The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Petitioner’s application for licensure as a mortgage broker should be approved.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner resides in Riverwoods, Illinois. He has four children, and is married to Sharon Wheat-Hester. Petitioner received his undergraduate degree from Wake Forest University in North Carolina. Petitioner also received a master’s degree and doctorate degree in theology from Share-A- Prayer and Word Theological School in Whitewater, Wisconsin. Petitioner is currently employed as the director of a ministry called Marketplace Movement Network. The ministry provides advice to businesses on Chritian business ethics. In that regard, Petitioner has published one book on the subject of Christian ethics in business. Petitioner is also the President and shareholder of Hester International, Inc., a Florida Corporation that since 1995, provides mortgage brokerage services in the State of Illinois and several other states. The corporation’s principal office is located in Illinois. The business has an established client list and referral list. Additionally, Petitioner is currently licensed as a mortgage broker in the Illinois, California, North Carolina and Hawaii. He has not had any disciplinary action taken against him in those states. On January 25, 1996, prior to the present license application at issue here, Petitioner sought licensure as a mortgage broker in Florida with the Florida Department of Banking and Finance, Respondent’s predecessor agency. On the 1996 application Petitioner answered “no” to a question that asked whether he had ever had a license revoked. Petitioner’s 1996 application was denied for a material misrepresentation or omission. Petitioner did not challenge the 1996 denial. On February 16, 2004, also prior to the present application, Petitioner again applied for a mortgage broker license. On this application, question number six asked: Have you had a license, or the equivalent, to practice any profession or occupation denied, revoked, suspended, or otherwise acted against which involved fraud, dishonest dealing, or any other act of moral turpitude? Yes No A “Yes” answer to question six required the applicant to attach details, provide a copy of allegations, and also supply documentation of the final disposition of the case. In response to question number six, Petitioner appeared to have marked both the answers “yes” and “no”, but then circled “yes.” On the second page of the application, Petitioner explained his answer to question number six, stating that he had had a real estate license ten years ago and that he had been involved with a dispute for $2,500 and lost the case. The explanation further stated that Petitioner was moving to Illinois at the time, so he voluntarily surrendered his license. On April 1, 2004, without investigating the facts to refresh his memory, Petitioner provided the requested signed letter of explanation. Subsequently, he withdrew his February application because he did not have time to deal with the ongoing questions the agency had regarding his application. Around July 13, 2004, after discussing the February 2004 application with Respondent, Petitioner submitted a revised Application for Licensure as a Mortgage Broker in the State of Florida. In response to question six, Petitioner marked “no” based on his memory that his real estate agent’s license had been “voluntarily surrendered.” Petitioner also submitted character reference letters. Additionally, Petitioner discussed with Respondent any proof of rehabilitation since the “voluntary surrender” of his real estate license. On page two of the July application, Petitioner wrote that his “only blemish” was a voluntary surrender of a real estate license in 1992. Petitioner stated, “[t]his was ‘not’ an act of moral turpitude or fraud.” In a deficiency letter dated July 28, 2004, the Office requested additional information from the Petitioner, including a signed statement explaining his side of the occurrence. On September 30, 2004, the Office received the same statement the Petitioner had previously forwarded to the Office for his February 2004 application. Petitioner again did not avail himself of the opportunity to discover the true facts surrounding the claimed surrender of his license. In the second paragraph of this explanatory letter Petitioner stated that the disciplinary action that led to surrender of his real estate license arose out of a transaction involving one of his customers who rented property to a third- party renter. Petitioner stated that the rental transaction between his customer and the third-party renter occurred in the lobby of Petitioner’s office without his knowledge or help. According to Petitioner’s, somewhat confusing, explanatory letter, the customer did not have the right to rent the house, but collected $2,500 from the renter and then left the state. Later, Petitioner discovered that the customer had closed in escrow and gained temporary occupancy of the home, thereby enabling the customer to ostensibly rent the home. Petitioner further explained that the renter sued him for the $2,500 and prevailed because the transaction took place in Petitioner’s lobby. Petitioner stated he lost the case because his attorney, Scott Hester (also his brother), was unavailable to make the closing argument and Petitioner had to do his own summation. In fact, Petitioner’s brother never represented Petitioner in the renter’s case because he did not have time to undertake the case. Petitioner did not supply the names of the people referenced in the letter because he did not remember them. As will be seen, at the time of the explanatory letter, Petitioner’s memory of the facts surrounding his license surrender is, at best, faulty. On April 19, 2005, the Office issued its Denial Letter, denying Petitioner’s application for licensure as a mortgage broker. As grounds for denial under Section 494.041(2)(c), (g), (i) and (q), Florida Statutes, the letter stated in relevant part: The Office’s background investigation and information you provided revealed the following: You answered Question #6 on your application as “no”, when it asks if you have had a license, or the equivalent, to practice any profession or occupation denied, revoked, suspended, or otherwise acted against which involved fraud, dishonest dealing, or any other act of moral turpitude. On or about May 7, 1996, the Florida Department of Banking and Finance, Division of Finance, denied your application for a license as a mortgage broker for making a material misstatement of fact on their application. On or about December 8, 1992, after the State of Florida, Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate conducted an investigation, you surrendered your license with that agency and entered into a written agreement stating that you agreed to have your license revoked. Accordingly, the Real Estate Commission did revoke your license in their meeting of January 19, 1993 effective December 8, 1992. The Investigative Report attached to the Final Order to revoke reveals that you were sued for dishonest conduct and subsequently, on March 25, 1992, ordered to pay Johannes Fruhwirt $7,800 plus post- judgment interest. This order was by the County Court of Broward County as a result of a Final Judgment, Case #9103333 CC53 and a Writ of Execution. The investigation revealed that Hester left the State of Florida without leaving word of his whereabouts. Apparently, that judgment was never satisfied. On May 14, 1991 you promised to pay $3000 to Leonard Schoenfeld when closing occurred on a home Mr. Schoenfeld was purchasing. Closing occurred shortly afterward, and you have never made that payment. On or about July 17, 1995, the State of Illinois received an Application Form to Operate as a Residential Mortgage Licensee in the name of Hester International, Inc. on which you were listed as 50% owner. You signed the “Verification” portion of that form and your signature was notarized on June 20, 1995 indicating that you verified as being true all data entered onto that form. However, you responded “N/A” to Part III, Question #10 which asks that you list all licenses which you or your firm have applied for and been denied and/or any and all licenses issued to you or your firm which were subsequently suspended or revoked. You therefore failed to disclose the revocation of your license with the Florida Division of Real Estate that occurred in 1992. On the same application filed with the State of Illinois, in response to Part III, question 19(m), you did not disclose that a judgment had been entered against you on grounds of fraud, misrepresentation, or deceit. The renewal for Hester International Inc., with the State of Illinois, states under the section labeled, “Averment of License” in item “s” that the licensee will advise the Commissioner in writing of any changes to the information submitted on the most recent application for license within 30 days of said change. The State of Illinois reports that you never disclosed the denial of a mortgage broker license in 1996 with the State of Florida . (i) On November 18, 2004 in an electronic filing for corporation reinstatement for Hester International, Inc., you certified that as Registered Agent you maintained an office at 6278 N. Federal Highway, Suite #305 in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida. In fact, that address is a mail drop leased to one Carl Thames, CPA. The signage required by Section 48.091(2), Florida Statutes, does not appear, and you and Hester International, Inc. are unknown at this location. In pre-hearing interrogatories, the Office asked Petitioner to provide more information about the transaction involving the transaction that had led to the revocation of his real estate license, including the identity of those individuals. Even though the importance of accuracy was apparent since Petitioner was now in litigation, Petitioner, again, without investigating the facts and relying solely on his improving memory answered the interrogatories posed to him. In his answers, Petitioner identified the “customer” who had collected the money as Leonard Schoenfeld and the “renter” as Johannes Fruhwirt. Petitioner went on, in his answers, to describe the transaction with Mr. Schoenfeld and Mr. Fruhwirt. This description is similar to the explanation offered in the explanatory letters supplied for his earlier applications. In his response to Requests for Admissions, Petitioner denied that in May of 1991 he acted as a real estate broker in the auction of a home located at 14884 Equestrian Way in Wellington, Palm Beach County, Florida, and that he had been unable to deliver a mortgage at an agreed interest rate. Petitioner also denied that he had agreed to pay $3,000 for closing costs as deferred interest payments. Despite these denials, Petitioner admitted that he had signed an agreement to pay $3,000 to Mr. Schoenfeld. Petitioner explained these denials by claiming that these funds were never due because the agreement to pay $3,000 was contingent on closing. Since the real estate deal never closed, the $3,000 was never due. At his July 15, 2005, deposition, Petitioner essentially reaffirmed the inaccurate account of events in his interrogatory answers. At the deposition, Petitioner was asked to review documents related to the Schoenfeld transaction. Those documents included: (1) a copy of the May 14, 1991, agreement wherein he agreed to pay Mr. Schoenfeld $3,000, (2) a handwritten letter wherein he agreed to pay Mr. Schoenfeld the money that he owed him, and (3) a warranty deed on property purchased by Mr. Schoenfeld. When he was shown the May 14, 1991, agreement, Respondent testified that he did not know why he would have agreed to pay Mr. Schoenfeld $3,000. Even when he was shown the deed on the property and even though he had notarized the signatures on that deed, Petitioner maintained that the deal never closed and he never owed the $3000. At hearing, Petitioner’s various and growing explanations during discovery significantly differ from his testimony. Petitioner testified that throughout his various explanations he had confused and combined several individuals into one transaction. Even though he knew that the true facts of these transactions were important to consideration of his application and in answering discovery in this case, Petitioner did not make any real attempt to refresh his memory of these transactions until shortly before the hearing. In fact, the Schoenfeld and Fruhwirt transactions involved different real estate deals and had nothing to do with each other. The Schoenfeld transaction occurred in 1991 and involved the sale of real property located at 14884 Equestrian Way in Wellington, Florida. Mr. Schoenfeld was Petitioner’s customer. As part of the transaction, Petitioner guaranteed he could get a mortgage at a certain rate. After failing to get Mr. Schoenfeld a mortgage at a certain rate, Petitioner agreed to pay Mr. Schoenfeld $3,000 upon closing. When Petitioner failed to pay Mr. Schoenfeld the $3,000 on closing, he asked Mr. Schoenfeld if he could make payments of $200 a month. In a letter to Mr.Schoenfeld, Petitioner confirmed that he would pay Mr. Schoenfeld the amount that was owed. Petitioner made two payments and then stopped making payments. In a letter dated July 1, 1991, Mr. Schoenfeld complained about his dealings with Petitioner to the Division of Real Estate. A few days before Mr. Schoenfeld’s deposition on July 25, 2005, Petitioner paid Mr. Schoenfeld $2,600. Mr. Schoenfeld accepted the payment since the money was still owed to him. However, the payment had been delayed for 14 years and did not include interest for those years. Petitioner testified that he made the payment because, once he remembered the details of the transaction, he felt morally obligated to pay Mr. Schoenfeld what he had promised. However, fulfillment of this obligation also occurred with this litigation pending and after denials that any money was due Mr. Schoenfeld. In short, Petitioner did not pay Mr. Schoenfeld the money that was due him for 14 years until Petitioner was forced to acknowledge the true facts of the Schoenfeld transaction in this litigation. The Fruhwirt transaction involved a man named Mark Ritter who was a client of Petitioner. Mr. Fruhwirt met with Mark Ritter at a house he wanted to rent. Eventually, Mr. Ritter sent him to Petitioner to complete a lease agreement. Mr. Ritter did not know about leases and said Petitioner was a friend whose real estate office could set up the lease contract. Mr. Fruhwirt met Petitioner at his real estate office. Since it was lunchtime, they went to a nearby Burger King to finalize the lease. While at Burger King, Mr. Fruhwirt paid Petitioner $2,850 on the lease. Petitioner’s testified that he did not receive any money from Mr. Fruhwirt and did not accompany Mr. Fruhwirt to Burger King. Petitioner testified that Mr. Ritter and Mr. Fruhwirt met in his lobby and both went to Burger King to finalize the lease arrangement. However, given Petitioner’s past faulty memory, Petitioner’s testimony is not credible. At some point, Mr. Fruhwirt moved into the house. Subsequently, Mr. Fruhwirt received a letter from an attorney representing the real owner demanding that he vacate the premises. Mr. Fruhwirt then discovered that Mr. Ritter was not the owner and had to hire an attorney to sort out his continued occupancy of the property. Eventually Mr. Fruwhirt bought this property. Mr. Fruhwirt sued Petitioner and the real estate office for the recovery of the $2,850 he had paid to rent the house. Petitioner was found liable, but the real estate office was found not liable because the transaction happened off its premises at Burger King. On March 25, 1992, the Broward County Court entered a judgment of $7,800 against Petitioner, finding that Petitioner had “breached his duty to disclose that Mark Ritter was not the owner of the involved property.” After Mr. Fruhwirt obtained the judgment, Petitioner declared bankruptcy. Mr. Fruhwirt pursued an adversary action in Petitioner’s bankruptcy proceedings. Subsequently, the Bankruptcy Court cited “11 U.S.C. 523 A(2) and 11 U.S.C. 523 A(4)” and refused to discharge the judgment debt. The Bankruptcy Court’s Order refusing to discharge the debt clearly conflicts with Dr. Hester’s repeated implications and statements that this debt was discharged in bankruptcy. Unable to collect from Petitioner, Mr. Fruhwirt filed with the Florida Real Estate Recovery Fund. The fund paid $2,850 to Mr. Fruhwirt and suspended Petitioner’s license. Mr. Fruhwirt used the money to defray some of his legal expenses. To date, Petitioner has not paid Mr. Fruhwirt any money on the judgment. The Fruwhirt transaction led to the revocation of Petitioner’s real estate license and, on January 19, 1993, the Florida Real Estate Commission entered a final order revoking Petitioner’s real estate license. Despite Petitioner’s testimony that he never received a copy of the documents, the certificate of service for the final order indicates it was sent to Petitioner at 1101 Hidden Cove, Salem, SC 29676, which was the address where Petitioner was living at that time. Again, Petitioner’s testimony is not credible. The Final Order referenced a December 8, 1992, agreement in which Petitioner agreed that his license would be revoked. In the December 8, 1992 agreement, entitled “Affidavit for the Voluntary Surrender of License, Registration, Certificate/Permit for Revocation,” signed by Petitioner, he agreed to the revocation of his license and to not apply for a new real estate license for ten years from the effective date of revocation. In particular, the December 8, 1992 agreement stated, “[t]he effective date of the revocation shall be upon signing this document.” Notwithstanding the clear language revoking the license, at the hearing, Petitioner maintained that because he had voluntarily surrendered his license, he did not believe his license had been revoked. In referring to the agreement he had signed, he testified that the agreement said, “that my license will be inactive, not revoked” and denied ever seeing the other documents revoking his license. This testimony is simply not credible and demonstrates Petitioner’s propensity to see or remember things in a way that is more flattering to him, irrespective of reality. The affidavit signed by Petitioner clearly stated that Petitioner’s license would be and was revoked upon signing. In 1995, Hester International applied to operate as a residential mortgage licensee in Illinois. The application identified Petitioner as the vice president and Sharon Hester as the president. Page one of the application indicated the application had to be executed “by two officers or all directors if the applicant/licensee is a corporation.” The application was signed by Petitioner and his wife. Petitioner did not disclose to Illinois that a judgment had been entered against him in Florida or that his real estate license had been revoked or suspended. Question 10 in Part III of the Application asked: “LIST ALL LICENSES WHICH YOU OR YOUR FIRM HAVE APPLIED FOR AND BEEN DENIED AND/OR ANY AND ALL LICENSES ISSUED TO YOU OR YOUR FIRM WHICH WERE SUBSEQUENTLY SUSPENDED OR REVOKED.” Petitioner responded “N/A.” (Id.). Question 19(m) in Part III of the Application asked: UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY, I(WE) STATE THAT ALL OF THE FOREGOING IS TRUE AND CORRECT TO THE BEST OF MY (OUR) KNOWLEDGE AND FURTHER STATE THAT AS THE APPLICANT/LICENSEE: . . . (m) Has not committed a crime against the law of this State, any other state or the United States, involving moral turpitude, fraudulent or dishonest dealing, and that no final judgment has been entered against it in a civil action upon grounds of fraud, misrepresentation or deceit which has not previously been reported to the Commissioner. The evidence did not demonstrate that the emphasized clauses in question 10 or the “I(WE)” in 19(m) direct such questions to individuals signing the application. One reasonable interpretation of the language is that the questions are directed to the business entity applying for the license. In short, the I(WE) language is simply language in a form meant to cover multiple types of business entities ranging from sale proprietorships to corporations. Therefore, Petitioner was not required by Illinois to disclose matters which involved him personally. To date, Illinois has not filed any disciplinary action against Petitioner or Hester International. Thus, the failure to disclose personal judgments or license actions to Illinois in a corporate application for licensure does not support a finding of dishonesty or denial of Respondent’s application at issue here. At some point, Hester International’s corporate status had to be reinstated in Florida. Petitioner reinstated the company’s corporate status in November of 2004. Petitioner filed as registered agent at 6278 North Federal Highway #305, Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Petitioner had not lived at this address for some 15 years, but had lived there for seven years with his girlfriend. The evidence showed that Petitioner simply forgot to change the registered agent’s address and was not acting dishonestly. Once he discovered his mistake, Petitioner amended his filing to reflect the appropriate address. Again, these facts do not form a basis to deny Petitioner’s license application. Finally, Petitioner testified that until Spring 2005, he and his wife were 50/50 owners of Hester International, Inc., as reflected on the application and license renewals in Illinois. In September 2004, Ms. Hester submitted Hester International, Inc.’s application for Florida licensure as a mortgage broker business. The Hester International business application was submitted after the Office had denied Petitioner’s license application in 1996 and was scrutinizing his July 2004 application. In the application, Ms. Hester identified herself as 100 percent owner of the Hester International. Petitioner did review this application, but he intentionally did not take part in its filing. The purported change in ownership was not adequately explained at hearing and appears to have been done in order to forestall any problems with licensure of the corporation due to Petitioner’s participation in the corporation. While the change of ownership is troubling, given Petitioner’s history, and also adds to the evidence that Petitioner is less than forthright in his memory and past business dealings, the change of ownership for the corporation’s licensure application does not, by itself, support a denial of Petitioner’s application. On the other hand, too many inconsistencies exist between Petitioner’s hearing testimony and his earlier accounts to conclude that Respondent can be trusted to hold a mortgage brokerage license. At worst, the evidence shows that Petitioner is not truthful or acts with integrity. At best, the evidence shows that Respondent has the ability to convince himself of facts that do not quite fit the truth, but are more flattering to him. Under either scenario, Petitioner’s appreciation of honesty, truthfulness and integrity are suspect. Neither Petitioner’s letters supporting his good character, nor his success in his ministry demonstrates sufficient rehabilitation to overcome what appears to be long-time evasive behavior. Therefore, Petitioner’s application for licensure as a mortgage broker should be denied.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: A Final Order be entered denying Petitioner’s application for licensure as a mortgage broker. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of November, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of November, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: C. Scott Hester, Esquire 13843 Longs Landing Road East Jacksonville, Florida 32225 Robert H. Schott, Esquire Gregg Morton, Esquire Department of Financial Services 200 East Gaines Street Fletcher Building, Suite 526 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0376 Carlos G. Muniz, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0307 Honorable Tom Gallagher Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue Whether Respondent's license as a real estate broker should be suspended or revoked, or the licensee otherwise disciplined, for alleged violation of Chapter 475, Florida Statutes, as set forth in Administrative Complaint, dated December 4, 1981. This proceeding involves allegations by the Florida Board of Real Estate (now Florida Real Estate Commission) that Respondent, James R. Siebert, violated Subsection 475.25(1)(h) Florida Statutes, by sharing a commission with a person not properly licensed under the real estate law, and that he employed a person as a salesman who is not the holder of a valid license, in violation of Subsection 475.42(1)(c) , Florida Statutes, and therefore in violation of Subsection 475.25(1)(a), Florida Statutes. The incident which prompted the Administrative Complaint involved an auction sale of a restaurant in Brooksville, Florida which was conducted by an auctioneer who did not have a license to practice real estate in Florida. Respondent requested an administrative hearing and filed an answer to the Administrative Complaint admitting the occurrence of the auction, but denying that it involved the sale of real estate.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, James L. Siebert, is a licensed real estate broker at Orange Lake, Florida, and was so licensed at all times relevant in this proceeding. (Stipulation) On several occasions prior to February 21, 1981, Respondent had gratuitously assisted Albert W. (Billy) Mitchell, an auctioneer, in conducting auctions by serving as a "ring man" and clerk. A "ring man" normally is one of several such individuals at an auction who assists the auctioneer by encouraging bidding and identifying bidders. Mitchell is not licensed under real estate laws of Florida, but operates under a local occupation license. None of the prior auctions in which Respondent assisted Mitchell involved the sale of real estate. (Testimony of Respondent, Mitchell) On January 28, 1981, Mitchell entered into an "auction sale contract" with Welberta Pruitt whereby Mitchell agreed to sell at auction to the highest and best bidder: . . . the following described business and personal property owned by the Party of the First Part: Pruitts Golden Wagon Steak House Restaurant and Contents on attached inventory list and located 1702 Howell Avenue, Brooksville, in Hernando County, State of Florida. The terms of this sale shall be 10 percent of the amount of the purchase price to be paid on day of sale and the balance to be paid as follows: On delivery of title - There is a mortgage on the business of $67,838.20 with interest at 8 3/4 percent on the unpaid balance. The attachment to the contract listed various items of food supplies and restaurant furniture and equipment, plus decorative items of personal property. Pruitt and her husband had purchased the real property on which the restaurant building was located under an agreement for deed in 1979 which provided that the Pruitts would make the payments on a mortgage of about $67,000 from the sellers to the First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Citrus County and, when such mortgage was paid in full, the sellers would convey title to the property by warranty deed. The contract reflected that the total purchase price of the property was $75,000, and that a down payment had been made in the sum of $7,000. Mrs. Pruitt owned furniture, fixtures and equipment which she transported from Tennessee to operate a restaurant on the premises. (Testimony of W. Pruit Kelly, Mitchell, Johnston, Respondent's Exhibits 1,2) It was the understanding of the parties to the auction agreement that only the personal property in and around the restaurant building would be sold to the highest bidder, and it was anticipated that the successful bidder would take up the mortgage payments on the real property. The equity which the Pruitts had acquired by prior mortgage payments was to be "given" to whoever purchased the "business" at the auction. Accordingly, on February 20, 1981, the day preceding the auction, Mrs. Pruitt issued a "notice" that she would sell her "entire Restaurant, business, furnishings, equipment, and Inventory at Public Auction". The notice further stated that she would give her equity in the real estate to the purchaser on which there was an existing mortgage of $67,821.36 "that you may assume". The noticewas placed on the door of the restaurant. In addition, Mitchell issued a brochure advertising the auction wherein it was stated that the "entire business, furnishings, equipment, and stock" would he sold at absolute auction and that the purchaser would have the "privilege of assuming the payments on the existing mortgage." Mitchell had Respondent's name placed at the bottom of the brochure without Respondent's knowledge because he thought it would be a good advertisement for him. (Testimony of Mitchell, W. Pruitt, Petitioner's Exhibit 3, Respondent's Exhibit 3) Mitchell asked Respondent to assist at the Pruitt auction and told him that since Mrs. Pruitt and her attorney were having a disagreement, it might be necessary for Respondent to write the contract resulting from the auction. No fee for Respondent's services was discussed prior to the auction. (Testimony of Mitchell, Respondent) On February 21, 1981, the auction was conducted at the restaurant in Brooksville, and Respondent was present to act as a "ring man". There were only about 3 individuals who entered bids at the auction. Prior to receiving bids, Mitchell announced that he was auctioning the contents of the business and that whoever bought the property would take over the payments on the mortgage. The successful bidder was Robert Shrader, who bid $9,600. He made a 20 percent down payment at the time in the amount of $1,920 which Mitchell retained as a commission on the sale. Mitchell had not described the real estate at the auction, but merely stated that he was auctioning the business and that Mrs. Pruitt would give the successful bidder her equity in the property. After accepting Schrader's bid, Mitchell gave the figures on the sale to Respondent who prepared a standard contract for sale and purchase of the real estate in the total amount of $77,421.36. The contract reflected a deposit of $1,920 to be held in escrow by Billy Mitchell and Associates, that the contract was subject to assumption of a mortgage of $67,821.36, and that there would be a balance of $7,680. Shrader and Mrs. Pruitt signed the agreement on February 21, 1981, which was witnessed by Mitchell and Respondent. Although no brokerage fee was listed, Respondent signed as broker on the contract. He testified at the hearing that he had done this out of habit. A real estate contract was prepared rather than merely a bill of sale of the personal property in order that the parties would have the figures they needed to close which they could take to the closing attorneys. After the auction, Mitchell gave Respondent $200 as a gift for his gasoline and other expenses on the Pruitt and prior auctions. Respondent testified, and Mitchell confirmed, that the latter insisted that he accept that amount as reimbursement for expenses. (Testimony of Mitchell, Respondent, Petitioner's Exhibit 1) On April 6, 1981, Joseph P. Johnston, an attorney in Brooksville, closed the transaction by means of a bill of sale for the furnishings and equipment in Pruitts restaurant, and assignment of the Pruitt interest in the mortgaged real property. The closing statement reflected that a "broker's commission" in the amount of $1,920 was held by the "broker" to apply on commission, In actuality, the sum retained by Mitchell as a commission was based solely upon a percentage of the personal property sold at auction. (Testimony of Johnston, Mitchell, Petitioner's Exhibit 2)
Recommendation That the Florida Real Estate Commission dismiss the charges against Respondent, James R. Siebert. DONE and ENTERED this 3d day of June, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3d day of June, 1982 COPIES FURNISHED: Salvatore Carpino, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Harvey R. Klein, Esquire Klein & Klein 333 North West 3rd Avenue Ocala, Florida 32670 Frederick H. Wilsen, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. C. B. Stafford Executive Director Florida Real Estate Commission Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801
The Issue The issue posed for decision herein is whether or not James T. Speaks, Respondent, engaged in conduct amounting to a failure to maintain in an escrow bank account deposits he received as a selling broker which were entrusted to him in the course of his brokerage activities until a proper or authorized disbursement of such monies was made. Based on its Administrative Complaint filed on May 17, 1978, the Florida Real Estate Commission, Petitioner, seeks to revoke, annul, suspend or otherwise discipline licensee James T. Speaks, who holds Florida Real Estate License No. 0083459, based on conduct which will be set forth herein in detail.
Findings Of Fact Based on the testimony presented during the course of the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: During October of 1976, Donna W. Ross was a listing broker to sell the property of Katherine Scanlon. During mid-October, 1976, Respondent Speaks located purchasers for the Scanlon property and submitted an offer to the listing broker, which offer was accepted by the seller. Respondent Speaks deposited a $1,000.00 binder deposit in his escrow account. (See FREC Composite Exhibit No. 7.) The closing of the real estate transaction in the Scanlon property took place in Attorney David Booher's office who, based on evidence received during the course of the closing, questioned Respondent Speaks as to the negotiability of a $1,000.00 check Respondent Speaks presented as a refund of the escrow deposit he had tendered to secure the deposit receipt contract for the Scanlon property. Virginia RawIs, who was formerly employed by Booher and Crabtree, Realtors, called the Barnett Bank of Regency to verify if sufficient funds were on deposit in Respondent Speaks' account and was advised that sufficient monies were not on deposit to cover the check. At that juncture, Respondent Speaks acknowledged that he had tendered a check which was drawn on an account without sufficient funds to cover it and agreed that the $1,000.00 binder deposit should be deducted from his commission monies due. This agreement was acceptable to all parties concerned at the closing and another check representing the commission monies due Respondent Speaks, less the $1,000.00 deposit, was drawn and made payable to Speaks. Donna W. Ross, the listing broker, was also present during the hearing and verified the testimony of Attorney Booher respecting the presentation by Respondent Speaks of the $1,000.00 check which was not secured by sufficient funds. As noted in the appearance section of this Recommended Order, the Respondent, James T. Speaks, did not appear during the hearing although copies of the Notice of Hearing were mailed to his last known addresses.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, I hereby recommend that the Registered Real Estate Broker license of Respondent, James T. Speaks, be suspended for a period of two (2) years. RECOMMENDED this 5th day of January, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675
The Issue Whether Petitioner's application for a real estate salesman's license should be approved.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is Victor Kevin Koellner. By application, he sought licensure as a real estate salesman. Petitioner was a unsuccessful candidate for the December 1988 real estate salesman's licensure examination. Petitioner received a score of 74. A score of 75 is required for licensure. Each correct answer has a grade value of one (1) point. Candidates are instructed to choose the most correct answer from among the multiple choice answers given. Petitioner challenges the answers selected by the Florida Real Estate Commission as correct as to questions numbered 15 and 52, on the test administered on December 5, 1988. Question 15 is confidential under the provisions of Section 119.07(3)(c), Florida Statutes, but appears in Respondent's Exhibit 1. The commission holds that the correct answer to question 15 is D. (Do any of the above). The Petitioner alleges that the better answer is A. (Request an Escrow disbursement order from the Florida Real Estate Commission). Section 475.25(1)(d), Florida Statutes, supports the Respondent's conclusion. Seventy-three (73%) percent of the candidates taking the examination on December 5, 1988 answered the question correctly. Question 52 is confidential under the provisions of Section 119.07(3)(c), Florida Statutes, but appears in Respondent's Exhibit 1 (page 2). The commission holds that the correct answer is C. (Pay it at the closing). The Petitioner alleges that the correct answer is D. (Not pay it). The question asked what should the seller do concerning the sales commission at the closing. Based on the facts given in the Florida Real Estate Handbook, 1987 Edition, page 272, the seller would have no option but to pay the commission at closing. Sixty and 3/10 (60.3%) percent of the candidates taking the examination on December 5, 1988 answered question 52 correctly.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered denying Petitioner's application for licensure. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of September, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of September, 1989. APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by the parties. Respondent's Proposed Findings: 1-8. Adopted in substance. Petitioner's Proposed Findings: Paragraphs 1,2,3,4,5 (in substance), 7, and 10 are accepted. Paragraphs 6,8 and 9 are rejected as not relevant. COPIES FURNISHED: Victor Kevin Koellner, pro se 1385 Taurus Court, Merritt Island, Florida 32953 E. Harper Field, Esquire Deputy General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation Northwood Centre, Suite 60 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Darlene F. Keller, Division Director Real Estate Legal Services 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 Kenneth E. Easley General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: At all times pertinent to this proceeding, respondent Alan Kaye was a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida and respondent KNAC of Miami Realty, Inc. was a corporation registered as a real estate broker in the State of Florida. Respondent Alan Kaye was an officer of and qualifying broker for respondent KNAC of Miami Realty, Inc. Respondents secured a 90-day listing from Christina Trivino for the sale of her residence located at 271 N.W. 148th Street in North Miami, Florida. When that listing expired, respondents obtained an extension. On or about November 28, 1987, respondents solicited and obtained a sales contract for the purchase and sale of the Trivino property. In connection therewith, the purchasers, Marie C. Eduoard and Henry S. Roy, entrusted to the respondents a total earnest money deposit of $6,200.00, and the respondents placed the deposit in the escrow account of respondent KNAC of Miami Realty, Inc. In accordance with the provisions of the sales contract, the purchasers were to pay a total of $62,000 for the property, and assume the existing first mortgage in the principal amount of approximately $45,000. While the contract initially called for the closing to occur on or before February 15, 1988, Ms. Trivino was very anxious to close earlier due to some problems she was having with the Internal Revenue Service. Accordingly, the closing date was changed to occur on or before January 15, 1988. Among the terms of the sales contract was a provision that conditioned the sale upon the purchasers' assumption of the first mortgage in the principal amount of approximately $45,000. Paragraph 8 of the contract provided that If, after diligent effort on the part of the purchaser, the purchaser is unable to obtain said first mortgage, all monies deposited hereunder shall be refunded to purchaser and parties herewith agree to enter into a Release on Deposit Receipt; and this contract shall be declared null and void. At some point in time, it became known to the respondents and the seller Trivino that the bank which held the first mortgage on the subject property would not authorize an assumption of the mortgage by the purchasers without either a $3,000 paydown of the mortgage amount or the completion of qualifying papers by the purchasers. The testimony from Ms. Trivino and Mr. Kaye differ widely with regard to the dates upon which and the manner in which they became aware of this problem, as well as their communications with each other thereafter. Ms. Trivino testified that in early January, 1988, she became concerned about the status of the transaction and began making repeated calls to the respondents which calls were never returned. She admits talking with Todd Kaye, respondent's son, in the respondents' offices on January 5, 1988, whereupon the mortgage problem was discussed. At that time, needing "desperately" to sell the house, Ms. Trivino offered to hold a second mortgage for the purchasers in the amount of approximately $3,000.00. She states that she also spoke with the officials at the bank regarding the mortgage. In spite of numerous unreturned telephone calls, Ms. Trivino did not hear anything further from Mr. Kaye until his letter dated January 29, 1988. That letter informed Ms. Trivino of the mortgage situation and indicated that "there is some doubt whether or not the Buyer has this extra money." Mr. Kaye further informed Ms. Trivino that "for all practical purposes, since the closing has not taken place, due to no one (sic) fault, the contract is void." Ms. Trivino then had her employer, a licensed real estate broker, write a letter dated February 3, 1988, to Mr. Kaye requesting Mr. Kaye to retain the $6,200 deposit pending a determination of the matter. She asserts that she made numerous further attempts to contact Mr. Kaye regarding this matter, but he would not return her calls. According to Mr. Kaye, he delivered the sales contract to a title company in early December, 1987, with the requests that the title company do a title check, that the mortgage holder be contacted, and that a mortgage assumption package for the buyers be obtained. Mr. Kaye states that he was thereafter informed by the title company that the mortgage holder would not allow an assumption of the mortgage without a paydown of about $3,000. Mr. Kaye states that he communicated to the buyers the problem with the mortgage assumption and also communicated Ms. Trivino's offer to take a second mortgage for $3,000. According to Mr. Kaye, the buyers did not want a second mortgage and did not feel that they could qualify for an assumption of the first mortgage because they were unemployed at the time. Instead, they wanted a return of their $6,200 deposit. Mr. Kaye felt that the sales contract had become void because of the inability of the buyers to assume the first mortgage, as provided in Paragraph 8 of the sales contract. Accordingly, he returned the $6,200 deposit to the buyers on January 10, 1988. He did not request Ms. Trivino's consent nor did he notify Ms. Trivino that he had refunded the deposit to the buyers because he felt that Ms. Trivino was fully aware that "the deal was dead."
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that the Administrative Complaint filed against the respondents be DISMISSED. Respectfully submitted and entered this 15th day of March, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of March, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 88-4062 The parties' proposed findings of fact have been fully considered and are accepted and/or incorporated in this Recommended Order, with the following exceptions: Petitioner 8. The evidence demonstrates that the amount of the deposit was $6,200 in lieu of $6,000. 13. Partially rejected based upon the seller's testimony that she spoke to Todd Kaye in respondent's offices on or about January 5, 1988. 15. Accepted with the addition of the fact that the respondent communicated this offer to the buyers. Respondent 4. The evidence demonstrates that the amount of the deposit was $6,200 in lieu of $6,000. 8. The date of "early December" is rejected as not established by competent, substantial evidence. 10. Rejected as not established by competent, substantial evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: James H. Gillis, Esquire DPR, Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Manuel M. Arvesu, Esquire 100 North Biscayne Blvd. Miami, Florida 33132 Darlene Keller, Executive Director DPR, Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 =================================================================
Findings Of Fact Robert Hartnett was at all times pertinent to this complaint a registered real estate broker. Bill Dew and Dave Allman sought to lease a specific piece of real property for business purposes. In this regard they contacted William Hartnett, who had previously leased a piece of real property which included the specific piece of property Messrs. Dew and Allman desired to lease. Messrs. Allman and Dew entered into an agreement to sublease a portion of the Hartnett leasehold. A contract was prepared by William Hartnett and delivered by Robert Hartnett to Dew and Allman, who executed the contract. Although there is conflicting testimony, the testimony of Robert Hartnett is accepted as the more accurate explanation of his role in the transaction. Robert Hartnett had no interest in William Hartnett's business venture or in the leasehold, and did not appear or function as a real estate broker in this transaction. The owner of the property, Mr. Grossinger, testified he agreed to lease the property to William Hartnett. Hartnett was permitted to occupy the premises and paid rent. William Hartnett prepared a written lease which was not signed by the owner, Mr. Grossinger. Grossinger terminated the agreement when Hartnett subleased the premises to Allman and Dew without notifying him and instituted legal action to evict William Hartnett. Under the circumstances, there was an oral lease between Hartnett and Grossinger. Messrs. Dew and Allman made arrangements with contractors to make modifications to the subleased premises, and the modifications were begun. These modifications were in part the cause for the owner terminating the lease with William Hartnett. Messrs. Dew and Allman or their agents did have occupancy of the premises.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law the Hearing Officer recommends that the Florida Real Estate Commission take no action against Respondent Robert Hartnett. DONE and ORDERED this 14th day of June, 1979, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Manuel E. Oliver, Esquire Florida Real Estate Commission 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Louis M. Jepeway, Esquire 619 Dade Federal Building 101 East Flagler Street Miami, Florida 33131
Findings Of Fact Roy Ahringer, hereinafter referred to as "Respondent" has held real estate broker-salesman license number 0158288 at all times material hereto. From approximately August 15, 1983 to November 20, 1983, and from approximately March 1, 1984 to April 30, 1984, Respondent was licensed and operated as a real estate salesman in the employ of Highlands Holiday Realty, Inc., a licensed brokerage Corporation. On or about August 11, 1983, Highlands Holiday Realty, Inc., obtained from Mildred M. Haydon, as owner, a six month listing to sell certain property designated as Lot 9, Block 353, Section 26 Lake Placid, at a price of "any reasonable cash offer". By the terms of this listing agreement, the listing would continue beyond the six month period "until this agreement is revoked by a ten day's written notice" delivered by the owner to Highlands Holiday Realty, Inc. There is no evidence that this listing agreement was ever revoked and it remained in effect during the time Respondent was employed at Highlands Holiday Realty, Inc. Respondent was therefore an agent for Mildred M. Haydon. While this listing agreement was in effect, Respondent obtained a sales contract on March 29, 1984, executed by Robert J. and Marjorie P. Mitchell, as purchasers, for the purchase of Mildred M. Haydon's Lot 9 at a total purchase price of $5000. On April 30, 1984, the Mitchells executed two checks totaling $5000 to Highlands Holiday Realty which were to be placed in a trust account for this transaction. The contract was initially prepared omitting the name and address of the seller but was later completed by Respondent by having a secretary at Highlands Holiday Realty Inc. type in the names of Roy Ahringer and May Ahringer as sellers. On March 31, 1984 Respondent and his wife, May Ahringer, executed a contract for sale and purchase of Mildred M. Haydon's Lot 9 for the purchase price of $2220. Mildred M. Haydon executed this contract for sale and purchase on April 4, 1984. Subsequently this transaction closed and Respondent, with his wife, purchased the subject property for $2220 on or about May 23 or 24, 1984. The evidence presented establishes that Respondent did not explain to the Mitchells or to Mildred M. Haydon that he would be purchasing the property for $2220 from Mildred M. Haydon and then reselling the property to the Mitchells for $5000. Mildred M. Hayden was not informed of the Mitchell's offer of $5000 for her lot prior to her sale of the lot to Respondent. It is Respondent's contention that he told the Mitchells he was having a problem with the lot owner and that he might have to buy it from her in order to be able to resell it to the Mitchells. However, no evidence supporting this assertion was presented by Respondent, and in any event there is no evidence that the Mitchells or Mildred M. Haydon knew about the difference in the purchase and resale prices which would have resulted from this transaction. When the circumstances surrounding this transaction became apparent to Ronald N. Weisser, broker and owner of Highlands Holiday Realty, Inc., he stopped the Ahringer-Mitchell transaction, and the $5000 paid by the Mitchells for this lot has been returned to them. Respondent still owns the subject property. Mildred M. Hayden was damaged in an amount of approximately $2780 due to Respondent's failure to present the Mitchells' offer to her. The Mitchells were damaged in an amount equal to the interest they were required to pay on money borrowed for the purchase price during the period when the funds were retained in a non-interest bearing escrow account. The parties were allowed to submit post-hearing proposed findings of fact pursuant to Section 120.57(1)(b)4, F.S. A ruling on each proposed finding has been made either directly or indirectly in this Recommended Order except where such proposed findings of fact have been rejected as subordinate, cumulative immaterial or unnecessary.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that a Final Order be issued suspending Respondent's license for a period of two (2) years and imposing an administrative fine in the amount of one thousand dollars ($1000). DONE and ENTERED this 10th day of June, 1985 at Tallahassee Florida. Hearings Hearings DONALD D. CONN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative this 10th day of June, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: James Gillis, Esquire Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Roy Ahringer 232 Harmony Avenue Lake Placid Florida 33852 Harold Huff, Executive Director Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Fred Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Salvatore A. Carpino, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Respondent's real estate broker's license should be disciplined based upon the allegations that Respondent is guilty of fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, false pretenses, dishonest dealing by trick, scheme, or device, culpable negligence or breach of trust in a business transaction, in violation of Section 475.25(1)(b) Florida Statutes. Whether Respondent's real estate broker's license should be disciplined based upon the allegation that Respondent is guilty of failure to account and deliver funds, in violation of Section 475.25(1)(d)1., Florida Statutes. Whether Respondent's real estate broker's license should be disciplined based upon the allegation that Respondent is guilty of failure to maintain trust funds in a real estate brokerage escrow bank account or some other proper depository until disbursement thereof was properly authorized, in violation of Section 475.005(1)(k), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a state government licensing and regulatory agency charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute Administrative Complaints pursuant to the laws of the State of Florida, in particular Section 20.165, Florida Statutes, Chapters 120, 455 and 475, Florida Statutes, and the rules promulgated pursuant thereto. Respondent Leslie L. White is now and was at all times material hereto a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida having been issued license number 0095441 in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. The last license issued to the Respondent was as a broker with an address of Les White Realty, 6313 Wynglow Lane, Orlando, Florida, 32818-1311. Respondent's license is currently under suspension for failing to pay a fine and failure to complete certain education courses. On or about September 28, 1993, Respondent negotiated a contract between himself, doing business as Les White Enterprises, as seller, and Charles and Greta White, as buyers, (no apparent relationship to Respondent) to purchase Lot Number 18, Whisper Ridge subdivision in Orange County, Florida and build a house thereon for the total sum of $79,000. Respondent prepared the contract, using the standard Contract for Sale and Purchase form approved by the Florida Association of Realtors and The Florida Bar. Les White Enterprises was listed as the "Seller" and Charles White and Greta White, his wife, were listed as "Buyers". The Buyers agreed to purchase Lot 18 and to have a house constructed on the site by the Seller. The Buyers agreed to seek "new financing at prevailing interest rates" in the amount of $75,550; put down a $2,000 deposit and pay an additional $1,450 at closing. The contract called for the deposit to be held in escrow by Les White Realty/Builders. The $2,000 deposit was paid in cash by the Buyers and given to Respondent. The Respondent did not place the $2,000 deposit in an escrow account contrary to the express terms of the contract. Respondent did not acknowledge receipt of the deposit in his capacity as a broker. At the time the contract was signed, the Buyers knew that the Respondent did not own or have title to Lot 18, and that the purchase price of the lot exceed the amount of the deposit. The Buyers consented to the Respondent using the funds to acquire the property. Respondent was unable to purchase Lot 18, and sought the Buyers' permission to purchase Lot 2 instead and construct a house on it in accordance with the parties' prior agreement. The Buyers reluctantly agreed. On February 18, 1994, Buyers gave Respondent a cashier's check for $1,200 for the purpose of clearing the land and beginning construction of a home for them on Lot 2. The funds were not placed in escrow. The Respondent utilized the funds received from the Buyers and acquired title to Lot 2 in his name alone on or about February 25, 1994. The Respondent cleared Lot 2 in preparation for construction, obtained building plans and applied for building permits in connection with building a house on said lot. Shortly thereafter, Respondent notified the Buyers that the private investors, who approved their loan application, had discontinued financing of the Respondent's construction loan and he was unable to construct the house. The transaction failed to close and the Buyers demanded that Respondent return the earnest money deposit. Respondent was unable to return to return the $3,200 earnest money deposit to the Buyers. Respondent filed for personal reorganization under Chapter 13 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. Throughout the course of this transaction, Buyers dealt with Respondent in his capacity as a broker/builder. In 1994 and 1995, the Florida Real Estate Commission found Respondent guilty of violating the provisions of Section 475.25(1)(b) and (1)(d)1., Florida Statutes on three occasions. Following the third offense, Respondent's license was suspended for six months and it is presently under suspension for failure to pay his administrative fines and complete other requirements of probation.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission issue and file a Final Order finding the Respondent guilty of violating Subsections 475.25(1)(b), (d)1., and (k), Florida Statutes; and guilty of having been found guilty for a second time (or more) of misconduct that warrants suspension, in violation of subsection 475.25.(1)(o), Florida Statutes; it is further RECOMMENDED that Respondent's licensed be revoked. DONE and ENTERED this 4th day of October, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of October, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: Daniel Villazon, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Frederick H. Wilsen, Esquire Gillis and Wilsen 1415 East Robinson Street, Suite B Orlando, Florida 32801 Lynda L. Goodgame, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Henry M. Solares Division Director Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802
