The Issue Whether deceased retiree's prior selection of Option One retirement benefit pay-out and his receipt and negotiation of retirement several checks should now be set aside, due to his wife's alleged forgery of her signature on the Spousal Acknowledgement (Form FR-11).
Findings Of Fact 1. Irvin M. Carpenter was born November 16, 1934, and died of cancer on November 18, 1997. Mr. Carpenter was employed by the Hillsborough County Aviation Authority as a police officer on September 10, 1984, and attained the rank of police sergeant at the time of his retirement. Mr. Carpenter was a member of the Florida Retirement System. 2. On January 20, 1991, Irvin M. Carpenter and Susan Ann Prescott were married. Susan Ann Carpenter is now, and has been at all time pertinent to these proceeding, employed by the Hillsborough County Aviation Authority as a police officer. Susan Carpenter is a member of the Florida Retirement System. 3. In October of 1996, Irvin Carpenter and Susan Carpenter separated and continued to live separately. Dissolution of marriage proceedings were initiated but was not finalized at the time of Irvin Carpenter's death in November 1997. At all times pertinent to these proceedings, Irvin Carpenter and Susan Ann Carpenter were husband and wife. 4. On July 8, 1997, Irvin Carpenter executed a Florida Retirement System form styled "Application for Service Retirement" (Form FR-11). This form provides the retiree with information pertaining to the four options by which his retirement benefits can be paid. One full page of the form provides an explanation of each option. By use of this form, Irvin Carpenter selected Option One retirement benefit payout plan. The explanation of Option One on Form FR-11 is as follows: Option 1: A monthly benefit payable for my lifetime. Upon my death, the monthly benefit will stop and my beneficiary will receive only a refund of any contributions I have paid which are in excess of the amount I have received in benefits. This option does not provide a continuing benefit to my beneficiary. 5. The FR-11 also contained the following information in bold lettering: THIS SECTION MUST BE COMPLETED IF YOU SELECT OPTION 1 OR 2 MARRIED YES[ ] NO [ ] IF YES, YOUR SPOUSE MUST SIGN BELOW: SPOUSAL ACKNOWLEDGEMENT : I, (Signature) Susan A. Carpenter,’ being the spouse of the above named member, acknowledges that the member has elected either Option 1 or 2. (Signature Irvin Carpenter 11-27-96 Signature of Spouse Date If your spouse does not sign, you must attach a signed statement explaining why your spouse did not acknowledge your selection. 6. The "yes" or "no" blocks requesting marriage status were blank on the FR-11 submitted by the retiree to the Agency. The Spousal Acknowledgement block contained the signature of "Susan Ann Carpenter." Susan Carpenter alleged this signature to be a forgery. 7. The form FPR-11 also contained the following statement in capital letters: I UNDERSTAND I MUST TERMINATE ALL EMPLOYMENT WITH FRS EMPLOYERS TO RECEIVE A RETIREMENT BENEFIT UNDER CHAPTER 121, FLORIDA STATUTES. I ALSO UNDERSTAND THAT I CANNOT ADD ADDITIONAL SERVICE, CHANGE OPTIONS, OR CHANGE MY TYPE OF RETIREMENT (REGULAR, DISABILITY AND EARLY) ONCE MY RETIREMENT BECOMES FINAL. MY RETIREMENT BECOMES FINAL WHEN ANY BENEFIT PAYMENT IS CASHED OR DEPOSITED. 8. Between the date of his retirement and the date of his death, Irvin Carpenter received, cashed, or deposited a minimum of three retirement checks from the Florida Retirement System, pursuant to his selection of Option One benefit payout plan. 9. After the death of Mr. Carpenter, the Agency, by letter dated November 24, 1997, addressed to: FAMILY OF IRVIN M. CARPENTER, 3602 W. Tampa Circle, Tampa, Florida 33629, informed the family of the retirement benefit due beneficiaries for November and the income tax deduction therefrom. 10. By letter to the Agency dated July 13, 2000, Susan Carpenter stated: My Husband, Irvin M. Carpenter, DOB 11/16/34, SSN 263-42-0146, retired from the Tampa International Airport Police Department on 07/31/1997. At the time of his retirement, we were separated but still Married. He passed away less than three months later in November 1997. I inquired as to any benefits and informed by the Hillsborough County Aviation Authority, the parent organization of the Tampa International Airport Police Department, that he had changed his beneficiary to his daughter, Anita Carpenter. Just recently, I became aware of the Florida Retirement System provisions concerning retirement options. I ama police officer with the Tampa International Airport Police Department and these matters were covered in a pre-retirement briefing conducted by Human Resources. It is my understanding that if you are married and select option 1 or 2, the spouse must acknowledge that selection in writing. Since I had not signed any such acknowledgement, it occurred to me that my deceased husband's remaining options both provide for the joint annuitant. I posed this question to the HCAA Human Resources and was informed that my deceased husband did not retire. The Department announced his retirement, his name was added to the plaque listing retired officers and Department personnel files indicate a retirement date of 07/31/1999. I questioned my police captain and Chief of Police and both of them were emphatic that my husband retired on 07/31/1999. With my superiors providing information contrary to Human Resources, I have some doubt as to the status of my deceased husband with regards to the Florida Retirement System. Please confirm the status of Irvin M. Carpenter. Did he retire from FRS? If not, what was his status at the time he passed away? I am sure you understand the significance of my determining the correct status. Thank you for any assistance you can provide. 11. The Agency denied Susan Carpenter's request to void Irvin Carpenter's selection of Option One retirement pay-out. The Agency's letter of November 15, 2000, asserted the position that the selection cannot be changed since the retirement checks were cashed or deposited and cited the following portions of Section 121.091(6) (a), Florida Statutes: "The spouse of any member who elects to receive the benefit provided under subparagraph 1. or subparagraph 2. shall be notified of and shall acknowledge any such election." The law does not require the spouse to agree with the members' retirement option selection. The Form FR-11, Application for Service Retirement, submitted by Irvin Carpenter included Susan Carpenter's signature acknowledging that she was aware of the Option 1 selection. We receive numerous applications monthly and we do not investigate to determine if each signature is authentic. Although Mrs. Carpenter contends that her signature was forged, once a member cashes or deposits a check the option selection cannot be changed. The statutes do not require the spouse to agree with the members option selection, only to be made aware. Your request to void the Option 1 selection is denied. 12. Susan Carpenter denies having signed the Form FR-11, Application for Service Retirement submitted by Irvin Carpenter. Susan Carpenter alleges that the signature, "Susan Ann Carpenter," appearing on the Form FR-11 is a forgery. 13. During the final hearing and in the presence of the undersigned, Susan Carpenter signed "Susan A. Carpenter" three times, Petitioner's Exhibit F. At the request of the undersigned Susan Carpenter signed "Susan Ann Carpenter" once. A review of the four signature samples provided by Susan Carpenter, the sample signature, "Susan Ann Carpenter," proved to the satisfaction of the undersigned evidence of the genuineness of the written signature in dispute. Accordingly, and as a finding of fact, the Form FR-11 signature "Susan Ann Carpenter" is not a forgery. 14. Susan Carpenter's assertion that the Agency is under legal obligation to contact each spouse or otherwise verify the signature of each spouse on the Form FR-11ls received in the Agency's normal course of business is without foundation in law and in fact. 15. Only the circuit court has jurisdiction and authority in dissolution of marriage cases to enter final orders determining property rights of marital assets. Petitioner proffered no such order as evidence. Accordingly, all testimony and evidence based on alleged spousal rights and entitlements pursuant to Chapter 61, Florida Statutes, are not considered
Conclusions For Petitioner: Scott W. Fitzpatrick, Esquire Southeast Building, Suite 1500 St. Petersburg, Florida 33703 For Respondent: Thomas E. Wright, Esquire Department of Management Services Cedars Executive Center, Building Cc 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact an Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order denying Susan Carpenter's request to change the retirement option 13 selected by Mr. Irvin Carpenter, including benefits due, and denying all such other relief. lo& DONE AND ENTERED this = day of July, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division _of Administrative Hearings this J2% day of July, 2001.
The Issue May Petitioner make an application with Respondent for disability retirement benefits when he was already applied for and has received regular retirement payments?
Findings Of Fact Mr. Vernon Taylor Bell voluntarily terminated his employment with the Department of Legal Affairs on February 26, 1980. By that date he had accumulated 23.66 years of service for credit in the Florida Retirement System. After his termination Mr. Bell had a conference with a retirement benefits specialist, Ms. Taylor, who is an employee of Respondent. At Mr. Bell's request she gave him an estimate of his retirement benefits for a regular retirement. She did not discuss the benefits which a disabled retiree might receive. The testimony of Ms. Taylor and Mr. Bell is in conflict on whether or not she discussed disability retirement benefits with him. Ms. Taylor's testimony is accepted as being more credible because Mr. Bell was shown throughout his testimony to have a poor memory. Mr. Bell began to receive regular retirement benefits in the monthly amounts of $178.32 on May 30, 1980. Since that date he has continued to receive and accept regular retirement payments. Petitioner has cashed or deposited his first benefit check. If Mr. Bell were to be granted disability retirement benefits rather than regular retirement benefits, his monthly payment would be substantially increased. Petitioner did not present credible evidence that he was misinformed or mislead by Respondent about the relative advantages to him in electing to apply for regular retirement as opposed to applying for disability benefits. On August 26, 1980, Mr. Bell wrote a letter to Mr. Andrew M. McMullian III, who is the State Retirement Director. Mr. Bell stated that he had been given incorrect information about the disability benefits he might be eligible for. He requested that he be allowed to make an application as a disabled retiree. On October 1, 1980, Mr. McMullian responded to Mr. Bell in a letter which states in part: We have reviewed your retirement account and have determined the information provided to you by this office was correct regarding your retirement eligibility. We regret if there was any misunderstanding on your part re- garding disability retirement; however, we cannot honor your request to be retired with disability at this late date, because you applied for regular retirement which was approved for you effective April 1, 1980. Your initial monthly benefit was $178.32 and your July 1980 benefit payment contained a cost-of-living increase, thus your current monthly benefit is $179.73. The Florida Retirement System law requires certification by two licensed physicians in Florida that one is totally and permanently disabled and unable to render any useful and efficient work before this agency can approve an employee for retirement with disability. Apparently, you made no attempt to retire with disability, other than discussing the matter in general with us, and according to our records, you made no application for disability retirement. Further, a retiree is not allowed by law to change his type of re- tirement once he begins drawing monthly re- tirement benefits.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the State Retirement Director enter a Final Order authorizing Mr. Bell is submit an application for disability retirement benefits. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 24th day of August, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida MICHAEL PEARCE DODSON Hearing Officer Department of Administration Division of Administrative Hearings Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24 day of August, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Silas R. Eubanks, Esquire 103 North Gadsden Street Post Office Box 4266 Tallahassee, Florida 32303 William Frieder, Esquire Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center 2639 North Monroe Street Suite 207C - Box 81 Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Daniel C. Brown, Esquire General Counsel Department of Administration 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Nevin G. Smith Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The central issues in this case are (1) whether Petitioner is eligible for membership in and retirement benefits from the Teachers' Retirement System; and (2) whether Petitioner is entitled to receive as a refund contributions paid by his employing agency and, if so, how much and at what interest rate.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, currently sixty-six years old, was employed as a professor of economics and finance at the University of South Florida (USF), Tampa, Florida, from September 1965 through August 31, 1981, when he terminated employment. As a member of the teaching faculty, Petitioner automatically became a compulsory member of the Teachers' Retirement System (TRS) and remained a member throughout his tenure at USE. When Petitioner originally enrolled in the TRS in September 1965, he signed an enrollment form entitled "Teachers' Retirement System of Florida, Enrollment Blank New Teachers." The form provided general information concerning the TRS, and included information about contributions, service credit, and service retirement benefits under the TRS. The enrollment form provided in part the following: I understand that the full amount of deductions from my compensation for annuity purposes with compound interest will be returned to me if I leave the service without a retirement benefit or will be paid to my beneficiary if I die in active service. At all times relevant hereto, the TRS required that members make contributions of six-quarter percent of their total salaries to their retirement accounts. Of this amount, six percent went into the TRS member's retirement account and the quarter percent was allocated to the Survivors' Benefits Fund. In addition to the contributions made by TRS members, employers were required to contribute matching funds to the TRS Retirement Fund. While employed at USF, the prescribed six quarter percent of Petitioner's salary was deducted, with six percent appropriately posted to his TRS retirement account. During the time Petitioner was employed at USF, the employer contribution paid by USF to match Petitioner's contribution was $23,846.06. Had Petitioner remained a member of TRS, he would have been eligible to begin receiving benefits in February 1993. While employed at USF, Petitioner was given the option to transfer from the TRS to the newly created Florida Retirement System on five different occasions: December 1970; June 1971; July 1972; January 1975; and January 1979. Through information disseminated by Respondent, TRS members were notified that by transferring to the "new" Florida Retirement System, they would become mandatory members of the federal Social Security System. Petitioner chose to remain in TRS rather than transfer to the Florida Retirement System, thereby foregoing membership in the federal Social Security System. In August 1981, prior to his normal age of retirement, Petitioner terminated his employment with USF and requested that Respondent refund Petitioner's retirement contributions. In making the request, Petitioner completed and signed a form entitled, "Request for Refund," FRS M81. Completion of this form is a requisite for receiving retirement refunds and applies to members of any of the Florida retirement systems. The Request for Refund states: I hereby make application for refund of my accumulated contributions in the Florida Retirement Systems. I do waive for myself, my heirs and assignees all rights, title and interest in the Florida Retirement Systems. On the reverse side of the Request for Refund card, is the following: Under the provision of the Florida Statutes, a member MUST terminate employment before he can obtain a refund. * * * The refund process may be started upon receipt of this application. It may be necessary to issue a second refund after all payrolls on which a member's name appears are received and audited by the Retirement System Office. A member who has ten or more years of creditable service has a vested interest in retirement and may leave his contributions on deposit indefinitely and qualify for deferred retirement. Pursuant to Petitioner's request, the Division refunded $22,153.10 to Petitioner in October 1981. The refund, which was provided in three warrants, included all employee contributions and earned interest posted to Petitioner's retirement account as of the date of the refund. Petitioner's refund was provided in three separate warrants because the system in place, in 1981, was incapable of generating a single check for an amount in excess of $9,999.99. In late 1995 or early 1996, Petitioner called the Division of Retirement to inquire about his benefits under the TRS. Petitioner made after this call after he reviewed his Social Security wage earning history and learned that no contributions had been posted to his Social Security account during the sixteen years he had been employed at USF. Upon reviewing the Petitioner's request, Respondent discovered that $1,692.96 remained in Petitioner's TRS account. Of the amount remaining in Petitioner's account, $292.63 represented Petitioner's employee contributions, and $1,400.33 was earned interest. Respondent's failure to refund Petitioner's $292.63 and the interest earned thereon as soon as these moneys were posted to Petitioner's account was the result of an unintentional accounting error. Under the procedures used by the Division at that time, Petitioner's most recent employee contributions were not posted to his account until November or December 1981. The interest earned on Petitioner's employee contributions were not posted to Petitioner's account until the end of the 1981/1982 fiscal year. This matter is addressed in the Request for Refund which notified members that "it may be necessary to issue a second refund" after all payrolls on which the member's name appears have been posted. After discovering this inadvertent accounting error, Respondent initially agreed to refund Petitioner the outstanding $1,692.96. Subsequently, the Division of Retirement agreed to pay Petitioner $1,692.96 plus six a-half percent interest from October 1981, for a total amount of $4,088.31. The six and a- half percent interest rate is the current rate established by Respondent. Pursuant to Petitioner's request, Respondent has not yet refunded Petitioner's outstanding employee contributions and interest, pending the culmination of this proceeding. At the time Petitioner completed and signed the Request for Refund, it was his intention to obtain all of his contributions and interest. It was not until Petitioner's inquiry in 1995 or 1996 that he became aware that a small amount of his employee contributions and interest thereon had not been refunded. Petitioner believes that because Respondent did not refund all moneys due him, some $1,692.96, he retained membership in the TRS and is now able to retire from that system with a partial benefit. Alternatively, Petitioner asserts that he is entitled to receive as a refund, all contributions paid into his retirement fund, including the contributions paid by USF. According to Petitioner, his understanding and belief in this regard is based on an explanation provided to him by Dr. John Milliken, the Dean of the College of Business at USF. Petitioner's understanding in this regard was not correct. At some point prior to Petitioner's terminating his employment at USF, he reviewed a Summary Plan Description (SPD) which was issued by the Division of Retirement in 1980. One section of the SPD, Refund of Contributions, provides in relevant part: If a member terminates employment he may elect to receive a refund of all the contributions he has made to the retirement system, except those made to the Survivors' Benefit Trust Fund. Furthermore, the first paragraph of the Summary Plan Description states: This brochure contains basic information on the Teachers' Retirement System, established by Ch. 238, Florida Statutes. It is not intended to be a comprehensive review of the Teachers' Retirement System and should not be used in place of the law on questions of interpretation and appli-cation. Any question which are not answered by this brochure may be addressed to the Div. of Retirement, . . . . Based on Petitioner's reading of the provision of the SPD quoted in paragraph 20 above, it was his "judgment" and "impression" that any refund prior to retirement, would include both employee and employer contributions and the interest on these contributions. At no time did Petitioner verify his interpretation with the Division of Retirement or the USE Personnel Office.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Division of Retirement enter a final order finding that Petitioner, John C. Deiter, is (1) ineligible for retirement benefits under the Teachers' Retirement System and (2) is not entitled to receive employer contributions and interest thereon. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of September, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELDK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of September, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Murray B. Silverstein, Esquire POWELL, CARNEY, HAYES and SILVERSTEIN, P.A. Barnett Tower One Progress Plaza, Suite 1210 St. Petersburg, Florida 33701 Stanley M. Danek, Senior Attorney Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 A. J. McMullian, III, Director Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399
Findings Of Fact The Division of Retirement will make no Findings of Fact relating to whether Petitioner's disability was in-line-of-duty. Accordingly, for the reasons mentioned previously, all findings contained in paragraphs 5, 6, 7, and 8, of the recommended order are rejected. However, the Division accepts the remaining Findings of Fact contained in the recommended order. As taken from the order these findings are: Herman Williams was an employee of the Department of Transportation and a member of the Florida Retirement System. The Division of Retirement approved payment of regular disability benefits to Herman Williams. Herman Williams is currently receiving and accepting these benefits. Herman Williams is an illiterate Seminole Indian, 62 years of age. Williams' duties with the Department of Transportation were driving a mowing tractor and cleaning out roadside ditches. Williams worked for the Department of Transportation approximately 21 years 11 months prior to being placed on the retired roles [sic]. On May 1, 1975, Williams was driving his tractor in the course of his regular employment at the Department of Transportation when the power steering of the tractor malfunctioned causing the front wheels to swerve violently, wrenching the steering wheel in Williams' hands and nearly throwing him from the tractor. Repairs had to be made to Williams' tractor by a Department of Transportation mechanic because the tractor was inoperative. The mechanic discovered a loose nut in the power steering assembly when he exchanged the power steering unit in Williams' tractor with another from the maintenance yard. When the new unit was installed in Williams's tractor it functioned normally. When the power steering from Williams' tractor was installed in the other tractor, it also functioned normally. The mechanic stated that the loose nut which he had discovered could cause the tractor to swerve violently in the manner Williams' had described. On the afternoon of May 1, 1975, Williams reported this instant [sic] to his supervisor, David McQuaig. Mr. McQuaig inquired as to any injuries to Williams and the tractor. Williams reported to McQuaig that the tractor had not been harmed and that he was only sore and stiff. No report of injury was prepared by McQuaig whose duty it was to file such reports. Williams' condition did not materially improve after seeking medical treatment by Dr. Albritton. Williams remained on sick leave until August 11, 1975, when it was exhausted. Williams then took annual leave from August 12, 1975 until September 23, 19975, when his retirement became effective. When the Petitioner's sick leave was exhausted, he was contacted by his supervisor in the Department of Transportation. He suggested that Williams could retire on disability if two physicians would state that he was disabled. This letter was read to Williams by his son, Eddie, because Williams is illiterate. Retirement application forms were provided Williams by the Department of Transportation. The physician report forms were completed by Dr. Albritton and Dr. Wilkerson. The statement of disability by employer form was completed by Williams' supervisor, David A. Young, Maintenance Engineer, for the Department of Transportation. Young stated that he completed the Statement of Disability by Employer, indicating that the application was for regular disability benefits because he had determined that no workman's compensation claim had been made by Williams and because Dr. Wilkerson's medical report had stated that the injuries occurred at Williams's home. The determination that the application was for regular disability benefits was solely Young's. The Application for Disability Retirement signed by Williams was prepared by personnel at the Department of Transportation District Office. This form was signed by Herman Williams; however, this form does not make provision for the member to state the nature of the disability benefits sought. Eddie Williams, son of Herman Williams, took his father to sign the forms at the Department of Transportation office. These forms were not explained to Williams, nor did Eddie Williams read them. Herman Williams was also unaware that such a benefit existed. Herman Williams stated he sought disability benefits based upon his injury on the job. Disability retirement was not discussed between Herman Williams and David Young. Based upon the application submitted in his behalf, the Division of Retirement made a determination that Williams was entitled to regular disability benefits. Williams was unaware that he was not receiving the in-line-of-duty benefits until his son inquired as to how much money he was receiving. When he was advised, he told his father that it appeared to be too little money. At this point Eddie Williams discovered that the application had been for regular disability.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Officer RECOMMENDS: That the administrator permit the applicant to file an amended application for disability in-line-of-duty retirement, and, further, that said application be approved. DONE and ENTERED this 8th day of December, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: J. W. Chalkley, III, Esquire Post Office Box 1793 Ocala, Florida 32670 Douglas Spangler, Jr., Esquire Asst. Division Attorney Division of Retirement 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA DIVISION OF RETIREMENT DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION HERMAN H. WILLIAMS, Petitioner, vs. CASE NO. 77-982 STATE OF FLORIDA, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, Respondent. / FINAL AGENCY ORDER A petition for formal proceedings having been duly filed, and a request for hearing officer having been duly made, a hearing was held in the above-styled cause pursuant to the provisions of Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, before the Honorable Stephen F. Dean, Hearing Officer, in Ocala, Florida, on September 15, 1977. The Petitioner requested relief from the Division's determination that Petitioner was not entitled to resubmit an application for disability retirement requesting in-line-of-duty disability retirement benefits because he had previously applied for and accepted regular disability retirement. The purpose of the hearing was to determine the factual basis for Petitioner's claim that he should be allowed to apply for in-line-of-duty disability retirement benefits. APPEARANCES AT THE HEARING: Eric E. Wagner, Esquire J. W. Chalkey, III, Esquire Law Offices of Eric E. Wagner, P.A. Post Office Box 1763 Ocala, Florida 32670 For the Petitioner E. Douglas Spangler, Jr., Esquire Assistant Division Attorney Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center 2639 North Monroe Street Suite 207C-Box 81 Tallahassee, Florida 32303 For the Respondent The Hearing Officer entered his Recommended Order on December 8, 1977, in which he sustained Petitioner's assertion and concluded, on the basis of the findings made as a result of the hearing, that Petitioner should be entitled to resubmit his application and request in-line-of-duty disability benefits. In addition to this determination, the Hearing Officer found that Petitioner was in fact entitled to in-line-of-duty disability retirement benefits. In making this latter conclusion, both as a matter of fact and of law, the Hearing Officer went beyond his scope of authority. As will be developed more fully herein, the Hearing Officer was without jurisdiction to consider the issue of whether Petitioner was in fact entitled to the in-line-of-duty benefits. Therefore, so much of the recommended order as purports to address this issue is of no effect, being the result of a hearing that did not comply with the essential requirements of law.
The Issue Whether Respondent is estopped from denying Petitioner's request to rescind her choice to change retirement plans (2nd Election) and requiring her to remain in the Florida Retirement System (FRS) Pension Plan; and, if so, what are Petitioner's options? Because of the complicated nature of FRS and Petitioner's unique circumstances, the issues and parties' positions are summarized herein. After being hired by the University of Florida, Petitioner had three retirement plan options: (1) State University System Optional Retirement Program (SUSORP), (2) FRS Investment Plan (Investment Plan), or (3) FRS Pension Plan (Pension Plan). Petitioner had been an FRS member in a previous job and switched from the Investment Plan to the Pension Plan solely because she was told she could only participate in SUSORP if she first became a Pension Plan member. The Division now admits there is no authority for this requirement, but argues it is not responsible for Petitioner's decision to switch from the Investment Plan to the Pension Plan. Rather, it blames another state agency and non-government agents for her belief that she could not participate in SUSORP unless she first bought into the Pension Plan. Ultimately, the issues in this proceeding are: (1) whether Petitioner was required to switch from the Investment Plan to the Pension Plan to participate in SUSORP; (2) whether the Division is responsible for Petitioner's belief that this was a requirement; and (3) if so, whether Petitioner's funds used to buy into the Pension Plan can be returned to the Investment Plan or transferred to her SUSORP account. PROCEDURAL HISTORY On May 30, 2018, Petitioner, Lee Hayes Byron, elected to switch her FRS plan from the Investment Plan to the Pension Plan. On November 1, 2019, Respondent, Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement (the Division), issued a letter to Petitioner denying her request to essentially rescind this election and/or have her "cost associated with buying into the FRS Pension Plan from the FRS Investment Plan transferred to SUSORP." On November 25, 2019, Ms. Byron submitted a request for an administrative hearing to the Division. Respondent forwarded Petitioner's request to DOAH on December 11, 2019. The matter was originally scheduled for hearing for February 5, 2020, but was continued three times: once at the Division's request and twice due to the state of emergency related to the COVID-19 health crisis. A final hearing was held on April 29, 2020, by Zoom. Petitioner testified on her own behalf and Petitioner's Exhibits P1 through P7 were admitted into evidence without objection.1 The Division offered the testimony of Joyce Morgan (Division Bureau Chief of Contributions), and Respondent's Exhibits R1 through R8 were admitted into evidence without objection. The final hearing was recorded by a court reporter, but neither party ordered a transcript. Petitioner requested 30 days to submit her proposed recommended order, and the Division had no objections to Petitioner's request. By requesting and agreeing to the extension of time, the parties waived the requirements in section 120.57(3)(e), Florida Statutes (2019), for the rendering of a recommended order within 30 days of the hearing. See Fla. Admin. Code. R. 28-106.216(2).2 1 Exhibit P7 is a disk with numerous audio files of telephone conversations between Petitioner and Division employees, other State employees, representatives, and agents. 2 All references to statutes and administrative rules are to the 2019 versions of the Florida Statutes and Florida Administrative Code unless otherwise noted. Accordingly, the proposed recommended orders were due no later than May 29, 2020. Both parties submitted timely Proposed Recommended Orders (PROs), which have been considered in the preparation of this Recommended Order.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Lee Hayes Byron, is currently employed by the University of Florida and eligible to participate in the Investment Plan, Pension Plan, or SUSORP. She is in an optional (not a mandatory) SUSORP position. Respondent, the Division, is a part of the Department of Management Services (DMS). The Division, as part of DMS, is the state entity responsible for oversight and administration of the Pension Plan and SUSORP. See §§ 121.125 and 121.035, Fla. Stat. The Division authorizes provider companies to assist SUSORP members with investments. See § 121.035, Fla. Stat.; Fla. Admin. Code R. 60U-1.011(4). The State Board of Administration of Florida (SBA) is the state agency responsible for oversight and administration of the Investment Plan.3 SBA is not a party to this proceeding. In coordination with DMS, SBA is responsible for dissemination of information regarding the FRS plans. See § 121.4501(10), Fla. Stat. SUSORP is a defined contribution plan authorized by section 121.35, Florida Statutes. The plan is an optional retirement plan in which 3 There was evidence that prior to attempting to undo her election with the Division, Petitioner requested an agency hearing with SBA, which was held on May 21, 2019. The SBA Hearing Officer recommended that SBA grant Petitioner relief by allowing her to rescind the 2nd election. On September 17, 2019, SBA issued a Final Order rejecting the SBA Hearing Officer’s recommendation. Petitioner has appealed the SBA’s Final Order, which is now pending at the Second District Court of Appeal in the matter of Lee Hayes Byron v. State Board of Administration, Case No. 2D19-3930. "eligible employees" of the State University System can elect to participate in lieu of the Pension Plan or Investment Plan. One of the benefits SUSORP offers over the FRS plans is the employer contribution rate is greater. SUSORP and the Investment Plan require an employee to contribute a minimum pretax contribution and allow additional funds to be contributed. Both the Investment Plan and SUSORP allow the employee to allocate the money in the plan account among approved investment funds.4 The ultimate benefit from the Investment Plan and SUSORP received by the employee upon retirement depends on both the amount contributed and the financial markets. The employee is responsible for managing his or her SUSORP or Investment Plan account through approved providers. In comparison, the Pension Plan requires a fixed pretax contribution by an employee. The Pension Plan is responsible for investing the contributions and accumulated funds in the member's pension account. Upon retirement, the employee receives a lifetime monthly benefit using a formula based on his or her length of service and salary. The employee has no control over how the money in the pension account is invested but is guaranteed a fixed, predictable benefit. PETITIONER'S FRS HISTORY Ms. Byron originally enrolled in FRS as an employee of Sarasota County on July 11, 2005. At that time she had the option to participate in either the Investment Plan or Pension Plan. On December 28, 2005, Ms. Byron made a timely election to participate in the FRS Investment Plan, effective January 1, 2006. As part of the FRS system, she had one more chance to switch to the Pension Plan. The subsequent decision to change FRS plans is referred to as the "2nd Election." On April 20, 2018, Petitioner began employment with the University of Florida in a SUSORP-eligible position. At this point, as explained in the 4 SBA recommends acceptable SUSORP investment products to the DMS; the DMS has final approval of such products. See § 121.035(6)(c), Fla. Stat. Conclusions of Law, Petitioner would begin participation in SUSORP unless she opted to remain in the FRS System (in either the Investment Plan or Pension Plan) or failed to enroll in a SUSORP-approved investment fund. See § 121.35(3), Fla. Stat. INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS A handout distributed by the Division titled, "Florida Retirement System (FRS) Investment Plan • Members With a Remaining FRS Election Inquiring About State University System Optional Retirement Program (SUSORP) Membership" (SUSORP Handout) provides information for an Investment Plan member who wants to participate in SUSORP. The SUSORP handout states in relevant part: You will need to use your 2nd (and last) election to transfer from the Investment Plan to the Pension Plan before you will be eligible to elect participation in the SUSORP. * * * There is a cost associated with using your 2nd election to transfer to the Pension Plan. * * * The estimated transfer cost is calculated using your salary, service credit, membership class, and other actuarial assumptions used in the annual FRS actuarial valuation. The payment for the amount of the transfer cost is required to complete the transfer to establish your Pension Plan membership. The amount of money liquidated from your Investment Plan account to pay for your transfer cost will not transfer to the SUSORP. If the value of your Investment Plan account is less than the transfer cost, you may use personal resources including a direct transfer from a qualified plan … to make up the difference. Any personal resources paid will not transfer to the SUSORP. * * * Your membership in SUSORP will not begin until you have completed the transfer process and will be entirely funded by future (after the transfer) employer and employee contributions submitted on your behalf. * * * Your SUSORP account will begin with a zero balance and will be funded by future employer and employee contributions. The Division's witness, Ms. Morgan, confirmed the SUSORP Handout is a Division document. Ms. Morgan further stated that although this version of the SUSORP Handout was not provided to Petitioner, it was the Division's position at the time she was eligible for participation in SUSORP. Ms. Morgan also conceded that there is no statutory authority for the requirement that an employee would need to use his or her 2nd Election to transfer from the Investment Plan to the Pension Plan before becoming eligible to elect participation in SUSORP. As explained in the Conclusions of Law, this is an unpromulgated requirement that has no statutory authority, and therefore cannot be applied to determine Petitioner's substantial interests. The Division approves provider companies to provide information and investment products to SUSORP members. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 60U- 1.012(1)(a). AXA Advisors (AXA) is one of the provider companies listed on the SUSORP Enrollment Form. See Form ORP-ENROLL-1, available at https://www.flrules.org/Gateway/reference.asp?No=Ref-06117. On April 24, 2018, Petitioner received an email from Patrick Ashe with AXA. Mr. Ashe described AXA as a resource to help Petitioner select the best retirement plan: Pension, Investment, or SUSORP. Mr. Ashe eventually spoke to Ms. Byron on the phone and sent her FRS information. He also provided her with contact information for the Division and an FRS general phone number. On May 3, 2018, Mr. Ashe provided Petitioner with a document titled, "Welcome to the Florida Retirement System for State University System SUSORP-Eligible Employees" (Comparison Brochure), dated January 2018. The Division alleges the Comparison Brochure is published by SBA, not the Division. Although SBA is responsible for providing educational information about retirement options to eligible employees, it must do so in coordination with DMS. See § 121.4501(10)(a) and (10)(c)7., Fla. Stat. Regardless of who published the Comparison Brochure, it is clear that it is an official document used to advise SUSORP members, and AXA was authorized to advise Ms. Byron regarding her FRS retirement options and SUSORP. The Comparison Brochure explains the differences between SUSORP, the Investment Plan, and the Pension Plan. The Comparison Brochure also provides deadlines for the election to participate in each plan. According to the Comparison Brochure, from the date of hire, a SUSORP-eligible employee has 90 days to choose to participate in SUSORP. If he or she does not elect to participate in SUSORP, the employee has until 4:00 p.m. (E.S.T.) on the last business day of the eighth month after the month of hire to choose between the Investment Plan and the Pension Plan. If the employee does not make an election, FRS automatically enrolls the employee in the Investment Plan. As explained in the Conclusions of Law, this is contrary to the SUSORP statute. Regarding changes made after an initial election, the Comparison Brochure provides: SUSORP Plan Investment Plan Pension Plan Can I change plans after I make my initial election? No. If you elect the SUSORP, you will remain in this plan for as long as you remain at this employer in a SUSORP-eligible position. You have a one-time 2nd Election that you can use during your FRS career to change to the other FRS retirement plan, provided you are actively employed by an FRS-participating employer at the time your 2nd Election is received.4 (Footnote in original, see ¶20 below). The Comparison Brochure explains that once an employee chooses to participate in SUSORP, the employee cannot change to a different plan, and will remain in SUSORP as long as the employee is in a SUSORP eligible position. Once an employee elects to participate in the Investment Plan or the Pension Plan, he or she has only one opportunity (the 2nd Election) during his or her entire FRS career to change between the Investment and Pension Plans. Regarding changing to SUSORP from the Investment Plan or Pension Plan, footnote 4 in the Comparison Brochure explains: If you are enrolled in the Investment Plan and move to a SUSORP-eligible position, you must use your 2nd Election (if available) to buy back into the Pension Plan in order to enroll in the SUSORP. You are not permitted to make a direct transfer from the Investment Plan to the SUSORP (unless in a mandatory SUSPORP position). Again, during the hearing, Ms. Morgan admitted there was no statutory authority for the requirement that Petitioner use her 2nd Election to buy into the Pension Plan before she could enroll in SUSORP. On May 4, 2018, Mr. Ashe sent Ms. Byron a follow-up email that explained the procedure to switch from the Investment Plan to the Pension Plan so she could enroll in SUSORP: It sounds like you are currently in the Investment Plan so if you decide to stay in that plan just verify with [FRS] that you want to make sure you automatically are re-enrolled in that plan. If you elect to switch to either the Pension or the SUSORP plan then we would just fill out the 1 page 2nd election form and fax that to FRS to utilize the switch. That would put you in the Pension Plan. From there if you would like to enroll in the SUSORP plan then I will get those forms to you and we will get that set up. … The main factor on whether the switch would be in your best interest would be based on the differential between the Pension and Investment Plans at your current number of years in the FRS system. * * * In the Investment Plan the university is contributing 3.3% to match your mandatory 3% contribution and in the SUSORP plan they would contribute 5.14% in addition to your 3% contribution. The differential involved in switching to the Pension Plan so that you could then enroll in the SUSORP plan would be the major factor in whether picking up the extra employer contribution would be beneficial in the long run. (emphasis added). Mr. Ashe's email erroneously indicated Ms. Byron must use her 2nd Election to go into the Pension Plan before she could enroll in SUSORP. He also acknowledged she should weigh whether the cost to buy into the Pension Plan was worth the extra contributions available if she ultimately decided to go into SUSORP. In this email, Mr. Ashe reiterated he had the authority to provide the SUSORP paperwork and "get that set up." Ms. Byron testified she believed Mr. Ashe was authorized by the Division to advise and enroll her into SUSORP. Although the Division argues other people who spoke with Ms. Byron were not Division employees, it does make this same assertion regarding Mr. Ashe. See Resp. PRO, ¶¶ 44-47 (claiming Ernst and Young's employee was an SBA agent, not a Division agent). Given that AXA was a approved by the Division as a provider company, the undersigned finds that AXA and Mr. Ashe were authorized by the Division to provide Ms. Byron with information about SUSORP and administer her SUSORP account. See § 121.35(6), Fla. Stat. On May 29, 2018, Ms. Byron called the FRS Financial Guidance Line and was put in contact with "Mike with Ernst & Young." During the call, Ms. Byron explained to Mike that she was in the Investment Plan, but wanted to "move to the SUSORP." Specifically, she called because she understood she would "have to maybe pay a fee to get into the pension plan and then move to the SUSORP." She had been told that she should call the FRS Financial Guidance Line to figure out what that fee might be. Mike confirmed Petitioner would need to be a member of the Pension Plan before getting into SUSORP. Again, this information is not accurate and contrary to the SUSORP statute and Division rules. He also stated there is a 90-day window for her to move to SUSORP. During the call, Mike could not give Petitioner a quote for the buy in cost of switching from the Investment Plan to the Pension Plan and indicated it could take up to six weeks to get that information. He also informed her it could take a full month to process the paperwork and payment amount to become a Pension Plan member. He urged her to submit the 2nd Election form to switch from the Investment Plan to the Pension Plan before the end of the month (May 31, 2018), and then not to pay the cost if she concluded it is was too much or did not want to go forward with the switch. Ms. Byron: Okay. So, what is the risk of submitting the [2nd Election] form? I know I only get one chance to make the change. If I submit the form and change my mind, does that count as my chance? Mr. Mike: I mean, you have the full month following to rescind. * * * Ms. Byron: And if I don't submit the form, then nothing happens. If I do submit the form, and I don't want to pay it, I have to not pay it and nothing happens … [i]f it automatically happens and I still don't want to do it, I have a month. Mr. Mike: Yeah. Based on the information she received from Mr. Ashe and her conversation with Mike, Ms. Byron understood she had 90 days, or until July 19, 2018, to buy into the Pension Plan and then elect to participate in SUSORP. Because she had been led to believe only Pension Plan participants could elect to participate in SUSORP, she reasonably concluded she would need to use her 2nd Election to change from the Investment Plan to the Pension Plan before she could participate in SUSORP. On May 31, 2018, Ms. Byron submitted a "2nd Election Retirement Plan Enrollment Form" (2nd Election form) by facsimile to the number designated on that form. Ms. Byron selected the following option: Option 1: Change from the FRS Investment Plan or Hybrid Option to the FRS Pension Plan. I want to transfer from the Investment Plan to the Pension Plan and use my existing Investment Plan account balance and possibly other personal resources to 'buy' into the Pension Plan. The 2nd Election form does not make any reference to SUSORP. On May 31, 2018, Petitioner called the FRS Financial Guidance Line to confirm that the 2nd Election form was received by FRS. During this call, Ms. Byron was transferred to Misty, who identified herself as an Investment Plan administrator. Ms. Byron indicated she wants to make sure the 2nd Election form had been received, but Misty could not confirm this. Misty explains it may take a few hours to show up "in her system." Ms. Byron was concerned she may not be talking to the right person. Ms. Byron: Okay. Now, am I –are you sure I'm with the right person? Because I'm switching from investment to the pension with the intention of eventually switching to SUSORP. Ms. Misty: You're switching from investment plan to pension with the intention of switching to the [sic] something entirely outside of the pension? Ms. Byron: To SUSORP. Ms. Misty: Okay. I don't know what that is, I apologize. Let's go ahead and get you over to pension just to be sure since they are a separate department. * * * Ms. Byron: Who's in charge of switching from the investment to the pension? Ms. Misty: We [SBA and the Division] would both be involved in it. (emphasis added). She then instructed Ms. Byron to press Option 4 for the Pension department when she returned back to the automated system. From this conversation and the other conversations Ms. Byron had with people on the FRS Financial Guidance Line, the undersigned finds both the Division (as the agency administering the Pension Plan) and SBA (as the agency administering the Investment Plan) were responsible for processing Ms. Byron's 2nd Election form. On June 4, 2018, FRS sent Ms. Byron a "Confirmation of 2nd Election – Pension Plan" (Confirmation). It indicated that her election to move from the Investment Plan to the Pension Plan was effective as of June 1, 2018, but that it was not finalized. The Confirmation informed Petitioner "you will need to buy into the FRS Pension Plan using the available balance in your FRS Investment Plan account. If your account is not sufficient to cover the cost of the buy in, you will need to submit personal funds." Although the Confirmation did not state whether it was sent from SBA or the Division, the second page indicated: If you feel this retirement Plan election was made in error, you may be able to cancel it. Please call the MyFRS Financial Guidance Line at 1-866-446- 937, Option 2. Failure to notify us no later than 4:00 PM EST on the last business day of the month following your election month will void your right to cancel this election. The Confirmation directed members to contact the Division (not SBA) at the same number, Option 3, for specific questions. Based on the date of the submittal of her 2nd Election form (May 31, 2018), Ms. Byron had until June 29, 2018, to rescind her 2nd Election form, and thereby reverse her decision to go from the Investment Plan to the Pension Plan. At this point, however, even though she had executed the 2nd Election form, Petitioner's election transfer from the Investment Plan to the Pension Plan was not final because she had not submitted the buy in payment. The Confirmation did not address what would happen if the buy in amount was not submitted, or if it was, what would happen if an employee canceled the 2nd Election and did not remain in the Pension Plan. The Confirmation did not make any reference to SUSORP. On June 18, 2018, Ms. Byron spoke with Leah at the Division. In this call, Ms. Byron explained she received the Confirmation, but she had not received a bill for the buy in amount. Leah replied that a letter with the amount was generated on June 14, 2018, but has not been mailed out. Ms. Byron was concerned about the last day she has to rescind the election. Ms. Byron: So what is my deadline for canceling? I'm just panicking about if it's – if it's not what I want to do because I don't have the bill yet, when can I cancel the second election? Ms. Leah: Typically they give you a 60-day period. Let me double check. One moment. Okay. So you'll have until no later than the last business day of the month following the election. During the call, Ms. Byron pressed Leah on the letter with the buy in figure, and questioned her as to why the Confirmation was sent if the election was not final. Leah determined the letter was issued by the Investment Plan (SBA), not by the Pension Plan (the Division), and transferred Ms. Byron to Rick with the Investment Plan. It is apparent from the audio recording that Ms. Byron was exasperated (justifiably), but remained patient. Once transferred to Rick, Ms. Byron was informed that any questions regarding the buy in had to go through the Pension Plan. Rick offered to transfer her back to the "pension department." On June 21, 2018, before the deadline to rescind her 2nd Election, Mr. Ashe sent Ms. Byron two documents: (1) a SUSORP enrollment form, and a risk tolerance questionnaire to identify Ms. Byron's investment strategy for SUSORP. There was no discussion of the buy in payment to transfer into the Pension Plan. On July 3, 2018, Ms. Byron called the FRS Financial Guidance Line and was transferred to Durriya with Ernst & Young. During this call, Ms. Byron explained she received an invoice for the buy in amount to switch to the Pension Plan and needed a "letter of acceptance" for the financial firm handling her Investment Plan to release the funds. Durriya said could not help her and offered to transfer Ms. Byron to someone else. Durriya transferred Ms. Byron to Phyllis at the Division who was able to help her. Phyllis stated she would request for the letter and it would be mailed to Ms. Byron as soon as possible. Ms. Byron expressed concern that the letter might not get to her by July 19, 2018, the date she needed to elect to participate in SUSORP. Ms. Byron: So help me with the deadline. I was hired April 20th. I have made my intention known to go into the SUSORP, but I can't physically do that with the money until all of this happens. And I'm worried it won't happen by July 20th, July 19th, which is my deadline for selection. Am I going to be okay? Ms. Phyllis: Let's see. Okay. So you have until August 16th for us [the Division], but you need it by July 19th? Ms. Byron: That's when my selection of the – which plan I want to be in has to be in. And I submitted my, I want to be in SUSORP [ ], but I can't physically be in … SUSORP until all the money's there [Pension Plan]. Does that matter? * * * Ms. Phyllis: Okay. So, basically you are switching from investment to pension and then to SUSORP, right? Ms. Byron: Yeah. (emphasis added). Phyllis did not advise Petitioner she could start participation in SUSORP without first switching from the Investment Plan to the Pension Plan or buying into the Pension Plan. At this point, Petitioner's 2nd Election was not finalized because she had not submitted the buy in funds. Had she been informed that she did not have to be in the Pension Plan first, Petitioner could have simply not submitted the buy in funds, kept her existing funds in the Investment Plan, and started in SUSORP. Rather, Phyllis advised she would place a notation in the system that Ms. Byron was attempting to make an election to participate in SUSORP, and "asked them to rush it." Ms. Byron then asked Phyllis about the deadline for her to get into SUSORP. Phyllis could not help her, but offered to transfer her to the Optional Retirement Program department. What is clear from the call is that Ms. Byron is very concerned about getting the buy in funds to the Division to participate in the Pension Plan because she believed she had to be a Pension Plan member before the SUSORP election deadline. On August 3, 2018 (after both the deadline to rescind her 2nd Election form and the deadline to enroll in SUSORP had passed), Ms. Byron contacted the Division and spoke to Leah. At the outset of the call, Ms. Byron informed Leah that called to see if her 2nd Election status was final because she had submitted the funds to buy into the Pension Plan. Although it is unclear from the record how much Petitioner paid to buy into the Pension Plan, she used her entire savings from her Investment Plan plus additional monies. The Investment Plan was valued at approximately $138,000. Leah confirmed the switch from the Investment Plan to the Pension Plan had gone through, and advised Ms. Byron that she had 13 years of service under the Pension Plan. Ms. Byron was audibly upset and stated, "Well, I actually didn't want to end up in the pension, I wanted to end up in the SUSORP, so how do I make sure that that choice is recorded? We had to do the pension first and transfer it to SUSORP." From the audio recording, it is clear Leah was confused. Leah then placed Ms. Byron on hold and had a separate call with another Division employee, Phyllis. Leah relayed the conversation with Ms. Byron to Phyllis and Phyllis suggested Leah call another extension. Leah then checked back in with Ms. Byron to let her know she was still looking for someone who can help her. Ms. Byron agreed to stay on hold. On a separate line (which Ms. Byron could not hear), Leah received an automated recording announcing that she had reached the "Florida Division of Retirement Optional Program O-R-P unit." Leah then spoke with Jim at the Division. Leah explained to Jim that Ms. Byron did not want to remain in the Pension Plan, but rather wanted to transfer to SUSORP. Leah remained confused. [Mr. Jim]: You don't transfer to SUSORP. You're either in it or you're not in it. There is no way to buy into it … there's no way to get from investment by going through pension to get to SUSORP. You take a job that's eligible for SUSORP and you make the choice to be in it or not. * * * Ms. Leah: Well, she had questions about the forms that she would need to submit, but doesn't look like she's going to be – Mr. Jim: Just put up the wall. She's not going to be able to do it. What Jim told Leah is consistent with the SUSORP statute: it does not matter whether one is in the Investment Plan or Pension Plan; one is in SUSORP when he or she is eligible. Jim seemed to be telling Leah that what Ms. Byron wanted (to have her retirement funds in SUSORP) was not possible, but that Leah should not do anything about it. Jim agreed to speak with Ms. Bryon but joked with Leah that it was Friday, and he had one hour left on his shift. He also sarcastically told Leah she may want to stay on the line as it might be "entertaining or educational." Again, Ms. Byron did not hear this conversation between Leah and Jim. Leah then patched Ms. Bryon through to Jim. At this point, Ms. Byron, Jim, and Leah were all on the call. Ms. Byron: I submitted my second election form to go from investment to pension with the intention of going into SUSORP and I need to check if you have all my forms necessary to make that happen. Jim: So, you've just taken a job with one of the universities?Ms. Byron: Yes. Mr. Jim: Okay. It looks like everything's in place. Jim informed Ms. Byron a letter of acceptance to SUSORP was mailed to her on July 5, 2018, and that she could call back to make sure everything had been processed in a few days. He did not tell Ms. Byron what he had explained to Leah: "You don't transfer to SUSORP. You're either in it or you're not in it." After Ms. Byron ended the call, Jim and Leah continued to discuss Ms. Byron's situation. Mr. Jim: Great. Understand now, Ms. Byron just spent a whole bunch of money. That money's gone except that it purchased her some years of pension service. Ms. Leah: Right. Mr. Jim: Okay. Her new SUSORP account starts at zero. Oh, did I hear a great intake of breath? Ms. Leah: Are you serious? Mr. Jim: Absolutely serious. At no point during the conversation between Ms. Byron and Leah or Jim was Ms. Byron informed she did not have to use her 2nd Election and buy into the Pension Plan before she could participate in SUSORP. In fact, at no time during these numerous emails and telephone conversations did anyone affiliated with DMS, the Division, AXA, Ernst & Young, or SBA tell Ms. Byron that she was essentially enrolled in SUSORP (unless she choose to go with an FRS plan or failed to pick a provider) when she started the position at the University of Florida. No one told her that she did not need to exercise her 2nd Election or buy into the Pension Plan to participate in SUSORP.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, enter a final order rescinding Petitioner's 2nd Election and either: (1) return the buy in monies to the Investment Plan, (2) transfer the buy in monies from her Pension Plan to SUSORP, or (3) refund these monies to Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of June, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HETAL DESAI Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of June, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Lee Hayes Byron 2414 River Ridge Drive Sarasota, Florida 34239 Thomas E. Wright, Esquire Office of the General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) William Chorba, General Counsel Office of the General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) David DiSalvo, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Post Office Box 9000 Tallahassee, Florida 32315-9000 (eServed)
The Issue The issue in this case is whether James B. Anderson, a deceased retiree in the Florida Retirement System Pension Plan, selected Option 1 (maximum retiree’s monthly benefit without any spousal benefit after death of the retiree) or Option 3 (a reduced retiree’s monthly benefit with continued spousal benefit after death of the retiree).
Findings Of Fact On June 30, 2007, the named Petitioner, James B. Anderson, terminated his employment with the University of South Florida (USF) at the age of 69 years and 9 months. At the time, his tenure at USF spanned 27 years and entitled him to receive pension benefits under the Florida State Retirement System Pension Plan. Also on June 30, 2007, Mr. Anderson completed an application for retirement. By applying Mr. Anderson, who was USF’s Director of Insurance and Risk Management, acknowledged that he would not be able to add service, change options, change his type of retirement (regular, disability, and early) or elect the Investment Plan once his retirement became final, which would be when he cashed or deposited any benefit payment. Also on July 2, 2007, Mr. Anderson and his wife, Mitzi Anderson, executed a Statutory Official Form FRS 110 before a notary public. By doing so, they selected Option 1, which provides the maximum pension benefits to Mr. Anderson until his death and no pension benefits to his wife after his death. The form stated clearly, in bold print, that Option 1 did not provide a continuing benefit after Mr. Anderson’s death and that the selection of Option 1 would be final when Mr. Anderson cashed or deposited any benefit payment. The next day, Mr. Anderson faxed the executed form to the Division of Retirement, which mailed Mr. Anderson an acknowledgement of receipt of the executed form. The acknowledgement included a clear statement, in bold print, that Mr. Anderson would not be able to change his benefit option selection after retirement and that his retirement would become final when he cashed or deposited any benefit payment. Mr. Anderson had second thoughts about his benefit option selection and contacted Donna Pepper, a retirement specialist employed by USF, to discuss changing to Option 3, which would give him a reduced pension benefit that would continue and be paid to his wife after his death. On July 6, 2007, Ms. Pepper sent an email to Mr. Anderson stating: “Here is another option selection form so that you can change your option.” The email attached a blank Statutory Official Form FRS 110. Ms. Pepper’s email also stated: “As we discussed, you may want to indicate that this form should supersede the previously submitted form.” It also advised the Petitioner to keep a copy for his records and send the original to the Division of Retirement as soon as possible. On July 20, 2007, at 12:53 p.m., a comment was entered on the Integrated Retirement Information System (IRIS) telephone log, documenting that Mr. Anderson was considering changing his benefit option selection and would “either FAX a form with a change of option on it or call to let them know he would not make the change.” The comment also documented that Jan Steller in retirement payroll was asked to hold Mr. Anderson’s first check until “this is resolved.” Later the same day, at 2:30 p.m., another comment was added to document that Mr. Anderson had called back to say he had decided to stay with Option 1 and that Jan Steller had been called back and asked “to release his check.” On July 31, 2007, an initial pension check was sent to Mr. Anderson in the amount of $4,188.45, in accordance with his selection of benefit Option 1, which was about $1,200 more than it would be under Option 3. This check was not immediately cashed. On August 31, 2007, a second Option 1 pension check in the same amount was sent to Mr. Anderson. On September 4, 2007, Mr. Anderson deposited the first two benefit checks into his Bank of America account. He continued to receive and cash or deposit monthly Option 1 benefit checks through January 2015. Mr. Anderson died on February 14, 2015. His wife notified the Division of Retirement, which stopped benefit payments in accordance with Mr. Anderson’s Option 1 selection. In March 2015, Mrs. Anderson found among her husband’s papers a copy of an executed Form FRS 110 that selected Option 3. Notwithstanding the telephonic communications with the Division of Retirement on July 20, 2007, the executed form indicates that it was notarized on July 23, 2007. Included in handwriting at the bottom of the executed form was the language, as suggested by Ms. Pepper: “This option supersedes option dated 7-02-07.” Mrs. Anderson also found a copy of Donna Pepper’s e-mail dated July 6, 2007, with instructions on how to change the selection of pension payments. Mrs. Anderson sent copies to the Division of Retirement and requested Option 3 spousal benefit payments. The Division of Retirement denied Mrs. Anderson’s request because it did not receive an Option 3 benefit selection before the copy Mrs. Anderson sent in March 2015. There was no evidence that the form was sent to the Division of Retirement before then. This, together with the fact that Mr. Anderson received and cashed or deposited seven and a half years’ worth of monthly Option 1 benefit checks, which were each over $1,200 more than the Option 3 benefit would have been, support a finding that Mr. Anderson actually selected Option 1 and never switched to Option 3. It is not clear from the evidence why Mr. Anderson kept a copy of an executed change from Option 1 to Option 3 after deciding not to send it to the Division of Retirement.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, enter a final order finding that Mr. Anderson selected benefit Option 1, finally and irrevocably and that Mrs. Anderson is not entitled to Option 3 spousal benefits. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of January, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of January, 2016. COPIES FURNISHED: Nicholas E. Karatinos, Esquire Law Office of Karatinos Suite 101 18920 North Dale Mabry Highway Lutz, Florida 33540 (eServed) Joe Thompson, Esquire Department of Management Services Suite 160 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) Dan Drake, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Post Office Box 9000 Tallahassee, Florida 32315-9000 (eServed) J. Andrew Atkinson, General Counsel Office of the General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Ste. 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 (eServed)
The Issue Whether Petitioner, Heike Stoll (f/k/a Heike Bybee), has standing to assert a claim or right to any portion of her former husband’s Florida Retirement System (“FRS”) benefits as an “innocent spouse” pursuant to Article II, Section 8(d) of the Florida Constitution, and section 112.3173, Florida Statutes (2017).1/
Findings Of Fact Mr. Bybee is a member of the FRS Investment Plan by virtue of his former employment as a deputy with the Sarasota County Sheriff, an FRS participating employer. On October 6, 2017, in Sarasota County Circuit Court Case Number 2017CF001018, Mr. Bybee was found guilty by jury verdict of the following felonies under Florida law: Kidnap- Commit or Facilitate Commission of Felony; Crimes Against Person-Exploitation Elderly or Disabled Adult $20,000 to $100,000 dollars; Fraudulent Use of Personal Identifying Information (8 counts); and Computer Crime to Defraud or Obtain Property (3 Counts) (referred to collectively as the “felony convictions”). On October 6, 2017, judgment was entered against Mr. Bybee adjudicating him guilty of the felony convictions. The SBA notified Mr. Bybee that his felony convictions required forfeiture of his FRS benefits under section 112.3173(2)(e), Florida Statutes. Mr. Bybee did not file a petition for hearing to challenge the Notice of Forfeiture or otherwise assert that his felony convictions did not warrant forfeiture of his FRS benefits under the forfeiture statute. Mr. Bybee’s interest in his FRS benefits is subject to forfeiture due to his commission of the crimes, and his felony convictions. Ms. Stoll was married to Mr. Bybee on August 27, 1994. On or about May 9, 2017, Ms. Stoll filed her Petition for Dissolution of Marriage in Manatee County (Circuit Court Case Number 2017-DR-2067) asserting her interest in, inter alia, Mr. Bybee’s FRS benefits. On December 8, 2017, Ms. Stoll filed an “FRS Investment Plan Petition for Hearing” asserting her claim of entitlement to her spousal share of Mr. Bybee’s FRS benefits as an “innocent spouse.” On February 26, 2018, Mr. Bybee and Ms. Stoll executed a Marital Settlement Agreement. As to retirement accounts, Mr. Bybee and Ms. Stoll agreed to the following: Retirement Accounts/Pension. Wife shall receive as her sole property, and all equity and value therein, all retirement accounts and/or pensions in the Husband’s sole name, in the joint name of the parties, and/or in the Wife’s sole name, free and clear of any claims or interest which Husband may have thereto. Specifically, Husband has a pension and/or retirement account through the County of Sarasota Sheriff’s Department, State of Florida. Wife shall receive as her sole property, and all equity and value therein, in said pension and/or retirement account, free and clear of any claims or interest which Husband may have thereto. Further, Husband assigns, transfers, and relinquishes any legal or equitable claims, causes of action, or remedies of any nature against the pension and/or retirement account through the County of Sarasota Sheriff’s Department, State of Florida; and Husband shall fully cooperate with Wife in any and all respects as necessary for Wife to pursue any such legal or equitable claims, causes of action, or remedies related any manner said pension and/or retirement account. Ms. Stoll was not charged with or convicted of any crimes related to Mr. Bybee’s felony convictions. Ms. Stoll’s testimony was credible that she was unaware of Mr. Bybee’s crimes, and had not benefited from them in any fashion. On April 16, 2018, a Final Judgement of Dissolution of Marriage was entered in Manatee County Circuit Court Case Number 2017-DR-2067 that “approved, ratified and incorporated” the marital settlement agreement.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the State Board of Administration issue a final order finding that Petitioner is not entitled to her former husband’s retirement benefits, because he was a public employee convicted of specified offenses; and pursuant to section 112.3173, he forfeited all of his rights and benefits in his Florida Retirement System Investment Plan account upon committing the crimes. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of May, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LYNNE A. QUIMBY-PENNOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of May, 2018.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Willie Mae Miles is entitled to retirement credit for the period beginning March 1952 through August 1976 when she was employed at the Jackson Memorial Hospital in Miami, Florida (the "Hospital"). There is no dispute that Willie Mae Miles was employed at the Hospital during that time period. However, the Department of Administration (the "Department") contends that Ms. Miles received a refund of her employee retirement contributions of $5,475.39 in May 1977. Therefore, the Department contends that Respondent is not entitled to credit for that period of service. Ms. Miles claims that she did not apply for or receive a refund of retirement contributions. She also claims that she would only have accepted a lump sum refund if it included her contributions and the county and state contributions with interest. Since no such sum was received, she claims she is entitled to retirement credit for her employment at the hospital.
Findings Of Fact While Mrs. Miles has handled her case up to and including the hearing since she dispensed with the services of her attorney, her testimony and the nature of the exhibits indicate that she did not fully comprehend the meaning and intent of the documents that she signed requesting a refund of her retirement contributions and mistakenly believed that she still had funds in the Retirement Trust Fund from which a retirement benefit would be paid later upon her retirement. Her belief was erroneous. Under the State and County Officers and Employees' Retirement System (SCOERS), an employee and the employing agency each paid retirement contributions into the Retirement Trust Fund, and these contributions were credited to the employee's retirement account. Eventually, when the employee retired, the retirement benefit was paid from the total contributions paid into the Trust Fund, including investment earnings of the Fund. However, if the employee terminated employment before retirement, he could legally receive only a return of his personal contributions paid in and not the retirement contributions paid in by his employing agency. Mrs. Miles believed she was due and had a right to her own paid-in contributions, as well as the contributions paid in for her by her employing agency, and since she had received a refund of only a portion (her portion) of her retirement contributions, there were monies (retirement contributions made by her employer) still on deposit with the Division of Retirement that would provide for her retirement. Mrs. Miles did not understand that the return of her personal contributions would end any entitlement or vested right on her part to a future retirement benefit under the SCOERS. It is also evident from her testimony that no one with her employing agency advised her of this fact and that none of the information received from the Division of Retirement made this clear to her. The "Request for Refund" card stated the effect of a refund of personal contributions, but Mrs. Miles did not understand the instructions on the refund card. In April, 1989, the Division received an inquiry from Mrs. Miles advising that she was applying for her retirement benefits. This is further evidence that she believed she still had an active retirement account with the State of Florida. It is concluded that Mrs. Miles never had any actual intent to relinquish her right to apply for and receive a retirement benefit under the SCOERS.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner not be credited with any creditable service under the provisions of Chapter 121, Florida Statutes, for the period from March 1952 to May 1977. DONE and ORDERED this 30 day of March 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. STEPHEN MENTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30 day of March 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER 89-4834 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes on all of the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Respondent in this case. Petitioner's submittal was a mixture of argument, conclusions and facts which have been carefully considered in the preparation of this Recommended Order. However, specific ruling on proposed findings of fact by the Petitioner is not possible given the format of her proposal. Rulings on Respondent's Findings of Fact Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 1. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 3. The first sentence is adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 5. The remainder of the proposal is rejected as unnecessary. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 7. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 8 and 10. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 11 and 12. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 14 and 16. COPIES FURNISHED: Willie Mae Miles 10220 S.W. 170th Terrace Miami, Florida 33157 Larry Scott, Esquire Division Attorney Office of General Counsel Department of Administration Room 440 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Stanley M. Danek, Esquire Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Aletta Shutes, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 =================================================================
The Issue Whether the Petition has forfeited his rights and benefits under the Florida Retirement System (FRS) as a result of a guilty plea in the United States District Court, Southern District of Florida, for acts committed in connection with Petitioner's employment with the Broward County Sheriff's Department.
Findings Of Fact From the Joint Stipulation of Facts: The Florida Retirement System (FRS) is a public retirement system as defined by Florida law. Respondent is charged with managing, governing, and administering the FRS on behalf of the Department of Management Services. Petitioner was employed as an Assistant State Attorney by the State Attorney's Office from December 1972 to January 1974. During this time, Petitioner was a member of the FRS and this service is credited as service under the FRS. Petitioner was employed as Executive Director of the Broward County Charter Commission from January 1974 to November 1974. During this time, Petitioner was a member of the FRS and this service is credited as service under the FRS. Petitioner was employed by the Broward County Board of County Commissioners from March 1975 to November 1978. During this time, Petitioner was a member of the FRS, and this service is credited as service under the FRS. In November 1978, Petitioner was elected to serve as a member of the Florida Legislature; he continued to serve as a state legislator for approximately 18 years. As a state legislator, Petitioner was a member of the FRS class of State Elected Officers, and this service is credited service under the FRS. Most recently, Petitioner was the elected Sheriff of Broward County. By reason of his service as Sheriff, Petitioner was a member of the FRS. Petitioner was initially appointed Sheriff in January 1998 by then-Governor Lawton Chiles. Petitioner was subsequently elected Sheriff in 1998 and reelected in 2000 and 2004. As Sheriff of Broward County, Petitioner was Broward County's chief law enforcement officer and was responsible for directing the Broward County Sheriff's Office ("BSO"), a law enforcement agency that currently employs over 6,000 employees. The office of Sheriff is a constitutional office established under Article VIII, Section 1(d), Constitution of Florida. Upon assuming his duties as Sheriff of Broward County, Petitioner took an oath to support, protect, and defend the Constitution and Government of the United States and the State of Florida and to faithfully perform the duties of sheriff pursuant to Article II, Section 5(b), Constitution of Florida. On or about September 4, 2007, Petitioner wrote a letter to Governor Charlie Crist notifying him of his resignation from the office of Sheriff of Broward County. By reply letter of the same date, Governor Crist accepted Petitioner's resignation. Petitioner is not retired from the FRS and currently does not receive FRS retirement benefits. On or about September 4, 2007, Petitioner was charged, by information, in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, in case number 0:07-cr-60209-WPB, with one count of conspiracy to commit mail fraud, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 371, and three counts of filing a false tax return, in violation of Title 26, United States Code, Section 7206(1). The same four-count information is filed in U.S. District Court (S.D. Fla.) case number 0:07-cr- 60209-WPB as document 1. At all times relevant to the information, Petitioner was the Sheriff of Broward County. The section of the information entitled "General Allegations" contains numerous references to Petitioner's service as Sheriff of Broward County and the power and authority vested in that position. The "Objects of the Conspiracy" contained in count one of the information states: An object of the conspiracy was for JENNE to unlawfully enrich himself by obtaining monies from P.P. and L.N., who were Broward Sheriff's Office vendors, by making false representations, omitting to state material facts, and concealing material facts concerning, among other things, the ultimate destination of monies that JENNE asked P.P. and L.N. to give to his secretaries, A.V. and M.Y. It was further an object of the scheme for JENNE to perpetuate and conceal the scheme and the actions taken in furtherance of it by, among other things, making false, misleading, and incomplete statements in public filings and to investigators. The "Manner and Means of the Conspiracy" contained in count one of the information states: JENNE and M.Y. arranged for JENNE to receive $20,000 from P.P. by having the money transferred from P.P. through JENNE's secretary, M.Y., to JENNE. JENNE and M.Y. did this in order to conceal that JENNE was the true recipient of the funds. JENNE provided L.N. with access to off- duty Broward Sheriff's Office deputies, who L.N. hired to do work for his companies. On two different occasions, in exchange for the access to the deputies, JENNE instructed L.N. to pay money to JENNE's secretary, A.V., purportedly to compensate A.V. for work done for L.N. JENNE instructed A.V. to cash checks given to her by L.N. and to have the cash deposited into JENNE's bank account. JENNE and A.V. did this in order to conceal that JENNE was the true recipient of the funds, which totaled $5,500. JENNE perpetuated this fraud and attempted to prevent its detection by mailing incomplete and misleading annual financial disclosure forms, which did not list his receipt of the payments from P.P. and L.N., to the Florida Commission on Ethics. On or about September 5, 2007, after being advised of the nature of the charges against him, the above-referenced information, and of his rights, Petitioner waived in open court prosecution by indictment and consented to proceeding by information. The same waiver of indictment is filed in U.S. District Court (S.D. Fla.) case number 0:07-cr-60209-WPB as document 13. On or about September 5, 2007, Petitioner entered into an agreement with the United States of America to plead guilty as charged in the four-count information. The same plea agreement is filed in U.S. District Court (S.D. Fla.) case number 0:07-cr-60209-WPB as document 3. Paragraph 7.c. of the plea agreement provides: 7. The United States and the defendant agree that, although not binding on the probation office or the court, they will jointly recommend that the court make the following findings and conclusions as to the sentence to be imposed: * * * c. Advisory sentencing range on the conspiracy to commit mail fraud count: That, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2X1.1, the applicable guideline to be used in calculating the defendant's advisory sentencing range on the conspiracy to commit mail fraud count is § 2B1.1; that under § 2B1.1(a)(1), the Base Offense Level is 7; that under § 2B1.1(b)(1)(C), four levels are added because the loss was between $10,000 and $30,000; that under § 3B1.3, two levels are added because of the defendant's abuse of his position of public trust; and that under § 3E1.1(b), two levels are subtracted for acceptance of responsibility . . . The United States Sentencing Guide, Section 3B1.3, referenced in paragraph 7.c of the plea agreement, provides in relevant part that "[i]f the defendant abused a position of public . . . trust . . . in a manner that significantly facilitated the commission or concealment of the offense, increase by 2 levels." USSG § 3B1.3. Paragraphs 10. and 12. of the plea agreement provide: 10. The defendant confirms that he is guilty of the offenses to which he is pleading guilty; that his decision to plead guilty is the decision that he has made; and that nobody has forced, threatened, or coerced him into pleading guilty. The defendant affirms that he has discussed this matter thoroughly with his attorneys. The defendant further affirms that his discussions with his attorneys have included discussion of possible defenses that he may raise if the case were to go to trial, as well as possible issues and arguments that he may raise at sentencing. The defendant additionally affirms that he is satisfied with the representation provided by his attorneys. The defendant accordingly affirms that he is entering into this agreement knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently, and with the benefit of full, complete, and effective assistance by his attorneys. * * * 12. This is the entire agreement and understanding between the United States and the defendant. There are no other agreements, promises, representations, or understandings. On or about September 5, 2007, Petitioner entered a statement of factual basis for guilty plea with the United States of America (hereinafter "factual proffer"), wherein he agreed that, if the case went to trial, the government would have been able to establish the facts recited therein beyond a reasonable doubt. The same factual proffer is filed in U.S. District Court (S.D. Fla.) case number 0:07-cr-60209-WPB as document 8. On or about September 5, 2007, a hearing was held in which Petitioner pled guilty as charged in the information. At the hearing, Petitioner admitted to committing the acts set forth in the charges and to which he pled guilty. In addition, at the hearing Petitioner admitted to the following facts and to committing the following actions: At no point in time did Petitioner ever disclose to the public that he received an $8,130 benefit from P.P. in November 2001 in connection with the demolition of a house he owned in Lake Worth, Florida. Within P.P.'s internal accounting system, the $8,130 check was attributed to the "HIDTA project" (i.e., a lease committing BSO and HIDTA as tenants of an office building owned by P.P.). Petitioner never reported the $8,130 benefit on any of his state ethics disclosure forms, nor did he ever make a disclosure in any other fashion. At no point in time did Petitioner ever disclose to the public that, in September 2002, he had received $10,000 from P.P. as a reward for his work concerning a new company called SuperTech Products, Inc. Petitioner never reported the $10,000 payment on any of his state ethics disclosure forms, nor did he ever make a disclosure in any other fashion. Prior to becoming Sheriff, Petitioner was a partner in Conrad, Scherer & Jenne, a law firm located in Fort Lauderdale. Petitioner was with the firm from 1992 through the beginning of 1998, when he left to become Sheriff. While Petitioner was at the firm, he, like some other partners, drove a car paid for by the firm's investment arm, CSJ Investments. In October, 1997, at Petitioner's request, the law firm, through CSJ Investments, bought a used 1994 Mercedes E320 convertible for Petitioner to drive. The price of the Mercedes was $61,297. Rather than pay for the car all at once, the firm financed the car with a 60-month loan. When Petitioner left the firm in early 1998 following his appointment as Sheriff, he took the Mercedes with him. Despite the fact that Petitioner no longer worked for the firm, the firm continued to pay off the Mercedes loan for the balance of the loan term, making the final payment in 2003. The loan payments were $1,320 per month, resulting in a total eventual cost to the firm of approximately $79,234 in loan payments, all but approximately $1,320, of which were made after Petitioner had already left the firm to become Sheriff. In addition, after Petitioner left the law firm, the firm continued to pay for the insurance on the Mercedes. The insurance payments continued even unto September 2007. At that time, the firm had made a total of approximately $30,961 in insurance payments on Petitioner's behalf, all but approximately $880, of which were made after Petitioner had already left the firm to become Sheriff. Petitioner never disclosed any of the loan payments or insurance payments made by the firm on his behalf on any state ethics filing. During the time that Petitioner was receiving these undisclosed payments from Conrad, Scherer, the firm was billing BCSO for legal work that it was doing on its behalf. At the hearing, Petitioner did not take any exception or make any objections to the facts as summarized in the factual proffer. In fact, with the exception of one non-substantive addition, Petitioner accepted the factual proffer as indicated. On or about November 16, 2007, a judgment was entered on the aforesaid guilty plea, wherein Petitioner was adjudicated guilty of all counts charged in the four-count information. The same judgment is filed in U.S. District Court (S.D. Fla.) in case number 0:07-cr-60209-WPB as document 59. By certified letter dated January 24, 2008, Petitioner was notified of Respondent's proposed action to forfeit his FRS rights and benefits as a result of the aforesaid guilty plea. The notice set forth the basis for the Division's decision and informed Petitioner of his right to an administrative hearing. Petitioner, by and through counsel, timely requested a formal administrative hearing to challenge said proposed agency action. [End of Stipulated Facts] The parties agreed that the following exhibits would be considered in this cause: Petitioner's resignation letter dated September 4, 2007; Governor Crist's letter accepting Petitioner's resignation dated September 4, 2007; The Information filed against Petitioner on September 4, 2007, in United States of America v. Kenneth C. Jenne, Case No. 0:07-cr-60209-WPB, United States District Court, Southern District of Florida; The Plea Agreement offered in United States of America v. Kenneth C. Jenne, Case No. 0:07-cr-60209-WPB, United States District Court, Southern District of Florida; The Statement of Factual Basis for Guilty Plea of Defendant Kenneth C. Jenne in United States of America v. Kenneth C. Jenne, Case No. 0:07-cr-60209-WPB, United States District Court, Southern District of Florida; The Transcript of the Plea of Guilty before the Honorable William P. Dimitrouleas, U.S. District Judge, United States of America v. Kenneth C. Jenne, Case No. 0:07-cr-60209- WPB, United States District Court, Southern District of Florida; The Waiver of Indictment from United States of America v. Kenneth C. Jenne, Case No. 0:07-cr-60209-WPB, United States District Court, Southern District of Florida; The Judgment in a Criminal Case from United States of America v. Kenneth C. Jenne, Case No. 0:07-cr-60209-WPB, United States District Court, Southern District of Florida; The Agency Action letter dated January 24, 2008; Form 6 Full and Public Disclosure of Financial Interests 2001 (with attachments and amendments), Ken Jenne, Sheriff, Broward County, Elected Constitutional Officer, June 27, 2002; Form 6 Full and Public Disclosure of Financial Interests 2002 (with attachments), Ken Jenne, Sheriff, Broward County, Elected Constitutional Officer, July 7, 2003; and Form 6 Full and Public Disclosure of Financial Interests 2004 (with attachments), Ken Jenne, Sheriff, Broward County, Elected Constitutional Officer, July 1, 2005. Petitioner did not have a trial on the merits of the charges against him. Instead, he voluntarily accepted and admitted to the factual allegations set forth in the charging and plea documents. The factual statements set forth in those documents are not subject to interpretation or conjecture. They must be considered facts of this case based upon the stipulation of the parties. Petitioner was notified of the Department's preliminary decision to forfeit the FRS benefits and rights and Petitioner timely challenged that decision.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and the Conclusions of Law set forth above, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order finding Petitioner was convicted of crimes that require the forfeiture of his rights and benefits under the FRS, pursuant to Florida law. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of March, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of March, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Sarabeth Snuggs, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Post Office Box 9000 Tallahassee, Florida 32315-9000 John Brenneis, General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Mark Herron, Esquire Thomas M. Findley, Esquire Messer, Caparello & Self, P.A. 2618 Centennial Place Post Office Box 15579 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5579 Clifford A. Taylor, Esquire Barbara M. Crosier, Esquire Geoffrey M. Christian, Esquire Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160D Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner has forfeited her rights and benefits under the Florida Retirement System (“FRS”) pursuant to section 112.3173, Florida Statutes (2017).1/
Findings Of Fact Based on the record in this proceeding, including the evidence presented at the formal hearing and the stipulation of the parties in the Joint Response to Pre-hearing Order, the following Findings of Fact are made: The FRS is a public retirement system as defined by Florida law. The Florida Division of Retirement is charged with managing, governing, and administering the FRS on behalf of the Florida Department of Management Services. For over 21 years, Ms. Painter was the head softball coach for Gulf Coast, an FRS-participating employer. By virtue of her employment, Ms. Painter was enrolled in the FRS. On May 5, 2014, the Bay County Sheriff’s Office commenced an investigation into allegations that Ms. Painter had misappropriated cash that had been provided to her to pay for players’ meals during a softball tournament in Las Vegas and that Ms. Painter was collecting and keeping rent money from softball players who were on full room-and-board scholarships and had their rent paid by the college. In the summer of 2014, Ms. Painter was charged by information with one count of grand theft, a third-degree felony. Gulf Coast did not terminate Ms. Painter’s employment. Gulf Coast allowed Ms. Painter’s employment contract to expire on June 20, 2014. On January 9, 2015, the information was amended to include seven counts of grand theft, each constituting a third degree felony under section 812.014(1) and (2)(c), Florida Statutes (2014). Though some counts dealt with other allegations, for the purposes of this proceeding, the essential charges involved the meal money and the rental payments. Ms. Painter ultimately entered a plea of nolo contendere to one count of grand theft. During the hearing before the court, the state attorney specified that Ms. Painter was pleading to Count IV, which alleged theft of the meal money. The contemporaneous notes taken by the court clerk state that Ms. Painter was pleading to “Count 4.” The order of probation states that she pled to “Count 4.” However, the actual written “Plea, Waiver and Consent” signed by Ms. Painter and the attorneys shows the numeral “1” under the heading, “Count.” It is unclear from the document whether Ms. Painter was pleading nolo contendere to one count of grand theft, or to Count I of the information. Count I involved the allegation that Ms. Painter had improperly collected rent from one of the scholarship players, Megan Griffith. At the circuit court hearing, no mention was made of the specific factual allegations in the count to which Ms. Painter was pleading. The court made no findings of fact. Ms. Painter was not required to allocute to any facts.2/ Upon entry of the nolo contendere plea, the court withheld adjudication. Ms. Painter was given two years’ probation and ordered to make restitution of $4,400, perform 100 hours of community service, and was directed to have no contact with Gulf Coast or her former players. The undersigned finds that the understanding of all parties, including the court, was that Ms. Painter was pleading nolo contendere to Count IV of the information. The amount of restitution ordered is roughly consistent with the amount of meal money that was at issue in Count IV. The numeral “1” on the plea document is either a misprint or was intended to convey that Ms. Painter was pleading to a single count of grand theft. At the final hearing, Ms. Painter testified that she was given $4,752 in cash to pay for meals during the Las Vegas trip, which began on January 31, 2014, and ended on February 4, 2014. Ms. Painter testified that if the girls were splitting up to eat at different restaurants, she would dole out cash to each group. If everyone was eating at the same restaurant, all the girls would place their orders, and Ms. Painter would pay the entire tab. Ms. Painter testified that this had been her practice on team trips for some time. She stated that she used to give each girl her portion of the total meal money at the start of a trip. However, some girls would inevitably spend all of their money before the end of the trip and Ms. Painter would have to pay for their meals out of her own pocket. By doling out the money one meal at a time, Ms. Painter ensured that it would last the entire five days. Ms. Painter denied keeping any of the meal money for herself. She admitted that she did not keep receipts from each meal she purchased, but testified that meal receipts were not required on multiple day trips, such as the Las Vegas tournament. Nothing she did on this trip was different than her usual practice. At the end of the trip, she returned $132 in unspent meal money to the athletic department. Ms. Painter testified that her nolo contendere plea was made for financial and emotional reasons. The case had dragged on for 17 months. The ordeal was humiliating and exhausting. She stated that accepting the plea deal was the hardest decision she had ever made, but that she did not in fact take any of the meal money from her softball players. The Department offered no admissible direct evidence to contradict Ms. Painter’s version of events. The undersigned did not admit the deposition of Gulf Coast Athletic Director Gregg Wolfe because it was a discovery deposition taken in Ms. Painter’s criminal case. The undersigned did admit the Bay County Sheriff’s Office case file on Ms. Painter’s criminal case, which included witness interviews and Ms. Painter’s bank statements. However, the case file was admitted on the understanding that it was a hearsay document that could only be used to supplement or explain other evidence. In the absence of competent non-hearsay evidence, or any showing by the Department that elements of the case file would be admissible over objection in a civil trial, the case file was of no utility. The Department’s only witness aside from Ms. Painter was its employee Allison Olson, the benefits administrator in the Bureau of Retirement Calculations. Ms. Olson’s knowledge of the case was gleaned purely through her review of the paper record, including the case file and the transcripts of depositions taken in the criminal proceeding. She had no first- hand knowledge of any of the events in question. Ms. Painter offered the deposition testimony of Joanne Booker, a member of Ms. Painter’s softball team at the time of the Las Vegas trip and currently an assistant basketball coach for Gulf Coast. In most essentials, Ms. Booker corroborated Ms. Painter’s testimony. Ms. Booker did not recall many particulars as to how the meals were purchased, but testified that at each meal the players were either given cash by Ms. Painter or had their meals paid for by Ms. Painter. Ms. Booker recalled no problems as to meals and recalled no one complaining about food on the Las Vegas trip. Even if it were found that Ms. Painter’s plea was actually entered as to Count I, the findings would be much the same. Ms. Painter testified that the “rent” she was accused of collecting and pocketing from the scholarship players was actually a voluntary contribution toward the rent of the non- scholarship players, to enable the entire team to live together in the same apartment complex. Ms. Painter testified that any money she collected was turned over to the lessor of the apartments. Again, the Department offered no admissible direct evidence to contradict Ms. Painter’s version of events. Ms. Painter’s testimony was at least credible enough to be accepted in the absence of any competent non-hearsay evidence to the contrary.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, enter a final order restoring to Susan Painter her rights and benefits under the Florida Retirement System and providing for payment to her of any past due benefits, together with interest at the statutory rate. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of September, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of September, 2018.
