The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether petitioner's rights and benefits under the Florida Retirement System are subject to forfeiture.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Robert T. Lacey (Lacey), was employed as the Director of the Criminal Justice Institute, Broward Community College, Broward County, Florida, from at least January 1, 1985, until his resignation in March 1986. At all times pertinent to this case, Broward Community College (BCC) was an employer which participated in the Florida Retirement System, and petitioner, while employed by BCC, was a member of the Florida Retirement System. On February 4, 1987, a Grand Jury impaneled in Broward County, Florida, returned a fourteen (14) count true bill of indictment against Lacey. The matter was ultimately assigned Case No. 87-2056CFA, Circuit Court, Broward County, Florida. Pertinent to this case are Counts I-XII of the indictment, one count for each of the calendar months of 1985 (January through December 1985). Each count charges that Lacey did, while employed by BCC that year, commit the following acts each month: . . . unlawfully and knowingly obtain or endeavor to obtain the property of Broward Community College, to wit: United States Currency, services and/or material, of a value of one hundred dollars ($100.00) or more, with the intent to permanently or temporarily deprive Broward Community College of a right to the property or a benefit thereof, or to appropriate the property to his own use or the use of any person not entitled thereto, contrary to F.S. 812.014(1)(a)., and (1)(b)., and F.S. 812.014(2)(b). The gravamen of such charges was the assertion that while employed as director of the Criminal Justice Institute, an entity within Broward Community College, Lacy used materials, time and personnel to benefit him personally in his consulting business. On February 25, 1988, following a jury trial, the jury returned a verdict of guilty of grand theft, as alleged in Counts I-XII of the indictment, and not guilty as to Counts XIII and XIV of the indictment. Although found guilty by a verdict of the jury, the court withheld adjudication as to each count, placed Lacey on probation for a period of three years, ordered Lacey to pay $3,000 in restitution to BCC, and ordered Lacey to perform 200 hours of community service. Lacey's post trial motions for arrest of judgment, new trial, and renewed motion for judgment of acquittal were denied by the court. Following the true bill of indictment that issued February 4, 1987, Lacey was also charged by direct information filed April 21, 1987, in the Circuit Court, Broward County, Florida, Case No.87-6744CFA, with two counts of official misconduct (Counts I and III), one count of petit theft (Count II), and one count of grand theft (Count IV). Pertinent to this case, Count I of the information charged that on or about September 5, 1985, Lacey did, while a public servant, to wit: . . . an employee of Broward Community College . . . did then and there unlawfully and knowingly falsify, or cause another to falsify, an official record or official document, to-wit: a Broward Community College form entitled "STAFF AND PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT COURSE APPROVAL FORM," with the corrupt intent to obtain a benefit for himself . . . or another, to-wit: for the benefit of JACINDA LYNN FANNIN, contrary to F.S. 839.25(1)(b). Counts III and IV of the information charged Lacey with official misconduct and grand theft, respectively; however, that portion of the information which would have set forth the factual basis for Counts III and IV is not of record, and no conclusion can be drawn as to whether or not the basis for those charges related to Lacey's employment with BCC. In response to the information in Case No. 87-6744 CFA, and following the resolution of Case No. 87-2056CFA, Lacey entered a plea of nolo contendere to all counts. The Court, by order of November 28, 1988, withheld adjudication of guilt, and placed Lacey on probation for three years with regard to Counts I, III and IV and six months as to Court II. All probationary terms were to run concurrent and coterminous with those imposed in Case No.87-2056CFA. 2/
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be rendered forfeituring the rights and benefits of petitioner, Robert T. Lacey, under the Florida Retirement System, except for the return of his accumulated contributions. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 25th day of March 1994. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of March 1994.
The Issue The issues to be determined are whether Dawn Jenkins (“Jenkins”) failed to meet the Deferred Retirement Option Program (“DROP”) termination requirements set forth in chapter 121, Florida Statutes; and, if so, whether Petitioner, Town of Miami Lakes (“Miami Lakes,” the “Town,” or “Petitioner”), is required to reimburse Respondent, Department of Management Services (“DMS”), Division of Retirement (“DOR” or “Respondent”), for the overpayment of retirement benefits paid to Jenkins.
Findings Of Fact DMS is the state agency delegated to administer FRS. The Florida Legislature created DOR to manage the retirement plans and programs under FRS within DMS. FRS is a retirement program for state and local government employees administered pursuant to chapter 121. All state agencies participate in FRS. Local governments have the option of joining the plan if they meet certain requirements set out in statute and rule. Participating employers agree to follow chapter 121 and Florida Administrative Code Chapter 60S when they join FRS. Petitioner is the Town, a State of Florida municipal government located within Miami-Dade County and duly charted on December 5, 2000. In January 2004, the Town joined FRS as a participating employer. Jenkins was a member of FRS through her employment with Miami- Dade County Public Schools. Jenkins entered DROP and received two one- year extensions (totaling seven years) until her retirement, effective June 8, 2018. Before entering DROP, Jenkins signed a DP-Term form on May 7, 2018. The DROP termination notification form specified that Jenkins had to “terminate all employment relationships with all participating FRS employers for the first 6 calendar months after [her] DROP termination date.” Clary Garcia Ramos (“Clary”) is a Town employee. In her regularly established position, Clary teaches yoga part time at a community center for the Town and is paid $25.00 per hour per class. She has worked for Miami Lakes for approximately 15 years and is covered under the FRS. In the fall of 2018, Clary was having bilateral knee replacement surgery and asked her longtime friend Jenkins to help her out and cover her yoga classes with the Town while she was out after her surgery. Clary and Jenkins have known each other for approximately 15 years and obtained their yoga education together. Jenkins, a certified yoga instructor, agreed to help Clary out with her classes for September and October 2018. Miami Lakes did not post a position opening nor conduct interviews for a back-up, part-time yoga instructor. Before Jenkins started filling in for Clary, Jenkins was instructed to fill out paperwork to start the position. She first filled out an employment application dated August 22, 2015, and then a second one with the corrected date of August 22, 2018, for the position of yoga instructor. On the completed application, Jenkins informed the Town that she had retired from Miami-Dade County Public Schools with “40 years of service” on June 8, 2018. The last detachable page of the application allowed the Town to perform Jenkins’ required background screening since she would be teaching yoga with seniors, a vulnerable population. Only the last page of the application pertains to a background check. On or about August 31, 2018, Jenkins received an offer of employment letter signed by Town Manager Alex Rey (“Rey”) regarding the position she was filling in for Clary. The letter stated: SUBJECT: EMPLOYMENT LETTER Dear Ms. Jenkins: On behalf of the Town of Miami Lakes, I would like to offer you the position of Back up-Part-Time Instructor, Yoga. Instructors work under the supervision of the Leisure Services Manager and are required to select, plan, and teach cultural classes for youth and adults. Your supervisor will determine your schedule for yoga classes. This position start date is September [12], 2018 and the rate of pay will be $26.00 per hour. Each time you are scheduled to work, you will be required to submit a time sheet to your supervisor. This position qualifies for participation under the Florida Retirement System (FRS), and 3% employee contribution is mandatory. This employment offer is contingent upon satisfactory results of the following pre-employment requirements: Criminal Background check and Drug Screening Proof of required education, certifications and/or licenses This is an exciting step for the Town of Miami Lakes, and we look forward to you joining our team. Should this offer be considered acceptable, please sign below and return [i]t to the attention of Cynthia Alejo, Human Resources Specialist, to complete your pre-employment process. Jenkins signed the employment offer letter and accepted the FRS position from Miami Lakes on September 4, 2018. Rey was the town manager for Miami Lakes during all times material to this case. He was the chief executive of the Town and oversaw human resources. Cynthia Alejo (“Alejo”) was the Town’s part-time human resources specialist, who served as the assistant to Rey in the Human Resources Department. Alejo used Clary’s offer letter as a template when she drafted the employment offer letter that Jenkins signed. Ismael Diaz (“Diaz”), the Town’s comptroller and chief financial officer, was off work during October 2018 on vacation. While Clary was out recuperating, Jenkins performed yoga instruction to the seniors for the Town in her place. Jenkins was paid a rate of pay of $26.00 per hour per class. However, while in Clary’s position, Jenkins did not receive the benefits available for employees or receive orientation or training for new employees. Jenkins taught 16 one-hour yoga classes to senior citizens from September 13, 2018, until October 11, 2018. Jenkins was paid and received, as agreed in the terms of her employment offer letter, a total of $442.00 for the yoga classes she taught for the Town. The Town erroneously reported Jenkins to FRS. The Town’s monthly reports specifically included Jenkins under a preretirement code, which alerted DOR internally that a person who had retired was being reported within the first 12 months after retirement. Each month that Jenkins worked, the Town reported her wages to DOR and made retirement contributions to DOR with the payroll reports. During the period when the Town reported Jenkins to DOR as an employee for three consecutive months on its retirement reports, the wrong codes registered errors. DOR notified the Town that Jenkins should not be reported in that way. The Town could have corrected the errors. However, the Town never provided a correction report to change Jenkins’ status. Instead, by the Town continuously reporting Jenkins as an employee, a DOR review of Jenkins’ retirement status was triggered. Eventually, Jenkins found out that she was being reported as an employee to DOR by the Town and her DROP retirement funds were in jeopardy. On or about December 3, 2018, Jenkins complained to DMS, Office of Inspector General, regarding her potential violation of FRS rules. Jenkins was informed in writing that her complaint was being referred to DOR for review. Jenkins also telephoned DMS several times, including December 3, 10, and 11, 2018, and February 8, 2019, requesting a review of her reemployment status and possible voiding of DROP. Jenkins requested to speak with an FRS specialist regarding her FRS retirement issue by email on December 10, 2018. At one point, Jenkins spoke to Kathy Gould, DOR bureau chief of calculations, and informed her that the reporting of her as an employee was a mistake and she was just covering for a friend who was out after having surgery. Because of the variety of Jenkins’ requests to review her retirement issue, which included the inspector general complaint and the multiple payroll report errors reported for Jenkins, DOR investigated Jenkins’ retirement status. June Moore (“Moore”), from the retirement calculations section at DOR, handled Jenkins’ review for DOR. On or about December 13, 2018, Moore started looking into the Jenkins’ retirement issue and contacted the Town’s comptroller, Diaz, by email requesting Jenkins’ personnel action form when she was hired and informing the Town that Jenkins was reemployed with Miami Lakes and “in violation of [her] termination date.” That same day, Diaz emailed Alejo, copying Moore, to update Alejo that he had spoken with Moore and told her the Town had also issued Jenkins an offer letter. In the email, Diaz asked Alejo to provide Moore’s requested information and suggested that the situation be mitigated so that Jenkins did not suffer any financial loss. Diaz also suggested that Jenkins could perhaps return the $400.00 earned. Moore responded 30 minutes later by email, “We are still reviewing this account. Once we receive the documents from your agency we will let you know what the outcome is.” The next day, Alejo sent Moore Jenkins’ two personnel action forms dated September 25, 2018, and October 12, 2018, and the August 31, 2018, offer letter that had been executed by Jenkins. Alejo stated in the email that: [Jenkins] was also under the impression that as a temporary employee, this would not affect her retirement. As Mr. Diaz mentions, Ms. Jenkins is willing to return all funds back to the Town and instead be considered a volunteer. While we don’t know if that’s a possibility, we are willing to help in any way so that Ms. Jenkins does not suffer a financial loss. Both personnel action forms dated September 25, 2018, and October 12, 2018, listed Jenkins as a temporary part-time, hourly wage, non- exempt employee. Each form had FRS checked under the benefits section. Additionally, the September form had “temporary coverage for Clary” written on it and the October form had checked resigned with notice and “temp position” written on it. Jenkins also received an Internal Revenue Service W-2 wage and tax statement from Miami Lakes for her services of working as a yoga instructor at the Town in Clary’s place. On or about February 12, 2019, Alejo sent a memorandum to Diaz that was contrary to all the previous employment records the Town had regarding Jenkins’ employment. The memorandum changed Jenkins’ status to a volunteer and referenced her $26 per hour payments as a stipend. The memorandum stated: After a review of our records, it has come to my attention that Ms. Dawn Jenkins, who assisted the Town of Miami Lakes (the “Town”) as a senior fitness class volunteer during September 19, 2018 thru October 11, 2018 and was inadvertently classified as a Town of Miami Lakes employee. Additionally, a review of our records reveals that Ms. Jenkins did not receive a salary for her services. The only monetary contribution from the Town was in the form of a $26.00 daily stipend. Ms. Jenkins became a volunteer following her friend’s knee incident which required surgery. The Town required Ms. Jenkins to complete an application and consent to a criminal background search, which is standard policy for any volunteer that engages with vulnerable children or adults. Upon receipt of Ms. Jenkins application, the Town in error, reported Ms. Jenkins wages to the Florida Retirement System (“FRS”). The error was discovered within a month or so, and by that time, Ms. Jenkins had already stopped volunteering and was thereby removed from our payroll system. As a follow-up, the Town will need the assistance of the FRS administration to correct the error reported. FRS is under the impression that Ms. Jenkins abused the system by seeking re- employment after retirement. As detailed in this memorandum, this is not the case. Ms. Jenkins, at no time during the period of September 19 thru October 11, 2018 served the Town as a salaried employee. Should you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact us. On February 19, 2019, DOR issued a final agency action letter, notifying Jenkins that she was “subject to the termination requirement found in [section] 121.021(39)(b), Florida Statutes,” and that she was required to “repay all retirement benefits previously paid to [her], as provided in Rule 60S-4.012, Florida Administrative Code,” in the amount of $445,013.04. Jenkins petitioned for, and received, a section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, hearing in response to the notice of intended agency action that would have required her to repay her DROP payout and the retirement benefits she had received. The DOAH case number assigned to that proceeding is 19-1692. Case No. 19-1692 was litigated through the final hearing. At that final hearing, the parties presented evidence and testimony of the same witnesses in this proceeding. After the administrative hearing on December 20, 2019, DMS and Jenkins entered into a Settlement Agreement to resolve the issues related to her termination of DROP and retirement benefits. As part of the Settlement Agreement, Jenkins’ benefit amount was recalculated based on the additional service credit she earned for the years she participated in DROP. The Settlement Agreement also deducted $464.86 monthly from Jenkins’ retirement benefits for a lifetime to repay $445,013.04, the overpayment amount in DROP benefits. In addition, a part of the Settlement Agreement obligated DMS to seek reimbursement for the entire debt, $445,013.04, from Miami Lakes. After settling the case with DMS, Jenkins voluntarily dismissed Case No. 19-1692 with prejudice. On October 2, 2020, DMS then issued its Notice of Intended Agency Action against the Town, informing Miami Lakes that due to hiring Jenkins on September 12, 2018, her FRS termination requirement of ceasing all employment with an FRS employer for six calendar months was never satisfied and, as a result, whenever a participating employer employs a retired FRS member in violation of the termination requirements, both the employee and the participating employer are liable for repayment of the money to the FRS Trust Fund in accordance with section 121.091(9)(c)3. The notice included an invoice demanding payment from the Town of the full amount of the “overpayment of benefits” to Jenkins. The Town timely filed a Petition for Formal Hearing contesting the agency action letter. Ultimate Findings of Fact Upon careful consideration of the entire record, it is determined that DMS has demonstrated by the preponderance of the evidence that Jenkins was an employee of Miami Lakes instructing yoga from September 2018 to October 2018, while Clary was out recuperating. It is interesting to note that, even though Jenkins testified at hearing, she did not believe providing services to the Town to help a friend who was having knee surgery was violating the DROP agreement, and she did not realize that Miami Lakes was a participating employer with FRS when she substituted for Clary while she was out recuperating. Jenkins did admit that she understood the DP-Term form she signed, which specified that she could not work for any FRS entities. Jenkins was also honest and forthright and admitted at hearing that she did not read the September 4, 2018, employment offer letter that she signed when she accepted the FRS position. Had she read the employment letter, she would have been put on notice that the position she was taking was “under the Florida Retirement System, and 3% employee contribution is mandatory.” At hearing, Alejo testified that it was her first time processing an employee covering for another employee. Notwithstanding her lack of experience, the evidence establishes Jenkins was employed with Miami Lakes. In this matter, Miami Lakes was notified of Jenkins’ retirement on June 8, 2018, from Miami-Dade County Public Schools on her employment application before she started the position. Also, the Town offered Jenkins employment through Rey, the Town’s human resources chief executive. The employment offer letter informed Jenkins who her supervisor was and specified participation in FRS, which both Rey and Jenkins signed. Additionally, the Town checked FRS twice under Jenkins’ benefit sections on both her personnel action forms. Likewise, the September personnel action form had “temporary coverage for Clary” written on it and the other form had “temp position” written on it. The evidence also demonstrates that the Town reported Jenkins’ wages as an employee three months in a row and made retirement contributions to DOR on three consecutive payroll reports. At hearing, Dr. Joyce Morgan credibly testified that even after DOR notified Miami Lakes that there was an error in reporting Jenkins, they continued to report her in November and December 2018, and the Town never attempted to correct the error or contact DOR to get help in correcting any errors.1 In addition, the Town properly issued Jenkins a W-2 tax statement as an employee for instructing yoga for Miami Lakes not a 1099 statement. At hearing, the record not only shows Miami Lakes hired Jenkins as an employee, but was fully aware of her employee status with the Town. The evidence demonstrates that Diaz, the comptroller, confirmed by his December 13, 2018, email that Jenkins’ status was a Town employee when he informed Moore that Jenkins had executed an employment offer letter and Diaz attempted to assist mitigate Jenkins’ financial loss with DOR by suggesting her pay be returned to the Town. Additionally, Alejo further established Miami Lakes’ full knowledge of Jenkins’ status as an employee with the Town in her email of December 14, 2018, when she admitted she did not know if it were possible, but offered to help Jenkins not suffer a financial loss by suggesting to Moore to change Jenkins’ title so Jenkins could be considered a volunteer and return the money paid. The record also demonstrates that it was not until almost two months later in February 2019, that the Town’s Human Resource Department actually reclassified Jenkins’ title to a senior fitness volunteer and renamed her “rate of pay” that had formally been $26.00 per hour in the employment offer letter to a “$26.00 daily stipend” in an internal memorandum2 that Alejo sent to Diaz. 1 The undersigned is not persuaded that the Town’s reporting error was caused because Comptroller Diaz was out on vacation during October 2018, because the errors were not corrected after Diaz returned and have not been corrected as of the date of the hearing. Additionally, the Town’s errors are not determinative of Jenkins’ employment status. Any contention that correcting the error in the payroll report would have an impact on changing Jenkins’ employee status is misplaced. To that end, the payroll report does not determine Jenkins’ employment status. 2 The undersigned rejects the memorandum as reliable evidence to help determine Jenkins’ employment status since the record demonstrates that Alejo had been working on Jenkins’ behalf to help her from receiving a financial loss for approximately two months. An internal title change by the Town did not change Jenkins’ status as a temporary yoga employee for Miami Lakes. Additionally, the record shows that the Town did not process Jenkins as it did for other volunteers. At hearing, Rey testified that there were categories of volunteers: resident volunteers that served on different committees and volunteers through agreements. Rey explained that volunteers with the Town are non- paid persons and the Town only reimburses volunteers for supplies by providing the funds or obtaining a receipt for reimbursement, neither of which occurred with Jenkins. Rey also testified that upon learning there was an issue with Jenkins’ employment, he explained to Jenkins that she had been hired by Miami Lakes as a “temporary employee to cover for a limited period of time.” Rey also testified that Jenkins was never considered a volunteer for the Town. Therefore, the greater weight of the evidence in this cause establishes that Miami Lakes employed Jenkins as a temporary yoga instructor. Hence, Jenkins was reemployed by an FRS employer, Miami Lakes.
Conclusions For Petitioner: Onier Llopiz, Esquire Joan Carlos Wizel, Esquire Lydecker Diaz 1221 Brickell Avenue, 19th Floor Miami, Florida 33131 For Respondent: Thomas E. Wright, Esquire Gayla Grant, Esquire Office of the General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, enter a final order that: Finds that Jenkins’ reemployment with Miami Lakes, an FRS municipality, failed to meet the DROP termination requirements; Upholds DMS’s October 2, 2020, notice of intended agency action that the Town of Miami Lakes is jointly and severally liable for repayment; Requires the Town of Miami Lakes to pay back the total overpayment of Jenkins’ benefits in the amount of $445.013.04; and Allows the Town of Miami Lakes to repay the overpayment in installments over a three- to five-year period. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of December, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: S JUNE C. MCKINNEY Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of December, 2021. Thomas E. Wright, Esquire Office of the General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Gayla Grant, Esquire Office of the General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Onier Llopiz, Esquire Lydecker LLP 1221 Brickell Avenue, 19th Floor Miami, Florida 33131 Joan Carlos Wizel, Esquire Lydecker LLP 1221 Brickell Avenue, 19th Floor Miami, Florida 33131 Kristen Larson, Interim General Counsel Office of the General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 David DiSalvo, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Post Office Box 9000 Tallahassee, Florida 32315-9000 Trey D. Evans, Esquire Lydecker LLP 1221 Brickell Avenue, 19th Floor Miami, Florida 33131
The Issue The issue in this proceeding is whether Petitioner was convicted of specified criminal offenses, requiring the forfeiture of all his rights and benefits under the Florida Retirement System, except for the return of accumulated contributions.
Findings Of Fact From 1999 until 2017, Bautista was an employee of the Miami-Dade County Public Schools (“MDPS”). On August 24, 2017, Bautista resigned from his position as principal of the Miami Jackson Adult Education Center, an office he had held since 2011. Bautista departed shortly after being arrested on charges of organized fraud, official misconduct, and grand theft. In the criminal Information leading to Bautista’s arrest, the State Attorney of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit alleged, in summary, that Bautista had used his position as principal to misappropriate between $20,000.00 and $50,000.00 of MDPS’s funds for personal expenses, and had destroyed official payroll records to cover his tracks. On or about July 10, 2019, Bautista pleaded nolo contendere in the Eleventh Judicial Circuit Court to one count of official misconduct, a felony of the third degree pursuant to section 838.022, Florida Statutes, and to one count of grand theft under section 812.014, Florida Statutes, also a third- degree felony. The court withheld adjudication of guilt and placed Bautista on community control, to be followed by probation. In addition, Bautista was ordered to pay restitution to MDPS in the amount of $41,798.22. SBA is an agency of the state of Florida whose jurisdiction includes the administration of the Florida Retirement System Investment Plan (the “Plan”). By letter dated August 14, 2019, SBA notified Bautista that his rights and benefits under the Plan are forfeit as a result of his pleas of no contest to the aforementioned criminal charges, which had arisen from acts allegedly committed by Bautista as an MDPS employee. SBA offered Bautista an opportunity to request a formal administrative proceeding to contest the determination, and Bautista timely requested a hearing. As grounds for opposing the forfeiture, Bautista claims that his former employer, MDPS, failed to provide him due process of law during the run-up to his forced resignation. He complains, as well, that “procedural irregularities” in the criminal prosecution likewise deprived him of due process. Next, Bautista notes that he never admitted guilt and insists that he is, in fact, innocent of the charges to which he pleaded no contest. Finally, Bautista argues that he was not “convicted” for purposes of forfeiture of retirement benefits, because the court withheld adjudication of guilt on the criminal charges against him. To be sure, if Bautista was not afforded due process or was otherwise victimized by prosecutorial abuse or inadequate legal representation, as he alleges, then Bautista might have suffered an injury for which the law affords redress. But this proceeding is not the vehicle, and DOAH is not the forum, for hearing such disputes. It does not minimize the seriousness of Bautista’s allegations to recognize that, even if true, none of them changes the undisputed facts that he pleaded nolo contendere to the crimes of official misconduct and grand theft, each of which is a “specified offense” under section 112.3173(2)(e), Florida Statutes. Conviction of a specified offense results in the forfeiture of retirement benefits pursuant to the plain language of section 112.3173(3).1 Thus, the MDPS investigation and any “irregularities” in the criminal prosecution are irrelevant to the issues at hand, and the undersigned declines to make findings of fact concerning Bautista’s allegations in this regard.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the State Board of Administration enter a final order determining that Joey Bautista forfeited all his rights and benefits under the Plan, except for the return of any accumulated contributions, when he pleaded nolo contendere to “specified offenses” committed prior to his retirement from public service. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of December, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of December, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Soeurette Michel, Esquire The Michel Law Firm, LLC Post Office Box 245131 Pembroke Pines, Florida 33024 (eServed) Rex D. Ware, Esquire Moffa, Sutton & Donnini, P.A. 3500 Financial Plaza, Suite 330 Tallahassee, Florida 32312 (eServed) Jonathon W. Taylor, Esquire Moffa, Sutton & Donnini, P.A. Trade Center South, Suite 930 100 West Cypress Creek Road Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33309 (eServed) Ash Williams, Executive Director and Chief Investment Officer State Board of Administration 1801 Hermitage Boulevard, Suite 100 Post Office Box 13300 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-3300
The Issue The issue in this case is whether James B. Anderson, a deceased retiree in the Florida Retirement System Pension Plan, selected Option 1 (maximum retiree’s monthly benefit without any spousal benefit after death of the retiree) or Option 3 (a reduced retiree’s monthly benefit with continued spousal benefit after death of the retiree).
Findings Of Fact On June 30, 2007, the named Petitioner, James B. Anderson, terminated his employment with the University of South Florida (USF) at the age of 69 years and 9 months. At the time, his tenure at USF spanned 27 years and entitled him to receive pension benefits under the Florida State Retirement System Pension Plan. Also on June 30, 2007, Mr. Anderson completed an application for retirement. By applying Mr. Anderson, who was USF’s Director of Insurance and Risk Management, acknowledged that he would not be able to add service, change options, change his type of retirement (regular, disability, and early) or elect the Investment Plan once his retirement became final, which would be when he cashed or deposited any benefit payment. Also on July 2, 2007, Mr. Anderson and his wife, Mitzi Anderson, executed a Statutory Official Form FRS 110 before a notary public. By doing so, they selected Option 1, which provides the maximum pension benefits to Mr. Anderson until his death and no pension benefits to his wife after his death. The form stated clearly, in bold print, that Option 1 did not provide a continuing benefit after Mr. Anderson’s death and that the selection of Option 1 would be final when Mr. Anderson cashed or deposited any benefit payment. The next day, Mr. Anderson faxed the executed form to the Division of Retirement, which mailed Mr. Anderson an acknowledgement of receipt of the executed form. The acknowledgement included a clear statement, in bold print, that Mr. Anderson would not be able to change his benefit option selection after retirement and that his retirement would become final when he cashed or deposited any benefit payment. Mr. Anderson had second thoughts about his benefit option selection and contacted Donna Pepper, a retirement specialist employed by USF, to discuss changing to Option 3, which would give him a reduced pension benefit that would continue and be paid to his wife after his death. On July 6, 2007, Ms. Pepper sent an email to Mr. Anderson stating: “Here is another option selection form so that you can change your option.” The email attached a blank Statutory Official Form FRS 110. Ms. Pepper’s email also stated: “As we discussed, you may want to indicate that this form should supersede the previously submitted form.” It also advised the Petitioner to keep a copy for his records and send the original to the Division of Retirement as soon as possible. On July 20, 2007, at 12:53 p.m., a comment was entered on the Integrated Retirement Information System (IRIS) telephone log, documenting that Mr. Anderson was considering changing his benefit option selection and would “either FAX a form with a change of option on it or call to let them know he would not make the change.” The comment also documented that Jan Steller in retirement payroll was asked to hold Mr. Anderson’s first check until “this is resolved.” Later the same day, at 2:30 p.m., another comment was added to document that Mr. Anderson had called back to say he had decided to stay with Option 1 and that Jan Steller had been called back and asked “to release his check.” On July 31, 2007, an initial pension check was sent to Mr. Anderson in the amount of $4,188.45, in accordance with his selection of benefit Option 1, which was about $1,200 more than it would be under Option 3. This check was not immediately cashed. On August 31, 2007, a second Option 1 pension check in the same amount was sent to Mr. Anderson. On September 4, 2007, Mr. Anderson deposited the first two benefit checks into his Bank of America account. He continued to receive and cash or deposit monthly Option 1 benefit checks through January 2015. Mr. Anderson died on February 14, 2015. His wife notified the Division of Retirement, which stopped benefit payments in accordance with Mr. Anderson’s Option 1 selection. In March 2015, Mrs. Anderson found among her husband’s papers a copy of an executed Form FRS 110 that selected Option 3. Notwithstanding the telephonic communications with the Division of Retirement on July 20, 2007, the executed form indicates that it was notarized on July 23, 2007. Included in handwriting at the bottom of the executed form was the language, as suggested by Ms. Pepper: “This option supersedes option dated 7-02-07.” Mrs. Anderson also found a copy of Donna Pepper’s e-mail dated July 6, 2007, with instructions on how to change the selection of pension payments. Mrs. Anderson sent copies to the Division of Retirement and requested Option 3 spousal benefit payments. The Division of Retirement denied Mrs. Anderson’s request because it did not receive an Option 3 benefit selection before the copy Mrs. Anderson sent in March 2015. There was no evidence that the form was sent to the Division of Retirement before then. This, together with the fact that Mr. Anderson received and cashed or deposited seven and a half years’ worth of monthly Option 1 benefit checks, which were each over $1,200 more than the Option 3 benefit would have been, support a finding that Mr. Anderson actually selected Option 1 and never switched to Option 3. It is not clear from the evidence why Mr. Anderson kept a copy of an executed change from Option 1 to Option 3 after deciding not to send it to the Division of Retirement.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, enter a final order finding that Mr. Anderson selected benefit Option 1, finally and irrevocably and that Mrs. Anderson is not entitled to Option 3 spousal benefits. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of January, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of January, 2016. COPIES FURNISHED: Nicholas E. Karatinos, Esquire Law Office of Karatinos Suite 101 18920 North Dale Mabry Highway Lutz, Florida 33540 (eServed) Joe Thompson, Esquire Department of Management Services Suite 160 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) Dan Drake, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Post Office Box 9000 Tallahassee, Florida 32315-9000 (eServed) J. Andrew Atkinson, General Counsel Office of the General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Ste. 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 (eServed)
The Issue Whether Petitioner is eligible to participate in the Deferred Retirement Option Program.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner is now, and has been since 1976, a firefighter employed by Miami-Dade County and, as such, a Special Risk member of the Florida Retirement System. Petitioner's date of birth is September 19, 1937. Accordingly, on July 1, 1998, the effective date of DROP, Petitioner was 61 years of age and had approximately 22 years of creditable service as a Special Risk member of the Florida Retirement System. Petitioner was aware that he needed to file an application to join DROP within 12 months of July 1, 1998, but he opted not to file such an application because he believed that the retirement benefits he would receive if he joined DROP within this 12-month period would not be enough for him to "live on" after he stopped working.2 Petitioner thought that it would be in his best interest, instead, to wait until 2003 to retire (and enjoy higher retirement benefits). On June 7, 2001, Petitioner sent an e-mail to Governor Bush, which read, in pertinent part, as follows: Yesterday I met with the head spokesman of FL. State Retirement concerning my participation in the D.R.O.P. [and] he advised me to send this note. As you know it started in 1998 at which time I was offered a small window because of my age (unlawful discrimination) for which I was not able to get into because of the insignificant amount offered as permanent retirement. Since then, as anticipated, my retirement has increased from the high 30's to the low 60's due thanks to you . . . Now, I am asking, by special request, to be allowed to enter into the D.R.O.P. either to finish these two years or to be given an opportunity to go for the whole 5 years, which I doubt I would complete. . . . Petitioner's e-mail correspondence was referred to the State Retirement Director who, by letter dated June 8, 2001, advised Petitioner that Petitioner's "request to join DROP at this late date must be denied."
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent issue a final order finding that Respondent is not eligible to participate in DROP because he did not elect to do so within the time frame prescribed by Subsection (13)(a)2. of Section 121.091, Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of December, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of December, 2001.
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Petitioner was properly enrolled in the Florida Retirement System (FRS) Hybrid Option Plan (Hybrid Option) in 2002, and whether he should be retroactively re-enrolled in the Florida 1 All statutory references are to the 2019 version of the Florida Statutes, except where indicated otherwise. Retirement System Pension Plan (Pension Plan) without having to pay a “buy-in” amount.
Findings Of Fact Mr. Marinak began employment with the Marion County Public School System, an FRS-participating employer, in 1989. At that time, the Pension Plan was the only retirement program available for eligible employees, and, thus, Petitioner was enrolled in the Pension Plan. The Pension Plan is administered by the Florida Division of Retirement (Division of Retirement), which is housed within the Department of Management Services. The Pension Plan is a defined benefit plan; the benefit is formula-based. The formula used for calculating a pension plan benefit is based on total years of service at the time of retirement, membership class, and average final compensation. Mr. Marinak has been continuously employed by an FRS-participating employer from 1989 to present. In 2002, the FRS Investment Plan (Investment Plan) became available to employees participating in FRS. The Investment Plan is administered by Respondent. The Investment Plan is a defined contribution plan; the benefit is based on gains and losses due to market performance. Mr. Marinak was provided a choice window of September 1, 2002, through November 30, 2002, to remain in the Pension Plan or switch to the Investment Plan. The parties stipulate that the Plan Choice Administrator at the time, now doing business as Voya, has records indicating Mr. Marinak elected the Hybrid Option by means of a telephone call on November 27, 2002. Voya no longer has a recording of the call. SBA does not have a recording of the telephone call either. The Hybrid Option is as its name indicates—it is a hybrid of the Pension Plan and the Investment Plan. When the Investment Plan was introduced in 2002, Pension Plan participants, with at least five years of service, could elect to enroll in the Investment Plan with a zero balance. With the election of the Hybrid Option, retirement funds from all years of service prior to the election remain in the Pension Plan; everything from the election forward is administered under the Investment Plan. Hybrid Option participants will receive the resulting defined benefit from the Pension Plan (earned prior to the election) upon retirement, plus the benefits from the investments in the Investment Plan after the election. The Pension Plan portion of the Hybrid Option remains with, and continues to be administered by, the Division of Retirement. The Investment Plan portion is administered by Respondent. Mr. Marinak disputes electing to enter the Hybrid Option. He credibly testified that he did not desire to transfer to the Investment Plan and has no recollection of authorizing such a transfer. Beginning at least as early as 2005, Respondent sent or otherwise made available to Mr. Marinak quarterly “FRS Investment Plan” statements. Mr. Marinak testified that he received these statements, but did not know what they meant. The earliest FRS Investment Plan statement documented by Respondent as having been sent to Mr. Marinak covered the period of January 1, 2005, to March 31, 2005. Mr. Marinak did not inquire about the statement or file a complaint with Respondent after receiving this statement. Beginning at least as early as 2008, the Department of Management Services sent or otherwise made available to Mr. Marinak annual “FRS Pension Plan – Hybrid Option” statements. These statements were sent to Mr. Marinak’s address of record at the time the statements were mailed. Mr. Marinak testified that the addresses where the statements were sent were, indeed, his addresses. Since the transfer in 2002, Mr. Marinak has updated his beneficiary designations for both the Pension Plan and Investment Plan portions of his Hybrid Option. In November 2008, Mr. Marinak communicated by e-mail with personnel at the Division of Retirement about the status of the Pension Plan and the years of service used to calculate his benefits. In December 2008, in response to his inquiry, the Division of Retirement prepared and provided to Mr. Marinak an Estimate of Retirement Benefit. The “Comments” section of the Estimate of Retirement Benefit stated as follows: This estimate is based on retirement at 30 years of service. It represents your 13.40 years of service in the Florida Retirement Pension Plan (8/1989 through 11/2002). You will have to terminate all employment with FRS employer to receive this benefit. You have an additional 6.00 years in the Hybrid Investment Plan through 11/2008; the years in the Hybrid Option are not used in calculating your monthly retirement benefit from the pension plan, which is why they are not reflected in your Member Annual Statement. Mr. Marinak did not inquire about the comment or file a complaint after receiving the Estimate of Retirement Benefit.2 Mr. Marinak testified that he saw the comment, but not being an expert in retirement financing, he did not comprehend what it meant. Mr. Marinak did not present documentary evidence or an audio recording demonstrating that he did not elect to transfer from the Pension Plan to the Hybrid Option. In early 2019, Mr. Marinak, nearing retirement, reviewed his retirement account and recognized that he was enrolled in the Hybrid Option. He contacted the Division of Retirement for guidance on how to switch back into the Pension Plan. The Division of Retirement informed Mr. Marinak that he may utilize a one-time “second election” to move back into the Pension Plan, but must pay a sum of approximately $160,000 as a “buy-in” amount to do so. This sum is derived from an actuarial calculation conducted by the Division of Retirement.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the State Board of Administration enter a final order dismissing Petitioner’s Florida Retirement System Investment Plan Petition for Hearing. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of July, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JODI-ANN V. LIVINGSTONE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of July, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Ruth E. Vafek, Esquire Ausley McMullen 123 South Calhoun Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (eServed) Herbert M. Hill Law Office of Herbert M. Hill, P.A. Post Office Box 2431 Orlando, Florida 32802 (eServed) Robert John Marinak 16531 Swan View Circle Odessa, Florida 33556 (eServed) Ash Williams, Executive Director and Chief Investment Officer State Board of Administration 1801 Hermitage Boulevard, Suite 100 Post Office Box 13300 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-3300
The Issue The issue in the case is whether Eldon Sadler, Taylor County Property Appraiser, (Petitioner) is required to enroll Connie LaValle in the Florida Retirement System (FRS) for all of her employment with the Taylor County Property Appraiser's Office from June 1993 until the present.
Findings Of Fact Connie LaValle has been employed in Petitioner's office as a permanent part-time employee since September 16, 1992, as a "mapper." Pursuant to a contract, she has also been performing additional mapping services for Petitioner since June 1993, for which no contributions have been made to FRS. Contributions have been made for LaValle's other part-time employment in the office. Prior to June 2, 1993, LaValle and Petitioner spoke regarding LaValle's performing services related to implementing a Geographic Information System (GIS) in the event that Taylor County decided to obtain such a system. As a consequence, LaValle sought and obtained placement of her name on the Department of Revenue's approved bidder's list. Placement on the list is a prerequisite to entering into a contract with Petitioner's office. On June 2, 1993, Petitioner's office and LaValle entered into a contract whereby LaValle would perform "mapping services to aid in assessment." While not detailed as such in the written contract, these services were related to the GIS mapping function and were in addition to LaValle's existing part-time employment in the office. The contract was renewed on May 30, 1996. LaValle was not given any training for the tasks for which she contracted, she was not required to follow daily or weekly routines or schedules established in Petitioner's office, she was given no instructions in the way that work was to be performed, and Petitioner could not change methods used by LaValle or otherwise direct her as to how to do the work. LaValle did the contractual work at her convenience and was not required to perform that work in the office or pursuant to any schedule. She was paid for the work product as she finished it. Payment under one contract resulted in a $60 per map payment from Petitioner when the product was completed. Under the renegotiated contract, she received $3 per parcel on computerized maps. She was not guaranteed a minimum payment, nor did she receive pension benefits, bonuses, paid vacation time, or sick pay. Earnings pursuant to the contract were reported by LaValle as self-employment income on form 1099. The contract provided that neither Petitioner nor LaValle could terminate the agreement absent 30 days notice to the other party. In addition to furnishing her own work location, work equipment, tables, engineering scales, computer and other necessary equipment, LaValle also paid all related expenses. LaValle performed all contract work in her home. Although not prohibited by terms of the contract, she did not work for other entities. Respondent, pursuant to an audit of retirement records of Petitioner's office, determined that LaValle was performing additional duties for Petitioner's office and receiving salary for which no retirement contributions were paid. Petitioner was notified by Respondent by letter dated August 10, 1999, that LaValle previously filling a part-time regularly established position, was now performing additional duties for the same employer and was now considered to be filling a regularly established position for her total employment. Petitioner was informed that salary earned by LaValle for the additional duties should have been reported and contributions paid to Respondent for retirement benefits. Petitioner maintains that LaValle is an independent contractor with regard to additional duties and no retirement contributions are due and payable. Respondent has determined LaValle is not an independent contractor. Respondent asserts that the additional duties are an extension of her normal duties in her part-time position and contributions for retirement benefits are due with regard to compensation paid to her by Petitioner.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the State of Florida, Division of Retirement, enter a final order finding that payments made to Connie LaValle for additional duties from Petitioner's office constitute salary for additional employment requiring payment of retirement contributions by Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of October, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of October, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Levy E. Levy, Esquire 1828 Riggins Road Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Larry D. Scott, Esquire Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Ron Poppell, Interim Director Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Emily Moore, Chief Legal Counsel Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Bruce Hoffmann, General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
The Issue The issue posed for decision herein is whether or not the Respondent's (Division of Retirement) denial of Petitioner's claim to buy for retirement credit purposes, service while she was a student nurse during the period August, 1941 through December, 1944 was proper.
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the arguments of counsel, and the entire record compiled herein, the following relevant facts are found. The facts herein are virtually undisputed. From August, 1941, through December, 1944, Petitioner was a student nurse at Florida State Hospital (Hospital) at Chattahoochee, Florida. As a student nurse, Petitioner worked twelve (12) hours a day, six and one-half (6-1/2) days per week with one full day off each month. During the weekdays, Petitioner spent time in class, with the remainder of time spent in the wards at the Hospital. Petitioner averaged between thirty-nine (39) and forty-seven (47) hours of work per week at the Hospital. As a student nurse, Petitioner received a salary of $15.00 per month in addition to her room, board, uniform and various fringe benefits such as medical care and leave, much like other Hospital employees. Personnel problems were resolved through the personnel office as with other employees. Petitioner returned to work at the Hospital as a Registered Nurse in October, 1954, and has worked almost continually to the present time. During the period 1970 through early 1972, employees of Florida State Hospital were given the opportunity to participate in the State and County Officers and Employees Retirement System (SCOERS). Petitioner participated in that retirement system. During the period 1970 through 1972, various state retirement systems, including SCOERS, merged and formed the present Florida Retirement System (FRS). Petitioner was given the option to transfer to FRS and in fact exercised that option by designating that election on a ballot provided by the personnel office at Florida State Hospital (Petitioner's Exhibit 1). The effective date of that transfer to FRS is December 1, 1970. During the period 1970 through early 1972, Respondent permitted transferees of the SCOERS retirement system to transfer student nurse credits as part of the retirement credits in the same manner as "full-time work" for retirement credit purposes. In early 1972, Respondent changed its policy of allowing work as a student nurse to be credited toward retirement benefits. C. J. Brock has been the personnel manager at Florida State Hospital in Chattahoochee since approximately 1968. He was initially hired at the Hospital in 1955. As personnel manager, Mr. Brock is in charge of submitting employee claims for retirement credits for various types of employment service to FRS for retirement benefits.' Mr. Brock recalled Petitioner visiting his office pan various occasions between the periods 1963 through 1972 inquiring as to the manner for purchasing student time for retirement credit purposes. Mr. Brock advised Petitioner that he would research the wage statements to determine the exact amount of student time she had earned and would refer the matter to FRS for a decision, Mr. Brock is not authorized to act for or on behalf of Respondent. The interaction between the Hospital's personnel officer and Respondent is limited to the referral of claims and certification of wage and employment statements. As such, there is no agency relationship between the Hospital and Respondent. This referral was made by Mr. Brock on Petitioner's behalf on December 20, 1972, and the request was denied. Former student nurses who were members of SCOERS and transferred to FRS during the periods 1970 through early 1972 had been allowed to purchase retirement credit for their student nurse service. This practice ended in early 1972. In this regard, Mr. Brock has certified the payroll records for student nurses who purchased retirement credit for their student nurse time, Ruth Sampson, Assistant Bureau Chief for the Division of Retireent, has primarily been involved in reviewing retirement benefit calculations since approximately 1969. Mrs. Sampson is familiar with the merger of SCOERS and FRS. Mrs. Sampson affirmed that Respondent had a policy which allowed members of SCOERS who transferred to FRS to purchase retirement credit for student employment time and that such policy was followed from December 1, 1970 (the inception of FRS) to early 1972. This policy was also followed by the SCOERS administrator prior to December 1, 1970. This unwritten policy was changed, according to Mrs. Sampson for two primary reasons. First, Chapter 122, Florida Statutes, did not permit the purchase of student time. Secondly, with the combination of SCOERS and the Teacher Retirement System (TRS) into the combined FRS system, an inequity existed since TRS members, unlike student nurses, were not allowed to purchase student time. As stated, the letter from Mr. Brock certifying Petitioner's employment and wage statements for the period in question was dated December 20, 1972. Mrs. Sampson, by letter dated March 30, 1973, requested additional information respecting the salary paid Petitioner and the amount of time she actually spent working at the Hospital during the period in question. Mr. Brock replied by letter dated April 4, 1973, advising that during the period in question, Petitioner was a student nurse at the Hospital which paid a full-time salary of $15.00 per month. By letter dated May 14, 1973, Mrs. Sampson denied Petitioner's claim since Petitioner was primarily a student during the period that the prior service claim was submitted (Joint Exhibit No. 1). Mr. Robert L. Kennedy, Jr. , the former Director of FRS, appeared and related that the policy decision was made to discontinue the practice of allowing student time to be credited for retirement purposes since that practice was not contemplated by pertinent statutes. Former Director Kennedy disagreed with the Comptroller's policy decision which had previously allowed this practice.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED: That the Petitioner's appeal of the State Retirement Director's decision denying her request to purchase prior service credit for her service as a student nurse be DENIED. Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that the decision of the State Retirement Director be SUSTAINED. RECOMMENDED this 13th day of May, 1980, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Edward S. Stafman, Esquire Diane K. Kiesling, Esquire PATTERSON and TRAYNHAN Division of Retirement 1215 Thomasville Road Cedars Executive Center Tallahassee, Florida 32302 2639 North Monroe Street Suite 207C - Box .81 Tallahassee, Florida 32303 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER =================================================================
