The Issue The issue for determination in this case is whether the Petitioner is entitled to purchase a retirement service credit for approximately three and one-half years pursuant to Section 121.011(3)(e), Florida Statutes. The record in this cause consists of all documents filed in this cause either with the Hearing Officer or with the Division of Retirement, including all documents received in evidence at the hearing as exhibits. After review of the record in this case, the Division accepts all the findings of fact as set forth by the Hearing Officer in his recommended order. However, the Division is unable to accept all of the conclusions of law as set forth by the Hearing Officer in his recommended order.
Findings Of Fact As a teacher with the Orange County School Board (the School Board") since 1967, Petitioner is a member of the Florida Retirement System. Petitioner was so employed in 1978 and was a member of the Florida Retirement System at that time. In January, 1978, Petitioner was on approved personal leave for her wedding. Her husband lived in Arkansas. Petitioner requested and was granted a leave of absence to join her husband in Arkansas for the balance of the school year. Petitioner and her husband intended to return to Orlando, Florida before the beginning of the next school year. Petitioner's husband intended to accept a position with a veteran's clinic in the Orlando area. Petitioner intended to resume employment with the School Board. On January 16, 1978, Petitioner properly submitted a written request for a leave of absence. The leave requested was limited to the remaining term of the school year which ended in June, 1978. The request asked for a teaching assignment in the event the request was denied. On February 14, 1993, the School Board granted Petitioner's request for a leave of absence. The School Board's written authorization was issued on a standard approval form used by the School Board for such authorizations. The one page form consisted of standard boiler plate language except for three blanks in the first paragraph stating the date of approval, the reason for the leave, and the expiration date for the leave. The boiler plate language in the standard form included the following statement: . . . A teacher who desires to return to employment at the expiration of the leave period must notify the Superintendent in writing by March 1 of the school year for which the leave was granted. . . . Petitioner notified the Superintendent in writing of her desire to return to employment. Petitioner's written request on January 16, 1978, was addressed to the School Board. The relationship of the School Board and Superintendent is that of principal and agent. Petitioner's written request expressly provided that the leave period was limited to the remainder of the school year and that Petitioner wanted a teaching assignment if the request for leave of absence was denied. The requirement for notice prior to March 1, 1978, was based on the Master Agreement, Article IX, Section L, entered into by the School Board and the teacher's union. No similar requirement appears in Respondent's rules. Florida Administrative Code Rule 60S-2.006(1)(a) requires only that: . . . A leave of absence must be authorized in writing by a member's employer prior to or during the leave of absence. Petitioner's leave of absence was authorized in writing by Petitioner's employer during her personal leave. Early in February, 1978, Petitioner telephoned Mr. Royce B. Walden, Associate Superintendent of the School Board, and informed him that she desired to return to her employment at the beginning of the next school year; in the Fall of 1978. Mr. Walden did not indicate to Petitioner that she had failed to provide timely written notice of her intent to return to employment. Later in February, 1978, Petitioner traveled to Orlando. While in Orlando, Petitioner telephoned Mr. Walden and again stated her desire to return to employment at the beginning of the next school year. The Associate Superintendent did not indicate to Petitioner that she had failed to provide timely written notice of her desire to return to employment. In May, 1988, Petitioner moved back to Orlando. Petitioner again telephoned Mr. Walden. Petitioner was informed for the first time during that telephone conversation that there may not be a teaching position available for her at the beginning of the next school year. The reason stated by the Associate Superintendent was that Petitioner had failed to notify the Superintendent in writing by March 1, 1978, of her desire to return to employment. Petitioner immediately wrote a letter on May 25, 1978, restating her desire to return to employment at the beginning of the next school year. On the same day, Mr. Walden issued a letter to Petitioner stating that the School Board would not automatically assign Petitioner to an employment position for the 1978-1979 school year. The reason stated in Mr. Walden's letter was that Petitioner failed to comply with the requirement that she notify the Superintendent in writing by March 1, 1978, of her desire to return to employment. On July 11, 1978, Mr. Walden issued a letter to Petitioner purporting to terminate her as an employee of the School Board. The reason given for the purported termination was that Petitioner had failed to give written notice to the Superintendent by March 1, 1978, of her desire to return to employment. The letter purporting to terminate Petitioner contained no notice of Petitioner's rights to challenge the School Board's proposed action, including the right to a proceeding under Section 120.57, Florida Statutes. After informing Petitioner of the purported termination and the reason, the letter stated: . . . Should you wish to return as an employee with the School Board of Orange County, we invite you to communicate with us in the near future. Please accept our sincere appreciation for your contribution to the educational program for children in the Orange County Public School System. 1/ Shortly after July 11, 1978, the School Board sued Petitioner for repayment of funds allegedly advanced to Petitioner for a paid sabbatical in 1973. The litigation culminated in a settlement agreement and Petitioner's reinstatement to her employment for the 1981-1982 school year with credit for nine years of service. Petitioner has been continuously employed by the School Board since that time and has maintained her continuing contract status with no loss in seniority. The settlement agreement did not pay Petitioner any back compensation and did not address Petitioner's fringe benefits, including the right to purchase the retirement service credit for the period of January, 1978 through the date of her reinstatement. Petitioner must pay the total cost of providing the retirement credit into the Retirement System Trust Fund. The economic burden of the retirement service credit falls solely on Petitioner. Petitioner's purchase of the retirement service credit will not result in any adverse economic impact on the School Board, Respondent, or the State of Florida. The proposed purchase price for the retirement service credit is sound for actuarial purposes.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a Final Order allowing Petitioner to purchase the retirement service credit at the statutorily prescribed purchase price. RECOMMENDED this 26th day of July, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of July, 1993.
The Issue Whether at the time of his father's death, Armando Martinez, Jr., was a "dependent beneficiary" of his father, a vested member of the Florida Retirement System, so as to be entitled to his father's retirement benefits?
Findings Of Fact Armando Martinez, Jr., was born on February 22, 1974, to Natalie M. Martinez and the late Armando Martinez, Sr. In 1992, when Armando, Jr., was eighteen years old, Mr. and Mrs. Martinez were divorced. The following year, 1993, less than two weeks after Armando, Jr.'s, nineteenth birthday, Armando Martinez, Sr., died. The cause of death was liver cancer, a disease from which Ms. Martinez presently suffers. At the time of his death on March 7, 1993, Mr. Martinez was a vested member of the Florida Retirement System. A municipal employee, he had been a bus operator. At some point close to commencement of his employment, slightly more than ten years prior to his death, Armando Martinez, Sr., had executed a Form M-10. The form named his wife, Natalie, as his primary beneficiary. Armando, Jr., the only child of Armando, Sr., and Natalie Martinez, was named as the sole contingency beneficiary. Following Mr. Martinez, Sr.'s death, Ms. Martinez disclaimed Florida Retirement System benefits. She did so in order for Armando, Jr., as the contingent beneficiary, to be able to receive the benefits. On February 17, 1997, the Division of Retirement denied Armando, Jr., survivor benefits. Had Mr. Martinez, Sr., died one-year and several weeks earlier, that is, prior to Armando, Jr.'s eighteenth birthday, the Division would have approved distribution of survivor benefits to him. But, although he was still a high school student, since he was older than nineteen by a few days at the time of his father's death, the Division required proof that Armando, Jr., had received half of his support from his father at the time of his father's death. No such proof was provided to the Division prior to or at the time of its preliminary denial. In fact, in his 1992 tax return, Mr. Martinez did not claim his son Armando, Jr., as a dependent. In this formal administrative proceeding, however, Armando Martinez, Jr., provided such proof, proof which was lacking until hearing. The year 1992 was very difficult for Armando Martinez, Jr., and his family. His parents separated, Armando, Jr., lived with his mother. Armando, Sr., lived elsewhere. Prior to his death, divorce proceedings were finalized. In the meantime, Ms. Martinez had lost her job. She remained unemployed for the entire year and in early 1993 as well. Armando, Jr., was still in high school at the time of his father's death. During the 1992-93 school year, to support himself and his mother, he obtained work part-time while he remained in school. Ms. Martinez paid the rent for their apartment at a rate of between $370 and $500 per month. The monthly phone bill of Ms. Martinez and Armando, Jr., was approximately $50; utility payments $70; groceries $300; gasoline $10, automobile insurance $100; and school supplies $40. There were other expenses, clothes, for example, that occurred from time-to-time. In addition to minimal government support to Ms. Martinez and Armando, Jr.'s, part-time employment income, Armando, Jr., was supported by cash payments provided by his father. Two or three times a month, Armando's father and a girl friend, Karen Jones, would drive to the front of the house. Because of his illness, Mr. Martinez remained in the car while Ms. Jones brought cash, usually between two and five hundred dollars in an envelope to the front door. On more than one of these occasions, Ms. Jones, the envelope, and the cash were observed by friends of the family at the moment of delivery. Ms. Martinez log of the estimates of these payments totals approximately $8,500, an amount in excess of Mr. Martinez's income reported in his 1992 tax return filed before his death in 1993 to be $6,389.00. But, Mr. Martinez, Sr. had access to other means of support and other monies including proceeds from insurance policies. The $8,500 provided to Armando, Jr., by Armando Martinez, Sr. constituted more than half of Armando, Jr.'s, support for the year 1992 and up until Mr. Martinez, Sr.'s, death in early 1993.
Recommendation Accordingly, it is hereby recommended that the Division of Retirement recognize Armando Martinez, Jr., to have been the dependent beneficiary of Armando Martinez, Sr., at the time of Mr. Martinez, Sr.'s, death, and therefore entitled to retirement benefits. DONE AND ORDERED this 27th day of January, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DAVID M. MALONEY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of January, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert B. Button, Esquire Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Natalie Martinez Suite 3811 3801 Northgreen Avenue Tampa, Florida 33624 Paul A. Rowell, General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 A.J. McMullian, III, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560
The Issue The issue for consideration in this matter is whether Peter McRedmond, the deceased, should have been permitted to change the beneficiary on his state retirement plan to elect an annuity for the benefit of his estate and the Intervenor, Martin Horton.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, the Respondent, Division of Retirement, was the state agency responsible for the control, operation and monitoring of the State Retirement System. Petitioner, Eugene McRedmond, is the surviving brother of Peter McRedmond, deceased, a former member of the Florida Retirement System. Intervenor, Martin V. Horton, is the former live-in friend and companion to Peter McRedmond and the individual who claims an interest in Peter's retirements benefits. For some period prior to 1988, Peter McRedmond was employed at Manatee Community College as a psychology professor and as such was a member of the Florida Retirement System, (FRS). He was so employed until he retired for disability in early 1990. Before that time, however, in August or September, 1988, he was diagnosed as having AIDS by Dr. Warren D. Kuippers, a physician with the Community Migrant Health Center. Tests taken at or around that time indicated he was suffering from toxoplasmosis, a disease of the brain in which significant portions of that organ are eaten by parasites, resulting in intermittent periods of impaired judgement and reasoning ability. He also suffered numerous other medical problems including weight loss, a wasting syndrome, general weakness and fatigue. Notwithstanding the seriousness of his illness, because Mr. McRedmond wanted to qualify for retirement under the FRS system, he continued to work for another year to meet the minimum requirements for retirement. On April 27, 1990, he made application for disability retirement to be effective July 1, 1990. As a part of that application, Mr. McRedmond selected Option 1 under the FRS as the method under which he desired his benefits be paid and named the Intervenor, Mr. Horton, as his designated beneficiary to receive any benefits legally due after his death. Mr. McRedmond could have elected to receive benefits under either Option 1 or Option 2 of the plan. Option 3 was not available to him because of his marital status. Under Option 1, he would receive payments of $639.33 per month for the remainder of his life, regardless of how long he lived. Under Option 2, he would have been paid a slightly lesser monthly sum, $587.51, for the rest of his life, but not less than 10 calendar years, and if he were to die before 10 years were up, the payments would go to his designated beneficiary. In May, 1990, consistent with the procedure then in effect within the Division, Mr. McRedmond was sent a second Option selection form to give him as much information as was possib1e and to make sure he understood what he was doing as it related to his option selection. Mr. McRedmond again selected Option 1, had his signature notarized, and returned the executed form to the Division. The individual who performed the notary service did not recall the transaction but indicated her routine practice was not to notarize a document for anyone who did not appear to know what he was doing. Peter McRedmond died on August 23, 1990 from the disease with which he was afflicted. Several months before his death, in mid June, 1990, Mr. McRedmond and Mr. Horton discussed finances and what Horton could expect after McRedmond's death. It is clear that Mr. McRedmond wanted to make arrangements for Mr. Horton to finish his education without having to work while doing so. At that time, McRedmond's life insurance policy, in the face amount of $60,000.00, had Horton as the beneficiary. Shortly before his death, however, upon the prompting of his brother, Eugene, Petitioner herein, Peter McRedmond directed the policy be changed to make his estate the beneficiary. This was done by Eugene through a power of attorney. There was also some discussion of an additional $500.00 per month which was to go to Mr. Horton, but no one, other than Mr. Horton, recalls this. Also shortly before his death, Mr. McRedmond and Mr. Horton travelled to the family home in Connecticut for several weeks. During that time, Mr. McRedmond had at least one major seizure and family members noticed that while he was sometimes forgetful, for the most part his thinking was rational and normal. There can be little doubt that Mr. McRedmond had deep feelings for Mr. Horton and wanted the latter to be provided for after his death. Friends of both relate the numerous comments McRedmond made to that effect and are convinced that at the time he made the contested election, Mr. McRedmond was not of sound mind sufficient to knowingly make the choice he made. To be sure, the ravages of his disease had taken its toll and there were numerous occasions on which he was not lucid or competent to determine issues such as here. On the other hand, the benefits administrator with whom McRedmond talked at the time he selected his retirement plan option was totally satisfied that at that time, he fully understood the nature and effect of the option he selected and was choosing that which was consistent with his desires at the time. By the same token, the notary, whose testimony was noted previously herein, also was satisfied he knew what he was doing at the time of the second election. In its final configuration, Mr. McRedmond's estate includes all his assets, including the proceeds of the insurance policy previously designated to go to Mr. Horton, for a total of approximately $120,000.00. According to the terms of the will, the estate is to be put into a trust from which Mr. Norton is to receive $1,000.00 per month for his lifetime, as well as all his medical expenses. Since Mr. Horton has tested HIV positive, these can be expected to be extensive. Eugene McRedmond is the executor of the estate. Petitioner and Mr. Horton claim that since the trust contains all of Peter's assets existing at his death, the only other source of the additional $500.00 per month would be the benefits from the FRS. Both cite this as evidence of Mr. McRedmond's intent that the option selection providing for payment after death was his intention. This does not necessarily follow, however. Notwithstanding what Petitioner and Intervenor state were his intentions, Mr. McRedomnd took no action to make the change in option selection which would have effectuated them. Instead, he went out of town to visit family for several weeks, and even after receipt of the first retirement check, received on July 31, 1990, still took no action to make the change. During this period, after the return from Connecticut, Mr. McRedmond's condition deteriorated to the point he was often bedridden and was periodically unaware. However, there is ample evidence to indicate that he was often lucid during this period and still took no action to change his retirement option. During this time, Mr. Horton conducted come of Mr. McRedmond's business affairs for him pursuant to specific instructions. These included making bank deposits and as a part of one of these deposits, when Horton was to deposit two checks as requested by McRedmond, he also deposited the first retirement check. Horton and Eugene McRedmond both claim that at no time did Peter McRedmond ask or authorize him to do so. In a visit that Petitioner made to his brother in early August, 1990, just weeks prior to Peter's death, according to Petitioner his brother explained he had selected the wrong retirement option and requested that Eugene attempt to change the election. Peter gave Eugene a Power of Attorney with which he was to do this as well as to change the beneficiary on the life insurance policy. Consistent with those instructions, Eugene wrote a letter to the Division explaining the situation and that the check had been deposited by mistake. On August 13, 1990, Eugene telephonically contacted the Division where he spoke with Melanie White. During this conversation, in which he again spelled out the circumstances which he believed constituted the mistaken election, he was told to file a power of attorney. When he did this, the Division would not honor it claiming that since it had been executed in May, 1990, some three months earlier, it was not current. Subsequent to the death of Peter McRedmond and the filing of the claim against the Division, Eugene McRedmond and Martin Horton have entered into an agreement whereby any sums recovered from the Division will be split with 25% going to Mr. Horton and 75% going to the Trust. Upon the death of Mr. Horton, any sums remaining in the trust will be split by Eugene McRedmond and another brother.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that Petitioner's and Intervenor's claims for retirement benefits under Option 2 of the Florida Retirement System retirement plan, on behalf of Peter McRedmond, be denied. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee, Florida this 29th day of July, 1991. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Buildi5g 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clark of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of July, 1991 APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NUMBER 90-7104 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. FOR THE PETITIONER AND INTERVENOR: Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. First two sentences accepted and incorporated herein. Third sentence not proven. & 5. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted that Peter McRedmond had numerous conversations with friends about providing for Mr. Horton, but it was not established that he mentioned using his retirement benefits for that purpose. & 9. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Rejected as not necessarily following from the facts. Rejected as speculation not supported by fact, except that Petitioner claims Peter desired to change the option selection. First sentence accepted. Second sentence accepted in so far as it asserts Peter told Horton he would receive a monthly sum of $1,000.00. Balance rejected. Accepted and incorporated herein. Rejected as speculation and conclusion except for first sentence and first clause of second sentence. Accepted and incorporated herein. 17.-20. Accepted and incorporated herein. 21. First and second and last sentences accepted. 22.-24. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. & 28. Accepted. 29. Irrelevant. FOR THE RESPONDENT: 1-4. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. & 7. Accepted and incorporated herein. 8.-10. Accepted. Ultimate finding accepted. On the date he filed his application, Peter McRedmond was capable of understanding what he was doing and the implications thereof. & 13. Rejected as comments of the evidence and not Findings of Fact. First four sentences accepted. Remainder rejected except that McRedmond wanted Horton to get at least $1,000.00 per month for life, and more if possible. & 16. Accepted except for last two sentences of 16. Accepted except for last sentence which is a comment on the evidence and not a Finding of Fact. Accepted. & 20. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. & 23. Accepted and incorporated herein. 24. Accepted and incorporated herein. COPIES FURNISHED: Edward S. Stafman, Esquire Stafman & Saunders 318 North Calhoun Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Stanley M. Danek, Esquire Department of Administration Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 A. J. McMullian, III Director Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Bldg. C 1639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 John A. Pieno Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Linda Stalvey Acting General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550
Findings Of Fact The ultimate issue to be decided is whether the Petitioner is eligible to transfer from Florida Teacher Retirement Plan A to Florida Teacher Retirement Plan E and if so, whether he should be allowed to do so at this time. Robert L. Wonsick, the Petitioner, served as a classroom teacher in the Pinellas County School System for approximately 19 years. He resigned from his employment as a school teacher on approximately June 14, 1972 which resignation was accepted by his employer. At that time, Petitioner advised duly the employer through its agent, Jerry J. Switts, Director of Elementary Placement and Retirement, that he was unable to return too work the 72-73 school year due to illness; therefore he opted to, void his Florida Retirement System Transfer Ballot which would have been effective July 1, 1972, and requested disability retirement under the Teacher's Retirement System Plan. Petitioner was advised by Switt's to submit a written request for final decision on his application filed for disability retirement. As indicated by his petition filed on or about March 5, 1976, Petitioner takes the position that he should be entitled to transfer from Teachers Retirement System (hereinafter referred to as TRS) Plan A to TRS Plan E. Petitioner attempted to elect to transfer to the Florida Retirement System (hereinafter sometimes referred to as FRS) in 1972, the effective date to be July 1, 1972. This was denied inasmuch as Petitioner had already resigned his employment and never worked under or contributed to FRS, since by his own testimony he resigned in August, 1972, on or about the second day of pre-school. Respondent therefore denied the application for transfer based on Section 121.051(2)(a) 3(a), Florida Statutes. Petitioner submitted his transfer ballot which was received by Respondent along with numerous other employees in 1972. By letter dated September 8, 1972, Petitioner requested that his transfer ballot be cancelled. Upon learning that Petitioner had in fact not worked after July 1, 1972, the transfer ballot was forwarded for reasons previously stated by way of "Application for Retirement Acknowledgement Form" dated September 11, 1972. Petitioner was requested to supply certain information to Respondent and by that same form was advised that he might wish to transfer from TRS Plan A to TRS Plan B. By letter dated December 12, 1972, Petitioner was supplied with estimates of retirement benefits showing that his monthly benefits under Plan A would be approximately $129.00 per month and the benefits under Plan E would be approximately $260.00 per month with the caveat that in order to effectuate the transfer to Plan E (an option open to him at that time) it would be necessary for him to pay in approximately $2,550 in contributions. Said contributions were necessary to meet the statutory contribution rates for Plan E if Petitioner desired to become a member of said plan. Section 238.09, Florida Statutes. Petitioner was also notified that he would have to remit $228.47 if he wished to receive retirement credit for a leave of absence utilized by him during school year 1970-1971. Within the next few days i.e., December 15, 1972, Petitioner indicated without question that he intended to remain a member of Plan A and remitted the requested $228.47 in required contributions to receive retirement credit for the above mentioned leave of absence. During a hiatus of a considerable period, adequate medical evidence was provided to Respondent to demonstrate Petitioner's disability and he began receiving monthly benefits under his monthly benefit i.e., Plan A. Thereafter on September 12, 1973, Petitioner inquired of Respondent concerning difference in benefits available under Plan A and Plan E, and possibility of changing from one plan to the other. Respondent answered Petitioner's inquiry by letter dated January 4, 1974, informing him of his previous choice to remain in Plan A. In addition, Respondent informed him that inasmuch as he had chosen not to remit the additional $2,550 necessary to transfer to Plan E in 1972, there were no provisions under the law allowing a change in retirement plans to be made after an employee had elected to retire under another plan. It should be noted that Petitioner had been advised in December of 1972 of all options available to him prior to the time of his retirement and his subsequent choice of Retirement Plan was unequivocally made by him. Again, on May 9, 1974, Petitioner requested that his claim be reevaluated whereupon Respondent replied by letter dated May 20, 1974, advising that Respondent had followed his (Petitioner's) written instructions and had taken the action permitting him to retire under plan A per his request. He was again reminded of the status of the law which did not permit a change in retirement plans. He was reminded that assuming for the sake of argument that his account could be reopened and benefits be computed under the Florida Retirement System, it would be necessary for him too contribute more than $2,200.00 to his account which he had previously elected not to do when given the option. Accordingly, his request for reevaluation was denied by Respondent. Again, by letter dated June 5, 1974, Petitioner requested that he be credited with approximately $2,250.00 that he would have been eligible to receive had he retired under Plan E and requested that said amount be credited to his account in order to facilitate his transfer into Plan E. These requests were denied by Respondent by letter dated June 13, 1974. Thereafter, Petitioner wrote a series of letters to various state officials and agencies including federal agencies requesting reconsideration of Respondent's decision to decline his request to reevaluate his claim that he had not been afforded ample information to assist him in making an informed choice concerning his retirement benefits. Petitioner appeared and testified at the hearing and recalled the series of transactions entered into by him in transferring from the various plans. He testified that he was aware of the difference in benefits or that he became aware of the difference in benefits after he had made the decision to transfer from Plan E to Plan A. He voiced the opinion that he probably could not raise the additional $2,500.00 that would be required assuming that he was given the option of now transferring to Plan E. He indicated that he had received no public assistance and that his large family and the mental problems prevented him from making an intelligent choice at the time he made the election to retire under Plan A. During the hearing, he admitted that he had received full cooperation and assistance from Respondent but that it was his mental condition and other financial problems which hampered his ability to make an intelligent choice based on psychological problems, etc. Based on all the evidence presented in this case, it is clear that the Respondent afforded Petitioner all of the information requested and explained all the options available to him including the differences in the benefits of the various plans and his contributions for retirement in such plans. It is further clear that at each juncture, he was permitted to change his mind about enrolling in various plans when the change could be effectuated within the permissible guidelines under the law. With these facts in mind and inasmuch as there is no provisions in the law which permits a retiree from changing plans after his effective date of retirement, Petitioner's claim that he was wrongfully denied the opportunity to retire or to change his retirement plan to Plan E must fall as being unsubstantiated by the record evidence. I shall therefore recommend that his petition requesting permission to allow him to change from Plan A to Plan E be denied.
Recommendation Based on the above facts and conclusions of law, I recommend than the Petition filed herein requesting permission to retire from Plan A to Plan E be disallowed. DONE and ENTERED this 24th day of August, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Stephen S. Mathues, Esquire Assistant Division Attorney Division of Retirement 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Lawrence L. Black, Esquire 152 8th Avenue, Southwest Largo, Florida 33540 Robert L. Wonsick 6260 Second Avenue, South St. Petersburg, Florida 33707
The Issue The issue is whether the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, correctly excluded Petitioner from participation in the Florida Retirement System from August 18, 1995, through November 17, 1996.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was hired by Dixie County on August 18, 1995, to work the roll-off site in Jena, Dixie County, Florida. At the time of his hiring, Petitioner's position was described as "Temporary Roll-Off Site Fill In." A roll-off site is where people take their garbage which is then transferred to the main facility for disposal. A "Temporary Roll-Off Site Fill In" is defined as someone who is called to work as needed. According to the Dixie County Payroll Records, Petitioner was employed as a "Temporary Roll-Off Site Fill In" from August 19, 1995, until November 18, 1996, when he became a "Part-Time Fill In Roll-Off" with an 80-hour biweekly schedule, until a permanent position could be filled. In July 1998, Petitioner's position became classified as permanent and his position description was changed to "Full Time Roll-Off Site." Testimony from Howard Reid, the road superintendent who was Petitioner's supervisor at the Jena roll-off site during the time period of August 18, 1995, to November 17, 1996, was that Petitioner was employed to fill the full-time position of Houston O. ("Hugh") Markham who had been fired from his employment with Dixie County in August 1995. Mr. Reid testified that Petitioner was employed in a regularly established position during this time period. No documentation was produced to substantiate the claim that Petitioner worked in a regularly established position from August 18, 1995, to November 17, 1996. Respondent's records show that Houston O. Markham was employed by Dixie County during the period of August 18, 1995, to November 17, 1996. Houston Markham was paid by Dixie County until December 1, 1996. December 1, 1996 is the pay date for the period beginning November 18, 1996. Based upon the payroll records, Petitioner began working 80 hours, biweekly, on November 18, 1996. This date coincides with Respondent's records for the last pay date of Houston Markham. The only time records in evidence for Petitioner are for the time period of November 3, 1996, to July 26, 1998. For the pay date of November 3, 1996, Petitioner was paid for 42 hours of work. For the pay date of November 17, 1996, Petitioner was paid for 53 hours of work. Thereafter, for the next 43 pay periods, Petitioner was paid for 80 hours of work biweekly (with one exception, the pay date of July 13, 1997, for which he was paid 76 hours). Petitioner's other witnesses, Joseph Ruth and Arthur Bellot, were not in a supervisory position over Petitioner from August 18, 1995, to November 17, 1996, and could not attest to Petitioner's employment during that time. Membership in the Florida Retirement System is compulsory for any person who fills a regularly established position, as defined by statute. A person filling a temporary position, as defined by statute, is not eligible to participate in the FRS. The agency would not report the temporary employee's work to Respondent. The first time Dixie County ever reported Petitioner for retirement purposes was in January 1998. After review, Respondent found that Petitioner was eligible to participate in the FRS effective November 18, 1996, based upon a Payroll Change Notice from Dixie County. The number of hours a state employee works is not dispositive of the issue of whether he or she is an employee in a regularly established position. An employee who works only two days a week, for example, would be a participant in the FRS if employed in a regularly established position. Based upon the documentation in its possession, Respondent enrolled Petitioner in the FRS effective November 18, 1996. Respondent requested that Petitioner submit tax documentation to demonstrate that he had worked full-time for Dixie County during the August 18, 1995, to November 17, 1996, period, as he claimed. Respondent submitted no documentation to support his claim to have been either a full-time employee or an employee in a regularly established position.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED that the Division of Retirement enter a Final Order denying Petitioner's request for participation in the Florida Retirement System for the period of August 18, 1995, through November 17, 1996. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of November, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT S. COHEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of November, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Spencer Kraemer, Assistant General Counsel Department of Management Services Office of the General Counsel 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 260 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Joseph Lander, Esquire Lander & Lander, Attorneys at Law Post Office Box 2007 Cross City, Florida 32628 Sarabeth Snuggs, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Alberto Dominguez, General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560
The Issue Whether Petitioner, by pleading no contest to four counts of petit theft, in violation of Section 812.014(2)(e), Florida Statutes, despite steadfastly maintaining her innocence, must forfeit her rights and benefits under the Florida Retirement System, pursuant to Section 112.3173, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Division of Retirement is charged with the responsibility of managing, governing, and administering the Florida Retirement System (FRS) on behalf of the Department of Management Services. (Joint Stipulation of Fact 1.) FRS is a public retirement system as defined by Florida law. As such, Respondent had deemed its action regarding the forfeiture of Petitioner's rights and benefits under FRS subject to administrative review. (Joint Stipulation of Fact 2.) Petitioner is a senior management service class member of FRS. (Joint Stipulation of Fact 3.) At all times material to the allegations of this case, Petitioner was employed by the Town of Callahan as a planning and zoning administrator. (Joint Stipulation of Fact 4.) On or about August 23, 2005, the State Attorney for the Fourth Judicial Circuit, through an assistant, filed a Third Amended Information charging Petitioner with (a) one (1) count of grand theft, contrary to the provisions of Section 812.014(2)(c), Florida Statutes; (b) two (2) counts of grand theft, contrary to the provisions of Section 812.014(2)(b)1., Florida Statutes; (c) nineteen (19) counts of official misconduct, contrary to the provisions of Section 839.25(1), Florida Statutes; and (d) one (1) count of petit theft, contrary to the provisions of Section 812.014(2)(e), Florida Statutes. (Joint Stipulation of Fact 5.) The events that formed the basis for the Third Amended Information occurred during Petitioner's tenure as an employee of the Town of Callahan. (Joint Stipulation of Fact 6.) The Third Amended Information outlines the violations to which Petitioner pled no contest and provides, in pertinent part, as follows: COUNT 1: BARBARA F. BOONE on or between May 10, 2001 and January 31, 2002, in the County of Nassau and the State of Florida, did knowingly obtain or use or endeavor to obtain or use U.S. currency or gasoline, the value of $300.00 or more but less than $20,000.00, the property of the TOWN OF CALLAHAN, with intent to either temporarily or permanently deprive THE TOWN OF CALLAHAN of a right to the property or benefits therefrom, or with the intent to appropriate the property to her own use or to the use of any person not entitled thereto . . . COUNT 2: BARBARA F. BOONE on or between October 1, 1999 and September 30, 2002, in the County of Nassau and the State of Florida, did knowingly obtain or use or endeavor to obtain or use U.S. currency, the value of $20,000.00 or more but less than $100,000.00, the property of THE TOWN OF CALLAHAN received in accordance with El Nino Community Development Block Grant 00DB-6M- 04-55-02-G16, with intent to either temporarily or permanently deprive THE TOWN OF CALLAHAN of a right to the property or benefit therefrom, or with the intent to appropriate the property to her own use or the use of any person not entitled thereto . . . COUNT 3: BARBARA F. BOONE on or between October 1, 1999 and September 30, 2002, in the County of Nassau and the State of Florida, did knowingly obtain or use or endeavor to obtain or use U.S. currency, the value of $20,000.00 or more but less than $100,000.00, the property of THE TOWN OF CALLAHAN received in accordance with Housing Rehabilitation Community Development Block Grant 00DB-6B-04-055-02-H09, with intent to either temporarily or permanently deprive THE TOWN OF CALLAHAN of a right to the property or benefit therefrom, or with the intent to appropriate the property to her own use or to the use of any person not entitled thereto . . . * * * COUNT 23: BARBARA F. BOONE on or between October 1, 2000 and January 31, 2002, in the County of Nassau and the State of Florida, did knowingly obtain or use, or endeavor to obtain or use U.S. currency or cellular phone service, valued at One-Hundred Dollars ($100.00) or more but less than Three- Hundred Dollars ($300.00), the property of THE TOWN OF CALLAHAN, with intent to, either temporarily or permanently deprive THE TOWN OF CALLAHAN of a right to the property or benefit therefrom, or with the intent to appropriate the property to her own use or to the use of any person not entitled thereto . . . (Joint Stipulation of Fact 9.) Count 1 related to alleged misuse of a City gasoline credit card. Count 2 related to alleged dual billing of hours for the El Nino Block Grant. Count 3 related to alleged dual billing of hours for the HUD Block Grant. Count 23 related to alleged misuse of a City cell phone. (Exhibit 4: Circuit Court Hearing Transcript, pages 10-12.) Petitioner had filed a civil action against the City concerning all these issues before she was charged with them as crimes. (Exhibit 9: Informal Hearing Transcript, page 13.) On or about March 7, 2006, Petitioner entered a plea agreement with the State of Florida, wherein she acknowledged she would plead no contest (nolo contendere), while maintaining her innocence, to the "lesser included" offense of petit theft contained in Counts 1, 2, 3 and 23 of the Third Amended Information. The agreement provided, however, that Counts 1, 2, and 3 would be reduced to the lesser-included misdemeanor counts of petit theft, in violation of the provisions of Section 812.014(2)(e), Florida Statutes, and Counts 4 through 22 would be dismissed. (Joint Stipulation of Fact 7.) The first sentence of the plea agreement reads as follows: I hereby enter my plea of no contest for the reason it is in my best interest although I maintain my innocence. (Joint Stipulation of Fact 8.) On or about March 7, 2006, Petitioner pled no contest in accordance with the terms of the plea agreement. (Joint Stipulation of Fact 10.) During the plea dialogue, which included inquiry by the circuit judge taking the plea to ascertain if the accused understood the charges and was entering the plea voluntarily, Petitioner articulated that she was innocent of all charges. (Exhibit 4: Circuit Court Hearing Transcript, pages 5-13.) In accepting a nolo contendere plea and its concomitant plea agreement, a circuit judge is required to inquire and determine if there is a "factual basis" for the charges. To those types of questions at Petitioner’s plea dialogue Petitioner's counsel replied: . . . just for our purposes we do not agree that any of those facts are true, but we do agree, if they were true they would constitute a sufficient factual basis. (Exhibit 4: Circuit Court Hearing Transcript, pages 12-13.) The circuit judge then stated on the record: The Court finds that there is sufficient factual basis to support the pleas, and that the pleas have been entered into freely, willingly, and voluntarily. (Exhibit 4: Circuit Court Transcript, page 13.) Judge Robert Foster, Circuit Court Judge in the Circuit Court of the Fourth Judicial Circuit, in and for Nassau County, Florida, ordered that adjudication of guilt be withheld for good cause shown. Petitioner was ordered to pay $8,260 in restitution to the Town of Callahan and $386.00 in court costs. (Joint Stipulation of Fact 11.) The state attorney then entered a Code 30 nolle prosequi in accordance with the plea agreement. (Exhibit 4: Circuit Court Hearing Transcript, page 13.) On or about August 17, 2006, Respondent received from its legal counsel a report recommending that Petitioner's FRS rights and benefits be forfeited pursuant to Section 112.3173, Florida Statutes. (Joint Stipulation of Fact 12.) On August 21, 2006, Respondent approved the forfeiture of Petitioner's FRS rights and benefits pursuant to Section 112.3173, Florida Statutes. (Joint Stipulation of Fact 13.) On August 28, 2006, Respondent notified Petitioner, by agency action letter, of the forfeiture of her FRS rights and benefits and afforded Petitioner a point of entry to challenge its decision and to request an administrative review of the issues. (Joint Stipulation of Fact 14.) The Agency conducted an informal proceeding on or about February 19, 2007. At that hearing, Petitioner maintained, under oath, her innocence with regard to all criminal charges that had been alleged against her, including those to which she had pled "no contest." She further testified that she was not guilty on all counts and had pled "no contest" to some of the criminal charges because the stress of the criminal process had been taking a toll on her and her family. The stress on Petitioner was exacerbated by a mastectomy and her subsequent treatment for breast cancer conducted during the pendency of the criminal proceeding, the plea bargaining, and the plea itself. (Exhibit 9: Informal Hearing Transcript, pages 10-14.) After the informal proceeding, the cause was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings for proceedings consistent with Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. Herein, Respondent presented no evidence refuting Petitioner's testimony and no evidence of her guilt in relation to the charges to which she had pled nolo contendere.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency enter a final order determining that Petitioner’s rights and benefits under the Florida Retirement System have not been forfeited and reinstituting those benefits. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of July, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of July, 2007.
The Issue The issue in this proceeding is whether Petitioner was convicted of specified criminal offenses, requiring the forfeiture of all his rights and benefits under the Florida Retirement System, except for the return of accumulated contributions.
Findings Of Fact From 1999 until 2017, Bautista was an employee of the Miami-Dade County Public Schools (“MDPS”). On August 24, 2017, Bautista resigned from his position as principal of the Miami Jackson Adult Education Center, an office he had held since 2011. Bautista departed shortly after being arrested on charges of organized fraud, official misconduct, and grand theft. In the criminal Information leading to Bautista’s arrest, the State Attorney of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit alleged, in summary, that Bautista had used his position as principal to misappropriate between $20,000.00 and $50,000.00 of MDPS’s funds for personal expenses, and had destroyed official payroll records to cover his tracks. On or about July 10, 2019, Bautista pleaded nolo contendere in the Eleventh Judicial Circuit Court to one count of official misconduct, a felony of the third degree pursuant to section 838.022, Florida Statutes, and to one count of grand theft under section 812.014, Florida Statutes, also a third- degree felony. The court withheld adjudication of guilt and placed Bautista on community control, to be followed by probation. In addition, Bautista was ordered to pay restitution to MDPS in the amount of $41,798.22. SBA is an agency of the state of Florida whose jurisdiction includes the administration of the Florida Retirement System Investment Plan (the “Plan”). By letter dated August 14, 2019, SBA notified Bautista that his rights and benefits under the Plan are forfeit as a result of his pleas of no contest to the aforementioned criminal charges, which had arisen from acts allegedly committed by Bautista as an MDPS employee. SBA offered Bautista an opportunity to request a formal administrative proceeding to contest the determination, and Bautista timely requested a hearing. As grounds for opposing the forfeiture, Bautista claims that his former employer, MDPS, failed to provide him due process of law during the run-up to his forced resignation. He complains, as well, that “procedural irregularities” in the criminal prosecution likewise deprived him of due process. Next, Bautista notes that he never admitted guilt and insists that he is, in fact, innocent of the charges to which he pleaded no contest. Finally, Bautista argues that he was not “convicted” for purposes of forfeiture of retirement benefits, because the court withheld adjudication of guilt on the criminal charges against him. To be sure, if Bautista was not afforded due process or was otherwise victimized by prosecutorial abuse or inadequate legal representation, as he alleges, then Bautista might have suffered an injury for which the law affords redress. But this proceeding is not the vehicle, and DOAH is not the forum, for hearing such disputes. It does not minimize the seriousness of Bautista’s allegations to recognize that, even if true, none of them changes the undisputed facts that he pleaded nolo contendere to the crimes of official misconduct and grand theft, each of which is a “specified offense” under section 112.3173(2)(e), Florida Statutes. Conviction of a specified offense results in the forfeiture of retirement benefits pursuant to the plain language of section 112.3173(3).1 Thus, the MDPS investigation and any “irregularities” in the criminal prosecution are irrelevant to the issues at hand, and the undersigned declines to make findings of fact concerning Bautista’s allegations in this regard.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the State Board of Administration enter a final order determining that Joey Bautista forfeited all his rights and benefits under the Plan, except for the return of any accumulated contributions, when he pleaded nolo contendere to “specified offenses” committed prior to his retirement from public service. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of December, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of December, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Soeurette Michel, Esquire The Michel Law Firm, LLC Post Office Box 245131 Pembroke Pines, Florida 33024 (eServed) Rex D. Ware, Esquire Moffa, Sutton & Donnini, P.A. 3500 Financial Plaza, Suite 330 Tallahassee, Florida 32312 (eServed) Jonathon W. Taylor, Esquire Moffa, Sutton & Donnini, P.A. Trade Center South, Suite 930 100 West Cypress Creek Road Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33309 (eServed) Ash Williams, Executive Director and Chief Investment Officer State Board of Administration 1801 Hermitage Boulevard, Suite 100 Post Office Box 13300 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-3300
The Issue The issue in this case is whether James B. Anderson, a deceased retiree in the Florida Retirement System Pension Plan, selected Option 1 (maximum retiree’s monthly benefit without any spousal benefit after death of the retiree) or Option 3 (a reduced retiree’s monthly benefit with continued spousal benefit after death of the retiree).
Findings Of Fact On June 30, 2007, the named Petitioner, James B. Anderson, terminated his employment with the University of South Florida (USF) at the age of 69 years and 9 months. At the time, his tenure at USF spanned 27 years and entitled him to receive pension benefits under the Florida State Retirement System Pension Plan. Also on June 30, 2007, Mr. Anderson completed an application for retirement. By applying Mr. Anderson, who was USF’s Director of Insurance and Risk Management, acknowledged that he would not be able to add service, change options, change his type of retirement (regular, disability, and early) or elect the Investment Plan once his retirement became final, which would be when he cashed or deposited any benefit payment. Also on July 2, 2007, Mr. Anderson and his wife, Mitzi Anderson, executed a Statutory Official Form FRS 110 before a notary public. By doing so, they selected Option 1, which provides the maximum pension benefits to Mr. Anderson until his death and no pension benefits to his wife after his death. The form stated clearly, in bold print, that Option 1 did not provide a continuing benefit after Mr. Anderson’s death and that the selection of Option 1 would be final when Mr. Anderson cashed or deposited any benefit payment. The next day, Mr. Anderson faxed the executed form to the Division of Retirement, which mailed Mr. Anderson an acknowledgement of receipt of the executed form. The acknowledgement included a clear statement, in bold print, that Mr. Anderson would not be able to change his benefit option selection after retirement and that his retirement would become final when he cashed or deposited any benefit payment. Mr. Anderson had second thoughts about his benefit option selection and contacted Donna Pepper, a retirement specialist employed by USF, to discuss changing to Option 3, which would give him a reduced pension benefit that would continue and be paid to his wife after his death. On July 6, 2007, Ms. Pepper sent an email to Mr. Anderson stating: “Here is another option selection form so that you can change your option.” The email attached a blank Statutory Official Form FRS 110. Ms. Pepper’s email also stated: “As we discussed, you may want to indicate that this form should supersede the previously submitted form.” It also advised the Petitioner to keep a copy for his records and send the original to the Division of Retirement as soon as possible. On July 20, 2007, at 12:53 p.m., a comment was entered on the Integrated Retirement Information System (IRIS) telephone log, documenting that Mr. Anderson was considering changing his benefit option selection and would “either FAX a form with a change of option on it or call to let them know he would not make the change.” The comment also documented that Jan Steller in retirement payroll was asked to hold Mr. Anderson’s first check until “this is resolved.” Later the same day, at 2:30 p.m., another comment was added to document that Mr. Anderson had called back to say he had decided to stay with Option 1 and that Jan Steller had been called back and asked “to release his check.” On July 31, 2007, an initial pension check was sent to Mr. Anderson in the amount of $4,188.45, in accordance with his selection of benefit Option 1, which was about $1,200 more than it would be under Option 3. This check was not immediately cashed. On August 31, 2007, a second Option 1 pension check in the same amount was sent to Mr. Anderson. On September 4, 2007, Mr. Anderson deposited the first two benefit checks into his Bank of America account. He continued to receive and cash or deposit monthly Option 1 benefit checks through January 2015. Mr. Anderson died on February 14, 2015. His wife notified the Division of Retirement, which stopped benefit payments in accordance with Mr. Anderson’s Option 1 selection. In March 2015, Mrs. Anderson found among her husband’s papers a copy of an executed Form FRS 110 that selected Option 3. Notwithstanding the telephonic communications with the Division of Retirement on July 20, 2007, the executed form indicates that it was notarized on July 23, 2007. Included in handwriting at the bottom of the executed form was the language, as suggested by Ms. Pepper: “This option supersedes option dated 7-02-07.” Mrs. Anderson also found a copy of Donna Pepper’s e-mail dated July 6, 2007, with instructions on how to change the selection of pension payments. Mrs. Anderson sent copies to the Division of Retirement and requested Option 3 spousal benefit payments. The Division of Retirement denied Mrs. Anderson’s request because it did not receive an Option 3 benefit selection before the copy Mrs. Anderson sent in March 2015. There was no evidence that the form was sent to the Division of Retirement before then. This, together with the fact that Mr. Anderson received and cashed or deposited seven and a half years’ worth of monthly Option 1 benefit checks, which were each over $1,200 more than the Option 3 benefit would have been, support a finding that Mr. Anderson actually selected Option 1 and never switched to Option 3. It is not clear from the evidence why Mr. Anderson kept a copy of an executed change from Option 1 to Option 3 after deciding not to send it to the Division of Retirement.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, enter a final order finding that Mr. Anderson selected benefit Option 1, finally and irrevocably and that Mrs. Anderson is not entitled to Option 3 spousal benefits. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of January, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of January, 2016. COPIES FURNISHED: Nicholas E. Karatinos, Esquire Law Office of Karatinos Suite 101 18920 North Dale Mabry Highway Lutz, Florida 33540 (eServed) Joe Thompson, Esquire Department of Management Services Suite 160 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) Dan Drake, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Post Office Box 9000 Tallahassee, Florida 32315-9000 (eServed) J. Andrew Atkinson, General Counsel Office of the General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Ste. 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 (eServed)
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, John F. Morack, is a member of the Teachers Retirement System (TRS). The TRS is administered by respondent, Department of Administration, Division of Retirement (Division). On April 18, 1988, petitioner began working for a new employer and concurrently filled out an application form to enroll in the Florida Retirement System (FRS), a plan also administered by the Division. By letter dated June 27, 1988, the Division, through its chief of bureau of enrollment and contributions, Tom F. Wooten, denied the request on the ground Morack failed to qualify for such a transfer. Dissatisfied with the agency's decision, Morack initiated this proceeding. Petitioner first enrolled in the TRS on September 18, 1970, when he began employment as a dean at Broward Community College. At that time, he had no option to enroll in any retirement program except the TRS. Under the TRS, an employee did not have to make contributions to social security and earned "points" for calculating retirement benefits at a rate of 2% for each year of creditable service. In contrast, under the FRS, which was established in late 1970, members earned benefits at a rate of only 1.6% per year but were participants in the social security program. Finally, a TRS member could not purchase credit for wartime military service unless he was an employee at the time he entered the military service and was merely on a leave of absence. On the other hand, an FRS member could purchase credit for military service after ten years of creditable service as long as such military service occurred during wartime. When the FRS was established in late 1970, members of the TRS were given the option of transferring to the newly created FRS or remaining on TRS. Morack executed a ballot on October 15, 1970 expressing his desire to remain on the TRS. In November 1974, the Division offered all TRS members an open enrollment period to change from TRS to FRS. Morack elected again to remain on the TRS. In the latter part of 1978, the Division offered TRS members a second open enrollment period to switch retirement systems. On November 21, 1978, Morack declined to accept this offer. On January 1, 1979 Morack accepted employment with the Department of Education (DOE) in Tallahassee but continued his membership in the TRS. He remained with the DOE until July 1981 when he accepted a position in the State of Texas. However, because Morack intended to eventually return to Florida, he left his contributions in the fund. Approximately two years later, petitioner returned to Florida and accepted a position at Florida Atlantic University (FAU) in Boca Raton as assistant vice president effective July 11, 1983. About the same time, he prepared the following letter on a FAU letterhead. To Whom it May Concern: This is to indicate that I elect remaining in TRS rather than FRS. (Signature) John F. Morack The letter was received by the Division on July 19, 1983, and the enrollment form was processed on November 2, 1983. Although Morack stated that he was told by an FAU official that he could not transfer plans at that time, there is no competent evidence of record to support this claim since the testimony is hearsay in nature. On November 18, 1985, Morack requested the Division to audit his account for the purpose of determining how much it would cost to purchase his Korean War military service. On January 24, 1986, the Division advised Morack by memorandum that because he had "no membership time prior to (his) military service, that service is not creditable under the provisions of the Teachers' Retirement System." During the next two years Morack requested two audits on his account to determine retirement benefits assuming a termination of employment on July 31, 1987 and June 30, 1988, respectively. On April 14, 1988, Morack ended his employment with FAU and began working on April 18, 1988, or four days later, at Palm Beach Junior College (PBJC) as construction manager for the performing arts center. When he began working at PBJC he executed Division Form M10 and reflected his desire to be enrolled in the FRS. As noted earlier, this request was denied, and Morack remains in the TRS. The denial was based on a Division rule that requires at least a thirty day break in service with the state in order to change retirement plans after returning to state employment. Because Morack's break in service was only four days, he did not meet the requirement of the rule. At hearing and on deposition, Morack acknowledged he had several earlier opportunities to transfer to the FRS but declined since he never had the benefits of the FRS explained by school personnel. As retirement age crept closer, petitioner began investigating the differences between the TRS and FRS and learned that the latter plan was more beneficial to him. This was because the FRS would allow him to purchase almost four years of military service, a higher base salary would be used to compute benefits, he could participate in social security, and there would be no social security offset against his retirement benefits. Also, petitioner complained that school personnel were not well versed in retirement plans and either were unaware of alternative options or failed to adequately explain them. As an example, Morack points out that when he returned from Texas in 1983 he was not told by FAU personnel about the change in the law now codified as subsection 121.051(1)(c). Finally he thinks it unfair that the Division counts four days employment in a month as a full month's creditable service for computing benefits but will not count his four days break in service in April 1988 as a full month for computing the time between jobs.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that petitioner's request to change retirement plans be DENIED. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of November, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of November, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 88-4183 Respondent: 1. Covered in finding of fact 6. 2-4. Covered in finding of fact 7. 5. Covered in finding of fact 10. 6-7. Covered in finding of fact 11. Covered in findings of fact 8 and 11. Covered in findings of fact 1 and 10. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. John F. Morack 10474 Green Trail Drive Boynton Beach, Florida 33436 Stanley M. Danek, Esquire 440 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Andrew J. McMullian, III State Retirement Director Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Adis Maria Vila Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Augustus D. Aikens, Jr., Esquire general Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Ida L. Salz, began her employment as a classroom teacher in 1942 with the Central Institute for the Deaf in St. Louis, Missouri. The Central Institute for the Deaf is a private, non-profit agency and has been such ever since its beginning in 1914. Mrs. Salz worked for the institute as a classroom teacher for eight (8) years. She moved to Florida in 1954 and began employment with the public schools in January, 1955, at which time she also became a member of the Teachers' Retirement System. When she started her employment with the Dade County School System, she completed an enrollment application form which is required of all teachers in the public school systems of Florida. The purpose of the enrollment form was to identify the member, to provide beneficiary designation, to establish the beginning date of employment and the beginning date of membership in the Teachers' Retirement System. In 1966, she inquired of the (then) Teachers' Retirement System regarding her right to purchase credit for the eight (8) years of out-of-state teaching service from Missouri. She was informed shortly thereafter by the Teachers' Retirement System (Mr. B. M. Kelley) that she would be allowed to purchase eight (8) years of credit for hem Missouri teaching time. The Petitioner received a letter from Mr. B. M. Kelley employed by the Respondent, in September 2, 1966, stating that she could make periodic personal remittances to the Teachers' Retirement System in any amount she desired. She made periodic payments to the Teachers' Retirement System and on November 28, 1977, made the final payment of the amount due to the Teachers' Retirement System representing the eight (8) years prior service credit which she was purchasing. The Petitioner retired on June 15, 1981. She thereupon made application to the Respondent for retirement benefits. The Petitioner is sixty- four (64) years of age and has been a classroom teacher since 1942. The Petitioner's husband had previously retired on April 1, 1979,and is now sixty- seven (67) years old. The Petitioner's and her husband's retirement plans were based upon their belief that her retirement benefits would be computed based upon credit for the eight (8) years out-of-state Missouri service. The Petitioner would not have retired in July of 1981 had she not been in the belief, since 1966, that she would receive credit for her eight (8) years of out-of-state service. She relied on the Division of Retirement's representation in 1966 that she would have credit for those eight (8) years out-of-state service and had computed her expected retirement benefits and personal budget based on this information. Had the Petitioner known that after her retirement benefits resulting from the eight (8) years out-of-state service would be denied, she would not have retired, since the income so generated is insufficient to adequately support her and her husband. Upon receipt of the Petitioner's retirement application by the Division, the Bureau of Retirement Calculation reviewed the Petitioner's file for compliance with the statute and appropriate rules and regulations. It determined that the eight (8) years out-of-state service was not creditable because it was in a private school. The Respondent took the position that the so-called approval given the Petitioner in 1966 to purchase the service time related to her private school teaching was a "clerical error or a oversight" by the division. In a letter of August 3, 1981, Mr. A. J. McMullian, III, Director of the division, advised the Petitioner that the out-of-state service had been erroneously allowed to her, that the contribution she had paid for it would be returned, and that she would not get retirement credit for those eight (8) years. The personnel of the Teachers' Retirement System (later the Division of Retirement) are unilaterally responsible for the investigation in 1966, which led to their determination at that time that the Petitioner was entitled to the eight (8) years out- of-state service. The Petitioner had no influence in making this determination, but has relied on it in making her retirement plans during the years from 1966 through 1981. Sometime after the Petitioner started employment in the Dade County School System, the Division of Retirements' sent a form. to the Central Institute for the Deaf in St. Louis and, either personnel of that institute or of `a state agency of Missouri, completed the form and returned it to the Division of Retirement. The form certifies that the Petitioner was employed in the school, Central Institute for the Deaf in St. Louis, Missouri, from September 1, 1940 to June, 1948. The word in the form, "public", which appears before "schools" on the form was crossed out by either the Central Institute personnel or an employee of the Missouri State Government who completed the form. Thus, the Respondent's official who read the form and made the decision that the Petitioner was entitled to eight (8) years of out-of-state service was on notice that the out-of-state service was performed at a private institution rather than a public school. The parties stipulated that the Central Institute for the Deaf in St. Louis, Missouri, is a private, non-profit school and not a public school and that their interpretation of the statute quoted below is that out-of-state service in private schools is not creditable. The Petitioner contends, however, that inasmuch as the Petitioner relied, from 1966 through 1981, upon the representation made to her in 1966 that she would be allowed credit for the eight (8) years out-of-state service and planned her retirement and budgeted her retirement income accordingly, that the State Division of Retirement is now estopped to deny her benefits based upon those eight (8) years out-of-state service.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the pleadings and arguments of the parties, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the evidence in the record, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Respondent, the Division of Retirement, issue a Final Order finding that the Petitioner be allowed credit for her out-of-state teaching service, and recompute her retirement benefits from the date of her retirement, allowing her such credit. DONE and ENTERED this 11th day of June, 1982 at Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of June, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: William DuFresne, Esquire Suite 1782, One Biscayne Tower Two South Biscayne Boulevard Miami, Florida 33131 Stanley M. Danek, Esquire Division Attorney Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center 2639 North Monroe Street Suite 207C-Box 81 Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Andrew J. McMullian, III, Director Division of Retirement Building C Cedars Executive Center Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Nevin G. Smith, Secretary Department of Administration The Carl ton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION DIVISION OF RETIREMENT IDA L. SALZ, Petitioner, vs. CASE NO. 81-2487 DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, Respondent. /
