The Issue Whether petitioner qualifies for a II-C Club alcoholic beverage license, which is issued to Nonprofit organizations or clubs devoted to promoting community, municipal, or county development or any phase of community, municipal or county development.
Findings Of Fact Code I is a nonprofit Florida corporation located at 3420-31 West Broward Boulevard, Ft. Lauderdale, Florida. In February, 1982, it applied for a II-C or Club alcoholic beverage license pursuant to Section 561.20(7)(a)3, Florida Statutes (1981) and Rule 7A-3.19, Florida Administrative Code. On August 3, 1982, DABT denied its application, asserting that it was not qualified for licensing under tie statute and rule. Code I was incorporated as a Florida nonprofit corporation in 1962. Ms. Bessie Walton and her former husband formed the corporation to raise funds to build a home for the elderly. With funds subsequently generated by the corporation, Tropical Home for Senior Citizens was constructed and continues to be operated in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida. In 1974, the corporation became inactive. According to several members of Code I, the goals and purposes of the Club are to support and make contributions to benevolent causes. This testimony, however, is based upon representations made to them by others concerning the goals and purposes of the Club. (Testimony of Troutman, Reddick) In the past, Code I has donated funds to numerous organizations or allowed them to use its facilities--without charge. These organizations, included Broward County Youth Football, Greater Bethel AME Church, Tropical Home for Senior Citizens, North Fork Elementary School, and Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity (for scholarships). It has also sponsored foster families. Code I has charged, however, some organizations $175 for the use of its facilities. (Testimony of Troutman) The articles of Incorporation of Code I state that the objectives of the organization are to provide a meeting place for recreational purposes of its members, to provide aid and comfort for its members in case of sickness or death, and to assist in any other matters pertaining to the highest orders of American Citizenship. For carrying out these purposes, the corporation is authorized to buy, hold and sell real and personal property, to invest funds, and to construct and operate social club houses. (P-1) Neither the articles nor the bylaws of the corporation explicitly, or by reasonable inference, dedicate it to promoting community, municipal, or county development. (P-1, P-4) According to its treasurer, its main purpose is to provide a facility where the public can enjoy an evening on the town in a conducive club atmosphere. Membership is open to the general public. An alcoholic beverage license would enable the Club to earn additional funds for its operations.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That Code I's application for a II-C Club alcoholic beverage license be DENIED, without prejudice to its right to reapply after amendment of its charter and bylaws. DONE AND ORDERED this 25th day of February, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. L. CALEEN, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of February, 1983.
The Issue Does Petitioner qualify for a consumer's certificate of exemption as a "church" as defined in Rule 12A-1.001(3)(c), Florida Administrative Code, or as a "religious institution" as defined in Section 212.08(7)(o) 2.a., Florida Statutes?
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: Friends Housing and Care, Inc. (Petitioner), is a non-profit corporation exempt from federal income tax under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. Petitioner has filed under the fictitious name statute and is doing business under the name Woodmere at Jacarande. Petitioner's Amended Articles of Incorporation dated October 25, 1996, state Petitioner's purposes as follows: To provide elderly families, elderly persons, and handicapped persons housing and related facilities and services specially designed to meet the physical, social, psychological, economic and spiritual needs of the aged and contribute to their health, financial security, happiness and usefulness in longer living. To plan, construct, operate, maintain, and improve housing and related facilities and services for elderly families and elderly persons. To acquire by gift or purchase, hold, sell, convey, assign, mortgage, or lease any property, real or personal, necessary or incident to the provisions of housing and related facilities and services for elderly families and elderly persons. To borrow money and issue evidence of indebtedness in furtherance of any or all of the objects of its business; and to secure loans by mortgage, pledge, deed or trust, or other lien. To engage in any kind of activity, and enter into, perform and carry out contracts of any kind, necessary or in connection with, or incidental to the accomplishment of any one or more of the nonprofit purposes of the corporation. To conduct educational or scientific research on a non-profit basis and to cooperate with foundations, educational institutions, and research centers in promoting same, with the aim of increasing knowledge and enhancing life in our society. To foster and encourage spiritual life and bring the human spirit into intimate relation with the Divine Spirit, to provide definite, organized opportunity for the development of spiritual values and for the renewal of our strength in accordance with generally accepted faith and practice of the Religious Society of Friends. Note 1 of Petitioner's audited financial statements containing the independent auditor's report dated January 8, 1997, states that Petitioner ". . .was created by Friends (Quakers) to plan and develop a Not-for-Profit Condominium Retirement Community in Florida to meet the needs of Friends and others who wish to retire or live in a Quaker-sponsored retirement community in Florida. " Note 3 to the same financial statements indicates that Petitioner's operations have been devoted to raising capital, obtaining financing, purchasing land and beginning construction on the planned retirement community. As reflected in the unaudited financial statement dated April 30, 1997, of the total reflected year-to-date expenses of $820,681: $299,548 went to architectural fees; $71,985 was spent for engineering fees; $84,265 was spent for pre-construction management fees; and $40,331 went to advertising. Only $200 was directed to worship expenses. Neither the audited financial statements nor any of the notes thereto indicate that Petitioner is engaged in any religious activities or worship services. Petitioner's retirement community will comprise 32.7 acres, with a 3.7 acre easement. There will be about 700 condominiums constructed on this acreage. Currently, it is anticipated that the first condominiums will be available for occupancy sometime in 1999. Thus, currently there are no residents residing at the Petitioner's retirement community. Petitioner will be constructing an 80,000 square foot commons building which will contain an "auditorium chapel" consisting of approximately 5,500 square feet. This building has not been constructed. The "auditorium chapel" will be used for "religious purposes and multiple-purposes." It is anticipated that both silent and program services of the Friends (Quaker) faith will be held in the chapel. Other religious faiths would also be included. There will also be located within the commons building a 6,000 square foot dining facility, 4,000 square foot library, a gift shop, beauty and barber shops, post office, banking facility, game rooms, and lounge area. Petitioner sells its condominiums to members of the general public of retirement age, regardless of their religious affiliation or even if they have no religious affiliation. Purchasers do not have to be members of the Friends (Quaker) faith. In fact, the retirement community will be a "non- denominational community." The price of the condominiums ranges from about $82,000 for a one-bedroom (676 square foot) unit, to well over $200,000 for a large (2100 square foot) unit. In addition to the sales price, Petitioner will charge its residents a monthly condominium fee to cover maintenance. An activity or club fee will also be charged by Petitioner to cover residents' social activities and transportation costs. If a resident needs medical attention, Petitioner will provide the care and bill the resident's insurance company for the cost of the care. Several witnesses testified that the meetings held at Petitioner's location were held under the name "Woodmere Friends Fellowship," while other witnesses testified that the meetings held at Petitioner's location were held under the name "Woodmere Fellowship." The newspaper advertisements or other published advertisements advertising meetings at Petitioner's location did not refer to "Woodmere Friends Fellowship" or "Woodmere Fellowship." An advertisement appearing in "Quaker Life" in June 1997, indicated that "All Friends Fellowship" was located at Woodmere at Jacaranda. A newsletter from Petitioner dated January 1997, stated that "Friends Inter-Faith Fellowship" was begun at Woodmere Information Center and that several prospective residents from the Venice/Englewood area had "voiced interest in having a meeting in this area. Presently, these meetings are being held every Sunday evening at 6:30 p.m." Additionally, this newsletter stated that these meetings were consistent with Petitioner's federally-recognized religious affiliation. However, Petitioner is never identified as a church or religious institution in this newsletter. By letter dated February 17, 1997, William R. Martin, Petitioner's Chairman, advised the Department that "[o]ur Worship group is being identified as the Woodmere All Friends Fellowship." In an advertisement dated February 1, 1997, Woodmere at Jacaranda, a Quaker-sponsored, resident-owned retirement community, invites interested people to attend a fellowship hour at 6:00 p.m. the first and third Sunday of each month. This advertisement does not refer to Petitioner as a church or religious institution. The bulletins, advertisements, newsletters, and other evidence submitted by the Petitioner do not refer to Petitioner as a church or religious institution. The hours of operation posted on the doors to Petitioner's premises indicate that Petitioner is open Monday through Friday from 9:00 a.m. to 5:30 p.m., and Saturday from 9:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. There were no hours listed for Sunday. Additionally, there was nothing to indicate that worship service or religious activities were being conducted by Petitioner on its premises. Although there are meetings being held at Petitioner's location where religious services or activities are being conducted on a somewhat regular basis, there is insufficient evidence to show that Petitioner is responsible for, and conducting, those religious services or activities. Petitioner's sole purpose is not to provide free transportation services to church members, their families, and other church attendees. Petitioner is not a state, district, or other governing or administrative offices the function of which is to assist or regulate the customary activities of religious organizations or members. Petitioner does not own or operate a Florida television station whose programs are of a religious nature. Petitioner does not provide regular religious services to Florida state prisoners. Friends Housing and Care, Inc., d/b/a Woodmere at Jacaranda is a Quaker-sponsored, resident-owned, retirement community whose primary function is the development and marketing of a retirement community to members of the general public, regardless of religious affiliation. Petitioner intends to use its sales tax exemption primarily to purchase building materials, including those building materials for the condominiums which it produces for sale to the general public, regardless of their religious affiliation.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department enter a final order denying Petitioner's application for sales tax exemption. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of February, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6947 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of February, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Larry Fuchs Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Linda Lattera General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Nick Roknich, Esquire Dunlap, Moran, Roknich, and Gibson, P.A. 1819 Main Street, Suite 700 Sarasota, Florida 34236 Ruth Ann Smith, Esquire Department of Revenue Post Office Box 6668 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668
The Issue Whether Respondent has committed a discriminatory act with respect to public accommodations in violation of Chapter 760, Florida Statutes, and if so, what remedy should be provided.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an African-American woman living in the Gainesville area. She is married and has children. On November 15, 2006, Petitioner went to the Days Inn at 7516 Newberry Road to make a reservation for her mother and sister. She was dressed casually and had her children with her. When she arrived at the Days Inn, she spoke with John Osley, who was later identified as the manager of the hotel, and asked if all the rooms were entered from the outside. He told her that the Newberry Road hotel had outside rooms only but that the Days Inn on Archer Road had internal corridors. Mr. Osley asked what dates she wanted to reserve. She told him November 23-24, which was Thanksgiving Day and the day after. Mr. Osley told her there were no rooms available those days because the hotel was the host hotel for a race-car event. She asked about cancellations and he told her to call back closer to the dates she needed the room to see if there were any. He gave her a business card for a person at the front desk. Upon her request, he allowed her to look at one of the rooms. Petitioner thanked Mr. Osley and left. After she left the hotel, she felt that she had not been treated appropriately. That evening, she checked on the Days Inn internet website to see if any rooms at the Newberry Road location were available online for November 23-24. She was able to make a reservation for the desired days via the internet. Ultimately, her mother opted to stay at another hotel. As a result, the reservation at the Days Inn was canceled. Petitioner was angry because she felt she had been mistreated at the hotel, and wrote to Joseph Kante, whom she identified as being in a management position for Days Inn. She also e-mailed him and within 24-hours, she received an apology from him. However, according to Petitioner, Mr. Kante indicated that each Days Inn is responsible for itself and the person she needed to speak to regarding the Days Inn on Newberry Street was John Osley. Petitioner returned to the Days Inn on Newberry Road in an effort to speak with Mr. Osley, and also called the hotel. Each time, Mr. Osley was not present and she never spoke with him about her concerns. After her attempts to reach him were unsuccessful, she filed her complaint with the Commission. No evidence was presented regarding any other person of any race seeking a room at the same time as Ms. Henderson who was able to reserve a room when she could not. No evidence was presented indicating that Mr. Osley was not being truthful when he stated that no rooms were available when Ms. Henderson originally sought to reserve a room.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered that dismisses Petitioner's claim. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of September, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S Hearings Hearings LISA SHEARER NELSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative this 27th day of September, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Burnita Henderson 5010 Southwest 63rd Boulevard Gainesville, Florida 32608 John Osley Days Inn I-75 7516 Newberry Road Gainesville, Florida 32606 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Respondent's beverage license should be suspended or revoked, or a civil penalty assessed, for alleged violations of Sections 562.13(3)(a)(1), and 561.20(7)(a)(3), 562.23, Florida Statutes and Rule 7A-3.19(2), Florida Administrative Code, pursuant to Section 561.29, Florida Statutes, as set forth in Notice to Show Cause issued by Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact The Florida Voluntary Roadside Improvement Association (Association) was incorporated in 1951 as a nonprofit corporation under the laws of the State of Florida by the Circuit Court of Leon County. The general objects of the Association as set forth in its certificate of incorporation are to develop and carry out a program of voluntary mutual cooperation among businesses occupying lands adjoining highways of Florida, highway users, and others concerning highway utilization. Petitioner has issued beverage licenses to the Association in several business names since 1969 at several locations in Tallahassee. In November, 1974, a Series 11-C beverage license (club license) was issued to the Association in the name of 1221 Club located at 1221 Alabama Street, Tallahassee, Florida. The license was in effect at the time of the alleged violations set forth in Petitioner's Notice to Show Cause and is presently held by the licensee. (Petitioner's Exhibits 1, 2, Testimony of Schoenfeld) The Association has rented space in a building owned by Willie Bennett at 1221 Alabama Street for several years. When he first purchased the building some seven years ago, it was rented to Alberta Walker who was then operating a place of business known as the Psychedelic Shack under a beverage license issued by Petitioner. In October, 1974, on a plea of nolo contendere, she was sentenced to eight months in the Leon County Jail by the County Court of Leon County for a violation of the State Beverage Law and another offense. Her beverage license was cancelled in May, 1974. City utilities for 1221 Alabama Street have been supplied under a contract with Walker in the name of Psychedelic Shack since 1970. (Petitioner's Exhibits 6, 10, 12, Testimony of Bennett, Schoenfeld, Connell, Walker) On June 3, 1977, Petitioner's beverage officer, Gary E. Sams, took a paid informant, Nathan Jones, to the vicinity of the 1221 Club and instructed him to enter the premises and attempt to become a member of the club and purchase alcoholic beverages there. Some 20 minutes later, Jones came out of the club and had a membership card. On several later occasions during the month of July, 1977, Jones purchased beer and vodka at the club from Walker who was tending the bar. Although Jones relied on a recent memorandum prepared by Sams to recall the precise dates of the beverage sales by Walker, his testimony concerning the incidents is deemed credible. (Testimony of Sams, Jones, Simmons, Respondent's Exhibit 1) On July 14, 1977, Sams observed Walker go to the door of the club, insert a key and enter the premises. On July 18, he observed Walker take a key from her purse, give it to Theodore Simmons, who thereafter unlocked the door. On July 19, Sams served a subpoena duces tecum upon Walker at the club premises for cancelled checks and bank statements of her personal checking account during the period January through June, 1977. She expressed no objection to turning over the required documents and did so that day. Theodore Simmons, the president of the Association, voluntarily turned over checks from the Association banking account in the Second National Bank of Tallahassee, which were variously dated in May and June of 1977. Upon comparison of the two sets of checks, a handwriting expert employed by the Florida Department of Criminal Law Enforcement found that Walker had written many of the words and figures appearing on the face of the checks, but had not signed them. (Petitioner's Exhibits 7-9, Testimony of Sams, Deposition of McCarthy (Petitioner's Exhibit 13) The bylaws of the Association provide that the membership committee inquires into the eligibility of applicants and submits findings to the board of directors who then vote on membership. The bylaws further provide that the treasurer of the organization shall have charge of the funds and deposit all monies in Association bank accounts, make disbursements, and maintain the books. In fact, two former treasurers of the Association resigned from their duties because they were given no functions to perform and never saw any books of the Association or handled any of its monies. Both individuals had become members of the Association by paying a $1.00 membership and were unaware as to whether any vote had ever been taken on their membership. Although at one time, the Association contemplated creating recreational facilities across the street from its premises, all that was accomplished was a clearing of land. Several times, the membership was solicited for funds to assist families of deceased members. The primary function of the club was social in nature. (Petitioner's Exhibit 3, Testimony of Dixie, Allen) Both Theodore Simmons and Alberta Walker testified at the hearing. Simmons was president of the Association from 1975 until a few months ago. Walker has been a member since May of 1975. During the period that Simmons was president, the Association had officers but not a board of directors. The club did not have a paid manager or employee. The practice was for Simmons to make sales of beverages and snacks during the hours of operation, and sign checks prepared by Walker for payment of rent, supplies and other Association expenses. Although Walker was not a paid employee, she possessed keys to the establishment, kept the books, handled the monies and made the periodic deposits in the club bank accounts. Simmons was aware that Walker had been convicted of a beverage violation and testified that "I didn't start the club until she came out of jail." Although Simmons wasn't paid for his work at the club, if he needed money, he would routinely take some from the club receipts. Walker testified that Simmons was her "boy friend" for five years and that she spent a lot of time at the 1221 Club to be with him and because she was unemployed. She testified that she kept the books of the Association because Beverage Officer Sams had said in 1975 that it was all right to "work there" due to the fact that her criminal conviction had been for a misdemeanor; but that he told her in August, 1977, that a 1976 state law prohibited her working as a bartender, although she could continue to keep the books. At the hearing, Sams conceded that he had informed Walker that she could continue to maintain the books of the Association. Walker claimed that the reason the utilities for the premises remained in her name was that it would cost $300 to transfer the account to the 1221 Club. Her claimed reason for making the club bank deposits was that Simmons had no motor vehicle and that the bank was located on the route to her home. She admitted selling alcoholic beverages as a consequence of Sams telling her that she could work at the club. The reason she had a key to the premises was that the one used during her operation of the Psychedelic Shack still opened the lock on the door of the premises. Her reason for filling out checks for Simmons to sign was that he was nervous and a poor speller. (Testimony of Simmons, Walker, Sams)
Recommendation It is recommended that Petitioner impose a civil penalty against Respondent, Florida Voluntary Roadside Improvement Association, in the amount of $100, pursuant to the authority granted under Section 561.29(1)(e) and (4), Florida Statutes, for violation of Rule 7A-3.19(2), Florida Administrative Code. DONE and entered this 21st day of February, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Francis Bayley, Esquire Department of Business Regulation The Johns Building 725 South Bronough Tallahassee, Florida 32304 W. R. Phillips, Esquire Post Office Box 594 Carrabelle, Florida 32322 Charles A. Nuzum, Director Division of Beverage Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32304
The Issue Whether Petitioner was discriminated against based upon race?
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Deland Housing Authority (the Authority), provides subsidized housing to low-income families in Deland, Florida. Linda McDonnell has been the Executive Director of the Authority since approximately 1990. Petitioner, Marjorie R. Ross, a black female, was employed by the Authority as a Project Management Aide, beginning on or about June 14, 1993. At the time of Petitioner's hire, Greg Norton, the Public Housing Manager, was her immediate supervisor. Petitioner's job duties included, among others, maintaining residents' records and files, computing and inputting utility charges, preparing and issuing monthly rent statements to residents, and preparing 14-day notices (late rent notices). Petitioner's performance evaluation, for the period August 21 to December 21, 1993, rated her overall performance as "needs improvement." In comments attached to the evaluation, it was noted that Petitioner "tried to do too many things at once," causing decreases in her productivity. The comments also stated Petitioner "needs to make an effort to straighten her office each day" and that her "greatest shortfall as an employee is the manner in which she relates to the other employees." From the date of this evaluation, tension existed between Petitioner and McDonnell. For example, McDonnell cautioned Petitioner about speaking to persons outside the organization without permission. On September 26, 1994, McDonnell approached Petitioner to introduce a visiting HUD representative to Petitioner. Petitioner did not speak with the representative, despite McDonnell's repeated requests, because of McDonnell's previous instructions not to speak without permission. Petitioner received a written reprimand for her conduct. On July 25, 1995, McDonnell gave Petitioner a memo that documented Petitioner's habit of promising to create certain projects and failing to complete them. At the end of July 1995, Norton resigned from the Authority. On July 31, 1995, McDonnell conducted a staff meeting relating to Norton's resignation. During the meeting, McDonnell instructed Petitioner to only write receipts for rent checks, but to refrain from entering the receipts into the computer. Despite this instruction, Petitioner subsequently removed rent receipts from McDonnell's secretary's desk and entered them into the computer. As a result, Petitioner received a reprimand and was given a day off without pay. Petitioner received another written reprimand on September 27, 1995, for failing to follow established Authority policy regarding reporting absences. Authority policy required employees to complete an absentee report upon returning to work from an unscheduled absence. Petitioner failed to complete an absentee report upon returning from an unscheduled absence on September 25, 1995, and was not given pay for the absence. Petitioner applied for the position vacated by Norton as Public Housing Manager. The Authority hired Connie Grobstein, a white female, in September 1995. The stated reason for hiring Grobstein was her experience in grant writing; McDonnell stated that writing grants was an important part of the job. Grobstein had little if any experience with public housing. Grobstein became Petitioner's direct supervisor and Petitioner was asked to teach her the day-to-day operations of the office. During September 1995, Grobstein wrote several memos to McDonnell regarding Petitioner's work performance and attitude. On December 21, 1995, Petitioner received a written reprimand from Grobstein for, among other infractions, failing to timely issue 14-day notices. The reprimand stated, "any additional violations of Authority procedures will lead to further disciplinary actions up to and including termination." On February 6, 1996, Grobstein and Petitioner had a confrontation in front of a tenant regarding the start date of a lease. Even though her office was several doors away, McDonnell could hear Grobstein and Petitioner arguing about the lease. As a result of the incident, McDonnell terminated Grobstein.1/ Petitioner was suspended for one day as a result of the argument with Grobstein. While Petitioner was absent, McDonnell discovered that several resident files, which Petitioner was responsible for maintaining, were missing necessary documentation. McDonnell contacted the Authority's attorney, who advised McDonnell that she had no choice but to terminate Petitioner's employment. On February 12, 1996, Petitioner's employment was terminated. The stated reasons for her termination were: consistent problems with her work performance; the incident with Grobstein on February 6, 1996; refusing to follow instructions; giving out rent credits/reductions without approval; attempting to undermine McDonnell and the Authority; demonstrating a poor attitude and an unwillingness to cooperate with others; and failing to complete her work in a timely manner. Respondent maintains a disciplinary policy for Authority employees. Pursuant to this policy, employees may be discharged for, among other reasons, insolence or insubordination; failure to obey legitimate orders from a supervisor; mistreatment (verbal, psychological or physical) of a client or fellow employee; and neglect or willful disregard of the responsibilities, duties and work rules of a position.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of October, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of October, 2003.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent committed unlawful employment practices contrary to Section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2007)1/, by terminating Petitioner's employment in retaliation for her filing a formal grievance asserting that a co-worker made a racially discriminatory comment to her at a staff meeting.
Findings Of Fact The District Board of Trustees of LCCC is an employer as that term is defined in Subsection 760.02(7), Florida Statutes. Petitioner, an African-American female, was hired by the College and began work on January 29, 2007. She worked in the cosmetology department as a Teaching Assistant II until the College terminated her employment on June 28, 2007. In addition to Petitioner, the College's cosmetology department consisted of two instructors, Carol McLean and Vicki Glenn. Ms. McLean was also the department coordinator, meaning that she supervised Petitioner and Ms. Glenn. The instructors performed classroom instruction and supervised students "on the floor" in the department's laboratory, where the students practiced their skills on clients who made appointments with the department to have their hair styled. Petitioner's duties included answering the telephone, making client appointments, ordering and stocking cosmetology supplies, and recording the hours and services performed by the students. Petitioner was a licensed cosmetologist and was expected to assist on the floor of the lab, but only when an instructor determined that her presence was necessary. Petitioner was not authorized to perform classroom instruction. Petitioner was at all times employed on a probationary basis under LCCC Policy and Procedure 6Hx12:8-04, which provides that all newly hired career service employees must serve a probationary period of six calendar months. This Policy and Procedure also requires that conferences be held with the employee at the end of two and four months of employment. The conferences are to include written performance appraisals and should be directed at employee development, areas of weakness or strength, and any additional training required to improve performance. Petitioner acknowledged that she attended orientation sessions for new employees during which this Policy and Procedure was discussed.4/ The evidence at hearing established that the orientation sessions covered, among other subjects, an explanation of the probationary period, the College's discipline and grievance procedures, and how to find the College's Policies and Procedures on the internet. The employee orientation process also required Petitioner's immediate supervisor, Carol McLean, to explain 14 additional items, including Petitioner's job description and the College's parking policies. The evidence established that Ms. McLean covered these items with Petitioner. Petitioner's first written evaluation covered the period from January 29, 2007 through March 29, 2007. The evaluation was completed by Ms. McLean on April 13, 2007, and approved by the Dean of Occupational Programs, Tracy Hickman, on April 30, 2007. The College's "Support Staff Job Performance Evaluation" form provides numerical grades in the categories of work knowledge, work quality, work quantity and meeting deadlines, dependability, co-operation, judgment in carrying out assignments, public relations, and overall performance. A score of 1 or 2 in any category is deemed "unsatisfactory." A score of 3 or 4 is "below norm." A score of 5 or 6 is "expected norm." A score of 7 or 8 is "above norm." A score of 9 or 10 is rated "exceptional." Petitioner's scores in each area were either 5 or 6, within the "expected norm." Ms. McLean graded Petitioner's overall performance as a 6. The evaluation form also provides questions that allow the supervisor to evaluate the employee's performance in a narrative format. In response to a question regarding Petitioner's strengths, Ms. McLean wrote that Petitioner "has demonstrated she is very capable handling conflicts/situations concerning clients. She is also good working with the students when needed. Her computer skills/knowledge has been an asset." In response to a question regarding Petitioner's weaknesses, Ms. McLean wrote, "Kay5/ needs to be a little more organized. I feel confident with the move to the new building, she will be able to set her office up to be more efficient for herself." Petitioner testified that she has excellent organizational skills and that she is, in fact, a "neat freak." Her problem was the utter disorganization of the cosmetology department at the time she started her job. She could not see her desk for the pile of papers and other materials on it. Boxes were piled in the middle of the floor. There were more than 100 unanswered messages in the recorded message queue. Petitioner testified that neither Ms. McLean nor Ms. Glenn could tell her how to proceed on any of these matters, and that she was therefore required to obtain advice via telephone calls to either Wendy Saunders, the previous teaching assistant, or Jeanette West, secretary to the Dean of Occupational Programs. Neither Ms. McLean nor Ms. Glenn recalled the complete departmental disorganization attested to by Petitioner at the outset of her employment. In fact, Ms. McLean recalled having to work 80-hour weeks to restore order to the department's workspace after Petitioner was discharged. No other witness testified as to disorganization prior to Petitioner's hiring. The evidence presented at the hearing established that Petitioner dramatically overstated the poor condition of the cosmetology department's offices at the time she started work, and also greatly overstated any contribution she made to improve its organization. Petitioner's second and final evaluation covered the period from March 29, 2007, through May 29, 2007. The evaluation was completed by Ms. McLean on May 22, 2007, and approved by Dean Hickman on May 23, 2007. Petitioner's numerical scores in each of the categories, including overall performance, was 4, meaning that her performance was "below norm." In a typewritten attachment, Ms. McLean wrote: Employee Improvement: Strengths: Kay is very good with the students and has strong desires to help them. Weaknesses: A concern is Kay's words and actions have shown that she would rather teach than be in the office. There is still a lack of organization in the office. We have had a couple incidents where we have to search for invoices, etc. I am still receiving complaints about the phone not being answered. Other comments: Too often Kay's actions have made it difficult for the department to operate effectively. Since Kay's arrival, it have discussed [sic] that each person must respect the protocol of communicating within the chain of command. On numerous occasions Kay ignored those instructions, In spite of my direct instructions to notify/discuss an incident report to Dean Hickman before doing anything else with it, Kay distributed it to others.6/ The College terminated Petitioner's employment on June 28, 2007, roughly five months after she began work and well within the six-month probationary period. Petitioner's dismissal was due to inadequate job performance and to several episodes displaying poor judgment and disregard of the College's rules and regulations. As to day-to-day job performance, the evidence established that Petitioner often had to be asked several times to do things that she conceded were within the scope of her duties. One of Petitioner's duties was to track the department's inventory, order supplies as needed, check the supplies against the invoices as they arrived, and unpack the supplies and restock the department's shelves. If the supplies were not removed from their shipping containers and stocked on the shelves, it was difficult for the instructors and students to find items or know when the department was running low on a given supply. Student cosmetologists at the College were frequently required to use caustic chemicals, and it was critical that the supplies be correctly inventoried and shelved to avoid mistakes in application of these chemicals. Ms. McLean had to tell Petitioner repeatedly to unpack the supplies. Petitioner would tell Ms. McLean that she would take care of it, but later Ms. McLean would notice that the supplies were still in their boxes.7/ Ms. McLean testified that there were multiple occasions when paperwork could not be located due to Petitioner's lack of a filing system. Ms. McLean and Petitioner would have to rummage through stacks of paper to find the item they needed because Petitioner failed to file the department's paperwork in a coherent manner. Another of Petitioner's duties was to set up "product knowledge" classes conducted by vendors of hair care products used in the cosmetology program. In February 2007, Ms. Glenn asked Petitioner to set up a class with Shirley Detrieville, the Redken representative for the College. Over the next month, Ms. Glenn repeatedly asked Petitioner about her progress in setting up the class, and Petitioner consistently responded that Ms. Detrieville had not returned her calls. Finally, in March, Ms. Glenn happened to see Ms. Detrieville on the campus. Ms. Detrieville informed Ms. Glenn that all the paperwork for the class had been completed long ago, and she was just waiting for Petitioner to call and let her know when to come. Ms. Glenn's class never received the Redken training. The evidence established that Petitioner consistently failed to return phone calls made to the department. There was a core group of women, mostly retirees that constituted an important segment of the regular patrons at the department's lab. Keeping track of their appointments was important because the students needed practical experience in order to meet the requirements for licensure. It was also important to keep track of the training needs of each student, because a student working on hair coloring, for instance, needed to be matched with a customer requesting that service. Among Petitioner's duties was to make the appointments for the patrons, and to coordinate the appointments with the students. Ms. McLean and Ms. Glenn testified that they consistently received complaints that Petitioner did not return phone calls from patrons attempting to make appointments. Ms. McLean recalled an elderly woman named Ms. Grammith, who was a weekly customer at the lab. Ms. Grammith phoned Ms. McLean at home because she was unable to get Petitioner to return her calls for an appointment.8/ Ms. Glenn recounted an occasion when she received a phone call from Ms. Grammith, complaining that Petitioner was not returning her calls. Ms. Glenn walked into Petitioner's office and asked her to return Ms. Grammith's call and make her appointment. Petitioner assured Ms. Glenn that she would. Ms. Glenn then went to teach a class. When she returned to her office, Ms. Glenn had another message from Ms. Grammith. Ms. Glenn asked Petitioner about the situation, and Petitioner admitted that she had not yet returned the call. Still later on the same afternoon, Ms. Glenn received a third call from Ms. Grammith. Again, Ms. Glenn inquired of Petitioner, who again admitted that she had not phoned Ms. Grammith. The next morning was a Friday, and Ms. Glenn received another call from Ms. Grammith. Ms. Glenn walked into Petitioner's office and told her to call Ms. Grammith. Ms. Glenn knew Petitioner never made the call because Ms. Grammith called Ms. Glenn yet again on the following Monday. Another elderly regular customer, Ms. Caldwell, stopped Ms. Glenn in the hallway one day to ask "what in the world was going on here." Ms. Caldwell complained that Petitioner never got her appointment right, and always told her that she had come in on the wrong day or at the wrong time. On this day, Ms. Caldwell was left sitting in the hallway outside the lab for three and one-half hours because Petitioner failed to schedule her appointment correctly. On another occasion, Shirley Rehberg, an LCCC employee, emailed Ms. Glenn to inquire about making an appointment for a pedicure. Ms. Glenn responded that Petitioner handled appointments, and provided Ms. Rehberg with information as to Petitioner's office hours. On three different occasions, Ms. Rehberg informed Ms. Glenn that she had attempted to make appointments with Petitioner but had received no response. Ms. Glenn also recalled going to the College registrar's office on unrelated business and being asked by Debbie Osborne, an employee in that office, whether the cosmetology department had stopped taking appointments. Ms. Glenn told her that all she had to do was call Petitioner. Ms. Osborne replied that she had emailed Petitioner several times and never received a response. Ms. McLean concluded that Petitioner was much more interested in the occasional teaching aspect of her position than she was in the quotidian matters of filing, ordering and answering the phone that constituted the bulk of her job. Ms. McLean believed that Petitioner's eagerness to teach, even when her presence on the floor was not requested or needed, sometimes caused Petitioner to neglect her other duties. Petitioner admitted that she preferred teaching, but also testified that she was forced to teach students at least two days per week because Ms. McLean simply skipped work every Wednesday and Thursday. Petitioner stated that when she was on the floor of the lab, she could not hear the phone ringing back in the office. She believed that this might have accounted for some of the missed phone calls. Ms. McLean credibly denied Petitioner's unsupported allegation that she skipped work twice per week. Ms. McLean was in the classroom and lab with her students four days per week, as required by her schedule. Ms. McLean reasonably observed that she would not remain long in the College's employ if she were to skip work every Wednesday and Thursday. When classes were not in session, faculty members such as Ms. McLean and Ms. Glenn were not required to come into the office, whereas the teaching assistant was required to come in and work a full day from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. On these faculty off-days, it was especially important for Petitioner to be on the job because she constituted the sole point of contact between students and the cosmetology department. New classes in cosmetology start twice a year, and prospective students may drop by the campus at any time. If no one is present during normal working hours to answer questions or assist the student in applying, the College could lose a prospective student as well as suffer a diminished public image. The evidence established that Petitioner would take advantage of the lack of supervision on faculty off-days to go missing from her position, without submitting leave forms for approval by an administrator as required by College policy. May 4, 2007, was the College's graduation day. Ms. McLean and Ms. Glenn arrived at the cosmetology building at 3:00 p.m. to prepare for the cap and gown ceremony and noted that Petitioner was not there, though it was a regular work day for her. Petitioner was still absent at 4:30 p.m. when the two instructors left the building to go to the graduation ceremony. On May 15, 2007, a faculty off-day, Ms. Glenn came in at 11:00 a.m. to prepare for her class the next day. Petitioner asked Ms. Glenn to handle a student registration matter while Petitioner went out. Ms. Glenn agreed to do so. The students had yet to arrive by 2:00 p.m. when Ms. Glenn was ready to leave. Petitioner had still not returned to the office, forcing Ms. Glenn to ask Ms. West to register the students if they arrived. Ms. Glenn had no idea when or if Petitioner ever returned to work that day. Marcia Brinson was the custodian who cleaned the cosmetology building. During summer session at the College, Ms. Brinson worked from 2:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. She would often come into the cosmetology building and find that Petitioner was not there. This was the case on May 15, 2007, when Ms. Brinson entered the building at 2:00 p.m. At around 2:30, an administrator named Glenn Rice came to the cosmetology building with two students whom he was attempting to enroll.9/ Ms. Brinson phoned Ms. McLean at home to inform her of the situation. Ms. McLean phoned the cosmetology office. Petitioner did not answer. At about 2:50 p.m., Ms. McLean called Petitioner at her cell phone number. Petitioner answered and told Ms. McLean that she was at her mother's house, but was about to return to the College. Ms. McLean could not say whether Petitioner ever actually returned to the College that day. At the hearing, Petitioner claimed that the only time she left the cosmetology department on May 15, 2007, was to go to the library at 2:15 p.m. and obtain materials for a class she was going to teach on May 17. This testimony cannot be credited, given that it conflicts with the credible testimony of Ms. McLean, Ms. Glenn and Ms. Brinson. Further belying Petitioner's claim is the fact that she later submitted a leave form claiming "personal leave" for two hours on May 15, 2007. She claimed the hours from 3:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m. Aside from its inconsistency with Petitioner's testimony, this claim was inaccurate on two other counts. First, the evidence established that Petitioner was away from the office from at least 11:00 a.m. until some time after 3:00 p.m. Second, Petitioner's regular work day ended at 5:00 p.m., thus giving her no cause to claim leave for the half-hour between 5:00 and 5:30 p.m. The College has a "wellness" program in which employees are allowed to take 30 minutes of leave, three days per week, in order to engage in some form of exercise. Petitioner considered wellness time to be the equivalent of personal leave, and would leave her job at the College early in order to keep an appointment at a hair-styling salon at which she worked part-time. Finally, Petitioner was unwilling or unable to comply with the College's parking decal system. At the time she was hired, Petitioner was issued a staff parking pass that entitled her to park her car in any unreserved space on he campus. As noted above, many of the cosmetology customers were elderly women. For their convenience, the College had five spaces reserved for customers directly in front of the cosmetology building. Customers were issued a 5 x 8 "Cosmetology Customer" card that they would leave on their dashboards. If all five of the reserved spaces were taken, the card allowed the customer to park in any space on the campus. On May 30, 2007, the College's supervisor of safety and security, Tony LaJoie, was patrolling the campus on his golf cart. Petitioner flagged him down, asking for help with a dead battery in her car. Mr. LaJoie stopped to help her, but also noticed that Petitioner's car was parked in a space reserved for customers and that Petitioner had a "Cosmetology Customer" card on her dashboard. When he asked her about it, Petitioner told Mr. LaJoie that she had lost her staff parking pass and therefore needed to use the customer pass. Mr. LaJoie told Petitioner that she could go to the maintenance building and get a new staff pass, or get a visitor's pass to use until she found the first pass. Petitioner told Mr. LaJoie that she could not afford the $10 replacement fee for the pass. Mr. LaJoie told her that the $10 replacement fee was cheaper than the $25 to $50 fines she would have to pay for illegally parking on campus. Petitioner promised Mr. LaJoie that she would go to maintenance and take care of the situation. On June 5, 2007, Mr. LaJoie found Petitioner's car again parked in a customer reserved space and with a customer card on the dashboard. Mr. LaJoie wrote Petitioner a parking ticket. Petitioner was well aware that the customer spaces were reserved at least in part because many of the department's customers were elderly and unable to walk more than a short distance. Petitioner nonetheless ignored College policy and parked her car in the reserved spaces. Petitioner never obtained a replacement parking pass.10/ Dean Hickman was the administrator who made the decision to recommend Petitioner's termination to the College's Vice-President, Charles Carroll, who in turn presented the recommended decision to LCCC President Charles W. Hall, who made the final decision on termination. She based her recommendation on the facts as set forth in Findings of Fact 19 through 48, supra. Petitioner's termination was due to her performance deficiencies. Dean Hickman considered Petitioner's pattern of conduct, including her repeated violation of parking policies and her practice of leaving her post without permission, to constitute insubordination. Ms. McLean, who provided input to Dean Hickman as to Petitioner's performance issues, testified that Petitioner's slack performance worked to the great detriment of a department with only two instructors attempting to deal with 20 or more students at different stages of their training. Petitioner's position was not filled for a year after her dismissal. Ms. McLean and Ms. Glenn worked extra hours and were able to perform Petitioner's duties, with the help of a student to answer the phones. The fact that the instructors were able to perform their own jobs and cover Petitioner's duties negates Petitioner's excuse that she was required to do more than one full-time employee could handle. Furthermore, Ms. McLean testified that, despite the added work load, Petitioner's departure improved the working atmosphere by eliminating the tension caused by Petitioner. Because Petitioner was still a probationary employee, the College was not required to show cause or provide specific reasons for her dismissal. Nevertheless, the evidence established that there were entirely adequate, performance-based reasons that fully justified the College's decision to terminate Petitioner's employment. The evidence further established that Petitioner's dismissal was not related to the formal grievance Petitioner filed on June 5, 2007. However, because Petitioner has alleged that her termination was retaliatory, the facts surrounding her grievance are explored below. The grievance stemmed from an incident that occurred between Petitioner and Ms. Glenn on May 16, 2007, the first day of the summer term. A student named Russia Sebree approached Ms. Glenn with a problem. Ms. Sebree was not on Ms. Glenn's summer class roster because she had not completed the Tests of Adult Basic Education ("TABE"), a test of basic reading, math and language skills. Students were required to pass the TABE in their first semester before they would be allowed to register for their second semester. Ms. Glenn told Ms. Sebree that, because the initial registration period had passed, they would have to walk over to the Dean's office and have Dean Hickman register Ms. Sebree for the class. Ms. Glenn phoned Dean Hickman's secretary, Ms. West, to make an appointment. Ms. West told Ms. Glenn that Dean Hickman was out of the office, and that she would make a return call to Ms. Glenn as soon as the dean returned. While waiting for Ms. West's call, Ms. Sebree apparently drifted into Petitioner's office. She mentioned to Petitioner that she hadn't passed the TABE test, and Petitioner told her she could take care of the matter by making an appointment for Ms. Sebree to take the test. Ms. Glenn overheard the conversation and walked in to stop Petitioner from making the call. She told Petitioner that she had a call in to Dean Hickman, and that she and Ms. Sebree would have to meet with the dean to determine whether Ms. Sebree could register for Ms. Glenn's summer class or whether she would be required to complete the TABE and wait until the next semester. Ms. Glenn was angered by Petitioner's interference in this matter. Petitioner's actions were beyond the scope of a teaching assistant's duties, unless requested by an instructor.11/ She jumped into the situation without inquiring whether Ms. Sebree had talked to her instructor about her problem and without understanding the steps that Ms. Glenn had already taken on Ms. Sebree's behalf. Eventually, Ms. West returned the call and Ms. Glenn and Ms. Sebree met with Dean Hickman. After the meeting, Ms. Glenn requested a private meeting with Dean Hickman. She told the dean that she was very upset that Petitioner had taken it upon herself to take over the situation with Ms. Sebree, when Ms. Glenn was taking care of the matter and Petitioner had no reason to step in. Dean Hickman told Ms. Glenn that she would not tolerate a staff person going over an instructor's head in a matter involving a student. Dean Hickman asked Ms. Glenn to send Petitioner over to her office. Dean Hickman testified that she met with Petitioner for about 30 minutes, and that Petitioner left her office requesting a meeting with Ms. Glenn. Dean Hickman did not testify as to the details of her meeting with Petitioner. The dean knew that Petitioner was angry and cautioned her to conduct herself in a professional manner when speaking with Ms. Glenn. Petitioner testified that Dean Hickman "yelled" at her, "I will not have you undermine my instructor's authority." Petitioner professed not to know what Dean Hickman was talking about. The dean repeated what Ms. Glenn had said to her about the incident with Ms. Sebree. According to Petitioner, Ms. Glenn had told the dean "some lie," an "outlandish" tale in which "I went in telling Russia that she didn't have to do what Vicki said, or something like that." Petitioner told Dean Hickman her version of the incident, which was essentially that nothing happened. She was showing Ms. Sebree "some basic algebraic equations and stuff and there was no conflict or anything in the office." Petitioner asked for a meeting "so I can see what's going on." Petitioner returned to the cosmetology department. She was visibly upset. She asked for a departmental meeting with Ms. McLean and Ms. Glenn that afternoon. Ms. McLean agreed to move up the weekly departmental meeting in order to take care of this matter. The meeting convened with Ms. McLean going over the usual day-to-day matters involving the program. Once the regular business was completed, Ms. McLean stated that she wanted Petitioner and Ms. Glenn to air out their problems. Petitioner asked Ms. Glenn why she wanted to tell lies about her. Ms. Glenn said, "What?" and Petitioner stated, "You're a liar." Ms. Glenn denied the accusation. Petitioner repeated, "You're nothing but a liar." In anger and frustration, Ms. Glenn stated, "Look here, sister, I am not a liar." Petitioner responded, "First, you're not my sister and, secondly, my name is Stephanie K. Taylor, address me with that, please."12/ Ms. McLean testified that both women were "pretty heated" and "pretty frustrated" with each other. She concluded the meeting shortly after this exchange. After the meeting, Petitioner and Ms. McLean spoke about Ms. Glenn's use of the word "sister," which Petitioner believed had racial connotations. Ms. McLean told Petitioner that she did not believe anything racial was intended.13/ Ms. Glenn had never been called a liar, and in her frustration she blurted out "sister" in the same way another angry person might say, "Look here, lady." Petitioner seemed satisfied and the matter was dropped for the remainder of the day. Dean Hickman testified that Petitioner brought some paperwork to her office that afternoon after the departmental meeting. Petitioner told her that she felt better about the situation, that they had aired their differences and everything now seemed fine. The dean considered the matter resolved. By the next morning, May 17, 2007, Petitioner had changed her mind about the comment. She sent an email to each member of the College's board of trustees, President Hall, Dean Hickman, and various other College employees that stated as follows: Hello. I am Stephanie K. Taylor, Teaching Assistant for Cosmetology. I am writing because of an incident that took place on yesterday, May 16, 2007. Nancy Carol McLean (Coordinator/Instructor), Vicki Glenn (Instructor) and I met for a meeting to discuss concerns in our department approximately 11:35 am. During our discussion, Vicki Glenn made a racial comment to me. I disagreed with her concerning a statement she made. Her reply to me was: "No, 'Sister', I did not!" I was very offended by her remark and I replied, "My name is Stephanie Kay Taylor." Following the meeting, I spoke with Ms. McLean and I decided to write this incident statement. If I allow an instructor to call me something other than my name, these incidents will continue. Ms. McLean had repeatedly cautioned Petitioner to respect the College's chain of command. As Petitioner's immediate supervisor, Ms. McLean was supposed to be Petitioner's first resort insofar as work-related complaints. Petitioner was in the habit of going straight to Dean Hickman with complaints before discussing them with Ms. McLean. However, in this instance, Petitioner did show Ms. McLean the text of her statement before she distributed it. Ms. McLean advised Petitioner to take the matter straight to Dean Hickman and discuss it with her before distributing the statement. Petitioner did not take Ms. McLean's advice. Though Petitioner emailed the statement to Dean Hickman, the dean did not actually see the statement until it had been distributed to several other people. No evidence was presented that Petitioner suffered any adverse consequences from distributing her written statement outside the College's chain of command. To the contrary, Petitioner testified that Ms. McLean advised her that if she felt strongly about the matter, she should file a formal grievance pursuant to the LCCC Policy and Procedure 6Hx12:6- 10.14/ Ms. McLean provided Petitioner with the forms she needed to file a written grievance. Petitioner also sought and received the advice of a human relations specialist at the College as to how to file a formal grievance. Both Ms. McLean and Ms. Glenn convincingly testified that they had no ill feeling toward Petitioner for filing a grievance. Ms. McLean stated that the grievance had no impact on her at all. Ms. Glenn was not disturbed by the grievance because she had done nothing wrong and believed the process would vindicate her. Petitioner filed her formal written grievance on June 5, 2007. Vice president Marilyn Hamm began the investigation in the absence of Human Resources Director Gary Boettcher, who picked up the investigation upon his return to the campus. Dean Hickman also participated in the investigation of Petitioner's grievance. They interviewed the witnesses to the incident. They also interviewed 11 cosmetology students and asked them whether they had ever heard Ms. Glenn make any "derogatory or racial slurs or comments" relative to Petitioner. None of the students had heard Ms. Glenn make any remarks fitting the description in the query.15/ One student told the investigators that he had heard Petitioner speak disparagingly of Ms. Glenn, but not vice versa. On June 19, 2007, Mr. Boettcher issued a memorandum to Petitioner that stated as follows: You filed a grievance alleging that Ms. Vickie Glenn made a racial comment to you by calling you "sister." You further stated that you want the same respect that you have given to others and that you be referred to by your name, Stephanie K. Taylor. I was not available when you filed the grievance therefore it was referred to Vice President Hamm who began the investigation and upon my return it was referred to me. Ms. Hamm interviewed yourself, and Carol McLean. Ms. Hamm and I then interviewed Ms. Glenn. Subsequently, Ms. Hickman, the Dean of your department, and I interviewed a random sampling of students in the cosmetology program. The incident you described, when you were referred to as "sister" was discussed with both Ms. McLean and Ms. Glenn, who were in the meeting when the comment was made. They both acknowledged that you were in fact referred to as sister. Neither of them viewed it as a racial comment but a term that was used in the heat of the discussion in which you and Ms. Glenn were very much at odds on a subject. The students were interviewed and asked if you had discussed or made mention of an evaluation that you received and also whether that had ever heard Ms. Glenn talk derogatorily or made any racial comments relative to you. Some of the students heard of talk of your evaluation but none of them heard it first hand from you. None of the students ever heard Ms. Glenn refer to you in any racial or disparaging way. In view of the investigation it is concluded that you were called "sister" but not in a negative or racial inference and that Ms. Glenn has not referred to you in a derogatory or racial manner. This has been discussed with Ms. McLean and Ms. Glenn in that they were asked to refer to you strictly by your name and in a professional manner. I trust this will be satisfactory to you and if you have any questions please feel free to contact me. Petitioner's employment with the College was terminated on June 28, 2007, nine days after Mr. Boettcher's memorandum. No evidence was presented to establish a causal connection between these two events, aside from their temporal proximity. As noted extensively above, the College had more than ample justification to terminate Petitioner's employment before the conclusion of her six-month probationary period. The greater weight of the evidence establishes that Petitioner was terminated from her position with the College due to poor job performance and conduct amounting to insubordination. The greater weight of the evidence establishes that the College did not retaliate against Petitioner for the filing of a grievance alleging that Ms. Glenn had made a racially discriminatory remark towards Petitioner. Rather, the greater weight of the evidence established that College personnel assisted Petitioner in filing her grievance and that the College conscientiously investigated the grievance. The greater weight of the evidence establishes that the College has not discriminated against Petitioner based on her race.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding that Lake City Community College did not commit any unlawful employment practices and dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of June, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of June, 2010.
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent, as City Manager for the City of Opa-locka, violated Section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes, by (1) using his position to engage in sexual, or romantically-oriented, comments, behavior, and/or invitations to female City employees; (2) having a subordinate's car repaired using City resources; (3) soliciting a personal sexual or romantic relationship with a female job applicant; and (4) if yes, what penalty is appropriate.
Findings Of Fact Respondent served in the Marines for two years and in the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) for thirteen years. He then served as Police Chief of Florida City for two years before resigning to become the Executive Officer in Charge of Investigations at the City of Lauderhill Police Department. After two or three months he quit that job, and conducted private investigations until he was hired by the City of Opa- locka. Respondent was appointed acting City Manager for the City of Opa-locka (City/Opa-locka) on Friday, June 9, 1995. He was appointed City Manager effective July 28, 1995, and remained in that position until May 1997. All City employees, other than those in the City Attorney's Office, ultimately reported to the Respondent as City Manager. Also, as City Manager, Respondent could terminate City employees. In Respondent's positions as acting City Manager and City Manager, he was subject to the requirements of Part III, Chapter 112, Florida Statutes, the Code of Ethics for Public Employees and Officers. Remarks and Conduct Toward Female Employees At all times relevant hereto, Angelita Griffin was employed by the City of Opa-locka. Ms. Griffin first started working with the City of Opa-locka during a Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) project in late 1992. Thereafter, in March 1993, Ms. Griffin was hired by the City, in a temporary position as an accounts clerk in the Water Department, which was under the City's Finance Section. Ms. Griffin was eventually placed in a permanent position with the City and continued to work as a clerk in the Water Department until June 1995. Ms. Griffin first met Respondent on Saturday, June 10, 1995, the day after he was appointed acting City Manager. Respondent was visiting the Finance Department with Winston Mottley, Director of the Finance Department. Ms. Griffin and several other employees were in the office working that day. Respondent briefly spoke to some of the employees, but he did not engage in extended conversations with any of them. On June 10, 1995, while at the Finance Department, Respondent asked Mr. Mottley if he could send someone to Respondent's office on Monday to answer the telephones. Mr. Mottley said that he had just the right person, someone who he had been "trying to get out of his office." Even though Mr. Mottley did not name or otherwise identify that person to Respondent, the employee to whom he was referring was Ms. Griffin. The following Monday, June 12, 1995, Mr. Mottley informed Ms. Griffin that she was being transferred to the Building Department and told her to report there the next day. After Ms. Griffin reported to the Building Department on June 13, 1995, she was directed to report to the City Manager's Office. Although Ms. Griffin reported to the City Manager's Office, she was unhappy about being transferred from the Water Department. Ms. Griffin wanted to remain in the Water Department because she enjoyed the work, believed that she knew the job, and was comfortable there. Almost immediately after being transferred from the Water Department, Ms. Griffin openly expressed her disatisfaction about the transfer and took steps which she believed would possibly result in her being reassigned to the Water Department. Within a day or so of Ms. Griffin's being transferred to the City Manager's Office, she told Respondent that she wanted to go back to the Water Department. However, he did not comply with her request. Also, as early as June 13 or 14, 1995, Ms. Griffin telephoned former City Manager Dennis Whitt and asked him if he could "talk to someone in City Hall and see if [she could] go back to the Water Department." Ms. Griffin called former City Manager Whitt because she believed that he was "still close to the mayor and the commissioners." When former City Manager Whitt did not call Ms. Griffin with a response regarding her request, Ms. Griffin telephoned Mr. Whitt. In that conversation, Mr. Whitt told Ms. Griffin that he had been unsuccessful in trying to help her get transferred back to the Water Department. Mr. Whitt conveyed to Ms. Griffin that he had spoken to someone in the Water Department who said that Ms. Griffin was incompetent and that there was "nothing they could do to help [her]." Based on her telephone conversation with Mr. Whitt, Ms. Griffin believed that Respondent had told City Commissioner Helen Miller that Ms. Griffin couldn't return to the Water Department because she was "incompetent, . . ., didn't know [her] work over there, [and]. . . couldn't even type." During the week of June 12, 1995, Ms. Griffin also went to the office of the City's Vice-Mayor Timothy Holmes and asked him to help her "get back to the Water Department." Vice- Mayor Holmes apparently believed that such a transfer was unlikely and advised Ms. Griffin that Respondent had said Ms. Griffin "didn't know [her] work over there." Despite Ms. Griffin's soliciting the assistance of Mr. Whitt and Vice-Mayor Holmes, whom she considered to be influential, and Respondent, she was never reassigned to the Water Department. Between June 1995 and November 1995, Ms. Griffin worked in four different offices: the City Manager's Office, the Mayor's Office, Safe Neighborhoods, and Code Enforcement. While working in each of the aforementioned offices, Ms. Griffin's sole or primary responsibility was to answer the telephone. Beginning on June 13, 1995, Ms. Griffin worked for Respondent in the City Manager's Office and was there for about two months. While working in the City Manager's Office, there were two instances when Respondent spoke to Ms. Griffin about reporting to work late. In the first instance, Ms. Griffin indicated that her tardiness was due to transporting her son to daycare. During this or a subsequent conversation, Respondent asked Ms. Griffin several personal questions. The questions concerned Ms. Griffin's marital status, the paternity of her child, and her financial status as it related to her ability to take care of herself and her child. It was then that Ms. Griffin told Respondent that she earned extra money by working part-time as a singer. Ms. Griffin agreed to and did eventually bring him a tape of her music. On another occasion, when Ms. Griffin was working in Respondent's office, he commented on her weight and the junk food she was eating. Respondent then suggested that Ms. Griffin contact a company to inquire about having a juice machine put in the building. Respondent's comments upset Ms. Griffin so much that she almost stayed home from work the next day. However, she later decided to report to work even though she was late. When Ms. Griffin arrived at the office, Respondent called Ms. Griffin into his office to discuss her tardiness. Respondent also called his assistant, Ms. Robinson, into the office while he talked to Ms. Griffin. Mr. Mottley, who was already in Respondent's office when Ms. Griffin arrived, remained there during the meeting. Ms. Griffin became frustrated and told Respondent and Mr. Mottley that she was tired of them "harassing" her. After Ms. Griffin made this comment, Respondent demanded that she write a letter of apology for her accusation against Respondent and Mr. Mottley. Ms. Griffin acknowledged that she, in fact, wrote the letter and gave it to Respondent. However, there is no indication of what Respondent did with the letter. After working full-time in the City Manager's Office for about two months, Ms. Griffin was transferred to the Mayor's Office for a short time. From the Mayor's Office, Ms. Griffin was sent to Safe Neighborhoods, where she worked for approximately three weeks. Ms. Griffin's assignment to Safe Neighborhoods was the result of a request by the director of that program for additional assistance. From Safe Neighborhoods, Ms. Griffin went to work in Code Enforcement, where she worked until November 6 or 7, 1995. In the City of Opa-locka, a Report of Personnel Action was to be completed whenever an employee was transferred from one section to another section. However, it was not unusual for City employees to be transferred without such forms being completed. In Ms. Griffin's case, there was never any paperwork reflecting any of her interdepartmental transfers or reassignments. During Ms. Griffin's tenure with the City, even when she was not assigned exclusively to the City Manager's Office, she was called to that office several days a week, for some part of the workday, to answer the telephone. Ms. Griffin had no set schedule for reporting to the City Manager's Office to answer the telephone, but was considered a relief person and, as such, went there whenever she was called upon to report. When Ms. Griffin was needed, she was always called by a support staff person from the City Manager's Office. Ms. Griffin also served as a relief person under the two former city managers who preceded Respondent. In addition to Ms. Griffin, employees from other City departments were required to serve as relief persons by answering the telephone in the City Manager's Office. Again, this practice was in place prior to Respondent's being appointed City Manager and continued during his tenure. Several City employees, mainly Department heads or other highly placed staff, had Rotary Club memberships paid for by the City. Although Ms. Griffin did not fall into this category of employees, Respondent also authorized a City paid membership for her. Ms. Griffin was one of the City employees who regularly attended Rotary functions and meetings. In addition to her job with the City, Ms. Griffin was a singer. Because Ms. Griffin was a performing artist, she often sang at Rotary Club activities. Notwithstanding the fact that Ms. Griffin customarily sang at Rotary Club or other functions, there was at least one occasion when Respondent asked Ms. Griffin to sing at an event and she refused to do so. After Ms. Griffin refused to sing at that particular event, Respondent asked her why she was not more cooperative given "all that he had done for her." In response to this inquiry, Ms. Griffin told Respondent that her refusal to sing was not anything "personal." However, Ms. Griffin maintained her position that she "couldn't do it." After this exchange, there is no indication that Ms. Griffin sang at this function or that she suffered any adverse consequences as a result of her decision. During the period between June 13, 1995, and November 6, 1995, none of Ms. Griffin's supervisors ever documented any complaint about her job performance or observed any changes in her behavior or attitude. In fact, those individuals who worked with Ms. Griffin and saw her on a regular basis found her to be pleasant and happy, and noticed no changes in her demeanor. However, while Ms. Griffin worked in Safe Neighborhoods, a fellow employee, Mildred Bradshaw, observed that Ms. Griffin sometimes appeared disgusted or disturbed when she returned from the City Manager's office. In response to Ms. Bradshaw's inquiry about what was wrong, Ms. Griffin expressed her dissatisfaction with Respondent and told Ms. Bradshaw that she was "tired of [Respondent] calling her back over to his office" and "switching me back and forth and the way he was treating me as far as coming on to me." Ms. Griffin testified that she gave Ms. Bradshaw no detailed explanation of what she meant by these comments. None the less, contrary to Ms. Griffin's statement, Ms. Bradshaw testified that Ms. Griffin told her that she and Respondent had had "sex" in Respondent's office. According to Ms. Bradshaw, Ms. Griffin made this statement to her in October 1995, when Ms. Griffin worked in Safe Neighborhoods. On October 1, 1995, while Ms. Griffin was working in Safe Neighborhoods, City Commission authorized a 5 percent cost of living salary increase for City Employees. As a result thereof, Ms. Griffin's annual salary went from $16,500 to $17,388. Respondent authorized an additional raise for Ms. Griffin, on October 9, 1995, which increased her salary to $18,000. For the three weeks Ms. Griffin was in Safe Neighborhoods, she was supervised by Ms. Lockhart. However, Ms. Lockhart was unaware of Ms. Griffin's salary or of the pay raise authorized by Respondent. During Respondent's tenure as City Manager for the City Of Opa-locka, City employees other than Ms. Griffin received salary increases in excess of the 5 percent cost-of- living increase approved by the City Commission. Some of those salary increases, approved by Respondent, were substantially higher than the one received by Ms. Griffin. Completion of a Report of Personnel Action (RPA) is required to effectuate a salary increase for City employees and the form contains a "remarks" section that may be used to indicate the reason for any pay adjustment. Nonetheless, it is not unusual for such a statement to be absent from the RPA. In Ms. Griffin's case, no reason for the October 9, 1995, salary increase was provided on the form. Ms. Griffin signed the RPA authorizing her salary increase. However, when she signed the form, the only pay raise shown was the 5 percent cost of living adjustment. Ms. Griffin testified that the first she knew of the raise was when the Respondent called her in and asked her how she liked her raise. According to Ms. Griffin, she was upset to know she was receiving special treatment, and was concerned about what Respondent might want in return. On October 25, 1995, Ms. Griffin submitted a letter of resignation to the City, with such resignation being effective November 6, 1995. At the time Ms. Griffin tendered her letter of resignation, she told City colleagues that she was leaving the City to accept a job as a singer. Ms. Griffin told some City employees that she would be going on tour with someone, although after leaving the City, Ms. Griffin performed as a singer on a cruise ship. On the evening of November 1, 1995, Respondent and a number of City officials who belonged to the Rotary Club, including Respondent's assistant, Michael Jones, and Police Chief Craig Collins, attended a Rotary Club function. Ms. Griffin also attended and sang at the event. While enroute to the Rotary Club function on November 1, 1995, Ms. Griffin damaged her car. Ms. Griffin testified that the car was damaged when she backed into the gate or lock at her apartment complex as she was leaving for the Rotary Club event. However, that evening Ms. Griffin told Respondent, Michael Jones, and Craig Collins, in separate conversations, that someone had hit her car. On November 1, 1995, after learning that Ms. Griffin's vehicle was disabled, Police Chief Craig Collins offered to drive her home. Even though Ms. Griffin knew Chief Collins not only as the City's Police Chief, but also as a relative of one of her friends, she declined his offer. Michael Jones also offered to provide Ms. Griffin with a police escort to take her home. Again, Ms. Griffin declined this offer and instead accepted a ride with Respondent. At Respondent's suggestion, Ms. Griffin then drove her car to the City Police Station and parked it. Respondent went to the Police Station to pick up Ms. Griffin and drive her home. Respondent drove Ms. Griffin home after the Rotary Club event. When Respondent arrived at Ms. Griffin's apartment complex, he entered through the security entrance and drove Ms. Griffin to her apartment. About fifteen minutes after Respondent left the Rotary function, Respondent called Mr. Jones from the cellular telephone in Respondent's car to advise him of matters that the Mayor had discussed earlier that evening. This call was made after Respondent took Ms. Griffin to her apartment. Ms. Griffin's and Respondent's versions of what occurred once they arrived at Ms. Griffin's apartment complex are at odds. Respondent's version of the events that transpired on the evening of November 1, 1995, is that after he arrived at Ms. Griffin's apartment complex, she exited his car and he immediately left. According to Respondent, he never went into Ms. Griffin's apartment. According to Ms. Griffin, Respondent carried Ms. Griffin's belongings upstairs, entered her apartment, put the items in her bedroom, seated himself on her couch, and asked for something to drink. Ms. Griffin testified that while she was getting Respondent something to drink, he came up behind her, and rubbed against her. Ms. Griffin stated that she then turned around and tried to push him away, but Respondent persisted in his efforts, asking her why she was resisting after all he had done for her. Finally, according to Ms. Griffin, Respondent pushed her down and asked her for oral sex, and when she did not comply, he engaged in sexual intercourse with her against her will. Ms. Griffin testified that she did not want Respondent in her apartment on the evening of November 1, 1995, but claims that she did know how to stand up to him. Ms. Griffin never reported the aforementioned alleged sexual assault to anyone before about August 1996, when she mentioned it to her attorney. Moreover, Ms. Griffin never reported the incident to law enforcement officials nor did she seek medical attention after the alleged assault. There is no physical or otherwise reliable evidence that the alleged sexual assault occurred. Furthermore, it is found that Ms. Griffin's testimony regarding the alleged assault is not credible. Thus, it is found that on the evening of November 1, 1995, Respondent never entered Ms. Griffin's apartment. The next day, November 2, 1995, Ms. Griffin reported to her City job as usual. During that day, Ms. Griffin went to the City Manager's office after she was called to report there. Ms. Griffin continued to work for the City until November 7, 1995. Although Ms. Griffin's resignation was to be effective November 6, 1995, she worked an extra day until November 7, 1995, at the request of Respondent. During the period between November 7, 1995, and August 19, 1996, Ms. Griffin was employed as a singer on the a cruise ship, Europa Sea Cruise. About nine months after Ms. Griffin left her job with the City, she filed a sexual harassment claim against Respondent. According to Ms. Griffin, the reason she decided to file the complaint was that she "had gone for a long time without saying anything to anybody." Also, Ms. Griffin acknowledged that she filed the complaint because she was struggling financially, was in a low-paying job, was away from her son, had given up her apartment, and was "stressed out and worried." The basis of the claim was alleged acts that occurred between June 1995 and November 1995. With the possible exception of comments that may have been made to Ms. Bradshaw in October 1995, Ms. Griffin never told anyone that Respondent made inappropriate remarks to her or behaved inappropriately toward her. Ms. Griffin testified that from the first month that she reported to Respondent's office and continuing until she left the City's employ four and one-half months later, she was subjected to continuous sexual harassment by the Respondent. According to Ms. Griffin, in addition to the questions about her personal life noted in paragraph 15 above, Respondent asked her whether there was a man in he life, told her he was looking for a girlfriend, and asked for her help. Ms. Griffin also testified that during the time she worked in Respondent's office, he stared at her breasts. Moreover, Ms. Griffin testified that Respondent hugged her almost everyday that she came into the office. According to Ms. Griffin, Respondent sometimes hugged her in the presence of other City employees who worked in the office. According to Ms. Griffin, Respondent not only hugged her, but also hugged other female City employees. From the reception area, anyone could see into Respondent's private office through a transparent window. This was possible because there was no covering on the window to obscure the view. Regla Mederes, who worked as Respondent's executive secretary at the time relevant to this proceeding, worked in an area where she was able to observe both Ms. Griffin and Respondent and would have seen Respondent hug Ms. Griffin if he had done so. However, Ms. Mederes never saw Respondent hug Ms. Griffin when she came into the office to answer the telephones or any other time. Aletha Robinson, Respondent's assistant when he worked for the City, was in and out of Respondent's office on a regular basis, but also never saw Respondent hug Ms. Griffin. Ms. Robinson stated that Respondent was always professional and "very much" a gentleman when he was in the office. Respondent never hugged Ms. Griffin or any other City employee in the workplace and was never overheard making sexually inappropriate remarks to female employees in the workplace. Ms. Griffin testified that at on two separate occasions, Respondent touched her on the buttocks. According to Ms. Griffin, Respondent touched her buttocks with his knee when he sat behind her at a banquet. Based on Ms. Griffin's account of events, Respondent also touched her buttocks with his hands while they stood in a buffet line at a Rotary function. Ms. Griffin stated that in the first situation, she made no attempt to move her chair and in neither of the aforementioned situations did she say anything to Respondent. Other City employees and officials attending these events never observed Respondent touching Ms. Griffin. In fact, at Rotary events, Respondent never sat near Ms. Griffin. As City Manager, Respondent was seated at the front of the room, typically at the head table. On the other hand, Ms. Griffin was usually late and sat in or near the back of the room. Moreover, Ms. Griffin testified that during the course of her employment, Respondent asked her out to dinner and on another occasion, called her at home and asked if her boyfriend was in bed with her. Ms. Griffin never reported this to anyone during her employment with the City. According to Ms. Griffin, on the evening of November 1, 1995, after the Rotary Club function had concluded, Respondent remarked that since Ms. Griffin had resigned from the City, she could now go out with him. Moreover, Ms. Griffin testified that these comments were made in the presence of City officials and/or employees, namely Vice Mayor Holmes, Aletha Robinson, and Michael Jones. Neither of the aforementioned individuals heard Respondent make any comment that Ms. Griffin could now be his girlfriend or go out with him. Respondent, on one occasion, commented to Mr. Mottley about Ms. Griffin's breasts and their size. During this conversation, which Mr. Mottley characterized as "talking as men," he jokingly warned the Respondent that "breasts" could get him into trouble. This was a private conversation between only Respondent and Mr. Mottley. It is unknown where or when this discussion took place. Respondent has had numerous courses dealing with sexual harassment. Thus, he was aware that remarks of a sexual nature to subordinates are inappropriate; that it was improper to ask a subordinate employee about her sexual partners; that it was improper to ask a subordinate employee to kiss him; and that it was improper for a superior to attempt to engage a subordinate employee in a sexual or romantic relationship. Ana Otero was employed by the City of Opa-locka for eight years, leaving in September 1997, after she was asked to resign by Arlington Sands. Ms. Otero testified that she did not like anyone associated with the City of Opa-locka, including Respondent. On one occasion when Ms. Otero went to Respondent's office, he told her that he wanted to come to her house for rice and beans. On another occasion, while passing through the small room where the copier was located, Respondent came up behind Ms. Otero while she was making photocopies. He was so close to her that she could feel his breath on her neck. Also, there was a time that Respondent made a comment to Ms. Otero regarding short Puerto Rican women. In another incident that occurred at the workplace, Respondent asked Ms. Otero to give him an "intimate" kiss. Ms. Otero never reported Respondent's conduct or comments during her tenure with the City. Liliana Cuevas was employed by the City of Opa-locka from 1990 until 1996. At one point, when Ms. Cuevas was in a meeting with Respondent on a personnel matter, he began to inquire about her personal life. Respondent asked such questions as why she was divorcing her husband, and whether her husband was her son's father. Respondent also asked her if she wanted to go out with one of his colleagues. On another occasion, Ms. Cuevas was delivering papers to the Respondent. As she gave him the items, he brushed his fingers lightly against her hand. As she was about to exit his office, he called her back to give her something else to take back with her. This scene was repeated several times, each time with Respondent brushing Ms. Cuevas' hand and watching her as she went back and forth. Respondent never asked Ms. Cuevas to have sex with him, asked her out, or made any "moves on her." Notwithstanding, Ms. Cuevas' description of the the incident described above, she stated that Respondent has never flirted with her or gotten physical with her. Ms. Cuevas never reported any inappropriate conduct by Respondent while she was employed by the City. While Ms. Cuevas filed sexual harassment charges against other employees of the City, she has not filed any such charges against Respondent. Sonia Hernandez started working for the City as an administrative assistant in the Public Works Department in November 1995. She left the City's employ in December 1996, after being terminated by Aibola Balogun. One week into her employment with the City, someone at a staff meeting asked Ms. Hernandez if she were single. Respondent told the staff member to "back off." When Ms. Hernandez came to this meeting, she unknowingly sat in the area designated for upper management, Respondent grabbed her arm and hand as if indicating she was in the wrong area. Ms. Hernandez characterized Respondent's action as physical rather than sexual. Nonetheless, when he put his hand on Ms. Hernandez, she felt uncomfortable. About a week after the staff meeting Respondent called Ms. Hernandez and invited her to the Christmas party. During this call, another person was on Respondent's speaker phone. Respondent made comments to this third person about Ms. Hernandez's "big brown eyes." On another occasion, during one of his regular visits to the City's public works section, Respondent observed Twinkies on Ms. Hernandez's desk and suggested that she "lay off the Twinkies." Ms. Hernandez believed that the comment was a negative reference to her weight, and responded by telling Respondent that she was "comfortable with herself." Respondent then looked at her, chuckled, and said, "Well, when I usually go to the meat market, I buy a pound of meat as opposed to a pound of bones." Ms. Hernandez did not understand the meaning of Respondent's statement, but the earlier reference to her weight made her feel uncomfortable. Although Respondent made comments about Ms. Hernandez's weight, she testified that Respondent made no sexual advances toward her either at the Christmas party or the workplace. Finally, at the City employees' Christmas party, Respondent approached Ms. Hernandez and her date, and told Ms. Hernandez that someone wanted to meet her. Ms. Hernandez indicated that she was not interested. During the conversation, Ms. Hernandez believed that Respondent was looking at her breasts, rather than at her face. This made Ms. Hernandez feel uncomfortable. At the end of the conversation Respondent shook Ms. Hernandez's hand. The entire conversation lasted about 30 seconds. While serving as City Manager, Respondent was aware that it was improper for a superior to engage in unsolicited or unwelcome sexually or romantically-oriented remarks or behavior toward a subordinate employee. Repair of Employee's Vehicle Using Public Resources As previously noted, on November 1, 1995, Ms. Griffin damaged her car on the way to a Rotary Club function at which she was to sing. After the event, Ms. Griffin approached Michael Jones and told him that someone had hit her car, that the bumper was on the ground, and that the car was inoperable. Nevertheless, later that evening, Ms. Griffin was able to drive the damaged vehicle to the City Police Station, where she left it overnight. The next day, Ms. Griffin went to see Michael Jones about having her car repaired. Mr. Jones instructed City employee, Jesus Corrales, to look at the car to assess the damage. Mr. Corrales told Mr. Jones that he could reattach the bumper in about five minutes. Thereafter, Mr. Jones directed Mr. Corrales to repair Ms. Griffin's car. Pursuant to Mr. Jones' directive, Mr. Corrales repaired Ms. Griffin's car. Even though no City-owned parts were required, it took Mr. Corrales two to three hours to repair the vehicle. After the vehicle was prepared, Ms. Griffin offered to pay Mr. Corrales $20.00 for repairing the damage to her car. Mr. Corrales refused to accept the money. Respondent never authorized or directed Mr. Corrales to repair Ms. Griffin's car. Nor did Respondent authorize or instruct Mr. Jones to have Mr. Corrales repair the vehicle. Behavior Toward Job Applicant One day during Respondent's tenure as City Manager, he went to the City's Revenue Department. While in that office, Respondent observed an individual who was not employed by the City in that office typing. The Respondent then asked Deborah Ford, Director of the Revenue Department, who the person was and why she was in the office working. Ms. Ford indicated that the individual, Tonia Sanders, was good and had previously worked with her. Respondent admonished Ms. Ford, reminded her that there were procedures for hiring people, and directed her to have Ms. Sanders leave the office. Respondent then told Ms. Ford to have Ms. Sanders pick up an employment application and he offered to interview her if Ms. Ford brought her by his office. A couple of days later Ms. Ford brought Ms. Sanders by Respondent's office. After both women entered the office, Ms. Ford commented to Respondent about Ms. Sanders' physical appearance, indicating that Ms. Sanders was attractive and had nice legs. Respondent cut this conversation off and then talked to Ms. Sanders about matters related to her application. Immediately after Ms. Sanders left, Respondent counseled Ms. Ford and told her not to ever bring anyone else to the office and "talk like that." Respondent put Ms. Sanders' City employment application on file and subsequently interviewed Ms. Sanders on one other occasion. However, Respondent never hired her for a position with the City. Ms. Sanders testified that Respondent later called Ms. Sanders and asked her out socially. On one occasion, he suggested she prepare dinner for him and offered to purchase the ingredients. On another occasion, Ms. Sanders spent some time talking with Respondent at a restaurant called Shula's, as part of a gathering organized by City employee Debra Ford. Following the gathering, Ms. Ford invited Respondent to go out with her and Ms. Sanders, but Respondent declined and all three decided to go home. However, as Respondent was leaving, he asked Ms. Sanders to ride with him. Ms. Sanders refused Respondent's offer. On another occasion, Respondent called Ms. Sanders and told her to make hotel reservations at a specified hotel. Respondent instructed Ms. Sanders to call him after she had made the arrangements and he would meet her at the hotel. Although Respondent never expressly spoke to her about sexually-related matters or made sexually-explicit suggestions, Ms. Sanders reasonably assumed that Respondent was attempting to set up a sexual liaison with her. Ms. Sanders was not interested and did not comply with Respondent's instructions. The aforementioned incidents involving Ms. Sanders occurred while Ms. Sanders' job application with the City was pending.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is: RECOMMENDED that a Final Order and Public Report be entered finding that the Respondent, Earnie Neal, violated Section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes, in two of the three instances alleged; imposing a civil penalty of $3,000 per violation; and issuing a public censure and reprimand. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of November, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. _ CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative this 13th day of November, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Virlindia Doss, Assistant Attorney General Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 David H. Nevel, Esquire Law Offices of Ronald S. Lowy Seventh Floor 420 Lincoln Road Miami Beach, Florida 33139 Cynthia Everett, Esquire City of Opa-locka City Hall 777 Sharazad Boulevard Opa-Locka, Florida 33054 Kerrie J. Stillman Complaint Coordinator and Clerk Commission on Ethics Post Office Box 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 Bonnie Williams, Executive Director Commission on Ethics Post Office Box 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 Phil Claypool, General Counsel Commission on Ethics Post Office Box 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent, Country Club Village MHP, Inc. (CCV Park), discriminated against Petitioner, Miguel A. Cotrich (Mr. Cotrich), based on his national origin in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act (the Act), and, if so, the relief to which Mr. Cotrich is entitled.
Findings Of Fact Mr. Cotrich is a Hispanic male,8/ who resided in CCV Park for approximately 29 months. Mr. Cotrich did not own the mobile home or the lot (number 56) on which it was placed; thus, he owed monthly rent to CCV Park and to the owner of the mobile home. Mr. Cotrich moved out of CCV Park in late May or early June 2011.9/ Rocio Harris, an Hispanic woman, who spoke Spanish, was CCV Park's manager during the majority of the time that Mr. Cotrich resided in CCV Park. Ms. Harris was well thought of and did her best as manager, but she did not collect monthly rent payments or enforce park rules uniformly. On June 5, 2009, Mr. Cotrich and Anna Maria Cotrich, his wife, executed a $10,000.00 Promissory Note (Note) to buy the mobile home located at lot 56 in CCV Park. The Note was between the Cotriches and Maria Gonzalez. The Note called for a $1,400.00 down payment and monthly installments of $500.00 beginning on July 1, 2009. Mr. Cotrich created a ledger to record the monthly Note payments he made on the mobile home (Petitioner's Exhibit 2). This ledger reflects he paid the $1,400.00 down payment and a $500.00 payment on January 3, 2009, five months before the Note was executed. Likewise, it also reflects five $500.00 payments for the trailer before the Note was executed. Simply by adding up the figures on Mr. Cotrich's ledger, the total comes to $10,600.00. This is $600.00 in over-payments. Mr. Cotrich did not disclose this overpayment during his testimony. Mr. Cotrich did not possess the title to the mobile home, nor did he produce any credible evidence that he was entitled to it. Mr. Cotrich's testimony contradicts the executed Note and his own written record of the amounts of payments. Neither Mr. Cotrich's testimony nor his ledger is credible. Mr. Cotrich allegedly paid Ms. Harris the monthly Note payments because he did not trust Ms. Gonzalez. Mr. Cotrich did not receive a receipt from Ms. Harris or Ms. Gonzalez for any payments made on the Note. His claim that he was working away from the mobile home and could not get to the office during its office hours to obtain such a receipt is not credible. Further, Mr. Cotrich's testimony that he paid someone other than the Note lender without obtaining a receipt from that recipient is not credible. In January 2011, Debra Hunter became CCV Park's manager following Ms. Harris' death. Ms. Hunter started collecting the rent payments on time and enforcing CCV Park rules. Her actions caused tension among those who were delinquent with their rent and/or not abiding by other park rules. Mr. Cotrich was always in arrears for his lot rent payment while Ms. Hunter was the manager. At some point Mr. Cotrich had one or two dogs (at least one of which was a pit bull dog) in his rented mobile home. CCV Park rules allow for one small (under 20 pounds) dog. Apparently Ms. Harris knew of the dogs, but did not charge Mr. Cotrich for having them. However, beginning in January 2011, when Ms. Hunter became the manager and was aware of the dogs, Mr. Cotrich was charged $16.00 monthly for having the two dogs ($8.00 per pet, per month). Charles Stevens, one of CCV Park's owners, credibly testified that he had a conversation with Mr. Cotrich about the pit bull dog(s). In that conversation, Mr. Stevens advised Mr. Cotrich that mean dogs (including pit bull dogs) were not (and are not) allowed in CCV Park. This was because there were children present, and there were insurance concerns. Mr. Stevens felt he was unable to make Mr. Cotrich understand the need to remove the dog(s). At some point, Mr. Cotrich approached Ms. Hunter and told her he wanted to sell or rent his trailer to his brother, who is Puerto Rican. Ms. Hunter objected to that proposal on the grounds that Mr. Cotrich owed past-due rent. Mr. Cotrich became loud and apparently yelled that Ms. Hunter did not want Puerto Ricans in CCV Park. Ms. Hunter's position to deny Mr. Cotrich's proposed tenant was based on the outstanding balance that Mr. Cotrich had with CCV Park. Following this verbal confrontation, Mr. Cotrich claimed he felt harassed by CCV Park management. Although Mr. Cotrich produced his medical records for hospitalization dates of January 8, January 10, and March 30, 2011,10/ there is nothing therein to substantiate that CCV Park or its management caused his physical circumstances. Mr. Cotrich, upon being discharged from the last hospitalization, went to a rehabilitation/nursing home facility. Mr. Cotrich testified he was not evicted from CCV Park, but he voluntarily left CCV Park in May 2011, because he felt his health was in jeopardy. Mrs. Cotrich completed her move out of CCV Park sometime in June 2011. CCV Park issued monthly receipts for payments it received. For the 29-month period that Mr. Cotrich claimed to reside at CCV Park, only 13 dated receipts were produced. (There were a total of 20 pages of receipts, but some were duplicative.) The receipts offered and accepted in evidence began in July 2009. All but one receipt had a monetary figure in the section "REMINDER OF OUTSTANDING CHARGES" at the bottom of each receipt. Ms. Hunter and Mr. Stevens both testified that CCV Park is 70 percent Hispanic. Mr. Stevens knows the rental market in Kissimmee, and he understands the Hispanic population has a very real presence in Kissimmee. CCV Park is a multi-cultural mobile home park. Since becoming the manager (while Mr. Cotrich lived there and after), Ms. Hunter has increased rental collections, enforced the park rules, and made CCV Park a nice place to live. CCV Park has instituted several after-school programs and activities that have apparently helped raise the children's grade-point averages in school. Mr. Cotrich presented Jess Jusino, his son-in-law, and Ernest Cotrich, his son and care-giver, as witnesses. The undersigned evaluated the testimony presented by these two witnesses and found it to be unpersuasive. Mr. Cotrich did not substantiate his claim of discrimination based on his national origin. The testimony and evidence demonstrate that Mr. Cotrich left CCV Park on his own volition and that he failed to pay rent in a timely manner.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Miguel A. Cotrich. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of August, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LYNNE A. QUIMBY-PENNOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of August, 2012.
