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JAMES BARNETT vs. DIVISION OF LICENSING, 81-003175 (1981)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 81-003175 Latest Update: Apr. 19, 1982

The Issue At the commencement of the hearing, the parties stipulated that Petitioner had filed applications for Class "A" and Class "C" licenses and was qualified except for the failure to demonstrate good moral character. The bases for the dispute over Petitioner's character were: Petitioner's arrest record; Petitioner's alleged falsification of his applications as to his employment with the Pittsburgh Police Department; and Petitioner's check for the application fee was dishonored for insufficient funds.

Findings Of Fact The Petitioner duly filed applications with the Department of State, Division of Licensing for Class "A" and Class "C" licenses. Except for matters related to Petitioner's good moral character, Petitioner is qualified for licensure. Petitioner's application reflects that he answered the question whether he had been arrested affirmatively with the following comment: The Courts of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in all five cases from 1965 to 1974 - ruled that as a Police Officer, I acted within the scope of my authority - These cases stem from being an undercover Narcotics Officer. The Petitioner's arrest records as maintained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation reveal several juvenile offenses, not considered by the Department and not at issue. This record also reveals the following arrests of Petitioner as an adult: Date Place Charge Disposition 06/09/66* Pittsburgh VDD & CA Not guilty 08/15/66* Pittsburgh VUFA Not guilty 08/20/66* Allegheny County VDDCA 06/24/67* Allegheny County VUFA Unavailable per contra 06/30/70 *Only one offense with different charges made on different dates 09/05/74 Allegheny County Theft, VUFA Discharged 09/23/74 05/07/75 Allegheny County Fraud - imper- sonating a public servant 12/19/79 Office of Provost No charge No charge Martial Petitioner presented testimony and supporting documentary evidence that the arrests reported on the FBI criminal history for the dates 06/09/66 through 06/24/67 were all related to the same offense, and that these charges were resolved in favor of the Petitioner by a verdict of not guilty. See Petitioner's Exhibit #1. The judge arrested judgment of the two years' probation for the charge of 05/07/75. See Respondent's Exhibit #2. Petitioner stated that based upon his status as a capital police officer he was not guilty of fraud or impersonation of a public servant. The Petitioner's remaining arrest was on 09/05/74, and was discharged. Petitioner's explanation of these arrests is not consistent with the explanation stated on his application form. According to the resume accompanying his application, Petitioner was employed on the indicated dates in the following positions: Date Position 1963 to 1965 Globe Security 1965 to 1970 Pittsburgh Police Department, special patrolman 1970 to 1973 NAACP special investigator and Bucci Detective Agency 1972 to 1976 Commonwealth Property Police with State of Pennsylvania 1973 to 1974 Part-time security guard in addition to employment listed above May, 1976 January, 1977 Federal Civil Service guard March, 1977 September, 1977 Part-time security guard with A&S Security December, 1978 Sears, Roebuck and Company as to June, 1980 undercover security investigator February, 1979 Security guard to June, 1980 September, 1979 VA, guard at VA Hospital GS5 to June, 1980 June, 1980 Came to Florida Petitioner stated that his check for the application fee bounced because of his travel back and forth to Pennsylvania to try to develop the data to support his application, which depleted his bank account. He has since made the check good and paid the fees by money order.

Recommendation The Petitioner has failed to establish that he has the requisite good character for licensure; therefore, it is recommended that the Petitioner's applications for Class "A" and Class "C" licensure be denied. DONE and ORDERED this 19th day of April, 1982, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. James Barnett 758 Woodville Road Milton, Florida 32570 James V. Antista, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of State Division of Licensing R. A. Gray Building, Room 106 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of April, 1982. George Firestone, Secretary Department of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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SHADDAINAH LALANNE vs AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION, 20-003423 (2020)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Jul. 30, 2020 Number: 20-003423 Latest Update: Dec. 22, 2024

The Issue The issue is whether Respondent abused its discretion in denying Petitioner’s request for an exemption from disqualification for employment in a position of trust.

Findings Of Fact AHCA is the state agency charged with protecting vulnerable persons, such as Medicaid recipients and the Medicaid program, and, in that capacity, it maintains discretion to approve or deny requests for exemption from disqualification. Petitioner is seeking to work as a certified nursing assistant. Petitioner’s employment goals require her to have a Level 2 criminal background screening to ensure she does not have any disqualifying offenses to prohibit her from working with AHCA-regulated facilities. Petitioner’s background screening of February 5, 2020, identified the following five criminal offenses: elder abuse/neglect; trespass (refuse to leave property, peace officer’s request); and three counts of obstructing/resisting executive officer with minor injury. By letter dated February 5, 2020, AHCA notified Petitioner that she was disqualified from employment due to the disqualifying offense of “04/22/2017 Sheriff’s Office San Diego, Obstruct/Resist Exec Off.” The letter also informed Petitioner that she may be eligible to apply for an exemption from disqualification and how to apply. On or around February 7, 2020, Petitioner submitted a request for exemption from disqualification and supporting documentation to AHCA. By letter dated February 18, 2020, AHCA denied Petitioner’s request for exemption. On April 6, 2020, Petitioner submitted a second Application for Exemption (“exemption package”) to AHCA. Petitioner’s exemption package contained documentation including employment history, education/training, a criminal history report, arrest reports, investigation reports, a California Department of Public Health investigation report, and a 12-month suspension of nurse assistant certification. By letter dated April 7, 2020, AHCA denied Petitioner’s request for exemption, stating Petitioner is not eligible for the exemption based on the following grounds: A disqualifying felony offense(s) and you have not been lawfully released from confinement, supervision, or nonmonetary condition imposed by the court for the disqualifying felony 3 years prior to the date you applied for the exemption. Our records indicate you met the above criteria for the following: ELDER/DEP ADULT CRUELTY, Case number CN3772399 Petitioner contested the denial and requested a formal administrative hearing. AHCA acknowledged the disqualifying offense error in the denial letter of April 7, 2020, and corrected its denial letter. The corrected denial letter dated September 8, 2020, deemed Petitioner not eligible for an exemption based on the following grounds: A disqualifying felony offense(s) and you have not been lawfully released from confinement, supervision, or nonmonetary condition imposed by the court for the disqualifying felony 3 years prior to the date you applied for the exemption. Our records indicate you met the above criteria for the following: Corrected Disqualifying Offense: 04/22/2017 SHERIFF’S OFFICE SAN DIEGO, RESISTING AN OFFICER (California Penal Code section 148,) Case Number CN372399. Hearing At hearing, Petitioner testified about the incident that occurred on April 22, 2017, while working at Fallbrook Skilled Nursing (“Fallbrook”) in California. Petitioner explained that three police officers came to her job at Fallbrook while she was working her shift and asked to speak to her outside the facility about allegations of resident abuse. Petitioner testified she refused to leave the facility upon multiple instructions from the police to leave. Petitioner admitted that after an officer told her several times he was going to arrest her, she told the police “you don’t have a right to arrest me.” Petitioner detailed how she did not allow the police to put handcuffs on her because she believed the reports about her were lies. Ultimately, the incident escalated--Petitioner testified that when she did not allow the police to handcuff her, the three police officers put her on the ground, one put his knee on her back, and she was handcuffed. Petitioner weighed approximately 125 pounds when arrested. After the police got Petitioner outside, the three police officers picked her up, put her in the police car, and took her to jail. Petitioner was charged with: elder abuse/neglect; trespass (refuse to leave property, peace officer’s request); and three counts of obstructing/resisting an officer, all stemming from the same April 22, 2017, incident. The elder abuse and trespass charges against Lalanne were dismissed. On January 30, 2018, Petitioner proceeded to a bench trial before a judge on the resisting an officer charge. At trial, Petitioner was found guilty and convicted of “count 1 PC 148 (a)(1), resisting an officer” in case number CN372399. That same day, the judge sentenced Petitioner to three years’ probation2 and community service for the resisting an officer conviction. Subsequently, the County of San Diego, California, probation department provided Petitioner a certificate of completion for completing her three days of public work service on or about September 13, 2018. Petitioner testified that she made a mistake when she did not listen to the officers and it was a lesson for her. She also testified that she believed there was no harm to the police and her offense is a misdemeanor not a felony. Vanessa Risch (“Risch”), AHCA’s operations and management consultant manager in the Background Screening Unit, testified that because Petitioner’s offense occurred in California, AHCA had to evaluate the nature of the offense, what occurred during the incident, and the final outcome of the case to determine the correlating criminal offense in Florida. Risch testified that she contacted the California Clerk of Courts to validate the outcome of Petitioner’s case and probationary status. Risch testified that, through her investigation, she confirmed that Petitioner’s probation started on January 30, 2018, and terminates on January 30, 2021. Risch also detailed how AHCA converted Petitioner’s California resisting an officer charge to a Florida resisting arrest with violence felony offense, after determining the officers in California had to force Petitioner’s body to the ground after Petitioner did not comply with the officers’ repeated instructions. AHCA concluded that Petitioner’s actions of opposing the three 2 The compelling evidence at hearing supports Petitioner’s probationary sentence. The undersigned finds that Petitioner failed to testify honestly and forthright regarding her three-year probationary period. First, Petitioner denied knowledge of any probationary period even though probation was listed on the sentencing documents Petitioner presented as Exhibit 1. Also, Petitioner’s Exhibit 3 is from the probation department. Additionally, Petitioner testified that her lawyer told her she had probation, which confirms Petitioner’s knowledge of her probationary period. officers is equivalent to the criminal offense of resisting arrest with violence in Florida. Risch testified that resisting an officer with violence is a disqualifying felony offense. Risch testified further that AHCA ultimately concluded that Petitioner was not eligible to apply for an exemption. Risch explained that Petitioner’s current probationary status prohibited her from being eligible to apply for an exemption because eligibility starts three years after Petitioner’s probationary period for the disqualifying felony offense is terminated.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration, enter a final order denying Shaddainah Lalanne’s, request for an exemption from disqualification. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of December, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JUNE C. MCKINNEY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of December, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Shaddainah Sherly Lalanne Apartment 206 6609 Woods Island Circle Port St. Lucie, Florida 34952 (eServed) Katie Jackson, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 7 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (eServed) Shena L. Grantham, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Building 3, Room 3407B 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (eServed) Thomas M. Hoeler, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (eServed) Bill Roberts, Acting General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (eServed) Shevaun L. Harris, Acting Secretary Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 1 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Richard J. Shoop, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (eServed)

Florida Laws (9) 120.569120.57435.04435.07775.082775.083775.084843.01943.10 DOAH Case (1) 20-3423
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, BOARD OF MEDICINE vs MANUEL D. VAZQUEZ, M.D., 05-003155PL (2005)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Coleman, Florida Aug. 30, 2005 Number: 05-003155PL Latest Update: Dec. 22, 2024
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BORDEN, INC. vs DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES, 96-005847CVL (1996)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tampa, Florida Dec. 12, 1996 Number: 96-005847CVL Latest Update: Jan. 07, 1997

The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Petitioner should be placed on the convicted vendor list.

Findings Of Fact On May 31, 1990, Borden pled guilty to commission of a public entity crime, as defined by Section 287.133(1)(g), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1996), for: a conspiracy to rig bids for the award and performance of contracts to supply milk to school boards within Peninsular Florida, lasting from the early 1970's through July, 1988; a conspiracy to rig bids for the award and performance of contracts to supply milk to school boards within the Florida Panhandle, lasting from the early 1970's through July, 1988; and a conspiracy to rig bids for the award and performance of contracts to supply dairy products for use at federal military installations within Peninsular Florida and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and at the Kings Bay Naval Submarine Base in Georgia, lasting from the early 1970's through July, 1988. As a corporate entity, Borden was culpable of the crimes committed by its employees or agents. However, as set out in more detail in the Joint Stipulation, when the crimes came to the attention of Borden's corporate management, Borden cooperated with state and federal investigations and prosecutions of the crimes, promptly terminated the employees and disassociated itself from individuals implicated in the crimes, and promptly paid the damages and penalties resulting from Borden's conviction. As set out in more detail in the Joint Stipulation, Borden notified the Department of Management Services within 30 days of its conviction. As set out in more detail in the Joint Stipulation, in addition to terminating the employees implicated in the crimes, Borden has instituted self- policing to prevent public entity crimes. As set out in more detail in the Joint Stipulation, after a period of suspension by the Defense Logistics Agency of the federal government in relation to Borden's public entity crime, the suspension was terminated, and Borden's Dairy Division has been reinstated as a qualified government contractor. As set out in more detail in the Joint Stipulation, Borden has demonstrated its good citizenship with the exception of the public entity crime of which it was convicted. As set out in more detail in the Joint Stipulation, other than the public entity crime conviction itself, there was no evidence that it is in the best interest of the public to place Borden on the convicted vendor list.

Florida Laws (3) 120.57120.68287.133
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DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE AND TREASURER vs RANDY LEE POMERANTZ, 90-004430 (1990)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Jul. 17, 1990 Number: 90-004430 Latest Update: Feb. 27, 1991

Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Randy Lee Pomerantz, is currently eligible for licensure and is licensed in the State of Florida as a general lines, property, casualty, surety, and miscellaneous lines insurance agent. On or about May 30, 1989, the Respondent, along with one of his former employees, was charged by Information in the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit, in and for Dade County, Florida, in Case No. 89-20405, with fifteen felony counts and three misdemeanor counts. The fifteen felony counts included one count of a RICO violation, one count of scheme to defraud, three counts of grand theft in the second degree, and ten counts of grand theft in the third degree. On or about July 13, 1990, the Respondent entered a plead of nolo contendere to Count VIII of the information, which was one of the counts charging grand theft in the third degree in violation of Section 812.014, Florida Statutes. The prosecutor entered a nolle prosequi as to all other counts insofar as they related to the Respondent. Adjudication of guilt was withheld on Count VIII. The Respondent was placed on probation for three years and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $2,325.03. The Respondent's plea of nolo contendere to Count VIII of the Information was a plea of convenience. The Respondent did not commit the acts alleged in Count VIII of the Information. As the Respondent explained at the hearing, at the time of his plea his wife was about to give birth and he did not feel he could take a chance on a "roll of the dice" with a jury trial.

Recommendation For all of the foregoing reasons, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Insurance and Treasurer issue a Final Order in this case dismissing the Amended Administrative Complaint in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 27th day of February 1991. MICHAEL PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of February 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 90-4430 The following are the specific rulings on all proposed findings of fact submitted by all parties. Findings proposed by Petitioner: Paragraphs 1, 2, and 4: Accepted. Paragraph 3: Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Although it is likely that the facts alleged in Count VIII of the Information related to the transaction of insurance business in this state, such is not established by clear and convincing evidence. And, in any event, the matter is irrelevant in light of the findings that the Respondent's plea was a plea of convenience and that the Respondent was not guilty of the crime charged. Findings proposed by Respondent: COPIES FURNISHED: James A. Bossart, Esquire Department of Insurance 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Ted Crespi, Esquire 110 Tower, Suite 815 110 S.E. 6th Street Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Tom Gallagher Bill O'Neil State Treasurer and General Counsel Insurance Commissioner Department of Insurance The Capitol, Plaza Level and Treasurer Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300

Florida Laws (8) 120.57120.68458.311458.331626.611626.621626.641812.014
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CONTINENTAL MEDICAL LABORATORIES, INC. vs DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, 93-003951BID (1993)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Jul. 16, 1993 Number: 93-003951BID Latest Update: Oct. 08, 1993

The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services improperly awarded a contract to National Health Laboratories, Inc. for the reasons set forth in the petition.

Findings Of Fact By Invitation to Bid mailed March 26, 1993 (ITB), the Dade County Public Health Unit requested bids on an annual contract for the performance of clinical laboratory test services. The Dade County Public Health Unit is under the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS). The contracting agency shall hereafter be referred to as HRS. The ITB called for the opening of bids on April 12, 1993. Six bids were timely submitted. The apparent low bid was submitted by National Health Laboratories, Inc. (NHL). The NHL bid was $202,271. The second low bid was submitted by Continental Medical Laboratory, Inc. (CML). The CML bid was $241,100. HRS issued a notice of intent to award the contract to NHL. CML timely protested. There is no issue as to the responsiveness of the CML bid. The only issue as to the responsiveness of the NHL bid concerns the matters raised by CML. CML's petition alleges that the bid of NHL was defective because the Sworn Statement Pursuant to Section 287.133(3)(a), Florida Statutes, on Public Entity Crimes (Public Entity Crime Affidavit) was incomplete, an agreement attached to the Public Entity Crime Affidavit did not relieve NHL from disqualification concerning CHAMPUS fraud, and NHL should be disqualified from bidding because it failed timely to inform the Department of Management Services of the company's conviction of a public entity crime. Paragraph 10 of the General Conditions of the ITB allows HRS to "waive any minor irregularity or technicality in bids received." However, special conditions provide, in part: PUBLIC ENTITY CRIMES Any person submitting a bid or proposal in response to this invitation must execute the enclosed [Public Entity Affidavit], including proper check(s), in the space(s) provided, and enclose it with the bid/proposal. Failure to complete this form in every detail and submit it with your proposal will result in immediate disqualification of your bid. The Public Entity Crime Affidavit completed by NHL and submitted with its bid was executed and notarized on April 9, 1993. Paragraph six of the form affidavit states: Based on information and belief, the statement which I have marked below is true in relation to the entity submitting this sworn statement. [Indicate which statement applies.] Neither the entity submitting this sworn statement, nor any of its officers, directors, executives, partners, shareholders, employees, members, or agents who are active in the management of the entity, nor any affiliate of the entity has been charged with and convicted of a public entity crime subsequent to July 1, 1989. The entity submitting this sworn statement, or one or more of its officers, directors, executives, partners, shareholders, employees, members, or agents who are active in the management of the entity, or an affiliate of the entity has been charged with and convicted of a public entity crime subsequent to July 1, 1989. The entity submitting this sworn statement, or one or more of its officers, directors, executives, partners, shareholders, employees, members or agents who are active in the management of the entity, or an affiliate of an entity has been charged with and convicted of a public entity crime subsequent to July 1, 1989. However, there has been a subsequent proceeding before a Hearing Officer of the State of Florida, Division of Administrative Hearings and the Final Order entered by the Hearing Officer determined that it was not in the public interest to place the entity submitting this sworn statement on the convicted vendor list. [attach a copy of the final order] The next paragraph of the Public Entity Crime Affidavit form states: I UNDERSTAND THAT THE SUBMISSION OF THIS FORM TO THE CONTRACTING OFFICER FOR THE PUBLIC ENTITY IDENTIFIED IN PARAGRAPH I (ONE) ABOVE IS FOR THAT PUBLIC ENTITY ONLY AND, THAT THIS FORM IS VALID THROUGH DECEMBER 31 OF THE CALENDAR YEAR IN WHICH IT IS FILED. I ALSO UNDERSTAND THAT I AM REQUIRED TO INFORM THE PUBLIC ENTITY PRIOR TO ENTERING INTO A CONTRACT IN EXCESS OF THE THRESHOLD AMOUNT PROVIDED IN SECTION 287.017, FLORIDA STATUTES FOR CATEGORY TWO OF ANY CHANGE IN THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS FORM. In completing the Public Entity Crime Affidavit, NHL penned in, just over the second alternative that discloses a conviction, "See Attached." The attachment was a copy of an Agreement dated December 31, 1992, between NHL and the "state of Florida" (Settlement Agreement). The agreement was executed by an NHL officer and the Director, Medicaid Fraud Control Unit of the Auditor General Office. The Auditor General's Office is not part of the Department of Management Services. The Settlement Agreement concerns invoices from NHL to the Florida Medicaid program for certain cholesterol and iron tests from January 1, 1987, through November 30, 1992. The Settlement Agreement requires NHL to pay as restitution to the State of Florida $1,470,917. In return, the state of Florida, for itself and on behalf of its agents and assigns, will release and forever discharge NHL, its current or former officers, directors, employees, agents, shareholders, affiliates, assigns and successors from any and all claims, actions, demands or causes of action including penalties or interest against any of them, either civil or criminal, as regards Medicaid reimbursement [for certain cholesterol and iron tests] between January 1, 1987 and November 30, 1992, except that nothing contained in this Settlement Agreement shall preclude the state Medicaid program from seeking recoupment of payments made [for certain cholesterol tests] during the period covered by this Settlement Agreement, subject to the understanding that NHL will contest any such recoupment action on the grounds that such payments were appropriate. The Settlement Agreement also provides: The state of Florida agrees that neither the Settlement Agreement nor any federal criminal conviction or other sanction of the corporation or a current or former officer or employee of NHL as regards claims for Medicaid reimbursement [for certain cholesterol and iron tests] [b]etween January 1, 1987 and November 30, 1992 will be the basis for a state exclusion of NHL from the Florida Medicaid program. NHL is a company that provides laboratory testing nationally and receives payment for many of its services from government sources, such as Medicaid, Medicare, or CHAMPUS. CHAMPUS is the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services. During the period of 1987 through 1992, NHL supplied certain cholesterol and iron testing, in addition to that specifically requested by the health-care provider, at little or no cost to the health-care provider. But NHL invoiced various government payors at higher rates. On December 18, 1992, NHL entered guilty pleas to two counts of criminal fraud involving these practices as they concern the CHAMPUS program. These pleas were the bases of a conviction and sentence that included a criminal fine of $1,000,000. One or two former officers entered guilty pleas to charges of criminal fraud involving these practices as they concern the Medicaid program. As part of the settlement, NHL paid the United States the sum of $100,000,000. At the same time, NHL was negotiating with various states, including Florida, with respect to the above-described billing practices. On December 8, 1992, the Director of the Medicaid Fraud Control Unit in the Florida Office of the Auditor General wrote a letter to NHL confirming a proposed settlement. The conditions of the settlement are incorporated in the above- described Settlement Agreement. On December 17, 1992, the Assistant Secretary for Medicaid in HRS mailed a letter to NHL agreeing that HRS would not take administrative action for the above-described cholesterol and iron claims submitted for reimbursement by NHL to the Florida Medicaid program. NHL did not inform the Department of Management Services of the guilty plea, conviction, and $1,000,000 criminal fine. However, based probably on information received in early February 1993 from another governmental entity in Florida, the Department of Management Services, on February 8, 1993, sent a letter to NHL advising it that the Department had received information that NHL had been convicted of a public entity crime and requesting copies of the charges and final court action. NHL complied and the Department's investigation is continuing. On February 18, 1993, HRS Deputy Secretary for Health, sent a memorandum to all of the County Public Health Units directors and administrators advising them of concerns about laboratory fraud and attaching a recent report concerning the NHL case. The report described the NHL guilty pleas, conviction, and sentencing, as well as the business practices that led to the prosecution. By memorandum dated March 18, 1993, HRS Assistant Secretary for Medicaid informed HRS Depute Secretary for Health that the Auditor General had entered into the Settlement Agreement. The memorandum states that, on December 17, 1992, the Assistant Secretary signed an agreement with NHL not to terminate it from the Florida Medicaid program, which was the "same treatment afforded many other providers--including [County Public Health Units]--who overbilled the Medicaid program. The Assistant Secretary's memorandum describes the settlement as requiring NHL to make "full restitution," although the $1.4 million in restitution involves only the iron test and the State of Florida and NHL may still litigate whether any reimbursement is due for the cholesterol tests. The failure of NHL to check the second alternative on the Public Entity Crime Affidavit did not confer an economic advantage on NHL in the subject procurement. The material attached to the affidavit sufficiently informed HRS of the criminal conviction of NHL. Likewise, the omission of any mention of CHAMPUS claims in Paragraphs two and three of the Settlement Agreement did not confer any economic advantage on NHL in the procurement. The purpose of mentioning only Medicaid in the Settlement Agreement is that Florida has no jurisdiction over the CHAMPUS program. NHL was concerned only that Florida not terminate NHL's participation in the program over which Florida had jurisdiction--the Medicaid program. These references to "Medicaid reimbursement" are merely descriptive and are not intended to limit the scope of the exoneration purportedly effectuated in the Settlement Agreement.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services enter a final order dismissing the bid protest of Continental Medical Laboratory, Inc. ENTERED on August 24, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of August, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-3951BID Treatment Accorded Proposed Findings of Respondent and Intervenor 1-8 and 11: adopted or adopted in substance. 9-10 and 12-15: rejected as subordinate. 16-31: adopted or adopted in substance. 32-37: rejected as subordinate and irrelevant. 38-43 and 45-48: rejected as irrelevant and legal argument. 44: adopted. 49-50: adopted as to absence of material variations. 51: rejected as subordinate and recitation of evidence. Treatment Accorded Proposed Findings of Petitioner 1-14 and 16-17: adopted or adopted in substance. 15: rejected as legal argument and unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. 18-21: rejected as subordinate, repetitious, and legal argument. 22-27: adopted in substance. 28: rejected as irrelevant. 29 (first sentence): rejected as repetitious and irrelevant. 29 (second sentence): rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. 30: adopted, but the period of the delay of DMS review in this case was too short to make any difference. 31: rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence with respect to a delay of such a short duration. 32: rejected as legal argument inviting a remedy far in excess of any remedy provided for or envisioned by 287.133. 33: rejected as legal argument inviting a remedy far in excess of any remedy provided for or envisioned by 287.133, at least under the facts of the present case. 34: rejected as irrelevant. 35: rejected as legal argument and unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Geoffrey Kirk Adorno & Zeder, P.A. 2601 S. Bayshore Dr., Ste. 1600 Miami, Florida 33133 Morton Laitner, District Counsel District 11 Legal Office 401 NW 2d Ave., Ste. N-1014 Miami, Florida 33128 Thomas F. Panza Seann Michael Frazier Panza, Maurer 3081 E. Commercial Blvd., Ste. 200 Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33308 John Slye, General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Robert L. Powell Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700

Florida Laws (4) 120.53120.57287.017287.133
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DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE vs JAMES M. STILLS, 92-005725 (1992)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:West Palm Beach, Florida Sep. 24, 1992 Number: 92-005725 Latest Update: May 17, 1993

Findings Of Fact Mr. Stills filed a sworn application for eligibility to sit for the licensure examination for limited surety agents with the Department of Insurance on February 24, 1992. The application contains these questions: Q: Have you ever been charged with or convicted of or pleaded guilty of no contest to a crime involving moral turpitude, or a felony, or a crime punishable by imprisonment of one (1) year or more under the law of any state, territory or county, whether or not a judgment or conviction has been entered? What was the crime? Where and when were you charged? Did you plead guilty or nolo contendere? Where you convicted? Was adjudication withheld? Please provide a brief description of the nature of the offense charged: If there has been more than one such felony charge, provide an explanation as to each charge on an attachment. Certified copies of the Information or Indictment and Final Adjudication for each charge is required. Mr. Stills answered "no" to the main question and filed no response to subquestions a through f. Discharging a firearm - 1973 Mr. Stills had been charged with the misdemeanor of discharging a firearm within city limits on September 10, 1973, a violation of Section 790.15, Florida Statutes (1973). The incident occurred in Pensacola, Florida. Mr. Stills accidently discharged a shotgun in an incident involving his father. Mr. Stills had been called to his father's home because of a dispute his father was having with a neighbor. His father met him on the back porch, with a shotgun in his hand. Mr. Stills calmed his father, and was able to get him to give him the shotgun. The shotgun was an old one, and as Mr. Stills attempted to unload it, the hammer slipped and the gun accidently discharged. The neighbor called the police, and the charge was filed, and Mr. Stills paid a small fine. Second degree murder - 1984 On May 31, 1984, Mr. Stills was arrested and charged with second degree murder, in violation of Sections 775.087(2) and 782.04(2), Florida Statutes (1983). The arrest arose from an argument which Mr. Stills had with the decedent. On May 24, 1980, Mr. Stills and the decedent had an argument in which the decedent threatened to kill Mr. Stills. Mr. Stills then left. Later that afternoon, the decedent approached Mr. Stills at another location, and appeared to reach for something. Out of fear generated by the decedent's earlier threat Mr. Stills had already armed himself, and when the victim made a threatening movement, Mr. Stills shot him out of fear for his own safety. He was arrested, charged with second degree murder, but acquitted in a jury trial on March 21, 1985 based on his plea of self defense. Firearms chares - 1987 Mr. Stills was charged on April 15, 1987, in an Information with the felony of carrying a concealed firearm, in violation of Section 790.01(2), Florida Statutes (1987), and the misdemeanor of improper exhibition of a firearm, in violation of Section 790.10, Florida Statutes (1987). On that date, Officer John Gonzalez responded to a request for police assistance; the call said a man was displaying a firearm in a threatening manner. Officer Gonzalez arrived at the location given to him, and saw Petitioner, who generally fit the description of the man allegedly waiving a firearm about. Mr. Stills was then seated in an automobile. He was not waiving a gun about or threatening anyone. Officer Gonzalez approached him from the passenger side of the car, where he observed a revolver sitting on the passenger seat; the gun was loaded. He then arrested Mr. Stills. The charge of carrying a concealed firearm was dismissed by the court. Mr. Stills entered a plea of guilty to the misdemeanor of exhibiting a firearm on July 20, 1987. After exchanging correspondence with the Department, Mr. Stills amended his application, disclosing the charges and sending the necessary backup information required by the application form. He stated he had misread the question as requiring only information on felony convictions, and he had none. When the Department denied Mr. Still's application it gave these specific reasons: He had been charged with discharging a firearm within the City of Pensacola on September 17, 1973. He had been charged with second degree murder on May 21, 1984, but had been found not guilty on March 21, 1985. On April 15, 1987, he had been charged with carrying a concealed firearm and improper exhibition of a firearm, that he had pled guilty to the misdemeanor charge and been placed on three months probation yet Mr. Stills had failed to acknowledge any of these charges on his application. The Department relied on Section 648.32(2)(f), Florida Statutes, and 648.45(2)(e), Florida Statutes, to deny his application.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a Final Order finding Mr. Stills eligible for licensure as a limited surety agent, and permitting him to sit for the licensure examination. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 31st day of March 1993. WILLIAM R. DORSEY, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of March 1993. APPENDIX The following constitute my rulings on findings proposed by the Department as required by Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes. Adopted in Findings of Fact 1. Adopted in Findings of Fact 2. Adopted in Findings of Fact 3. Adopted, as modified in Findings of Fact 4. Adopted in Findings of Fact 5. Adopted in Findings of Fact 5. Adopted in Findings of Fact 5. Adopted in Findings of Fact 6. Adopted in Findings of Fact 7. Adopted in Findings of Fact 7. Adopted in Findings of Fact 9. COPIES FURNISHED: James A. Cassidy, Esquire 6121 Palm Beach Lakes Boulevard Suite 403 West Palm Beach, Florida 33409-0223 Daniel T. Gross, Esquire Department of Insurance Division of Legal Services 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 The Honorable Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Bill O'Neil General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, PL 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300

Florida Laws (9) 120.57648.27648.34648.45775.087782.04790.01790.10790.15
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DEPARTMENT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND TRAINING COMMISSION vs TENA D. GRANT, 05-004458PL (2005)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Sebring, Florida Dec. 08, 2005 Number: 05-004458PL Latest Update: May 10, 2006

The Issue The issues in the case are whether the allegations set forth in the Administrative Complaint filed against the Respondent are true, and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency charged with the responsibility for certification of correctional officers within the State of Florida. Respondent holds Correctional Certificate No. 200857, issued to her by Petitioner. Shortly after 2:00 a.m., on January 8, 2005, Corporal Andrew Markham of the City of Sebring Police Department was dispatched to the scene of a reported traffic crash at the intersection of Center Street and Northeast Lakeview Drive in Sebring, Florida. Corporal Markham found no vehicles in the intersection or any evidence of a crash there. Adjacent to the intersection, in the parking lot of the Sebring Public Library, Corporal Markham saw a car with its brake lights illuminated. He approached the car to determine whether the occupants could provide any information about the reported traffic accident. Corporal Markham observed that the front of the car was damaged from its collision with a low barrier wall that bordered the parking lot. The windshield was also damaged from what Corporal Markham concluded was the impact of the occupants' heads with the windshield when the car hit the barrier. When Corporal Markham approached the car, he saw Respondent exit the driver's seat and begin to walk away. Corporal Markham stopped Respondent to speak with her. Respondent had blood on her face, as did the other occupant of the car. At the time of the incident, Respondent denied being the driver of the car. At the hearing, Respondent admitted that she was the driver. During his conversation with Respondent at the scene, Corporal Markham smelled the odor of alcohol on Respondent, noted that she was unsteady, and that her eyes were red. When Corporal Markham asked Respondent to take field sobriety tests, she continued to insist that she was not the driver of the car and would not take the tests. Based on his observations at the scene, his training, and his 13 years of experience as a police officer, Corporal Markham believed Respondent was under the influence of alcoholic beverages to the extent that her normal faculties were impaired. Therefore, he arrested Respondent for the offense of driving under the influence of alcohol. Corporal Markham first transported Respondent to the Highlands County Medical Center to receive treatment for her injury. At the Medical Center, Respondent refused medical treatment, and Corporal Markham transported her to the Highlands County Jail. At the jail, Respondent was taken to the area where breath tests are conducted. Corporal Markham read Respondent the "Implied Consent" that informed her that if she refused to take the test, she could lose her driving privilege for up to one year. Respondent refused to take a breath test at the jail. Deputy Loran Danielson of the Highlands County Sheriff's Office was the officer on duty to conduct the breath tests at the jail. When Deputy Danielson met Respondent, he noted that her breath smelled strongly of alcohol, her eyes were bloodshot, her speech was slurred, and she was unsteady on her feet. Based on his observations of Respondent, his training, and his 10 years of experience as a Deputy Sheriff, Deputy Danielson was of the opinion that Respondent was under the influence of alcoholic beverages to the extent that her normal faculties were impaired. During the time that Deputy Danielson talked to Respondent, she told him that she had consumed "many" drinks, and if she took the breath test, it would show "I'm drunk." On September 27, 2004, less than four months before the incident at issue in this case, Petitioner issued Respondent a Letter of Acknowledgement for an earlier driving under the influence (DUI) violation by Respondent. At the hearing, Respondent admitted that she had "a few drinks" with friends at a bar just prior to her arrest, but she denied that she was intoxicated. Respondent said the crash occurred because she had taken her eyes off the road to speak to passengers in the back seat. Respondent said she refused to take the field sobriety tests or the breath test at the jail because she was scared. Respondent explained that one term of her probation for the prior DUI conviction was that she was not to drink alcohol. Respondent expressed remorse for her behavior on January 8, 2005, and claimed she has stopped drinking alcohol. Respondent stated that her career as a correctional officer is very important to her, and she requested another opportunity to prove she is a responsible person and capable correctional officer.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner Department of Law Enforcement, Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission, enter a final order finding that Respondent Tena D. Grant failed to demonstrate good moral character as required by Subsection 943.13(7), Florida Statutes, and ordering that her certification as a correctional officer be revoked. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of April, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BRAM D. E. CANTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of April, 2006.

Florida Laws (4) 120.569316.193943.13943.1395
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EDWARD J. GIBNEY vs. FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION, 81-001684 (1981)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 81-001684 Latest Update: Dec. 23, 1981

The Issue Can the Board of Real Estate consider matters surrounding the offense to which a person pleads guilty in determining whether that person possesses the necessary character to be licensee? What is the evidentiary effect of a plea of guilty by an applicant for licensure? Is the Petitioner qualified for licensure?

Findings Of Fact Petitioner Edward J. Gibney made application to The Board of Real Estate for licensure as a real estate salesman. The Board denied Petitioner's application pursuant to Section 475.25(1)(f), Florida Statutes, because he was convicted of crimes against the laws of the United States and against the laws of the State of New Jersey involving moral turpitude. Petitioner pleaded guilty to the crimes of conspiring to commit fraud on medicaid and medicare claims, a felony under the laws of the United States. He also pleaded guilty to a similar offense which was a felony under the laws of New Jersey. Both offenses arose out of the same factual situation. The sole grounds for denial of Petitioner's application were his criminal convictions and the matters surrounding them. The Petitioner is otherwise qualified for licensure. After initial notification of the Boards intention to deny his application, the Petitioner requested and received an informal hearing before the Board. The Board notified Petitioner that it still intended to deny his application, and the Petitioner requested and was granted a formal hearing. The transcript of the Board's informal hearing was received as Petitioner's Composite Exhibit #1. Petitioner was the only witness at the hearing. He explained very candidly the facts surrounding his entry of guilty pleas to the criminal charges brought against him. His testimony was uncontroverted and is accepted as true. Petitioner, a graduate chemist, was qualified and licensed as a medical laboratory director in New Jersey. For 15 years prior to 1975, he owned and operated a small medical laboratory directly providing clinical laboratory services to private physicians. In 1975, Petitioner was approached several times over a period of three months by Seymour Slaughtnick to provide laboratory services to several doctors for medicaid/medicare patients. Slaughtnick was functioning as an intermediary. Slaughtnick picked up test samples at the doctors' offices and transported them to another laboratory. Slaughtnick wanted to change laboratories because of the poor quality laboratory work. Although Slaughtnick's function was described, Slaughtnick's relationship with the other laboratory or the doctors was never defined. Petitioner described Slaughtnick as a salesman. Petitioner initially refused the Slaughtnick offer because he had not done medicare/medicaid work and did not know how to process the paperwork. Slaughtnick continued to press Petitioner for a commitment to do this work and offered to prepare and submit all the paperwork for Petitioner. Slaughtnick and petitioner eventually agreed to an arrangement under which Slaughtnick picked up the samples, brought them to Petitioner's laboratory, transmitted the test results back to the physicians, and prepared Petitioner's billings to medicare/medicaid for the professional services rendered. Petitioner performed all the laboratory work as ordered by the physicians and prepared all test results, paying Slaughtnick a percentage of the fee for each test for his services. Petitioner was aware that his arrangement with Slaughtnick and permitting Slaughtnick to bill in his name was illegal under New Jersey law. To assure himself that Slaughtnick's billings were in order, Petitioner checked on Slaughtnick's billings after they began to work together. The State of new Jersey's medicaid/medicare plan was administered by Prudential Insurance Company using a blind fee schedule. Petitioner was advised by Prudential that his schedule initially provided various fees for various laboratory tests, but laboratories would not be advised of the amounts of payment or criteria used for assessing the appropriateness of ordering the tests. He was advised Prudential would reject any billings that were inappropriate. In 1976, the State of New Jersey began an investigation of its entire medicare/medicaid system. Initially, the inquiry with Petitioner's laboratory centered on whether he was performing the work ordered. It was determined that Petitioner performed all the work for which he billed the state. This investigation gave rise to an administrative complaint against Petitioner that charged him with overbilling. An administrative hearing was conducted which lasted eight months, during which 55 days of testimony were taken. The New Jersey hearing officer eventually that 50 percent of the orders and billings were correct; however, before the administrative order was entered, the Petitioner was indicated by the state of New Jersey and the United States for conspiracy to defraud under medicaid/medicare. The indictment alleged that Petitioner, Slaughtnick and other unnamed co-conspirators had conspired to defraud medicaid and medicare. The indictment was not introduced at this hearing; however, the Petitioner explained it alleged that the conspirators arranged to order more complex tests than were necessary, performed these tests, and then billed the state for the inflated service. Petitioner denied any knowledge of such a scheme to inflate test orders, however Petitioner did admit that his permitting Slaughtnick to prepare bills to medicaid and medicare in the laboratory's name was not authorized under the New Jersey law. Petitioner also denied knowledge of any kickbacks paid by Slaughtnick to any of the physicians or those in their employment. However, Petitioner stated he had no doubt after the fact that Slaughtnick was engaged in such a practice. Since his release from probation slightly more than 18 months ago, Petitioner has studied real estate and attempted to recover from the strain of the loss of his business, the long hearing, and his conviction and sentencing. The facts upon which this case are based occurred in 1975-76. Petitioner was sentenced in 1977, and has been released from confinement and probation since January, 1980. There is no evidence that petitioner has engaged in any conduct that would reflect adversely on his character since he terminated his laboratory work for medicaid/medicare in 1976.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that Petitioner Edward J. Gibney be denied licensure upon the specific ground that under Section 475.17(1), Florida Statutes, he failed to present sufficient evidence of his reputation in the community to assure the Board of Real Estate that the interest of the public and investors would not be endangered unduly. DONE and ORDERED this 14th day of October, 1981, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of October, 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: Larry H. Spalding, Esquire 6360 South Tamiami Trail Sarasota, Florida 33581 Jeffrey A. Miller, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs Administrative Law Section The Capitol, 16th Floor Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Carlos B. Stafford, Executive Director Board of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street PO Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802

Florida Laws (2) 475.17475.25
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ANITA KING vs DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 00-004169 (2000)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Perry, Florida Oct. 09, 2000 Number: 00-004169 Latest Update: Nov. 30, 2001

The Issue Whether Respondent was the subject of an unlawful discrimination action as defined in Chapter 760, Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an African-American female. She was certified as a corrections officer in March 1991. In November 1995, Petitioner was employed by Respondent, Department of Corrections, at Taylor Corrections Institution in Perry, Florida, as a correctional officer with the rank of sergeant. Prior to her employment at Taylor Corrections Institution she had been a corrections officer at a correctional facility in Jefferson County. Petitioner did not have employment problems while working at the Jefferson County facility. Petitioner's first year at the Taylor County correctional facility was "O.K." However, Petitioner was not well liked among her fellow officers. Between June through October 1996, Petitioner was the subject of several complaints from her fellow officers. These separate complaints were: On June 12 or 13, 1996, King cursed at an entire dormitory of inmates. On June 19 King was assigned to assist another officer in conducting a recount of inmates. She failed to assist the officer in conducting the recount. On July 24, 1996, King was assigned to escort the swill truck (a food truck) by the control room sergeant. She refused to accept the assignment and cursed at the control room sergeant. A few days later, she confronted another officer in a hostile and threatening manner because the officer had submitted an incident report concerning King's conduct in cursing at the control room sergeant. On October 9, another sergeant asked King to sign a typed incident report regarding King's loss of her state-issued handcuff case. King initially refused to sign the report. Shortly thereafter, she tore up the report in the presence of an inmate because she was displeased with certain comments in the report. On October 28, King cursed at a coworker. Id. PERC Final Order dated October 8, 1997. In October 1996, Petitioner filed several internal discrimination complaints against the agency generally opposing unfair employment practices. The exact nature of these complaints was not established by the evidence. On December 13, 1996, Petitioner received a notice of disciplinary charges being brought against her based on the earlier-filed employee complaints. The notice lists the charges as follows: Multiple charges are being brought against you stemming from several investigations. In the first case, you are being charged with malicious use of profane or abusive language toward inmates, visitors, or persons under supervision, use of verbal abuse of an inmate, conduct unbecoming a public employee, and willful violation of state statute, rule, directive, or policy statement. Specifically on June 25, 1996, an anonymous request was received by the Superintendent's Office alleging that you cursed the entire dormitory of inmates on June 13, 1996. It was also alleged that you had been gambling and would not pay off your debts. This prompted an investigation into these allegations. Several witnesses including an inmate verified the above allegations. The basis for these charges is contained in the Institutional Investigation Report #96-044, a copy attached and made a part hereof. This conduct violates Department of Corrections' Rules 33- 4.001(4)(a), 33-4.002(4)(9), and 33- 4.003(6)(20)(22)(24), F.A.C., copies attached and made a part hereof. In the second case, you are being charged with willful violation of state statute, rule, directive, or policy statement, conduct unbecoming a public employee, unwilling to follow lawful orders or perform officially designated duties, interference with an employee, failure to follow oral or written instructions, witness tampering during an investigation, and retaliation. Specifically on July 24, 1996, Sergeant J. Pickles reported that while assigned as Control Room Supervisor, he advised you via radio that he needed an escort for the swill truck. You responded by telephone and stated "Why are you calling me? I'm not escorting that fucking swill truck. I'm busy in the Caustic Room. Get someone else to do that shit." Officer V. Aman submitted an incident report verifying the telephone conversation since it was the dormitory in which she was assigned to that you came to use the telephone. On August 1, 1996, Officer Aman also stated that you made threats toward her in retaliation for submitting her report, in which you admitted to confronting this officer. The basis for these charges is contained in Institutional Investigation Report #96-052, a copy attached and made a part hereof. This conduct violates Department of Corrections' Rules 33-4.001(4)(a), 33- 4.002(4)(11)(17), 33-4.003(22)(24)(32), F.A.C., and Sections 914.22, 914.23, Florida Statutes, copies attached and made a part hereof. In the third case, you are being charged with willful violation of state statute, rule, directive, or policy statement, conduct unbecoming, unwillingness to perform officially designated duties, substandard quality of work, negligence, and failure to follow oral or written instructions. Specifically, on June 19, 1996, a recount was ordered and you were informed by the control room that your dormitory officer needed assistance in the recount. The officer stated that he waited approximately ten (10) minutes for your arrival and proceeded to recount without assistance. He then submitted an report as to the incident. You then submitted an incident report concurring with the officer with the exception that you observed the recount from the Officer's Station. The basis for these charges can be found more specifically contained in the Institutional Investigation #96-058, a copy attached and made a part hereof. This conduct violates Department of Corrections' Rules 33-4.001(4)(a), 33-4.002(4)(11) and 33-4.003(10)(13)(22)(24)(32), F.A.C., Institutional Post Orders 17.02(j), 06.03(B)(1b)(1c)(1f)(lg)(2a), and (D)(4), and Institutional Operating Procedures 3.03.3(C)(5)(11e), copies attached and made a part hereof. In the fourth case, you are being charged with conduct unbecoming a public employee, willful violation of state statute, rule, directive, or policy statement, and destruction or abuse of DC property or equipment. Specifically on October 9, 1996, you submitted an Incident Report for losing your state issued handcuff case. On October 13, 1996, after being typed, Sergeant Chad Dees gave the Incident Report to you to be signed. Upon receiving the report, you allegedly stated "I will show you what I will do with this," then tore the report up and walked away. You admitted to tearing up the report because of the comments written by Captain Simons, but denied making the comment alleged by Sergeant Dees. Officer Tammy Alvarez witnessed you tear up the report, but denied hearing any statements made by you. The basis for these charges is contained in the Investigative Report #96-23008, a copy attached and made a part hereof. This conduct violates Department of Corrections' Rules 33-4.001(4)(a), 33-4.002(25), and 33- 4.003(22)(24)(27), F.A.C., copies attached and made a part hereof. All of these charges pre-date Petitioner's internal complaints. On January 23, 1997, a predetermination conference was held on the above charges. The evidence did not demonstrate that the employee charges or the disciplinary action were retaliatory in nature or based in discrimination. Moreover, the factual basis of the charges was upheld in the PERC Final Order. As referenced in the letter, Petitioner was the subject of several investigations conducted by the Inspector General's Office of the Department of Corrections. The role of the Inspector General was to gather the facts and evidence involved in a complaint. The Inspector General does not make any recommendations as to discipline or determine if a rule or statutory violation has occurred. Raleigh Sistruck, an Inspector with the Inspector General's office conducted some of the investigations of Petitioner. He did not personally know Petitioner. There was no evidence that he treated Petitioner differently than he did any other investigatory subject. Nor did Inspector Sistruck engage in any conspiracy or act alone to fabricate evidence against Petitioner or elicit false testimony from witnesses. Indeed, the only evidence presented in this case, is that Inspector Sistrunk followed standard investigatory procedures in investigating the complaints against Petitioner. In January, 1998, Petitioner was accused of soliciting an inmate and another correctional officer to cause harm to another inmate at the facility. The Inspector General's office investigated that accusation. Again there was no evidence that the inspectors engaged in any conspiracy to falsify or fabricate evidence. Normal investigatory procedures were followed. Based on the various complaints and the findings set forth in various Inspector General investigations, Mr. Drake decided to terminate Petitioner. Petitioner received a letter of extraordinary dismissal on February 7, 1997. The dismissal letter dismisses Petitioner for: This dismissal is the result of you being charged with willfully engaging in conduct which violates state statutes and Agency rules; conduct unbecoming a public employee; failure to conduct yourself in a manner consistent with the welfare of inmates; soliciting, bartering, dealing, trading with or accepting a gift or other compensation from an inmate(s); willfully treating an inmate in a cruel or inhuman manner; threatening or interfering with other employees while on duty; failure to maintain a professional relationship with inmates; giving false testimony; and interfering with an inmate. Specifically, on or about January 10, 1997, you solicited the assistance of inmate Tony Jackson, DC#724515 and Correctional Officer Jacqualyn Jackson-Beasley to cause harm to inmate Mike Doty, DC#725094. As a result of your actions and requests, Officer Jackson- Beasley, inmate Jackson, inmate Mark Smith, DC#724887, inmate Alberto Matta, DC#191523 and inmate Thomas Carrillo, DC#195319, conspired and did plant a homemade knife, with an approximate 14 inch blade, in inmate Doty's cell in an effort to set him up. When inmates Carrillo and Matta entered F- Dorm with the knife, Officer Jackson-Beasley signaled then with her fingers indicating inmate Doty's cell number. She also acted as a cover while the inmates planted the knife in inmate Doty's cell. Once the knife was planted, you and Officer Jackson-Beasley had a telephone discussion during which you instructed her to call Sergeant Gerald Miller and have inmate Doty's cell searched. Once Officer Jackson-Beasley reported the information to Sergeant Miller, a search of Doty's cell was made and the knife was recovered. Sergeant Miller than notified Captain William F. Buchtmann. After questioning by Captain Buchtmann, inmates Carrillo and Mata, both admitted their participation in placing the knife in inmate Doty's pillow and stated they were contacted by inmates Jackson and Smith for assistance. Carrillo was told by Jackson and Smith that it was you who wanted inmate Doty taken care of and they gave inmate Carrillo the impression that if he took care of inmate Doty, he would be paid $50.00 and be given an undisclosed amount of marijuana for his assistance. The following day, January 11, 1997, you stated to inmate Jackson words to the effect, "They locked up inmate Smith" and "That motherfucker talked" (referring to inmate Matta) You also stated to inmate Jackson words to the effect, "It's not cool for me to be seen talking to you." On or about January 17, 1997, Officer Beverly Pratt overheard you state to an unidentified inmate, words to the effect, "Something needs to be done with Doty." On that same date, inmate Willie Jackson, DC#041463, overheard you state to an unidentified inmate, words to the effect, "I am going to get Officer Jackson-Beasley and Sergeant Miller." When questioned under oath, on January 24, 1997, you gave false testimony when you denied all allegations. Additionally, the letter dismisses Petitioner for the earlier disciplinary charges discussed at the predetermination conference in December. Mr. Drake, Superintendent of Taylor Correctional Institute at the time, testified that Petitioner's termination was based on his belief that she had in fact committed the aforementioned rule and statutory violations. He stated that the termination was not based on Petitioner's race or sex or any other of her characteristics; rather, the termination was based on rule and statute violations. There was no evidence which demonstrated Mr. Drake engaged in any conspiracy to concoct evidence against Petitioner or to falsely accuse her. Angela Ratliff, Personnel Supervisor at the time, testified that she did not have any conversation with Petitioner wherein she told her that the Department, her supervisors or coworkers were "out to get her" or words to similar effect. Additionally, Ms. Ratliff does not recall having any conversations with prospective employers for Petitioner. The Respondent's policy is to recite to a prospective employer information contained in the employee's personnel file. The Department does not offer opinions or recommendations about an employee. Moreover, most of the information in the personnel file is considered a public record and must be released to any person or entity requesting the information. In any event, other than broad general statements about seeking employment and what she was told by others who did not testify at the hearing, there was no evidence regarding any specific prospective employer or the information, if any, the prospective employer received from the Department. There is no doubt that Petitioner feels very strongly she was discriminated against. The problem with Petitioner's case is a total lack of evidence to support her allegations. Throughout the hearing she made allegations of discrimination. However, no evidence apart from her allegations of which she had no personal knowledge, was offered. For instance, the alleged paper trail created against her or documents she claimed were changed were not introduced into evidence. No witness was called who wrote or filed such document or statement was called to testify about any such document or statement or any alleged change made to the document or statement. The paper noises or pauses of tape-recorded interviews of witnesses taken during the Inspector General's investigation did not support Petitioner's claim that the witnesses were prompted or told what to say. Such noises or pauses sounded exactly like pages being turned in a notebook when one page is full and a new page is needed to continue taking notes. The pauses sounded like a note taker pausing the witnesses' statement in order to catch up the notes to the witnesses' statement. Given these critical lapses in evidence and the earlier PERC Final Order, the Petition for Relief should be dismissed.

Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of May, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of May, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Anita King 108 Alice Street Perry, Florida 32347 Gary L. Grant, Esquire Department of Corrections 2601 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Azizi M. Coleman, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana A. Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149

Florida Laws (4) 120.5717.02760.10914.22
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