Findings Of Fact Before 1989, the Petitioner, Gregory Miller, was a community control counselor (in effect, a juvenile probation officer) working for HRS. After several years of satisfactory job performance, his employment was terminated for unsatisfactory job performance in 1989. The Petitioner believes his termination by HRS was unfair. On January 30, 1991, the Petitioner, Gregory Miller, pled nolo contendere to attempted arson in violation of Section Section 806.01, Fla. Stat. (1991). Adjudication was withheld, and the Petitioner was placed on probation for two years. The attempted arson charge arose at a time in October, 1990, when the Petitioner, who has a 20-year history of substance abuse and suffers from bipolar disorder and borderline personality disorder, decompensated under financial and other stress and attempted to burn his automobile in order to fraudulently obtain property and casualty insurance benefits. At the time of the arson attempt, his car was parked in the garage, and a tenant was residing in the garage apartment overhead. The tenant noticed the fire started by the Petitioner, put it out and reported it to the Petitioner. The Petitioner berated him for putting the fire out and told him to get his personal belongings out of the garage apartment and leave. While the tenant was in the garage apartment gathering his belongings, the Petitioner was attempting to restart the fire. The tenant had been a worker's compensation client of the Petitioner. The Petitioner continued to have mental and emotional and substance problems that led to additional criminal charges. On February 13, 1991, he was arrested and charged with battery of a law enforcement officer, a third degree felony. On October 3, 1991, the Petitioner pled guilty to the lesser included offense of resisting arrest without violence, a misdemeanor, and was sentenced to seven days time served in jail. On or about December 22, 1991, the Petitioner overdosed on a mixture of drugs and alcohol in a possible suicide attempt. When confronted with law enforcement officers, the Petitioner struck the officers and was arrested and charged with battery of a law enforcement officer, a third degree felony. The Petitioner was involuntarily committed under the Baker Act, and on September 21, 1992, he pled nolo contendere to simple battery, a first degree misdemeanor, and was sentenced to one day time served in jail and ordered to pay $200 in fine and court costs. As a result of his other criminal charges, the Petitioner was charged with violation of his probation on the attempted arson charge. On or about March 16, 1992, the Petitioner pled guilty to violation of probation. Adjudication on the violation of probation was withheld, but probation was revoked, and he was resentenced under the attempted arson charge to a year of community control, followed by a year of probation. On or about March 8, 1992, the Petitioner was charged with driving with his license suspended or revoked for failure to maintain required insurance coverage. Since 1992, the Petitioner has not been involved in any additional criminal activity or charges. On February 23, 1993, his community control was converted to probation. He moved to Pasco County and, on December 22, 1993, his probation was terminated early. The Petitioner has sought professional counseling. On or about March 22, 1993, he was referred to a vocational rehabilitation counselor with the Department of Labor and Employment Security, Division of Vocational Rehabilitation. Since approximately early 1994, he also has been under the care of a psychiatrist. With the help of counseling, the Petitioner has been sober since before August, 1993. Fortunately, therapy seems to have been successful. Except for two short hospitalizations for decompensation and medication adjustment early in his counseling, the Petitioner has been sober and mentally stable over the course of the last three years. From a mental health standpoint, the Petitioner no longer seemed to be a danger to himself or others, and he was making good progress in rehabilitating himself. On or about May 18, 1995, the Petitioner sought employment with Action Youth Care, a provider on contract with HRS. When he applied for the job, he was required to complete an Affidavit of Good Moral Character that swore, in pertinent part, that he had "not been found guilty of, or entered a plea of nolo contendere or guilty to, any offense prohibited under . . . Section 806.01 [Florida Statutes, arson]." The affidavit also required the Petitioner to "acknowledge the existence of any criminal . . . record regardless of whether [he] was adjudged guilty by the court and regardless of whether or not those records have been sealed or expunged." The Petitioner signed without acknowledging his attempted arson record. When his name was screened, the attempted arson record disqualified him from employment, and the Petitioner was terminated from his employment pending his request for an exemption. Despite the Petitioner's commendable progress in rehabilitating himself, there still are signs that some instability persists. He does not seem to appreciate the seriousness of his criminal record and history of substance abuse and mental illness, as they relate to HRS's statutory obligation to properly assess his moral character under Section 409.175, Fla. Stat. (1995). Instead, he blames HRS's actions on a "political" conspiracy to prevent him from obtaining employment. Similarly, he attempts to excuse his criminal record by blaming it all on HRS--the termination of his employment in 1989 allegedly was the sole cause of his decompensation and the resulting criminal offenses. His excuse for falsifying his Affidavit of Good Moral Character was that it was reasonable not to disclose the arson record because it was only attempted arson, not arson. He does not seem to appreciate that there is little or no difference in blameworthiness between the two. (The only real difference between the two is how soon the fire goes out or is put out.) Finally, the Employee Closing Summary produced by Action Health Care upon termination of the Petitioner's employment stated that Action would not re-hire the Petitioner and that the Petitioner's "weak areas" included: "poor rapport with team"; "would not accept authority"; and "documentation skills." (No "strengths" were noted on the form.) The Petitioner again blamed HRS, contending that the person who completed the form was lying to cooperate with HRS's conspiracy against the Petitioner. It is found that the evidence, taken as a whole, was not clear and convincing proof of rehabilitation and good moral character at this time.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that HRS enter a final order denying the Petitioner's request for an exemption from disqualification. DONE and ENTERED this 21st day of August, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of August, 1996.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent, Theodore Lazier, Jr., committed the violations alleged in an Administrative Complaint issued by Petitioner, the Department of Law Enforcement, Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission, and dated June 18, 2004, and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken against him.
Findings Of Fact The Commission is charged with the responsibility for, among other things, certifying individuals for employment or appointment as a law enforcement officer and investigating complaints against individuals holding certificates as law enforcement officers in the State of Florida, pursuant to Section 943.3195, Florida Statutes. At the times pertinent to this matter, Respondent, Theodore Lazier, Jr., was certified by the Commission as a law enforcement officer, having been issued Law Enforcement Certificate Number 138687 on August 20, 1993. Since being certified, Mr. Lazier as been employed as a correctional officer at the Dade Correctional Institution (hereinafter referred to as the "Correctional Institution"), a state facility. On and between November 14, 1999 and September 24, 2003, Mr. Lazier, while working as a recreational supervisor, brought items declared to be contraband into the Correctional Institution. Those items included movies, candy, razor blades, and one pair of athletic shoes with cleats. When the items of contraband were discovered by Correctional Institution officials, Mr. Lazier admitted bringing the items to the facility, a fact which he also admitted at the final hearing. He also explained why he had introduced the items into the facility and, while his explanation does not exonerate him from the charges in this case and apparently constituted grounds to terminate his employment at the facility, his explanation at least dispelled any thought that he had introduced the items for any purpose other than assisting him in the discharge of his duties. As for the movies, Mr. Lazier testified convincingly and without any evidence to the contrary being offered by the Commission that he had been given specific permission to show movies to inmates as long as those movies did not contain sex or violence. That permission was given by the individual who served as warden prior to the current warden's employment. The candy consisted of small pieces of primarily hard candy which Mr. Lazier used to reward inmates that assisted him as "aides" and other inmates who gave him "thoughts for the day." The razor blades, which are the most troublesome items of contraband he brought into the facility, were used by inmates, under Mr. Lazier's supervision to work on sports equipment, like the weight-lifting benches. The razor blades were collected, accounted for, and stored under lock and key after their use. Finally, the one pair of shoes introduced into the facility by Mr. Lazier was used by inmates participating in football. The bringing of the items of contraband into the Correctional Institution, other than the movies, constituted an act which would constitute a felony offense as specified in Section 944.47(1)(a), Florida Statutes.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Commission finding that Theodore Lazier, Jr., violated Section 943.1395(7); dismissing the allegation that he violated Section 943.1395(6); and suspending his certification for a period of one year. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of December, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LARRY J. SARTIN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of December, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Linton B. Eason, Esquire Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Theodore Lazier, Jr. 225856 South West 132d Court Naranja, Florida 33032 Michael Ramage, General Counsel Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Crews, Program Director Division of Criminal Justice Professionalism Services Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Douglas Clayton Brown (Brown), applied to Respondent, Department of Insurance and Treasurer (Department) , for examination as a general lines agent. By letter of September 9, 1986, the Department advised Brown that his application was denied because he had pled guilty to certain felonies which involved moral turpitude, and that he had failed to divulge on his application for examination that he had been charged with such felonies. Brown filed a timely request for formal hearing to contest the Department's decision. On March 21, 1983, an Information was filed in the Circuit Court of the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County, Florida, charging Brown with one count of burglary, Section 810.02(2) Florida Statutes; and two counts of aggravated assault, Section 784.021, Florida Statutes. Brown entered a plea of guilty to the charges. On December 12, 1983, the court entered a judgment wherein it adjudged Brown guilty of having committed one count of burglary with a deadly weapon and two counts of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. The court withheld the imposition of sentence, and placed Brown on 10 years probation. 1/ On August 20, 1984, Brown filed a motion in the criminal proceeding to terminate his probation and vacate the adjudication of guilt. By order of March 4, 1985, the court granted Brown's motion to vacate the adjudication of guilt, but continued his probation on the same terms and conditions as previously set. Subsequently, on March 13, 1985, the court entered a formal order that withheld adjudication of guilt and the imposition of sentence on the charges, and reimposed the term of probation previously established. By application dated March 4, 1985, filed with the Department on March 13, 1985, Brown sought examination for licensure as a general lines agent. Pertinent to this case the application requested and Brown responded: 12(a) Have you ever been charged with a felony? No Brown's application contained a material misrepresentation since he failed to disclose that he had been charged with a felony which involved moral turpitude. Brown's attempt to rationalize his nondisclosure was unpersuasive. According to Brown, he inquired of his attorney before completing his application and was advised that he could respond in the negative to the question set forth in paragraph 6, supra. Brown's assertion is not, however, supported by the proof and is inherently improbable and unworthy of belief. (See: Petitioner's exhibit 2).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the application of Petitioner, Douglas Clayton Brown, for examination as a general lines agent be DENIED. DONE AND ORDERED this 9th day of June, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of June, 1987.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the Final Hearing and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: On March 3, 1994 Petitioner submitted to the Department an application for licensure as a Limited Surety Agent (Bail Bondsman). In a Denial Letter dated July 20, 1994, the Department notified Petitioner that his application for licensure was denied. The basis for the Department's denial of Petitioner's application was Petitioner's past felony convictions. The evidence established that on or about December 4, 1980, Petitioner was charged in the Circuit Court for the Twelfth Judicial Circuit of Florida, Case Number 80-105 (the "First State Case"), with trafficking in illegal drugs and the use of a firearm during the commission of a felony in violation of Sections 893.135 and 790.07, Florida Statutes. On June 5, 1981, Petitioner pled no contest in the First State Case to trafficking in excess of two thousand (2,000) pounds, but less than ten thousand (10,000) pounds of cannabis. Petitioner was fined and placed on probation for ten (10) years. On or about June 14, 1981, Petitioner was charged in the United States District Court, Southern District of Florida, Case Numbers 83-6033-CR-EPS and 83-6038-CR-NCR (the "Federal Cases"), with five felony counts of possession with intent to distribute illegal drugs and conspiracy to import illegal drugs into the United States of America, in violation of Title 21, Sections 841(a)(1), 846, 952(a), 960(a), 963, and 843(b), United States Code. On or about November 5, 1981, Petitioner was charged in the Circuit Court for the Twentieth Judicial Circuit of Florida, Case Number 81-1191 CFG (the "Second State Case") with violation of the Florida Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organization Act ("RICO"), Section 943.462, Florida Statutes. Although the exact timing is not clear, at some point after his arrest, Petitioner began cooperating with authorities which led to plea bargains and a sentence which did not include any jail time. On April 4, 1984, Petitioner pled guilty to one count in each of the Federal Cases to attempt and conspiracy to import marijuana and methaqualaudes into the United States of America. As a result of his plea in the Federal Cases, Petitioner was fined and placed on 5 years probation. On April 6, 1984, Petitioner pled guilty in the Second State Case, was fined $7,500.00 and placed on probation for fifteen (15) years. This plea was negotiated as part of the plea in the Federal Cases. Petitioner's probation from the First State Case was terminated May 20, 1988. Petitioner's probation from the Federal Cases was terminated on April 21, 1989 and September 11, 1989. Petitioner's civil rights were restored pursuant to Executive Orders of the Office of Executive Clemency dated May 19, 1989 and May 23, 1990. It is not clear from the record if the Executive Orders constitute a "full pardon" as suggested by counsel for Petitioner at the hearing in this matter. Petitioner down plays his role in the elaborate criminal scheme that led to his arrests and convictions. He suggests that all of the charges were related to the same scheme. Insufficient evidence was presented to reach any conclusions regarding the underlying criminal activity and/or Petitioner's exact involvement. Petitioner has been very active in community affairs since his convictions. He has apparently been a good family man and claims to have rehabilitated himself. Subsequent to his conviction, Petitioner and three other investors started a bail bond business. Petitioner claims he did not play an active role in the business. However, when the Department learned of his involvement, it required Petitioner to terminate any affiliation with the company. Petitioner's wife currently owns a bail bond company. Petitioner operates a "court services" business out of the same building where his wife's bail bond business operates. No evidence was presented of any improper involvement by Petitioner in his wife's business.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Insurance and Treasurer enter a Final Order denying Petitioner's application for licensure as a Limited Surety Agent. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 2nd day of August, 1995, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. STEPHEN MENTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of August, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-4893 Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Petitioner: Subordinate to findings of fact 4 through 10. Subordinate to findings of fact 13. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in substance in findings of fact 1. Adopted in substance in findings of fact 2. Adopted in the Preliminary Statement. Rejected as vague and unnecessary. Subordinate to findings of fact 14 and 15. Subordinate to findings of fact 14 and 15. Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Respondent: Adopted in substance in findings of fact 1. Adopted in substance in findings of fact 2. Adopted in substance in findings of fact 2 through 10. Subordinate to findings of fact 14. Rejected as argumentative and unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Bill Nelson State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 Dan Sumner Acting General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, PL-11 Tallahassee, FL 32399 Julio Gutierrez, Esq. 2225 Coral Way Miami, FL 33145 Allen R. Moayad, Esq. Florida Department of Insurance and Treasurer 612 Larson Building 200 E. Gaines Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300
The Issue Whether Respondent failed to maintain the minimum qualifications for employment or appointment as a law enforcement or correctional officer by failing to exhibit good moral character and, if so, the nature of the sanctions.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the entity within the Florida Department of Law Enforcement responsible for the execution, administration, implementation, and evaluation of the powers, duties, and functions established under sections 943.085 through 943.255, Florida Statutes, and is charged with certifying and revoking the certification of correctional officers in Florida. § 943.12, Fla. Stat. Pursuant to section 943.1395, Petitioner is authorized to investigate incidents in which certified correctional officers are alleged to have failed to maintain compliance with the minimum qualifications for certification, and to take disciplinary action against correctional officers found to have failed to maintain those qualifications. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Respondent was certified by Petitioner as a correctional officer, and holds Correctional Certificate Number 77370. He was initially certified on April 9, 1987. During the period from his initial certification up to 2007, Respondent rose through the ranks, achieving the rank of captain. In 2007, as he neared his date of retirement, Respondent requested a voluntary demotion to sergeant. The duties associated with being a “correctional officer in charge” were causing difficulties with his marriage, and his voluntary demotion to sergeant allowed him to “lay out the last five years so I could use my leave up easier and kind of have a life.” Respondent has not previously been the subject of any disciplinary action, nor was there any allegation of prior disciplinary history involving Respondent. On March 1, 2010, Respondent served as a correctional officer at the Lowell Correctional Institution. Respondent knew Tracy Coer as an inmate at the Lowell Correctional Institution. Respondent occasionally tasked inmate Coer, along with other inmates, with cleaning the correctional officers? supply room and staff bathroom at the end of a shift. Respondent testified that such activities were never done without another officer present in the officer station. On the evening of March 1, 2010, Respondent was assigned to escort inmate Coer from her dormitory to the medical unit for a breathing treatment. The medical unit has an exterior door, with a clear window described as being “about six inches long and . . . maybe about a foot and a half tall.” The exterior door led into a waiting room, which contained bench seating for inmates. A second secured door led from the inmate?s waiting room into the medical facility. Directly inside the second secured door was a desk for a monitoring correctional officer, which had a clear view into the inmate waiting room. From the dormitory to the medical unit, Respondent and inmate Coer were in view of the guard tower. Respondent intended to turn inmate Coer over to the custody of the monitoring correctional officer on duty and leave. When Respondent arrived at the medical unit, there was no correctional officer on duty at the waiting room monitoring desk.2/ Therefore, Respondent transferred custody of inmate Coer directly to medical staff. Since the monitoring officer was not at her post, Respondent stayed in the waiting room. After about 30 minutes, inmate Coer was returned by medical staff to the inmate waiting room. The monitoring officer had not returned to her duty station, and the waiting room was vacant, but for Respondent and inmate Coer. The time was about 9:25 or 9:30 p.m. It was dark outside, but the sidewalk was lit by security lights. It is Respondent?s practice to always be in view of another correctional officer when with a female inmate. However, for the period after inmate Coer was placed into Respondent?s custody in the waiting room, and before they exited through the exterior door, they were not in direct view of medical staff, the guard tower, or any other correctional officer. Respondent testified that as he was preparing to escort inmate Coer from the medical unit and return her to her dormitory, she became “off balance.” In Respondent?s experience, breathing procedures can make persons “dizzy and lightheaded.” He did not want her to fall, so Respondent grabbed inmate Coer?s jacket sleeve to steady her. She turned towards him, whereupon he grabbed her other sleeve to hold her up. According to Respondent “we came in close proximity at that time and shortly within like seconds I heard the door opening and I turned and looked over my right shoulder and Officer Richardson was standing in the door.” Respondent denied that he kissed inmate Coer, that he tried to kiss inmate Coer, or that he ever tried to kiss any inmate. Officer Richardson testified that she was returning to the medical unit from outside, and was preparing to enter the facility through the exterior door. She looked through the window, and saw Respondent and inmate Tracy Coer “holding hands and he leaned down to kiss her. It was like a lip to lip peck maybe.” She testified that she was able to see lip-to-lip contact between Respondent and inmate Coer. Her description gave a clear impression of a consensual act, with Respondent and inmate Coer holding hands, and inmate Coer in “a leaning upward motion so it?s not really unbalanced, but her face was leaning up.” After the incident, Officer Richardson testified that she reported what she observed to a fellow officer, and then to her captain. She was instructed to fill out an incident report describing her observations, which she did. Her incident report is consistent with and supplements her testimony. After submitting the incident report, Officer Richardson had no further involvement in the investigation of the incident until her testimony at the hearing. Officer Richardson testified that she had a clear view of the inmate waiting room, and of Respondent and inmate Coer, through the 6” x 18” window. Respondent testified that the windows consist of thick security glass, and that “[w]henever you approach one of those small windows at night, the reflection from the security lights, the shadows that are moving . . . [y]ou can?t see as clearly as you think you can.” Inmate Coer did not testify at the final hearing. Instead, Petitioner submitted an affidavit of inmate Coer describing the incident that forms the basis of the Administrative Complaint. The affidavit is hearsay. Inmate Coer?s affidavit could be said to supplement and corroborate Officer Richardson?s testimony in that they both describe an incident that culminated in a kiss. However, the affidavit described an act that was sudden, abrupt, and against inmate Coer?s will, while Officer Richardson described a more intimate and consensual act. Therefore, the affidavit does not serve to establish a firm belief or conviction in the mind of the undersigned as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established, but rather suggests a degree of imprecision or confusion as to the facts in issue.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered dismissing the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of June, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S E. GARY EARLY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of June, 2012.
The Issue Whether Respondent violated Subsections 943.1395(6), 943.1395(7), and 943.13(7), Florida Statutes (2003), and Florida Administrative Code Rule 11B-27.0011(4)(a), and, if so, what discipline should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Anderson is a certified correctional officer, certified by Petitioner. Her certificate number is 190482. At the time of the incident at issue, Anderson was working for the Wackenhut Corrections Corporation as a correctional officer at South Bay Correctional Facility. On May 27, 2003, Patricia Johns (Johns) was in the Wal-Mart parking lot in Clewiston, Florida. Johns was taking groceries she had purchased from a shopping cart and placing them in her vehicle. She placed her sweater and her purse in a shopping cart while she was loading the groceries. Johns retrieved her sweater from the cart, but left her purse in the cart. She pushed the cart with the purse in it between her vehicle and another vehicle, got into her vehicle, and left the parking lot. A few seconds later Anderson pulled into Johns' parking space. Anderson's vehicle bumped the shopping cart, pushing it forward a couple of feet. She got out of her vehicle, went over to the cart, and removed the purse. Anderson, while wearing her correctional officer uniform, placed the purse in the backseat of her vehicle, took her son out of the vehicle, and went into Wal-Mart. She did not take the purse into Wal-Mart and attempt to locate the owner. The purse was a Tommy Hilfiger brand valued at $50. Inside the purse was a wallet with $18 in cash, a credit card, and blank checks. A cellular telephone valued at $350 was also in the purse. Anderson picked up some prescriptions at Wal-Mart, returned to her vehicle, and eventually returned home. She knew that the purse did not belong to her, but claimed that she was planning to turn the purse in at the police department the next day. Her claim that she was going to turn the purse into the police is not credible based on later actions. Sometime after she had returned home, she remembered she had put the purse in the back of her vehicle and asked her fiancé to get the purse. When he went to retrieve the purse, only the wallet remained minus the cash. During the time that Anderson left Wal-Mart and the time that her fiancé discovered that the purse, cash, and cellular telephone were missing, both Anderson and her fiancé had driven the vehicle while carrying other passengers. Anderson did not remove the purse, cash, and cellular telephone from the vehicle. She believes that one of the other passengers who had been riding in her vehicle on May 27, 2003, took the purse, cash, and cellular telephone. The next day, Anderson placed the wallet in a zip-lock plastic bag and dropped it in a drop box at the post office. She did not notify the owner of the purse that she had taken the purse from the Wal-Mart parking lot, and did not notify the police until later that she had taken the purse. Johns reported to the police that her purse had been stolen. An investigation ensued, and it was learned based on a video tape of the Wal-Mart parking lot on May 27, 2003, that Anderson had taken the purse. A police officer attempted to contact Anderson by telephone concerning the incident. On June 9, 2003, Anderson gave a taped interview to police officers, in which she admitted taking the purse out of the shopping cart and placing it in the backseat of her car. She was arrested for grand theft and released on the same day after posting a bond. An information for grand theft, a third degree felony, was entered against Anderson on August 13, 2003. She agreed to make restitution in the amount of $419, and a Notice of Nolle Prosequi was entered on December 5, 2003. As a result of the incident at issue, Anderson was dismissed from her position as a correctional officer at South Bay Correctional Facility. She is sincerely sorry for her actions and has made restitution for the property taken.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that Lenora R. Anderson is not guilty of a violation of Subsection 943.1395(6), Florida Statutes (2003); finding that she failed to maintain good moral character as required by Subsection 943.13(7), Florida Statutes (2003), and defined by Florida Administrative Code Rule 11B-27.0011; and imposing the following penalties as set forth in Subsection 943.1395(7), Florida Statutes (2003): issuance of a written reprimand and placement of Respondent on probation for two years under conditions as specified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of December, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUSAN B. HARRELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of December, 2004.
The Issue Whether Respondent may be disciplined for failure to maintain the qualifications established by Subsection 943.13(7), Florida Statutes (2002), which requires that a correctional officer have good moral character.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing, the following findings of fact are made: Respondent, Jacqueline L. Scriven, is a state-certified correctional officer holding certificate No. 45230. She was certified by Petitioner on August 28, 1985. On March 18, 2002, Respondent and her 21-year-old daughter, Marissa Jefferson, were involved in a physical altercation. The daughter reported to the arresting officer that Respondent struck her with her fists and a claw hammer. The arresting officer reported physical evidence on Marissa Jefferson's back and shoulders consistent with an attack with a claw hammer. Marissa Jefferson also reported to the arresting officer that Respondent threatened to shoot her with a revolver that Respondent was holding, although Respondent did not point the weapon at her. Marissa Jefferson was not available to testify; she is presently incarcerated for writing bad checks in Orange County jail. She has charges pending in four other Florida counties. She has a history of police involvement for various criminal and drug-related offenses. She stole from her mother while living with her. Interestingly, while Marisa Jefferson is in jail, Respondent is the primary caretaker for Marissa Jefferson's son. Respondent was arrested and charged with aggravated battery (Section 784.045, Florida Statutes (2002)) and aggravated assault with a firearm (Section 784.021, Florida Statutes (2002)). On December 17, 2002, Respondent entered a plea of nolo contendere to a violation of Section 784.03, Florida Statutes (2002), felony battery. Adjudication was withheld, and she was placed on probation for a period of one year. In addition, she paid $183.50 in costs and was directed to undergo anger management evaluation and training. Respondent, who is 43 years old, had been employed by Department of Corrections since 1985 and had risen to the rank of captain. She was terminated on January 9, 2003. Respondent acknowledges hitting her daughter with a hammer, but denies having ever had the pistol in her possession during the altercation. Respondent contends that she used the hammer in self-defense. The position of the blunt trauma visible on Marissa Jefferson's back and shoulders indicates that she had her back to Respondent when she was struck. Based on the hearsay nature of the evidence supporting the allegations of assault with a firearm and Respondent's candid admission of hitting her daughter with a hammer, but denying having ever had possession of the firearm during the altercation, her testimony is credible regarding both allegations. It does not appear that Respondent's striking her daughter with the claw hammer was in self-defense.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner, Department of Law Enforcement, Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission, enter a final order finding that Respondent, Jacqueline L. Scriven, violated Subsection 784.045(1)(a)2., Florida Statutes, and, as a result, failed to demonstrate good moral character as required by Subsection 943.13(7), Florida Statutes, and that her certification be suspended for two years from January 10, 2003, and that she be given such other associated penalties as Petitioner deems appropriate. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of December, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of December, 2003.
