The Issue Whether Respondent has failed to maintain "good moral character," as alleged in the Administrative Complaint issued against her, and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken against her.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: It is undisputed that, as alleged in numbered paragraph 1 of the Administrative Complaint, "Respondent was certified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission on February 12, 1998, and was issued Correctional Certificate Number 178264." At all times material to the instant case, Respondent was employed as a correctional officer at the Broward Correctional Institution (BCI), a correctional facility operated by the Florida Department of Corrections (DOC). While on "full duty" as a correctional officer at BCI, Respondent was "responsible for [the] care, custody, and control of inmates" at the facility. She was not, however, on "full duty," the entire time she was at BCI. In the fall of 2001, while recovering from an eye injury, she was placed on "light duty" and assigned to the BCI mail room, where she did not have any supervisory responsibility over inmates. This "light duty" assignment was less demanding and had a more desirable work schedule compared to her normal "full duty" assignment. At all times material to the instant case, Jennifer Bateman was the environmental health and safety sergeant at BCI "responsible for all Work[ers'] Comp cases" at the facility. On or about September 24, 2001, Respondent reported to Sergeant Bateman that, earlier that month, while working in BCI's main kitchen (carrying out her duties as the facility's "main kitchen officer"), she had suffered an injury to her right eye. After having been told about the incident, Sergeant Bateman filled out and submitted a "first report of injury" form. She also made arrangements for Respondent to see a "Worker[s'] Comp" doctor. Respondent visited the office of Eye Surgery Associates (ESA) to see Kenneth Karp, M.D., on October 1, 2001. The ESA office was "very busy" that day. After seeing Dr. Karp, Respondent went to the check out counter, where Sherry Pendlebury, an ESA employee, was stationed. Respondent asked Ms. Pendlebury for a note concerning her visit with Dr. Karp that day that Respondent could give to her supervisor at work. Ms. Pendlebury "called back and asked for [and received] permission" to give Respondent the "work note" Respondent had requested. After receiving "permission" to write such a note for Respondent, Ms. Pendlebury asked Respondent what Dr. Karp had told her about "return[ing] to work" and whether "there [were] any stipulations." Respondent replied that, "other than light duty, there was nothing and that she could return to work tomorrow." Ms. Pendlebury then wrote the following note on ESA letterhead and signed Dr. Karp's name on the note (First Note) : CERTIFICATE FOR RETURN TO SCHOOL OR WORK Teresa Harden has been under my care from 9- 22-01 to open and is able to return to work on 10-2-01. Limitations/Remarks: Lite Duty The First Note was sent by facsimile transmission by "a Ms. Cummings" to Sergeant Bateman on or about October 10, 2001. Sergeant Bateman was suspicious of the First Note's authenticity. She thought that if the note indeed were one "coming from a doctor's office, 'light' would be spelled the right way." Sergeant Bateman therefore contacted ESA to inquire "as to whether or not [Dr. Karp] truly issued that note." In response to her inquiry, Sergeant Bateman was told that Dr. Karp "had not provided [Respondent] that note and that as of 10-02-01 [Respondent] was released to full duty." On October 11, 2001, Sergeant Bateman received a second note about Respondent's condition on ESA letterhead (Second Note). This Second Note, which was undated, read as follows: CERTIFICATE FOR RETURN TO SCHOOL OR WORK Teresa Harden has been under my care from 9/22/01 to 10/9/01[2] and is able to return to work on 10/2/01. Limitations/Remarks: full duty, no limitations.[3] The Second Note, as did the First Note Sergeant Bateman had received, purported to bear the signature of Dr. Karp, but the note was actually written by Dr. Karp's assistant, Sharon Corbin. On October 12, 2001, the matter was referred to Marilyn Henderson, a Senior Prison Inspector assigned to DOC's Fort Lauderdale field office, to conduct an internal investigation. As part of her investigation, Ms. Henderson obtained from BCI the First Note and the Second Note and, in addition, took sworn statements from Sergeant Bateman and Dr. Karp. In his sworn statement, which was taken on November 30, 2001, Dr. Karp stated the following: I provided Teresa Harden a certificate to return to work at "full duty, no limitations." I did not write "Lite duty." Furthermore, the signature on the form is not in my own handwriting. Ms. Harden was examined in my office on the following dates only: 9/22/01, 9/24/01, 9/25/01, 9/28/01, 10/1/01, and 10/9/01.[4] Ms. Henderson concluded as a result of her investigation that Respondent had "provided a false document to Broward Correctional Institution in reference to her return to duty status."
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission issue a Final Order dismissing the Administrative Complaint issued against Respondent in the instant case. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of June, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of June, 2005.
Findings Of Fact Before 1989, the Petitioner, Gregory Miller, was a community control counselor (in effect, a juvenile probation officer) working for HRS. After several years of satisfactory job performance, his employment was terminated for unsatisfactory job performance in 1989. The Petitioner believes his termination by HRS was unfair. On January 30, 1991, the Petitioner, Gregory Miller, pled nolo contendere to attempted arson in violation of Section Section 806.01, Fla. Stat. (1991). Adjudication was withheld, and the Petitioner was placed on probation for two years. The attempted arson charge arose at a time in October, 1990, when the Petitioner, who has a 20-year history of substance abuse and suffers from bipolar disorder and borderline personality disorder, decompensated under financial and other stress and attempted to burn his automobile in order to fraudulently obtain property and casualty insurance benefits. At the time of the arson attempt, his car was parked in the garage, and a tenant was residing in the garage apartment overhead. The tenant noticed the fire started by the Petitioner, put it out and reported it to the Petitioner. The Petitioner berated him for putting the fire out and told him to get his personal belongings out of the garage apartment and leave. While the tenant was in the garage apartment gathering his belongings, the Petitioner was attempting to restart the fire. The tenant had been a worker's compensation client of the Petitioner. The Petitioner continued to have mental and emotional and substance problems that led to additional criminal charges. On February 13, 1991, he was arrested and charged with battery of a law enforcement officer, a third degree felony. On October 3, 1991, the Petitioner pled guilty to the lesser included offense of resisting arrest without violence, a misdemeanor, and was sentenced to seven days time served in jail. On or about December 22, 1991, the Petitioner overdosed on a mixture of drugs and alcohol in a possible suicide attempt. When confronted with law enforcement officers, the Petitioner struck the officers and was arrested and charged with battery of a law enforcement officer, a third degree felony. The Petitioner was involuntarily committed under the Baker Act, and on September 21, 1992, he pled nolo contendere to simple battery, a first degree misdemeanor, and was sentenced to one day time served in jail and ordered to pay $200 in fine and court costs. As a result of his other criminal charges, the Petitioner was charged with violation of his probation on the attempted arson charge. On or about March 16, 1992, the Petitioner pled guilty to violation of probation. Adjudication on the violation of probation was withheld, but probation was revoked, and he was resentenced under the attempted arson charge to a year of community control, followed by a year of probation. On or about March 8, 1992, the Petitioner was charged with driving with his license suspended or revoked for failure to maintain required insurance coverage. Since 1992, the Petitioner has not been involved in any additional criminal activity or charges. On February 23, 1993, his community control was converted to probation. He moved to Pasco County and, on December 22, 1993, his probation was terminated early. The Petitioner has sought professional counseling. On or about March 22, 1993, he was referred to a vocational rehabilitation counselor with the Department of Labor and Employment Security, Division of Vocational Rehabilitation. Since approximately early 1994, he also has been under the care of a psychiatrist. With the help of counseling, the Petitioner has been sober since before August, 1993. Fortunately, therapy seems to have been successful. Except for two short hospitalizations for decompensation and medication adjustment early in his counseling, the Petitioner has been sober and mentally stable over the course of the last three years. From a mental health standpoint, the Petitioner no longer seemed to be a danger to himself or others, and he was making good progress in rehabilitating himself. On or about May 18, 1995, the Petitioner sought employment with Action Youth Care, a provider on contract with HRS. When he applied for the job, he was required to complete an Affidavit of Good Moral Character that swore, in pertinent part, that he had "not been found guilty of, or entered a plea of nolo contendere or guilty to, any offense prohibited under . . . Section 806.01 [Florida Statutes, arson]." The affidavit also required the Petitioner to "acknowledge the existence of any criminal . . . record regardless of whether [he] was adjudged guilty by the court and regardless of whether or not those records have been sealed or expunged." The Petitioner signed without acknowledging his attempted arson record. When his name was screened, the attempted arson record disqualified him from employment, and the Petitioner was terminated from his employment pending his request for an exemption. Despite the Petitioner's commendable progress in rehabilitating himself, there still are signs that some instability persists. He does not seem to appreciate the seriousness of his criminal record and history of substance abuse and mental illness, as they relate to HRS's statutory obligation to properly assess his moral character under Section 409.175, Fla. Stat. (1995). Instead, he blames HRS's actions on a "political" conspiracy to prevent him from obtaining employment. Similarly, he attempts to excuse his criminal record by blaming it all on HRS--the termination of his employment in 1989 allegedly was the sole cause of his decompensation and the resulting criminal offenses. His excuse for falsifying his Affidavit of Good Moral Character was that it was reasonable not to disclose the arson record because it was only attempted arson, not arson. He does not seem to appreciate that there is little or no difference in blameworthiness between the two. (The only real difference between the two is how soon the fire goes out or is put out.) Finally, the Employee Closing Summary produced by Action Health Care upon termination of the Petitioner's employment stated that Action would not re-hire the Petitioner and that the Petitioner's "weak areas" included: "poor rapport with team"; "would not accept authority"; and "documentation skills." (No "strengths" were noted on the form.) The Petitioner again blamed HRS, contending that the person who completed the form was lying to cooperate with HRS's conspiracy against the Petitioner. It is found that the evidence, taken as a whole, was not clear and convincing proof of rehabilitation and good moral character at this time.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that HRS enter a final order denying the Petitioner's request for an exemption from disqualification. DONE and ENTERED this 21st day of August, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of August, 1996.
The Issue Should the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission (the Commission) impose discipline on Respondent in association with his Correctional Officer Certificate?
Findings Of Fact Having considered Respondent's comment in requesting a formal hearing, it is inferred that Respondent holds a correctional officer's certificate issued by the Commission. On October 28, 2004, Respondent and Misty Quarles were living together in Gainesville, Florida, as a couple. Ms. Quarles describes their relationship as boyfriend and girlfriend. Respondent determined to end the relationship, to include removing Ms. Quarles' name from the lease for the apartment. An argument ensued. Ms. Quarles left the bedroom and went to the bathroom and closed the door. Respondent opened it and started yelling at Ms. Quarles. Respondent was angry. Respondent pushed Ms. Quarles forcefully. She fell to the ground. When Respondent pushed her down, Ms. Quarles hit her head on the and door the impact left a knot on her head. She got up and pushed Respondent back. The argument continued. Respondent pushed Ms. Quarles again and she landed on the bed in the bedroom. Ms. Quarles then began to pack her belongings to leave. Respondent started gathering some of her clothing and other effects to throw in the dumpster outside the apartment. Ms. Quarles knocked those items out of Respondent's hands. Respondent began yelling again and punched Ms. Quarles on her leg while holding her down on the bed. In trying to stop Respondent from punching her, Ms. Quarles used her right hand to resist the Respondent. He pushed against a joint in her hand, causing a right thumb fracture at the base of the first metacarpal. After that, Ms. Quarles asked Respondent to take her for medical treatment. Respondent took Ms. Quarles to North Florida Regional Medical Center where she was observed to have the fracture, together with abrasions on her nose, under her left eye, and a contusion on her right forehead. Her right hand was also swollen. Ms. Quarles received a splint and was told to use ice and employ elevation and rest to deal with her fracture. She was provided pain medication and referred to an orthopedic physician. Petitioner's Exhibit numbered one is a composite exhibit containing a series of photographs depicting Ms. Quarles physical state after her encounter with the Respondent leading to her injuries. Respondent's actions against Ms. Quarles were against her will and intentionally caused bodily harm. Deputy Robert Wesley of the Alachua County Sheriff's Office came to the hospital to investigate. Based upon his investigation, he arrested Respondent for felony domestic battery involving the incident with Ms. Quarles. The disposition of that arrest was not explained at hearing. There is no indication that Respondent has had prior discipline imposed on his correctional officer's certificate.
Recommendation Based upon the consideration of the facts found and the conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered finding violations of the statutes and rules referred to and revoking Respondent's correctional officer's certificate. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of May, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CHARLES C. ADAMS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of May, 2007 COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph S. White, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Curtis Coleman, Jr. Michael Crews, Program Director Division of Criminal Justice Professionalism Services Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Rampage, General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue Whether Petitioner's application for licensure as a "resident public all lines insurance adjuster" should be approved.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: On or about February 27, 1989, a six-count criminal information was filed in Dade County Circuit Court Case No. 89- 4970 against Petitioner. Count I of the information alleged that Petitioner: on the 6th day of February, 1989, in the County [of Dade] and State [of Florida], did unlawfully and feloniously utter and publish as true to and upon DALLY SHUAIB and/or CAMPEAU CORPORATION, doing business as BURDINES, a certain false, forged or counterfeited and printed order or receipt for delivery or merchandise commonly known as a CREDIT CARD RECEIPT or RECORD OF CHARGE, upon which credit card receipt or record of charge the defendant or a person whose name or identity is to the State Attorney unknown, did forge the signature of MICHAEL YAMAGUCHI, thereon, with the intent thereby to injure of defraud MICHAEL YAMAGUCHI and/or DALLY SHARUIB and/or CAMPEAU CORPORATION, doing business as BURDINES or other person or persons whose name or names and identity are to the State Attorney unknown, the defendant at the said time and place well knowing that the said credit card receipt or record of charge was false and forged aforesaid, in violation of 831.02 Florida Statutes, contrary to the form of the Statute in such cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Florida. Count II of the information alleged that Petitioner: on the 6th day of February, 1989, in the County [of Dade] and State [of Florida], did unlawfully and feloniously with intent to defraud CAMPEAU CORPORATION, doing business as BURDINES and/or MICHAEL YAMAGUCHI use for the purpose of obtaining goods, to wit: CLOTHING a credit card which he knows is stolen by representing without the consent of the card holder that he is the holder of the specified card, and such card has not in fact been issued, in violation of 817.61 Florida Statutes, contrary to the form of the Statute in such cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Florida. Count III through VI of the information each alleged that Petitioner: on the 6th day of February, 1989, in the County [of Dade] and State [of Florida], having received a credit card, property of MICHAEL YAMAGUCHI, as owner and custodian, which he knew had been lost, mislaid, or delivered under a mistake as to the identity or address of the cardholder, did then and there unlawfully retain possession of said credit card, with intent to use it, to sell it, or to transfer it to a person other than the issuer or the cardholder, in violation of 817.60 Florida Statutes, contrary to the form of the Statute in such cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Florida. On April 17, 1989, Petitioner entered a plea of nolo contendere to all six counts of the information (1989 Plea). Adjudication of guilt was withheld, and he was placed on probation for one year. On or about March 31, 2000, a one-count criminal information was filed in Miami-Dade County Circuit Court Case No. F00-8233, alleging that Petitioner: on or about MARCH 1, 2000, in the County [of Miami-Dade] and State [of Florida], did unlawfully, willfully, and knowingly inflict physical injury upon a child, to wit: A. C. (A MINOR), without causing great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement to said child, by SLAPPING C. (A MINOR) IN THE FACE, in violation of s. 827.03(1), Fla. Stat., contrary to the form of the Statute in such cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Florida. On July 17, 2000, Petitioner entered a plea of nolo contendere to the charge (2000 Plea). Adjudication of guilt was withheld, and he was placed on 18 months' probation.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department issue a final order denying Petitioner's application for licensure. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of April, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of April, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael Armin Toro 490 Southwest 101st Terrace Plantation, Florida 33324 Dean Andrews, Esquire Department of Insurance Division of Legal Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Honorable Tom Gallagher Chief Financial Officer The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Carlos G. Muniz, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue The issue presented is whether Respondent is guilty of the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaint filed against him, and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken against him, if any.
Findings Of Fact Respondent was certified by the Commission as a correctional officer on October 1, 1987, and was issued correctional certificate numbered 83658. Respondent has been employed since that time by the Miami-Dade Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, assigned to the Turner Guilford Knight Correctional Institute, the stockade. He is also certified by the Commission as an instructor and has taught at the Academy. Respondent is a very professional, "by-the-book" correctional officer. He is considered by his supervisors to be an excellent correctional officer who performs his job efficiently. He has received numerous commendations while at the Department, including a humanitarian award and the Department's monthly recognition award. His annual evaluations rate him consistently above satisfactory or outstanding but for some need for improvement in attendance. January 28, 1994, was Respondent's birthday. He and Pamela Gray, the woman with whom Respondent then lived, walked on the beach together and then went to Denny's Restaurant. While there, they encountered three young women whose car had been stolen while they were inside Denny's. Respondent offered them a ride home, and they accepted. Respondent, in Gray's car, and Gray drove the women to Hamlet Estates Apartments and entered through the security gate. Once inside the complex, Respondent and Gray were walking the women to their apartment when they saw a juvenile walking around looking in the recreation room. They commented to each other that it was too late for a child that age to be out. Since it was after 3:00 a.m., Respondent and the others approached the juvenile who appeared to be 10 to 12 years old. Respondent asked him why he was out at that time of the morning, and the juvenile said he lived there. Respondent asked him which apartment he lived in, and the juvenile stated an apartment number. The young women with Respondent and Gray advised that the apartment complex used letters, not numbers, on the apartments there. Respondent asked the juvenile to show Respondent where he lived, and Respondent and the boy walked off together. The boy was unable to identify an apartment where he lived. The boy was also evasive about his name and telephone number. Respondent and the juvenile returned to where Gray was waiting for them. The young women went to their apartment, and Respondent and Gray drove the juvenile to the security guard booth at the entrance to the complex. Gray waited in the car, while Respondent and the juvenile walked over to the booth and spoke to the security guard. Respondent identified himself to security guard Marvel Williams as Officer Ford and showed her his correctional officer badge. Respondent asked Williams if the juvenile lived there, and she confirmed that he did not. Respondent used the telephone to call the telephone number the juvenile told him was his parents' telephone number, but the number was disconnected. Respondent was concerned about leaving the juvenile at the complex where the juvenile had no right to be. He was concerned that something might happen to the child or that the child might be intending wrongdoing. Respondent then called the Miami-Dade Police Department precinct nearby and requested that a patrol car be sent to pick up the juvenile and take him home. Respondent was told that no unit was available to come there. Respondent then decided that he would drive the juvenile to the precinct and leave him there until the police could take him home. He told the juvenile to come with him, and they walked over to Gray's car. Respondent opened the back door, and the juvenile got in. Respondent then got in the car and drove out of the complex. Because the security guard had some concern about a child going somewhere with a stranger, she copied down Respondent's license number and a description of the vehicle as Respondent exited the complex. She then pushed the redial button on the telephone to verify that Respondent had in fact called the police and discovered that he had. She then wrote an incident report describing what had happened. When Respondent arrived at Station 6, he, Gray, and the juvenile went inside. Respondent and the juvenile approached the desk officer, and Gray sat down in the waiting area. Respondent introduced himself as Officer Ford and showed the police officer his correctional officer badge and identification. He then told the police officer what had transpired and requested that the police take the juvenile home. At the request of the police officer, Respondent wrote down his name, his badge number, his identification number, and his beeper number. The desk officer then buzzed the door to the back area to unlock it and allow Respondent and the juvenile to enter the back area of the station. Respondent held the door for the desk officer and the juvenile, and the juvenile walked into the back area. Respondent told the desk officer that he was tired and was going home. He then walked out of the station, and he and Gray drove home. The desk officer did not try to stop Respondent from leaving. Not knowing what to do next, the desk officer contacted his supervisor, asking him to come to the station to deal with the juvenile. When his supervisor arrived, he described what had happened. In doing so, he told his supervisor that Respondent was an off-duty police officer. This erroneous assumption arose from the fact that Miami-Dade police officer badges and correctional officer badges look alike, but for the wording across the top of the badge. The desk officer's supervisor called Respondent's beeper, and Respondent returned the call. In a hostile and profane manner he told Respondent to return to the station and fill out appropriate paperwork. Respondent told him he would not come back to the station and hung up on him. The supervisor again beeped Respondent, and Respondent again called him back. The supervisor threatened to call Respondent's precinct and report him to internal affairs, and Respondent advised him that Respondent was not a police officer but was a correctional officer. The supervisor then contacted correctional internal affairs and reported Respondent for impersonating a police officer. The police attempted to find out the juvenile's name and address, but he only gave them false information. They finally fingerprinted him and discovered that his fingerprints were on file and that there were several outstanding warrants/pick-up orders against him. Instead of taking him home, they transported him to juvenile hall. Respondent did not identify himself as a police officer to anyone that night. Respondent did not restrain the juvenile or imprison him against his will. The juvenile went with Respondent both to the security guard booth and to the police precinct without protestation.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding Respondent not guilty of the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaint and dismissing the Administrative Complaint filed against Respondent in this cause. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of December, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of December, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: A. Leon Lowry, II, Program Director Division of Criminal Justice Professionalism Services Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Ramage, General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Richard D. Courtemanche, Jr., Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Braverman, Esquire 2650 West State Road 84 Suite 101A Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33312
The Issue The issue presented here concerns the question of the entitlement of Petitioner to be granted certification as a law enforcement officer under the provisions of Section 943.13, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 11B-16, Florida Administrative Code. In particular, the matter to be determined deals with the propriety of the denial of certification in the face of an arrest and conviction of Petitioner for a felony offense, which allegedly would cause the Petitioner to be rejected as an applicant for certification. The denial of licensure is purportedly in keeping with the dictates of Subsection 943.13(4), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner had made application to be certified as a law enforcement officer in the State of Florida, in keeping with the terms and conditions of Subsection 943.13, Florida Statutes. See Respondent's Exhibit No. 1, admitted into evidence. Petitioner has completed all administrative requirements for such licensure; however, he has been denied licensure based upon his arrest, a finding of guilt and judgment and sentence related to a charge of conspiracy to transport a stolen vehicle in Interstate Commerce and Foreign Commerce from New York, New York, to Miami, Florida, and from Miami, Florida, to Havana, Cuba, knowing that the motor vehicle had been stolen. This offense related to Title XVIII, Sections 2312 and 2371, U.S.C., in an action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, Case No. 8519-M-CR. For these matters the Petitioner was imprisoned for a period of two (2) years on two (2) counts of the indictment, Counts 3 and 6. The sentence in those counts was to run concurrently. See Respondent's Exhibit No. 2, admitted into evidence. Petitioner has had his civil rights restored in the State of Florida, together with his rights to own, possess and use a firearm. Federal firearms disability arising from the felony conviction have also been set aside. See Petitioner's Exhibit Nos. 1 through 3, respectively, admitted into evidence.
The Issue Whether Respondent violated Subsections 943.1395(6), 943.1395(7), and 943.13(7), Florida Statutes (2002),1 and Florida Administrative Code Rules 11B-27.0011(4)(a), 11B-27.0011(4)(c), and 11B-20.0012(1)(f), and, if so, what discipline should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to the allegations in the Administrative Complaint, Odom was a correctional officer working as a sergeant at Century Correctional Institution (Century) in Century, Florida. Jarl Johnson (Johnson) is a correctional officer who was employed at Century while Odom was employed there. Johnson went to the dormitory where Odom was stationed to check equipment. He advised Odom that he would do the head count of the inmates, but Odom indicated that he would do the head count instead of Johnson. Odom took two inmates, who were in the officers' station, with him to do the head count, and the inmates carried flashlights with them while doing the head count. Inmates are prohibited from doing head counts and carrying flashlights. Vera Elliot (Elliot) is a correctional officer, who is employed at Century. On February 14, 2003, she was working a double shift. One of her shifts that day was the same shift on which Odom was working. Elliot observed Odom and two inmates do a head count of the inmates. The two inmates came into the officers' station, while Odom was present. At that time, no inmates were allowed in the officers' station. On that same evening, Elliot saw Odom give a white box containing food to the two inmates. Correctional officers are not allowed to give food to inmates. Gregory Gilliard (Gilliard) is a correctional officer, who was employed at Century while Odom was employed at Century. Gilliard observed an inmate and Odom in the laundry room directly behind the officers' station. The inmate was polishing Odom's shoes. Gilliard also observed another inmate in the officers' station. The doors to the laundry room were open, making the dormitory accessible, which is a breach of security. On May 8, 2003, Jeffrey R. Brooker (Brooker), a correctional investigator for the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Corrections, interviewed Odom concerning complaints against staff at Century. While under oath, Odom told Brooker that he never allowed inmates to carry flashlights, never gave food to inmates, never allowed inmates in the officers' station, and never allowed an inmate to polish his shoes. These sworn statements were false. Based on the statements given by Odom to Brooker, it is found that Odom knew that his statements were not true. The Commission alleged in the Administrative Complaint that Odom used excessive or unnecessary force on an inmate. The only evidence presented concerning these allegations was hearsay. Subsection 120.57(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2005), provides: "Hearsay evidence may be used for the purpose of supplementing or explaining other evidence, but it shall not be sufficient in itself to support a finding unless it would be admissible over objection in civil actions." Therefore, no finding is made that excessive or unnecessary force was used by Odom.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that Richard L. Odom violated Subsection 943.13(7), Florida Statutes, and revoking his certification as a correctional officer. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of March, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUSAN B. HARRELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of March, 2006.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent's certification as a Firefighter II Compliance should be permanently revoked for the reasons stated in the Administrative Complaint (Complaint), dated June 6, 2018.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency responsible for licensing and regulating firefighters in the State. Respondent is certified in Florida as a Firefighter II Compliance. He holds Certificate No. 139586. Until the incident underlying this controversy arose, Respondent was employed by the Sarasota County Fire Department as a firefighter/paramedic. He now is working in the emergency room of a local hospital. The parties have stipulated that on March 21, 2018, Respondent entered a plea of nolo contendere to aggravated assault with a weapon, a third-degree felony punishable by imprisonment of one year or more under Florida law. Adjudication was withheld, Respondent was placed on probation for a period of two years, and he was ordered to pay court costs, fines, and fees in the amount of $1,525.00. See also Dep't Ex. 19. In response to the Complaint, Respondent essentially argues that: (a) he should not have been charged with the underlying criminal offense because he was defending himself against an aggressor in a road rage incident, and (b) he entered a nolo contendere plea based on bad advice from his attorney. At hearing, Respondent gave his version of the events resulting in his arrest. Also, two police officers involved with his arrest testified to what they observed and reported. Their testimony conflicts in many respects with Respondent's testimony. The undersigned will not attempt to reconcile the conflicts, as this proceeding is not the appropriate forum in which to relitigate the criminal charge. During the criminal case, Respondent was represented by a criminal law attorney who presented him with two options: enter into a plea arrangement or go to trial and risk a harsher penalty if he were found guilty. Respondent says he accepted his counsel's recommendation that he enter a plea of nolo contendere on the belief that he would not have a felony arrest on his record. After the plea agreement was accepted by the court, Respondent learned that the plea required revocation of his certification and loss of his job. Respondent also testified that even though he paid counsel a $15,000.00 fee, his counsel did little or no investigation regarding what happened, as he failed to depose a single witness before making a recommendation to take a plea.1/ In hindsight, Respondent says he would have gone to trial since he now believes he had a legitimate claim to the "castle defense," and the so-called victim in the incident (the driver of the other car) has a long criminal history and is now incarcerated. At this point, however, if Respondent believes an error in the legal process occurred, his only remedy, if one exists at all, is through the court system and not in an administrative proceeding. A felony plea constitutes noncompliance with the certification statute and requires permanent revocation of a certification. According to a Department witness, however, five years after all requirements of the court's sentencing have been met, the Department has the authority "in a formal process" to make a "felony conviction review" that may result in the reissuance of a certification. Except for this incident, Respondent has no other blemishes on his record. He served in the United States Marine Corps, with combat tours of duty in Iraq and Afghanistan, he was honorably discharged, and he was honored for saving a life at a Target store while off-duty. He has apologized for his actions, taken an anger management course, and received further treatment for Post-traumatic Stress Disorder at a local Veteran's Administration facility.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services enter a final order permanently revoking Respondent's certification. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of February, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S D. R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of February, 2019.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner completed an application for issuance of a Class "C" Private Investigator License. That license request was denied on October 30, 1991. On November 20, 1991, Petitioner challenged the denial leading to the formal hearing held pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. The statement of denial was amended on December 23, 1991. The reasons in the amendment are associated with Petitioner's criminal law history. The amended statement of denial frames the dispute. Petitioner was charged in the case of United States of America v. Hugh Mattingly Padgett, Jr., No. 63-230-CR-J, in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, Jacksonville Division, with having in his possession and custody, and under his control, a still and distilling apparatus set up, which had not been registered as required by law, in violation of Title 26 U.S.C., Section 5601(a)(1). He was convicted in that case upon a plea of guilty and fined $500. He was given a nineteen month sentence with was suspended upon service of probation for three years under supervision. The judgement and order of probation was entered on January 31, 1964. The probation was terminated after two years of service. That action by the Court shortening the probationary period was by order drawn on January 17, 1966. On May 8, 1981, in Hunterton County, New Jersey, Petitioner was convicted of distributing a controlled substance, methaqualone; possession of that controlled substance; possession of that controlled substance with intent to distribute and conspiracy to distribute that controlled substance. For this conviction he received a prison term totalling ten years and a $45,000 fine. Petitioner served the prison sentence in New Jersey. There was a Florida criminal law case which was basically the factual counterpart to the New Jersey prosecution. That case was State of Florida v. Hugh M. Padgett, Jr., No. CF880-2813A2-XX, in the Circuit Court, Tenth Judicial Circuit, in and for Polk County, Florida. On June 27, 1989, Petitioner plead guilty to the Florida case. That plea pertained to a violation of the Florida Racketeering Influence and Corrupt Organization Act, Section 943.462(3), Florida Statutes, and trafficking in methaqualone more than five kilograms but less than 25 kilograms, a lesser included offense, Section 893.135(1)(e)3, Florida Statutes. Part of the sentence which Petitioner was given in the Florida case involving the controlled substance methaqualone was a five year mandatory minimum sentence pursuant to Section 893.135(1), Florida Statutes. For entering his plea the court sentenced the Petitioner to a period of eight years concurrent time with 192 days credit for jail time served. Later by order of February 14, 1990, in connection with the case, Petitioner was given credit for 894 days of jail time served, reflecting credit for time spent in New Jersey awaiting return to Florida. The two cases involving controlled substances stem from activities by the Petitioner in 1980 in both Florida and New Jersey. Concerning the 1964 Federal conviction, Petitioner acknowledges that he knew of the operations of what he referred to as a "moonshine still" but denies that he received any money from that operation beyond rent money from the person to whom he had rented a house and upon which property the still had been found.
Recommendation Based upon a consideration of the facts found and the conclusions of law reached, it is, RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered which denies the application for a Class "C" Private Investigator License. DONE and ENTERED this 21st day of April, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of April, 1992. Copies furnished: Ronald L. Jones, Esquire Jones and Koch 1200 East Lafayette Street, Suite 108 Tallahassee, FL 32301 Henri C. Cawthon, Esquire Department of State Division of Licensing The Capitol, MS #4 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0250 Honorable Jim Smith Secretary, Department of State The Capitol, MS #4 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0250
