Whether Petitioner Lewis Velken failed to meet the Deferred Retirement Option Program ("DROP") termination requirements set forth in chapter 121, Florida Statutes; and, if so, whether he is liable for repayment of the distribution from DROP in the amount of $691,307.41.Petitioner is an independent contractor pursuant to section 121.021(50) and rule 60S-6.001(33). Therefore, he did not violate the terms of the DROP agreement and gets to retain his FRS retirement benefits.

Whether Petitioner, as a surviving minor child, is entitled to benefits from the Florida Retirement System (FRS), instead of the beneficiaries designated by the FRS member on the form provided by the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement (Department). Alternatively stated, the issue is what effect, if any, did the marriage and subsequent divorce of the FRS member to the minor child's mother have on his previous designation of beneficiaries, pursuant to section 121.091, Florida Statutes (2018).1/Petitioner failed to prove that FRS member's minor child is entitled to receive benefits instead of the beneficiaries designated by the FRS member.

The issue in this case is whether a city, which sponsors a retirement plan covering its general employees and police officers, became ineligible to receive funds that the state distributes for the benefit of police pensions when, in 1999, the board of trustees for the retirement plan failed to hold an election affording the member police officers a chance to vote on whether a new plan for police officers only should be established.City's retirement plan was not rendered ineligible to receive premium tax distributions when the plan's board of trustees failed to hold an election, as required by statute, on whether a new plan should be established for police only.

The issue for determination is whether Petitioner has enough creditable service in the Florida Retirement System (FRS), within the meaning of Subsection 121.021(17)(a), Florida Statutes (2009),1 to be "vested" and, therefore, eligible for a retirement benefit.Petitioner had only 3.09 years of service and was not vested in the Florida Retirement System.

Whether Petitioner is entitled to receive continuing retirement benefits as a joint annuitant of her late husband, Raymond Coyle.Petitioner could not demonstrate entitlement to her deceased spouse`s retirement benefits, where he never executed a form to change the designation of joint annuitant to Petitioner.

The primary issue in this case is whether Petitioner is entitled to receive an early retirement benefit pursuant to Sections 121.091(3)(b) and 121.091(7)(b), Florida Statutes, based on an effective retirement date of February 1, 1996.Petitioner is entitled to receive an early retirement benefit pursuant to Sections 121.091(3)(b) and 121.091(7)(b), Florida Statutes, based on an effective retirement date of February 1, 1996.

The primary issue in this case is whether Petitioner is entitled to receive an early retirement benefit pursuant to Sections 121.091(3)(b) and 121.091(7)(b), Florida Statutes, based on an effective retirement date of February 1, 1996.Petitioner is entitled to receive an early retirement benefit pursuant to Sections 121.091(3)(b) and 121.091(7)(b), Florida Statutes, based on an effective retirement date of February 1, 1996.

Whether wife alleged forgery of her signature, if proven, would cause Department of Retirement to change deceased husband`s selection of Option One retirement pay-out plan. Failed to prove forgery.

Whether Respondent is estopped from denying Petitioner's request to rescind her choice to change retirement plans (2nd Election) and requiring her to remain in the Florida Retirement System (FRS) Pension Plan; and, if so, what are Petitioner's options? Because of the complicated nature of FRS and Petitioner's unique circumstances, the issues and parties' positions are summarized herein. After being hired by the University of Florida, Petitioner had three retirement plan options: (1) State University System Optional Retirement Program (SUSORP), (2) FRS Investment Plan (Investment Plan), or (3) FRS Pension Plan (Pension Plan). Petitioner had been an FRS member in a previous job and switched from the Investment Plan to the Pension Plan solely because she was told she could only participate in SUSORP if she first became a Pension Plan member. The Division now admits there is no authority for this requirement, but argues it is not responsible for Petitioner's decision to switch from the Investment Plan to the Pension Plan. Rather, it blames another state agency and non-government agents for her belief that she could not participate in SUSORP unless she first bought into the Pension Plan. Ultimately, the issues in this proceeding are: (1) whether Petitioner was required to switch from the Investment Plan to the Pension Plan to participate in SUSORP; (2) whether the Division is responsible for Petitioner's belief that this was a requirement; and (3) if so, whether Petitioner's funds used to buy into the Pension Plan can be returned to the Investment Plan or transferred to her SUSORP account.Pet. proved estoppel and should be allowed to rescind her 2nd election to switch FRS Plans. Division advised and allowed her to believe she must buy into Pension Plan before she could participate in SUSORP, but such requirement was contrary to statute.

The issues to be determined are whether Dawn Jenkins (“Jenkins”) failed to meet the Deferred Retirement Option Program (“DROP”) termination requirements set forth in chapter 121, Florida Statutes; and, if so, whether Petitioner, Town of Miami Lakes (“Miami Lakes,” the “Town,” or “Petitioner”), is required to reimburse Respondent, Department of Management Services (“DMS”), Division of Retirement (“DOR” or “Respondent”), for the overpayment of retirement benefits paid to Jenkins.Town of Miami Lakes is jointly and severally liable for repayment of overpayment paid to employee who violated DROP terms.