with Grand Theft, Organized Scheme to Defraud, and Official Misconduct on April 14, 2010. The state attorney filed criminal charges against Respondent on January 18, 2011. After a jury trial, Respondent was acquitted of the criminal charges on March 28, 2014. Additional Findings of Fact Griffin’s last day working at Diamond View was January 22, 2010. During the pertinent time period, school treasurers were also referred to as “bookkeepers.” Internal funds are funds collected at the school level. School staff who collected funds at the school could also be referred to as “sponsors.” The MCR should contain the source of the money collected, the amount collected, and should be dated with the date of collection and signed by the sponsor. Deborah Puig (“Puig”) was an internal accounts technician during the 2009-2010 school year, and her responsibilities included training incoming treasurers and supporting treasurers in place. It was never brought to Puig’s attention that she was training treasurers incorrectly. Puig also performed the duties of a school treasurer, and it was not brought to her attention that she was performing the duties of a treasurer incorrectly. Puig explained the full process that should be followed for a school treasurer from the time of removing drops from the safe until finalizing them for deposit: [The school treasurer] would retrieve the contents of the safe, which would include individual Monies Collected Reports, along with any cash, checks or coins associated with the Monies Collected Report. The Drop Safe Log would be pulled and the treasurer would take the contents of the safe, along with the Drop Safe Log, to her office to verify, to count the cash, coin, checks. [The school treasurer would] enter the cash, coin and checks into the school cash accounting system. [The school treasurer would] issue an official receipt from SchoolCash, which she would then combine at the end of verifying, entering each Monies Collected form individually and verifying the amounts individually. She would then compile the bank deposits. Prepare a series of reports that would then be kept at the school level. She would initial each Monies Collected Report at the bottom of the form. Initialing, dating and the Monies Collected Reports require a deposit number form number, that would be filled in at the bottom by the treasurer. The deposit would then be prepared by issuing a bank Deposit Ticket. Completing -- at the time we had Dunbar, so completing a Dunbar pick-up bag and dropping in the contents of the deposit into the bag. There would be a ticket on the bag that would then be pulled off, a bag number, to verify that the bag was processed at the school and then delivered to the bank. There was a Dunbar logbook that that bag was recorded into. And then the deposit in its entirety would have been dropped back into the safe until which time the Dunbar carrier came to retrieve it. The reports would then be filed in the bookkeeper’s office numerically, until which time there was an audit. … The paperwork was filed as part of their school audit, to show that the items dropped were processed, verified and intact and sent to the bank to show the audit trail. Griffin was aware of all the standards to which Puig testified, because she attended monthly training meetings for school treasurers. Griffin confirmed that she attended monthly meetings during her time as a school treasurer II, including all the monthly meetings from the period of August 2009 through January 2010. The standards were also reflected in a document entitled “NEW BOOKKEEPER TRAINING – SchoolCash.NET,” which was admitted into evidence. The school treasurer was required to maintain the paperwork associated with each deposit for five years. The accounting software used at the school was SchoolCash.net, which had been introduced into the District during the 2008-2009 school year and was fully integrated into all the District schools by the beginning of the 2009-2010 school year. As the sole treasurer at the school, Griffin was the only person responsible for preparing deposits. Griffin testified that, when she accessed the safe, she would take out everything that had been dropped into the safe. District policy and procedure were that when a bookkeeper took money out of the drop safe, the Drop-Safe Log needed to be initialed and dated. This requirement was discussed at bookkeeper trainings and meetings. It was important for there to be an indication on the Drop-Safe Log, among other reasons, as another measure of accountability for school funds. There was a section on the Drop-Safe Log that read, “Date Removed from Safe by Bookkeeper.” The column immediately next to the column labeled “Date Removed from Safe by Bookkeeper,” read “Bookkeeper’s Initials.” Whether the Drop-Safe Log was initialed and dated was something that District auditors looked for during this time period. Griffin testified that she did not understand how to use the Drop-Safe Log, including whether it was her responsibility to fill out the section “Date Removed from Safe by Bookkeeper.” According to Griffin, she sometimes initialed the Drop-Safe Log when she removed drops, while at other times she would wait until she had receipted and verified the amounts of the drops. Griffin testified that she did not know the purpose the Drop-Safe Log served during the 2009-2010 school year. District policy was that deposits should be recorded at the bank within five days of collection. In other words, from the time a school staff member filled out an MCR and dropped it into the safe, the corresponding deposit should have been recorded with the bank within five days. This was five business or working days. Puig testified that it was suggested to school treasurers that they prepare deposits more frequently, at least twice a week, since there were two pickups per week by the Dunbar armored car, so that they would always fall within the five-day rule. Puig would advise treasurers to process their deposits the day before the armored car pickup since the time of day the armored car would arrive was not known in advance. The New Bookkeeper Training similarly provided that “[t]he bank deposit will be prepared by the bookkeeper in time to meet the school’s established armored car pickup schedule.” Griffin testified that she did not know how long she had from when sponsors dropped funds to have them ready to be deposited. Griffin also testified that the only time of the school year that she would describe herself as being caught up was summertime or close to it, i.e., the end of the school year. Griffin testified that there were times when she would not be able to access the safe when the armored car arrived and a deposit was otherwise ready to be picked up. She offered her inability to access the safe as a reason a deposit might take longer than five business days to be picked up from the school. However, she did not identify specific occasions when this occurred. Further, this statement by Griffin was inconsistent with her earlier testimony that she did not know how long she had from when sponsors dropped funds to have them in the courier bag ready to be deposited. She also never complained to Principal Carolyn Seal about not being able to access the safe when the armored car arrived to pick up deposits. To the contrary, on many occasions during this time period, she would not be on campus when the armored car arrived to pick up deposits, so she would let school administrators, such as Principal Seal, know whether the deposit was ready. Finally, during the 2009-2010 school year, there were times when Griffin would inform Principal Seal that the deposit for the armored car was not ready to be picked up. Attending the monthly meetings was highly suggested for school treasurers, but not mandatory. Griffin perceived attending them to be mandatory, if her principal approved her attendance. She earned points toward a monetary award for attending these monthly meetings. During the 2009-2010 school year, Griffin also acted as a mentor to other treasurers/bookkeepers. Mentoring other bookkeepers was not a mandatory part of her job. Other bookkeepers would call and email her during the workday, and she would make time during the workday to communicate with them. Principal Seal would observe Griffin on the phone, and she would tell Principal Seal that she was mentoring other bookkeepers. During the 2009-2010 school year, Principal Seal assigned Griffin two duties in addition to her school treasurer duties: assisting in the front office for 30 minutes during lunch; and then, assisting during dismissal time with any bus issues. Griffin testified that she also had to cover for school secretaries for an additional 30 minutes after they left for the day at 3:30 p.m., since she was scheduled to work until 4:00 p.m., and whenever they were absent. The duty relating to buses at dismissal time consisted of Griffin having a walkie talkie, in her office, and being responsible for contacting the bus compound by phone if she was told that a bus did not arrive. Griffin did not have responsibilities relating to the school clinic in the 2009-2010 school year because she had informed the school administration that she was not CPR trained, which is required to serve as backup for the clinic. Griffin testified that she had responsibilities relating to fire drills that would require her to leave her office. However, there was no testimony or other evidence about how frequent fire drills were. Griffin never complained to Principal Seal that she was unable to get her work done because of other responsibilities that she had been assigned. District Auditor Waterman was a certified public accountant who was responsible for auditing the internal funds at schools during the 2009-2010 school year. Waterman’s audits concluded with an exit conference with the bookkeeper, the Student Age Child Care (“SACC”) director, and then the principal, as well as a cash count. A cash count entailed having the bookkeeper open the drop safe and take the money out that was in the safe; counting the money with the bookkeeper and tracing it to the Drop-Safe Log to make sure that the Drop- Safe Log was completed; ensuring that teachers were properly completing their portion of the documents; and confirming that the bookkeeper was doing what she was supposed to be doing. The audit that Waterman was concluding when she came to Diamond View on January 21, 2010, was for the two prior fiscal years, 2007-2008 and 2008-2009, and it had begun in November 2009. The cash count, on the other hand, would cover the time period for whatever monies collected by sponsors had been dropped into the safe when the count was conducted. For the cash count, Waterman and Griffin removed the money from the drop safe once it was opened, copied the Drop-Safe Log, and went to Griffin’s office. Waterman and Griffin had to wait between 30 and 45 minutes to get access to the drop safe. While Waterman and Griffin were counting the money from the safe, Waterman observed that there were more drops on the Drop-Safe Log than money she had pulled from the safe. When Waterman pointed this out to Griffin, she pulled bags out of her desk and stated that she had been in the middle of a deposit, and she also produced a bag of coins. She similarly testified that she had removed contents from the drop safe earlier that day and was in the process of compiling a deposit when Waterman arrived, and that she took money out in her office to give to Waterman. The bags that Griffin produced were not initialed on the Drop-Safe Log; in other words, there was no indication on the Drop-Safe Log that the money had been removed from the drop safe. Additionally, for one of the bags Griffin produced, there were no MCRs with the money in the bag. Waterman mentioned the missing MCRs to Griffin, and she answered that she had them, looked around on her desk, found three MCRs, and handed them to Waterman. The three MCRs were not all of the MCRs that were missing for that bag, however, and Waterman did not find all of the MCRs that should have been in that bag. Waterman and Griffin were together continuously from the time they took the money out of the safe, took it to her office, and counted it, and Waterman would not count money without the bookkeeper or other school staff being present. Waterman and Griffin also went to the copier to make copies of MCRs and checks. Finally, Waterman and Griffin went back to the drop safe and put the money back into the safe. Waterman did not go back into the drop safe on January 21, 2010. Waterman checked the copy room to make sure she had not left anything there. She further testified that both she and Griffin would have checked to make sure there was no money or MCRs left in the copy room. After she went home on January 21, 2010, Waterman realized that there was a drop in the amount of approximately $866 from the SACC director according to the Drop-Safe Log that she had not found when she was doing her cash count, and that there was also a portion of the Drop-Safe Log possibly missing. Waterman decided to report to Diamond View early the next day, January 22, 2010, and to have another District auditor come assist her. When Griffin arrived at Diamond View on January 22, 2010, Waterman asked her for her January deposit records, which did not reflect the SACC drop of approximately $866. Waterman asked Griffin if she could look through her inbox and the drawer in her office from where the bank bags had been produced the day before, and Griffin allowed her to do so. When looking through files in the drawer, Waterman found six white envelopes containing approximately $9,500 worth of drops, including the SACC drop for which she had been looking. According to her work papers from the time, the amount in the envelopes was $9,478.93. There was no indication on the Drop-Safe Log that the SACC drop had been removed from the drop safe. Griffin was in the office with Waterman when Waterman found the envelopes and counted their contents. Even after finding the envelopes, Waterman still did not find MCRs that she had identified as being missing the previous day. From there, Waterman’s coworker arrived at the school, and they gathered all of the money, MCRs, Drop-Safe Log, and deposit records and tried to determine what had been deposited to the bank and what they could account for with the paperwork they had. For the drops in January 2010, there were 20 entries on the Drop-Safe Log for which the auditors could not find an MCR or the money associated with it and also could not find the drops as part of a previously prepared deposit. For entries on the January Drop-Safe Log dated January 15, 2010, or later, there was no indication on the log that they had been removed from the safe by the bookkeeper. Some of those items were subsequently found that day in Griffin’s office, but three were not. For the other January entries before January 15, 2010, there was a note of “1/14” in the column “Date Removed from Safe by Bookkeeper,” for an entry dated January 5, 2010, and a line drawn through all of the boxes for entries up through January 14, 2010. Seven entries on January 13 and 14, 2010, were also initialed “KG.” For the period from January 5 through 14, 2010, 17 drops could not be located by the auditors. Two of the drops that were not located by the auditors were initialed “KG.” The other 15 drops that could not be located, had the date or line drawn through the boxes under “Date Removed from Safe by Bookkeeper.” Four of the entries that had been noted as removed on “1/14” had been noted as being dropped on January 5, 2010, meaning that more than five working days had passed without the January 5, 2010, drops being deposited. Additionally, some of the drops that had been removed on January 14, 2010, had been found in Griffin’s office on January 21, 2010. Waterman also observed that, for the deposit to the bank that had been made in January, some of the MCRs were dated in December. Her work papers reflect that multiple drops identified on the Drop-Safe Log as having been made on December 8, 2009, were not deposited to the bank until January 14, 2010. Waterman’s coworker was Susy Kay (then Susy Miller) (“Kay”), who was a senior auditor for the School Board at the time. At the time, Kay held a bachelor’s degree in accounting and was also a certified internal auditor. Kay ultimately conducted a review of the school’s financial records from July 1, 2009, through January 21, 2010. Her role was to perform financial analysis of the collection records to determine if there were missing records or missing documentation. Principal Seal was asked by the auditors to collect yellow copies of MCRs from school staff. Principal Seal provided everything she collected to the auditors. Some staff had not retained their yellow MCRs. Pages of the Drop-Safe Log before November 2009 were also missing, as in not available for review. Accordingly, only the period beginning in November 2009 was reviewed in detail. Kay’s process was to conduct a two-way analysis of the available records. First, she would work from the yellow MCR, to the Drop-Safe Log, to the deposit packet including the corresponding white MCR. Second, she would work from the bank statement to the deposit packets, to the Drop-Safe Log, to the yellow copy of the MCR. In her review, Kay was unable to confirm that the drops for certain MCRs associated with certain line items on the Drop-Safe Log were part of completed deposits. She was also unable to find a white MCR for every yellow MCR she collected. For some yellow MCRs, Kay was able to find an entry on the Drop-Safe Log, but not the white MCR. If there was an inconsistency between the amount on the MCR and the amount in the drop, Kay testified that, in most situations, the bookkeeper would make a notation on the MCR and have the staff member initial it to show the correction. Kay would look for this correction on the white copy in her analysis as an auditor, and possibly attach a copy of an email to the MCR as well. For November and December 2009, there were 26 drops from the Drop-Safe Log pages available that Kay could not trace to a deposit. Fourteen of these drops had the initials “KG” on the Drop-Safe Log. Ten of the drops had a line drawn through the box for initials under “KG.” Twelve school employees also provided sworn statements that they had, in fact, dropped funds into the drop safe as shown by MCRs they completed and, where available, their entries on the Drop-Safe Log. These sworn statements confirmed that the following drops were made as shown on the Drop-Safe Log that were found to be missing by District auditors: Elizabeth Sheppard for $27 ($15 and $12) on 1/19/10, Pet. Ex. 3, SB000025; Pet. Ex. 5, SB000160; Veronica Carner for $300 on 1/19/10, Pet. Ex. 3, SB000067; Pet. Ex. 5, SB000160; Elizabeth Sheppard for $16 on 1/5/10, Pet. Ex. 3, SB000023; Pet. Ex. 5, SB000161; Elizabeth Sheppard for $20 ($7.50 and $12.50) on 1/6/10, Pet. Ex. 3, SB000023; Pet. Ex. 5, SB000161; Elizabeth Sheppard for $18 ($14 and $4) on 1/7/10, Pet. Ex. 3, SB000023; Pet. Ex. 5, SB000161; Elizabeth Sheppard for $32 ($13 and $4 and $15) on 1/8/10, Pet. Ex. 3, SB000023; Pet. Ex. 5, SB000161; Teresa Muller for $10 on 1/11/10, Pet. Ex. 3, SB000065; Pet. Ex. 5, SB000161; Elizabeth Sheppard for $20 ($4 and $16) on 1/12/10, Pet. Ex. 3, SB000025; Pet. Ex. 5, SB000161; Veronica Carner for $195 on 1/13/10, Pet. Ex. 3, SB000067; Pet. Ex. 5, SB000161; Kaitlyn Byrne for $42 on 12/08/09, Pet. Ex. 3, SB000059; Pet. Ex. 5, SB000162; Erica Lucarelli for $6 on 12/9/09, Pet. Ex. 3, SB000057; Pet. Ex. 5, SB000162; Ellen Moore for $6 on 12/3/09, Pet. Ex. 3, SB000049; Pet. Ex. 5, SB000163; Ashley James for $5 on 11/24/09, Pet. Ex. 3, SB000018; Pet. Ex. 5, SB000164; Ellen Moore for $6 on 11/30/09, Pet. Ex. 3, SB000049; Pet. Ex. 5, SB000164; Ellen Moore for $12 on 11/19/09, Pet. Ex. 3, SB000049; Pet. Ex. 5, SB000165; Lynn Klopfer for $14.50 on 11/19/09, Pet. Ex. 3, SB000061; Pet. Ex. 5, SB000165; April Kirton for $229.25 ($177 and $52.25) on 11/20/09, Pet. Ex. 3, SB000016; Pet. Ex. 5, SB000165; Emilee Roche for $6 on 11/17/09, Pet. Ex. 3, SB000054; Pet. Ex. 5, SB000166; and (19) Tara Alm for $40.50 on 11/17/09, Pet. Ex. 3, SB000063; Pet. Ex. 5, SB000166. There were also two drops that included cash and checks. Kay was able to determine through review of bank records that the checks from these drops had been endorsed and deposited, showing that Griffin had handled the drop at some point. Griffin testified that she was responsible for preparing checks to be deposited with the bank. For those drops, however, Kay could not find the corresponding white copy of the MCR. The drops that were determined to be missing did not include the money that was found in Griffin’s office during Waterman’s cash count; that money was deposited and not included in the special review. Of the total number of drops that District auditors concluded could not be located, Kay went back after the operative events and determined that her conclusion with respect to four of the drops was in error, and they had in fact been deposited. Notably, for one of the drops, the issue had been that there was a difference of $0.25 between what was on the MCR and what Griffin recorded in SchoolCash. Griffin testified that she conducted her own review of Kay’s findings and found “about seven” errors. She did not substantiate this conclusory testimony by identifying what those errors were. Even if she had, District auditors identified 42 drops, just from the available pages of the Drop-Safe Log, that could not be traced to a bank deposit or otherwise located, excluding the four that Kay testified were in error. Griffin’s having found seven errors, even if distinct from those errors already identified by Kay, fails to excuse the District auditors’ findings about the other 35 drops. Griffin did not recall any collection of money ever missing from her office, nor she did recall reporting a collection missing from her office or reporting a collection missing that she believed should have been in the drop safe. Prior Related Discipline of Ms. Griffin Griffin received a written reprimand dated September 5, 2007, for failure to follow procedures set forth in the School District’s accounting guidelines. Specifically, for a period in 2006, there were five checks that were not entered in the school’s accounting system, but had been deposited into the school’s bank account. Respondent’s Defense to School Board Findings Griffin testified that school personnel were not trained on how to use/complete the Drop-Safe Log and personnel would often times fail to properly complete the Drop-Safe Log after making deposits into the safe. Griffin testified that use of the Drop-Safe Log was not discussed at any of the trainings she attended. While Puig testified that the Drop-Safe Log was discussed during training sessions, she was unable to confirm whether Griffin attended any specific training where the Drop-Safe Log was discussed. School Board Exhibit 4 was the “New Bookkeeper Training” packet, which was provided to school treasurers at a training session, but Puig could not unequivocally confirm that Griffin had received a copy of the packet. The greater weight of the evidence, however, supports that Griffin was a regular attendee at school treasurer trainings and most likely received all the relevant materials. This is especially true when considering, as she testified, that she helped train other school treasurers and served as a mentor to some. In any event, while the training packet mentions the Drop-Safe Log, it fails to provide specific guidance on the procedures for filing out the log by either school personnel or school treasurers. Griffin testified that she had not been trained by District staff on how to complete the Drop-Safe Log. At the time of Waterman’s arrival to perform the audit at Diamond View on January 21, 2010, Griffin was in the middle of performing a count that she was preparing for a bank deposit. Correcting teachers’ counts was something Griffin frequently had to do, as it was common for school personnel to make mistakes on their MCR forms and/or the Drop-Safe Log. While Waterman completed Griffin’s count, Griffin went about her daily activities, at times leaving Waterman alone in her office with the money for the count. The School Board alleges that pages were missing from the Drop-Safe Log, but were unable to ascertain or establish whether the missing pages were the result of Griffin’s negligence as opposed to the negligence of other school staff/personnel since the log was kept in an open area accessible to all, or the result of the negligence of Waterman who testified to having moved the documents on several occasions between Griffin’s office and the school’s copy room. Griffin did not dispute that some pages may have been missing from the Drop-Safe Log. The greater weight of the evidence supports Griffin’s mishandling of the Drop-Safe Log and any missing pages rather than shifting the responsibility for the missing pages to other District or Diamond View staff. Waterman testified that she could not definitively state that she had not misplaced or lost any of the money she was counting or any of the documents she was copying. Griffin testified that she left Waterman at the school on both January 21 and 22, 2010, when she left the school each day. The implication from this testimony was that Waterman could have misplaced or misappropriated funds. As mentioned above, such implication is not credible since Griffin did not testify that she knew the Drop-Safe Log was intact prior to Waterman’s audit. Kay’s audit contained numerous mistakes that she made in both her initial audit and several subsequent reviews. Kay acknowledged making several accounting mistakes which were brought out during Griffin’s criminal trial. Unexplained was the fact that Kay, one of the School Board’s main auditors, failed to catch her mistakes during the three years between her audit and her testimony at Griffin’s trial. Kay testified that she had reviewed her findings each time prior to being deposed and prior to testifying in Griffin’s criminal trial, yet she never realized her mistakes until Griffin’s criminal attorney brought them to her attention on cross-examination. While this behavior is evidence of sloppiness on her part, it fails to negate the substantial evidence provided by both Waterman and Kay that significant errors were made by Griffin in her accounting for funds left in her care. Additionally, Kay made several obvious mistakes in her notations on the Drop-Safe Log by consistently noting the wrong dates on the log during her audit. The evidence was clear that the School Board, namely Kay, made many obvious mistakes in performing the audit. Griffin was suspended without pay and terminated, at least in part, based on the audit containing these errors. Even after acknowledging the accounting mistakes, Kay testified that she did not amend her findings or submit a corrected audit addressing the miscalculations. As a result, the School Board knowingly retained an audit containing inaccuracies as part of its official records. There is credible evidence through the testimony of Kay that School Board officials/personnel made recording or clerical mistakes in the handling and documentation of Griffin’s investigation, which ultimately, led to her suspension without pay and termination. However, that evidence does not negate the majority of the errors and the failure to follow District procedures committed by Griffin. Griffin was suspended without pay effective November 3, 2011. Griffin’s termination from the School Board became effective November 18, 2011. Since that time, she has lost her pay, health insurance, and other benefits as a result of the suspension and termination. Griffin has experienced difficulty in securing full-time employment to replace all her lost earnings since the time of her termination by the School Board.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner, Palm Beach County School Board, enter a final order suspending Respondent, Kim Griffin, without pay and terminating her employment. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of October, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT S. COHEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of October, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Dedrick D. Straghn, Esquire Dedrick D. Straghn, Attorney & Counselor at Law 26 Southwest 5th Avenue Delray Beach, Florida 33444 (eServed) Sean Fahey, Esquire Jean Marie Middleton, Esquire School District of Palm Beach County Office of the General Counsel 3300 Forest Hill Boulevard, Suite C-331 West Palm Beach, Florida 33406 (eServed) Matthew Mears, General Counsel Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1244 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 (eServed) Donald E. Fennoy II, Ed.D., Superintendent Palm Beach County School Board 3300 Forest Hill Boulevard, C-316 West Palm Beach, Florida 33406-5869
