Findings Of Fact Before 1989, the Petitioner, Gregory Miller, was a community control counselor (in effect, a juvenile probation officer) working for HRS. After several years of satisfactory job performance, his employment was terminated for unsatisfactory job performance in 1989. The Petitioner believes his termination by HRS was unfair. On January 30, 1991, the Petitioner, Gregory Miller, pled nolo contendere to attempted arson in violation of Section Section 806.01, Fla. Stat. (1991). Adjudication was withheld, and the Petitioner was placed on probation for two years. The attempted arson charge arose at a time in October, 1990, when the Petitioner, who has a 20-year history of substance abuse and suffers from bipolar disorder and borderline personality disorder, decompensated under financial and other stress and attempted to burn his automobile in order to fraudulently obtain property and casualty insurance benefits. At the time of the arson attempt, his car was parked in the garage, and a tenant was residing in the garage apartment overhead. The tenant noticed the fire started by the Petitioner, put it out and reported it to the Petitioner. The Petitioner berated him for putting the fire out and told him to get his personal belongings out of the garage apartment and leave. While the tenant was in the garage apartment gathering his belongings, the Petitioner was attempting to restart the fire. The tenant had been a worker's compensation client of the Petitioner. The Petitioner continued to have mental and emotional and substance problems that led to additional criminal charges. On February 13, 1991, he was arrested and charged with battery of a law enforcement officer, a third degree felony. On October 3, 1991, the Petitioner pled guilty to the lesser included offense of resisting arrest without violence, a misdemeanor, and was sentenced to seven days time served in jail. On or about December 22, 1991, the Petitioner overdosed on a mixture of drugs and alcohol in a possible suicide attempt. When confronted with law enforcement officers, the Petitioner struck the officers and was arrested and charged with battery of a law enforcement officer, a third degree felony. The Petitioner was involuntarily committed under the Baker Act, and on September 21, 1992, he pled nolo contendere to simple battery, a first degree misdemeanor, and was sentenced to one day time served in jail and ordered to pay $200 in fine and court costs. As a result of his other criminal charges, the Petitioner was charged with violation of his probation on the attempted arson charge. On or about March 16, 1992, the Petitioner pled guilty to violation of probation. Adjudication on the violation of probation was withheld, but probation was revoked, and he was resentenced under the attempted arson charge to a year of community control, followed by a year of probation. On or about March 8, 1992, the Petitioner was charged with driving with his license suspended or revoked for failure to maintain required insurance coverage. Since 1992, the Petitioner has not been involved in any additional criminal activity or charges. On February 23, 1993, his community control was converted to probation. He moved to Pasco County and, on December 22, 1993, his probation was terminated early. The Petitioner has sought professional counseling. On or about March 22, 1993, he was referred to a vocational rehabilitation counselor with the Department of Labor and Employment Security, Division of Vocational Rehabilitation. Since approximately early 1994, he also has been under the care of a psychiatrist. With the help of counseling, the Petitioner has been sober since before August, 1993. Fortunately, therapy seems to have been successful. Except for two short hospitalizations for decompensation and medication adjustment early in his counseling, the Petitioner has been sober and mentally stable over the course of the last three years. From a mental health standpoint, the Petitioner no longer seemed to be a danger to himself or others, and he was making good progress in rehabilitating himself. On or about May 18, 1995, the Petitioner sought employment with Action Youth Care, a provider on contract with HRS. When he applied for the job, he was required to complete an Affidavit of Good Moral Character that swore, in pertinent part, that he had "not been found guilty of, or entered a plea of nolo contendere or guilty to, any offense prohibited under . . . Section 806.01 [Florida Statutes, arson]." The affidavit also required the Petitioner to "acknowledge the existence of any criminal . . . record regardless of whether [he] was adjudged guilty by the court and regardless of whether or not those records have been sealed or expunged." The Petitioner signed without acknowledging his attempted arson record. When his name was screened, the attempted arson record disqualified him from employment, and the Petitioner was terminated from his employment pending his request for an exemption. Despite the Petitioner's commendable progress in rehabilitating himself, there still are signs that some instability persists. He does not seem to appreciate the seriousness of his criminal record and history of substance abuse and mental illness, as they relate to HRS's statutory obligation to properly assess his moral character under Section 409.175, Fla. Stat. (1995). Instead, he blames HRS's actions on a "political" conspiracy to prevent him from obtaining employment. Similarly, he attempts to excuse his criminal record by blaming it all on HRS--the termination of his employment in 1989 allegedly was the sole cause of his decompensation and the resulting criminal offenses. His excuse for falsifying his Affidavit of Good Moral Character was that it was reasonable not to disclose the arson record because it was only attempted arson, not arson. He does not seem to appreciate that there is little or no difference in blameworthiness between the two. (The only real difference between the two is how soon the fire goes out or is put out.) Finally, the Employee Closing Summary produced by Action Health Care upon termination of the Petitioner's employment stated that Action would not re-hire the Petitioner and that the Petitioner's "weak areas" included: "poor rapport with team"; "would not accept authority"; and "documentation skills." (No "strengths" were noted on the form.) The Petitioner again blamed HRS, contending that the person who completed the form was lying to cooperate with HRS's conspiracy against the Petitioner. It is found that the evidence, taken as a whole, was not clear and convincing proof of rehabilitation and good moral character at this time.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that HRS enter a final order denying the Petitioner's request for an exemption from disqualification. DONE and ENTERED this 21st day of August, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of August, 1996.
Findings Of Fact Respondent was certified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission on July 14, 1983, and November 19, 1981, and was issued certificate numbers 02-33918 and 502-868. Respondent is currently certified as a law enforcement officer and as a correctional officer by the Commission. At all times material hereto, Respondent was employed as a Deputy Sheriff by the Broward County Sheriff's Department. On May 3, 1986, Respondent, Deputy McDonald, and their immediate supervisor Sergeant James Walkup were working a directed patrol in the south portion of Broward County, Florida. Each was in his own patrol car, but they were working as a group with the express purpose of conducting a routine harassment of known or suspected drug dealers or users in the vicinity. They spotted a rental car occupied by two black males parked in an open field in a residential neighborhood. The occupant of the vehicle in the driver's seat was Jimmy Fox, a reputed drug dealer. All three patrol cars pulled into the field behind the rental vehicle. Respondent "radioed" in that he had made a traffic stop. Neither McDonald nor Walkup radioed that they were on the scene to serve as back-up units. Deputy George Gechoff was working off-duty at the Home Depot on 58th Avenue in the west Hollywood area when he heard Respondent radio that he had made a traffic stop. Since Gechoff did not hear anyone radio that they were serving as back-up to Respondent, Gechoff drove to the location of the traffic stop which was just a few blocks away. When Gechoff arrived at the scene Respondent had already searched the front seat area of the rental vehicle and had asked Fox's permission to search the trunk. Initially, Fox refused consent to the search of the trunk of the rental vehicle. Gechoff and Fox knew each other. After Respondent assured Fox that Fox would not be arrested since the search was illegal and after Gechoff urged Fox to be cooperative, Fox consented to the request. The trunk of the car was opened, and Respondent and Gechoff began searching it. The Respondent found a pistol in the trunk and went to his patrol car to "run a check" on the gun. While Respondent was in is patrol car, Deputy Gechoff, who assisted in the search of the trunk, found an aspirin or "pill- type" bottle containing approximately 50 small objects. Although Walkup testified that the objects were square cubes of yellowish material, Gechoff testified that the objects were white chips of different sizes. At the time, Walkup, Gechoff, and Respondent each believed that the objects were "crack" cocaine. If the objects were indeed crack cocaine, each object would be a single dose of the drug, and each object would have a sale price ranging from $10 to $20. In respondent to his radio inquiry, Respondent was advised that he had a "hit" on the gun, which meant it was wanted in connection with a crime or that it had been previously reported as stolen. When Respondent communicated that information to his immediate supervisor, Sergeant Walkup, Gechoff handed Respondent the aspirin bottle. Walkup instructed Respondent to take both the firearm and the suspected cocaine and write up a "found property report." Respondent was concerned about writing a report for found property, rather than seized property, and suggested to Walkup that they simply turn the matter over to the State Attorney's Office. Walkup took the position that the property was illegally seized since there was no probable cause for the search of the vehicle and the search had taken place simply as part of an harassment operation. He instructed Respondent to report the property as "found property" and left the scene. When Respondent left the scene, he had with him both the confiscated firearm and the aspirin bottle with its contents. He remained concerned about being ordered to write a found property report, but knew he had to do something since he had already radioed in that he had recovered a firearm wanted by the Broward County sheriff's Office. On the spur of the moment, as he was driving through a wooded area near a rock pit, Respondent took the top off the bottle and threw it out the window scattering the contents as he threw away the bottle. Later that day Respondent wrote and signed an Event Report at the Broward County Sheriff's Office reporting that he had found a .44 Magnum and suspected cocaine off the roadway while on routine patrol. The firearm was turned in at the same time, and a property receipt was issued. No property receipt was issued for the suspected cocaine. Several weeks later, Sergeant Walkup received a telephone call from Fox concerning the incident on May 3. In response to that telephone call, Walkup retrieved and reviewed Respondent's report of the May 3 incident with Fox. Upon reviewing the report, Walkup became concerned with the apparent conflicts between the report's contents and his recollection of the events. He so notified his supervisor. On July 1, 1986, Respondent provided a sworn statement to Lieutenant Roger Lekutis of the Broward County Sheriff's Office, Internal Affairs Unit. He admitted that after he drove away from the scene of the Fox "traffic stop" he threw the bottle which he believed contained cocaine "rocks" out the window of his patrol car. He told Lekutis that Walkup had instructed him to write a report of the incident as a "found property" report. He also admitted failing to turn over the suspected cocaine to an evidence custodian. No evidence was offered suggesting that Respondent disposed of the suspected cocaine in a manner different than throwing it out the window as he drove through the wooded area near the rock pit, and the Respondent's testimony in that regard is credited. Since this incident, Respondent has been reinstated by the Broward County Sheriff's Office but was not yet on the payroll by the time of the final hearing in this cause, since he was undergoing certain pre-employment certification and testing procedures.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding Respondent not guilty of the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaint filed against him and dismissing the Administrative Complaint filed in this cause. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of April 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of April 1989. APPENDIX DOAH CASE NO. 88-4963 Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 1, 5, 6, 8-10, 13-17, and 19 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 2-4, 7, 11, 12, and 18 have been rejected as not being supported by the weight of the credible evidence in this cause. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph S. White, Esquire Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Johnny L. McCray, Jr., Esquire 400 East Atlantic Boulevard Pompano Beach, Florida 33060 Daryl McLaughlin, Executive Director Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Jeffrey Long, Director Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Rodney Gaddy, General Counsel Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue The issues in this case are whether the Respondent, the Department of State, Division of Licensing, should grant the applications of the Petitioner, Ricky O. Dawes, for a Class "C" Private Investigator License and for a Class "G" Statewide Firearms License. Specifically, under Section 493.6118(3), Fla. Stat. (1991), the issue as to each application is whether there is clear and convincing evidence that the Petitioner lacks good moral character.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Ricky O. Dawes, was a municipal law enforcement officer from approximately 1975 through the middle of 1977. He was a deputy sheriff and, later, a detective with the Hillsborough County Sheriff's Office from approximately June, 1978, through April, 1979, and from May, 1980, through August, 1992. Background checks when he was employed with the Sheriff's Office revealed no evidence of facts that would establish a personal history of dishonesty, unfairness, or disrespect for the rights and property of others or for the laws of Florida or of the nation. Nor is there any evidence, during the course of his employment through approximately May, 1992, that the Petitioner had a personal history of dishonesty, unfairness, or disrespect for the rights and property of others or for the laws of Florida or of the nation. During the summer of 1992, and for some time before, the Hillsborough County Sheriff's Office was involved in a substantial multiple-law-enforcement- agency investigation. In approximately June or July, 1992, the law enforcement agencies involved learned that the subjects of the investigation not only knew about it but had been given copies of four pages of notes made by members of the Sheriff's Office involved in the investigation that listed, by name and in some cases additional identifying information, some 15 "suspects" and 22 "possible targets." The disclosure seriously compromised the investigation, to say the least. An internal investigation was launched to determine the source of the damaging disclosure. It was revealed that a copy of the notes had been in the copying room of the identification and records section of the Sheriff's Office for approximately six to eight weeks prior to the disclosure. An employee recalled: seeing it on a work table in the copying room at the beginning of that time period; looking at it and realizing it was something important that should not be made public; thinking that whoever put it there would be back for it soon; and finishing his business in the copying machine, leaving the notes where he had found them. He also recalled returning to the copying room the next day and not seeing the notes where he had left them. He assumed at the time that whoever had put them there had returned and removed them. But later, in July, 1992, he read in the local newspapers that copies of documents sounding much like what he had seen in the copying room had been given to the suspects under investigation. He returned to the copying room and found the notes in a stack of miscellaneous papers. Several people, including the Petitioner, were questioned under oath during the course of the internal investigation. The Petitioner was questioned in a deposition conducted by an assistant state attorney on or about July 30, 1992. During the deposition, the Petitioner was shown copies of the four pages of notes that were recovered from the copying room and was asked whether he had ever seen a copy of them. The Petitioner looked at all four pages carefully (the deposition transcript indicates a pause in the proceedings) and answered, "no." After the deposition, the four pages of notes recovered from the copying room were processed for latent fingerprints. The Petitioner's left thumb print appeared on the left side of one of the pages, labeled at the top "Possible Targets," about two-thirds of the way up the page. On the list of 14 "possible targets" on that page were the names Vincent Loscalzo, who the testimony indicates is reputed to be involved in organized crime in the Tampa area, and several others whom the Petitioner either knew personally or whose names he would have recognized. The Petitioner's left thumb print also appeared on the left side of the next page of the list of "possible targets," also about two-thirds of the way up the page. On the list of eight names on that page were at least two names the Petitioner would have recognized. One was the husband of the mayor of the City of Tampa. The Petitioner knows Vincent Loscalzo personally. While employed with the Hillsborough County Sheriff's Office, the Petitioner also was in business for himself distributing an oil re-refiner. The Petitioner is concentrating on that business now that he has "retired" from the Sheriff's Office. (The Petitioner tried to give the false impression that his "retirement" in August, 1992, had nothing to do with the internal investigation and that the Petitioner had been planning for some time to retire in August, 1992, to concentrate on his business.) The product was manufactured by a company in which Vincent Loscalzo has an ownership interest. Loscalzo has an office above a lounge he owns in Tampa, called the Brothers Lounge, and the Petitioner has had conversations with him there. It is found that the Petitioner testified falsely on his deposition that he had never before seen copies of the four pages of notes recovered from the copying room. Many people, besides the Petitioner, had access to the copying room during the six to eight weeks that the notes were there. Most had legitimate Sheriff's Office business to conduct, and they would not have been questioned or supervised. Others, not having legitimate Sheriff's Office business to conduct, also could have entered the copying room unquestioned and unsupervised during that time period. Two other person's fingerprints were identified on the notes- -the person who brought the notes into the copying room and left them, and the person who saw the notes and recovered them after reading about them in the newspaper. Not all people who touched the notes necessarily would have left fingerprints that could be lifted and identified. Many factors would enter into the question whether someone who touched the notes would leave prints that could be lifted and identified. In addition to those identified, some unidentifiable prints were left on the notes. Under these facts, the Respondent concedes in its proposed recommended order that it was unable to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the Petitioner criminally disclosed the existence of a substantial criminal investigation to the subjects of the investigation. On or about January 23, 1993, the Petitioner was stopped for driving a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol consumption. As the arresting officer approached the Petitioner's vehicle, from the rear, the Petitioner opened the driver-side door and got out. As he did, his left pant leg got caught on an object that appeared to be under the pant leg at the Petitioner's ankle, and the pant leg bunched up and bulged. The Petitioner identified himself to the arresting officer as a retired deputy sheriff. Based on the arresting officer's experience and knowledge, particularly that off-duty law enforcement officers often concealed their firearms under the pant leg in an ankle holster, the arresting officer asked if the bulge he saw under the pant leg was a firearm. The Petitioner acknowledged that it was. In answer to the officer's question whether the Petitioner had a permit to carry a concealed firearm, told the officer that he did. In fact, the Petitioner did not even apply for a concealed firearm license until March 30, 1993, and one was not issued to him until April 6, 1993. It is found from the clear and convincing totality of the evidence in this case, taken as a whole, that the Petitioner lacks a personal history of honesty, fairness, and respect for the rights of others and for the laws of Florida.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Respondent, the Department of State, Division of Licensing, enter a final order denying the applications of the Petitioner, Ricky O. Dawes, for a Class "C" Private Investigator License and for a Class "G" Statewide Firearms License. RECOMMENDED this 19th day of August, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of August, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-2048S To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Fla. Stat. (1991), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. Rejected as not proven that the resignation was totally voluntarily. Also, no party questioned about it at the hearing knew the procedures for licensure by a former law enforcement officer. In any event, the procedures are matters of law, not fact, and are set out in Section 790.06, Fla. Stat. (1991). Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent necessary. Rejected in part as not proven and as being conclusions of law. Fact of the pendency of criminal proceedings, a ruling suppressing evidence, and the State's appeal accepted but unnecessary. Rejected as not proven and as contrary to facts found and as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence that the firearm was visible. (It was only detectable.) Part of the rest is rejected as being conclusions of law, and the other part of the rest is accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Accepted but unnecessary that the Petitioner has been charged but not convicted. The rest is rejected as being argument and conclusions of law. Accepted (the questions to the witnesses excluded reference to the charges leveled in this case) and subordinate to facts found. Rejected in part as being argument and conclusions of law and in part as not proven and as contrary to facts found and to the greater weight of the evidence. First sentence, accepted and incorporated. Second sentence, rejected in part as being argument but otherwise accepted but in part subordinate to facts contrary to those found and contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Third sentence, rejected as being argument and not proven and contrary to facts found and contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Fourth sentence, rejected for the same reasons as in 3., above. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1.-2. Accepted and incorporated. 3. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. 4.-9. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. 10. Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. 11.-13. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. 14. Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. 15.-16. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. 17. Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Ellis Faught, Jr., Esquire 206 Mason Street Brandon, Florida 33511 Henri C. Cawthon, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of State Division of Licensing The Capitol, Mail Station #4 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Honorable Jim Smith Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Phyllis Slater, Esquire General Counsel Department of State The Capitol, PL-02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250
The Issue The central issue in this case is whether the Respondent is guilty of the violations alleged in the administrative complaint; and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the testimony of the witnesses and the documentary evidence received at the hearing, I make the following findings of fact: At all times material to the allegations of the administrative complaint, Respondent has been certified by the Commission as a law enforcement officer, certificate No. 02- 34512. In April, 1987, Respondent was employed by the Florida Highway Patrol (FHP) in Dade County, Florida. On the morning of April 9, 1987, at approximately 7:00 a.m., while dressed in his FHP uniform, Respondent went to the home of his girl friend, Connie Hawkins. Unable to waken Ms. Hawkins by knocking at the door, Respondent went around to her bedroom, began to bang on the glass, and attempted to pry open the window. As a result, the window broke and Ms. Hawkins was awakened by the noise. Respondent then demanded that Ms. Hawkins open the door since he had cut his left arm on the broken window. When Ms. Hawkins opened the door, Respondent began to strike her about the face and arm. Apparently, Respondent was angry that Ms. Hawkins had not opened the door earlier and felt she had caused the injury to his arm. This injury, a two inch cut on the left arm, was bleeding rather badly. Respondent went to Ms. Hawkins' bathroom and wrapped a hand towel around the wound in order to apply pressure and stop the bleeding. Subsequently, Respondent left the Hawkins' home in his FHP vehicle. After she was sure Respondent was gone, Ms. Hawkins telephoned the Metro-Dade police to report the incident. She did not want to have the Respondent criminally prosecuted, but she did want to take measures to assure he would not attack her again. After giving a statement to the police, Ms. Hawkins went to an area hospital for examination and treatment of her swollen face and bruised arm. She was required to wear a sling on the injured arm for a couple of days. The Metro-Dade police notified the FHP that one of its employees, Respondent, had been named in connection with a domestic disturbance. The report of the incident was given to Lt. Miller, the FHP supervisor on duty the morning of April 9, 1987. Coincidentally, that same morning at approximately 7:30 am., Lt. Miller had observed a cut on Respondent's left arm and had ordered him to a hospital for stitches. According to the story Respondent gave Lt. Miller, the injury had been caused by the FHP car door when Respondent was entering it after a routine highway stop. A sharp piece of the window framing had allegedly snagged Respondent's arm causing the cut. According to the Respondent, the piece of metal framing may have fallen off the car since the area was later found to be smooth.- Following treatment for the cut, Respondent signed a Notice of Injury form which is required by the Division of Workers' Compensation for all work- related injuries. This form alleged the injury had been sustained as described in paragraph 8. Subsequently, an investigation conducted by the FHP raised questions regarding the incident with Ms. Hawkins and the "work-related" cut on Respondent's arm. Lt. Baker attempted to interview Respondent regarding this investigation. Respondent declined to be interviewed and resigned from the FHP. Later, Respondent obtained a job as a security officer with the Dade County School District. Prior to his resignation from the FHP, Respondent did not claim he had cut or injured both arms on the morning of April 9, 1987. Lt. Miller did not observe a cut on Respondent's right arm on April 9, 1987. Neither Lt. Miller nor Trooper Allen, a trained traffic homicide investigator, could discover any trace evidence on Respondent's FHP vehicle to substantiate Respondent's claim regarding the cut. There were no breaks in the metal or paint along Respondent's door in the area he identified as the point of injury. There were no rough or jagged edges. The Notice of Injury signed by Respondent contained information which was false or misleading.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Criminal Justice standards and Training Commission enter a final order revoking the certification for a law enforcement officer held by Respondent. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 19th day of January, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of January, 1989. APPENDIX RULINGS ON PETITIONER'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT: Paragraphs 1-38 are accepted. Paragraph 39 is rejected as irrelevant, immaterial, or unnecessary to the findings made herein. Paragraph 40 is rejected as irrelevant, immaterial, or unnecessary to the findings made herein. Respondent's testimony and that of Mr. Black relating to the alleged wound to the right arm was not credible. Paragraph 41 is rejected as irrelevant, immaterial, or unnecessary to the findings made herein. See comment p. 3 above. Paragraph 42 is rejected as irrelevant, immaterial, or unnecessary to the findings made herein. See comment p. 3 above. RULINGS ON RESPONDENT'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT: Paragraphs 1-5 are accepted. With regard to paragraph 6, to the extent that it relates Respondent's testimony it is correct, however, the fact it not. That is, it is found that Respondent injured his left arm at the Hawkins' home; consequently, Paragraph 6 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. Respondent's account was not credible. Paragraph 7 is accepted to the extent that it relates the story given by Respondent; such story being deemed incredible and therefore, rejected as contrary to the weight of credible evidence. Paragraph 8 is accepted to the extent that it relates the testimony of the troopers; however, the conclusion reached is speculative and unsupported by the record in this cause. Paragraph 9 is rejected as contrary to the weight of credible evidence. Paragraph 10 is accepted; however the facts related in that form were false or misleading. Paragraph 11 is rejected as argument, or unsupported by the credible evidence in this cause. Paragraph 12 is rejected as argument, or unsupported by the credible evidence in this cause. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph S. White, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Denis Dean, Esquire Dean & Hartman, P.A. 10680 N. W. 25 Street Suite 200 Miami, Florida 33172 Daryl McLaughlin Executive Director Department of Law Enforcement P. O. Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Jeffrey Long, Director Criminal Justice standards Training Commission P. O. Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue The issue to be determined is whether Respondent failed to maintain good moral character in violation of section 943.1395(7), Florida Statutes (2010), and Florida Administrative Code Rule 11B-27.0011(4)(a), and if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The Department?s Case Respondent is a certified corrections officer in the State of Florida, to whom Petitioner has issued certificate number 249713. On or about April 9, 2011, at approximately 2:00 a.m., Officer George Dodson of the Cottondale Police Department responded to a disturbance call at the Cottondale Villas at 3111 Willow Street in Cottondale, Florida. Officer Dodson found a group of people in the parking lot, including Respondent. There was a large amount of blood on the ground. Ms. Bradie had a cut on her hand that was wrapped in a cloth, and denied knowing how her hand was cut. Officer Dodson spoke to several people at the location, and the consensus was that Ms. Bradie had cut Mr. Marques White with a box cutter. None of the people with whom he spoke testified at hearing. No box cutters were found at the scene. Mr. White was not present at the scene. He returned at approximately 4:00 a.m., but was still bleeding and could not really speak. Officer Dodson did not take statements from anyone at the scene because, other than Ms. Bradie, all of them appeared to be intoxicated. He did recall Ms. Bradie saying she was struck in the face, but does not recall her face being swollen. The next day, Officer Dodson learned that Mr. White had returned to the hospital because of his injuries, which were serious. Pictures taken of Mr. White show a scar on his lip and arm, and a scar resulting from the performance of a tracheotomy. However, there is no evidence to indicate whether Mr. White had any of these scars prior to the incident, or that all of the injuries evidenced by the scars occurred as a result of Respondent?s actions. Officer Dodson was able to interview Mr. White on April 15, 2011, and a witness statement/affidavit was prepared on April 17, 2011. The statement of Mr. White is hearsay, and he did not testify. On April 15, 2011, Officer Johnson filed an affidavit/complaint and application for warrant against Ms. Bradie for aggravated battery. An information filed June 15, 2011, charged her with aggravated battery in violation of section 784.045(1)(a)1., Florida Statutes, a second-degree felony. A warrant for Ms. Bradie?s arrest was issued that same day. Ms. Bradie resigned her position at the Jackson Correctional Institution on June 27, 2011. Ms. Bradie entered a pretrial intervention program, and the charges against her were nolle prossed on February 25, 2013. Richard Johnson is an assistant warden at the Charlotte Correctional Institution. In April of 2011, he worked in the Inspector General?s Office at the Florida Department of Law Enforcement. Mr. Johnson investigated an administrative case against Respondent stemming from the April 2011 incident. He spoke to Mr. White, and recorded an interview with him. He did not speak with Ms. Bradie. In sum, Petitioner proved that on April 9, 2011, Respondent was present at an altercation at the Cottondale Villas. She had a cut on her hand, and there was a large amount of blood on the pavement. All of the other people present smelled of alcohol or admitted to drinking. Petitioner presented no testimony from anyone who was present during the altercation to describe the events leading to the charges against Respondent. Further, Petitioner presented no competent evidence regarding the item allegedly used to cut Mr. White, as there was no evidence regarding the discovery of any item found at the scene. Respondent?s Story Ms. Bradie testified on her own behalf. She is the only person who testified that was present during the altercation. She testified that she went to Cottondale Villas to pick up her child from her mother, who cared for the child while Ms. Bradie was at work. When she was leaving her mother?s apartment, she heard her brother, Lesidney, outside arguing with Marques White. According to Ms. Bradie, she put her baby in the car and told her brother to go inside, because Marques White was “not worth it.” This apparently angered Mr. White, who started arguing with her. Ms. Bradie?s mother came out of the apartment and tried to break up the argument. Mr. White swung around her mother in order to try to hit Lesidney, and continued arguing with both Ms. Bradie and her brother. A bystander, Marcus Bellamy, pulled Lesidney away from the argument. At that point, Marques White jumped on Ms. Bradie and started hitting her in the face. Ms. Bradie is five feet, one-inch tall. She testified that Mr. White had pushed her down to the ground. While she was close to the ground, she picked something up off the pavement and started swinging to try and get him off of her. While she believes she probably cut him in her effort to get free, she could not identify the object she picked up (which was never located) or say that all of his injuries were a result of her actions. There is no evidence that she deliberately tried to cut him at all, much less that she meant to cut his face. Ms. Bradie?s account of the events is the only evidence from a witness who was actually present at the scene, and her testimony was credible. The most persuasive and compelling testimony presented is that Ms. Bradie acted in self-defense. No evidence was present to rebut her testimony.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission enter a Final Order dismissing the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of February, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LISA SHEARER NELSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of February, 2014. COPIES FURNISHED: Linton B. Eason, Esquire Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Ashley Bradie (Address of record) Jennifer Cook Pritt, Program Director Division of Criminal Justice Professionalism Services Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Ramage, General Counsel Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue The issue is whether the law enforcement officer's certification of the Respondent, Nicholas R. Small, should be revoked for failure to maintain good moral character as required by Section 943.13(7), Florida Statutes, based on two incidents of misconduct. A third incident alleged in the second unnumbered paragraph of paragraph two of the Administrative Complaint was voluntarily dismissed at the beginning of the hearing.
Findings Of Fact Nicholas R. Small was certified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission as a law enforcement officer before the occurrence of the events alleged in the Administrative Complaint. The Administrative Complaint was filed after a letter of complaint was received from a citizen in April, 1985. This delay in bringing the matter to the attention of the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission staff accounts for the delay in the filing of the complaint. On June 13, 1978, Mr. Albert Lee Taylor, his wife and their three small children, were leaving Miami in the family car which was being driven by Mr. Taylor. They were on their way to visit a sick relative in Lake Placid, Florida. Due to Mr. Taylor's work schedule they were unable to begin their trip until after midnight. The Taylors are black. The Respondent, Mr. Small, was a police officer for the City of Hialeah Gardens. He observed the Taylor vehicle as it passed his police car at the corner of N.W. 81st Street and l03rd Avenue. Mr. Small pulled Mr. Taylor's vehicle over because he believed there were deficiencies in the tag light on the car. When Mr. Small left the patrol car and walked to Mr. Taylor's car, he told Mr. Taylor to get out of the car and walk to the back of Taylor's vehicle, which Mr. Taylor did. While using his flashlight, Mr. Small observed a handgun setting in an area between the bucket seats of Taylor's automobile. Mr. Small took possession of the gun. Mr. Taylor carried the gun for protection during the family's travel. Mr. Small arrested Mr. Taylor and while doing so required him to place his hands on the hood of the police car to conduct a pat- down search of Mr. Taylor. The police car engine was running. The hood of the police car was hot to the touch which made it difficult for Mr. Taylor to take the position which Mr. Small required him to assume. Small told Mr. Taylor to spread his legs so that he could be patted-down. Mr. Taylor had recently had hip surgery to replace the ball joint of his hip with an artificial joint. This restricted his range of motion and any attempt to move the leg beyond its range resulted in severe pain. Mr. Taylor spread his legs as far as his hip condition would permit without pain. Mr. Small became dissatisfied with Mr. Taylor's stance and told him to spread his legs more. Mr. Taylor told Mr. Small that he had already spread his legs as far apart as he could with a pin in his hip. Mr. Taylor's wife, who was near by, told Mr. Small that she was a nurse, that Mr. Taylor had a pin in his hip, and that he could spread his legs no further apart. Mr. Small told Mrs. Taylor to "shut up" and shouted that he did not care about that. Mr. Small took his leg and placed it between Mr. Taylor's feet and, by pushing outward, forced Mr. Taylor's legs further apart. Mr. Taylor lost his balance and, as a result of the action, fell on the hood of the car. This caused Mr. Taylor severe pain at the time and resulted in increased pain and tenderness in the leg for several weeks. Mr. Small took Mr. Taylor to jail. Mr. Taylor was never convicted of any crime as the result of that arrest. The next incident alleged in the Administrative Complaint took place on October 24, 1981, when Mr. Small was a uniformed officer for the City of Opa- Locka. Mr. Small had been sent to the scene of a disturbance near Rutland Street and 22nd Avenue. Rayfield Brown, Lloyd Johnson, and his two-year old daughter Fiona were there. Mr. Small and other officers arrived and Mr. Brown and Mr. Johnson were arrested and placed in Mr. Small's police car. After the arrest Mr. Small got into the police car to drive Mr. Johnson and Mr. Brown to the police station. On the way to the police station, Mr. Small turned onto Rutland Street. Mr. Brown looked at the sidewalk on the street corner and saw Mr. Johnson's child, Fiona, standing alone on the sidewalk and crying. Mr. Johnson saw his daughter as they passed the corner and asked Mr. Small to stop the car and pick the child up. Mr. Johnson pleaded with Mr. Small to pick up his daughter so that she would not be left alone on the street but Mr. Small did not stop to attend to the child or take any other action to assure that another officer would take care of the child, thus leaving her abandoned in a urban residential area.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the law enforcement officer certification of the Respondent, Nicholas R. Small, be REVOKED. DONE AND ORDERED this 5th day of February, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. DORSEY, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of February, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 86-2383 The following constitute my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes (1985), on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Petitioner The substance of Petitioner's proposed findings of fact have been accepted. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Respondent No proposed findings of fact were submitted. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph S. White, Esquire Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Peter Kneski, Esquire Biscayne Building, Suite 626 19 West Flagler Street Miami, Florida 33130 Rod Caswell, Director Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Robert R. Dempsey, Executive Director Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
