Conclusions An Administrative Law Judge of the Division of Administrative Hearings has entered an Order Closing File in this proceeding. A copy of the Order is attached to this Final Order as Exhibit aA.
The Issue The issue is whether the small scale development amendment adopted by Respondent, Santa Rosa County (County), by Ordinance No. 2005-R-70 on February 23, 2006, is in compliance.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: The record in this case is extremely brief, thus accounting for the brevity of this Recommended Order. Petitioners, Larry Seal and Michelle Seal, reside at 7564 East Bay Boulevard, Navarre, Florida, an unincorporated community within the County. Although Boardwalk did not present any evidence at the hearing, for background purposes only, the parties' pleadings show that Boardwalk is a limited liability corporation which owns a 1.15-acre parcel in Navarre, Florida, and is seeking to have the land use designation on that property changed from Single-Family Residential to Commercial. The pleadings also show that the amendment was adopted by the County on February 23, 2006. Mr. Seal resides within the County. Also, he attended the County meeting on February 23, 2006, and offered comments in opposition to the amendment. As such, he is an affected person and has standing to participate in this proceeding. Mrs. Seal did not attend the final hearing. However, Mrs. Seal's interests are represented by her husband. See Petitioners' Exhibit 1. Whether she owns property adjacent to Intervenor's parcel, as alleged in the Petition, and whether Mr. Seal made comments on her behalf at the County meeting, was not established through Mr. Seal's testimony. Without citing specific portions of the Plan, in their Petition, Petitioners alleged only that the small scale development amendment adopted by the County is internally inconsistent with the Plan.2 Despite this lack of specificity, no discovery was taken by the parties prior to the hearing. At the hearing, Mr. Seal, who is a lay person, asserted that the amendment was inconsistent with Housing Element Policies 51B4 and 51B5 and with undisclosed portions of the Future Land Use Element. (Copies of the Plan itself were not introduced into evidence.) However, it became evident that the two cited policies in the Housing Element relate to land development regulations and are therefore irrelevant.3 See, e.g., Brevard County v. Dept. of Community Affairs et al., DOAH Case Nos. 00- 1956GM and 02-0391GM (DOAH Dec. 16, 2002; DCA Feb. 25, 2003) 2003 Fla. ENV LEXIS 20 at *7 (consistency with land development regulations is not a compliance criterion); Robbins et al. v. Dept. of Community Affairs et al., DOAH Case No. 97-0754GM (DOAH Oct. 30, 1997; DCA Dec. 9, 1997) 1997 Fla. ENV LEXIS 231 at *18 (land development regulations are not relevant to a plan or plan amendment compliance determination). Mr. Seal also asserted that the amendment contravened a resource extraction policy in the Conservation Element but later withdrew that assertion. That policy also appears to have no application to the map amendment. After the County's objection to testimony regarding land development regulations was sustained, Mr. Seal indicated that he did not intend to present any other evidence since the remainder of his prepared testimony related to that subject. Although he was given an opportunity to present further relevant evidence, he rested his case. The County and Boardwalk elected not to offer any evidence in response to Mr. Seal's testimony. Except for a Special Power of Attorney executed by Mr. Seal's wife, no documentary evidence, such as copies of relevant portions of the Plan, the existing and proposed FLUM, drawings or aerial photographs of the property and adjacent area, the application, or the Ordinance which adopted the amendment, was offered into evidence by any party.4 Because Boardwalk did not present any evidence, there is no basis upon which to determine whether it presented written or oral comments, recommendations, or objections to the County during the adoption of the amendment. (In its Motion to Intervene, Boardwalk did allege that such comments were made.) Therefore, there is no evidence to establish that Intervenor is an affected person and has standing to participate in this proceeding.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Community Affairs enter a final order determining that the small scale plan amendment adopted by Ordinance No. 2005-R-070 is in compliance. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of June, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of June, 2006.
Findings Of Fact Background The Parties Respondent, City of Hialeah (City), is a local governmental unit subject to the land use planning requirements of Chapter 163, Florida Statutes. That chapter is administered by respondent, Department of Community Affairs (DCA). The DCA is charged with the responsibility of reviewing comprehensive plans and amendments thereto. Petitioners, Edmond J. Gong and Dana L. Clay (petitioners), reside in Coconut Grove, Florida and own at least two parcels of property within the City. The parties have stipulated that petitioners are affected persons within the meaning of the law and have standing to challenge the remedial amendment in issue here. The Nature of the Dispute In 1991 and 1992, the City adopted three sets of land use amendments to its comprehensive plan known as amendments 91-1, 91-2 and 92-1. Each set of amendments generated objections by the DCA, and the matters were later sent to the Division of Administrative Hearings and were assigned Case Nos. 91-6340GM, 92-3113GM and 92-7517GM, respectively. Petitioners did not participate in any of these proceedings. To resolve the objections raised by the DCA, the City and DCA negotiated a stipulated settlement agreement in December 1993, which was executed by the City on January 28, 1994. Pursuant to that agreement, on April 21, 1994, the City adopted a remedial amendment (Ordinance 94-27) known as amendment 94R-1. After reviewing the amendment, on June 2, 1994, the DCA issued a cumulative notice of intent to find such amendment in compliance. On June 7, 1994, the South Florida Regional Planning Council also found the amendment to be in compliance. Finally, on July 11, 1994, the DCA's motion to dismiss Case Nos. 91-6340GM, 92-3113GM and 92-7517GM was granted. Petitioners, who participated in the local hearings concerning the adoption of amendment 94R-1, timely filed their petition for administrative hearing on June 23, 1994, challenging the propriety of that amendment for various reasons. The petition was assigned Case No. 94-3506GM. Although petitioners failed to plead any procedural issues in the initial petition, respondents have agreed that petitioners may raise certain procedural objections regarding amendment 94R-1 since the procedural issues were raised in their objections and comments filed with the City during the adoption process of the amendment. Procedurally, petitioners argue that the local government did not comply with all statutory requirements in noticing its proposed approval of the settlement stipulation and its later intent to adopt an ordinance. As to the DCA, petitioners argue that the state agency did not comply with the law in publishing its cumulative notice of intent on June 2, 1994, and that the notice contained erroneous rule citations and lacked a geographical map. Substantively, petitioners complain that before final approval of amendment 94R- 1 was given, the local government and DCA did not consider the enactment of Chapter 94-338, Laws of Florida, which created a multijurisdictional tourism, sports and entertainment special district known as the Blockbuster Park Special District, and they did not consider the traffic impacts of a recently opened connector to Interstate 75 and an interchange within the City that connects traffic from the connector to the Florida Turnpike. Finally, they contend that the amendment improperly redesignated more than ten acres of land from residential to commercial land use. Amendments 91-1, 91-2 and 92-1 involve ten amendments to the plan, all originally found not to be in compliance by the DCA. To cure three of those deficiencies, the City rescinded three ordinances leaving seven plan amendments to be remediated. Petitioners challenge the validity of these seven amendments but none change the use on their property. In reality, though, petitioners rely principally on their procedural objections in seeking to have a determination made that the amendment is not in compliance. Were the Notice Requirements Met? After the DCA and City reached an agreement in principle to resolve the DCA's objections to the plan amendments, a settlement agreement was prepared for execution by the City's mayor and DCA Secretary. Before the mayor could sign the agreement, however, the City Council's approval and authorization were required. Such approval and authorization to sign the agreement came in the form of a resolution adopted at a public hearing held on January 25, 1994. The agreement was later signed by the mayor and DCA Secretary on January 28 and March 3, 1994, respectively. The City had originally intended to consider the item at its January 11, 1994 meeting. Timely publication of notice was given for that meeting on December 27, 1993, in the regular edition of The Miami Herald, a newspaper of general paid circulation published daily in Dade County. At the January 11 meeting, however, the City discussed the matter but then deferred final action on the item until its next meeting on January 25, 1994. Accordingly, it republished a notice of its January 25 meeting in the Zone 4 Northwest Neighbors section of the Herald. The Zone 4 Northwest Neighbors section is an insert in the Herald each Thursday and Sunday and contains news pertaining to the northwest portion of Dade County, including the City. Because all copies of the Herald delivered and sold in northwest Dade County contain this particular Neighbors insert, the City complied with the requirement that the advertisement be published in a newspaper of general paid circulation within the jurisdiction of the City. Since petitioners reside and work outside of northwest Dade County, they say they did not receive the Neighbors insert in their paper and thus they were not aware of the January 25 hearing. There is no requirement, however, that the advertisement be published in other parts of Dade County. It is noted that even though they should have received notice of the January 11 hearing through the advertisement published in the regular edition of the Herald on December 27, 1993, they did not attend the hearing. The four-inch notice published on page 15 of the January 16, 1994 edition of the Neighbors section reads as follows: At its regular meeting of January 25, 1994, the Hialeah City Council will consider the following Resolution in addition to other business. Members of the public are invited to attend; the meeting begins at 7:00 p.m. at Hialeah City Hall, 501 Palm Avenue, Hialeah, Florida. RESOLUTION OF THE MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF HIALEAH, FLORIDA, AUTHORIZING THE MAYOR TO ENTER A STIPULATED SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT IN CASE NOS. 91-6340GM, 92-3113GM AND 92-7517GM, ENTITLED "DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY AFFAIRS VS. CITY OF HIALEAH" NOW CONSOLIDATED BEFORE THE STATE OF FLORIDA DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS FOR TRANSMITTAL TO THE FLORIDA DEPART- MENT OF COMMUNITY AFFAIRS. Applicable state law (s. 163.3184(16), F.S.) called for the notice to be published at least ten days prior to the hearing. In addition, general provision 3 of the settlement agreement provided in part as follows: This agreement has been approved by the governing body at a public hearing advertised in an adver- tisement published at least 10 but not more than 15 days prior to the hearing in the format prescribed for advertisements in Section 163.3184(15)(c) and Section 163.3187. Assuming the day of the hearing is not counted in computing the ten days, the City would have had to publish the notice by Saturday, January 15, 1994, in order to meet the ten-day requirement. Because the Neighbors section was not published on Saturdays, but rather only on Thursdays and Sundays, the City opted to publish the notice on Sunday, January 16, 1994, or just nine days before the hearing. This was necessary since the item was deferred at the January 11 hearing, and the City presumably was unable to meet the deadline for having an ad published only two days later in the Thursday, January 13, 1994 edition of Neighbors. Even so, petitioners were unable to show any prejudice by virtue of the City failing to meet the ten-day notice requirement. The settlement agreement called for the City to adopt certain remedial amendments by ordinance. These amendments are contained in Ordinance No. 94-27. Although state law (s. 163.3184(16)(d), F. S.) requires that the City hold only one advertised public hearing on a compliance amendment at the adoption stage, in accordance with the City Charter, two hearings were scheduled for that purpose on March 22 and April 12, 1994. A single one-quarter page advertisement in the regular edition of the Herald was published on March 17, 1994, or five days before the first hearing. The law (s. 163.3184(15)(b)2., F. S.) also requires that the hearing be "approximately 5 days after the day that the second (i. e., adoption stage) advertisement is published." The advertisement referred to both hearing dates and noted that their purpose was "to receive comments from interested parties on the Stipulated Settlement Agreement between the City of Hialeah and the Florida Department of Community Affairs related to the 1990 and 1991 Cycles I and II plan amendments to Hialeah's Comprehensive Plan." The advertisement also contained a list of the ten plan amendments and a map showing the portion of the City affected by each of those amendments. Although petitioners contended that the map was illegible in some respects, they nonetheless read the notice in the newspaper and attended both hearings to voice their objections to the ordinance. Notwithstanding petitioners' objections, on April 12, 1994, the City adopted the ordinance. Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the City complied with the notice requirements for both hearings. Assuming arguendo that the statutory notice requirements were not strictly met, petitioners failed to demonstrate that they were prejudiced by such an error. After reviewing the ordinance, on June 2, 1994, the DCA published in the Neighbors section of the Herald a cumulative notice of intent to find the plan amendments and remedial plan amendment in compliance. The advertisement was one-quarter page in size, identified the plan amendments in issue, advised readers that the amendments were in compliance, gave a location where such amendments and comments could be reviewed, and offered a point of entry to affected persons. Therefore, its content was sufficient to inform the public of the action being taken. The DCA concedes that in the notice, however, it cited rule 9J-11.012(8) as the provision dealing with the contents of a petition to challenge the amendments found to be in compliance when in fact the correct citation should have been rule 9J-11.012(7). There is no section (8) in the rule. The notice also cited former rule 22I-6.010 as the rule dealing with intervention when in fact that rule has been renumbered as rule 60Q-2.010. Even so, petitioners were unable to show how they were prejudiced by these minor errors, especially since they knew the nature of the action being proposed by the DCA, and they timely filed their petition for hearing to challenge the amendment. The DCA policy is to publish its notice of intent to find an amendment in compliance in the same local newspaper as the local government uses for its publication. The DCA also pointed out that by advertising in the Neighbors section as opposed to the regular edition of the Herald, it saved several thousand dollars. Therefore, the DCA used the Neighbors section of the Herald. At the same time, the DCA has never included in its advertisement a map showing the location of the land use changes being proposed. This is because the local government advertisements have already included a map, and the DCA notice is simply for the purpose of advising the public which ordinances are in or out of compliance. In the absence of any showing of prejudice, and in view of petitioners' failure to demonstrate to the exclusion of fair debate that the plan amendment as a whole is incompatible with, does not further or take action in the direction of realizing, the goals of the law, the cited procedural errors are insufficient to support a finding that amendment 94R-1 is not in compliance. The plan amendment Since 1986, petitioners have owned two parcels of undeveloped property in the southern one-half and northwestern one-quarter of Tract 24 of Section 28, which is located in the western part of the City. The property consists of approximately six acres located at the northeastern intersection of West 76th Street and the Hialeah-Hialeah Gardens Boulevard. The property has been designated on the future land use map as low density (single-family) residential, which allows up to twelve units per acre. Petitioners have not specifically pled or shown how amendment 94R-1 adversely affects their property. Instead, they simply argue that the plan amendment is not in compliance because the City did not consider the impacts of "drastically changed circumstances" before adopting the remedial ordinance, and the City improperly reclassified a small tract of land. These claims will be considered below. Effective June 3, 1994, Chapter 94-338, Laws of Florida, became law. That law created a multijurisdictional tourism, sports and entertainment special district more commonly known as Blockbuster Park. That legislation, however, is not relevant to this proceeding for several reasons. First, there is no mechanism to consider multijurisdictional impacts in the local planning process. Second, the special act did not become law until after the amendment process here had been completed. Since the City was only required to consider the best available data present at the time the amendment was being reviewed and adopted, consideration of the special law was neither necessary or appropriate. Third, the act itself does not authorize a development. If and when a development order is approved, the City can update its plan to take into account any impacts from the project. As to the contention that the City and DCA failed to take into account the six-lane connector road completed on December 31, 1993, or two years after the plan amendments were adopted, the impact of the connector road is identified and discussed on pages 21 and 23C of the future land use element contained in the remedial amendments. At hearing, it was further explained that the connector road is a limited access regional road under the control of Dade County, and not the City. This means that there is no access to the connector from properties which front on the road, and local access will be limited to three major road intersections. No land use changes along the road have been proposed, and the City has adequately addressed the circulation map requirements in the plan and how the internal circulation routes would be compatible with the major connectors. This being so, it is found that the City and DCA gave adequate planning consideration to the connector. Finally, petitioners contended that certain land was improperly redesignated from single-family residential to multi-family and commercial use. They complain that this is inappropriate since the land is close to a school and does not lie near a major intersection. The evidence shows, however, that such redesignation was appropriate since the land is located at an intersection and lies just across the street from an existing five-acre commercial tract. Moreover, the multi-family part of the tract will serve as a buffer between the commercial use at the intersection and the existing single-family use to the south. Then, too, the proximity of a nearby school to the west will serve to reduce trip time for persons shopping in the area while dropping off or picking up children from the school. Finally, some types of commercial use in residential neighborhoods can serve valid planning purposes, and the City has already established a pattern of having some schools located near commercially designated property. The redesignation is found to be reasonable and based on appropriate planning considerations. Although no proof was submitted by petitioners regarding any other parts of the plan amendment, respondents demonstrated that all remaining parts are supported by adequate data and analysis and are in compliance. Accordingly, petitioners have failed to prove to the exclusion of fair debate that remedial amendment 94R-1 is not in compliance.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Community Affairs enter a final order determining the City of Hialeah comprehensive plan amendment to be in compliance. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of October, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of October, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-3506GM Petitioners: 1-2. Partially accepted in finding of fact 2. 3. Partially accepted in finding of fact 3. 4-20. Partially accepted in findings of fact 5-8. 21-24. Partially accepted in findings of fact 9. Partially accepted in findings of fact 10 and 11. Partially accepted in finding of fact 4. 27-29. Covered in preliminary statement. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as unnecessary. 32-35. Rejected as irrelevant. 36-38. Partially accepted in finding of fact 6. 39-41. Partially accepted in finding of fact 11. 42. Rejected as unnecessary. Respondent DCA: 1-12. Covered in preliminary statement. 13. Partially accepted in finding of fact 1. 14. Partially accepted in findings of fact 2 and 13. 15. Partially accepted in finding of fact 1. 16-19. Partially accepted in findings of fact 6-8. 20-22. Partially accepted in finding of 9. 23-25. Partially accepted in findings of fact 10 and 11. 26. Partially accepted in finding of fact 6. 27. Partially accepted in finding of fact 11. 28. Partially accepted in finding of fact 6. 29-30. Partially accepted in finding of fact 10. 31-55. Partially accepted in findings of fact 13-17. Respondent City: Because the City's proposed recommended order was not timely filed, the undersigned has considered the contents of the proposed order but has not made specific rulings on each proposed finding of fact. See Sunrise Community, Inc. v. DHRS, 14 F.A.L.R. 5162 (DHRS, 1992), affirmed 619 So.2d 30 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1993). Note: Where a proposed finding has been partially accepted, the remainder has been rejected as being irrelevant, not supported by the more credible, persuasive evidence, subordinate, or unnecessary to the resolution of the issues. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Edmond J. Gong Ms. Dana L. Clay 6161 Blue Lagoon Drive, Suite 370 Miami, FL 33126 Terrell K. Arline, Esquire 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, FL 32399-2100 William M. Grodnick, Esquire 501 Palm Avenue, 4th Floor Hialeah, FL 33010 Linda Loomis Shelley, Secretary Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, FL 32399-2100 Dan R. Stengle, Esquire General Counsel Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, FL 32399-2100
The Issue Whether the City of Miramar Comprehensive Plan Amendment, adopted by Ordinance No. 1901 on October 17, 2018, is “in compliance,” as that term is defined in section 163.3184(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2018).1/
Findings Of Fact The Parties and Standing Petitioners own and reside on property located at 17428 Southwest 36th Street in Miramar, Florida. Petitioners submitted oral and written comments, recommendations, or objections to the City during the period of time between, and including appearances at, the transmittal hearing and the adoption of the Plan Amendment. Petitioners’ house is approximately 430 feet north of the property subject to the Plan Amendment (the “Subject Property”). Petitioners’ property is separated from the Subject Property by a residential canal, approximately 100 feet of wetland or marsh area, and a City street right-of-way. The residential canal is owned and controlled by Petitioners’ homeowner’s association. From the backyard of their home, Petitioners enjoy observing and photographing birds and wildlife that utilize the canal, including birds that can be seen from Petitioners’ property in the trees on the Subject Property and flying between the properties. The City is a Florida municipal corporation with the duty and authority to adopt and amend a comprehensive plan, pursuant to section 163.3167. Univision is a Delaware limited liability company authorized to transact business in Florida. Its principal business address is 500 Frank West Burr Boulevard, Teaneck, New Jersey 07666. Univision is the owner of the Subject Property. Lennar is a Florida limited liability company, whose principal business address is 700 Northwest 107th Avenue, Suite 400, Miami, Florida 33172. Lennar is under contract to purchase the Subject Property. Existing Conditions The Subject Property is approximately 120 gross acres of mostly undeveloped property. The Subject Property contains 102.2 acres of wetlands and 15.5 acres of uplands. At least 80 percent of the wetlands are covered by Melaleuca trees, which is an invasive species. Melaleuca is listed by federal and state agencies as a noxious weed, making it illegal to possess, sell, cultivate, or transport in Florida. The uplands on the Subject Property are limited to areas previously developed with radio transmission towers, a control room, and filled roadways connecting the on-site improvements. The improvements, with the exception of the fill roads, were removed in approximately 2017. The radio towers were secured by guy wires anchored by concrete blocks. The areas of the Subject Property underneath the guy wires were maintained to prevent vegetation from growing up into the guy wires. The areas where the concrete supports have been removed are wet, and the areas that were beneath the former guy wires contain fewer Melaleuca and some native vegetation, like sawgrass and ferns. However, the upland areas are also currently growing exotic grasses and Australian Pine, which are also invasive species. The Subject Property is currently designated on the City’s Future Land Use Map (“FLUM”) as “Rural.” Pursuant to the City’s Comprehensive Plan, the Rural land use category allows the following types of development: (1) residential development at a density of one dwelling unit per 2.5 gross acres (1du/2.5 acres); (2) agricultural and related uses, including crops, groves, horse and cattle ranches, private game preserves, fish breeding areas, and tree and plant nurseries; (3) parks; (4) police and fire stations, libraries, and civic centers; (5) special residential facilities, such as group homes; and (6) public utilities, including wastewater pumping stations, electrical utility substations, and telecommunications transmission facilities. The Plan Amendment The Plan Amendment changes the FLUM designation of the Subject Property from Rural to “Irregular (3.21) Residential,” which allows residential development at a density of 3.21du/acre.4/ Lennar proposes to develop 385 units on the property-- the maximum allowable under the Plan Amendment. Under Lennar’s development proposal, all of the on- site wetlands will be impacted. The Plan Amendment Process Broward County municipalities have a unique plan amendment review process. Each amendment to a municipal comprehensive plan must be consistent with, and incorporated into, the Broward County Land Use Plan (“BCLUP”). This Plan Amendment, as with all other municipal amendments, was reviewed and approved through both the County’s and City’s approval process. The Board of County Commissioners held an adoption public hearing on March 20, 2018, and approved Ordinance No. 2018-12, amending the BCLUP to change the County FLUM designation of the Subject Property from Agriculture to Irregular (3.21) Residential. On October 17, 2018, the City Commission held a duly advertised second public hearing, wherein the City voted to adopt the Plan Amendment. Lennar Permitting Lennar pursued permitting of its proposed development of the Subject Property during the Plan Amendment review process. On or about September 11, 2018, the Broward County Environmental Protection and Growth Management Department (“EPGMD”) issued an environmental resource license (“ERL”) for the proposed development. The ERL is based on Lennar’s site plan for the site, not the Plan Amendment. The ERL recognizes that the impacts on the Subject Property wetlands are unavoidable and determines that off-site mitigation is required to address any impacts on those wetlands. On or about September 11, 2018, the South Florida Water Management District issued an environmental resource permit (“ERP”) for the proposed development. The ERP is based on Lennar’s site plan and other required documents, not the Plan Amendment. The ERP provides that off-site mitigation is required to address any impacts on the Subject Property wetlands. On or about December 14, 2018, the Army Corps of Engineers (“ACOE”) issued a permit for the development proposed, based upon Lennar’s site plan and other required documents. The ACOE permit provides that off-site mitigation is required to address any impacts on the Subject Property wetlands. Petitioners’ Challenge Section 163.3177(2) directs that “the several elements of the comprehensive plan shall be consistent,” in furtherance of the major objective of the planning process to coordinate the elements of the local comprehensive plan. Petitioners allege the Plan Amendment is not “in compliance” because it creates internal inconsistencies with the existing Comprehensive Plan. Petitioners’ challenge rests on four provisions of the Comprehensive Plan: Future Land Use Element (“FLUE”) Goal (unnumbered), FLUE Policies 3.5 and 6.10, and Conservation Element Policy 7.3 (“CE Policy 7.3”). FLUE Goal (unnumbered) The City’s Comprehensive Plan contains one overarching goal for the FLUE, which reads as follows: Maintain a long-range future land use pattern which promotes orderly and well- managed growth and development of the community, producing quality neighborhoods, enhancing the city’s aesthetic appeal, conserving the natural environment and open space, supporting a vibrant economic tax base, and minimizing risks to the public’s health, safety, and welfare. (emphasis added). The goal is the singular goal for the overall FLUE, which includes 12 different objectives and many more policies for each objective. The purpose of the goal is to set the initial framework; it is a very broad statement setting the direction for the City’s long-term goals, but does not provide any measurable standards or specifics regarding implementation. Petitioners’ challenge focuses on the underlined phrase, and argues that the Plan Amendment is internally inconsistent with the goal’s direction to “conserv[e] the natural environment and open space.” The Subject Property is not currently designated as either “Recreation and Open Space” or “Conservation.” The Subject Property is private property that, by virtue of its land use designation, has always been intended for development as one of the uses allowable within the Rural land use category. Further, Eric Silva, the Director of the City’s Community and Economic Development Department, testified that the goal’s direction of “conserving the natural environment and open space” relates only to those areas that have been designated by the City, or another agency, for protection. The Recreation and Open Space Element (“ROS Element”) sets forth the specific objectives and policies to accomplish the City’s goal to “[p]rovide adequate and accessible parks and facilities to meet the recreation needs of all current and future Miramar residents.” In the ROS Element, the City has established a level of service standard of four acres of park and open space for each 1,000 City residents. Petitioners introduced no evidence that the Plan Amendment would diminish the amount of land designated for open space in the City, or otherwise impede the City’s progress toward the adopted standard. To the contrary, Mr. Silva testified that the City has over 300 extra acres of park space and that this Plan Amendment will not impact the City’s adopted level of service for parks and open space. Likewise, Petitioners introduced no evidence to support a finding that the Plan Amendment would reduce the amount of land designated for “Conservation” in the City. Rather, Petitioners argue that the Subject Property should be converted to a nature preserve, or otherwise placed in conservation use. The issue in this case is not whether the City should designate the Subject Property for a different use, but whether the designation the City proposes is consistent with the comprehensive plan. Petitioners did not prove the Plan Amendment is inconsistent with the FLUE Goal. FLUE Policy 3.5 Petitioners next contend the Plan Amendment is inconsistent with FLUE Policy 3.5, which directs the City to “[c]onsider the cumulative and long-term effects of decisions regarding amendments to the Land Use Plan Map and revisions to the Future Land Use Element.” Petitioners’ concerns here are similar to those with the FLUE Goal--the Plan Amendment will reduce green space and open space, which could be preserved under the existing Rural designation. Petitioners’ expert witness conceded that it is impossible to determine that the City did not consider the cumulative and long-term effects of the Plan Amendment. Moreover, the City introduced abundant evidence that it considered, during the lengthy Plan Amendment process, all impacts of the Plan Amendment on the City’s resources and infrastructure. Petitioners did not prove the Plan Amendment is inconsistent with FLUE Policy 3.5. FLUE Policy 6.10 Next, Petitioners argue the Plan Amendment is inconsistent with FLUE Policy 6.10, which states, “The City shall consider the impacts of land use plan amendments on wetland and native upland resources, and minimize those impacts to the maximum extent practicable.” Here, Petitioners focus on the density allowed under the Plan Amendment. Petitioners argue that the Plan Amendment is inconsistent with this policy because it allows development of 385 units, which will maximize, rather than minimize, impacts to the on-site wetlands. Petitioners argue that the residential density allowed under the existing Rural designation would yield development of only 48 units, which would provide for conservation of at least some of the wetlands on site, thereby minimizing the wetland impact. Petitioners’ argument ignores the fact that the Rural designation allows other types of non-residential development that may be as intense as residential, such as a civic center or fire station, or uses that require fewer improvements, but have a destructive effect on wetlands, such as horse or cattle ranches. The issue of whether the Plan Amendment minimizes impacts to wetlands is not determined by the mathematical function 48 units < 385 units. Instead, the determination hinges on the meaning of “minimizing impacts” in the City’s Comprehensive Plan. Under the City’s Comprehensive Plan, impact of development on wetlands must be considered in partnership with the County, and is dependent upon the value assigned to those wetlands, pursuant to the wetlands benefit index (“WBI”), as set forth in the Conservation Element. Based on the following relevant analysis, the Petitioners did not prove the Plan Amendment is inconsistent with FLUE Policy 6.10. CE Policy 7.3 Finally, Petitioners challenge the Plan Amendment as internally inconsistent with CE Policy 7.3, which reads as follows: The City shall distribute land uses in a manner that avoids or minimizes to the greatest degree practicable, the effect and impact on wetlands in coordination with Broward County. Those land uses identified below as being incompatible with the protection and conservation of wetlands and wetland functions shall be directed away from wetlands, or when compatible land uses are allowed to occur, shall be mitigated or enhanced, or both, to compensate for loss of wetland functions in accordance with Broward County Code of Ordinances, Chapter 27, Article XI, Aquatic and Wetland Resource Protection. Compatibility of Land UsesRelative to the Wetland Benefit Index (WBI) Wetland Benefit Index Land Use Compatibility 1. Wetlands with a WBI value greater than or equal to 0.80 1. There is a rebuttable presumption that all land uses except for conservation uses are incompatible. 2. Wetlands with a WBI value less than 0.80 2. All land uses are compatible, provided that the wetland impact compensation requirements of Chapter 27, Article XI, are satisfied. Source: Broward County Code of Ordinances, Chapter 27, Article XI, Aquatic and Wetland Resource Protection CE Policy 7.3 is more specific than FLUE Policy 6.10 regarding the City’s direction to minimize impacts of development on wetlands. Petitioners’ planning expert opined that the Plan Amendment is inconsistent with this policy because it does not “avoid or minimize” the impact of wetlands at all, much less “to the greatest degree practicable,” as directed by the policy. Petitioners’ expert based his entire argument solely on the first sentence of the policy. Petitioners’ planning expert explained, incredulously, that, in his opinion, the rest of the policy “doesn’t matter.”5/ The opinion of Petitioners’ expert was not persuasive. The Policy must be read in its entirety; and, when read as such, the Plan Amendment is consistent with the policy. The first sentence of the policy is precatory and direction-setting. It states the City’s intent to distribute land uses in a way that minimizes wetland impacts. The following sentences describe in more detail how that direction will be accomplished, and specifically reference the incorporated chart. The policy provides that land uses identified in the chart as incompatible with wetland protection “shall be directed away from wetlands.” By contrast, the policy provides that for land uses identified as compatible, wetland impacts “shall be mitigated . . . in accordance with the Broward County Code of Ordinances, Chapter 27.” It is undisputed that the wetlands on the Subject Property have a WBI value of less than .80. Pursuant to the chart, then, all uses of the Subject Property are compatible with the wetlands on-site, as long as the wetland impact compensation requirements of the Broward County Code are followed. The policy clearly provides that no development, regardless of density or intensity, must be directed away from the wetlands on the Subject Property. If the WBI value of the on-site wetlands was .80 or higher, pursuant to this policy, Petitioners’ position that the Subject Property should be placed in Conservation use would be presumed correct, although rebuttable. To that end, Petitioners introduced expert opinion testimony as to the quality of the wetland areas on-site which were previously maintained by the property owner--namely the areas under the guy wires. In the opinion of Petitioners’ wetlands expert, the on-site wetlands could be restored to higher quality if the Melaleuca trees were removed and the stumps sprayed to prevent regrowth. Petitioners’ argument is irrelevant to a determination of whether the Plan Amendment is consistent with this policy. Having established that the WBI value of the on-site wetlands is below .80, the issue of whether the on-site wetlands could be restored is irrelevant. Chapter 27 of the Broward County Code governs application for, and issuance of, an ERL for wetland alteration. On September 11, 2018, Broward County issued an ERL to Lennar for its proposed development of the Subject Property. Petitioner introduced no evidence to support a finding that the provisions of Chapter 27 were not satisfied by the County in issuing the ERL. Petitioners did not prove the Plan Amendment is inconsistent with CE Policy 7.3.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Economic Opportunity enter a final order determining that the Plan Amendment adopted by City of Miramar Ordinance 1901, on October 7, 2018, is “in compliance,” as that term is defined by section 163.3184(1)(b), Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of June, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE VAN WYK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of June, 2019.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the amendments to Miami- Dade County’s Comprehensive Development Master Plan (CDMP), adopted through Ordinance Nos. 08-44 and 08-45, are “in compliance” as that term is defined in Section 163.3184(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2008).1
Findings Of Fact The Parties The Department is the state land planning agency and is statutorily charged with the duty to review amendments to local comprehensive plans and to determine whether the amendments are “in compliance,” pursuant to Section 163.3184, Florida Statutes. The County is a political subdivision of the State and has adopted a local comprehensive plan that the County amends from time to time. 1000 Friends is a Florida not-for-profit corporation that maintains its headquarters in Tallahassee, Florida. Its corporate purpose is to ensure the fair and effective implementation of the Growth Management Act, Chapter 163, Part II, Florida Statutes, through education, lobbying, research and litigation. 1000 Friends has approximately 3,500 members, 174 of whom live in the County. NPCA is a foreign, not-for-profit corporation that is registered to do business in Florida. Its headquarters are in Washington, D.C. It has a branch office in Hollywood, Broward County, Florida. NPCA’s purpose is to protect and preserve national parks, including Everglades National Park. NPCA has approximately 340,000 members, 1,000 of whom live in the County. Barry White and Karen Esty are residents of the County. Lowe’s is a for-profit corporation that owns and operates a business in the County. David Brown, along with his father and brother, is a co-applicant for the Brown amendment. For the purpose of this Recommended Order, the Department and the Intervenors aligned with the Department will be referred to, collectively, as Petitioners. Standing Lowe’s filed the application with the County that resulted in Ordinance No. 08-44 (Lowe’s Amendment). Lowe’s submitted comments to the County concerning the Lowe’s Amendment during the period of time from the County’s transmittal of the amendment to the County’s adoption of the amendment. Brown filed the application with the County that resulted in Ordinance No. 08-45 (Brown Amendment). Brown resides in the County. Brown is a manager/member of BDG Kendall 172, LLC, which has a contract to purchase the larger of the two parcels on the application site. Brown is also a manager/member of BDG Kendall 162, LLC, which owns and operates a business in Miami-Dade County. Brown submitted comments to the County at the transmittal and adoption hearings. 1000 Friends submitted comments to the County during the period of time from the transmittal of the amendments to their adoption. 1000 Friends presented its comments to the County on behalf of its members who reside in the County. 1000 Friends does not own property or maintain an office in the County. 1000 Friends does not pay local business taxes in the County and did not show that it is licensed to conduct a business in the County. 1000 Friends has engaged in fundraising, lobbying, and litigation in the County. Its activities include efforts to promote growth management, affordable housing, and Everglades restoration. 1000 Friends did not show that its activities in the County subject it to the provisions of the CDMP. NPCA submitted comments to the County during the period of time from the transmittal of the amendments to their adoption. NPCA presented its comments to the County on behalf of NPCA members who reside in the County. NPCA does not own property or maintain an office in the County. No evidence was presented to show that NPCA pays business taxes in the County or that it is licensed to conduct business in the County. NPCA did not show that its activities in the County subject it to the provisions of the CDMP. Barry White and Karen Esty are residents of the County. They submitted comments to the County regarding the amendments during the period of time from the transmittal of the amendments to their adoption. The Amendment Adoption Process The applications which resulted in the Lowe’s and Brown Amendments were submitted to the County during the April 2007 plan amendment cycle. The County’s review process for comprehensive plan amendments includes a public hearing before the community council which has jurisdiction over the area of the County where the affected lands are located. Following the public hearings on the proposed Lowe’s and Brown Amendments, the community councils recommended that the Board of County Commissioners approve the amendments. The County’s Planning Advisory Board also reviews proposed amendments before the transmittal and adoption hearings. Following public hearings on the proposed Lowe’s and Brown Amendments, the Planning Advisory Board recommended that the Board of County Commissioners approve the amendments for transmittal and for adoption. The County planning staff recommended that the proposed amendments be denied and not transmitted to the Department. The principal objection of the planning staff was that the expansion of the Urban Development Boundary (UDB), an aspect of both proposed amendments, was unjustified. In November 2007, the Board of County Commissioners voted to transmit the amendments to the Department. The Department reviewed the proposed amendments and issued its Objections, Recommendations, and Comments (ORC) Report on February 26, 2008. In the ORC Report, the Department stated that expanding the UDB would be internally inconsistent with the CDMP because the need for the expansion had not been demonstrated. In addition the Department determined that the Lowe’s Amendment was inconsistent with CDMP policies regarding the protection of wetlands, and the Brown Amendment was inconsistent with CDMP policies regarding the protection of agricultural lands. When the amendments came before the Board of County Commissioners after the ORC Report in March 2008, the County planning staff recommended that the amendments be denied, repeating its belief that the expansion of the UDB would be inconsistent with the CDMP. Under the County’s Code of Ordinances, an expansion of the UDB requires approval by a two-thirds vote of the Board of County Commissioners. The County adopted the amendments through Ordinances No. 08-44 and 08-45 on April 24, 2008. On April 30, 2008, the Mayor Carlos Alvarez vetoed the ordinances, citing inconsistencies with the UDB policies of the CDMP. His veto was overridden by a two-thirds vote of the Board of County Commissioners on May 6, 2008. On July 18, 2008, the Department issued its Statement of Intent to Find Comprehensive Plan Amendments Not in Compliance. The Lowe’s Amendment The Lowe’s Amendment site consists of two parcels located in close proximity to the intersection of Southwest 8th Street, also known as Tamiami Trail, and Northwest 137th Avenue. The easternmost parcel, Parcel A, is 21.6 acres. The adjacent parcel to the west, Parcel B, is 30.1 acres. Neither parcel is currently being used. About 50 percent of both Parcels A and B are covered by wetlands. The wetlands are partially drained and show encroachment by exotic vegetation, including Melaleuca and Australian pine. The Lowe’s site is located within the Bird Trail Canal Basin, which the CDMP characterizes as containing “heavily impacted, partially drained wetlands.” Both Parcels A and B are currently designated Open Land under the CDMP, with a more specific designation as Open Land Subarea 3 (Tamiami-Bird Canal Basins), and can be used for residences at densities of up to one unit per five acres, compatible institutional uses, public facilities, utility and communications facilities, certain agricultural uses, recreational uses, limestone quarrying, and ancillary uses. East of the Lowe’s site is another parcel owned by Lowe’s that is designated Business and Office and is within the UDB. North and west of the Lowe’s site is Open Land. The Lowe’s site is bordered on the south by Tamiami Trail, a six- lane road. Across Tamiami Trail is land designated Business and Office. The Lowe’s amendment would reclassify Parcel A as Business and Office and Parcel B as Institution, Utilities, and Communications. The Lowe’s Amendment would also extend the UDB westward to encompass Parcels A and B. The Business and Office designation allows for a wide range of sales and service activities, as well as compatible residential uses. However, the Lowe’s amendment includes a restrictive covenant that prohibits residential development. The Institution, Utilities, and Communications land use designation allows for “the full range of institution, communications and utilities,” as well as offices and some small businesses. Parcel A is subject to another restrictive covenant that provides that Lowe’s shall not seek building permits for the construction of any buildings on Parcel A without having first submitted for a building permit for the construction of a home improvement store. The use of Parcel B is restricted to a school, which can be a charter school. If a charter school is not developed on Parcel B, the parcel will be offered to the Miami-Dade County School Board. If the School Board does not purchase Parcel B within 120 days, then neither Lowe’s nor its successors of assigns have any further obligations to develop a school on Parcel B. The Brown Amendment The Brown Amendment involves four changes to the CDMP: a future land use re-designation from “Agriculture” to “Business and Office”; an expansion of the UDB to encompass the Brown site; a prohibition of residential uses on the site; and a requirement that the owner build an extension of SW 172nd Avenue through the site. The Agriculture designation allows agricultural uses and single family residences at a density of one unit per five acres. The proposed Business and Office land use designation allows a wide range of commercial uses, including retail, professional services, and office. Residential uses are also allowed, but the Declaration of Restrictions adopted by the County with the Brown Amendment prohibits residential development. The Brown Amendment site is 42 acres. Some of the site is leased to a tenant farmer who grows row crops. The balance is vacant and not in use. The Brown site has a triangular shape. Along the sloping northern/eastern boundary is Kendall Drive. Kendall Drive is a major arterial roadway, a planned urban corridor, and part of the state highway system. On the site's western boundary is other agricultural land. There is commercial development to the east. Along the southern boundary is the 1200-unit Vizcaya Traditional Neighborhood Development, which is within the UDB. The entirety of the Brown site has been altered by farming activities. In the southwest portion of the site is a four-acre, degraded wetland that is part of a larger 28-acre wetland located offsite. The wetland is not connected to any state waters and the Army Corps of Engineers has not asserted jurisdiction over it. The wetland is not on the map of “Future Wetlands and CERP Water Management Areas” in the Land Use Element of the CDMP. The dominant plants in the wetland are exotic species. There is no evidence that any portion of the site is used by any threatened or endangered species. The Urban Development Boundary and Urban Expansion Area The principal dispute in this case involves the application of Policies LU-8F and LU-8G of the CDMP regarding the expansion of the UDB. Policy LU-8F directs that adequate supplies of residential and nonresidential lands be maintained in the UDB. If the supply of lands becomes inadequate, Policy LU-8G addresses where the expansion of the UDB should occur. The UDB is described in the Land Use Element: The Urban Development Boundary (UDB) is included on the LUP map to distinguish the area where urban development may occur through the year 2015 from areas where it should not occur. Development orders permitting urban development will generally be approved within the UDB at some time through the year 2015 provided that level- of-service standards for necessary public facilities will be met. Adequate countywide development capacity will be maintained within the UDB by increasing development densities or intensities inside the UDB, or by expanding the UDB, when the need for such change is determined to be necessary through the Plan review and amendment process. The UDB promotes several planning purposes. It provides for the orderly and efficient construction of infrastructure, encourages urban infill and redevelopment, discourages urban sprawl, and helps to conserve agricultural and environmentally-sensitive lands. The County only accepts applications for amendments seeking to expand the UDB once every two years, unless they are directly related to a development of regional impact. In contrast, Chapter 163, Florida Statutes, allows two amendment cycles in a calendar year, Amendments that would expand the UDB must be approved by at least two-thirds of the total membership of the Board of County Commissioners. Other types of amendments only require a majority vote of the quorum. Outside the UDB are County lands within the relatively small Urban Expansion Area (UEA), which is described in the CDMP as “the area where current projections indicate that further urban development beyond the 2015 UDB is likely to be warranted some time between the year 2015 and 2025.” The UEA consists of lands that the CDMP directs “shall be avoided” when the County is considering adding land to the UDB. They are (1) future wetlands, (2) lands designated Agriculture, (3) hurricane evacuation areas, and (4) lands that are part of the Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan. The “future” wetlands on this list are existing wetland areas delineated by the County on Figure 14 of the Land Use Element. A far larger area of the County, mostly west of the UDB and UEA, consists of lands that the CDMP directs “shall not be considered” for inclusion in the UDB. These are water conservation areas, lands associated with Everglades National Park, the Redland agricultural area, and wellfield protection areas. Policy LU-8F Policy LU-8F of the Land Use Element provides: The Urban Development Boundary (UDB) should contain developable land having capacity to sustain projected countywide residential demand for a period of 10 years after adoption of the most recent Evaluation and Appraisal Report (EAR) plus a 5-year surplus (a total 15-year Countywide supply beyond the date of EAR adoption). The estimation of this capacity shall include the capacity to develop and redevelop around transit stations at the densities recommended in policy LU-7F. The adequacy of non- residential land supplies shall be determined on the basis of land supplies in subareas of the County appropriate to the type of use, as well as the Countywide supply within the UDB. The adequacy of land supplies for neighborhood- and community- oriented business and office uses shall be determined on the basis of localized subarea geography such as Census Tracts, Minor Statistical Areas (MSAs) and combinations thereof. Tiers, Half-Tiers and combinations thereof shall be considered along with the Countywide supply when evaluating the adequacy of land supplies for regional commercial and industrial activities. There is no further guidance in the CDMP for determining the “adequacy of land supplies” with respect to nonresidential land uses. Neither Chapter 163, Florida Statutes, nor Florida Administrative Code Chapter 9J-5 requires that local governments use a particular methodology to determine the adequacy of nonresidential land supplies. The County’s usual methodology for determining need is described in the Planning Considerations Report that the County planning staff prepared for the 2007 amendment cycle. A report like this one is prepared by the staff for each amendment cycle to evaluate the adequacy of the CDMP to accommodate growth and to evaluate pending amendment applications. The County compares a proposed use to its immediate surroundings and the broader area of the County in which the proposed use is located. The basic geographic unit used in the County’s need analysis is the Minor Statistical Area (MSA). Larger planning areas, called Tiers, are groupings of MSAs. The County is divided into 32 MSAs and four Tiers. The Lowe’s Amendment site is in MSA 3.2, but it is on the border with MSA 6.1, so the two MSAs were consolidated for the County’s need analysis regarding the Lowe’s Amendment, even though MSA 3.2 is in the North Central Tier and MSA 6.1 is in the South Central Tier. The Brown Amendment is in MSA 6.2, but it is close to MSA 6.1, so the County combined the two MSAs for its need analysis for the Brown Amendment. Both MSAs are in the South Central Tier. The Planning Considerations Report contains a 2007 inventory of commercial land. The only vacant land used in the analysis of available commercial land supply was land zoned for business, professional office, office park, or designated Business and Office on the Land Use Map. Although it is stated in the Planning Considerations Report that lands zoned or designated for industrial uses are often used for commercial purposes, this situation was not factored into the calculation of the available supply of commercial lands. The County also excluded any supply that could be gained from the redevelopment of existing sites. Petitioners contend, therefore, that the County’s need for commercial land is less than the planning staff calculated in the Planning Considerations Report. On the other hand, Respondents contend that the County’s need for commercial land is greater than the planning staff calculated in the Planning Considerations Report because the County planning staff did not apply a “market factor” for commercial lands as it does for residential lands. A market factor is considered by some professional planners to be appropriate for commercial land uses to account for physical constraints and other factors that limit the utilization of some vacant parcels, and to prevent situations where the diminished supply of useable parcels causes their prices to rise steeply. The CDMP recognizes the problem in stating that: impediments can arise to the maximum utilization of all lands within the boundaries [of the UDB]. In some urbanized areas, it may be difficult to acquire sufficiently large parcels of land. In other areas, neighborhood opposition to proposed developments could alter the assumed density and character of a particular area. The County used a market factor of 1.5 (50 percent surplus) to determine the need for residential land. The County did not use a market factor in its analysis of the need for commercial land. The Department’s expert planning witness, Mike McDaniel, testified that the Department generally supports use of a 1.25 allocation (25 percent surplus). The County’s most recent UDB expansions for nonresidential uses (other than Lowe’s and Brown) were the Beacon Lakes and Shoppyland amendments in 2002. The Beacon Lakes and Shoppyland UDB expansions were approved despite the fact that the County did not project a need for more industrial land within the planning horizon. The need determinations for these amendments were not based on the use of a market factor, but on a percieved2`` need for the particular land uses proposed – warehouses and related industrial uses on large parcels to serve the Miami International Airport and the Port of Miami. The evidence indicates that the County’s exclusion from its analysis of industrial lands that can be used for commercial purposes, and additional commercial opportunities that could be derived from the redevelopment of existing sites, is offset by the County’s exclusion of a market factor. If the supply of commercial land had been increased 25 percent to account for industrial lands and redevelopment, it would have been offset by a 1.25 market factor on the demand side. The calculations made by the County in its Planning Considerations Report would not have been materially different. The Planning Considerations Report analyzes commercial demand (in acres) through the years 2015 and 2025, and calculates a “depletion year” by MSA, Tier, and countywide. A depletion year is the year in which the supply of vacant land is projected to be exhausted. If the depletion year occurs before 2015 (the planning horizon for the UDB), that is an indication that additional lands for commercial uses might be needed. The County planning staff projected a countywide depletion year of 2023, which indicates there are sufficient commercial lands in the County through the planning horizon of 2015. The County then projected the need for commercial land by MSA and Tier. MSA 3.2, where the Lowe’s site is located, has a depletion year of 2025, but when averaged with MSA 6.1’s depletion years of 2011, results in an average depletion year of 2018. The North Central Tier, in which the Lowe’s Amendment site is located, has a depletion year of 2023. The County’s depletion year analysis at all three levels, MSA, Tier, and countywide, indicates no need for more commercial lands in the area of the Lowe’s site. MSA 6.2, where the Brown site is located, has a depletion year of 2017, but when combined with MSA 6.1’s depletion of 2011, results in an average depletion year for the two MSAs is 2014. The South Central Tier, in which the Brown Amendment site is located, has a depletion year of 2014. Therefore, the County’s depletion year analysis, at the MSA and Tier levels, indicates a need for more commercial lands in the area of the Brown site. The County also analyzed the ratio of commercial acres per 1,000 persons by MSA, Tier, and county-wide. The countywide ratio is not a goal that the County is seeking to achieve for all Tiers and MSAs. However, if a Tier or MSA shows a ratio substantially lower than the countywide ratio, that MSA or Tier might need more commercial lands. The countywide ratio of commercial lands per 1,000 persons is projected to be 6.1 acres per 1,000 persons in 2015. MSA 3.2, in which the Lowe’s site is located, has a ratio of 11.3 acres per 1,000 persons. MSA 6.1 has a ratio of 2.6 acres. The average for the two MSAs is 6.95 acres. The ratio for all of the North Central Tier is 6.3 acres per 1,000 persons. Therefore, a comparison of the countywide ratio with the MSAs and Tier where the Lowe’s site is located indicates there is no need for additional commercial lands in the area of the Lowe’s site. MSA 6.2, where the Brown site is located, has a ratio of 4.1 acres per 1,000 persons. When combined with MSA 6.1’s ratio of 2.6 acres, the average for the two MSAs is 3.35 acres. The ratio for all of the South Central Tier is 4.5 acres per 1,000 persons. Therefore, a comparison with the countywide ratio of 6.1 acres indicates a need for additional commercial lands in the area of the Brown site. The County’s need analysis treated the Kendall Town Center as vacant (i.e., available) commercial land, but the Kendall Town Center is approved and under construction. If the Kendall Town Center had been excluded, the County’s projected future need for commercial land in the area of the Brown site would have been greater. The Planning Considerations Report does not discuss parcel size in its commercial need analysis. Lowe’s contends that the County should have considered whether there is a need for larger “community commercial” uses in the area of the Lowe’s site. Policy LU-8F refers only to the need to consider (by “Tiers, Half-Tiers and combinations thereof”) the adequacy of land supplies for “regional commercial activities.” Lowe’s planning expert testified that there are few undeveloped commercial parcels in MSAs 3.2 and 6.1 that are ten acres or more, or could be aggregated with contiguous vacant parcels to create a parcel bigger than ten acres. Lowe’s submitted two market analyses for home improvement stores, which conclude that there is a need for another home improvement store in the area of the Lowe’s site. The market analyses offered by Lowe’s differ from the County’s methodology, which focuses, not on the market for a particular use, but on the availability of commercial lands in appropriate proportion to the population. Even when it is reasonable for the County to consider the need for a unique use, the County’s focus is on serving a general public need, rather than on whether a particular commercial use could be profitable in a particular location. Some of the assumptions used in the market analyses offered by Lowe’s were unreasonable and biased the results toward a finding of need for a home improvement store in the study area. The more persuasive evidence shows that there is no need for more commercial land, and no need for a home improvement store, in the area of the Lowe’s site. Lowe’s Parcel B is proposed for use as a school. The elementary, middle and high schools serving the area are over- capacity. Lowe’s expects the site to be used as a charter high school. Using an inventory of lands that was prepared by the County staff, Lowe’s planning expert investigated each parcel of land located within MSAs 3.2 and 6.1 that was over seven acres2 and determined that no parcel within either MSA was suitable for development as a high school. The record is unclear about how the Lowe’s Amendment fits into the plans of the County School Board. The proposition that there are no other potential school sites in the area was not firmly established by the testimony presented by Lowe’s. The need shown for the school site on Parcel B does not overcome the absence of demonstrated need for the Business and Office land use on Parcel A. It is beyond fair debate that that the Lowe’s Amendment is inconsistent with Policy LU-8F. The County’s determination that the Brown Amendment is consistent with Policy LU-8F is fairly debatable. Policy LU-8G Policy LU-8GA(i) identifies lands outside the UDB that “shall not be considered for inclusion in the UDB. Policy LU- 8G(ii) identifies other lands that “shall be avoided,” including (1) future wetlands, (2) lands designated Agriculture, (3) hurricane evacuation areas, and (4) lands that are part of the Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan. A peculiarity of the UEA is that it is composed entirely of lands that “shall be avoided” when the County considers adding lands to the UDB. The Department contends that “shall be avoided” means, in this context, that the County must make “a compelling showing that every other option has been exhausted” before the UDB can be expanded. However, the CDMP does not express that specific intent. The CDMP does not provide any direct guidance about how compelling the demonstration must be to expand the UDB. Policies LU-8F and LU-8G appear to call for a balancing approach, where the extent of the need for a particular expansion must be balanced against the associated impacts to UEA lands and related CDMP policies. The greater the needs for an expansion of the UDB, the greater are the impacts that can be tolerated. The smaller the need, the smaller are the tolerable impacts. Because the need for the Lowe’s Amendment was not shown, the application of the locational criteria in Policy LU- 8G is moot. However, the evidence presented by Lowe’s is addressed here. Within the meaning of Policy LU-8G(ii)(a), the wetlands that “shall be avoided” are those wetlands that are depicted on the Future Wetlands Map part of the Land Use Element of the CDMP. About 50 percent of the Lowes site is covered by wetlands that are on the Future Wetlands Map. Petitioners speculated that the construction of a Lowe’s home improvement store and school on the Lowe’s site could not be accomplished without harm to the wetlands on the site, but they presented no competent evidence to support that proposition. The wetland protections afforded under the environmental permitting statutes would not be affected by the Lowe’s Amendment. Nevertheless, this is a planning case, not a wetland permitting case. It is a well-recognized planning principle that lands which have a high proportion of wetlands are generally not suitable for land use designations that allow for intense uses. The Lowe’s Amendment runs counter to this principle. Policy LU-8F(iii) identifies areas that “shall be given priority” for inclusion in the UDB: Land within Planning Analysis Tiers having the earliest projected supply depletion year; Lands contiguous to the UDB; Locations within one mile of a planned urban center or extraordinary transit service; and Lands having projected surplus service capacity where necessary services can be readily extended. The Lowe’s site satisfies all but the first criterion. The Lowe’s site is in the Tier with the latest projected supply depletion year. It is beyond fair debate that that the Lowe’s Amendment is inconsistent with Policy LU-8G. Because a reasonable showing of need for the Brown Amendment was shown, it is appropriate to apply the locational criteria of Policy LU-8G. The Brown Amendment would expand the UDB into an area of the UEA that is designated Agriculture. The single goal of the CDMP’s Land Use Element refers to the preservation of the County’s “unique agricultural lands.” The CDMP refers elsewhere to the importance of protecting “viable agriculture.” Brown argued that these provisions indicate that the County did not intend to treat all agricultural lands similarly, and that agricultural activities like those on the Brown site, that are neither unique nor viable, were not intended to be preserved. Petitioners disagreed. The County made the Redland agricultural area one of the areas that “shall not be considered” for inclusion in the UDB. Therefore, the County knew how to preserve “unique” agricultural lands and prevent them from being re-designated and placed in the UDB. The only evidence in the record about the economic “viability” of the current agricultural activities on the Brown site shows they are marginally profitable, at best. The Brown site is relatively small, has a triangular shape, and is wedged between a major residential development and an arterial roadway, which detracts from its suitability for agricultural operations. These factors also diminish the precedent that the re-designation of the Brown site would have for future applications to expand the UDB. The Brown site satisfies all of the criteria in Policy LU-8G(iii) to be given priority for inclusion in the UDB. The County’s determination that the Brown Amendment is consistent with Policy LU-8G is fairly debatable. Policy EDU-2A Policy EDU-2A of the CDMP states that the County shall not purchase school sites outside the UDB. It is not clear why this part of the policy was cited by Petitioners, since the Lowe’s Amendment would place Parcel B inside the UDB. Policy EDU-2A also states that new elementary schools “should” be located at 1/4 mile inside the UDB, new middle schools “should” be located at least 1/2 mile inside the UDB, and new high schools “should” be located at least one mile inside the UDB. The policy states further that, “in substantially developed areas,” where conforming sites are not available, schools should be placed as far as practical from the UDB. Petitioners contend that the Lowe’s Amendment is inconsistent with Policy EDU-2A because Parcel B, the school site in the Lowe’s Amendment, would be contiguous to the UDB if the Lowe’s Amendment were approved. However, when a policy identifies circumstances that allow for an exception to a stated preference, it is necessary for challengers to show that the exceptional circumstances do not exist. It was Petitioners’ burden to demonstrate that there were conforming school sites farther from the UDB in the area of the Lowe’s site. Petitioners did meet their burden. The County’s determination that the Lowe’s Amendment is consistent with Policy EDU-2A is fairly debatable. Urban Sprawl 1000 Friends and NPCA allege that the Brown and Lowe’s Amendments would encourage the proliferation of urban sprawl. The Department did not raise urban sprawl as an “in compliance” issue. Florida Administrative Code Rule 9J-5.006(5)(g) identifies 13 “primary indicators” of urban sprawl. The presence and potential effects of multiple indicators is to be considered to determine “whether they collectively reflect a failure to discourage urban sprawl.” Fla. Admin. Code R. 9J- 5.006(5)(d). Indicator 1 is designating for development “substantial areas of the jurisdiction to develop as low- intensity, low-density, or single use development or uses in excess of demonstrated need.” It was found, above, that the County had a reasonable basis to determine there was a need for the Brown Amendment, but not for the Lowe’s Amendment. Therefore, this indicator is triggered only by the Lowe’s Amendment. Indicator 2 is designating significant amounts of urban development that leaps over undeveloped lands. The facts do not show that undeveloped lands were leaped over for either of the amendments. Indicator 3 is designating urban development “in radial, strip, isolated, or ribbon patterns.” The Lowe’s and Brown Amendments do not involve radial or isolated development patterns. What would constitute a “ribbon” pattern was not explained. Not every extension of existing commercial uses constitutes strip sprawl Other factors need to be considered. For example, both the Lowe’s and Brown sites are at major intersections where more intense land uses are commonly located. Under the circumstances shown in this record, this indicator is not triggered for either amendment. Indicator 4 is premature development of rural land that fails to adequately protect and conserve natural resources. This indicator is frequently cited by challengers when an amendment site contains wetlands or other natural resources, without regard to whether the potential impact to these resources has anything to do with sprawl. In the area of the Lowe’s site, the UDB generally divides urbanized areas from substantial wetlands areas that continue west to the Everglades. The Lowe’s Amendment intrudes into an area dominated by wetlands and, therefore, its potential to affect wetlands is an indication of sprawl. In the area of the Brown Amendment, the UDB generally separates urbanized areas from agricultural lands that already have been substantially altered from their natural state. The Brown Amendment invades an agricultural area, not an area of natural resources. Therefore, the potential impacts of the Brown Amendment on the small area of degraded wetlands on the Brown site do not indicate sprawl. Indicator 5 is failing to adequately protect adjacent agricultural areas and activities. Because this indicator focuses on “adjacent” agricultural areas, it is not obvious that it includes consideration of effects on the amendment site itself. If this indicator applies to the cessation of agricultural activities on the Brown site, then the Brown Amendment triggers this primary indicator. If the indicator applies only to agricultural activities adjacent to the Brown site, the evidence was insufficient to show that this indicator is triggered. Indicators 6, 7, and 8 are related to the orderly and efficient provision of public services and facilities. Urban sprawl is generally indicated when new public facilities must be created to serve the proposed use. Petitioners did not show that new public facilities must be created to serve the Lowe’s or Brown sites. The proposed amendments would maximize the use of existing water and sewer facilities. Petitioners did not show that the amendments would cause disproportionate increases in the costs of facilities and services. Indicator 9 is failing to provide a clear separation between rural and urban uses. The Lowe’s Amendment would create an irregular and less clear separation between urban and rural uses in the area and, therefore, the Lowe’s Amendment triggers this indicator. The Brown Amendment does not trigger this indicator because of it is situated between the large Vizcaya development and Kendall Drive, a major arterial roadway. The Brown Amendment would create a more regular separation between urban and rural uses in the area. Indicator 10 is discouraging infill or redevelopment. The CDMP delineates an Urban Infill Area (UIA) that is generally located east of the Palmetto Expressway and NW/SW 77th Avenue. Petitioners did not demonstrate that the Brown and Lowe’s Amendments discourage infill within the UIA. Petitioners did not show how any particular infill opportunities elsewhere in the UDB are impaired by the Lowe’s and Brown Amendments. However, the expansion of the UDB would diminish, at least to a small degree, the incentive for infill. This indicator, therefore, is triggered to a small degree by both amendments. The CDMP promotes redevelopment of buildings that are substandard or underdeveloped. Petitioners did not show how any particular redevelopment opportunities are impaired by the Lowe’s and Brown Amendments. However, the expansion of the UDB would diminish, at least to a small degree, the incentive to redevelop existing properties. This indicator, therefore, is triggered to a small degree by both amendments. Indicator 11 is failing to encourage or attract a functional mix of uses. Petitioners failed to demonstrate that this primary indicator is triggered. Indicator 12 is poor accessibility among linked or related uses. No evidence was presented to show that this indicator would be triggered. Indicator 13 is the loss of “significant” amounts of open space. These amendments do not result in the loss of significant amounts of open space, whether measured by acres, by the percentage of County open lands converted to other uses, or by any specific circumstances in the area of the amendment sites. Evaluating the Lowe’s Amendment using the primary indicators of urban sprawl and the criteria in Florida Administrative Code Rule 9J-5.006(5)(h) through (j), it is found by a preponderance of the evidence that the County’s adoption of the Lowe’s Amendment fails to discourage the proliferation of urban sprawl. Evaluating the Brown Amendment using the primary indicators of urban sprawl and the criteria in Florida Administrative Code Rule 9J-5.006(5)(h) through (j), it is found by a preponderance of the evidence that the County’s adoption of the Brown Amendment does not fail to discourage the proliferation of urban sprawl. Land Use Analysis The Department claims that the Lowe’s and Brown Amendments are inconsistent with Florida Administrative Code Rule 9J-5.006(2)(c), which requires that the land use element of a comprehensive plan be based on an analysis of the amount of land needed to accommodate projected population. The Department believes the analyses of need presented by Lowe’s and Brown’s consultants were not professionally acceptable. Petitioners proved by a preponderance of the evidence that there was no need for the Lowe’s Amendment. Therefore, the Lowe’s Amendment is inconsistent with Florida Administrative Code Rule 9J-5.006(2)(c). A preponderance of competent, substantial, and professionally acceptable evidence of need, in conformance with and including the methodology used by the County planning staff, demonstrated that the Brown Amendment is consistent with Florida Administrative Code Rule 9J-5.006(2)(c).3 Florida Administrative Code Chapter 9J-5 - Natural Resources Petitioners contend the Lowe’s Amendment is inconsistent with the provisions of Florida Administrative Code Chapter 9J-5, which require that the land use element of every comprehensive plan contain a goal to protect natural resources, and that every conservation element contain goals, objectives, and policies for the protection of vegetative communities, wildlife habitat, endangered and threatened species, and wetlands. Petitioners failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the CDMP does not contain these required goals, objectives, and policies. Therefore, Petitioners failed to prove that the Lowe’s amendment is inconsistent with these provisions of Florida Administrative Code Chapter 9J-5.4 The State Comprehensive Plan Petitioners contend that the Lowe’s and Brown amendments are inconsistent with several provisions of the State Comprehensive Plan. Goal (9)(a) of the State Comprehensive Plan and its associated policies address the protection of natural systems. Petitioners contend that only the Lowe’s Amendment is inconsistent with this goal and its policies. For the reasons stated previously, Petitioners showed by a preponderance of the evidence that the County’s adoption of the Lowe’s Amendment is inconsistent with this goal and its policies. Goal (15)(a) and its associated policies address land use, especially development in areas where public services and facilities are available. Policy (15)(b)2. is to encourage a separation of urban and rural uses. Because the Lowe’s Amendment is inconsistent with Policies LU-8F and LU-8G of the CDMP, the County’s adoption of the Lowe’s Amendment is inconsistent with this goal and policy. For the reasons stated above, Petitioners failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the County’s adoption of the Brown Amendment is inconsistent with this goal and its associated policies Goal (16)(a) and its associated policies address urban and downtown revitalization. Although the expansion of the UDB diminishes the incentive to infill or redevelop, Petitioners did not show this effect, when considered in the context of the CDMP as a whole and the State Comprehensive Plan as a whole, impairs the achievement of this goal and its associated policies to an extent that the proposed amendments are inconsistent with this goal of the State Comprehensive Plan and its associated policies. Goal (17)(a) and its associated policies address the planning and financing of and public facilities. For the reasons stated previously, Petitioners failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the County’s adoption of the proposed amendments is inconsistent with this goal and its associated policies. Goal (22)(a) addresses agriculture. Policy(b)1. is to ensure that state and regional plans are not interpreted to permanently restrict the conversion of agricultural lands to other uses. This policy recognizes that agricultural landowners have the same right to seek to change the use of their lands, and that engaging in agricultural activities is not a permanent servitude to the general public. The policies cited by Petitioners (regarding the encouragement of agricultural diversification, investment in education and research, funding of extension services, and maintaining property tax benefits) are not affected by the Brown Amendment. For the reasons stated above, Petitioners failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the County’s adoption of the Brown Amendment is inconsistent with this goal and its associated policies. Goal (25)(a) and its associated policies address plan implementation, intergovernmental coordination and citizen involvement, and ensuring that local plans reflect state goals and policies. Because the Lowe’s Amendment is inconsistent with Policies LU-8F and LU-8G of the CDMP, and was found to contribute to the proliferation of urban sprawl, Petitioners proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the County’s adoption of the Lowe’s Amendment is inconsistent with this goal and its associated policies. Petitioners proved by a preponderance of the evidence that when the State Comprehensive Plan is construed as a whole, the County’s adoption of the Lowe’s Amendment is inconsistent with the State Comprehensive Plan. Petitioners failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that when the State Comprehensive Plan is construed as a whole, the County’s adoption of the Brown Amendment is inconsistent with the State Comprehensive Plan.. Strategic Regional Policy Plan Petitioners claim that the Lowe’s Amendment is inconsistent with Goals 11, 12, and 20 of the Strategic Regional Policy Plan of the South Florida Regional Planning Council (SFRPC) and several policies associated with these goals. The SFRPC reviewed the proposed Brown Amendment and found it was generally consistent with the Strategic Regional Policy Plan. Goal 11 and its associated policies encourage the conservation of natural resources and agricultural lands, and the use of existing and planned infrastructure. For the reasons stated previously, Petitioners proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the County’s adoption of the Lowe’s Amendment is inconsistent with this goal and its associated policies. Goal 12 and its associated policies encourage the retention of rural lands and agricultural economy. The CDMP encourages the retention of rural lands and agricultural economy. Because it was found that the Lowe’s Amendment was inconsistent with Policies LU-8F and LU-8G, Petitioners proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the County’s adoption of the Lowe’s Amendment was inconsistent with this regional goal and its policies. Goal 20 and its associated policies are to achieve development patterns that protect natural resources and guide development to areas where there are public facilities. Because it was found that there is no need for the Lowe’s Amendment and that it constitutes urban sprawl, Petitioners proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the County’s adoption of the Lowe’s Amendment is inconsistent with these regional goal and policies.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Administration Commission enter a final order determining that: Ordinance No. 08-44, the Lowe’s Amendment, is not in compliance, and Ordinance No. 08-45, the Brown Amendment, is in compliance. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of May, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. BRAM D. E. CANTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of May, 2009.
The Issue The issue is whether the City of Miami's small scale development amendment adopted by Ordinance No. 12550 on June 24, 2004, is in compliance.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Background On December 31, 2003, Intervenor submitted an application to the City for an amendment to the FLUM which would change the land use designation on a 7.91-acre tract of property from Industrial and General Commercial to Restricted Commercial. The property is located at 1818 and 1844 Northwest North River Drive, Miami, and is situated on the north side of the Miami River. It is bordered by Northwest North River Drive to the north, the Miami River to the south, and a recently renovated condominium development known as Serenity to the east. At one time (the specific date is unknown), the property was used as a boat repair facility and commercial marina. The property is currently unused. The application was submitted concurrently with an application for a zoning change in connection with Intervenor's intent to develop a mixed use project on the property. The applications were reviewed by the City's Planning and Zoning Department (Planning Department). The Planning Department recommended that the applications be approved. In doing so, it determined that the land use change furthers the objectives of the Plan, and that the land use pattern in the neighborhood should be changed. On April 7, 2004, the City Planning Advisory Board voted 4-3 in favor of recommending approval of the application. However, that vote constituted a denial due to the failure to obtain five favorable votes. Both the FLUM and zoning applications were initially presented for first reading to the City Commission (Commission) on April 22, 2004. At that meeting, the Commission voted to approve both applications. The applications were again presented to the Commission on June 24, 2004. At that time, Balbino's application for a major use special permit was also presented to the Commission. After consideration, the Commission adopted Ordinance No. 12550, which amended the FLUM by changing the land use designation on the property, as requested by Intervenor. (It also granted the rezoning request and approved the issuance of a major use special permit.) The Ordinance was signed by the City's Mayor on July 7, 2004. Because the amendment is a small scale development amendment under Section 163.3187(1)(c), Florida Statutes, it was not reviewed by the Department. See § 163.3187(3)(a), Fla. Stat. On August 5, 2004, Petitioners filed their Petition challenging the FLUM amendment generally alleging that the amendment involved a use of more than ten acres and therefore was not a small scale development amendment, that the amendment was internally inconsistent with other provisions in the City's Plan, and that the amendment was not supported by adequate data and analysis. After an intervening appeal to the Third District Court of Appeal, which involved the timeliness of their Petition, on March 1, 2006, Petitioners filed their Amended Petition which added additional grounds for finding the amendment not in compliance. On August 17, 2006, Intervenor, who is the contract owner of the property, petitioned to intervene in this proceeding. That request was granted on August 18, 2004. The Parties Durham Park is a non-profit corporation comprised of approximately ninety homeowners who reside within the Durham Park area. It lies on the south side of the Miami River across from Balbino's property. According to its president, Horacio Aguirre, every homeowner is automatically a member of the association but no dues are assessed. A list of members is not maintained. At the hearing, Mr. Aguirre acknowledged that the association is not engaged in any business and does not own any property. Although its corporate purpose is not of record, the association occasionally meets to discuss issues that "impact the neighborhood," including the amendment being challenged here. No minutes of meetings are kept. Once, in September 2003, the association published a newsletter. Mr. Aguirre appeared before the City Commission on behalf of Durham Park and offered comments in opposition to the plan amendment. Ann Stetser resides in a ten-story condominium at 1700 Northwest North River Drive, which is on the north side of the River and just east of the subject property. The Serenity condominium development lies between her condominium and Intervenor's property. Ms. Stetser offered oral or written comments to the City regarding the small scale amendment. Therefore, she is an affected person and has standing to bring this challenge. Mr. Payne resides in the City of Davie in Broward County but owns and operates a tug boat company known as Towing and Transportation, which is located in the Lower River portion of the Miami River. Mr. Payne submitted timely comments to the City regarding the small scale amendment and thus is an affected person with standing to bring this action. Miami River Marine Group, Inc. is a private, non- profit trade association comprised of approximately fifty-five members, each of which is a private business. Its mission "is to protect the working river." The executive director of the association, Fran Bohnsack, appeared before the City Commission on behalf of the association and offered comments in opposition to the proposed amendment. The parties agree that Miami River Marine Group, Inc. is an affected person and has standing to participate. The City is a political subdivision of the State of Florida. It initially adopted the Plan in 1989. The Plan has been amended from time to time. Balbino is the contract purchaser of the subject property. Balbino submitted comments concerning the amendment to the City at its meeting on June 24, 2004, and is an affected person with standing to participate in this proceeding. Relevant Provisions of the Plan The section of the Plan entitled "Interpretation of the Future Land Use Plan Map" describes the various land use categories in the Plan. See Joint Exhibit 2, pages 13-16. It describes the Industrial land use category as follows: Industrial: The areas designated as "Industrial" allow manufacturing, assembly and storage activities. The "Industrial" designation generally includes activities that would otherwise generate excessive amounts of noise, smoke, fumes, illumination, traffic, hazardous wastes, or negative visual impact unless properly controlled. Stockyards, rendering works, smelting and refining plants and similar activities are excluded. Residential uses are not permitted in the "Industrial" designation, except for rescue missions, and live-aboards in commercial marinas. The section also describes the "General Commercial" land use classification as follows: General Commercial: Areas designated as "General Commercial" allow all activities included in the "Office" and the "Restricted Commercial" designations, as well as wholesaling and distribution activities that generally serve the needs of other businesses; generally require on and off loading facilities; and benefit from close proximity to industrial areas. These commercial activities include retailing of second hand items, automotive repair services, new and used vehicle sales, parking lots and garages, heavy equipment sales and service, building material sales and storage, wholesaling, warehousing, distribution and transport related services, light manufacturing and assembly and other activities whose scale of operation and land use impacts are similar to those uses described above. Multifamily residential structures of a density equal to R-3 or higher, but not to exceed a maximum of 150 units per acre, are allowed by Special Exception only, upon finding that the proposed site's proximity to other residentially zoned property makes it a logical extension or continuation of existing residential development and that adequate services and amenities exist in the adjacent area to accommodate the needs of potential residents. This category also allows commercial marinas and living quarters on vessels for transients. Finally, the section describes the "Restricted Commercial" land use category as follows: Restricted Commercial: Areas designated as "Restricted Commercial" allow residential uses (except rescue missions) to a maximum density equivalent to "High Density Multifamily Residential" subject to the same limiting conditions; any activity included in the "Office" designation as well as commercial activities that generally serve the daily retailing and service needs of the public, typically requiring easy access by personal auto, and often located along arterial or collector roadways, which include: general retailing, personal and professional services, real estate, banking and other financial services, restaurants, saloons and cafes, general entertainment facilities, private clubs and recreation facilities, major sports and exhibition or entertainment facilities and other commercial activities whose scale and land use impacts are similar in nature to those uses described above, places of worship, primary and secondary schools. This category also includes commercial marinas and living quarters on vessels as permissible. The Plan is based on a pyramid structure. See Joint Exhibit 2, Interpretation of the Future Land Use Plan Map, page 13, paragraph 4. That is, each land use classification permits all land uses within previously listed categories, except as otherwise specifically provided in the Plan. Therefore, with the exception of residential uses, all uses permitted under the Restricted Commercial designation are permitted under the Industrial classification. The Restricted Commercial category is a logical designation for the property because of its proximity to residential neighborhoods. Those residential properties would clearly be more detrimentally affected by industrial activities that may generate excessive amounts of noise, smoke, fumes, illumination, traffic, hazardous wastes, or negative visual impact, which are now authorized under the Industrial designation. The Miami River The Miami River runs northwest to southeast for more than five miles from the Miami International Airport to Biscayne Bay (the mouth of the River). For planning purposes, it includes three sections: the Upper River, the Middle River, and the Lower River. Although the demarcations of those sections are in dispute, the best evidence of the appropriate demarcations of the three sections is found in the Miami River Master Plan (Master Plan), which was adopted by the City in 1992. See Joint Exhibit 1. The Master Plan clearly depicts the geographic scope of the Mid-River (or Middle River) as extending west to Northwest 27th Avenue and the Up River (or Upper River) as being that portion of the Miami River lying west of Northwest 27th Avenue. Based on these demarcations, the Lower River would run from the mouth of the Miami River to the 5th Street Bridge, the Middle River from the 5th Street Bridge to Northwest 27th Avenue, and the Upper River from Northwest 27th Avenue westward. It is undisputed that Intervenor's property is located on the Middle River. The parties agree that Restricted Commercial is a reasonable land use designation for the Middle River. Petitioners' expert witness also agreed that the Middle River "is supposed to be a mix of residential." In its discussion of the Middle River, the Master Plan provides: The Mid-River area contains most of the existing housing located along the Miami River. The wide variety of dwelling types, ranging from single family homes to high- rise apartment/condominium buildings, are mostly occupied by middle-income households. This is an important segment of the population for the City to retain in order to support the local economy and tax base. A number of opportunities remain for development of new housing by building on vacant lots or by increasing the density of existing developed lots. New housing construction should be encouraged, except on lands reserved for water dependent uses. In the proposed SD-4.1 waterfront commercial zoning district (See page 1.14) residential development could be permitted as an accessory use to a marina. The property is located within the referenced proposed SD-4.1 waterfront commercial zoning district. According to the Master Plan, the strategy for the Middle River is to "[b]ring the neighborhoods back to the river." The Master Plan further provides that "[d]iverse residential neighborhoods interspersed with commercial districts make the Mid-River unusual. The strategy is to develop centers of activities at strategic locations that will become gateways to the river and give identity to the neighborhoods." In contrast, the Master Plan describes the Up-River as "a working river." It also notes that "[m]arine industries in the Up-River area create a busy, economically vital district that is important to preserve. The challenge is to protect these industries from displacement by non-water-dependent uses and to nurture growth in marine industries without negatively impacting nearby residential neighborhoods." In describing the Upper River, the Master Plan provides: The character of the river changes dramatically west of NW 27th Avenue bridge. In fact, it is not really the river there; it is the man-made Miami Canal (and the Tamiami Canal branching off to the west). In contrast to the gently curving paths and irregular edges of the natural river, the canal banks are rigidly straight and significantly closer together at 90 feet. The most striking difference in the up-river area is the change in land use. The Miami Canal is almost entirely industrial in character, with commercial shipping being the predominant use. Most of the larger cargo vessels on the Miami River are loaded and unloaded in this area, resulting in an incredibly busy, narrow river channel. Due to the industrial nature of the up-river corridor, many of the urban design recommendations made for the mid-river and downtown areas are not applicable. The emphasis in this area should be to promote growth in shipping and related industries and to provide adequate roadways for the vehicles and trucks associated with these businesses. Allapattah The property is located in a community development target area known as Allapattah. Community development target areas are neighborhoods to which the City directs community block grants for revitalization. In need of revitalization, Allapattah has deteriorated over time and is one of the poorest neighborhoods in the City. Allapattah has been designated as a neighborhood development zone, a designation used in connection with community development programs. Also within the Allapattah neighborhood, and less than one mile from the subject property, is an area known as the Civic Center. The Civic Center includes Jackson Hospital, Cedars Hospital, the Justice Building, the County Jail, and government offices. More than 25,000 persons work in the Civic Center area. The area continues to expand. Urban Infill Area It is undisputed that the property is located within an urban infill area. Among the purposes of an urban infill designation are the promotion of the efficient use of infrastructure, including transportation and the prevention of urban sprawl. The Civic Center area is a major transportation hub and includes a metro rail station that is located approximately a five-minute drive from the property. The property is also served by several bus routes. As to urban sprawl, the amendment will fulfill a need for housing for persons who work in the Civic Center area. By doing so, the amendment is also expected to promote job creation. The Size of the Parcel Petitioners first contend that the parcel actually comprises 10.41 acres and therefore exceeds the threshold size (ten acres or fewer) for small scale development amendments. Petitioners point out that the approved companion rezoning and special permit encompasses 10.41 acres, while the application for the FLUM amendment is for 7.91 acres. Petitioners argue that the total area encompassed by the rezoning and special permit applications is the correct number to use in determining the actual size of the parcel. The application for the FLUM amendment included a site drawing on which the surveyor certified that the "NET TOTAL LOT AREA" of the property is 7.91 acres. This acreage includes upland and submerged lands and comprises all of the land under Intervenor's ownership and/or control. (Slightly more than one- half of the 7.91 acres is upland property, while the remainder is submerged land in the Miami River where Balbino will construct a marina.) The site drawing also includes areas adjacent to the property (from the boundaries of the property to the centerline of the adjacent rights-of-way and the centerline of the Miami River) and the surveyor's calculation of the sizes of those areas. The sum of the acreage of those areas and of the property is referred to as the "gross total lot area." To determine the size of the property for a future land use map amendment, for at least the last twenty-two years the City has employed the "net lot area" concept. Under that concept, defined in the City's Zoning Ordinance, an applicant may only seek a future land use map amendment with respect to property under its ownership or control, and the only property on which a land use classification is changed as a result of such an application is that which is within the ownership or control of the applicant. Approval of an application for a future land use map amendment does not result in a change in land use classification for lands not within the ownership or control of an applicant, such as a public right-of-way. Petitioners seek to contravene the City's longstanding use of net lot area in determining the size of property subject to a future land use map amendment by contending that it is the gross lot area that should be considered in determining the size of the property subject to the FLUM amendment. By doing so, however, they are improperly attempting to apply a zoning concept to the City's Plan process. More specifically, the concept of "gross total lot area" is relevant only for use in a mathematical calculation of "floor area ratio." Floor area ratio is a mathematical calculation pursuant to which the City determines the square footage of buildings that may be built on a particular piece of property. The City's Zoning Ordinance permits a property owner to include portions of the acreage of adjacent rights-of-way, bays, parks, or other open spaces in the floor area calculation. The floor area calculation will not be affected by the FLUM amendment. The City's net lot area approach is the correct methodology to be used in determining the size of the parcel. Therefore, the map amendment involves or uses only 7.91 acres and was properly considered by the City as a small scale development amendment. Consistency of the Amendment with the Plan At the hearing, Petitioners failed to present any evidence bearing on the consistency (or lack thereof) of the amendment with the following Plan objectives and policies: LU- 1.2.3, LU-1.3.1, HO-1.1, HO-1.2, SS-1.4, SS-2.1, SS-2.2, SS-2.5, SW-1.1, SS-2.1, SS-2.5, SW-1.1, PR-1.1, PR-1.4, CM-1.1, CM-2.1, CM-4.2, NR-1.1, NR-1.2, NR-3.2, and CI-1.3. Accordingly, Petitioners' challenge to the amendment based upon alleged inconsistencies with these objectives and policies must fail. Remaining for consideration are allegations that the amendment is inconsistent with Goal LU-1, Policy LU-1.3.6, and Objectives LU-1.2, LU-1.3, LU-1.6, SS-2.2, PW-1.2, TR-1.1, PA- 3.3, CM-3.1, CM-4.1, NR-1.3, NR-2.1, and CI-1.4. Goal LU-1 in the Plan's Future Land Use Element (FLUE) provides that a goal of the Plan shall be to: Maintain a land use pattern that (1) protects and enhances the quality of life in the city's residential neighborhoods; (2) fosters redevelopment and revitalization of blighted or declining areas; (3) promotes and facilitates economic development and the growth of job opportunities in the city; (4) fosters the growth and development of downtown as a regional center of domestic and international commerce, culture and entertainment; (5) promotes the efficient use of land and minimizes land use conflicts; and (6) protects and conserves the city's significant natural and coastal resources. The property is surrounded by residential neighborhoods. By eliminating the potential for development on the property of industrial uses that may generate "excessive amounts of noise, smoke, fumes, illumination, traffic, hazardous wastes, or negative visual impact," the amendment will enhance the quality of life in those surrounding neighborhoods. The Allapatah neighborhood, in which the property is located, is a declining area. The amendment is therefore consistent with subpart (2) of Goal LU-1, which is concerned with the redevelopment and revitalization of declining areas. Petitioners have also alleged that the amendment is inconsistent with subpart (3) of the Goal because it will negatively impact marine industrial uses along the Miami River. However, no persuasive evidence to support this contention was offered. Subpart (4) is not relevant to this case because it pertains to the downtown area and the property is not located in that part of the City. As to subpart (5), Petitioners offered no evidence that the amendment is inconsistent with the concept of the promotion of the efficient use of land. On the other hand, the evidence shows that the amendment will minimize land use conflicts by placing a land use classification on the property that is consistent with adjacent residential areas. Petitioners failed to offer any evidence that the amendment is inconsistent with subpart (6), which pertains to the protection and conservation of natural and coastal resources. FLUE Objective LU-1.2 provides that one of the objectives of the Plan is to: Promote the redevelopment and revitalization of blighted, declining or threatened residential, commercial and industrial areas. Because the property is in the Allapatah neighborhood, which is a declining residential area, the amendment will promote redevelopment and revitalization of that area and is therefore consistent with the Objective. FLUE Objective LU-1.3 provides as follows: The City will continue to encourage commercial, office and industrial development within existing commercial, office and industrial areas; increase the utilization and enhance the physical character and appearance of existing buildings; and concentrate new commercial and industrial activity in areas where the capacity of existing public facilities can meet or exceed the minimum standards for Level of Service (LOS) adopted in the Capital Improvement Element (CIE). The concurrency analysis performed by the City shows that approval of the amendment will not result in a failure of existing public facilities to meet or exceed applicable LOS minimum standards. At the same time, the new Restricted Commercial land use category permits the types of land uses that Objective LU- 1.3 seeks to encourage, namely, commercial and office uses. FLUE Policy LU-1.3.6 provides: The City will continue to encourage a diversification in the mix of industrial and commercial activities and tenants through comprehensive marketing and promotion efforts so that the local economy is buffered from national and international cycles. Particular emphasis is on, but not limited to, Southeast Overtown/Park West, Latin quarter, Little Haiti, Little River Industrial District, River Corridor, the Garment District and the Omni area. In considering the amendment, the City gave particular significance to the fact that the Restricted Commercial designation would allow greater flexibility in the development of the property. Such greater flexibility is consistent with the promotion of a diversification in the mix of industrial and commercial activities. The mix of uses permitted under the Restricted Commercial land use classification will promote urban infill and serve to prevent urban sprawl. As such, the amendment is consistent with Policy LU-1.3.6. FLUE Objective LU-1.6 provides as follows: Regulate the development or redevelopment of real property within the City to ensure consistency with the goals, objectives and policies of the Comprehensive Plan. This Objective (and its underlying policies) is not relevant because it pertains specifically to land development regulations. Even so, there was no evidence to show that the amendment is inconsistent with the Objective. Potable Water Element Objective PW-1.2 and Natural Resource Conservation Objective R-2.1 are identical and provide as follows: Ensure adequate levels of safe potable water are available to meet the needs of the City. Petitioners presented no evidence that the amendment is inconsistent with either Objective. Rather, they asserted that in evaluating the amendment application, the City failed to do an independent analysis to address the availability of potable water. (The City relied on information provided by Metro-Dade County.) The City's concurrency analysis revealed that potable water supplies will be available to the City even after the amendment becomes effective. Petitioners also failed to provide any evidence that the potable water usage under the Restricted Commercial classification would exceed that which may occur under the Industrial land use classification. Further, Petitioners failed to provide any evidence that there is a potable water deficiency in the City, or that the amendment would cause one. Finally, there was no evidence that the reliance on information provided by other local governments was unreasonable. Transportation Element Objective TR-1.1 provides as follows: All arterial and collector roadways under County and State jurisdiction that lie within the City's boundaries will operate at levels of service established by the respective agency. All other City streets will operate at levels of service that are consistent with an urban center possessing an extensive urban public transit system and characterized by compact development and moderate-to-high residential densities and land use densities, and within a transportation concurrency exception area (TCEA). The City will monitor the levels of service of all arterial and collector roadways to continue to develop and enhance transportation strategies that promote transit and minimize the impacts of the TCEA. Petitioners contend that the concurrency analysis performed by the City assumed that an unreasonably high percentage of persons accessing the property would use a form of transportation other than an automobile. However, Petitioners' expert conceded that he had no expertise in traffic analysis, and that the City's analysis was performed by persons who did. Because the challenge is based on criticism that is not supported by credible expert testimony, the assertion must necessarily fail. Coastal Management Element Objective CM-3.1 provides as follows: Allow no net loss of acreage devoted to water dependent uses in the coastal area of the City of Miami. Florida Administrative Code Rule 9J-5.003(137) defines "water-dependent uses" as "activities which can be carried out only on, in or adjacent to water areas because the use requires access to the water body for water-borne transportation including ports or marinas; recreation; electrical generating facilities; or water supply." Witness Payne, who is a tug boat captain, stated that the United States Coast Guard requires vessels over five hundred gross tons to "leave the port, seek shelter" in the event of a hurricane and that Intervenor's property is a destination for boats seeking shelter from a hurricane. Because the land use on the property is Industrial, there is no requirement that a marina or any other water-related facility be located on the property as an available site for boats seeking shelter from a hurricane, even in the absence of the amendment. In addition, the Restricted Commercial land use category permits commercial marinas; therefore, the amendment in no way prevents the property from serving as a destination for boats over five hundred gross tons seeking shelter. Finally, because the property can already be developed in such a manner that it would be used by large numbers of persons (e.g., offices and malls), there is no basis upon which to conclude that the amendment will have any impact on the potential for loss of human life and destruction of property by hurricanes. Natural Resources Element NR-1.3 provides as follows: Maintain and enhance the status of native species of fauna and flora. Although the parties agree that there are manatees in the Miami River, Petitioners failed to provide any evidence identifying locations along the Miami River where such manatees are found, or any evidence that the amendment would have any impact on those manatees. It is fair to conclude that by eliminating the potential for development that might include such uses that involve noise, fumes, smoke, and hazardous wastes, this will enhance the status of native species of flora and fauna. Capital Improvements Element Objective CI-1.4 provides as follows: Ensure that public capital expenditure within the coastal zone does not encourage private development that is subject to significant risk of storm damage. Contrary to Petitioners' assertion, this Objective does not provide that the City should discourage development in the coastal zone. For example, there are other areas of substantial development within the coastal zone, such as Brickell Avenue. The amendment does not trigger the expenditure of public funds for capital improvements. This is clearly demonstrated by a comparison of development permitted under the Industrial and Restricted Commercial land use classifications. Due to the intensity of development allowed under either land use classification, there is no basis upon which to conclude any development under the Restricted Commercial land use classification will require any greater infrastructure expenditures than development under the Industrial land use classification. Based on the foregoing, it is fairly debatable that the map amendment is internally consistent with other provisions of the Plan. Data and analysis Petitioners contend that the amendment "is not based on the best available, professional acceptable, existing data," as required by Florida Administrative Code Rule 9J-5.005 and Section 163.3177, Florida Statutes. However, they failed to offer any evidence that the City failed to consider any relevant data in existence at the time the amendment was adopted, or that the City failed to appropriately react to that data. The preponderance of the evidence supports a finding that the City had sufficient data and analysis available at the time the amendment was adopted to justify its approval. For example, the staff considered data provided by Balbino in its application package; data (such as potable water and wastewater transmission capacities) supplied by Metro-Dade County; the Miami River Master Plan; maps; the target area plans for Allapattah; the current Plan, including the extensive data and analysis supporting the Plan found in Volume II; and other related information, including support by citizen groups from the Allapattah area. In response to that data, among other things, the staff performed a concurrency management analysis concerning the availability of public facilities and levels of service (although actual levels of service cannot be determined until the City knows what is going to be built on the site), and it performed a land use study focusing on the area around the subject property and the compatibility of uses in the area with the new land use designation. A summary of the staff's efforts are found in a fact sheet and analysis package which accompanied the amendment. One of Petitioners' primary criticisms on this issue is that the City relied upon Metro-Dade County to provide certain data pertaining to concurrency matters (traffic and potable water). However, Petitioners failed to prove that this data was insufficient to support the adoption of the amendment or that it was unreasonable to rely on that information. Moreover, at least with respect to traffic, small scale amendments are exempt from the requirement that plan amendment applications be accompanied by a traffic concurrency study. Petitioners also contend that the City ignored certain data which shows that the amendment disrupts the existing land use pattern supporting water-dependent uses. As noted above, however, the City performed an extensive land use study to consider, among other things, these very concerns and concluded that the new land use designation is compatible with adjacent properties and consistent with the Plan. It is fairly debatable that the challenged plan amendment is supported by professionally acceptable data and analysis, and that the City reacted to that data and analysis in an appropriate manner. The Port of Miami River Petitioners also argue that the Port of Miami River Sub-Element must be considered in determining whether the amendment is in compliance. This Sub-Element is found within the Plan's Ports, Aviation and Related Facilities Element. It is an optional element not required under Chapter 163, Florida Statutes. The Plan defines the Port of Miami River as: Simply a legal name used to identify some 14 independent, privately-owned small shipping companies located along the Miami River, and is not a "port facility" within the usual meaning of the term. The identification of the shipping concerns as the "Port of Miami River" was made in 1986 for the sole purpose of satisfying a U.S. Coast Guard regulation governing bilge pump outs. The private shipping companies identified as comprising the Port of Miami River are listed in Volume II of the Plan. The location of each of those companies is also shown. See Joint Exhibit 3, Section VIII, page 35. An updated list is found in the City's Evaluation and Appraisal Report. (A few companies are located outside the City's boundaries in unincorporated Dade County.) None are located on 18th Avenue, where the subject property is found. Over the years, the City has consistently interpreted this Sub-Element as applying only to properties that are listed in Volume II of the Plan. Because Intervenor's property is not included within the definition of the Port of Miami River, in reviewing the application, the City adhered to its long-standing interpretation that the Sub-Element was not applicable or relevant to the analysis of the amendment's consistency with the Plan. See Monkus, supra at 33- 34. Under the majority opinion in Payne II, however, the Sub-Element appears to be relevant and is "intended to apply to the 'uses along the banks of the Miami River", and not just to specific companies named in the definition.3 Even so, only Objective PA-3.3 would require consideration.4 That objective reads as follows: The City of Miami shall coordinate its Port of Miami River planning activities with those of ports facilities and regulators including the U.S. Corps of Engineers, U.S. Coast Guard, and Miami-Dade County's Port of Miami. Petitioners failed to present any evidence concerning a lack of coordination activities relative to the FLUM amendment. Coordination does not mean that adjacent local governments or other interested persons have veto power over the City's ability to enact plan amendments. City of West Palm Beach et al. v. Department of Community Affairs et al., 2005 Fla. ENV LEXIS 191 at *34, DOAH Case Nos. 04-4336GM, 04-4337GM, and 04-4650GM (DOAH July 18, 2005, DCA Oct. 21, 2005). Rather, the City needs only take into consideration input from interested persons. Id. at *35. The City established that pursuant to its Resolution No. 00-320, before any resolution, ordinance, or issue affecting the Miami River is considered, the City Manager is required to inform the Miami River Commission (MRC) of that impending matter. The MRC serves as a clearinghouse for all interests of the Miami River, including residential, economic, and industrial interests, as well as the other entities listed in the Objective. See §§ 163.06 et seq., Fla. Stat. The evidence shows that the MRC was notified before the amendment was considered, and that it provided a recommendation to the Commission. At the same time, Petitioners, their expert witness (Mr. Luft), and other interested persons were also given an opportunity to provide input into the process before the amendment was adopted. Therefore, the requirements of the Objective and Sub-Element have been met. Other Issues Finally, in their Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Petitioners contend that "[t]he FLUM amendment renders the Port of Miami River Sub-Element (goals, objectives, and policies) vague, ambiguous, permissive, and without measurable and predictable standards." They also assert that the amendment "is an over-allocation of residential land use and is not economically feasible." Because these issues were not specifically raised in the Amended Petition or the parties' Pre-Hearing Stipulation, to the extent they are not otherwise discussed above, they have been waived. Even if the issues had been adequately pled, there is insufficient evidence to support these claims.
Conclusions For Petitioners: Andrew W. J. Dickman, Esquire Law Offices of Andrew Dickman, P.A. Post Office Box 771390 Naples, Florida 34107-1390 For Respondent: Rafael Suarez-Rivas, Esquire Assistant City Attorney 444 Southwest 2nd Avenue, Suite 945 Miami, Florida 33130-1910 For Intervenor: Paul R. Lipton, Esquire Pamela A. DeBooth, Esquire Greenberg Traurig, P.A. 1221 Brickell Avenue Miami, Florida 33131-3224 David C. Ashburn, Esquire Greenberg Traurig, P.A. Post Office Box 1838 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1838
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Community Affairs enter a final order determining that the small scale development plan amendment adopted by Ordinance No. 2055.1 is in compliance. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of May, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DONALD R ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of May, 2006.
Conclusions An Administrati ve Law Judge of the Division of Administrative Hearings has entered an Order Closing File in this proceeding. A copy of the Order is attached to this Final Order as Exhibit A.
The Issue The issue is whether Polk County's small scale development amendment (CPA2003S-02) adopted by Ordinance No. 03-03 on January 22, 2003, as later amended by Ordinance No. 03-19 on March 15, 2003, is in compliance.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Background Berry is the owner of a tract of land located on the southwest corner of the intersection of Eagle Lake Loop Road (County Road 540-A) and Pollard Road in Section 16, Township 29, Range 26 in the eastern part of unincorporated Polk County, Florida. The property lies south of the City of Winter Haven, east-southeast of the City of Eagle Lake, less than a mile south of Lake Eloise (on which Cypress Gardens is located), and west of U.S. Highway 27. Because Berry owns property within the County, and submitted oral and written comments to the County prior to the adoption of the challenged amendment, it has standing to participate in this action. On July 19, 2002, Berry filed an application with the County Planning Department seeking to change the land use on 9.99 acres (or just below the threshold of 10.0 acres for a small scale amendment) from RL-1 to Neighborhood Activity Center (NAC) to include approximately 4.95 acres of various neighborhood specialty shops such as a grocery store, drug store, convenience store, and dry cleaners, with the remaining acreage used as a mini-warehouse self-storage facility. In September 2002, Berry amended its application by seeking to change 3.93 acres from RL-1 to CC and 6.06 acres from RL-1 to BPC-1. The application was assigned Case File No. CPA2003S- 02. Under the County's review process, the application is first reviewed by the County Development Review Committee (Committee), then by the County Planning Commission (CPC), which either accepts or rejects the Committee's recommendation, and finally by the Board of County Commissioners (Board), which either adopts the amendment, adopts the amendment as amended by the Board, or rejects the amendment. After conducting a preliminary review of the application, on September 16, 2002, the Committee conducted a public hearing and voted to recommend approval. The matter was then transmitted to the CPC, which conducted a meeting on October 9, 2002, and recommended that the Board approve the amendment. On January 22, 2003, by a 3-2 vote, the Board adopted CPA2003S-02 changing the designation on the FLUM of the County Comprehensive Plan (Plan) as proposed by Berry. This was confirmed by the County's adoption of Ordinance No. 03-03. On February 21, 2003, Petitioners filed their Petition challenging the Berry amendment. The matter was again placed on the Board's agenda on March 19, 2003, after the County discovered that Ordinance No. 03-03 had inadvertently changed the land use on the entire parcel to CC rather a mix of CC and BPC-1. In addition, there were minor errors in the legal description of both the 3.93 and 6.06-acre parcels. Accordingly, Ordinance No. 03-19 was enacted to correct those errors. A second Petition for Formal Administrative Proceedings (with essentially the same allegations, but also adding an allegation that the same property had been improperly subject to two small scale amendments within a 12- month period) was filed by Petitioners on March 19, 2003, challenging the action taken in Ordinance No. 03-19. At the outset of the final hearing, Petitioners voluntarily dismissed two allegations contained in their Petition. In their Proposed Recommended Order, Petitioners have further narrowed the issues by addressing only the following allegations: that the property which is the subject of this proceeding exceeds 10.0 acres in size and therefore cannot qualify as a small scale amendment; and that the amendment violates Future Land Use Element (FLUE) Policies 2.102-A1, 2.113-B-3, 2.113-B-4, 2.110-C3, and 2.113-B-1 and is thus internally inconsistent with the Plan. These issues will be discussed separately below. All other allegations contained in the second Petition and the parties' Pre-Hearing Stipulation are deemed to have been withdrawn or abandoned. Because the change in the FLUM was filed and approved as a small scale plan amendment under Section 163.3187(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2003),1 a compliance review of the amendment was not made by the Department of Community Affairs (DCA). See § 163.3187(3)(a), Fla. Stat. Standing of Petitioners Durham is a realtor/developer who owns property within 250 feet of Berry's property and resides at 10 Lake Eloise Lane, Southeast, Winter Haven, Florida. He made oral and written comments to the County prior to the adoption of the amendment. As such, he qualifies as an affected person under Section 163.3184(1)(a), Florida Statutes, and has standing to bring this action. CPPI began as an association in November 2002 and was later incorporated in February 2003. Presently, it has around 100 members, all of whom reside in the County. According to its chairperson, its purpose is to "help educate and inform residents of Polk County . . . towards growth matters that may affect their daily lives." The organization "encourages donations" from its members; it was scheduled to have conducted its first annual meeting on January 10, 2004; and members prepared and circulated petitions opposing the amendment to residents of the area in December 2002 and January 2003. At least one member of CPPI made written and oral comments on its behalf to the County prior to the adoption of the amendment in March 2003. There is no evidence, however, that CPPI (as opposed to its individual members) owns property or owns or operates a business within the County. Therefore, it lacks standing to file a petition. The land and surrounding uses Berry owns a triangle-shaped parcel of land (the parent parcel) totaling around 14 acres which fronts on Eagle Lake Loop Road (a 24-foot wide urban collector road) to the north, Pollard Road (a local road) to the east, and a CSX railroad track, with right-of-way, on its western side. (Pollard Road dead ends at Eagle Lake Loop Road, and another collector road, Eloise Loop Road, continues to the north from the intersection). Pollard Road provides access to eight nearby single-family homes, which lie south of the Berry property and front on Pollard Road, and eventually terminates at the City of Winter Haven's Sewage Treatment Plant (an institutional use), which lies slightly more than a mile south of the site. To the west of the site directly across the railroad tracks and fronting on Eagle Lake Loop Road is additional property owned by Berry and on which were once located the original Berry corporate offices. The Berry office buildings are now used, at least partially, by other tenants. Although the land across the railroad tracks is classified as Residential Suburban (RS), the property can be used for offices since the buildings were constructed, and office use began, prior to the adoption of the Plan. Directly across Pollard Road to the east is a vacant 10-acre tract of land owned by the Baptist Ridge Association, which intends to construct a church on the property. Berry's property is now classified as RL-1, a land use classification which "is characterized by single-family dwelling units, duplex units, and small-scale multi-family units." Since at least the 1950s, however, or long before the County adopted its Plan, the property has been used primarily for agriculture purposes (citrus groves); therefore, Berry is grandfathered to continue this non-conforming use on its property. Presently, the entire tract of land is undeveloped and largely covered by an orange grove, which Berry describes as "past maturation and is declining." Citrus trucks and trailers have been parked on the extreme northwestern corner of the parent parcel and are used in conjunction with the citrus operation. Except for the former Berry offices, a nearby beauty salon operating out of a house, and a convenience store about three-quarters of a mile away, which all began operation before the Plan was adopted and are grandfathered as non- conforming uses, and the City of Winter Haven's large tract of institutional land to the south, all of the property within slightly less than a one-mile radius of the Berry property is classified in various residential land use categories with only residential uses. The Amendment As noted above, Berry has owned the subject property for many years. In 1987, Berry (then under the name of Jack M. Berry, Sr.) made application with the County for a zoning change on the property from Rural Conservation (RC) to Commercial (C-3) to allow typical commercial uses. The application was ultimately denied by the County on the ground, among others, that the zoning district being proposed was inconsistent with the Plan, "given the residential development pattern in the area." At least partly on the theory that the area has changed substantially in the last 15 years, Berry has filed (and the County has approved) an application seeking to change the land use on the property to commercial uses. Berry has carved out of the parent parcel two smaller parcels totaling 9.99 acres in size and seeks to change the land use on the northern parcel (3.93 acres) to CC and the land use on the southern parcel (6.06 acres) to BPC-1. The remaining land in the parent parcel, which consists of a 0.43-acre triangle-shaped parcel on the northwestern corner of the parent parcel and now used by citrus trucks, and a vacant 2.74-acre triangle-shaped parcel on the southern end, will remain R-1. (However, all parties agree that if the amendment is approved, these remaining parcels will be unsuitable for residential development.) In addition, strips of land ranging from 22 to 28 feet in width which front on Eagle Lake Loop Road and Pollard Road will be dedicated to the County for right-of-way and have not been included in the 9.99-acre amendment. Presumably, the proposed change is being done in this manner so that the total acreage is less than 10.0 acres, which qualifies the application to be processed as a small scale development amendment rather than a regular plan amendment and subject to DCA review and approval. If the change is approved, the northern part of the parcel (3.93 acres) will be changed to CC to develop convenience commercial uses. Under the Plan, the most typical tenant in this category is a convenience store, while other typical tenants include laundry, dry cleaning, barber, restaurant, gas station, and office uses. The southern (and larger) portion of the tract will be changed to BPC-1. The most typical tenant in this category is "[o]ne or more light- assembly plants, or warehouse facilities," which include a mini-warehouse storage facility. Other typical tenants described in the Plan are offices, distribution centers, research and development firms, and high-density residential, with proper buffering. (Berry says it intends to build a mini-warehouse facility on the southern parcel; however, any of the above described uses could be placed on the property if the change is approved.) Petitioners' Objections In broad terms, Petitioners have contended that the small scale amendment actually involves a use of more than 10 acres since the strips of land being dedicated as right-of-way to the County must be counted as a part of the land being amended. They also contend that the plan amendment violates five FLUE policies and is therefore internally inconsistent with the Plan. A small scale development amendment can only be adopted if "[t]he proposed amendment involves a use of 10 acres or fewer." See § 163.3187(1)(c)1., Fla. Stat. The parties have agreed that the legal description of the parcel subject to the change includes only 9.99 acres, or less than the 10-acre threshold. However, prior to the development of the site, Berry intends to dedicate to the County two strips of land, one fronting on Eagle Lake Loop Road (28 feet wide), and the other on Pollard Road (22 feet wide), for future right-of-way for some public purpose. Petitioners contend that the right-of-way constitutes essential infrastructure for the development and must be included as a part of the amendment. If this land is added to the amendment, the total acreage would obviously exceed 10.0 acres. The dedicated land is not "essential infrastructure" needed for the development activities on the land, since two roadways (Eagle Lake Loop Road and Pollard Road) already exist on the northern and eastern boundaries of the property, and they are sufficient in size to provide ingress to, and egress from, the property. Instead, the County will "bank" the land in the event some form of right-of-way activity is needed in the future. It is noted that Eagle Lake Loop Road was recently widened to 24 feet, and it is not anticipated that a further widening will occur for a number of years. There is nothing in the Plan which requires an applicant for an amendment to include all of its property in a proposed amendment, or prevents an applicant from leaving a residual piece of property out of the application. Therefore, Berry was not required to include in the amendment the right- of-way or the two smaller residual pieces of property that will remain R-1. Finally, assuming arguendo that Petitioners' contention is correct, that is, that an applicant must include right-of-way land dedicated to the local government in the total acreage calculation, Berry could still lawfully comply with the 10-acre threshold by simply reducing the other acreage being changed to CC or BPC by the amount of land being dedicated to the local government for right-of-way. Therefore, it is found that Berry has not improperly excluded from the amendment land necessary for essential infrastructure so as to violate Section 163.3187(1)(c)1., Florida Statutes, as alleged by Petitioners. Policy 2.102-A1 requires compatibility between adjacent uses. More specifically, it provides that: Land shall be developed so that adjacent uses are compatible with each other, pursuant to the requirements of other Policies in this Future Land Use Element, so that one or more of the following provisions are accomplished: there have been provisions made which buffer incompatible uses from dissimilar uses; incompatible uses are made to be more compatible to each other through limiting the intensity and scale of the more intense use; uses are transitioned through a gradual scaling of different land use activities through the use of innovative development techniques such as a Planned Unit Development. Therefore, as the Plan is now written, so long as Berry develops the land in a manner which accomplishes at least one of the three "provisions" in paragraphs a - c of the policy, so as to make the adjacent uses compatible, the proposed land use change is permissible. As noted above, except for a few non-conforming uses adjacent to, or near the property, virtually all of the area around the Berry property is designated for residential use. The area to the north and northeast is developed with up-scale (with some homes ranging to as high as $1 million in value), low density, large lot, single-family residential subdivisions, including Harbour Estates, Cedar Cove, Cypress Cove, Gaines Cove, and Valhalla. To the east of the site are more subdivisions, including Eloise Place, Skidmore, Cypress Point, Lake Eloise Estates, Eloise Pointe Estates, a mobile home park, and Little Lake Estates. The lands to the south are primarily agriculture and in active citrus groves, with eight single-family homes on Pollard Road. Finally, a church will be built on the property directly across the street from the Berry property at the southeast corner of the intersection of Eagle Lake Loop Road and Pollard Road. The County Planning Director agrees that a convenience store (which is an authorized use on CC land), standing alone, is incompatible with adjacent single-family residences. Given this acknowledgement, and the fact that a non-binding, proposed site plan submitted by Berry with its application does not provide for any buffering between the commercial uses and the residential areas, Petitioners contend that none of the conditions required for compatibility in paragraphs a through c have been met, and thus the policy has been violated. The County has made clear, however, that when a final site plan is submitted, there must be "provisions [in the site plan] . . . which buffer incompatible uses from dissimilar uses," as required by the policy. Assuming that this is done at the site plan stage, at least one of the three provisions will be accomplished, thereby satisfying the compatibility requirement. This being so, the plan amendment does not violate the policy and in this respect is not internally inconsistent with the Plan. Petitioners next contend that the amendment is inconsistent with Policy 2.110-C3, which contains locational criteria for CC property. One such criterion requires that "Convenience Centers shall be located at the intersections of arterial and/or collector roads." Because the property is at a T-shaped intersection (as opposed to a traditional cross intersection with four directions for traffic to move off the site), Petitioners assert that the property is not located at an "intersection" within the meaning of the policy. Eagle Lake Loop Road, on which the northern boundary of the property fronts, is designated as an urban collector road. That road forms an intersection with Pollard Road (a local road) and Eloise Loop Road (also an urban collector road), which meets Eagle Lake Loop Road from the north at the intersection, and then makes a 90 degree turn to the east. (When Eagle Lake Loop Road continues to the east beyond the intersection, it turns into Eloise Loop Road, and later into Thompson Nursery Road, until it eventually intersects with U.S. Highway 17.) There is no dispute that the two collector roads (Eagle Loop Lake Road and Eloise Loop Road) form a T intersection, rather than a traditional cross intersection. For many years, however, the County has considered a T intersection and a cross intersection to be the same in terms of satisfying Plan requirements. Indeed, at the present time, at least four other CC designated properties within the County are located at T intersections. The County's interpretation of the policy is consistent with sound planning principles, is reasonable and logical, and is more persuasive than the contrary view offered by Petitioners. Accordingly, it is found that the amendment does not conflict with Policy 2.110- C3. Petitioners also contend that the amendment is inconsistent with Policy 2.113-B-3, which provides that "Business-Park Centers shall be located with consideration being given to regional transportation issues, and should be located at the intersections of arterial roads, and preferably on a fixed-route mass-transit line." (Emphasis added.) The use of the word "should" (rather than "shall") is intended to state a preference, but not an absolute requirement, that BPC lands be located at the intersections of arterial roads. According to the County's Planning Director, this is because "most cases that come [before the County] don't meet the ideal situation" of satisfying every requirement, and the County has used this permissive language to give itself some degree of flexibility in handling cases that do not meet every Plan requirement. Therefore, even though it is preferable that BPC land be located at the intersection of arterial roads, this requirement is not mandatory, and the County has the flexibility to approve a BPC land use change at property not sited at the intersection of arterial roads. In contrast to the permissive language described above, Policy 2.113-B-4 provides that development within a Business-Park Center shall conform to certain development criteria, including one that Business-Park Centers shall have frontage on, or direct access to, an arterial roadway, or a frontage road or service drive which directly serves an arterial roadway. Business-Park Centers shall incorporate the use of frontage roads or shared ingress/egress facilities wherever practical. In this case, the closest arterial roadway to Berry's property is State Road 17 to the west, which is four miles away, while State Road 60, another arterial roadway, is approximately six miles to the south. These arterial roads must be accessed, at least at the beginning of the trip, by Eagle Lake Loop Road, a two-lane, 24-foot wide urban collector that runs through predominately residential neighborhoods with some homes having fences within a foot or two from the road. The County interprets the requirement that BPC land have "direct access to an arterial road" to be satisfied if the property fronts on a collector road, which then provides access to an arterial road. Under the County's interpretation, the requirement is met since Eagle Lake Loop Road provides access (albeit 4 to 6 miles away) to State Roads 17 and 60. The County says it has consistently interpreted this provision in this manner for at least ten years, and has approved other applications for changes to BPC when those parcels were located on urban collector roads. (The distance between these other BPC parcels and the arterial roads is not of record, however.) While Policy 2.113-B-1 provides that Business-Park Centers are "not intended to accommodate major commercial or other high-traffic producing facilities," they "are intended to promote employment opportunities within the region by allowing for the establishment of office parks, research and development parks, areas for light-industrial facilities, distribution centers, and mixed-use employment parks." The same policy provides that they must have a usable area of 10 acres or more, have a service-area radius of 20 miles or more, be supported by a population of 150,000 or more people, and have a gross leasable area of 500,000 to 2,000,000 square feet. Given this description of their purpose and characteristics, and the wide range of commercial activities that are allowed on Business-Park Center lands, it is not surprising that Policy 2.113-B-3 provides that BPC lands should be located "at the intersections of arterial roads, and preferably on a fixed-route mass-transit line," while Policy 2.113-B-4 requires that they "have direct frontage on, or direct access to, an arterial roadway, or a frontage road or service drive which directly serves on an arterial roadway." When reading these provisions as a whole, it is unreasonable to conclude, as the County does, that "direct access" contemplates a drive of over 4 miles, partly on a narrow two- lane road, in order to reach an arterial road. Accordingly, on this issue, Petitioners' evidence is the most persuasive, and it is found that the plan amendment conflicts with Policy 2.113-B-4 and in this respect is internally inconsistent with the Plan. Policy 2.110-C3 sets forth the following location criteria for Convenience Centers: LOCATION CRITERIA Convenience Centers shall be located at the intersections of arterial and/or collector roads. There shall be the following traveling distance, on public roads, between the center of Convenience Center and the center of any other Convenience Center, or other higher- level Activity Center, Linear Commercial Corridor, or Commercial Enclave providing for the same convenience shopping needs: One (1) mile within the UDA and UGA Two (2) miles within the SDA and UEA This required separation may be reduced if: The higher-level Activity Center, Linear Commercial Corridor or Commercial Enclave within the required distance separation is over 80 percent developed; or the proposed Convenience Center market- area radius, minimum population support is over 5,000 people. Petitioners contend that this policy has been violated in two respects: the Berry property is not located at the intersection of arterial roads; and there is an existing convenience center located within 0.8 mile of the Barry property, and Berry cannot qualify for a reduction in the required separation, as described in paragraphs a and b. For the reasons stated in Findings of Fact 30-32, it is found that the Berry property is located at the intersection of two collector roads (Eagle Lake Loop Road and Eloise Loop Road) and that a T intersection satisfies the requirements of the policy. As to the second contention, the Berry property is located within an UGA (Urban Growth Area), and an existing convenience store is located at the intersection of Rifle Range Road and Eagle Lake Loop Road, or less than a mile west of Berry's property. The land use on the property on which the store sits was recently changed (in December 2003) to BPC, which does not allow a convenience store. However, the store is a non-conforming use, having been located at that site before the Plan was adopted. The locational requirement in Policy 2.110-C-3 that CC lands within the UGA be located at least a mile apart is not the least bit vague or ambiguous: CC designated lands (and not individual convenience stores, as Petitioners suggest) must be separated by at least a mile, unless one of the two criteria for reducing this separation is met. Because there is no CC land within a one-mile radius of the Berry land, the policy has not been violated. Policy 2.113-B-1 sets forth the following relevant characteristic for Business-Park Centers: General characteristics of Business-Park Centers are: Usable Area 10 acres or more There is no dispute that the useable area for the BPC land is only 6.06 acres, or approximately 60 percent of the required acreage. Petitioners contend that the amendment violates the foregoing policy because the useable area on Barry's property is much less than "10 acres or more." While the former County Planning Director conceded that the 10-acre usable area requirement is "mandatory," he justified the amendment on the ground that the 6.06 acres "approximates" 10 acres, and thus satisfies the policy. In the same vein, the current County Planning Director asserted that if Berry was proposing a stand-alone BPC, it would have been required to have 10 usable acres. In this case, though, he pointed out that the Berry property will be used for a nonresidential mixed use (BPC and CC) totaling almost 10 acres, and therefore Berry has satisfied the requirement. The Planning Director admitted, however, that nothing in the Plan specifically allows this type of exception. He justified the County's action on the theory that the Plan "doesn't anticipate every situation that comes in," and "interpretations have to be made of the comprehensive plan and how it's applied." The requirement that Business-Park Centers have a usable area of 10 or more acres is clear and unambiguous, was characterized as being "mandatory," and is not subject to any exceptions in the Plan. This being so, the County's interpretation is found to be unreasonable and contrary to the plain language in the policy, and in this respect the plan amendment is internally inconsistent with the Plan.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Administration Commission enter a final order determining that the small scale development amendment (CPA2003S-02) adopted by Polk County by Ordinance No. 03-03, as amended by Ordinance No. 03-19, is not in compliance. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of February, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of February, 2004.
