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DEPARTMENT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND TRAINING COMMISSION vs VINCE CAMPBELL, 94-005306 (1994)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Gainesville, Florida Sep. 22, 1994 Number: 94-005306 Latest Update: Apr. 02, 1996

The Issue In this case, the Petitioner seeks to impose discipline against the Respondent's certificate to be employed as a correctional officer based upon the allegation that the Respondent has committed acts which evidence a failure to maintain the qualifications incumbent upon a correctional officer working in Florida. In particular, it is alleged that the Respondent committed acts which demonstrated a lack of good moral character.

Findings Of Fact Facts Deemed Admitted The Respondent was certified as a corrections officer by the Petitioner on or about August 16, 1985 and was issued Corrections Certificate No. 28-85- 502-02. The Respondent was employed as a sworn corrections officer with the Alachua County Department of Corrections from June 17, 1985 to August 8, 1991. The Respondent, on or about April 20, 1990, was found guilty by a jury for the crime of resisting arrest without violence, a misdemeanor. The court withheld adjudication and sentenced the Respondent to six months of probation. The Respondent, on or about July 8, 1991, entered a plea of nolo contendere to the criminal charges of resisting arrest without violence and battery, both misdemeanors. The court sentenced the Respondent to one year of probation and withheld adjudication. On or about August 6, 1991, the Respondent became involved in a dispute with members of his family at his residence. The Respondent had consumed one or more alcoholic beverages immediately prior to and/or during the above-referenced family dispute. The dispute turned into a verbal and physical disturbance involving the Respondent and members of his family. The police were called to the Respondent's residence due to the above- referenced disturbance. After the police arrived with regard to the above-referenced disturbance, the Respondent barricaded himself inside his residence by locking the doors. After barricading himself inside his residence, the Respondent armed himself with a knife. The Respondent threatened to kill the police officers at the scene of the above-referenced disturbance if the officers attempted to apprehend him. Other Facts The offense described in paragraph 3 to these facts is related to the allegations contained in paragraph 2.(a) to the Administrative Complaint. The offense described in paragraph 4 to these facts is related to the allegations contained in paragraph 2.(b) to the Administrative Complaint, with the exception that paragraph 2.(b) makes no mention that a battery was committed. The offense described in paragraph 4 to these facts was considered in the Circuit Court of Union County, Florida, Case No. 90-29-CF. In addition to the service of one year of probation, the Respondent was ordered to successfully complete Anger Management as instructed by the Respondent's probation officer. On August 2, 1989, at approximately 9:30 p.m., in Alachua, Florida, Officer Lisa Brown, in pursuing her duties as a sworn officer, stopped the Respondent for a traffic violation. The Respondent was stopped because he had run two stop signs in Alachua. The stop signs were run at Northeast 8th Avenue crossing over State Road 235 and at Northwest 8th Avenue at Main Street. Officer Brown is now Officer Lisa Brown Haefner. At times relevant, Officer Haefner was serving as a police officer with the City of Alachua. Officer Haefner made the traffic-violation stop on Northwest 8th Avenue, off of Main Street, in Alachua. When the traffic-violation stop was made, Officer Haefner was assisted by Sergeant Cindy Dennison of the City of Alachua. Sergeant Dennison and Officer Haefner were driving separate patrol units on that night. Both officers observed the Respondent run the stop signs. Officer Haefner and Sergeant Dennison did not know Respondent when the traffic stop was made. After the stop, Officer Haefner asked the Respondent to exit his vehicle. The Respondent exited the vehicle. At that time, Officer Haefner asked the Respondent for identification. The Respondent replied that he "had none". Officer Haefner asked the Respondent for his name. The Respondent stated that he "didn't have a name". When the Respondent was contacted about the traffic violations, Officer Haefner asked for his driver's license, and the Respondent told Officer Haefner that he did not have a driver's license. The Respondent was acting irrational and irritated in the presence of Sergeant Dennison and Officer Haefner. Officer Haefner detected an odor about Respondent's person which she believed to be cannabis. Officer Haefner determined to arrest the Respondent for resisting or obstructing arrest without violence based upon the Respondent's failure to give information concerning his identity and the belief that she had cause to arrest Respondent. After informing the Respondent that he was being arrested for resisting or obstructing arrest without violence, Officer Haefner and Sergeant Dennison attempted to place handcuffs on the Respondent. This was a normal procedure. The Respondent resisted the placement of the handcuffs by twisting and stiffening his body and leaving his arms in front of him, which obstructed the officers' ability to secure the Respondent's arms behind him, as they desired. Under the circumstances, Officer Haefner sought the assistance of Officer Clovis Watson, Jr. (later Sergeant Watson) and Officer VanHorn. The other officers who were summoned for assistance were employed by the City of Alachua Police Department. The Respondent was eventually handcuffed, placed in Officer Watson's patrol car, and taken to the police station. When at the police station, he continued to be irrational and irritated. At one point in the encounter between Officer Haefner, Sergeant Dennison, and the Respondent, the Respondent offered to obtain identification from the back seat of his vehicle. The officers declined that request in that the Respondent was acting irrational and irritated; and based upon a fear for her personal safety, Officer Haefner would not allow the Respondent to access his vehicle. Respondent's offer to obtain identification came about at the point in time at which Officer Haefner and Sergeant Dennison attempted to handcuff the Respondent. The nature of the Respondent's irrationality and irritability was manifested by his being "real vocal, not wanting to cooperate, agitated as far as being stopped" and asking the officers "why are you harassing me?". The Respondent manifested this attitude notwithstanding that Officer Haefner had told him that he was being stopped for a traffic violation. The Respondent also manifested his irritability by having an agitated appearance. Before the Respondent was arrested for resisting or obstructing arrest without violence, he had been told several times not to return to his vehicle; however, he continued to walk toward his vehicle. It is at that point that Officer Haefner and Sergeant Dennison physically grabbed the Respondent and tried to restrain and handcuff him. The Respondent's actions prohibited Officer Haefner and Sergeant Dennison from performing their law-enforcement duties in making the traffic- violation stop. The Respondent continued to struggle when the officers were attempting to place the handcuffs on him after Officer Watson arrived at the scene by swaying back and forth. In the course of that struggle, Sergeant Dennison fell to the ground and the Respondent and Officer Watson fell on top of her. As a consequence, Sergeant Dennison sustained a concussion. The Respondent held his hands close to his body as a means to restrict the ability of the officers to handcuff him. The Respondent shook back and forth and this caused the officers and the Respondent to fall, injuring Sergeant Dennison. While the officers were attempting to handcuff the Respondent, he did not strike out at the officers. The Respondent resisted, in part, because he did not wish to be taken to the jail where he worked. On May 5, 1990, the Respondent, together with his brother and a friend, went to Union County, Florida, to a nightclub. When they arrived they were confronted by a number of persons who were already at the club. A fight ensued and the Respondent's brother was injured. The Respondent then took his brother to Ramadan Hospital to have his brother treated for injuries sustained in the fight at the club. Ramadan Hospital was located in Lake Butler, Union County, Florida. Union County Sheriff Jerry Whitehead received a call on his beeper at around 1:00 to 1:30 a.m. on the morning in question. He called the Union County Jail and was told about the fight at the local nightclub. He was also told that all of the deputy sheriffs had been dispatched to the nightclub. In turn, Sheriff Whitehead got dressed and started toward Lake Butler. Ramadan Hospital is located between his home and the Union County Jail. About a mile from the hospital, Sheriff Whitehead received a call from the sheriff's office dispatcher indicating that there was a disturbance at the hospital. Sheriff Whitehead responded to that call. When Sheriff Whitehead entered the emergency room at the hospital, the Respondent, his brother and the friend were in the waiting area of the hospital. The Respondent was standing in the hallway at that time, cursing and saying that he had just contacted his supervisor, taken to mean supervisor at the Alachua Correctional Facility, and that the Respondent was "fixing to have some people come over and they were going to get the situation straight". Sheriff Whitehead identified himself to the Respondent and asked the Respondent what the problem was. The Respondent indicated that he had been involved in an incident at the local nightclub and that there had been a fight and his brother had been injured. The Respondent told Sheriff Whitehead that he was going to "take this thing into his own hands". The Respondent was also indicating "things" that he wanted to have done concerning the incident. Respondent was cursing and using foul language. Sheriff Whitehead told the Respondent that he had to calm down or leave the premises. Sheriff Whitehead repeated this remark a number of times. After a time Sheriff Whitehead went to a telephone in the hospital and called the sheriff's office dispatcher and asked that a deputy sheriff be sent. During the course of these circumstances, the Respondent was belligerent and had the smell of alcohol about his person. The Respondent was being very belligerent in telling the nurses something to the effect that he was going to "tear that place up if they didn't get this done." This related to the Respondent's concern that a doctor was not available to attend to his brother at the hospital. The disturbance which the Respondent was causing was primarily directed to the hospital staff. The Respondent continued his outbursts for several minutes. In the course of this event, the Respondent identified himself as a law enforcement officer. Sheriff Whitehead told the Respondent that he needed to calm down and to let the Union County Sheriff's Department take care of the situation. Finally, Sheriff Whitehead believed that he had lost control over the Respondent's conduct and told the Respondent that he was going to place the Respondent under arrest. The Respondent replied that "he did not need to be arrested, wasn't going to be arrested." Sheriff Whitehead then placed his arm on the Respondent's arm and the Respondent snatched his arm away from Sheriff Whitehead. At that point Sheriff Whitehead took the Respondent through a set of doors to exit the hospital emergency room. They struggled out onto a patio area and onto the asphalt parking lot and then onto a grassy area where Sheriff Whitehead took the Respondent down and held him until a deputy sheriff arrived to assist. Sheriff Whitehead told the Respondent that he was being arrested for breach of the peace, an offense which Sheriff Whitehead believed he had reasonable cause to arrest the Respondent for. After the Respondent had been subdued and handcuffs placed on him, the Respondent became cooperative and acted remorseful, again explaining to Sheriff Whitehead that he was a correctional officer and that he was afraid he was going to lose his job because of the incident. The Respondent was then taken by a deputy sheriff to be transported to the Union County jail. When Sheriff Whitehead was trying to talk to the Respondent, the Respondent would swing his arms and on several occasions made cursing remarks toward the nurses, which Sheriff Whitehead believed was because doctors were not available to attend the Respondent's brother at that time. On August 6, 1991, Officers Glen Hammond, Donald Rice and Price responded to an alleged domestic disturbance call at 305 N.E. Fifth Street in Alachua, Florida. Those officers were working for the City of Alachua Police Department when they made the response. The alleged domestic disturbance involved the Respondent, his mother, sister and brother. When the officers arrived at the scene the other family members told the officers that the Respondent had been involved in a physical altercation with them and had battered them. The Respondent's mother told Officer Hammond that the Respondent had been smoking crack cocaine prior to the arrival of the officers. The family members told the officers that the Respondent was located in a wooded area near the residence. The officers went to find the Respondent so they could talk to him concerning the complaint by his family. Officer Wallace located the Respondent and brought him back to the residence. While standing in front of the residence, the Respondent was arguing with his mother and using profanity. In addition, he yelled at Officer Hammond a few times to the effect that the Respondent wasn't going to be taken into custody. At that juncture there was no intention by the officers to arrest the Respondent. At this time Officer Hammond did not observe anything about the Respondent's demeanor to suggest that the Respondent had consumed alcoholic beverages. After a short period, the Respondent left the area adjacent to the residence and returned to the woods. The officers again went to find the Respondent so that they could discuss the complaint. While the officers were trying to locate the Respondent for the second time someone started yelling that the Respondent had returned to the residence and was inside the residence. The officers then returned to the residence. When Officer Hammond walked up to the front of the residence to an area adjacent to a porch on the front of the residence, the Respondent opened the door and stepped out holding a knife which appeared to be a steak knife. The Respondent told Officer Hammond that Officer Hammond was not going to arrest him and that if Officer Hammond tried to come on the porch, the Respondent would kill Officer Hammond. The Respondent also mentioned the possibility that he would do harm to himself. While standing on the porch, the Respondent was not acting in a rational manner. After the Respondent threatened to kill Officer Hammond, the officer backed away from the residence and called for assistance from other law enforcement officers. Officer Hammond did this being fearful for his safety. A second brother of the Respondent arrived at the residence when the Respondent went in the house from the front porch. The second brother went inside to try and talk to the Respondent to defuse the situation. The second brother managed to have the Respondent come out of the house, at which point, the Respondent was charged with disorderly intoxication. At about the time the Respondent was arrested, Officer Hammond was close enough to the Respondent to notice that the Respondent had an odor of alcohol about the Respondent's person. When Office Wallace found the Respondent in the woods on the first occasion, the Respondent did not resist the officer in any manner and agreed to go back to the residence with the officer. When the Respondent returned to the residence on the first occasion, he stated that he would kill somebody first before he would go to jail. It is at that point that the Respondent broke from the scene and ran into the woods. While on the porch, the Respondent stated that he would kill any officer or take his own life, and that the Respondent was not going to go to jail. When the Respondent was first approached in the woods, Officer Wallace did not have grounds to arrest the Respondent. When the Respondent came back from the woods the first time, Officer Hammond was trying to interview the Respondent concerning the circumstances between the Respondent and his family that had caused the officers to be summoned. When the Respondent returned to the woods for the second time, the officers did not have cause to arrest the Respondent. When the Respondent told the officers that he was not going to be arrested or go to jail, upon the conversation that the officers held with the Respondent after he returned from the woods on the first occasion, the Respondent had not been told that he was being arrested. When the Respondent went back in the house from the front porch, he locked the doors to the residence and still had possession of the steak knife. The residence in question was reported to the officers as being the Respondent's mother's residence.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent's Certificate No. 28-85-402-02 be revoked. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of October, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of October, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER CASE NO. 94-5306 The following discussion is given concerning the proposed findings of fact by Petitioner. Petitioner's Facts: Paragraphs 1 through 3 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 4 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraphs 5 through 30 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraphs 31 and 32 are not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraph 33 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 34 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraph 35 constitutes a conclusion of law. Paragraph 36 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraphs 37 through the first sentence in Paragraph 42 are subordinate to facts found. The second sentence in Paragraph 42 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraphs 43 through 50 are subordinate to facts found. COPIES FURNISHED: Paul D. Johnston, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement P. O. Box 1489 Tallahassee, FL 32302-1489 Joseph W. Little, Esquire 3731 Northwest 13th Place Gainesville, FL 32605 A. Leon Lowry, II, Director Department of Law Enforcement Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission P.O. Box 1489 Tallahassee, FL 32302-1489 Michael Ramage, General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement P.O. Box 1489 Tallahassee, FL 32302-1489

Florida Laws (8) 120.57316.074322.15784.011843.02943.10943.13943.1395 Florida Administrative Code (1) 11B-27.0011
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DEPARTMENT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND TRAINING COMMISSION vs HAWANDA GILBERT, 98-004122 (1998)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Sep. 17, 1998 Number: 98-004122 Latest Update: Aug. 20, 1999

The Issue Whether the Respondent committed the offenses set forth in the Administrative Complaint dated June 18, 1996, and, if so, the penalty which should be imposed.

Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission is the state agency responsible for certifying and revoking the certification of law enforcement officers. Section 943.12(3), Florida Statutes (1997). Ms. Gilbert was certified by the Commission as a law enforcement officer on March 12, 1993, and was issued Law Enforcement Certificate No. 136544. On July 1, 1994, Ms. Gilbert was employed as a sworn law enforcement officer by the Metro-Dade Police Department. On July 1, 1994, Officer William Romero was employed by the Metro-Dade Police Department as a law enforcement officer. He was first employed on March 29, 1993, and was still on probation on July 1, 1994. He was working as a uniform patrol officer, and, at the time of the incident in question, he was working alone. On the evening of July 1, 1994, a black female flagged down Officer Romero while he was patrolling the neighborhood. When Officer Romero stopped, she told him that an elderly, Hispanic male was in the vicinity armed with a handgun. Officer Romero promptly confronted the person pointed out by the black female and told him to turn around. When the man did so, Officer Romero saw a revolver sticking out from the waistband of the man's trousers. Although the gun was not in the man's hand at the time, Officer Romero immediately drew his firearm and told the man to put his hands up. The man did not respond but continued to talk with very slurred speech, and he appeared intoxicated to Officer Romero. After a few moments, the man grabbed the revolver in his waistband, but it stuck, and he was not able to remove it. Officer Romero overpowered the man, and they fell to the ground and wrestled. Officer Romero was able to remove the gun from the man's waistband, and he threw it onto a nearby grassy area. Officer Romero handcuffed the man and picked up the gun. He opened the cylinder of the revolver and saw that there were no bullets in the cylinder. Officer Romero took the gun back to his patrol car, and put the suspect in the car as well. Officer Romero then called fire rescue because the man was elderly and intoxicated, and Officer Romero was concerned because they had wrestled for what seemed like several minutes. Officer Romero did not speak with the black female who had flagged him down after she initially told him about the man with the gun, nor did he interview any other persons in the area. Lieutenant Kevin Lindahl arrived on the scene immediately after Officer Romero placed the suspect in the patrol car. Officer Romero explained the situation to Lieutenant Lindahl, showed him the suspect's handgun, and specifically told him that the gun was unloaded during his altercation with the suspect. When he showed the gun to Lieutenant Lindahl, the cylinder was open, and it was obvious that there were no bullets in the gun. Lieutenant Lindahl left the scene a short time after he arrived. As Lieutenant Lindahl was leaving the scene, then- Officer Gilbert and Officer Willie McFadden arrived. These officers were the primary unit assigned to the call. At the time of the July 1, 1994, incident, Officer McFadden was on probation as a new law enforcement officer, and Officer Gilbert had recently completed her probation. They were assigned to the same squad but were not routinely assigned to work together. When they arrived at the scene, both Officer McFadden and Officer Gilbert approached Officer Romero as he sat on the driver's side of his patrol car. Officer Romero told them what happened after he was flagged down; Officer Gilbert and Officer McFadden were both privy to Officer Romero's remarks.2 Officer Romero gave the suspect's revolver either to Officer McFadden or to Officer Gilbert. Officer McFadden asked Officer Romero whether the gun was loaded. Officer Romero responded that the gun was not loaded, and Officer McFadden examined the gun and confirmed that the cylinder was open and that there were no bullets in the cylinder. Both Officer Gilbert and Officer McFadden understood Officer Romero's statement that the gun was not loaded to refer to the time during which Officer Romero and the suspect struggled over possession of the gun, when Officer Romero took the gun from the suspect. Officer Romero turned the suspect over to Officer Gilbert and Officer McFadden and then left the scene. Officer Romero sought out and spoke with his acting sergeant, Officer Sandra Leon. He told her about the incident and advised her that Lieutenant Lindahl had appeared at the scene. During this conversation, Officer Romero told Officer Leon that there were no bullets in the gun. It was important to him because he was a rookie police officer and the July 1 incident was the first time he had confronted an armed suspect; he was nervous because he almost shot the suspect. Officer McFadden spoke with several witnesses at the scene who told him that the suspect's revolver had been loaded at some point during the afternoon and that the bullets had been removed from the gun. He was also told that the suspect had put the gun to someone's head and pulled the trigger twice but that the gun did not discharge. Officer McFadden "asked around for the bullets; no one could give me the bullets. And I immediately said then the gun is unloaded, we can't find any bullets."3 None of the witnesses Officer McFadden interviewed told him that the suspect had discharged the gun before Officer Romero arrived. Officer McFadden did not interview witnesses in the house in front of which the altercation took place. Rather, he stayed with the suspect while Officer Gilbert went into the house and spoke with several witnesses. She was told by Brenda Smith, the woman who had flagged down Officer Romero, that, earlier in the afternoon, the suspect had discharged the firearm into the air outside the house. Ms. Smith also told Officer Gilbert that the suspect entered the house after discharging the gun, pointed the gun at her and another person in the house, and pulled the trigger twice; the gun did not fire but just clicked when the hammer fell. Officer McFadden and Officer Gilbert stayed at the scene about 30 or 40 minutes. They discussed the offenses with which to charge the suspect and began preparing the required paperwork, which consisted of the arrest affidavit, the offense/incident report, and the property receipt. During the discussion at the scene, Officer McFadden raised the possibility of charging the suspect with the offense of "using a firearm while under the influence of alcoholic beverages, chemical substances, or controlled substances" (hereinafter "using a firearm while under the influence"), a crime defined in Section 790.151, Florida Statutes (1993), and identified as a first degree misdemeanor. Officer McFadden looked up the offense in the police manual setting forth crimes and their elements.4 The focus of discussion between Officer Gilbert and Officer McFadden was the statutory requirement that the firearm be loaded; they did not discuss whether the charge was appropriate in light of the fact that the offense was a misdemeanor. Officer McFadden and Officer Gilbert continued discussing the offense of using a firearm while under the influence as they drove the suspect to the Dade County Jail and as they completed the arrest affidavit, which they did while sitting in the patrol car in the jail parking lot. Officer Gilbert told Officer McFadden during this discussion that a witness had told her that the suspect had discharged the gun earlier in the afternoon, before Officer Romero arrived on the scene. Officer Gilbert believed that it was appropriate to charge the suspect with this offense because he was intoxicated and because she had been told that the gun had been discharged during the afternoon. Since she had been told that the gun had been discharged, Officer Gilbert reasoned that the gun had been loaded at some point during the afternoon, a fact which was corroborated by the witness statement given to Officer McFadden. Officer Gilbert and Officer McFadden agreed to charge the suspect with the offense of using a firearm while under the influence.5 Officer Gilbert filled out the arrest affidavit in the jail parking lot, in Officer McFadden's presence. She included the charge of using a firearm while under the influence, and she inserted the phrase "since the gun was loaded" into the narrative portion of the arrest affidavit, squeezing it in at the end of one line of printing as she was editing and completing the affidavit. As revised, the narrative in the completed arrest affidavit contains the following sentence: "V-01 advised that he and V-02 was in fear of their life being taken [when the suspect pointed the gun at them and pulled the trigger] since the weapon was loaded." Officer Gilbert did not mention in the arrest affidavit narrative that the witness Brenda Smith had told her that the suspect had discharged the revolver earlier in the afternoon. Before they left the patrol car, Officer Gilbert and Officer McFadden signed both pages of the affidavit, attesting by their signatures that "I swear that the above Statement is correct and true to the best of my knowledge and belief."6 The offenses set forth in the arrest affidavit when Officer Gilbert and Officer McFadden signed it in the parking lot of the jail were aggravated assault, discharging a firearm in public,7 carrying a concealed firearm, resisting arrest, and using a firearm while under the influence. Probable cause existed to arrest the suspect regardless of whether the offense of using a firearm while under the influence was properly charged. Although Officer McFadden had searched the suspect at the scene, he was searched again by the corrections officers at the jail. This search produced a knife and six bullets, which were found in the suspect's clothing. Officer Gilbert was told that these items were on the suspect's person, and, based on the information that the suspect was carrying a knife, she added to the arrest affidavit the charge of carrying a concealed weapon. Officer McFadden was aware that Officer Gilbert added the concealed weapon charge, which he considered an appropriate charge under the circumstances. The arrest affidavit was turned in at the jail. Officer McFadden completed the first page of the required offense/incident report at the station, after he and Officer Gilbert left the suspect at the jail.8 He included the charge of using a firearm while under the influence, and he cited the charge to Section 790.151, Florida Statutes. Officer McFadden claimed that he was not aware that he had included that offense in the report, that he was simply copying the information from the arrest affidavit completed by Officer Gilbert without thinking about what he was writing.9 At some point, Officer McFadden stopped working on the offense/incident report and began completing the property report. While Officer McFadden was preparing the property report, Officer Gilbert completed the narrative portion of the offense/incident report. Although Brenda Smith was listed in the report as a witness, Officer Gilbert did not mention in the narrative that Ms. Smith had reported that the suspect had discharged the gun during the afternoon, nor did she include in this narrative any statement regarding whether the gun was loaded or unloaded. Officer Gilbert cannot explain these omissions. As acting sergeant and the supervisor of Officer McFadden and Officer Gilbert on July 1, 1994, Officer Sandra Leon was responsible for reviewing the offense/incident report at issue in this proceeding and ensuring that all of the information provided was complete and correct. Officer Leon reviewed the offense/incident report on the evening of July 1, 1994, and she noticed that the offense of using a firearm while intoxicated was included in the report. She was not familiar with this offense, so she looked up the statute defining the offense. She noted that an element of the offense was that the firearm be loaded, and she remembered that Officer Romero had told her that the gun was not loaded when he struggled with the suspect. Nonetheless, without speaking with either Officer McFadden or Officer Gilbert, Officer Leon signed the offense/incident report and forwarded it through channels pursuant to the usual procedures. At the time she signed the report, Officer Leon knew that the narrative did not include all of the elements of the offense of using a firearm while under the influence, and she recalled that Officer Romero had told her that the gun was not loaded at the time he arrested the suspect. The next day, in a brief encounter, Officer Leon "casually" asked Officer Gilbert whether the gun was loaded.10 According to Officer Leon, Officer Gilbert responded affirmatively, and Officer Leon did not pursue the matter any further with Officer Gilbert. Officer Leon and Officer Gilbert did not engage in a conversation regarding the offense/incident report, and Officer Leon asked Officer Gilbert only the one question. Shortly after she spoke with Officer Gilbert, Officer Leon spoke with Officer McFadden about the condition of the gun because he had also signed the offense/incident report. According to Officer Leon, Officer McFadden appeared "visibly upset" during this conversation, and Officer Leon attributed this to the fact that, because he had signed the offense/incident report, he and Officer Gilbert were "equally at fault."11 Officer McFadden told Officer Leon that the gun was not loaded. Finally, Officer Leon spoke again with Officer Romero, who confirmed that the gun was not loaded when he took it from the suspect. Four or five days later, Officer Leon brought the matter to the attention of Lieutenant Lindahl, who had taken several days off from work after the July 1 incident. Officer Leon went to Lieutenant Lindahl because, even though she had signed and submitted the offense/incident report, she was concerned that there was a problem with charging the suspect with the offense of using a firearm while under the influence. Officer Leon told Lieutenant Lindahl that she had asked Officer Gilbert about the condition of the gun and that Officer Gilbert told her that it was loaded. Lieutenant Lindahl then had a copy of the arrest affidavit sent to his office via facsimile.12 Lieutenant Lindahl reviewed the arrest affidavit and questioned Officer Romero and Officer McFadden about the condition of the gun. Officer Romero reiterated his story that the gun was not loaded when he took it from the suspect. Officer McFadden told Lieutenant Lindahl that he had told Officer Gilbert repeatedly that the charge of using a firearm while under the influence was improper because the gun was not loaded, but he did not tell Lieutenant Lindahl that Officer Gilbert had told him that a witness reported that the suspect had discharged the gun before Officer Romero arrived at the scene. Lieutenant Lindahl did not ask Officer Gilbert why the charge of using a firearm while under the influence was included on the arrest affidavit and in the offense/incident report. Rather, he decided it was appropriate to refer the matter to the police department's internal affairs section, and he promptly filed a complaint against Officer Gilbert.13 Lieutenant Lindahl based his decision to file the complaint against Officer Gilbert on the statements of Officer Romero and of Officer McFadden. Lieutenant Lindahl concluded that Officer Gilbert included the charge of using a firearm while under the influence in the arrest affidavit even though she knew that the gun was not loaded and that this was an essential element of the offense. Lieutenant Lindahl testified that, if the gun had in fact been discharged, the charge of using a firearm while under the influence "would have been appropriate."14 Lieutenant Lindahl did not speak with Officer Gilbert after he filed the complaint because she was the subject of an internal affairs investigation, and it would have been improper for him to interfere in the investigation by talking with her. It is not unusual for arresting officers to charge a suspect with an offense when all of the elements of the offense are not present. If a charge included in an arrest affidavit is not appropriate, the responsible police officers bring it to the attention of the assistant state attorney handling the case, who sees that the unsupported charge is stricken from the arrest affidavit. When Officer McFadden and Officer Gilbert met with the assistant state attorney at what is called the "prefile conference" to discuss the arrest on July 1, 1994, they asked the assistant state attorney whether, in his opinion, the charge of using a firearm while under the influence should be stricken from the arrest affidavit because the gun was not loaded. The assistant state attorney reviewed the statute and concluded that the charge should be dropped. On October 20, 1994, Officer Gilbert gave a sworn statement to the internal affairs investigator for the Metro-Dade Police Department. In that statement, Officer Gilbert testified that she overheard Officer Romero state that the gun was unloaded at the time of the altercation; that she and Officer McFadden agreed to charge the suspect with using a firearm while under the influence; that the charge and the phrase "since the gun was loaded" were on the arrest affidavit before Officer McFadden signed the affidavit; and that she never spoke with Officer Leon about the offense/incident report. The evidence presented by the Commission is not sufficient to establish with the requisite degree of certainty that Ms. Gilbert knowingly made a false statement that was intended to mislead when she included in the arrest affidavit the offense of using a firearm while under the influence and inserted in the affidavit the phrase "since the gun was loaded." Rather, based upon the consideration of all of the evidence presented herein and upon the assessment of the credibility of the witnesses, the persuasive evidence supports the finding that Ms. Gilbert acted in good faith when she included the charge and the phrase "since the gun was loaded" in the arrest affidavit. It was Officer Gilbert's understanding from the statement of Brenda Smith that the suspect had discharged his gun prior to the arrival of Officer Romero and that the suspect was intoxicated when he did so, and Officer McFadden agreed with Ms. Gilbert that the offense of using a firearm while under the influence could appropriately be charged.15 In any event, Ms. Gilbert's use of the phrase "since the gun was loaded" in the arrest affidavit was, under the circumstances, ambiguous. Pursuant to her testimony, which is credited, Officer Gilbert assumed that, because the suspect discharged the gun, the gun had, at some point, been loaded; Officer Leon and Lieutenant Lindahl assumed that the phrase referred to the time period in which the suspect was involved in the altercation with Officer Romero. The first opportunity Officer Gilbert was given to explain what she meant by the phrase was in the sworn statement she gave on October 20, 1994. The evidence presented by the Commission is not sufficient to establish with the requisite degree of certainty that Ms. Gilbert gave false statements, which she did not believe to be true, in her sworn statement given on October 20, 1994, to the Metro-Dade Police Department's internal affairs investigator. First, the conflicts in the testimony of Officer McFadden and Ms. Gilbert have been resolved on the basis of the evidence presented herein, and the persuasive evidence supports the finding that Ms. Gilbert did not make a false statement under oath when she stated that Officer McFadden signed the arrest affidavit after she included the offense of using a firearm while under the influence and inserted the phrase "since the gun was loaded." Second, contrary to the position taken by the Commission, Ms. Gilbert did state in the October 20, 1994, sworn statement that she had overheard Officer Romero state that the gun was not loaded when the suspect was arrested. Third, although Ms. Gilbert's testimony in her sworn statement that she had never discussed the report with Officer Leon conflicts with Officer Leon's testimony that she asked Officer Gilbert if the gun was loaded, it is reasonable to infer that, due to the brief, casual nature of Officer Leon's inquiry to Ms. Gilbert and the length of time which elapsed between the incident and her sworn statement, Ms. Gilbert simply forgot that Officer Leon had asked her that one question.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission dismiss the Administrative Complaint against Hawanda Gilbert dated June 28, 1996. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of June, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. PATRICIA HART MALONO Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of June, 1999.

Florida Laws (12) 120.569775.082775.083790.151837.012837.06877.111893.13901.15943.12943.13943.1395 Florida Administrative Code (2) 11B-27.001111B-27.00225
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JAMES BARNETT vs. DIVISION OF LICENSING, 81-003175 (1981)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 81-003175 Latest Update: Apr. 19, 1982

The Issue At the commencement of the hearing, the parties stipulated that Petitioner had filed applications for Class "A" and Class "C" licenses and was qualified except for the failure to demonstrate good moral character. The bases for the dispute over Petitioner's character were: Petitioner's arrest record; Petitioner's alleged falsification of his applications as to his employment with the Pittsburgh Police Department; and Petitioner's check for the application fee was dishonored for insufficient funds.

Findings Of Fact The Petitioner duly filed applications with the Department of State, Division of Licensing for Class "A" and Class "C" licenses. Except for matters related to Petitioner's good moral character, Petitioner is qualified for licensure. Petitioner's application reflects that he answered the question whether he had been arrested affirmatively with the following comment: The Courts of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in all five cases from 1965 to 1974 - ruled that as a Police Officer, I acted within the scope of my authority - These cases stem from being an undercover Narcotics Officer. The Petitioner's arrest records as maintained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation reveal several juvenile offenses, not considered by the Department and not at issue. This record also reveals the following arrests of Petitioner as an adult: Date Place Charge Disposition 06/09/66* Pittsburgh VDD & CA Not guilty 08/15/66* Pittsburgh VUFA Not guilty 08/20/66* Allegheny County VDDCA 06/24/67* Allegheny County VUFA Unavailable per contra 06/30/70 *Only one offense with different charges made on different dates 09/05/74 Allegheny County Theft, VUFA Discharged 09/23/74 05/07/75 Allegheny County Fraud - imper- sonating a public servant 12/19/79 Office of Provost No charge No charge Martial Petitioner presented testimony and supporting documentary evidence that the arrests reported on the FBI criminal history for the dates 06/09/66 through 06/24/67 were all related to the same offense, and that these charges were resolved in favor of the Petitioner by a verdict of not guilty. See Petitioner's Exhibit #1. The judge arrested judgment of the two years' probation for the charge of 05/07/75. See Respondent's Exhibit #2. Petitioner stated that based upon his status as a capital police officer he was not guilty of fraud or impersonation of a public servant. The Petitioner's remaining arrest was on 09/05/74, and was discharged. Petitioner's explanation of these arrests is not consistent with the explanation stated on his application form. According to the resume accompanying his application, Petitioner was employed on the indicated dates in the following positions: Date Position 1963 to 1965 Globe Security 1965 to 1970 Pittsburgh Police Department, special patrolman 1970 to 1973 NAACP special investigator and Bucci Detective Agency 1972 to 1976 Commonwealth Property Police with State of Pennsylvania 1973 to 1974 Part-time security guard in addition to employment listed above May, 1976 January, 1977 Federal Civil Service guard March, 1977 September, 1977 Part-time security guard with A&S Security December, 1978 Sears, Roebuck and Company as to June, 1980 undercover security investigator February, 1979 Security guard to June, 1980 September, 1979 VA, guard at VA Hospital GS5 to June, 1980 June, 1980 Came to Florida Petitioner stated that his check for the application fee bounced because of his travel back and forth to Pennsylvania to try to develop the data to support his application, which depleted his bank account. He has since made the check good and paid the fees by money order.

Recommendation The Petitioner has failed to establish that he has the requisite good character for licensure; therefore, it is recommended that the Petitioner's applications for Class "A" and Class "C" licensure be denied. DONE and ORDERED this 19th day of April, 1982, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. James Barnett 758 Woodville Road Milton, Florida 32570 James V. Antista, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of State Division of Licensing R. A. Gray Building, Room 106 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of April, 1982. George Firestone, Secretary Department of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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DEPARTMENT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND TRAINING COMMISSION vs LORI A. DEFISHER, 97-002451 (1997)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Panama City, Florida May 21, 1997 Number: 97-002451 Latest Update: Feb. 24, 1998

The Issue The issue is whether Respondent is guilty of introducing or possessing contraband on the grounds of a state correctional institution, and if so, what penalty should be imposed.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner certified Respondent as a correctional officer on October 24, 1995. Respondent holds correctional certificate number 159550. At all times material to this proceeding, Respondent was employed as a correctional officer at the Bay Correctional Facility, a state correctional institution. During her employment, Respondent had contact with Zachary Richards, an inmate at Bay Correctional Facility. On August 23, 1996, Captain Ronnie Holland spoke to Inmate Richards regarding a complaint that Inmate Richards had made disrespectful remarks about an official. In order to avoid a disciplinary report for disrespecting the official, Inmate Richards gave Captain Holland a brown paper bag on which a personal letter had been written. Inmate Richards indicated that Respondent wrote the personal letter and gave it to him. Captain Holland gave the brown paper bag to Inspector Chris Hubbard along with his report. Inspector Hubbard interviewed Inmate Richards who claimed that he and Respondent had been writing letters to each other for some time. Inmate Richards signed a sworn affidavit in support of his claim that he received the letter written on the brown paper bag from Respondent. Inspector Hubbard interviewed Respondent who denied any knowledge concerning the letter on the brown paper bag. Inspector Hubbard obtained Respondent's known handwriting samples from the portion of the master control log which she maintained during her employment. He submitted these samples along with the brown paper bag to the Florida Department of Law Enforcement laboratory for comparison. Donald G. Pribbenow is a forensic document examiner employed by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement at the Pensacola Regional Crime Laboratory. He is an expert with 17 and 1/2 years of experience in comparing handwriting samples to determine their authorship. Mr. Pribbenow examined the writing on the brown paper bag and compared it to Respondent's known handwriting samples. Mr. Pribbenow determined that the person who wrote the submitted known writings was the same person who wrote the questioned writing on the brown paper bag. The result of Mr. Pribbenow's examination is persuasive evidence that Respondent wrote the letter to Inmate Richards on the brown paper bag. On September 16, 1996, Respondent was terminated from Bay Correctional Facility for being involved in an improper relationship.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that Petitioner enter a Final Order suspending Respondent's certification as a correctional officer for a period not to exceed two years. RECOMMENDED this 31st day of December, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of December, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: A. Leon Lowry, II, Director Division of Criminal Justice Standards and Training Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Ramage, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Karen D. Simmons, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Lori DeFisher 4123 West 21st Street Panama City, Florida 32405

Florida Laws (4) 120.57943.13943.1395944.47 Florida Administrative Code (2) 11B-27.001111B-27.005
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BOOZ-ALLEN AND HAMILTON, INC. vs DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES, 97-004422CVL (1997)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Sep. 23, 1997 Number: 97-004422CVL Latest Update: Feb. 24, 1998

The Issue Whether it is in the public interest to place Petitioners, Booz-Allen and Hamilton, Inc., on the State of Florida Convicted Vendor List maintained by Respondent, State of Florida Department of Management Services (the Department) Section 287.133, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1996).

Findings Of Fact The parties stipulated to the facts, as follows: On August 19, 1993, Petitioner was convicted of the commission of a public entity crime as defined within subsection 287.133(1)(g), Florida Statutes. Petitioner pled guilty in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina to two counts of filing false claims in violation of 18 U.S.C. section 287. The conviction related to time charging irregularities on two subcontracts to the United States Environmental Protection Agency. On February 25, 1994, Petitioner properly reported this conviction in its proposal to the Lee County Board of Commissioners. At the time the plea was entered, Petitioner paid to the United States $1,638,000. This included a $1,000,000 criminal fine, and $488,000 in civil damages, and $150,000 to reimburse EPA’s Office of the Inspector General for the costs of the investigation. The government estimated that the amount of improper charges was approximately $200,000. Petitioner’s cooperation with the EPA included voluntarily providing a wide array of information to EPA. Employees from Petitioner’s Finance and Contracts Department met with EPA investigators and auditors to explain Petitioner’s accounting system. Petitioner assisted EPA by making employees available for interviews. Petitioner voluntarily provided documents and other information to EPA. Petitioner fully cooperated with the Department of Management Services in connection with its investigation initiated pursuant to Section 287.133, Florida Statutes. Petitioner provided information as requested. No other persons or affiliates were charged with public entity crimes in relation to these matters. As a responsible government contractor, Petitioner has taken steps to prevent actions like those that formed the basis for its guilty plea from recurring. These steps and the ethical history of the company are listed in the stipulation and settlement agreement attached as Appendix A and are incorporated herein. Petitioner properly reported its plea to the Lee County Board of Commissioners and provided additional, extensive information concerning its guilty plea and related matters to the Respondent on April 5, 1994 and June 23, 1995. Petitioner’s presence in the market adds to competition in Florida markets for the transportation and consulting in solving state/public sector problems and in implementing their solutions. Petitioner’s commercial freight practice is the foremost management consultant to port authorities in the United States. Petitioner’s depth of knowledge and understanding of port operations, management, and planning have made Petitioner the consultant of choice to port authorities throughout the country. Specific projects are outlined in the stipulation and settlement agreement and are incorporated herein. In addition, Petitioner, due to its over 80 years of experience in both public and private sector (including Florida), can provide a broad perspective on solving state/public sector problems and in implementing their solutions in areas including law enforcement, systems integration and health care. Petitioner has a long history of providing service to the communities in which it works. Again specific instances of community service are referenced in the stipulation and settlement agreement and are incorporated herein.

USC (1) 18 U.S.C 287 Florida Laws (3) 120.57120.68287.133
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DEPARTMENT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND TRAINING COMMISSION vs MELVIN ROBERTS, 98-003314 (1998)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Jul. 23, 1998 Number: 98-003314 Latest Update: Sep. 13, 1999

The Issue The issue presented is whether Respondent is guilty of the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaint filed against him, and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken against him, if any.

Findings Of Fact Respondent, Melvin Roberts, was born on July 14, 1967. He was certified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission on March 1, 1993, and was issued correctional certificate numbered 151525. Respondent has been employed as a certified correctional officer with the Florida Department of Corrections since January 29, 1993. On October 28, 1994, Officer Elise Dillard-Gonzalez of the Miami-Dade Police Department was working as part of an undercover prostitution sting at Southwest 8th Street and 69 Avenue. At approximately 11:10 p.m., Respondent, who was alone, pulled over to the curb and motioned to her to approach his vehicle. When she did, he requested a "fuck for $20." She signaled to the undercover officers across the street, and Respondent was arrested for soliciting prostitution, in violation of Section 796.07, Florida Statutes. On November 10, 1994, Officer Sonja Crespo of the City of Miami Police Department was working as part of an undercover prostitution sting at Biscayne Boulevard and Northeast 73rd Street in Miami. Respondent, who was alone, approached her and gestured at her by placing a finger on one hand through a circle made by the fingers on his other hand. When she went over to Respondent's vehicle, he offered her $20 for a "fuck." She signaled to other near-by police officers, and Respondent was arrested for soliciting prostitution, in violation of Section 796.07, Florida Statutes. Rather than going forward on the charges for the two arrests, the State Attorney's Office agreed to place Respondent in some type of pre-trial diversionary program. Respondent was suspended from his employment with the Florida Department of Corrections for 10 consecutive days beginning April 17, 1995, for failing to report his arrests to his employer within 3 days and for being arrested, conduct unbecoming a correctional officer. Other than the October and November 1994 arrests, Respondent has not been arrested. Other than the disciplinary action imposed in April 1995, Respondent has had no disciplinary action taken against him as a correctional officer for the State of Florida. The superintendent at the Dade Correctional Institution where Respondent is employed considers Respondent to be a good employee and would like to continue Respondent's employment.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding Respondent guilty of the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaint filed against him, finding mitigating factors to be present, and suspending Respondent's certification as a correctional officer for 20 days. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of May, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of May, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: James D. Martin, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 H. R. Bishop, Jr., Esquire 300 East Brevard Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 A. Leon Lowry, II, Program Director Division of Criminal Justice Professionalism Services Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Ramage, General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302

Florida Laws (5) 120.569120.57796.07943.13943.1395 Florida Administrative Code (1) 11B-27.005
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, BOARD OF NURSING vs HARVEY JOHNNIE PRICE, L.P.N., 08-004380PL (2008)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Gainesville, Florida Sep. 03, 2008 Number: 08-004380PL Latest Update: Jun. 09, 2024
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DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES, DIVISION OF STATE FIRE MARSHAL vs EDWARD G. WHITAKER, JR., 18-005338PL (2018)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Sarasota, Florida Oct. 05, 2018 Number: 18-005338PL Latest Update: Jul. 11, 2019

The Issue The issue is whether Respondent's certification as a Firefighter II Compliance should be permanently revoked for the reasons stated in the Administrative Complaint (Complaint), dated June 6, 2018.

Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency responsible for licensing and regulating firefighters in the State. Respondent is certified in Florida as a Firefighter II Compliance. He holds Certificate No. 139586. Until the incident underlying this controversy arose, Respondent was employed by the Sarasota County Fire Department as a firefighter/paramedic. He now is working in the emergency room of a local hospital. The parties have stipulated that on March 21, 2018, Respondent entered a plea of nolo contendere to aggravated assault with a weapon, a third-degree felony punishable by imprisonment of one year or more under Florida law. Adjudication was withheld, Respondent was placed on probation for a period of two years, and he was ordered to pay court costs, fines, and fees in the amount of $1,525.00. See also Dep't Ex. 19. In response to the Complaint, Respondent essentially argues that: (a) he should not have been charged with the underlying criminal offense because he was defending himself against an aggressor in a road rage incident, and (b) he entered a nolo contendere plea based on bad advice from his attorney. At hearing, Respondent gave his version of the events resulting in his arrest. Also, two police officers involved with his arrest testified to what they observed and reported. Their testimony conflicts in many respects with Respondent's testimony. The undersigned will not attempt to reconcile the conflicts, as this proceeding is not the appropriate forum in which to relitigate the criminal charge. During the criminal case, Respondent was represented by a criminal law attorney who presented him with two options: enter into a plea arrangement or go to trial and risk a harsher penalty if he were found guilty. Respondent says he accepted his counsel's recommendation that he enter a plea of nolo contendere on the belief that he would not have a felony arrest on his record. After the plea agreement was accepted by the court, Respondent learned that the plea required revocation of his certification and loss of his job. Respondent also testified that even though he paid counsel a $15,000.00 fee, his counsel did little or no investigation regarding what happened, as he failed to depose a single witness before making a recommendation to take a plea.1/ In hindsight, Respondent says he would have gone to trial since he now believes he had a legitimate claim to the "castle defense," and the so-called victim in the incident (the driver of the other car) has a long criminal history and is now incarcerated. At this point, however, if Respondent believes an error in the legal process occurred, his only remedy, if one exists at all, is through the court system and not in an administrative proceeding. A felony plea constitutes noncompliance with the certification statute and requires permanent revocation of a certification. According to a Department witness, however, five years after all requirements of the court's sentencing have been met, the Department has the authority "in a formal process" to make a "felony conviction review" that may result in the reissuance of a certification. Except for this incident, Respondent has no other blemishes on his record. He served in the United States Marine Corps, with combat tours of duty in Iraq and Afghanistan, he was honorably discharged, and he was honored for saving a life at a Target store while off-duty. He has apologized for his actions, taken an anger management course, and received further treatment for Post-traumatic Stress Disorder at a local Veteran's Administration facility.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services enter a final order permanently revoking Respondent's certification. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of February, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S D. R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of February, 2019.

Florida Laws (5) 11.2421120.68633.406633.408633.426 Florida Administrative Code (1) 69A-37.055 DOAH Case (1) 18-5338PL
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LEROY L. BAINES, JR. vs FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION, 15-001959 (2015)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:West Palm Beach, Florida Apr. 10, 2015 Number: 15-001959 Latest Update: Jun. 10, 2016

The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner’s application for a license from the Florida Real Estate Commission was properly denied.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner, his Background, and the Application Leroy L. Baines, Jr., was born on October 31, 1985. Currently 29 years old, he is employed with a financial services company. He serves on the board of a non-profit organization called Butterfly Foundation Group. The organization works with underprivileged and at-risk youth. He also works with J.J.’s Boxing Club and Global Village, both non-profit entities. In 2005, Mr. Baines pled no contest to a criminal traffic infraction: operating a motor vehicle without a valid license (“Criminal Traffic Infraction No. 1”). He was adjudicated guilty and sentenced. Respondent’s Ex. No. 1 at 00028. The following calendar year, 2006, Mr. Baines was convicted of driving while his license was cancelled, suspended, revoked, or he was disqualified from holding a license (“Criminal Traffic Infraction No. 2”). Id. at 00022. In 2008, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida, Mr. Baines pled guilty and was adjudicated guilty of two federal crimes: 1) conspiracy to interfere with interstate commerce by robbery, and 2) carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence (the “Federal Criminal Offenses”). Id. at 00013. Mr. Baines was sentenced to 55 months imprisonment for the Federal Criminal Offenses on June 18, 2008. He served his sentence in prisons located in Florida, Texas, and North Carolina. His sentence expired on June 30, 2014, and he was discharged from supervision on September 3, 2014. Id. at 00040. On April 11, 2014, Respondent received Mr. Baines’ application for licensure as a real estate associate (the “Application”). He answered “Yes” to Background Question 1, which asks, “Have you ever been convicted or found guilty of, or entered a plea of nolo contendere or guilty to, regardless of adjudication, a crime in any jurisdiction . . . ?” Id. at 00010. After the background questions in the Application, the Application states, “If you answered ‘YES’ to any question in [the background questions], please refer to Section IV of the Instructions for detailed instructions on providing complete explanations, including requirements for submitting supporting legal documents.” Id. In the Application’s “Section IV(b) – Explanation(s) for Background Question 1,” Petitioner listed the Federal Criminal Offenses. For one of the two offenses under “Penalty/Disposition,” he wrote “Time Served”; for the other, he wrote “55 months.” Id. Under “Description” as to each of the two Federal Criminal Offenses, Petitioner wrote, “5 years Supervised Release.” Id. Despite the Application’s detailed instructions that require criminal traffic infractions to be listed (“This question applies to any criminal violation of the laws of any municipality, county, state or nation, including felony, misdemeanor and traffic offenses . . . .” Id.), Petitioner failed to list the two Criminal Traffic Infractions. Petitioner’s Case Mr. Baines testified that his application should be granted because he has cooperated with Respondent by providing everything that was asked of him during the Application review process. Although he had not included the Criminal Traffic Infractions on the written Application, he freely admitted during the hearing it was his responsibility at the time he made out the Application to report them and to offer any relevant explanation of them. With regard to the Criminal Traffic Infractions, Mr. Baines testified he spent 30 days in the Orange County Jail. He seeks leniency in this application process based on his age at the time of the offenses which he claimed, at first, was 16. Noting the difference between his birthday and 2005 and 2006, Mr. Baines conceded during cross-examination that he was several years older than 16 at the time of the Criminal Traffic Infractions. Mr. Baines elaborated on the Federal Criminal Offenses explaining that he had fallen in with former high school friends whom he had not seen for some time when they recruited him to drive the get-away car in a robbery. He stated that at the time of the crime he was in possession of two guns both of which he had been carrying legally prior to the crime: a nine millimeter Glock and a .40 caliber handgun. Mr. Baines’ time in prison was spent without any violations of prison rules, according to his testimony, and he completed the post-release program successfully. His success in serving his time is the basis, Mr. Baines asserted, for his release from federal supervision so promptly after the expiration of the sentence. No documentation of “good behavior” in prison, however, was offered at hearing. In an attempt to demonstrate rehabilitation, Mr. Baines referred to his service to the Butterfly Foundation, J.J.’s Boxing Club, and the other two non-profit organizations with which he works that serve at-risk youth in the Pompano and Fort Lauderdale areas. He also averred that he had been cleared by the Department of Children and Families (“DCF”) to work with underprivileged youth for cheerleading and gymnastics although he offered no supportive documentary evidence from DCF. Mr. Baines did submit to Respondent as part of his application three documents related to rehabilitation. The first extolled his work as an employee. The second was written by a teacher at Stranahan High School who is a fellow basketball player at pick-up games in a public basketball court in Plantation, Florida. The third was written by his pastor at the Living Waters Sanctuary in Oakland Park, Florida. The authors of the letters all write highly of Mr. Baines. In support of his case for rehabilitation, Mr. Baines testified that after his conviction for the Federal Criminal Offenses, he had had only one slip-up: a urinalysis (“UA”) positive for marijuana, a substance he had used as a youth. Mr. Baines claimed that the UA was conducted only because those supervising his post-release case sent him for the testing after Mr. Baines had voluntarily acknowledged his recent use of marijuana. But for the single marijuana incident, Mr. Baines asserted under oath that his record after his conviction, in prison and out of prison during a post-incarceration discharge period, had been spotless. His admirable conduct, he testified, is what led to the court to promptly release him from federal supervision.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order denying Petitioner’s application for licensure as a real estate sales associate. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of July, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DAVID M. MALONEY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of July, 2015. COPIES FURNISHED: Leroy L. Baines, Jr. 4808 Northwest 8th Court Lauderhill, Florida 33317 Tom Barnhart, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) William N. Spicola, General Counsel Department of Business and Profession Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) Darla Furst, Chair Real Estate Commission Department of Business and Profession Regulation 400 West Robinson Street, N801 Orlando, Florida 32801 (eServed)

Florida Laws (6) 120.569120.57120.68475.17475.25812.13
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, BOARD OF NURSING vs DAWN CHERI MCDANNEL, R.N., 14-003033PL (2014)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Daytona Beach, Florida Jun. 27, 2014 Number: 14-003033PL Latest Update: Jun. 09, 2024
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