The Issue The issue presented for decision herein is which of several claimants to payments from the Mortgage Brokerage Guaranty Fund are now entitled to payment and, if any, the amount of the payments due from the fund. A related issue concerns the priority of claims and/or whether certain claimants have waived or abandoned their claims.
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, stipulations of the parties, documentary evidence received and the entire record compiled herein, I make the following relevant factual findings. One of the provisions of the Mortgage Brokerage Act, Chapter 494, Florida Statutes, provides that the Department of Banking and Finance (Department) is charged with the responsibility and duty of administering the Fund, which includes the duty to approve or deny applications for payment from the fund as set forth in Section 494.042(2), Florida Statutes. The "fund" was created in 1977 to provide recovery for any person who meets all of the conditions prescribed in section 494.043, Florida Statutes. The Department is obliged to disburse from the fund pursuant to section 494.044, Florida Statutes. Section 494.042, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1986) provides: (1)(a) Effective September 1, 1977, the Treasurer shall establish a Mortgage Brokerage. Guaranty Fund. A fee of $50 shall be added to the fee for both application and renewal of a mortgage brokerage business registration, and a fee of $10 shall be added to the fee for both application and renewal of mortgage broker licenses. This fee shall be in addition to the regular application or renewal fee and shall be transferred to or deposited in the Mortgage Brokerage Guaranty Fund. From October 1, 1985, until the balance in the fund first reaches the sum of $1.5 million, the fees provided for in paragraph (a) shall apply only to an applicant who has not previously been issued a license or registration under this chapter. If the fund at any time exceeds $1.5 million, collection of special fees for this fund shall be discontinued, and such special fees shall not be reimposed unless the fund is reduced below $500,000 by disbursement made in accordance with s. 494.044. (2) The Mortgage Brokerage Guaranty Fund shall be disbursed as provided in s. 494.044, upon approval by the division, to any party to a mortgage financing transaction who is adjudged by a Florida court of competent jurisdiction to have suffered monetary damages as a result of any violation of this chapter committed by a licensee or registrant. Section 494.043, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1986) provides: Any person who was a party to a mortgage financing transaction shall be eligible to seek recovery from the Mortgage Brokerage Guaranty Fund if: The person has recorded a final judgment issued by a Florida court of competent jurisdiction in any action wherein the cause of action was based on s. 494.042(2); The persona has caused to be issued a writ of execution upon such judgment and the officer executing the same has made a return showing that no personal or real property of the judgment debtor liable to be levied upon in satisfaction of the judgment can be found or that the amount realized on the sale of the judgment debtor's property pursuant to such execution was insufficient to satisfy the judgment; The person has made all reasonable searches and inquiries to ascertain whether the judgment debtor possesses real or personal property or other assets subject to being sold or applied in satisfaction of the judgment, and by his search he has discovered no property or assets or he has discovered property and assets and has taken all necessary action and proceedings for the application thereof to the judgment, but the amount thereby realized was insufficient to satisfy the judgment; The person has applied any amounts recovered from the judgment debtor, or from any other source, to the damages awarded by the court. The person, at the time the action was instituted, gave notice and provided a copy of the complaint to the division by certified mail; however, the requirement of a timely giving of notice may be waived by the department upon a showing of good cause; and The act for which recovery is sought occurred on or after September 1, 1977. Recovery of the increased benefits allowable pursuant to the amendments to S. 494.044 which are effective October 1, 1985, shall be based on a cause of action which arose on or after that date. The requirements of paragraphs (1)(a), (b), (c), and (e) are not applicable if the licensee or registrant upon which the claim is sought has filed for bankruptcy or has been adjudicated bankrupt; however, in such event the claimant shall file a proof of claim in the bankruptcy proceedings and shall notify the department by certified mail of the claim by enclosing a copy of the proof of claim and all supporting documents. Section 494.044, Florida Statutes, (Supp. 1986) provides: (1) Any person who meets all of the conditions prescribed in s. 494.043 may apply to the department for payment to be made to such person from the Mortgage Brokerage Guaranty Fund in the amount equal to the unsatisfied portion of that person's judgment or judgments or $20,000, whichever is less, but only to the extent and amount reflected in the judgment as being actual or compensatory damages. As to claims against any one licensee or registrant, payments shall be made to all persons meeting the requirements of s. 494.043 upon the expiration of 2 years from the date the first complete and valid notice is received by the department. Persons who give notice after 2 years from the date the first complete and valid notice is received and who otherwise comply with the conditions precedent to recovery may recover from any remaining portion of the $100,000 aggregate, in an amount equal to the unsatisfied portion of that person's judgment or $20,000, whichever is less, but only to the extent and amount reflected in the judgment as being actual or compensatory damages, with claims being paid in the order notice is received until the $100,000 aggregate has been fully disbursed. * * * (3) Payments for claims shall be limited in the aggregate to $100,000, regardless of the number of claimants involved, against any one mortgage broker or registrant. If the total claims exceed the aggregate limit of $100,000, the department shall prorate the payment based on the ratio that the person's claim bears to the total claims filed. Licensees Apt and Caldwell have filed for bankruptcy. Accordingly, claimants whose claims were unperfected as of September 1, 1986 are not required to satisfy the requirements of section 494.043(1), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1986). However, pursuant to subsection 494.043(2)(Supp. 1986), claimants must provide the Department a proof of claim by certified mail. All claimants proceeding against licensees Schleusener, Sprague, Wright and Backhoff are required to satisfy section 494.043(1) as there is no showing that they have filed for bankruptcy. At all times material hereto, Petitioners, Apt Mortgage Corporation, Lee Caldwell, Beverly Backhoff, Wilma Sprague and Harry Wright were licensed Mortgage Brokers under Chapter 494, Florida Statutes, having been issued licenses by the Department. On March 30, 1987, the Department received a letter dated March 27, 1987 from attorney John C. Rayson, Esquire on behalf of the Zinni Claim against Lee Caldwell with the attached proof of claim. Thereafter on March 31, 1987, the Department's counsel, in conversation with attorney Rayson's secretary, was advised that the proof of claim letter mailed to the Department respecting the Zinni's was sent by certified mail but that the returned receipt part had fallen from the letter. An examination of the envelope submitted reveals that the letter was, in fact, sent by certified mail and contained the proper proof of claim. Additionally, by certified letter dated March 31, 1987, the Department received on April 2, 1987, a second letter from John C. Rayson on behalf of the Zinni's, against Caldwell with the attached "proof of claim". On March 30, 1987, the Department received by certified mail from Stephen F. Kessler, Esquire, on behalf of the Campbell and Ferdinand Claims: Schlaugat Claim. On October 14, 1986, the Department received by certified mail an Amended Complaint against Apt in Case No. 86 15853CB, which was filed on August 29, 1986. On March 23, 1987, the Department received by certified mail a recorded Final Declaratory Judgment in Case No. 86-15853CB against Apt in the principal amount of $50,000 plus 18 percent interest from January 18, 1984. On March 16, 1987, the Department received an Amended Complaint against Backhoff in Case No. 86-15856CH. On March 16, 1987, the Department received an Amended Complaint against Schleusener, Caldwell, Wright and Sprague in Case No. 86-11072CY. Hebl Claim. On October 14, 1986, the Department received by certified mail an Amended Complaint against Apt in Case No. 86-15853 CB, which was filed on August 29, 1986. On March 23, 1987, the Department received, by certified mail, a recorded Final Judgment in Case No. 86-15853 CB against Apt in the principal amount of $10,000 plus interest at 18 percent from December 29, 1983. Holdheim Claim. By certified mail dated March 27, 1987, the Department received a letter on April 3, 1987 from Attorney Arthur N. Wolff, on behalf of Evelyn M. Holdheim with the attached documents: Proof of Claim by Evelyn M. Holdheim against Doretha Lee Caldwell, Balloon Mortgage Note dated April 11, 1983, Complaint in Foreclosure in the 17th Judicial Circuit, Case No. 84- 7037CV by Evelyn M. Holdheim against Ernest Schleusener and Doretha Lee Caldwell, Mortgage Deed dated April 11, 1983, Proof of Claim; acceptance or rejection of claim by Evelyn M. Holdheim against Doretha Lee Caldwell, Letter dated March 31, 1987, by attorney Arthur N. Wolff to Clerk of U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Proposed Order and Motion. On October 15, 1986, the Department received a recorded Final Judgment against Schleusener, Case No. 84-7037 CV, which has been assigned to the Department. On April 27, 1987, the Department received a Withdrawal of Motion regarding Caldwell in the Bankruptcy Court wherein it is represented that it would be a useless effort to proceed against Caldwell in Case No. 84-7037 CV. See Exhibit A. Fuhrman and LaCotche Certified mail notice that an action will be instituted against Apt received by the Department on May 4, 1984. Complaint against Apt, Case No. 84-15882, was received by the Department on October 3, 1985. Complaint filed July 12, 1984. On October 15, 1987, the Fuhrman and LaCotche claims were dismissed from circuit court for lack of prosecution. Campbell Claim. On March 30, 1987, the Department received by certified mail: Proof of Claim by L. D. Mervyn Campbell against Doretha Lee Caldwell. Partial Final Judgment in the Circuit Court of the 17th Judicial Circuit against Doretha Lee Caldwell entered on August 4, 1986, Proof of Claim by Cecil Ferdinand against Doretha Lee Caldwell, Partial Final Judgment in the Circuit Court of the 17th Judicial Circuit against Doretha Lee Caldwell was entered on August 4, 1986, Proof of Claim by L. D. Mervyn Campbell against Apt, Proof of claim by Cecil Ferdinand against Apt. A Proof of Claim regarding Caldwell in the federal bankruptcy court, Case No. 85-01060, and a Partial Final Judgment against Caldwell in Case No. 86- 11362 DF, and A Proof of Claim against Apt in the federal bankruptcy court, Case No. 84-01247. Ferdinand Claim. On March 30, 1987, the Department received by certified mail: A Proof of Claim regarding Caldwell in the federal bankruptcy court, Case No. 85-01060, and a partial Final Judgment against Caldwell in Case No. 84- 11149 Co, and 39 . A Proof of Claim against Apt in the federal bankruptcy court, Case No. 84-01247. Stuart, Kutik and Marques Claim No significant documentation has been filed with the Department. Paine Complaint against Schleusener, Caldwell, Wright, Backhoff and Sprague, Case No. 84-18235 CX, received by the Department on August 29, 1984. Complaint filed August 8, 1984. 1/ Notice by certified mail received by the Department on September 10, 1984. Schiavone et al. Claim Certified mail notice of an action against Apt, Schleusener, Sprague, and Wright received by Department on March 22, 1985. Certified mail notice with complaint against Schleusener, Caldwell, Wright, and Sprague, received by the Department on April 14, 1986. Case No. unknown. Zinni Certified mail notice against Apt, Schleusener, Caldwell, Wright received by the Department on April 8, 1985. Complaint filed on April 18, 1984. Final Summary Judgment, Case No. 84-8669 CG, entered on June 24, 1986, against Caldwell and Wright. Turner Certified mail notice with complaint against Apt, Caldwell, Wright, and Sprague, Case No. 85-28746 CM, received by the Department on January 8, 1986. Complaint filed November 21, 1985. Mitchell Claim No significant documentation has been filed with the Department. Anglada Claim On July 3, 1986, the Department received certified mail notice of an action against Sprague, Case No. 85-6531, which was filed on July 15, 1985. Complaint, Case No. 85-6531, against Sprague and Wright received by Department on August 4, 1986. Judgment against Wright and Sprague entered on July 7, 1986. Certified mail notice of a judgment against Wright received by Department on August 18, 1986. Writ of Executions against Sprague and Wright returned nulla bona on September 3, 1986. Interrogatories served on August 1986, have not been answered and Certificate of Non-Attendance at Depositions of Sprague and Wright dated September 2, 1986. Judgment recorded October 9, 1986. Proof of Claim against Debtor Apt, Case No. 84-01247, dated September 9, 1984, in the Bankruptcy Court received by the Department on August 18, 1986, by regular mail. Smith Proof of Claim against Debtor Apt, Case No. 84-01247, dated August 28, 1984, in Bankruptcy Court received by the Department on October 6, 1986, by certified mail. Certified mail notice of an action against Caldwell, Wright Sprague, and Apt received by the Department on November 5, 1986. Case No. Unknown. APT/SCHLEUSENER 2/ Date certified Mail Received Claimant(s) Case No., if Known, and Proof of Claim Claim Amount 1. 3/29/84 Schlaugat 86-15853CB against Apt $10,000* 2. 5/4/84 Fuhrman & LaCotche 84-15882 against Apt 10,000 3. 9/10/84 Paine 84-18235CX against Schleusener 10,000 4. 3/22/85 D&R Schiavone Suit against 10,000 Paul, Schleusener 10,000 Miller, 10,000 Barron, 10,000 Margerite 10,000 5. 4/8/85 Zinni 84-8669CG against Schleusener 10,000* 6. 1/8/86 Turner 85-28746CM against Apt 10,000 7 a. b. 8/1/86 8/1/86 Schlaugat Hebl 86-11072CY against Schleusener 86-11072CY against 10,000* 10,000* c. 8/1/86 Schlaugat Schleusener Apt Proof of Claim 10,000* d. 8/1/86 Hebl Apt Proof of Claim 10,000* 8. 10/6/86 Smith Apt Proof of Claim 10,000* 9. 10/14/86 Hebl 86-15853 CB against Apt 10,000* 10. 11/5/86 Smith Against Apt 10,000* 11 a. 3/30/87 Zinni Apt Proof of Claim 10,000* b. 3/30/87 Campbell Apt Proof of Claim 10,000 c. 3/30/87 Ferdinand Apt Proof of Claim 10,000 12. 4/2/87 Zinni Apt Proof of Claim 10,000* CALDWELL Case No., if Date Certified Mail Received Claimant(s) Known, and Proof of Claim Claim Amount 1. 5/22/84 Campbell 84-11362DF $10,000* 2. 5/24/84 Ferdinand 84-11149 10,000* 3. 9/10/84 Paine 84-18235CX 10,000 4. 4/8/85 Zinni 84-8669CG 10,000 5. 1/8/86 Turner 85-2876CM 10,000 6. 4/14/86 D&R Schiavone unknown 10,000 Paul, unknown 10,000 Miller, unknown 10,000 Barron, & unknown 10,000 Margerite unknown 10,000 7 a. 8/1/86 b. 8/1/86 Schlaugat Hebl 86-11072CY and Proof of 86-11072CY Claim 10,000 10,000 and Proof of Claim 8. 11/5/1986 Smith Case No. unknown 10,000 9 a. 3/30/87 Campbell Proof of Claim 10,000* b. 3/30/87 Ferdinand Proof of Claim 10,000* SPRAGUE Date Certified Mail Received Claimant(s) Case NO. Claim Amount 1. 9/10/84 Paine 84-18235CX $10,000 2. 3/22/85 D&R Schiavone, unknown 10,000 Paul, unknown 10,000 Miller, unknown 10,000 Barron, unknown 10,000 & Margerite unknown 10,000 3. 1/8/86 Turner 85-28746CM 10,000 4. 7/3/86 Anglada 85-6531 10,000 5 a. 8/1/86 Schlaugat 86-11072CY 10,000 b. 8/1/86 Hebl 86-11072CY 10,000 6. 11/5/86 Smith unknown 10,000 D. BACKHOFF Date Certified Mail Received Claimant(s) Case No. Claim Amount 1. 9/10/84 Paine 84-18235CX $10,000 2. 7/22/86 Schlauqat 86-15856CH 10,000 3 a. 9/8/86 Campbell 86-10964CK 10,000 b. 9/8/86 Ferdinand 86-10964CK 10,000 E. WRIGHT Date Certified Mail Received Claimant(s) Case No. Claim Amount 1. 9/10/87 Paine 84-18235CX $10,000 2. 3/22/85 D&R Schiavone, unknown 10,000 Paul, unknown 10,000 Miller, unknown 10,000 Barron, & unknown 10,000 Margerite unknown 10,000 3. 4/8/85 Zinni 84-8669CG 10,000 4. 1/8/86 Turner 85-28746CM 10,000 5 a. 8/1/86 Schlaugat 86-11072CY 10,000 b. 8/1/86 Hebl 86-11072CY 10,000 6. 8/4/86 Anglada 86-6531 10,000 7. 11/5/86 Smith unknown 10,000 III STATUS OF CLAIMS NOT PERFECTED WITHIN TWO-YEAR PERIOD APT/SCHLEUSENER Claimant(s) Provisions Satisfied Provisions Not satisfied 1. Schlaugat s. 494.042(2), 494.043(1)(f) 494.043(2) (Supp. 1986) & s. 494.044(2) 2. Furhman & LaCotche 494.043(1)(f) 494.042(2), (Supp. 1986) 494.043(2), & 494.044(2) (Supp. 1986) 3. Paine 494.043(1)(e) & (f)(Supp. 1986) 494.043(1)(a)-(d) & 494.044(2) (Supp. 1986) 4. D&R Schiavone, Paul, Miller, 494.043(1)(e) & 494.043(1)(a)-(d) Barron, & Margerite (f)(Supp. 1986) & 494.044(2) (Supp. 1986) 5. Zinni 494.043(1)(e) (Sup. 1986) & (f) 494.043(1)(a)-(d) & 494.044(2) (Supp. 1986) 6. Turner 494.043(1)(f) (Supp. 1986) 494.042(2), 494.043(2), & 494.044(2) (Supp. 1986) 7 a. b. Schlaugat Hebl 494.043(1)(e) (Supp. 1986) 494.043(1)(e) & & (f) (f) 494.043(1)(a)-(d) & 494.044(2) (Supp. 1986) 494.043(1)(a)-(d) c. Schlaugat (Supp. 1986) See paragraph 1 & 494.044(2) (Supp. 1986) d. Hebl 494.043(1)(f) (Supp. 1986) & (2) 494.042(2) & 494.044(2) (Supp. 1986) 8. Smith 494.043(1)(f) (Supp. 1986) & (2) 494.042(2) & 494.044(2) (Supp. 1986) 9. Hebl 494.042(2) & 494.043(1)(f) & (2) 494.044(2) (Supp. 1986) (Supp. 1986) 10. Smith 494.043(1)(f) (Supp. 1986) & (2) 494.042(2) & 494.044(2) (Supp. 1986) 11 a. b. c. Zinni Campbell Ferdinand 494.043 (1)(f) & (2) (Supp. 1986) 494.043(1)(f) & (2) (Supp. 1986) 494.043(1)(f) & (2) (Supp. 1986) 494.042(2) & 494.044(2) (Supp. 1986) 494.042(2) & 494.044(2) (Supp. 1986) 494.042(2) & 494.044(2) (Supp. 1986) Zinni See paragraph 11a CALDWELL Claimant(s) Provisions Satisfied Provisions Not Satisfied 1. Campbell s. 494.042(2) & 494.043 (1)(f) & (2) - (Supp. 1986) s. 494.044(2) (Supp. 1986) 2. Ferdinand 494.042(2) & 494.043 (1)(f) & (2)(Supp. 1986) 494.044(2) (Supp. 1986) 3. Paine 494.043(1)(f)(Supp. 1986) 494.042(2), 494.043(2), & 494.044(2) (Supp. 1986) 4. Zinni 494.042(2) & 494.043(1)(f) (Supp. 1986) 494.043(2) & 494.044(2) (Supp. 1986) 5. Turner 494.043(1)(f) (Supp. 1986) 494.042(2), 494.043(2), & 494.044(2) (Sup. 1986) 6. D&R Schiavone, 494.043(1)(f) Paul, Miller, (Supp. 1986) Barron, & Margerite 494.042(2), 494.043(2) & 494.044(2) (Supp. 1986) 7 a. b. Schlaugat Hebl 494.043(1)(f) (Supp. 1986) 494.043(1)(f) & & (2) (2) 494.042(2) & 494.044(2) (Supp. 1986) 494.042(2) & c. Schlaugat (Supp. 1986) 494.043(1)(f) & (2) 494.044(2) (Supp. 1986) 494.042(2) & (Supp. 1986) 494.044(2) (Supp. 1986) d. Hebl 494.043 (1)(f) (Supp. 1986) & (2) 494.042(2) & 494.044 (2) (Supp. 1986) 8. Smith 494.043(1)(f) (Supp. 1986) 494.042(2), 494.043(2) & 494.044(2) (Supp. 1986) SPRAGUE Claimant(s) Provisions Satisfied Provisions Not Satisfied 1. Paine s. 494.043(1)(e) (Supp. 1986) & (f) 494.043(1)(a)-(d) & 494.044(2) (Supp. 1986) 2. D&R Schiavone, Paul, Miller, Barron, & Margerite 494.043(1)(e) (Supp. 1986) & (f) 494.043(1)(a)-(d) & 494.044(2) (Supp. 1986) 3. Turner 494.043(1)(e) (Supp. 1986) & (f) 494.043(1)(a)-(d) & 494.044(2) (Supp. 1986) 4. Anglada 494.043(1) (Supp. 1986) 494.044(2) (Supp. 1986) 5 a. Schlaugat 494.043(1)(e) (Supp. 1986) & (f) 494.043(1)(a)-(d) & 494.044(2) (Supp. 1986) b. Hebl 494.043 (1)(e) & (f) (Supp. 1986) 494.043(1)(a)-(d) & 494.044(2) (Supp. 1986) 6. Smith 494.043(1)(e) & (f) 494.043(1)(a)-(d) (Supp. 1986) & 494.044(2) (Supp. 1986) BACKHOFF Provisions Provisions Claimant(s) Satisfied Not Satisfied 1. Paine s. 494.043(1)(e) & (f) s. 494.043(1)(a)-(d) (Supp. 1986) & 494.044(2) (Supp. 1986) 2. Schlaugat 494.043(1)(e) & (f) 494.043(1)(a)-(d) (Supp. 1986) & 494.044(2) (Supp. 1986) 3 a. Campbell 494.043(1)(e) & (f) 494.043(1)(a)-(d) (Supp. 1986) & 494.044(2) (Supp. 1986) b. Ferdinand 494.043(1)(e) & (f) 494.043(1)(a)-(d) (Supp. 1986) & 494.044(2) (Supp. 1986) WRIGHT Provisions Provisions Claimant(s) Satisfied Not Satisfied 1. Paine s. 494.043(1)(e) & (f) s. 494.043(1)(a)-(d) (Supp. 1986) & 494.044(2) (Supp. 1986) 2. D&R Schiavone, 494.043(1)(e) & (f) 494.043(1)(a)-(d) Paul, Miller, (Supp. 1986) & 494.044(2) Barron, & (Supp. 1986) Margerite 3. Zinni 494.043(1)(a), (e) & 494.043(1)(b), (c) (f)(Supp. 1986) & (d) & 494.044 (2)(Supp. 1986) 4. Turner 494.0431)(e) & (f) 494.043(1)(a)-(d) (Supp. 1986) & 494.044(2)(Supp. 1986) 5 a. Schlaugat 494.043(1)(e) & (f) 494.043(1)(a)-(d) (Supp. 1986) & 494.044(2)(Supp. 1986) b. Hebl 494.043(1)(e) & (f) 494.043(1)(a)-(d) (Supp. 1986) & 494.044(2)(Supp. 1986) 6. Anglada 494.043(1)(Supp. 494.044(2) 1986) (Supp. 1986) 7. Smith 494.043(1)(e) & (f) 494.043(1)(a)-(d) (Supp. 1986) & 494.044(2)(Supp. 1986) *Although some claimants have filed more than one notice by certified mail, pursuant to Fla. Stat. Section 494.044(1), each claimant is only entitled to $10,000 per licensee.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Banking and Finance, Office of Comptroller, enter a Final Order determining that claimants Holdheim, Schlaugat, Hebl, Campbell, Ferdinand, Anglada perfected their claims against the licensees as noted herein. Such claimants are entitled to recover from the fund the statutory limit in effect at the time of $10,000 per licensee since the cause of action for each claimant commenced before October 1, 1985. As to all remaining claimants whose claims were not perfected within the two (2) year period but have since completed all prerequisites for recovery from the fund, it is recommended that the Department evaluate such claims at this time and take appropriate action. 3/ DONE and RECOMMENDED this 14th day of December, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of December, 1987.
The Issue The issue presented for decision herein is whether or not Respondent's real estate salesman's license should be disciplined because he engaged in acts and/or conduct amounting to fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, false promises, false pretenses, dishonest dealing by trick, scheme or device, culpable negligence and breach of trust and for failure to account and deliver monies entrusted to him while acting as a salesman in violation of Section 475.25(1)(b) and (d), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, documentary evidence received including a review of the entire record compiled herein, I hereby make the following relevant factual findings. During times material herein, Respondent was, and is, a licensed real estate salesman in Florida and has been issued license number 0128100. (Petitioner's Exhibit 1) Augustin Leon Padron is a resident of Caracas, Venezuela and is a part- time resident of Miami, Florida. During 1978, Leon was interested in purchasing property in the Miami area so he contacted a distant cousin, the Respondent, to help in the acquisition and management of any property be purchased. On November 9, 1978, Leon executed a power of attorney appointing the Respondent as his attorney-in-fact in regard to the acquisition and management of properties that Leon may purchase. (Petitioner's Exhibit 5) On November 17, 1978, Leon wired to the Pespondent $20,000 to be held for the acquisition of property by Leon. (Petitioner's Exhibit 6) On August 31, 1979, Leon, through the assistance of Respondent, purchased a duplex located at 43-45 NW 44 Avenue, Miami, Florida. Of the $20,000 sent to Respondent by Leon, $17,194.35 was used for the purchase of the duplex, leaving a balance of $2,805.65. (Petitioner's Exhibits 4 and 6) The balance of $2,805.65 was never accounted for by Respondent or delivered to Leon. Pursuant to the power of attorney, Respondent assumed the duties of manager of the duplex for Leon, which duties included the collection of rent, making repairs and the payment of the monthly mortgage to Atlantic Federal Savings and Loan Association in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida. On or about April 1, 1981, Leon gave a $10,000 check to the Respondent for the purpose of making certain repairs and additions to the duplex. (Petitioner's Exhibit 7) Respondent never made repairs or additions as requested and has failed to account for or deliver, to the present time, any of the $10,000, although demands have been made by Leon for the return of the money. On or about May 24, 1981, Leon issued two checks, each in the amount of $10,000. One check was issued to Arango and Galarraga, a law firm, as a deposit towards the purchase of the Kasbah Bar. The second check was issued to the Respondent to he used as a deposit on the purchase of property in Kendall. (Petitioner's Exhibit 8) Both of the above-referred transactions bailed to materialize. On July 7, 1981, the law firm of Arango and Galarraga issued a check payable to Leon in the amount of $10,000 representing a return of the deposit. (Petitioner's Exhibit 9) This check was tendered to the Respondent. Respondent took this check plus the $10,000 deposit as to the Kendall property and had a $20,000 certified check drawn and made payable to Leon. (Petitioner's Exhibit 10) On November 19, 1981, at Leon's request, Respondent issued a check to Leon in the amount of $10,000 representing a part payment of monies owed to Leon by Respondent. (Petitioner's Exhibit 11) Leon attempted to cash this check hut was told that there were insufficient funds in the Respondent's bank account to cover such an amount. (Petitioner's Exhibit 12) Leon has made numerous demands upon Respondent for the payment of the $10,000 but Respondent has failed to pay over to Leon the $10,000 or to make good on the check he issued. During 1980 and 1981, Respondent failed to make at least five (5) mortgage payments causing the mortgage loan on the duplex, referred to above, with Atlantic Federal Savings and Loan Association to become delinquent and foreclosure proceedings were instituted. (Petitioner's Exhibit 3) The evidence is undisputed that Atlantic Federal notified Respondent on at least two occasions that the loan was delinquent and, if not brought current, foreclosure proceedings would result. (Petitioner's Exhibits 15, 16, 17, and Respondent's Exhibit 1) Respondent failed to advise of the nonpayment of the mortgage and the impending foreclosure. Additionally, at no time did Respondent advise Leon that be did not have sufficient funds to make the mortgage payment as scheduled. On November 19, 1981, Leon discovered through the public records of Dade County and Atlantic Federal, that his duplex was about to be foreclosed. Leon brought the mortgage payments current and paid the attorneys fees and costs involved amounting to $5,281.47. (Petitioner's Exhibit 13) Based on the above-referred events, Leon revoked the Respondent's power of attorney effective that day, November 19, 1981. (Petitioner's Exhibit 14) Subsequent to November 19, 1981, Leon attempted to work out arrangements whereby Respondent would repay to Leon all monies owed by Respondent to Leon. These attempts failed and Leon filed suit against Respondent in Dade County Circuit Court for $26,065. On July 24, 1992, Leon secured a final judgment against Respondent for the amount requested, i.e., $26,065 plus interest and costs. (Petitioner's Exhibit 2) To this day, Respondent has failed and refused to satisfy the judgment and Leon has been unsuccessful in his attempted collection on that judgment. Respondent contends that the $10,000 check that gas issued him by Leon was for the payment of services performed on behalf of the Respondent. Evidence in that regard reveals that Respondent was not charging Leon a commission on any real estate transactions. A review of Respondent's testimony herein reveals that in addition to the acquisition and management of the duplex referred to herein which is located at 43-45 NW 44 Avenue in Miami, Respondent only picked up and forwarded goods and merchandise to Respondent in Caracas, Venezuela which had either been purchased by or shipped to Respondent from New York and other places. Apart from the time involved in the reshipping of those goods and merchandise, Respondent only paid nominal shipping charges. It is true that Respondent attempted to negotiate for the sale and purchase of the Kasbah Bar for Leon; however, his efforts in that regard were unsuccessful. Based on all of the evidence herein, including the testimony of Leon and the documentary evidence received, Respondent's contention that Leon owed him in excess of $10,000 is not credible and is rejected. This is especially so in view of the fact that Respondent issued a check in the amount of $10,000 to Leon which was returned for insufficient funds. For all these reasons, Respondent's testimony is incredible and is rejected in those instances wherein it differs from the version offered by the deposition testimony of Augustin Leon Padron.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED: That the Respondent, Ignacio Dulzaides', license as a real estate salesman (number 0128100) be revoked. DONE and ORDER of this 11th day March, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of March, 1985.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Defendant was registered with Plaintiff as an active broker, holding certificate NO. 0182756. On or about October 4, 1976, a Contract for Sale of Real Estate ("the contract") was entered into between Merit Properties Corporation as seller, Frances G. Williams ("the buyer") as buyer, and Defendant as "agent." The contract was for purchase and sale of certain real property and improvements located in Tampa, Florida. The contract provided that purchase of the property was contingent upon the buyer qualifying for and obtaining an FHA mortgage in the amount of $20,850. At the time the contract was signed, the Defendant obtained a $300.00 deposit from the buyer, and at some later date, accepted an additional deposit of $550.00, making a total deposit of $850.00 toward the purchase price of the property. The contract provides that the deposit shall apply as part of the purchase price of the property "...and shall be held by said Agent in escrow pending closing of [the] transaction..." In addition, the contract provides that upon closing of the transaction "[t]he Seller agrees to pay said Agent a sum equal to 7 percent of the purchase price as commission...." Finally, the contract contained a provision indicating that "[n]o agreements, unless incorporated in this contract shall be binding upon the Agent, Buyer, or, Seller." Sometime in late 1976, the buyer applied to Mortgage Associates, Inc. for an FHA mortgage. On or about November 5, 1976, this application was rejected. On or about November 29, 1976, the buyer again applied for an FHA mortgage, this time through Charles F. Curry and Company. This mortgage application was rejected on December 10, 1976. Defendant was aware that the buyer had applied for an FHA mortgage through Charles F. Curry and Company. Written notification of rejection of the buyer's application through this company was sent to the buyer, but a copy was not forwarded by Charles F. Curry and Company to Defendant. The record establishes, however, that Charles F. Curry and Company's general practice was to notify real estate brokers involved in financing transactions of the disposition of mortgage loan applications. Defendant denies receiving any such notification from Charles F. Curry and Company. On several occasions, after the aforesaid rejections of the buyer's mortgage loan applications, the buyer attempted to contact Defendant by telephone, but was unsuccessful in these attempts. Subsequently, on February 21, 1977, the buyer orally advised Defendant that her mortgage loan application had been rejected, and requested return of her $850.00 deposit. When Defendant did not return the deposit, the buyer retained an attorney to assist her in recovering her deposit. Finally, pursuant to a Compromise and Settlement Agreement dated September 5, 1978, Defendant returned the buyer's deposit of $850.00, together with an additional $100.00 as accrued interest. However, of this $950.00 total, the buyer received only $650.00. The remaining $300.00 constituted a fee which the buyer had to pay to her attorney for services rendered in recovering the deposit. Defendant was a substantial owner of Merit Properties Corporation, the purported seller of the real property here involved. Evidence of record in this proceeding clearly establishes that Defendant did not deposit the $850.00 earnest money deposit received from the buyer in an escrow account maintained either in his own name or in the name of Merit Properties Corporation. In fact, Defendant admits that the $850.00 deposit was used to make improvements to the real property which was the subject matter of the contract. Defendant contends that he received the earnest money deposit from the buyer as an officer of Merit Properties Corporation, and that he had an oral understanding with the buyer entered into prior to the execution of the contract that the money so received would note be held in escrow, but would be used to make improvements on the property. These contentions are not supported by the evidence and are specifically rejected. The record clearly establishes that during negotiations leading to the signing of the contract, Defendant informed the buyer that he was a real estate broker. In addition, the record also establishes that Defendant prepared the contract, and was therefore responsible for the wording of that document. The contract clearly provides that Defendant acted as "agent" for Merit Properties Corporation, and that as such, he was to receive a 7 percent commission on the purchase price at the closing of the transaction. By the very terms of the contract, therefore, Defendant was acting in the capacity of a real estate broker in this transaction. In addition, the contention that there existed an oral agreement between Defendant and the buyer prior to the signing of the contract to use the deposit money for construction purposes is not supported by the evidence of record in this proceeding, and, in fact, is directly contrary to the language contained in the contract document prepared by Defendant. Finally, Defendant contends that he never refused to return the buyer's deposit, but informed her that the deposit would be returned upon the buyer furnishing to Defendant both a copy of correspondence rejecting the buyer's mortgage loan application, and a "release." There is no provision in the contract involved in this transaction which would require the buyer to furnish Defendant any sort of "release", or to furnish notice of inability to obtain the necessary financing in any specific form. Thus, oral demand for return of the deposit was clearly permissible under the terms of the contract. Further, Defendant was aware of the fact that the buyer had applied for mortgage financing through Charles F. Curry and Company, and therefore could either have obtained a copy of the rejection of the buyer's mortgage loan application himself had he chosen to do so, or could at the least have inquired of that company as to the disposition of the buyer's application. Both Plaintiff and Defendant have submitted Proposed Findings of Fact for consideration by the Hearing Officer. To the extent that those proposed findings of fact have not been adopted in this Recommended Order, they have been rejected as either not having been supported by the evidence, or as having been irrelevant to the issues in this proceeding.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered by the State of Florida, Board of Real Estate, suspending Defendant's real estate broker's license No. 0182756 for a period of sixty (60) days from the date of final agency action in this proceeding. DONE and ENTERED this 21st day of July, 1980, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM E. WILLIAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 101 Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: John Huskins, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Gwynne A. Young, Esquire Post Office Box 3239 Tampa, Florida 33601 ================================================================= AGENCY MEMORANDUM ================================================================= DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Telephone 904-488-6692 MEMORANDUM TO: C. B. Stafford, Executive Director, Board of Real Estate E. B. Ashley, Administrator on Investigations FROM: John Huskins, Assistant General Counsel SUBJECT: FINAL ACTION - Suspension PD 3402 (DOAH 79-744) James E. Black, Broker 182756-1 DATE: February 6, 1981 This is to advise you that by FINAL ORDER dated September 15, 1980 (copy attached) the license of James E. Black was suspended for six (6) months, effective October 16, 1980, provided no appeal was taken. Black did appeal. January 21, 1991 the Appellate Court entered its ORDER dismissal of appeal (copy attached), therefore, suspension became effective immediately. Broker Black, through his lawyer, delivered to me Black's Certificate Number: 182756, as individual broker Certificate Number: 182755, as corporate-Best Opportunity Realty Corporation. both of which are attached to this memo to C. B. Stafford. It is suggested that revocation records be updated to reflect suspension and the effective date. It is further suggested that investigation be made as necessary to determine if James E. Black is in fact refraining from real estate activities, in compliance with his suspension. JH/pkr Enclosures* cc: Mr. Michael Schwartz, General Counsel Susan Penquite, Central Files Mr. Fred Wilson, Assistant General Counsel Ms. Renata Hendrick, Supervisor of Records * NOTE: Enclosures noted are not available at the Division and therefore not a part of this ACCESS document.
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent violated Section 475.42(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1995), by operating as a real estate broker without a license and, if so, what, if any, penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency responsible for regulating the practice of real estate. Respondent is the president of Lenox Investments & Development, Inc. ("Lenox"). Lenox shares office space with Lenox Realty Corporation ("Lenox Realty"). Mr. Richard Fess is the qualifying and managing broker for Lenox Realty. Mr. Carlos Hofle is Respondent's brother, a licensed real estate agent, and an employee of Lenox Realty. Respondent is not licensed to practice real estate and is not an employee of Lenox Realty. In 1993, Respondent practiced real estate without a license by renting and negotiating the sale of a home owned by Herman and Mae Agnes Scott (the "Scotts"). Mr. Scott built the home himself approximately 20 years ago. In November, 1993, Mr. Scott became fatally ill. The Scotts were unable to make the mortgage payments on their home. They were six months in arrears in their mortgage payments. Crown Bank, the mortgagee, began foreclosure proceedings. The Scotts approached Respondent to assist them in avoiding foreclosure through a mortgage assistance program promoted by Lenox. Respondent represented verbally, in the functions he performed, and in the capacity for which he signed relevant documents, that he was a licensed real estate agent. He and the Scotts met and discussed the pending foreclosure proceeding. Respondent advised the Scotts that they should sell their house. Respondent represented that he would obtain a tenant who would purchase the house. The Scotts were in a desperate financial situation and needed cash. Respondent loaned the Scotts $2,000. The loan included a personal loan of $1,250 to the Scotts and a $750 mortgage assistance fee for Respondent. On November 10, 1993, the Scotts executed a management agreement with Lenox. Respondent negotiated and signed the management agreement. The management agreement required Respondent to advertise and show the rental property, pre-qualify the tenant, negotiate the lease, and perform repairs and maintenance. The Scotts were to pay Respondent 12 percent of the gross rent, plus one month's rent, and $750 for a mortgage assistance program to avoid foreclosure. All of the rent earned on the property went to Respondent until the $1,250 loan and $750 mortgage assistance fee were paid. On November 10, 1993, Respondent solicited and obtained an Exclusive Right of Sale Listing Contract from the Scotts on behalf of Lenox Realty. Respondent obtained a tenant who Respondent represented would purchase the Scotts' house. Respondent collected $1,400 from the tenant. None of the rent was paid to avoid or work out the foreclosure. The mortgagee foreclosed on the Scotts' house. They lost their home, their equity, and their credit. Respondent never worked for Lenox Realty. Lenox Realty never authorized Respondent to obtain listing agreements or management agreements on behalf of Lenox Realty. Neither Lenox Realty nor Mr. Fess agreed to list the Scotts' home for sale. Neither authorized Respondent to do so. Mr. Fess never signed the listing agreement with the Scotts. The Scotts dealt only with Respondent. They did not know that Respondent was not licensed. The Scotts never dealt with anyone who was a licensed real estate agent.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order finding Respondent guilty of violating Section 475.42(1)(a) and imposing an administrative penalty of $5,000. RECOMMENDED this 28th day of April, 1997, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of April, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Henry M. Solares, Division Director Division of Real Estate Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Lynda Goodgame General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Center 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Daniel Villazon, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Edward A. Kerben, Esquire 725 North Magnolia Avenue Orlando, Florida 32803
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is an agency of the State of Florida charged, under Chapter 475, Florida Statutes, with enforcing the licensure standards embodied in Chapter 475, and regulating the manner of practice of licensed real estate brokers pursuant to the standards enumerated in Chapter 475, Florida Statutes and the rules promulgated pursuant thereto. The Respondent, Stewart J. Love, at all times pertinent hereto, has been a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida, holding license number 0145076. That license is issued to Stewart J. Love, t/a Love Realty, 2120 Westfield Road, Pensacola, Florida 32505. A previous Administrative Complaint was filed against the Respondent by Petitioner on June 23, 1988. That Complaint, in essence, also charged two violations of Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes involving alleged fraud and misrepresentation, concealment, dishonest dealing, culpable negligence and the like It involved two separate real estate transactions which the Respondent engaged in. The first transaction concerned a piece of property Respondent purchased with an existing mortgage and shortly thereafter resold. The Respondent was charged with failing to assume the existing mortgage and, in essence, with not keeping the mortgage payments current, with receiving funds from his purchasers without properly accounting for them in proper escrow accounts and with failing to formally consummate the sale, as well as with issuing a check to the mortgagee bank holding the delinquent mortgage upon insufficient funds. With regard to the other transaction, the Respondent, in essence, was charged with purchasing a piece of property, recording his warranty deed from the sellers, but never properly paying the sellers monies that were due them for the property nor carrying through with the promise to assume the mortgage on that piece of property. That complaint culminated in DOAH Case No. 88-4570, in which the Respondent was charged in pertinent part with violations of Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes. During the course of that proceeding the Petitioner and Respondent entered into negotiations such that a stipulated adjudication of that proceeding by the agency was effected. The Respondent neither admitted nor denied the charges, but rather agreed to a fine of $500.00, as well as to making restitution of all monies owed to the alleged injured parties and to having his license being placed on probationary status for a period of one year for "culpable negligence" in violation of 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes. A final order is in evidence as part of Petitioner's Exhibit 1 in this proceeding. Donald and Teresa Winingar, husband and wife, in 1986 found themselves in rather straitened financial circumstances. Their home mortgage was in arrears and was threatened by foreclosure by the mortgagee. The ultimate result of their financial problems caused them to search for a new place to reside. They located six acres of land owned by Donna Day Bowers. The acreage had a small frame house approximately 20 years of age on it. They began negotiating with Ms. Bowers concerning purchasing the property from her The Winingars discussed the price with Ms. Bowers and ultimately a purchase price of approximately $12,000.00 was agreed upon. The Winingars realized that they could not pay cash for the property but would have to secure financing arrangements in order to purchase it. The Winingars had approximately $4,500.00 in cash and at first attempted to have the balance financed by the owner and seller, Ms. Bowers. That arrangement did not come to fruition and so the Winingars searched for another source of funds in order to finance the purchase of the Bowers property in this search they somehow came in contact with the Respondent Stewart Love, a real estate broker. After negotiations with Mr. Love he agreed to finance the purchase of the Bowers property for the Winingars. This resulted in a verbal agreement entered into between the Winingars and the Respondent whereby the Winingars would pay Love $4,500.00 in cash and he would finance the balance of $8,500.00 of the purchase price by a mortgage. Love, or the corporation of which he was president and part owner, Courthouse Investments, Inc., would collect interest on the $8,500.00 mortgage and note from the Winingars. Love also assessed the Winingars a $2,000.00 fee for handling the transaction, the purpose of the fee being unclear. It was apparently some sort of "broker's fee," although Love did not represent the Winingars as a realtor. On October 16, 1986 Respondent entered into an agreement called a "Warranty Deed to Trustee Under Land Trust Agreement pursuant to Section 689.071, Florida Statues," with the seller of the property, Donna Day. That instrument conveyed title to the property to the Respondent as Trustee in fee simple. The "warranty deed to trustee" document granted the trustee, Love, full power and authority to sell, lease, encumber and otherwise manage and dispose of the property in accordance with the terms of that instrument and with a trust agreement. The trust agreement itself, providing for powers and duties of the trustee and beneficiary of the trust is not evidence and the terms of it are unknown. In any event, having purchased the property from Donna Day (also known as Donna Day Bowers) the Respondent the following day, October 17, 1986, agreed to sell the property to Donald and Teresa Winingar. The Winingars on that day gave the Respondent $4,500.00 in cash as a down payment for the Bowers property. Thereafter, on or about October 31, 1986, the Winingars executed a mortgage note for the amount of $8,500.00 remaining on the purchase price, payable in favor of Courthouse Investments, Inc., a corporation partially owned by and represented by the Respondent Love and of which the Respondent was President. That mortgage note provides that the note was to be for a principal balance of $8,500.00 with payments of $130.00 per month for 265 months at an interest rate of 18% per annum. The note provided for no prepayment penalties and for $6.00 for late fees for each late payment. Additionally, the Winingars executed a promissory note payable to Stewart J. Love for the above-mentioned fee, in the amount of $2,000.00. That note provided that one balloon payment was to be due six years from October 30, 1986 at the rate of 12% per annum, payable in one payment. The Winingars began making monthly payments on the mortgage note of $130.00 per month and made those payments to Stewart J. Love. They were frequently behind in their payments but made payments sporadically until approximately May of 1988. When the Winingars and Mr. Love first engaged in negotiating the financing arrangement, Love informed the Winingars that he would have his attorney draft an agreement whereby the property would be held in trust by Love on behalf of the Winingars allegedly so that it could not be attached by any creditors of the Winingars. This was apparently because the Winingars were involved in a foreclosure action concerning their previous residential property and feared a deficiency judgment from that foreclosure proceeding which might endanger their rights to the land in question. Whether or not their credit was in such peril, Love assured them that he would obtain title to the property from the seller in the form of a trust arrangement, with the beneficial interest to be conveyed to the Winingars, in order to allegedly protect their interest in the six acres from the claims of creditors. Love then at some point showed a photocopy of a document entitled "Warranty Deed to Trustee Under Land Trust Agreement pursuant to Section 689.071, Florida Statutes," to the Winingars and advised them that form of agreement would be drafted to represent their mutual arrangement regarding the sale and ownership of the property, pending final payment by the Winingars. After the initial down payment of $4,500.00 was made by the Winingars, however, they had to make repeated demands of the Respondent for the execution of an agreement or contract to to formalize their arrangement regarding the purchasing of the Bowers property. The purchase arrangements from October 1986 to May 1987 were merely verbal aside from the execution of the mortgage note in question. Finally, on May 1, 1987, a document entitled "Agreement to Convey Beneficial Interest" was signed and executed by the Respondent as President of Courthouse Investments, Inc., "beneficiary," and the Winingars. That agreement provided, in pertinent part, that the total purchase price should be $8,500.00, which acknowledged, in effect, that the remaining $4,500.00 of the originally agreed upon purchase price had already been paid. The agreement also provided that when the principal sum of the purchase price had been paid in full that the beneficiary would instruct the trustee (Stewart Love) to deliver to the grantees (the Winingars) a warranty deed showing good and marketable title to the property. The beneficiary held the beneficial equitable interest in the property with the legal title being held by the Respondent as trustee. The beneficiary was Courthouse Investments, Inc., of which the trustee, the Respondent, was the President. He signed the agreement to convey beneficial interest as the President of that corporation. The agreement also provided that the grantees would be, permitted to go into possession of the property immediately on the date of its execution (May 1, 1987) and would assume all liability for insurance, taxes and maintenance after that date. ,It was also expressly agreed that all oil, gas and mineral rights were to be conveyed to the grantee. Presumably, that meant that all gas and mineral rights were to be conveyed upon the conveying of the warranty deed to the grantees when the purchase price was paid in full. In any event, the agreement clearly provided that when the principal sum of the purchase price was paid in full that a warranty deed conveying good and marketable title would be immediately conveyed to the grantees and, in that connection, the mortgage note already executed at that time by the grantees and the respondent provided that there would be no penalty for early payment of the purchase price or principal amount of the mortgage note referenced in the Agreement to Convey Beneficial Interest. This Agreement to Convey Beneficial Interest reveals additionally that Courthouse Investments, Inc. was the beneficiary of the trust set up by the above-mentioned warranty deed instrument from the original owner to the Respondent, as well as the fact that the Respondent is the President of the beneficiary corporation. Thus, there is no doubt, based upon the terms of the Agreement to Convey Beneficial Interest and the manner in which it was executed by the Respondent as President of the beneficiary corporation, that the Respondent knew that the parties thereto had agreed that all oil, gas and mineral rights were to be conveyed to the grantee upon the payment of the principal sum of the mortgage involved and that the trustee (the Respondent) would be obligated to transfer fee simple title to the grantees by warranty deed upon full payment, at any time, by the grantees. The "Warranty Deed to Trustee . . . " referenced above, however, clearly reveals that the seller, Donna Day (a/k/a Donna Day Bowers) had retained one-half the mineral rights and thus neither the Respondent/Trustee nor the beneficiary corporation had any ability to convey all gas and mineral rights to the grantees simply because the Respondent as trustee with legal title and the beneficiary corporation, the holder of equitable title, only owned one-half of the oil, gas and mineral rights. Since the Respondent/trustee arranged and conducted the purchase transaction with Ms. Bowers whereby he took fee simple title as trustee to the property in question under an instrument which revealed on its face that Ms. Bowers retained half the mineral rights, and since that same Respondent executed the agreement to convey beneficial interest (analogous to a contract for deed) to the Winingars as president of the beneficiary corporation which was the Grantor under that instrument purporting to convey all oil, gas and mineral rights (upon payment of the full purchase price), the Respondent is chargeable with knowledge that the representation concerning oil, gas and mineral rights contained in the Agreement to Convey Beneficial Interest did not accurately represent the ownership situation with regard to those oil, gas and mineral rights. After the Winingars made the initial down payment of $4,500.00 cash in October 1986 and during the time when they were making repeated demands for the execution of a contract to formalize their agreement regarding purchasing of the Bowers property, Mr. Love brought a representative of a financial institution known as "C&S Family Credit" (C&S) to the Winingars' home, sometime in January 1987. This representative and the Respondent informed Teresa Winingar that C&S Family Credit was considering the purchase of their mortgage from the Respondent. The Respondent and the C&S representative, however, advised Ms. Winingar to continue making her monthly payments of $130.00 to the Respondent and not to C&S. The Following year, in May, 1988, Teresa Winingar went to the Respondent's office to pay off the balance of the $8,500.00 mortgage note. Mr. Love informed her at that time that he could not accept the payoff because he did not have a clear title to the property to transfer to the Winingars at that time. The Agreement to Convey Beneficial Interest required the Respondent to transfer marketable title by general warranty deed upon tender of the payoff of the principal balance on the mortgage note. This he did not do. Thereafter, in June of 1988, a representative from C&S again visited the Winingars at their home. This time he informed Mrs. Winingar that his company was about to foreclose on the property at issue because a mortgage on the Winingar's property was in arrears. This was a mortgage executed by the Respondent in favor of C&S as mortgagee and which encumbered the property the Winingars were purchasing. At some point after that June 1988 visit by the C&S representative, C&S filed a foreclosure action against Stewart J. Love and the Winingars. Prior to the May 1988 offer by Mrs. Winingar to pay off the mortgage note, the Respondent's because he could not convey clear title, and the visit by the C&S representative informing Ms. Winingar of the delinquency of the Respondent's mortgage, the Winingars had no knowledge that the Respondent had executed a mortgage on their property in favor of another party. The mortgage executed in favor of C&S encompassed several pieces of property owned by the Respondent, including the piece of property being purchased by the Winingars. The evidence does not reflect that the Respondent made any arrangements with C&S to obtain a partial release of that mortgage as to the Winingar's property at such point as they should tender full payment of the balance of their purchase money mortgage note. While the Respondent, as trustee and holder of fee simple title to the Winingars' property might have had legal authority to mortgage the property to C&S, he was equally obligated under the agreement to convey beneficial interest to insure that their equitable interest in the property was protected, such that he would be able to convey good and marketable title by warranty deed upon the payment by the Winingars of the principal sum of the purchase price. This he was unable to do because he had failed to make arrangements with C&S for a partial release of mortgage or other means of insuring that the Winingars' property was unencumbered at the point of their tendering payment of the remaining purchase price. This negligent failure to insure that the Winingars' equitable interest in the property was protected resulted in the foreclosure action filed by C&S against the Respondent and the Winingars' interest in the property because the Respondent had not made payments on the C&S mortgage in a timely manner. The conveyance of fee simple title to the Respondent by the "Florida Land Trust Agreement" containing the reservation in the original owner of one- half of the oil, gas and mineral rights was recorded, so that any prospective purchaser or his representative searching the title of the subject property could have determined that the Respondent only owned one-half of the mineral rights to the property. Nevertheless, the Winingars were under the impression that they were to receive all mineral rights to the property. This impression may have arisen from the fact that the clause in the agreement to convey beneficial interest provides that . . . "All oil, gas and mineral rights are to be conveyed to the grantee." This agreement appears to be a form or "fill-in- the-blank" agreement prepared by the Respondent himself and not an attorney. Thus, it appears that the mineral rights clause referenced above is a "standard one" which was probably inadvertently left in that form in the agreement when it was executed due to the Respondent's negligence. It has not been established that he intentionally misrepresented the state of his ownership of mineral rights which he would be able to convey to the grantees. In fact, some eighteen months after the original purchase transaction between the Winingars, the Respondent and Courthouse Investments, Inc. was entered into, the Respondent executed the renewal of a preexisting oil lease with regard to the subject property. He, or his corporation, collected the sum of $238.00 lease payment as a result of that renewal. At the time of that lease renewal the Respondent still had legal title to the property and one-half of the mineral rights. This would not have been the case, however, had he timely transferred title to the Winingars in May of 1988 when they tendered payment in full of the remaining balance of the purchase price and at which point he was unable to convey marketable title for the reasons delineated above. In any event, the Winingars were shown to have been entitled to the Respondent's mineral rights at the point of their tender of full payment of the remaining purchase price in May of 1988, at which point title should have been transferred, together with the mineral rights held by the Respondent, which did not occur. As a result of the Respondent's failure to convey title upon the fulfillment of the condition in the above-referenced agreement regarding payment and the dispute which arose between the parties concerning the mineral rights and the proceeds from the lease, the Winingars apparently obtained counsel and instituted legal proceedings against the Respondent of an undisclosed nature. Criminal proceedings were instituted by the State's attorney against the Respondent. These proceedings resulted in a plea of "Nolo Contendere" by the Respondent in order to avoid the expense and anguish of trial and was a negotiated settlement of the criminal charges. Through the plea negotiation arrangement which was accepted by the Court, on February 14, 1990, an order withholding adjudication of guilt and placing the defendant (Respondent) on probation was entered in the case of the State of Florida v. Stewart J. Love, Case NO. 88-5765 CFA. See Petitioner's exhibit (3) in evidence. That order was entered pursuant to the plea of Nolo Contendere entered by the Respondent to the offense of petit theft. The subject matter of the theft charge was the $238.00 lease payment which the Respondent had maintained he or his corporation was entitled to and which the Winingars believed they were entitled to. In any event, the Respondent was placed on probation for a period of six months and was ordered to pay restitution in the amount of the $238.00 to the Winingars. He was also ordered to pay certain costs and was ordered to set a firm closing date by which the Winingars could obtain clear title to the property upon their payment of the balance due, as well as applicable closing costs, including one- half title insurance. The Respondent was ordered by the Court to attend and assist in the closing of the transaction. The Court also ordered that the Respondent would not be liable to clear any encumbrances to the title to the property which had been caused by the Winingars. Ultimately, the Winingars failed to tender the remaining purchase price and therefore the closing never occurred.
The Issue The issue in Case No. 90-4722 was whether B & B Mortgage Equity, Inc. was entitled to licensure as a mortgage broker in the State of Florida. As discussed in more detail below, B & B Mortgage Equity subsequently withdrew its application for licensure and that case is now moot. The issue in Case No. 90- 6577 is whether Respondents committed the offenses alleged in the Amended Administrative Complaint filed in that case, and, if so, what disciplinary action should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent hereto, B & B Investors was registered with the Department as a mortgage broker pursuant to Chapter 494, Florida Statutes. Until June 15, 1990, the business address for B & B Investors was 1481 N.W. 7th Street #1, Miami, Florida 33125. B & B Investors' registration number is HB 592369518. On or about July 5, 1990, B & B Investors filed a petition for relief under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida, Case No. 9090-14587-SMW. Yanks was the president and principal mortgage broker for B & B Investors until May 10, 1989. Yanks is a licensed mortgage broker in Florida having been issued license number was 262788177. He has been licensed since 1980 or 1981. There is no evidence of any prior disciplinary action against him or B & B Investors. At all times pertinent hereto, Yanks was also the President of B & B Equity. B & B Equity has never been registered pursuant to Chapter 494, Florida Statutes. Until June 15, 1990, the business address for B & B Equity was also 1481 N.W. 7th Street #1, Miami, Florida 33125. At all times pertinent hereto, Hernandez-Yanks was married to Yanks and was the Vice President and Secretary of B & B Equity. Hernandez-Yanks is an attorney, but she has never been licensed pursuant to Chapter 494, Florida Statutes. On or about March 15, 1990, Hernandez-Yanks filed a Petition for Relief under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida, Case No. 90-11654-BKC-AJC. On or about January 1, 1990, B & B Equity filed an Application for Registration as a Mortgage Brokerage Business (the "Registration Application"). Paragraph 6 of the Registration Application stated in part: List all officers, directors, partners, joint-ventures, and ultimate equitable owners. Ultimate equitable owner means natural person who owns 10 percent or more of applicant. NAME ADDRESS TITLE Barry Yanks 1481 NW 7 St. Pres. Ana Hernandez-Yanks 1481 NW 7 St. VP/Scty Yanks was designated as the principal mortgage broker on the Registration Application. The Department denied the Registration Application by notice dated June 4, 1990. CALVARY CHAPEL TRANSACTION At the time of the hearing in this matter, Marie Hall was 66 years old. She was last employed in 1988 by the Broward County School System as an adult vocational education instructor teaching students how to operate sewing machines. Her husband, the late Reverend Arthur Hall, died on March 22, 1988, at the age of 75. Because of health problems, he had been unable to work since 1962. The late Reverend Hall had very little education. Prior to the transactions involved in this case, the only other real estate deal in which the late Reverend and Mrs. Hall had been involved was the purchase of their home many years ago. In the summer of 1987, the late Reverend and Mrs. Hall sought to purchase Mount Bethel Baptist Church (the "Church"). To assist in their effort to purchase the Church, the Halls contacted Reverend Frank Lloyd. Reverend Frank Lloyd was the pastor of Hope Outreach, Church of God in Christ and the Chairman of the State of Florida Prison Ministry. Reverend Lloyd was also engaged in a consulting business through a company called Professional Proposal and Financial Consultants, Inc. ("PPFC"). In the summer of 1987, the Halls entered into an agreement with PPFC pursuant to which they paid PPFC $800 for PPFC's assistance in securing a loan of $250,000 to purchase the church. The agreement called for an interest rate of approximately 11 3/4 percent. The Halls deposited a total of $15,000 in escrow with Reverend Lloyd and/or PPFC. At the time the first $10,000 was deposited with PPFC, the parties entered into an agreement which provided as follows: ...This money is not to be used for down payment, or services rendered. It is to be escrowed only. At the closing of the loan this entire amount is to be returned to Elder Hall or his designate. If in the event no loan is secure [sic] all funds is [sic] to be returned to Elder Arthur Hall, President Calvary Chapel Church of God in Christ or his designate. Reverend Lloyd attempted to obtain a mortgage for the Halls from several companies including Ft. Lauderdale Mortgage and Horizon Development Mortgage ("Horizon"). The Halls decided not to pursue a loan from Horizon because Horizon wanted a non-refundable $3,000 up-front fee. There was also some question whether either company would handle a loan for a church. Reverend Lloyd introduced the late Reverend and Mrs. Hall to Yanks because Reverend Lloyd knew that Yanks had successfully obtained loans for other churches. The Halls met with Yanks on a couple of occasions in late 1987 and early 1988. Other members of the Hall's congregation attended some of these meetings. During those meetings, the need for some of the other church members to sign on the loan and/or pledge additional collateral was discussed. Yanks advised the late Reverend and Mrs. Hall that he might be able to secure a loan for them to purchase the Church, but the amount of the loan would be smaller and the interest rate would be higher than they had anticipated in their agreement with PPFC. Yanks did not require an up-front loan application fee. On January 14, 1988, the late Reverend and Mrs. Hall met with Reverend Lloyd and Yanks at the office of B & B Investors in Miami. As noted above, the Halls were initially seeking a loan of $250,000. During the January 14, 1988 meeting, Yanks advised the representatives of Calvary Chapel that he could arrange a loan of $162,000 at 17 percent if additional collateral was provided. At the January 14 meeting, the late Reverend and Mrs. Hall executed a mortgage loan application (the "Loan Application") with B & B Investors. The Halls executed the Loan Application on behalf of Calvary Chapel Church of God in Christ, Inc. (hereinafter Calvary Chapel). Yanks executed the Loan Application on behalf of B & B Investors. The Loan Application was for a $162,000 loan and stated that the loan origination fee would be $4,860.00 and the loan discount fee would be $4,860.00. The Loan Application did not indicate when those fees would be due or to whom they would be paid. The Loan Application noted that there would be an appraisal fee of $600.00 and attorneys' fees of $750.00. The evidence established that, in the mortgage brokerage business, a loan origination fee is often considered synonymous with a broker's fee. The origination fee is traditionally charged at closing. However, the agreement between a mortgage broker and a client determines when the mortgage broker is entitled to his fee. In certain circumstances, a mortgage broker may be entitled to payment upon obtaining a firm commitment for a loan irrespective of whether the loan closes. Although there was no statutory or rule requirement at the time of this transaction, it was customary in the industry for a mortgage broker to set forth in writing the terms as to when he is to be paid. The Application in this case did not state when the fees were to be considered as earned. The Loan Application also provided in part: If the above commitment or a commitment in an amount and/or upon terms acceptable to the undersigned is obtained and said mortgage loan is not closed because (I)(We) have not fulfilled our part of this agreement. (I)(We) agree to pay $ , the application deposit being a part, for obtaining said commitment. If an acceptable commitment is not obtained, the mortgage application deposit will be refunded, except $ to cover expenses actually incurred. A loan discount fee is the cost to the lender to discount the interest rate on a mortgage loan for sale in the secondary market. The discount fee is owed to the lender or investor and was collected at closing. A broker is not entitled to a loan discount fee. Yanks tries to ignore the terminology used in the Loan Application he prepared and claims that all parties knew that he and/or B & B Investors would receive both the loan origination fee and loan discount fee. He contends that he explained to the late Rev. Hall and Mrs. Hall that the loan origination fee and the loan discount fees were fees that would be paid to him when he arranged a firm commitment for a loan at the agreed upon terms. However, the more persuasive evidence established that the late Rev. Hall and Mrs. Hall did not understand that the loan origination fee and/or discount fee would be paid to Yanks irrespective of whether the loan actually closed. Moreover, Yanks has provided no credible explanation as to why he would ever be entitled to receive the loan discount fee. At the January 14, 1988 meeting, Yanks orally arranged a deal with Alan Greenwald, a private investor with whom Yanks had worked in the past, to fund a $162,000 loan at 17 percent. At the time of this transaction, there was no statutory requirement that loan commitments be made in writing. No written confirmation of the commitment was provided even though it was common in the industry for commitments to be given in writing in order to bind the lender to the transaction and to provide evidence of the terms of the commitment. The only written evidence of the loan commitment is a letter from Yanks to the attorney for Alan Greenwald. That letter states that Mr. Greenwald had asked for additional collateral. During the January 14, 1988 meeting, the late Rev. and Mrs. Hall agreed to put up their house as additional collateral. In addition, two other members of the congregation who were present at the meeting, Effie Davis and Cleveland Foreman, agreed in principal to permit a mortgage to be placed on their houses as additional collateral to secure the loan. Yanks contends that, as a result of his efforts in securing a commitment from Alan Greenwald as noted above, he was entitled to receive the loan origination fee and loan discount fee set forth in the Loan Application. After the January 14, 1988 meeting, Rev. Lloyd released to Yanks $10,000 of the $15,000 that he had been holding in escrow for the late Rev. and Mrs. Hall. The $10,000 check was made payable to B & B Investors. The $10,000 was not placed in an escrow or trust account upon receipt. Yanks apparently arranged for $1,000 of the money to be paid to Debbie Landsberg, the attorney for Alan Greenwald, as an advance on the legal fees and costs that were expected to be incurred in closing the transaction. At the time the $10,000 was transferred to B & B Investors, all of the parties to the transaction expected the loan to close and no one contemplated or anticipated that the loan would not go through. While both Yanks and Rev. Lloyd claim that the late Rev. Hall approved the release of the $10,000 as payment to Yanks for services in securing a commitment from Alan Greenwald, this testimony is rejected as not credible. The more persuasive evidence clearly established that at no time did the late Rev. and Mrs. Hall understand that if the loan did not close Yanks would keep the $10,000. After the January 14, 1988 meeting, the parties initiated the steps necessary to close the deal. These efforts were complicated by the illness of the attorney for the seller, the marriage of the attorney for the lender and the difficulty in locating the abstracts for the properties involved. Moreover, a number of title deficiencies regarding the Church were discovered and had to be corrected. The arrangements for financing the purchase of the Church changed several times. Initially, the Seller had indicated that it would take back a second mortgage for $50,000 in order to facilitate a closing. However, as the parties got closer to closing, the Seller changed its mind regarding the second mortgage. Ultimately, in September of 1988, the Seller agreed to take back a second mortgage of $35,000. Sometime during the summer of 1988, Greenwald reduced to $110,000 the amount he was willing to lend on the deal. That amount was to be secured solely by the Church property. Yanks claims that he arranged for another investor to lend between $40,000 to $45,000 with the residences of certain congregation members, including the Halls, Effie Davis and Cleveland Foreman, serving as collateral. These modifications were never memorialized in writing. As preparations for a closing proceeded, it became apparent that Effie Davis' house could not be used as security for the loan. While there is conflicting evidence as to why Effie Davis' house could not be used for additional collateral, the more persuasive evidence indicates that the presence of one or more existing liens on the property rendered it of minimal value as additional collateral. As a result of the inability to use Ms. Davis' house as part of the collateral for the loan, Yanks advised Calvary Chapel that the amount of the loan would have to be decreased from $162,000 to $150,000. Yanks also advised Calvary Chapel that an additional cash deposit of $14,000 was necessary to demonstrate to the lender that sufficient funds were available to conclude the deal. The additional money was paid in two parts. On or about August 23, 1988, Calvary Chapel paid $10,000 to the Ana-Hernandez-Yanks Trust Account. Shortly thereafter, on or about September 1, 1988, Calvary Chapel paid an additional $4,000 to the Ana Hernandez-Yanks Trust Account. These sums were received by Ana Hernandez-Yanks in trust as the attorney for the B & B Investors. No written escrow agreement was executed. No written amendment to the Loan Application was provided to reflect the new terms for the anticipated loan nor was there any written commitment letter. As noted above, the late Rev. Hall died in March of 1988. Reverend Phillip Hall, the son of the late Rev. Hall, was appointed the pastor of Calvary Chapel in April of 1988. At the time of his appointment, Rev. Phillip Hall was living in Nashville. He commuted between Nashville and Fort Lauderdale for a while before moving to Fort Lauderdale on July 31, 1988. Yanks suggests that the Reverend Philip Hall did not like the deal his parents had entered into and refused to honor it. More specifically, Yanks contends that Calvary Chapel and the seller made alternate arrangements for the sale of the property in order to avoid paying him. The evidence does not support such a conclusion. The Seller was obligated to provide clear title before the sale could close. The evidence established that the Seller was never able to provide all of the documents necessary to clear title. There is no persuasive evidence that Calvary Chapel failed to meet its obligations under the contract to purchase the Church. Instead, it appears that Calvary Chapel did everything in its power to go through with the transaction. Sometime in the fall of 1988, the seller, Mount Bethel Baptist Church, rescinded the contract to sell the Church. At some point thereafter, Calvary Chapel began occupying the Church under a lease/purchase arrangement, the terms of which have not been established in this case. As noted above, there is no persuasive evidence that the Rev. Phillip Hall and/or Calvary Chapel conspired to cheat Yanks out of his fees. In any event, even if Calvary Chapel decided for economic reasons not to go forward with the loan that Yanks was trying to arrange, it is concluded that neither Yanks nor B & B Investors had the contractual right to retain any of the money that had been advanced. After the deal failed to close, Rev. Lloyd returned to Calvary Chapel the remaining $5,000 he had been holding in escrow for the Halls. By letter dated September 19, 1988, Holly Eakin Moody, an attorney for Calvary Chapel, wrote to Yanks demanding the return of all the money that had been advanced. The letter stated: Please be advised that I have been retained by Calvary Chapel Church of God in Christ, Inc., to begin the appropriate legal action against you and your wife, Ana Hernandez-Yanks, for return of my clients [sic] escrow funds in the amount of $24,000. On or about December 24, 1988, Hernandez-Yanks tendered a check in the amount of $14,000 to Calvary Chapel. On the back of the check, the following release language was written: Full and Final Settlement of all claims against B & B Mortgage and Barry Yanks or Ana Hernandez- Yanks. Hernandez-Yanks wrote a letter dated February 7, 1989 to Holly Eakin Moody stating in part: Please be advised that as per your client's request, on December 24, 1988 I mailed them my trust account check in the amount of $14,000. I have checked numerous times with the bank and said check has not been presented for payment. I am hereby depositing said monies with the Registry of the Court. If you should have any questions, please contact me. It does not appear that Hernandez-Yanks ever deposited any money in the Registry of the Court in accordance with that February 7 letter. By letter dated March 14, 1989, Holly Eakin Moody returned the check containing the accord and satisfaction language to Hernandez-Yanks and reiterated a demand for a return of the entire $24,000. Ultimately, Hernandez-Yanks paid Calvary Chapel $14,000 by check dated March 6, 1990 on account number 020051156008 at the TransAtlantic Bank. A review of the bank records indicates that the $14,000 advanced by Calvary Chapel to B & B Investors in late August and early September of 1988 was not held in escrow. On or about September 1, 1988, $10,000 was deposited in the trust or escrow account of Hernandez-Yanks at Continental Bank (the "Continental Trust Account"). An additional $4,000 was deposited in the Continental Trust Account on or about September 6, 1988. On or about October 4, 1988, the Continental Trust Account was closed with a closing balance of or about $13,553.06. On or about October 4, 1988, Hernandez-Yanks opened a trust or escrow account at Ocean Bank (the "Ocean Trust Account"). The beginning balance of the Ocean Trust Account on or about October 4, 1988, was $13,000. On or about December 7, 1988, the balance in the Ocean Trust Account was $2,437. On or about December 15, 1988, Hernandez-Yanks opened a trust or escrow account at United National Bank (the "United Trust Account"). On or about January 19, 1990, the cash balance in the United Trust Account was $2,236.29. On or about January 5, 1990, Hernandez-Yanks opened a trust or escrow account at TransAtlantic Bank (the "TransAtlantic Trust Account"). The beginning balance of the TransAtlantic Trust Account on or about January 5, 1990, was $10,000. By check dated March 6, 1990, Calvary Church was paid $14,000 from the TransAtlantic Trust Account. There is no evidence that Yanks, Hernandez-Yanks and/or B & B Investors had any other escrow accounts. Based upon the foregoing, it is concluded that Yanks failed to ensure that monies received in trust were properly placed in escrow in a transaction wherein he acted as a mortgage broker. Moreover, Yanks failed to ensure that the $14,000 received by Hernandez-Yanks was returned expeditiously to Calvary Chapel. Yank's explanation that he does not tell his wife, who is an attorney, "how to run her business" does not excuse his failure to ensure that money placed in escrow with his company was promptly returned when the transaction was terminated. Yanks refused to repay any of the remaining $10,000 that was paid to B & B Investors claiming that he was entitled to keep the money as fees earned for processing a mortgage commitment from Allan Greenwald. As set forth above, the contention that the late Rev. Hall authorized payment in full of Yanks' fees is rejected as not credible. The more persuasive evidence established that the principals of Calvary Chapel did not understand that Yanks and/or B & B Investors were to be paid their fee even if the loan did not close. Since there was no agreement specifying when Yanks was to be paid, he had no legal right to retain the $10,000. Arguably, Yanks was entitled to some reimbursement for the expenses he incurred, including perhaps the $1,000 he supposedly paid to the investor's attorney. However, the evidence clearly established that Yanks was not entitled to retain the entire $10,000. 52 After the Department began its investigation of this case, Yanks offered to repay the loan discount fee of $4,860 to Calvary Chapel. As of the date of the hearing, Yanks was still refusing to repay the $4,860 loan origination fee which he claims he has earned. While Yanks' claim to the $10,000 was legally insufficient and should have been recognized as such, the evidence did not establish that Yanks was attempting to defraud the Halls and/or Calvary Chapel. There were clearly some misunderstandings between the parties. Many of these problems could have been avoided if Yanks had properly documented his fee arrangement in writing. Yanks spent a good bit of time trying to put the deal together and felt slighted when the transaction he structured fell apart, especially when Calvary Chapel ended up occupying the Church anyway. Yanks overreacted in his attempts to obtain compensation for his services. The evidence was insufficient to establish that his actions should be characterized as fraudulent. VAZQUEZ-CASTILLO TRANSACTION In approximately mid-December of 1988, Ana Vazquez began working for Yanks. Vazquez was hired by Yanks to assist in the processing of mortgages. Prior to becoming employed by Yanks, she had little experience in real estate transactions. Vazquez was employed by Yanks for only about two or three weeks. Thereafter, she was employed by Hernandez-Yanks as a secretary. Both Yanks and Hernandez-Yanks occupy space in the same building. As noted above, Hernandez- Yanks is an attorney. On or about February 27, 1989, Pura Castillo entered into a contract (the "Sales Contract") with Vazquez for the purchase of a condominium owned by Vazquez and located in Dade County, Florida, at 7440 Harding Avenue, Unit 301, Miami Beach, Florida (the "Condominium"). The sales price was $70,000. Pursuant to the Sales Contract, Vazquez was to convey title free and clear of all encumbrances, by a good and sufficient Warranty Deed. "Free and clear of all encumbrances" meant that the title being transferred from Ana Vazquez to Pura Castillo was not to be encumbered by any mortgages, judgments or other liens. The Sales Contract was not made contingent upon Pura Castillo obtaining new financing. The relationship between Ana Vazquez and Pura Castillo is not entirely clear. They were obviously well acquainted with each other. The evidence suggests that Pura Castillo's common law husband, Joseph Hardisson, was a close friend of the father of Ana Vazquez. While Pura Castillo and Joseph Hardisson were visiting with Vazquez, they began discussing the possible purchase of the Condominium by Pura Castillo. Yanks first learned about the possible sale of the Condominium to Pura Castillo when Vazquez asked Hernandez-Yanks to represent her. Hernandez-Yanks indicated that she would represent Vazquez in the sale. Vazquez also requested Yanks' assistance in obtaining a loan for Pura Castillo. Yanks advised Vazquez that he did not process loan applications for employees. He suggested that she contact one of the mortgage lenders with whom he did business. Vazquez contacted one such company, Inter-Mortgage Corporation, and obtained a loan application package. Shortly thereafter, a loan application was submitted with InterMortgage Corporation in the name of Pura Castillo. The circumstances surrounding the completion and submittal of that loan application are not entirely clear nor are they necessarily pertinent to this proceeding. The evidence did establish that the loan application contained some false information regarding Pura Castillo's residence and employment. InterMortgage contacted Yanks' office and advised that there were some problems with the application. Vazquez went to InterMortgage's office and retrieved the application. The evidence did not establish that Yanks was aware of the filing of the application with InterMortgage and/or that he knew the application contained any false information. It appears that a similar application with false information may also have been filed with another lender, Dixie Mortgage. There is no indication that Yanks was aware of the filing of this application and/or that he knew it contained false information. The Condominium was subject to a $42,000 mortgage from Standard Federal to Vazquez (the "Standard Federal Mortgage"). The Standard Federal Mortgage was a typical Fannie Mae mortgage and included a commonly used due-on- sale clause in Clause 17. That clause provided for a default by the borrower upon sale of the property unless the mortgagee had consented to the assumption of the mortgage by the purchaser. There were no federal or state laws in existence at the time prohibiting the enforceability of Clause 17. Vazquez had a contract to purchase another home which was contingent upon the sale of her Condominium. Thus, she was under some time pressure to close the sale of the Condominium. When it became apparent that a quick loan could not be arranged for Pura Castillo, Ana Vazquez turned to Yanks for advice. While there is conflicting evidence as to the discussions that took place, the more persuasive evidence established that Yanks agreed to structure a deal that would enable Ana Vazquez to sell the Condominium to Pura Castillo. As discussed in more detail below, Yanks structured a complicated and confusing arrangement whereby Pura Castillo was to make her monthly payments to B & B Equity, which was to play the role of a servicing agent and distribute the payments to the first mortgagee, Standard Federal. While Yanks now claims that after the Standard Federal Mortgage payment was made, the remainder of the monthly payments received by B & B Equity were going to be paid to Vazquez, there is no written agreement confirming this arrangement. It is the usual practice in the industry for mortgage brokers to determine whether there are outstanding mortgages on the property to be sold and to see to it that an existing mortgage is paid off or otherwise taken care of at the time of closing. It is the responsibility of the mortgage broker to contact the institution holding the mortgage to find out if it is assumable. If an existing mortgage has a due-on-sale clause, the mortgage broker would characteristically contact the first lien holder and get an estoppel letter to determine the balance of the loan. The mortgage broker might also seek a waiver from the lender so that the sale could be made without paying off the loan. Without such a waiver, a due-on-sale clause would entitle the original lender to declare the entire original loan due upon sale of the property. Yanks never obtained an estoppel letter or a waiver of the due-on-sale clause from Standard Federal. While Yanks claims that he contacted various persons regarding the enforceability of due-on-sale clauses, he never contacted Standard Federal about the specific clause in its mortgage to Vazquez. There is conflicting evidence regarding the discussions between Yanks and Vazquez regarding the structuring of the transaction. It is clear that Vazquez was more concerned with concluding the transaction rather than understanding the intricacies of it. As discussed in more detail below, the transaction structured by Yanks included several unexplained and/or inappropriate charges. In addition, the loan documentation was confusing and sometimes conflicting and/or contradictory. Vazquez indicated to Yanks that Pura Castillo was prepared to go forward with the sale and a closing was scheduled for June 16, 1989. In preparation for the closing of the sale of her condominium, Vazquez incurred several expenses. On or about March 31, 1989, she paid $275 to have the condominium appraised. On or about April 5, 1989, Vazquez paid $200 to National Title Abstract Company for an update of the abstract. On or about June 15, 1989, she paid $150 to Ticor Title Co. She also paid for a credit report on Pura Castillo. On June 16, 1989, Pura Castillo arrived at the office of Yanks and B & B Investors at 1481 N.W. 7th Street, Miami, Florida, to close on the purchase of the Condominium in accordance with the Sales Contract. Yanks and/or Hernandez- Yanks prepared the closing documents used at the closing. Much of the closing was conducted in Spanish. Yanks is not fluent in Spanish. Hernandez-Yanks, who speaks Spanish, acted as the closing agent and remained throughout the process. Yanks and Vazquez were in and out of the room throughout the closing. During the closing, Pura Castillo was told that B & B Equity was going to be the lender for the transaction. Pura Castillo inquired whether it was necessary for her to have her own attorney. Hernandez-Yanks replied that she could represent all parties and that it was not necessary for Pura Castillo to have her own attorney. At the closing, Pura Castillo presented cashiers checks for $5,800, $7,250 and $5,900 all made payable to the order of Ana Hernandez-Yanks, Trust Account. In addition, either Yanks or Hernandez-Yanks was given a check from Parker Realty in the amount of $2,800 which was the balance of the $7,000 deposit after payment of the $4,200 real estate commission. From the $21,750 brought to the closing, $14,000 was disbursed to Ana Vazquez. As noted above, Vazquez had already paid for the abstract, appraisal and credit report. In addition, as part of her mortgage payment, she had contributed approximately $1,281 to an escrow for taxes and insurance for which she was entitled to be reimbursed. Thus, the net cash that she received from the closing was less than $12,000 from the sale of a $70,000 condominium with a $42,000 mortgage. At the closing, Vazquez executed an "Agreement for Deed" in favor of Pura Castillo. An agreement for deed is a conditional sales contract pursuant to which a seller agrees to sell property to a buyer over a period of time. The seller retains the legal ownership of the property until the full consideration for the purchase is paid. After all the conditions have been met, the seller delivers a deed conveying ownership of the land to the buyer. The Agreement for Deed in this transaction provided as follows: That if said Buyers shall first make the payments and perform the covenants herein mentioned on their part to be performed, the said Sellers hereby covenant and agree to convey and assure to the Buyers or their heirs or assigns, in fee simple, clear of all encumbrances whatever, by good and sufficient Warranty Deed...[the condominium] And the Buyers hereby covenant and agree to pay to the Sellers the sum of $70,000 to be paid as follows: $19,073.12 cash in hand, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, and $704.32 or more per month on or before the 16th day of each and every month after the date of this instrument, to be mailed to the Sellers' address given herein, with interest at the rate of 11 percent, per annum on the whole sum remaining from time to time unpaid,... Arguably, the Agreement for Deed required Pura Castillo to make monthly payments to Vazquez of $704.32 plus interest on the outstanding balance. However, at the closing, Yanks provided Pura Castillo with a letter which explained that her monthly payments of $704.32 included $499.97 for principal and interest, $142.35 for real estate taxes and $62 for insurance. At the closing, Pura Castillo executed a mortgage (the "Mortgage") in favor of B & B Equity as mortgagee. The Mortgage stated that it secured an indebtedness of $52,500 and a promissory note for that amount was executed by Pura Castillo to B & B Equity at the closing. The Mortgage was similar in form and content to a Fannie Mae or a Freddie Mac mortgage form, except it included some additional provisions stating that it was a "Wraparound Mortgage." A wraparound mortgage is a financing device that is sometimes used when a seller of a piece of property agrees to take back and finance a portion of the difference between an existing first mortgage which is not being assumed or satisfied and the sales price for the property. Typically, the mortgagor on the first mortgage is the seller of the property and the mortgagee on the wraparound mortgage. The wraparound mortgage becomes a second or other junior mortgage behind the existing mortgage. The mortgagee of the wraparound mortgage agrees to continue making payments on the existing primary mortgage, at least so long as payments are made under the wraparound mortgage. Page 8 of the Mortgage included the following language: This is a Wraparound Mortgage. This wraparound mortgage is a second mortgage. It is inferior to certain mortgage [sic], herein called the first mortgage which covers the above described property at the time of execution of this wraparound mortgage. The wraparound mortgagee shall be excluded from any terms or conditions of the prior mortgagees. The wraparound mortgagee's obligation to pay the prior mortgages is limites [sic] to funds received from the wraparound mortgagor. For a number of reasons, the use of a wraparound mortgage in this transaction was totally inappropriate. The first page of the mortgage included a number of warranties including the following: The mortgagor hereby covenants with and warrants to the Mortgagee that the Mortgagor is indefeasibly seized with the absolute and fee simple title to said property. This warranty is inconsistent with the ownership interest that the Mortgagor, Pura Castillo, had as a result of this transaction. Pura Castillo's only claim to title was via the Agreement for Deed and she was not indefeasibly seized with the fee simple title. As noted above, the Mortgage states that it secures an indebtedness of $52,500 and a promissory note (the "Note") for that amount was executed by Pura Castillo to B & B Equity at the closing. That Note required Pura Castillo to make payments directly to B & B Equity. However, the Agreement for Deed calls for Pura Castillo to make payments to Vazquez. Moreover, Pura Castillo signed the Note obligating herself to make payments on a $52,500 indebtedness to B & B Equity even though the Standard Federal Mortgage was not satisfied and had a remaining balance of $42,000. In other words, the result of this transaction, at least as it appeared on the public records, is that a $70,000 condominium was encumbered by two separate mortgages (the Standard Federal Mortgage and the "Wraparound Mortgage") securing separate promissory notes totalling more than $94,000. At no time prior to or during the closing did Yanks or Hernandez-Yanks explain to Pura Castillo that an Agreement for Deed was being utilized in this transaction and that she would not obtain full legal title until all of the mortgages were paid off. Furthermore, neither Yanks or Hernandez-Yanks explained to Pura Castillo that the mortgage she signed in favor of B & B Equity was a wraparound second mortgage. While Yanks contends that Pura Castillo had plenty of opportunity to review the documents and ask questions regarding them, she was clearly an unsophisticated buyer who was incapable of deciphering the confusing and ambiguous documentation for this clumsily crafted transaction. In sum, the use of an agreement for deed and a wraparound mortgage in the same transaction was redundant, confusing and illogical. Moreover, Yanks' efforts in this transaction clearly violated the due-on-sale clause (Clause 17) in Standard Federal's existing first mortgage. The Department has suggested that the transaction was a calculated fraud with some undefined goal. After considering all the evidence, the transaction can more accurately be described as an awkward attempt at creative financing which included a number of hidden and inappropriate charges for the benefit of Yanks and/or B & B Equity. Yanks contends that Vazquez was desperate to close the sale and authorized him to proceed with whatever financing he could arrange so long as she netted $14,000 from the sale. He claims that she agreed to the wraparound mortgage as the only way to proceed with the deal under the circumstances. Under this arrangement, he contends that B & B was authorized to retain any additional proceeds as compensation for serving as a servicing agent on the wraparound mortgage. Even if this explanation is accepted, there are a number of problems with the actions of Yanks and B & B Equity in this transaction. First of all, there was no written servicing agreement setting forth the obligations of the servicing agent nor is there any delineation of the amount of money to be paid for servicing the wraparound mortgage. Moreover, the Agreement For Deed and the Promissory Note call for Pura Castillo to make payments of slightly more than $700 per month. These payments exceed the monthly payments due under the Standard Federal Mortgage. However, there is no written delineation of how the additional payments received each month were to be disbursed. Finally, the servicing arrangement was never explained to Pura Castillo and the documentation for the transaction was very confusing and often contradictory. There is no closing statement for the transaction that accurately reflects all of the disbursements made from the proceeds of the closing. Petitioner's Exhibit 23 is a closing statement signed by both Vazquez and Pura Castillo and purports to delineate certain expenses paid from the proceeds of the sale. Petitioner's Exhibit 7 is an unsigned closing statement which Yanks contends he prepared for use at the closing of the loan. He claims that, after the closing, he found out that Vazquez substituted Petitioner's Exhibit 23 for the closing statement that he intended to be used because she thought it more accurately depicted the fees as she had discussed them with Pura Castillo. This explanation is rejected as not credible. Petitioner's Exhibit 23 was the only closing statement signed by both the buyer and seller. As noted above, Vazquez was in and out during the closing. Hernandez-Yanks was present throughout the closing. The more credible evidence established that Petitioner's Exhibit 23 was the closing statement presented at the closing and executed by the participants. Neither closing statement accurately explains how all of the funds from the sale were disbursed. Thus, it is impossible to determine conclusively how much money Yanks and/or B & B Equity received from the closing. Both statements include some charges which are inappropriate or questionable. Furthermore, it is clear that Yanks and/or B & B received more than either statement indicated. Both closing statements reflect a payment of $600 for title insurance. However, the evidence established that no title insurance policy was ever issued. Vazquez paid for a title insurance commitment prior to the closing. Such a commitment is typically issued by a title insurance company prior to a real estate transaction and is a contractual agreement by the title insurer to issue a policy of title insurance upon compliance with certain terms and conditions. The actual title insurance policy is not issued until after the transaction has closed. The title insurance policy, not the commitment, insures the main insured against certain defects in title. The $600 charge for title insurance reflected on both closing statements was totally inappropriate in this case since no title policy was ever issued. Petitioner's Exhibit 23 includes a number of charges assessed to the buyer which were wholly inappropriate to this transaction. For example, the closing statement included a $500 charge for FNMA underwriting. This fee is charged by the institution underwriting a mortgage loan for compliance with Fannie Mae guidelines. Since the Mortgage in this case was clearly not intended to be sold to a Fannie Mae pool, the FNMA charge was not appropriate. Similarly, the closing statement included a $250 charge for a warehouse fee. This is a fee paid to institutions to cover the cost of a warehouse line of credit and is totally inapplicable to the transaction involved in this case. The closing statement also included a photo fee of $25, a lender's inspection fee of $150 and a survey fee of $225. There is no indication that any photos were taken, an inspection was conducted or a survey was prepared. Petitioner's Exhibit 23 also included a loan origination fee of $1,375 and brokerage fees of $1,575. Petitioner's Exhibit 7 included a lump sum brokerage fee of $5000, but did not include any of the other charges listed in this paragraph. There is no dispute that Yanks and/or his firm were paid mortgage brokerage fees out of the proceeds of the closing. These fees are reflected on both of the closing statements (Petitioner's Exhibits 7 and 23). A mortgage broker is paid a fee to negotiate a mortgage loan transaction for another party. In other words, he is retained to find a lender for a potential borrower. Under a mortgage servicing agreement, the servicer is paid a fee to handle the collection and disbursement of payments on a mortgage loan. Any fees paid for servicing a loan should be separately itemized and disclosed. It is not appropriate for a person who is to service a loan to receive what has been disclosed as a broker fee. Irrespective of which closing statement is deemed authentic, the evidence established that Yanks and/or B & B Equity received significantly more money from the closing than was reflected on either closing statement. As indicated above, $21,750 cash was presented at the closing, of which $14,000 was paid to Vazquez. According to Petitioner's Exhibit 7, there was $6,123.35 in closing costs (including a $5,000 brokerage fee). Thus, there is at least $1,626.65 in cash that is not reflected on the closing statement. Yanks contends that Vazquez told him to keep this money in return for servicing the loan. This contention is rejected as not credible. Similarly, Petitioner's Exhibit 23 indicates closing costs of $6,379 (including the charges in paragraph 89 above). Thus, there is $1371 unaccounted for. Moreover, it is clear that Yanks and/or B & B received in excess of $6,500 which is not readily discernible from the face of the closing statement. Subsequent to the closing, B & B Equity received at least five monthly payments of $704.32 on the Wraparound Mortgage from Joseph L. Hardisson, the common law husband of Pura Castillo. B & B Equity apparently distributed some of these funds in accordance with its claimed role of "servicing agent." However, on at least one occasion in late 1989, a check issued by B & B Equity to pay the Standard Federal Mortgage was returned for insufficient funds. In addition, a check issued by B & B Equity in the amount of $700 to Ana Vazquez in December of 1989 bounced. At some point in late 1989 or early 1990, Pura Castillo became concerned when she learned that the Standard Federal Mortgage had not been paid off. In January or February 1990, Pura Castillo and her husband came to Florida and attempted to contact Yanks regarding the transaction and the irregularities surrounding it. Ultimately, Pura Castillo filed a complaint with the Department and also filed a civil suit in Circuit Court seeking cancellation of the Mortgage and the issuance of a warranty deed in her favor. On April 17, 1990, Vazquez executed a warranty deed to Pura Castillo. Vazquez states that she felt obligated to convey all of her interest in the property to Pura Castillo in view of the confusing and unfair circumstances surrounding the initial transaction. On October 23, 1990, Yanks and B & B Equity entered into a Settlement Agreement with Pura Castillo pursuant to which they paid Pura Castillo $12,000 and the wraparound mortgage was cancelled of record. The Settlement Agreement also resulted in the dismissal of the civil suit and called for Pura Castillo to withdraw her complaint filed with the Department. Despite this withdrawal, the Department has chosen to proceed with this administrative action.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that: A Final Order be entered finding Respondents B & B Investors, Yanks and Ana Hernandez-Yanks guilty of the violations alleged in Counts I, II, III, and IV of the Amended Administrative Complaint, finding them not guilty of Count VI and imposing an administrative fine of $5,000 which should be payable jointly and severally. Yanks and B & B Investors should also be required to repay $9,000 to Calvary Chapel within 30 days after the rendition of the Final Order. Failure to repay this sum should be a basis for the imposition of additional penalties, including revocation. The mortgage brokerage licenses of Yanks and B & B Investors should be suspended for one (1) year for their actions in connection with the Calvary Chapel transaction. A Cease and Desist Order should also be entered against Ana Hernandez- Yanks prohibiting her from any future violations of Chapter 494, Florida Statutes, from engaging in any act within the jurisdiction of the Department pursuant to Chapter 494, Florida Statutes, and from being an ultimate equitable owner of a business license pursuant to Chapter 494, Florida Statutes. The facts surrounding her trust account should be reported to the Florida Bar for investigation. A Final Order should also be entered finding Yanks, Hernandez-Yanks, and B & B Equity guilty of the violations alleged in Counts VIII, IX, and XI, finding Yanks and B & B Equity guilty of the violations alleged in Counts XII and finding Hernandez-Yanks guilty of violations alleged in Count XIII of the Amended Administrative Complaint. The Final Order should find the Respondents not guilty of the violations alleged in Counts X and XIV. Based upon the foregoing, the Department should impose an administrative fine of $5,000. The mortgage brokerage license of Yanks should be suspended for a period of three years to run consecutively with the suspension issued in connection with the Calvary Chapel transaction. Respondents should also be required to repay $6,040.12 to Ana Vazquez for inappropriate and undisclosed charges made at the closing. The collection of all fines and/or assessments against Ana Hernandez- Yanks and/or B & B Investors should be suspended pending approval of the Bankruptcy Court. In view of the Voluntary Dismissal filed on November 9, 1993, the Final Order should formally dismiss the Application Case. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 18th day of August 1994. J. STEPHEN MENTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of August 1994.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is currently licensed, and as of the date of the Administrative Charges and Complaint, held license No. HB-0008511 as a mortgage broker and was president and principal broker of Bay Area Financial Services, Inc. He has held such license since November 1979. He sold the business in April 1980 and has reapplied within six months for an individual license. The application was received on May 16, 1980. Pursuant to Rule 3D-40.03(3), Florida Administrative Code, Respondent is treated as a current licensee, and as an applicant. From October 25, 1977, until June 12, 1979, Respondent was employed as vice-president and principal mortgage broker by United Companies Mortgage and Investment of St. Petersburg, Inc., hereinafter UCMI, a mortgage brokerage firm. United Companies Financial Corporation, hereinafter UCFC, is a Louisiana corporation, authorized to do business in Florida. The company engages in the business as a mortgage lender. On August 31, 1978, UCMI by and through its broker, Respondent, made a loan to "James G. Anderson" and "Lorraine Anderson, his wife," and accepted a note in the amount of $14,500.00 made by "James G. Anderson and Lorraine Anderson," together with a first mortgage also made by "James G. Anderson and Lorraine Anderson, his wife," as security for the repayment of the loan. The first mortgage purported to encumber Lot 25, Oak Harbor Subdivision, according to the plat thereof as recorded in Plat Book 5, page 94, Public Records of Pinellas County, Florida. On August 31, 1978, UCMI, for value, assigned the note and mortgage to UCFC. The Respondent has no objection as to the authenticity and genuineness of Exhibit 11, a copy of a contract for sale of real estate which, on its fact, was executed by "James G. Anderson and Lorraine Anderson," as purchasers of certain real property from the seller, Linda Carol Querry, a/k/a L. C. Querry. The document reflects that the purchase price be $18,500.00, payable $100.00 in cash as a deposit, $900.00 cash within twenty-four hours, $4,500.00 additional deposit at time of closing, and $13,000.00 mortgage balance. (Exhibit 2). Anderson acknowledged his signature on this document but has no recollection of signing it. On August 31, 1978, a Notice to Customers, required by federal law, was executed by "James G. Anderson and his wife Lorraine," setting forth the disclosure requirements of Regulation Z. The lender is reflected as UCFC and the broker as UCMI of St. Petersburg. Respondent Hughes executed such document as a witness to the signatures of "Mr. and Mrs. Anderson." On August 31, 1978, a promissory note was executed by "James G. Anderson and Lorraine Anderson" promising to pay UCMI the sum of $14,500.00. (Exhibit 3). On August 31, 1978, a document entitled Consummation of Loan Secured by Real Property, was executed by "James G. Anderson and Lorraine Anderson," as the borrowers. (Exhibit 4). On August 31, 1978, a document entitled Notice to Customer Required by Federal Law was executed by "James G. Anderson and Lorraine Anderson," as the borrowers. (Exhibit 5). On August 31, 1978, a document regarding the loan transaction was executed by "James G. Anderson and Lorraine Anderson," acknowledging receipt of the "Good Faith Estimates," and certain other materials. (Exhibit 6). On August 31, 1978, a Notice to Purchaser-Mortgagor was executed by "James G. Anderson and his wife, Lorraine Anderson" acknowledging receipt of such notice. (Exhibit 7). On August 31, 1978, an Owner's Affidavit was executed by "James G. Anderson and his wife, Lorraine." (Exhibit 8). On August 28, 1978, a loan application was executed by "James G. Anderson" for the $14,500.00 to be secured by a first mortgage. Respondent personally handled the application as indicated on the application itself. (Exhibit 1). On August 31, 1978, check No. 15-39091 was executed by Respondent Hughes, as authorized representative of United Companies, Inc., as payor, to James G. Anderson and Title Consultants, as payees, in the amount of $11,014.58. The check was endorsed by "James G. Anderson and Lorraine Anderson." (Exhibit 10). On August 31, 1978, a Warranty Deed was executed by Linda Carol Querry, a/k/a L. C. Querry, as seller of certain real property to "James G. Anderson and Lorraine Anderson, his wife." Respondent Hughes executed the document as a witness to Linda Querry's signature and execution. The property described in the Warranty Deed is the identical property mortgaged by "James G. Anderson and Lorraine Anderson" to secure the loan from UCMI and UCFC. (Exhibit 13). On August 31, 1978, a Mortgage Deed was executed by "James G. Anderson and Lorraine Anderson, his wife," as mortgagors, to UCMI of St. Petersburg, as mortgagee, as security for the repayment of the loan. Respondent Hughes executed the Mortgage Deed as a witness to the signatures of "Mr. and Mrs. Anderson." (Exhibit 9). On August 31, 1978, UCMI, by and through its principal broker and vice president, Respondent Hughes, assigned the Anderson mortgage and note to UCFC. The applicable Florida law governing this matter is Chapter 494, Florida Statutes (1977), and as amended in the 1978 Supplement, and Chapter 3D- 40, administrative rules regulating mortgage brokerage, Florida Administrative Code. In August 1978, James G. Anderson, who worked in the Sanitation Department of the City of St. Petersburg, also worked part-time repainting houses purchased for resale by Vic Vogel, a speculator. While so employed, Anderson had seen Respondent a few times in the company of Vogel, but had never formally met Respondent. Vogel offered to sell one of these houses to Anderson on terms that would require no down payment by Anderson, who would thereafter make monthly payments similar to the rental payments he was then making. Further, there would be no "red tape" and Anderson would be buying a home rather than renting one. Anderson trusted Vogel, who assured Anderson he would take care of all the details. The house Anderson agreed to buy was on 11th Street and 20th Avenue South in St. Petersburg and was one of the houses Anderson had worked on in his part-time job with Vogel. In the contract to purchase signed by Anderson (Exhibit 11) the block for the legal description of the property is blank. The various other spaces on the form now showing the purchase price, down payment, etc., were blank when signed by Anderson. For several years prior to 1977 Anderson had been living with Lorraine Walker but never held her out as his wife. The signature "Lorraine Anderson" on all exhibits except Exhibit 14, the quitclaim deed from Anderson to United Companies Financial Corporation, were signed by someone other than Lorraine Walker. At the instigation of his attorney, Anderson and Lorraine Walker signed Exhibit 14 to clear up foreclosure proceedings that had been instituted against Anderson. The closing of the sale of property to Anderson took place at the offices of United Companies at 300 S. Duncan Street, Clearwater, Florida on 31 August 1978. Anderson was picked up by Vogel and driven to the closing. Accompanying Vogel was Mike Robertson, an associate of Vogel; Linda Querry, Vogel's girl friend, who signed the deed conveying the property to Anderson; and an unidentified black woman. While awaiting Respondent's arrival for the closing, Vogel took the group to lunch. At the closing, Anderson signed numerous documents and other people, including the black woman who obviously signed "Lorraine Anderson," also signed these documents as witnesses and/or notary. Anderson does not recall having seen Verona Krnjaich, who notarized his signature on the documents he signed at the closing and Ms. Krnjaich does not recall a closing at which Anderson was present. However, she testified that her normal practice is to notarize only documents notarized in her presence, and that she follows this practice at all closings. On the other hand, she has good recall of faces seen at closings but does not believe she ever saw Anderson before this hearing. Anderson testified that he trusted Vogel and signed whatever documents Vogel asked him to sign; that all the documents bearing his signature were blank when he signed them; that he did not know the black woman in the room at the closing or that when she signed these documents she did so in the name of Lorraine Anderson; that the closing took place on the second or third floor of a building just off U.S. 19 between Clearwater and St. Petersburg; that he doesn't know the address of this building but could return to it, and in fact, a few months prior to this hearing, took one of Petitioner's agents to the building where the closing took place; that he received no copy of any document signed by him at the closing; that he thought he was buying a house from Vogel; and that he expected Vogel to notify him after the closing when he could move in and how much he would pay each month. Vogel did not again contact Anderson and apparently has left the area. A few months prior to this hearing Anderson accompanied one of Petitioner's agents to show the agent where the closing occurred. The building to which the agent was taken by Anderson is two-storied and occupied by Ellis National Bank. In August 1978 there was no other occupant of this building and the second floor was unfinished but contained restrooms and some offices occupied by bank employees. Anderson made no cash payment before, at, or after the closing on this house; nor did he ever move into it. The legal description on the deed conveying the property to Anderson is for property located at 626-27th Avenue South, St. Petersburg, Florida, and not for the house at 11th Street and 20th Avenue South which Anderson thought he was buying. After Anderson became delinquent on his mortgage payments Respondent went to Anderson's home one Sunday afternoon demanding payment of the delinquent monthly payments owed by Anderson. The latter told Respondent he hadn't bought any house from the lender, owed no money, and wasn't going to pay. Respondent shortly thereafter turned the case over to the United Companies' attorney, who instituted foreclosure proceedings. When served with these papers Anderson took them to his lawyer. After some of the facts surrounding this transaction became apparent, the assignee of the mortgagee accepted a quitclaim deed to the mortgaged property from Anderson. Lorraine Walker accompanied Anderson to the lawyer's office and signed the quitclaim deed "Lorraine Anderson" (Exhibit 14). The deed signed by L. C. Querry conveying Lot 25 to Anderson (Exhibit 13) conveyed the property to "James G. Anderson and Lorraine Anderson, his wife." Respondent had known Vic Vogel for five or six years prior to August 1977 and had been involved in ten or twelve transactions in which Vogel had picked up distressed property, refurbished it and sold it. Anderson had few debts and readily qualified for the mortgage loan without considering the income of Lorraine or his income from his part-time work. He understood he was buying the house without any down payment, and, in fact, Anderson paid nothing down when he signed the contract and he produced no cash at the closing. The only disbursement made at closing was by the mortgagee, whose check for $11,014.58 (Exhibit 10) was payable to Title Consultants and Anderson. The latter endorsed this check and presumably Title Consultants disbursed to the seller. Closing statements for the buyer and seller were not in the files of UCMI or Title Consultants, nor was a contract to purchase in which the description of the property to be bought was shown. Respondent's witness testified that she reviewed all documents prior to a closing; that she recalls the Anderson transaction; doesn't recall who prepared those documents but believes she typed them; that documents were never signed in blank and the blanks subsequently completed; that she did the credit check on Anderson; and that all documents used in the closing were completed in full before the closing at which they were signed by Anderson and the person signing as Lorraine Anderson. A check with the credit bureau should have disclosed Anderson's marital status as not married and this witness was unable to explain the failure to pick this up when Exhibit 1, the loan application, was verified with the credit bureau. Respondent testified that he recalled the Anderson transaction on 31 August 1978 but later in his testimony stated he did not recall this specific transaction. He believes he followed his usual procedure and explained the various documents to Anderson before the latter signed them. Prior to 1978 he had closed many transactions for UCMI without a contract to purchase having been executed. The loan application is mailed to the main office of United Companies in Baton Rouge, Louisiana and telephonic approval is given by Baton Rouge. Accordingly, it was not unusual for Anderson's loan application to be prepared 28 August 1978, the original mailed to Baton Rouge and approval received in time to close the transaction on 31 August 1978. The contract upon which this house was conveyed, and the closing statements of buyer or seller, were not presented at this hearing. Witnesses testified these documents were missing from the files in which they would be expected to keep. Regardless of this, it is uncontradicted that Anderson made no payment at closing and, if any payment was made prior to closing, any such payment would have been accounted for by the escrow agent. It is also evident that no such accounting was made. By signing a note and mortgage for $14,500.00 Anderson purported to purchase a house for slightly more than $11,000.00, which is the amount of the check endorsed by Anderson at closing and which sum presumably went to the seller. Some $3,000.00 was retained by the lender as prepaid finance charges ($1,567.67) and brokerage fee ($1,545.45). (Exhibit 2.) Accordingly, the mortgage of $14,500 represented approximately 130% of the amount paid for this house. This fact was known, or should have been known, to Respondent, who presumably was representing his principal, UCMI, the lender at this closing. Respondent was paid a fixed salary by UCMI and did not receive additional compensation for each transaction he closed. UCMI suffered a financial loss on the repossession of the house from Anderson and filed suit against Industrial Valley Title Insurance Company (Exhibit 15).
Recommendation From the foregoing it is concluded that Respondent was guilty of concealing material facts from UCMI involving the transaction with Anderson at which UCMI was mortgagee, and that, as a result, UCMI suffered injury. It is therefore RECOMMENDED that Robert E. Hughes' license as a mortgage broker be suspended for a period of six (6) months. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of October 1980. COPIES FURNISHED: Franklyn J. Wollett, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Office of the Comptroller Room 1302, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 George W. Greer, Esquire 302 South Garden Avenue Clearwater, Florida 33516 K. N. AYERS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of October 1980.
Findings Of Fact The administratively complaint alleges that Respondent violated the provisions of Section 517,16(1)(a), F.S. by having sold notes, which were securities as defined by Section 517.02(1), F.S., which were unregistored in violation of Section 517.07, F.S., and having represented that said notes were secured by first mortgages when in fact they were not so secured in violation of Section 517.16(1)(d), F.S., on two occasions to Joseph M. and Patricia Barton. The first sale is alleged to have occurred on June 14, 1974, in the amount of $15,000, and the other sale is alleged to hake occurred on September 29, 1973 in the amount of $5,000. The Petitioner introduced Exhibit 1 which was received and which indicates that only the common stock of Equitable Development Corporation was registered with the State of Florida, Division of Securities. The Petitioner presented no evidence relative to the alleged sale occurring on June 14, 1974. It is therefore not proven. The Petitioner called Gregory Stevens who was the sole witness at the hearing and who was a license securities salesman and licensed mortgage broker. In September 1973 Stevens was self employed doing business for Gregory Stevens, Investment Incorporated. Stevens stated that he dealt in first mortgages. Respondent testified that he obtained the mortgage documents through Financial Resources Corp., the president of which was Mr. Rinehart. Respondent was assured by Mr. Rinehart before he began handling these mortgages that they were not required to be registered as securities because they ware exempt, and that the State had so indicated for this type of transaction. Respondent testified that he sold a note and mortgage to his clients, Joseph and Patricia Barton, in his capacity as a licensed mortgage broker on behalf of Gregory Stevens Investments, Inc., of which he is president. Exhibit 10 is a sample order form for another contract which shows that such transactions were in the corporate entity. Respondent's uncontroverted testimony was that only he individually is licensed to sell securities, and that no mortgages were sold as securities. The evidence is that on September 29, 1973, a promissory note of the Equitable Development Corporation was issued to Joseph and/or Patricia Barton, secured by a Mortgage Deed issued by Equitable Development Corporation. The face amount was $5,000. The Bartons also received a quitclaim deed. The mortgage deed specifically covenants that the underlying property is free and clear of all encumbrances except current and future real estate taxes. Respondent testified that he physically examined the property which secured the mortgages and it looked good. He saw appraisals at double the face amount of the mortgages he sold. Those clients who requested title insurance or opinions of title from a lawyer could obtain same, and when they were requested he saw then and they never showed any defects or other encumbrances. This was the procedure followed with the Bartons, although neither title insurance nor a title search and opinion were obtained requested by the Bartons. The Respondent indicated that at the time of said sale to the Bartons that he believed, and had no reason not to believe, that said mortgage was a first mortgage as it recites on its face. The Hearing Officer notes that Section 517.06(7), F.S., 1973, was amended effective October 1, 1973, and the Barton transaction took place on September 29, 1973. Therefore, the applicable provision is the unamended law found at Section 517.06(7), F.S.A. Regarding the law existing at the time and its interpretation, the Respondent also introduced Exhibit 2, 4, and 5 which letters indicate that the sale of notes secured by mortgages would be exempt from registration as exempt transactions pursuant to Section 517.06(7), F.S.A., and setting forth guidelines for exempt transactions. Without dealing with the question of estoppel, these exhibits state the agency's interpretations of the then existing law. The Hearing Officer finds the agency's interpretation as set out in Exhibits 2, 4, and 5 is an accurate interpretation of the statute. The Hearing Officer finds that a note is a security as defined in Section 517.02(1), F.S. Regarding the allegation that the note sold to the Bartons was an unregistered security, it is admitted that it was not registered, however, the Respondent asserts that the sale was a transaction exempted under the provisions of Section 517.06(7), F.S.A. Having examined the note and mortgage in question, the Hearing Officer finds that the note and entire mortgage securing it were sold in a single sale to one purchaser. The note and mortgage do not indicate any expressed recourse agreement or guarantee as to repayment of interest, principal, or both offered in connection with the sale. While the Respondent could not specifically recall the Barton transaction, he testified that purchasers were generally shown the property, an assessment of the property prepared by an appraiser indicating each lot's value, and it was represented that they would receive a first mortgage securing the note on lots worth two times the value of the note. There was no showing that the Respondent knew or should have known the mortgage to the Bartons was not a first mortgage and title to the property not clear. The transaction of September 29, 1973, was exempt under the law existing at that time. The Petitioner therefore has failed to show any violation of Section 517.16(1)(d), F.S.
Recommendation The agency having failed to show a violation of Section 517.16(1)(d), F.S., by the Respondent and the Hearing Officer having found that the September 29, 1973 transaction was exempt recommends that the charges be dismissed. DONE and ORDERED this 27th day of February, 1976. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Fred O. Drake, III, Esquire Counsel for Petitioner Charles W. Musgrove, Esquire Counsel for Respondent
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: Respondent Ronald E. Clampitt is the President of Respondent Action Mortgage Corporation and is the person designated to act on behalf of said corporation under the provisions of Chapter 494, Florida Statutes. Action Mortgage Corporation currently holds a mortgage brokerage license. The individual mortgage broker license issued to respondent Clampitt expired on August 31, 1980, and has not been renewed. Respondent Joseph W. Langford currently holds a license as a mortgage solicitor for and on behalf of Home Mortgage Investment Corporation. His prior individual mortgage broker license expired on August 31, 1980, and has not been renewed. COUNT I The respondents were counter codefendants in a civil suit filed in the Circuit Court of Sixth Judicial Circuit of the State of the Florida in and for Pinellas County, which case was numbered 78-12033-18 and styled Action Mortgage Corporation, etc., et al., Plaintiffs, vs. Denture Services, Inc., etc., et al., Defendants. On February 8, 1980, a Final Judgment was entered in that proceeding by Circuit Court Judge David Seth Walker. Judge Walker found, as a matter of fact, that a limited confidential/fiduciary relationship existed between Langford and the counter-plaintiffs, and opined that certain activities on the part of the individual counter-defendants were "bedecked with the badge of fraud." The Court, inter alis, awarded the counter-plaintiffs Final Judgment in the nominal sum of $1.00, plus costs. It was noted that the claim of the counter-plaintiffs for punitive damages had previously been denied. Subsequent to the Final Judgment enteed in Case No. 78-12033-18, the counter-plaintiffs filed a Motion for Rehearing on the matter of punitive damages, since the Court had noted in its Final Judgment that the activities of the counter-defendants were "bedecked with the badge of fraud." The counter- defendants (respondents herein) also moved the Court to alter or amend its Final Judgment so as to remove the fraud language quoted above. By Order filed on March 10, 1980, both motions were denied by Judge Walker. Judge Walker's deposition was taken on August 22, 1980, and was received into evidence in this proceeding as petitioner's Exhibit 9. Referring to the language in the Final Judgment "bedecked with the badge of fraud," Judge Walker makes the following comments: "I do not interpret that as a finding of fraud absolute, but just that there were indicia of fraud." (p.4) "But I did not consider this to be an absolute finding of fraud. I think I mentioned that on one of the motions that the counter-plaintiffs made to reconsider the judgment of $1.00 or the refusal to grant punitive damages. I reiterated at that hearing that I found that it was an indicia, but I did not go so far in my own mind as to specifically find fraud." (p. 4) "If I had wanted to find specifically that they were in fact guilty of fraud, I would have said as much. The phrase, in my mind, 'bedecked with a badge of fraud,' is meant to suggest the indicia of fraud. Fraud is a legal conclusion that must be based upon several legally accepted circumstances. And in law school we learned the term, 'badges of fraud.' But a badge of fraud does not per se constitute fraud. I didn't feel that I needed to go too deeply in the questions, because of my finding that the counter-plaintiffs had not in fact suffered any real damage." (pp. 7 and 8) "I listed a certain series of circmustances and activities which had taken place, rather specifically. And I found that these activities and circumstances were bedecked by the badge of fraud which is admittedly a little bit flowery for normal language, but that's what I said. I did not specifically find fraud. Fraud always carries with it the badges of fraud in and of it- self does not collaterally, and on the other hand mean that fraud exists. I did not go that far in this particular judgment. I did not feel I had to." (pp. 18 and 19) "I did not feel that it was necessary for the Court to delve into the ultimate determination of fraud." (p. 20) "I do not perceive that my final judgment made an absolute finding of fraud. Again, the phrase, 'badge of fraud,' simply menas to me an indicia of fraud, and I'm confortable with the finding that that indicia is there. But as far as a finding of fraud is concerned, I did not proceed to that point, and it's not there." (pp. 20 and 21) COUNT II In 1978, Dorothy L. Jones and Byron A. Jones were the owners of real property located at 2656 Granada Circle East in St. Petersburg, Florida. The first mortgage on that property held by Molten, Allen and Williams, Inc. or the Mortgage Corporation of the South, was in default and a foreclosure action, and is pendens against the property had been filed. The monthly mortgage payments were approximately $225. At that time, Dorothy Jones was separated from her husband, lived in the home with her five minor children and was having financial difficulties. Having seen a newspaper advertisement, Dorothy Jones contacted the Respondents in an effort to obtain a second mortgage or additional funds with which to pay her debts and preserve her homestead. Neither of the Respondents agreed to make a second mortgage loan to Mrs. Jones. Instead, they agreed to make an outright purchase of the Jones's residence and lease the property back to Dorothy Jones at a monthly payment which approximated her prior monthly mortgage payment. The lease payments were later increased to $275 per month due to the loss of homestead exemption on the property. It was Mrs. Jones' understanding that she would be given the opportunity to repurchase the home at less than fair market value though she may have to pay a down payment and higher monthly payments. No appraisal was performed on the property. The closing of the transaction took place at a title company, independent of the Respondents. Mrs. Jones understood that she was signing a deed to the property and other documents transferring title to Respondents. The property was purchased by the Respondents in February of 1978 for $23,656.54 and the transfer was made subject to the mortgage to Molten, Allen and Williams, Inc., in the amount of $21,848.44. No funds were paid to Mr. or Mrs. Jones at the time of closing. During the months which followed, Dorothy Jones fell far behind in her lease payments to the Respondents. In May of 1979, Respondent Langford notified Mrs. Jones that the property owners had elected to sell the property in the near future, and advised her to contact his office if she was still interested in purchasing the property. In July of 1979, Dorothy Jones filed a Complaint against the Respondents in the Circuit Court in and for Pinellas County seeking a declaratory decree as to her rights under the aforementioned deed, lease and oral agreement to repurchase the property. (Civil No. 79-7307-17). Mrs. Jones was represented by an attorney in that action. By Order filed on July 29, 1980, the Circuit Court approved the terms and conditions of a Stipulation entered into by the Respondents and Mrs. Jones whereby Mrs. Jones was given the opportunity to purchase the subject property from the Respondents for $32,000 within 90 days, and was also required to pay back rental payments to the Respondents. For some reason not clear from the evidence adduced in the proceeding, Mrs. Jones did not repurchase the property from the Respondents. By Final Judgment filed on October 15, 1980, Mrs. Jones' claim against the Respondents was dismissed with prejudice and Respondents were awarded a judgment against Mrs. Jones in the amount of $2,887.50. Apparently, an eviction action in the County Court for Pinellas County resulted in the award of possession of the home to the Respondents. Mrs. Jones vacated the subject property in October of 1980. In April of 1981, Respondents sold the subject property to Harold and Peralita Odlam for a purchase price of $41,7000. COUNT III Respondent Clampitt was licensed as an individual mortgage broker for the years 1978 and 1979. His 1979 license expired on August 31, 1979, as did the license of Action Mortgage Corporation. Mr. Clampitt made an attempt to renew his individual mortgage broker license on October 16, 1979. The renewal license for Action Mortgage Corporation also bears the date of October 16, 1979. During the period of time between August 31, 1979 (the date upon which his individual mortgage broker license expired) and October 16, 1979 (the date upon which said renewal license was issued), respondent, Clampitt, as an individual mortgage broker, received at least three mortgage brokerage fees or commissions. A broker is considered to be licensed by the petitioner when a completed application form accompanied by the correct fee is received by the petitioner. It is the petitioner's practice to mail out renewal application to its approximately 6,500 licensees on July 15 of each year with the request that they be returned by August 15. All licenses expire on August 31 and are reissued for the following year to be effective from September 1 to August 31. Those applications which are received by the petitioner after August 31 bear a different license date. The correct amount to be remitted for the renewal of respondent Clampitt's individual license was $125-- a $75 license fee and a $50 guaranty fund fee. The $190 check received by the petitioner from the respondent on or before August 31, 1979, was accompanied by three renewal application cards. The petitioner did not apply $125 of the $190 to the renewal of respondent Clampitt's individual license because petitioner could not ascertain how the respondent desired to have the funds applied. Although a small minority of licensees do not renew their licenses in a timely fashion, it is not the practice of the petitioner to directly notify a licensee that his license has expired. Respondent Clampitt did hold a license with an effective date of September 13, 1979, as an additional broker for Fickling and Walker, Inc. in Winter Park, Florida. Under this license, respondent Clampitt would have no authority to act individually or on behalf of anyone other than Fickling and Walker, Inc. COUNT IV Respondent Clampitt arranged for a loan to a Mr. and Mrs. Fink. When examining the respondent's books, petitioner's financial examiner was unable to account for an apparent overcharge of $13.80 for credit life insurance on the loan. The examiner did not examine the loan closing documents with regard to this transaction. The evidence establishes that there had been a clerical error in the respondent's office concerning this transaction, that the cost of the credit life insurance had been miscalculated and that respondent Clampitt was entitled to the $13.80. COUNT V It is the practice of the respondent Clampitt to interview his clients over the telephone, look at the involved property and then, if he agrees to make a loan, send the client to a title insurance company to sign the necessary papers. These papers include a loan closing statement, the required RESPA statement and a recision notice which allows the customer to cancel the transaction within 72 hours without cost or obligation. Thereafter, generally five to seven days later, the customer returns to the title company to receive the loan proceeds. Respondent Clampitt does not take deposits and most often does not even meet this clients on a face-to-face basis. All borrower disclosures and rights required by law are provided respondent's clients by the title insurance company.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED THAT: The Administrative Charges and Complaint filed on March 23, 1981, against Joseph W. Langford be DISMISSED; The Administrative Charges and Complaint filed on February 3, 1981, against Action Mortgage Corporation be DISMISSED; Counts I, II, IV and V of the Administrative Charges and Complaint filed against Ronald E. Clampitt on February 3, 1981, be DISMISSED; and Respondent Ronald E. Clampitt be found guilty of accepting fees at a time when his individual license had expired, but, because of the unintentional violation of the pertinent statutory provisions, no disciplinary action be imposed for this offense. Respectfully submitted and entered this 27th day of July, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of July, 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: Walter W. Wood Assistant General Counsel Office of the Comptroller Suite 1302 - The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 John C. Dew and Jay Emory Wood Harris, Barrett and Dew Post Office Drawer 1441 600 Florida National Bank Building St. Petersburg, Florida 33731 Comptroller Gerald A. Lewis State of Florida The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Frank Arata, Jr., is a vice president of The Keyes Company, the manager of The Keyes Company Miami Beach Office, a real estate broker registered by the Board of Real Estate and has been so registered for some fifteen years. He was so registered at all times here relevant. The Keyes Company is a corporate real estate broker registered by the Board of Real Estate and was so registered at all times here relevant. John Arata, Lauri Rutkin and Sophie Farkas are registered as salesmen by the Board of Real Estate and were so registered and employed by The Keyes Company at all times here relevant. John Arata and Sandra Spolter, another salesman of The Keyes Company, obtained a listing (Exhibit 5) on 9/20/77 on an apartment building owned by Bernard Wachtel and Linda Wachtel located at 1121 Pennsylvania Avenue, Miami Beach, Florida. Wachtel was about to lose the building due to an inability to meet current expenses and was anxious to sell before the mortgage on the building was foreclosed. John Arata had no further connection with any event later occurring involving this property. Several weeks after the property had been placed in the multiple listing service and further advertised for sale without success, the seller became even more anxious to get rid of the property and it became known in the Miami Beach Office of The Keyes Company that the owner would sell at a price he could walk away from without further cost. Another Keyes salesman, Leon Kaplan, called Gilbert Sens, an investor in properties in the area, to advise Sens about the availability of this property. At this time apparently both Kaplan, and certainly Sens, were unaware that the mortgage on the property was a wraparound mortgage held by the former owner which contained a provision requiring a pay-down of $25,000 in the mortgage principal upon sale of the property. This provision made the mortgagee essential to any negotiation, particularly if a purchaser wanted to negotiate for a lower or no pay-down. After viewing the property and learning of the straits of the owner, Sens concluded that he could acquire this property with a very small cash investment but would have to pay the broker's fee. In a letter dated 8 November 1977 (Exhibit 3) from Sens to Kaplan, Sens stated an intent to purchase the property at 1121 Pennsylvania Avenue, Miami Beach, Florida, by assuming the existing mortgage, paying taxes and real estate commission, all subject to the formal contract to be prepared by his attorney. Sens also contacted the mortgage holder, Regina Halperin, or her son, Morris Mulhrad, who acted as his mother's agent in many transactions, and learned the pay-down was negotiable. In further efforts to acquire the property with a minimum cash investment, Sens induced The Keyes Company to agree to defer the payment of the commission, if Sens bought the property, for one year with Sens executing a second mortgage for this commission (Exhibit 4). This document, dated 16 November 1977, was signed by Frank Arata, Jr., for The Keyes Company and by Sens (for corporation) as prospective purchaser. At this time Sens did not have a corporation formed to take title but expected to form one before the transaction closed. Also on 16 November 1977, Sens executed an offer to purchase the property (Exhibit 6) for the amount of the first mortgage with the purchaser "Gilbert Sens, his Assignees or Corporate Designees." Specific provisions of this offer included the buyer would pay the real estate sales commission and contained a provision that the offer was contingent upon purchaser entering into a mortgage modification agreement with Mrs. Halperin satisfactory to the purchaser to modify or eliminate the $25,000 mortgage pay-down requirement. This offer was presented to Wachtel by Kaplan but was never accepted, nor was a counteroffer made by the seller. On 22 November 1977 a meeting was held in the offices of Eugene Weiss, an attorney who had represented Sens in many real estate transactions but who also had represented Mrs. Halperin. Present at the meeting were Mrs. Halperin, Morris Mulhrad, Sens, Weiss and Wachtel. Mrs. Halperin expressed reservations about having a corporate purchaser of the property, about no pay-down of the mortgage as proposed by Sens, and about Sens' refusal to commit himself to a specific sum to repair and/or replace fixtures that were in disrepair. Mr. Mulhrad testified that he and his mother had no intention of letting Sens "steal" this property by getting title for only a $3,000 cash outlay and the offer made by Sens was totally unacceptable. On the other hand, Sens and Weiss both testified that they understood an agreement was reached and the contents of that agreement were dictated by Weiss to be prepared for signature the following day. However, Weiss' calendar for 23 November 1977 (attached to Exhibit 1) had no time scheduled for such a signature meeting. Sens' practice was to acquire investment property in the name of a corporation wholly owned by him or a family trust. He often would form such a corporation, the sole assets of which would be investment property acquired. None of the principals here involved were novices; all had considerable experience in buying and selling real estate. Mrs. Halperin had been involved in buying and selling real property in the Miami area for many years, as had Sens. Eugene Weiss, the lawyer who was representing both the buyer and the mortgagee at the 22 November 1977 meeting, specializes in the field of real estate. When he dictated his understanding of the offer being made by Hens at that meeting, he knew, as the other parties surely did, that what he was dictating was an offer to purchase under certain terms and conditions that could develop into a contract only after acceptance by the mortgagee of the modification of the mortgage agreement and by the seller. All parties certainly were aware that no oral agreement to purchase real property could be enforced in view of the statute of frauds, Section 725.01, Florida Statutes. All parties also knew that the seller had no money with which to pay the broker or to pay bills owed for taxes, overdue mortgage payments, utilities, etc., due at the apartment building and that the offer to purchase must make provisions for those debts. Before the offer dictated by Weiss was reduced to writing, he was advised that Mrs. Halperin would not accept the provisions proposed by Sens, would not release the mortgage pay-down provision and that there was no contract. He passed this information to Sens on 23 November 1977. Meanwhile, Frank Arata was being called frequently by Wachtel to get the property sold. At the weekly sales meeting on 22 November 1977, Arata inquired about the status of Kaplan's negotiations on behalf of Sens but Kaplan had little to report since Sens had been doing most of his own negotiations. Kaplan apparently did not know about the meeting between the parties on 22 November 1977 until long after that meeting. At this sales meeting it became known that the mortgage pay-down could be modified by the mortgage holder and Frank Arata mentioned to Sophie Farkas and Lauri Rutkin that they might be interested in buying this property. When Kaplan protested, Arata told him that he would hold off one more day to give Kaplan an additional 24 hours to get a binding offer from Sens. No such offer was obtained by Kaplan. Farkas and Rutkin visited the property and on 25 November 1977 made an offer to purchase the apartments at 1121 Pennsylvania Avenue (Exhibit 8). In this offer the buyers agreed to pay back taxes, pay a $10,000 commission to The Keyes Company, bring the mortgage payments current, pay past due bills for utilities, exterminating, garbage, etc., and the mortgage holder agreed to enter into a mortgage modification agreement. This offer was apparently prepared by Weiss and accepted by the seller on 25 November 1977. Morris Mulhrad testified that these buyers made a $10,000 pay-down on the mortgage but the documents attached to Exhibit 1, the deposition of Weiss, does not confirm such pay-down was required by the mortgage holder or paid by the buyers. These buyers did submit an offer more beneficial to the seller than the offer submitted by Sens.
