DR. TONY BENNETT, AS COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION,
vs.
Respondent.
Case No. 13-3360PL
On November 8, 2013, a duly-noticed hearing was conducted by Administrative Law Judge Lisa Shearer Nelson of the Division of Administrative Hearings via video teleconferencing with sites in Jacksonville and Tallahassee, Florida.
The issue for determination is whether Respondent has violated the provisions of section 1012.795(1)(d), (g), or (j), Florida Statutes (2010), and Florida Administrative Code Rule 10.081(5)(d), and if so, what penalty should be imposed?
On June 3, 2013, Tony Bennett, as Commissioner of Education (Petitioner or the Commissioner), filed a four-count Administrative Complaint against Respondent, alleging violations of section 1012.795(1)(d), (g), or (j), Florida Statutes (2010),1/ and Florida Administrative Code Rule 10.081(5)(d). Respondent disputed the allegations in the Administrative Complaint and requested a hearing pursuant to section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. On September 9, 2013, the matter was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings for assignment of an administrative law judge.
On September 23, 2013, the case was scheduled for hearing to take place November 8, 2013, and proceeded as scheduled. The parties filed a Joint Prehearing Statement in which they stipulated to certain facts that would not require proof at hearing. Those facts, where relevant, have been incorporated into the findings of fact below. At hearing, Petitioner presented the testimony of Johnetta Thorpe-Williams, Beverly Cobb, Marchette Kelley-Cole, Carol Thomas, Martha Johnson, and Ronda Cotter. Petitioner‟s Exhibits 1-3 were admitted into evidence. Respondent presented no witness or exhibits.
The Transcript of the proceedings was filed at the Division on December 5, 2013. Respondent and Petitioner filed their Proposed Recommended Orders on December 12 and 16, respectively.
Both submissions have been carefully considered in the preparation of this Recommended Order.
The Respondent, Doreen Whitfield, holds Florida Educator‟s certificate 819770, which is valid through June 30, 2015. She is certified in the area of exceptional student education.
At all times material to the proceedings in this case, Respondent was employed by the Duval County School District (DCSD).
Beverly Cobb is a payroll technician employed by the DCSD for approximately 20 years. In December 1999, she was working as a payroll technician, when the district was implementing a new payroll system.
On or about December 17, 1999, Ms. Cobb was in the payroll office on the second floor of the DCSD building when Ms. Whitfield came to the office because of a problem with a check. She had a young woman with her. Ms. Cobb did not assist Ms. Whitfield with her problem but was close enough to hear
Ms. Whitfield‟s conversation with her co-worker and with Ms. Whitfield‟s companion.
Ms. Cobb‟s co-worker went to get a payroll supervisor to assist in dealing with Ms. Whitfield‟s problem. Ms. Whitfield was angry, and Ms. Cobb heard her say to the young woman with
her, “all they need is one fatality up here and everything would be okay.” She paused and then said, “if I have to come back, I‟m going to take someone with me.”
Ms. Whitfield‟s statements disturbed Ms. Cobb, and she perceived them as a threat. She was especially concerned in light of a mass killing at a car dealership that had taken place in Jacksonville not long before.
Ms. Cobb reported the comments to her director, Ms. Parker, who called security. Security staff asked
Ms. Whitfield to leave the building, and Ms. Cobb was asked to write a statement, which she did. Ms. Cobb‟s account of the incident is credible.
On or about January 10, 2000, Respondent was given a written warning and directed not to go to the second floor of the DCSD building where the payroll section was located.
On or about April 8, 2004, Respondent was notified by the DCSD that she would not be reappointed for the 2005-2006 school year.2/
On or about August 18, 2004, Respondent was issued a letter of reprimand by her principal, who at the time was John Lumpkin. The parties stipulated that the reprimand was issued, but no evidence was presented to indicate the reason for the reprimand. While the letter of reprimand refers to three incidents where Ms. Whitfield had apologized, and notes concerns
on the part of other staff members, there was no evidence presented, beyond the fact of the reprimand itself, to indicate what prompted the disciplinary action.
In October 2004, approximately two months after the issuance of the reprimand, Ms. Whitfield had a conversation with Johnetta Thorpe-Williams. Ms. Thorpe-Williams was an employee at Grand Park Middle and High School (Grand Park), where she worked as an office assistant for the house administrator in the discipline office for the school. At the time, Ms. Whitfield was working at Grand Park as a drama teacher.
Ms. Thorpe-Williams‟ desk was situated where she could see everyone coming and going out of the office. Ms. Whitfield would often come by and talk to her in the mornings.
On October 17, 2004, Ms. Whitfield came to her desk and started speaking about Mr. Lumpkin. Ms. Whitfield stated that Mr. Lumpkin was trying to discredit her, ruin her career, and take food out of her child‟s mouth by making her lose her job. She also stated that she was standing up for her rights; that she hated him and could “take a knife and cut his heart out;” and that she wanted to kill him because he was nasty, mean, and treated her like a dog. Ms. Thorpe-Williams also described comments by Ms. Whitfield that Mr. Lumpkin was “nasty, mean, and dangerous, but that he did not know dangerous. He don‟t know who I know. He don‟t know what I can do.”
Ms. Thorpe-Williams responded that she did not see those traits in Mr. Lumpkin, but that she did not want to be a part of this dispute and that Ms. Whitfield needed to talk to Mr. Lumpkin. She called Mr. Lumpkin and went with Ms. Whitfield to his office because she thought the comments should be addressed immediately. She had never seen Ms. Whitfield act this way, and did not know that she would not act on her statements.
However, when the two women went to Mr. Lumpkins‟ office, Ms. Whitfield denied making any of the statements
Ms. Thorpe-Williams reported. Ms. Whitfield started screaming, accused Ms. Thorpe-Williams of making it all up, and called her a liar.
Understandably, Ms. Thorpe-Williams was very upset by this turn of events. Mr. Lumpkin sent her home for the rest of the day, and when she returned, Ms. Whitfield was no longer at the school. Ms. Thorpe-Williams‟ account of the incident is credible.
During the 2010-2011 school year, Respondent was employed as a teacher at Winter Park High School in Duval County. Her specific assignment was as a support facilitator for the eighth grade. Support facilitators go into other teachers‟ classrooms and work with ESE students in those classrooms.
Close to the end of the school year, Winter Park received its budget projections for the following year. As a
result of those projections, one support facilitator position was going to be eliminated. Ronda Cotter, the principal at Winter Park High School, decided that Ms. Whitfield would be transferred from a support facilitator position to an ESE teacher position working in a self-contained classroom. She announced the change at a meeting with the ESE teachers in approximately May of 2011.
Ms. Whitfield was unhappy with the prospect of returning to the classroom, and made her objections known.
The support facilitators and speech and language pathologists at Winter Park shared an office. Marchete Kelly- Cole was a support facilitator for the seventh grade, Carol Thomas was a speech-language pathologist, and Martha Johnson was a support facilitator for the sixth grade. At some time shortly after the announcement regarding her reassignment, Ms. Whitfield was upset and started complaining, loudly, about being assigned to a self-contained classroom. Martha Johnson and Marchete Kelly-Cole were both present for this conversation, which took
place in the shared office. Ms. Johnson suggested that she speak with Ms. Cotter about the reassignment, reminded her that she was going to have no reduction in pay, and told her that sometimes you just have to make adjustments.
Ms. Whitfield responded that, “maybe something needs to happen to the principal‟s children, and then she would know how it feels.” Ms. Johnson was concerned about the comment, and said
to Ms. Whitfield, “what if someone said that about your granddaughter?” Ms. Whitfield got up and left the room.
Ms. Kelly-Cole‟s description of Ms. Whitfield‟s comments is very similar to that of Ms. Johnson. She stayed very quiet during the conversation because she believed Ms. Whitfield sometimes came to school with extreme mood swings, and was unsure what Ms. Whitfield might do. Ms. Whitfield‟s statements made her uneasy because she also has children and Ms. Whitfield knew where she lived. When she was eventually asked to write a statement about the incident during a subsequent investigation, she declined to do so because she was concerned for herself and for her children. Both Ms. Johnson‟s and Ms. Kelly-Cole‟s accounts of the conversation are credible.
Ms. Whitfield had a similar, if perhaps more colorful, conversation with Carol Thomas. On a Monday morning in early June 2011, the two of them were in the office alone.
Ms. Whitfield told her, “I am so angry at Ms. Cotter, I could take a gun and blow her brains out.” Ms. Thomas did not know how to respond to such a statement. Ms. Whitfield went on to say that Ms. Cotter ruined people‟s lives and laughed about it, and that something bad should happen to her or her children so that she would know how other people feel.
Ms. Thomas perceived the comments as a threat, but was initially reluctant to do anything about them. She did not want
to be in the position of reporting a conversation with no witnesses, and felt unsafe even though the threats were not made toward her. She found the comments to be “chilling, given the current climate in our nation and the things happening in schools.”
Ms. Thomas sought advice from her son, but did not get a clear answer from him regarding how she should handle the matter. However, on Wednesday of that week, Ms. Thomas went to see Ms. Cotter early in the morning and relayed to Ms. Cotter the conversation that had occurred on Monday. Ms. Thomas, like the other staff members who had encounters with Respondent, was a credible witness.
Ms. Cotter was upset by the report and concerned about her two young children. She reported Ms. Thomas‟s conversation to the district office, and staff from professional standards and the district police department came to the school and searched Respondent‟s car. No weapons were found in the vehicle. However, Respondent was escorted off campus and not allowed to return, and was assigned to Bulls Bay where she would not have interaction with children.
Ms. Cotter also called her husband to alert him regarding the comments, and asked him to check on their children. She also reported the potential threat to the director of the daycare facility her children attended. For some time after the
incident, the school resource officer would come to school early to make sure Ms. Cotter entered the building safely, and for months she parked right next to the building entrance so that she could enter the building quickly. She still harbors some residual concern, although Ms. Whitfield now works at a different school. In her experience, the kinds of statements attributed to Ms. Whitfield are not normally made in a school environment.
On or about July 12, 2011, the DCSD issued a letter of reprimand to Respondent and required her to attend the District‟s employee assistance program.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties to this action in accordance with sections 120.569 and 120.57(1).
This is a proceeding to discipline Respondent's educator certificate. Because disciplinary proceedings are considered penal in nature, Petitioner is required to prove the allegations in the Administrative Complaint by clear and convincing evidence. Dep't of Banking & Fin. v. Osborne Stern &
Co., 670 So. 2d 932 (Fla. 1996); Ferris v. Turlington, 510 So. 2d
292 (Fla. 1987).
Clear and convincing evidence “requires more proof than a „preponderance of the evidence‟ but less than „beyond and to the exclusion of a reasonable doubt.‟” In re Graziano,
696 So. 2d 744, 753 (Fla. 1997). As stated by the Florida Supreme Court, the standard:
Entails both a qualitative and quantitative standard. The evidence must be credible; the memories of the witnesses must be clear and without confusion; and the sum total of the evidence must be of sufficient weight to convince the trier of fact without hesitancy.
Clear and convincing evidence requires that the evidence must be found to be credible; the facts to which the witnesses testify must be distinctly remembered; the testimony must be precise and lacking in confusion as to the facts in issue. The evidence must be of such a weight that it produces in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction, without hesitancy, as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.
In re Davey, 645 So. 2d 398, 404 (Fla. 1994)(quoting, with approval, Slomowitz v. Walker, 429 So. 2d 797, 800 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983)); see also In re Henson, 913 So. 2d 579, 590 (Fla. 2005). “Although this standard of proof may be met where the evidence is in conflict, it seems to preclude evidence that is ambiguous.” Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Shuler Bros., 590 So. 2d 986, 989 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991).
Petitioner alleged that Respondent violated subsections 1012.795(1)(d), (g), and (j), Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 6A-10.081(5)(d). Section 1012.795 provides in relevant part:
The Education Practices Commission may suspend the educator certificate of any person as defined in s. 1012.01(2) or (3) for up to 5 years, thereby denying that person the right to teach or otherwise be employed by a district school board or public school in any capacity requiring direct contact with students for that period of time, after which the holder may return to teaching as provided in subsection (4); may revoke the educator certificate of any person, thereby denying that person the right to teach or otherwise be employed by a district school board or public school in any capacity requiring direct contact with students for up to 10 years, with reinstatement subject to the provisions of subsection (4); may revoke permanently the educator certificate of any person thereby denying that person the right to teach or otherwise be employed by a district school board or public school in any capacity requiring direct contact with students; may suspend the educator certificate, upon an order of the court or notice by the Department of Revenue relating to the payment of child support; or may impose any other penalty provided by law, if the person:
* * *
(d) Has been guilty of gross immorality or an act involving moral turpitude as defined by rule of the State Board of Education.
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(g) Upon investigation, has been found guilty of personal conduct that seriously reduces that person‟s effectiveness as an employee of the district school board.
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(j) Has violated the Principles of Professional Conduct for the Education
Profession prescribed by State Board of Education rules.
Rule 6A-10.081(5)(d) provides that a certified instructor “shall not engage in harassment or discriminatory conduct which unreasonably interferes with an individual‟s performance of professional or work responsibilities or with the orderly process of education or which creates a hostile, intimidating, abusive, offensive, or oppressive environment; and, further, shall make reasonable effort to assure that each individual is protected from such harassment or discrimination.”
Section 1012.796(7) provides, in pertinent part, that:
1012.796 Complaints against teachers and administrators; procedure:
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A panel of the commission shall enter a final order either dismissing the complaint or imposing one or more of the following penalties:
Denial of an application for a teaching certificate or for an administrative or supervisory endorsement on a teaching certificate. The denial may provide that the applicant may not reapply for certification, and that the department may refuse to consider that applicant‟s application, for a specified period of time or permanently.
Revocation or suspension of a certificate.
Imposition of an administrative fine not to exceed $2000 for each count or separate offense.
Placement of the teacher, administrator, or supervisor on probation for a period of time and subject to such conditions as the commission may specify, including requiring the certified teacher, administrator, or supervisor to complete additional appropriate college courses or work with another certified educator, with the administrative costs of monitoring the probation assessed to the educator placed on probation. An educator who has been placed on probation shall, at a minimum:
Immediately notify the investigative office in the Department of Education upon termination of employment in the state in any public or private position requiring an educator's certificate.
Have his or her immediate supervisor submit annual performance reports to the investigative office in the Department of Education.
Pay to the commission within the first 6 months of each probation year the administrative costs of monitoring probation assessed to the educator.
Violate no law and shall fully comply with all district school board policies, school rules, and State Board of Education rules.
Satisfactorily perform his or her assigned duties in a competent, professional manner.
Bear all costs of complying with the terms of a final order entered by the commission.
Restriction of the authorized scope of practice of the teacher, administrator, or supervisor.
Reprimand of the teacher, administrator, or supervisor in writing, with a copy to be placed in the certification file of such person.
Imposition of an administrative sanction, upon a person whose teaching certificate has expired, for an act or acts committed while that person possessed a teaching certificate or an expired certificate subject to late renewal, which sanction bars that person from applying for a new certificate for a period of 10 years or less, or permanently.
Refer the teacher, administrator, or supervisor to the recovery network program provided in s. 1012.798 under such terms and conditions as the commission may specify.
Because of the penal nature of section 1012.795, it must be strictly construed, with any ambiguity construed against the petitioner. Elmariah v. Dep‟t of Prof‟l Reg., 574 So. 2d 164 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990); Taylor v. Dep‟t of Prof‟l Reg., 534 So. 2d 782, 784 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). Disciplinary statutes must be construed in terms of their literal meaning, and words used by the Legislature may not be expanded to broaden their application. Latham v. Fla. Comm‟n on Ethics, 694 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997); see also Beckett v. Dep‟t of Fin. Svcs., 982 So. 2d 94,
100 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008); Dyer v. Dep‟t of Ins. & Treas., 585 So. 2d 1009, 1013 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991).
Count 1 of the Administrative Complaint alleged that Respondent violated section 1012.795(1)(d), “in that Respondent has been guilty of gross immorality or an act involving moral
turpitude as defined by rule of the State Board of Education.” (emphasis added).
The Ethics in Education Act, chapter 2008-108, § 32, Laws of Florida, amended section 1012.795(1)(d) to add the phrase “as defined by rule of the State Board of Education,” creating the statute as it appears at present.
In Cappi Arroyo v. Dr. Eric J. Smith, as Commissioner
of Education, Case No. 11-2799, ¶ 109 (Fla. DOAH May 31, 2012; Fla. EPC Nov. 13, 2012), Judge F. Scott Boyd analyzed the effect of the 2008 legislative amendment of section 1012.795(1)(d) as
follows:
The Ethics in Education Act, Chapter 2008- 108, Laws of Florida, added the phrase "as defined by rule of the State Board of Education" to what now appears as section 1012.795(1)(d). It is unclear whether this new language modifies only "an act involving moral turpitude" or if it instead modifies the entire phrase "gross immorality or an act involving moral turpitude." The absence of a comma after the word "immorality" suggests that it modifies the entire phrase. In any event, when construing penal statutes, any statutory ambiguity should be resolved in favor of Petitioner. Cilento v. State, 377 So. 2d 663, 668 (Fla. 1979)(where criminal statute is ambiguous, construction most favorable to accused should be adopted). See also § 775.021, Fla. Stat. ("The provisions of this code and offenses defined by other statutes shall be strictly construed; when the language is susceptible of differing constructions, it shall be construed most favorably to the accused."). This portion of the statute is thus only violated if an educator is guilty of gross immorality as
defined by rule of the State Board of Education. (emphasis added).
The Final Order in Arroyo v. Smith accepted Judge Boyd‟s Recommended Order, and it was “adopted in full and becomes the Final Order of the Education Practices Commission.” That Final Order, and the conclusions of the Recommended Order adopted thereby, will therefore be applied in this case.
Judge Boyd correctly noted that “[t]he State Board of Education has not defined the term „gross immorality‟ by rule.” Arroyo v. Smith at ¶ 110. The undersigned, having reviewed the relevant rules promulgated by the State Board of Education, concurs with Judge Boyd and finds that the State Board of Education has not defined “gross immorality” by rule.
Petitioner suggests that “gross immorality” should be applied in accordance with administrative cases construing the term that were decided prior to the legislative mandate that the term be defined by rule. Given the 2008 amendment of the statute, those cases are inapplicable to the current standard established by the legislature.
Based on the foregoing, Respondent failed to prove that Petitioner was “guilty of gross immorality . . . as defined by rule of the State Board of Education.”
Petitioner asserts that the Commission has defined the terms “immorality” and “moral turpitude” in rule 6A-5.056. All
of the acts upon which this proceeding is based occurred prior to a substantial rewording of rule 6A-5.056 on July 8, 2012. Thus, whether such acts constituted ones involving moral turpitude must be gauged against the standard in effect at the time the acts giving rise to this proceeding occurred, i.e., that version of the rule as it existed prior to its 2012 amendment. Childers v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 696 So. 2d 962, 964 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997)(“The version of a statute in effect at the time grounds for disciplinary action arise controls.”).
Prior to its 2012 amendment, rule 6A-5.056(6) defined “moral turpitude” as “a crime that is evidenced by an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties, which, according to the accepted standards of the time a man owes to his or her fellow man or to society in general, and the doing of the act itself and not its prohibition by statute fixes the moral turpitude.” Furthermore, moral turpitude has been defined by the Supreme Court as:
involv[ing] the idea of inherent baseness or depravity in the private social relations or duties owed by man to man or by man to society . . . . It has also been defined as anything done contrary to justice, honesty, principle or good morals, though it often involves the question of intent as when unintentionally committed through error of judgment when wrong was not contemplated. (citations omitted)
State ex rel. Tullidge v. Hollingsworth, 108 Fla. 607, 611 (Fla. 1933).
Petitioner contends that as leaders and role models in the community, teachers are held to a high moral standard. Adams v. Prof‟l Practices Council, 406 So. 2d 1170, 1172 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), and that as a teacher, it is not necessary for Respondent to have been convicted of a crime in order to be disciplined for conduct involving moral turpitude. In support of this premise, Petitioner cited Walton v. Turlington, 444 So. 2d 1082, 1084 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).
In Walton, however, the court does not cite the statute under which Walton was charged or provide the language of the statute. The current language of the statute, however, as discussed above, specifically requires the State Board of Education to define an act of moral turpitude by rule. The Board has done so, expressly limiting an act of moral turpitude to “a crime that is evidenced by an act of baseness . . . .” In light of the requirement that statutes and rules be strictly construed in favor of the licensee, and inasmuch as there is no evidence that Respondent was ever convicted of a crime or engaged in conduct constituting a crime, Respondent is not guilty of violating section 1012.795(1)(d).
Count 2 of the Administrative Complaint charges a violation of section 1012.795(1)(g), by “being found guilty of
personal conduct which seriously reduces her effectiveness as an employee of the school board.” Like Walker v. Highlands County School Board, 752 So. 2d 127, 128 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000), the conduct at issue occurred on school board property. In each instance, Respondent‟s comments were heard by other school board employees who took her seriously. At least two were reluctant to report her conduct for fear of retaliation and Respondent‟s volatile nature. Ms. Cotter took precautions for months and feared for the safety of her children. Petitioner has proven a violation of Count 2 by clear and convincing evidence.
Count 3 charges a violation of section 1012.795(1)(j), which requires a violation of rule 6A-10.081(5)(d). Count 3 does not constitute an independent violation, but rather is dependent upon a corresponding violation of the rules constituting the Principles of Professional Conduct, which is charged in Count 4.
The unrebutted evidence is that Respondent repeatedly made comments to employees in the school district that threatened other employees. While the threats were not made directly to the subjects of the threats, in each incident the comments generated concern. While Respondent‟s counsel attempted to characterize the statements as simply dramatic behavior, Respondent‟s comments were similar to shouting “fire” in a crowded theater. Making threatening comments about school officials in today‟s social climate3/ is far more than simply being dramatic. Comments such
as those made by Respondent are inflammatory and designed to, at a minimum, intimidate. Petitioner has proven a violation of rule 6A-10.081(5)(d).
Disciplinary Guidelines for educator discipline are found in rule 6B-11.007. For a violation of section 1012.795(1)(f), the range of penalties is probation to revocation. For a violation of rule 6A-10.081(5)(d) that does not involve students, the penalty range is reprimand to revocation. Rule 6B-11.007(2)(f), (i)11.
The guidelines also list aggravating and mitigating factors to be considered in determining whether to deviate from the guidelines. In cases such as this one, where the range of appropriate penalties is wide, these factors are helpful in determining where in the spectrum of available penalties the appropriate penalty falls. The aggravating factors relevant to this case are the severity of the offense; the number of repetitions of offenses; the actual damage, physical or otherwise, caused by the violation; and any effort of rehabilitation by the educator. Rule 6A-11.007(3)(a), (c), (g), and (j). The undersigned has also considered that while no evidence was presented regarding Respondent‟s actual competency as an instructor, there was evidence that Respondent was unhappy at the prospect of being in a self-contained classroom teaching
to teach.
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Education Practices Commission enter a Final Order finding Respondent guilty of section 1012.795(1)(g) and (j) and rule 6A-10.081(5)(d). It is further recommended that the Commission revoke Respondent‟s certification as an educator, with the decision concerning whether the revocation is permanent being left to the discretion of the Commission.
DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of January, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.
Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of January, 2014.
1/ Subsections listed in the Administrative Complaint correspond to the version in the 2013 Florida Statutes. Those subsections were the same in 2010, when the most recent events giving rise to the Administrative Complaint occurred. In 1999, these same violations were codified in section 231.28(1)(c), (f), and (i), and in 2004 were codified in section 1012.795(1)(c), (f), and (i). While the numbering of the statute has changed, the actual text for each violation remains the same throughout.
2/ While the parties stipulated to this fact, there was no evidence that explained how Respondent came to be teaching within the district after the non-renewal of her contract.
3/ Attached to Petitioner‟s PRO was a table of school and mass shootings that have occurred since 1996, listing the date, location, and number of people killed in each instance.
Respondent has not objected to the inclusion of the table. However, evidence regarding these mass shootings was not presented at hearing and the chart has not been considered. Reference to the current social climate is based on the testimony of Ms. Cobb and Ms. Thomas.
David A. Hertz, Esquire Duval Teachers United 1601 Atlantic Boulevard
Matthew Carson, General Counsel Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1244
15 days from the date of this Recommended Order. Any exceptions to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that will issue the Final Order in this case.
