The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent, Zion's Hope, Inc., d/b/a Holy Land Experience (hereinafter "HLE"), discriminated against Petitioners, James Gantz and Bette Gantz, by refusing Petitioners entry into HLE due to the Gantzes's disability, i.e., being hard of hearing and requiring the service of hearing ear dogs.
Findings Of Fact Zion's Hope, Inc., is a Florida not-for-profit corporation formed in 1989. It is a religious entity with a Section 501(c)3 designation under the U.S. Tax Code as a bona fide charitable organization. HLE is a privately-owned religious theme park operated by Zion's Hope. Religious services are conducted at HLE seven days a week. HLE is located at 4655 Vineland Road, Orlando, Florida. The public, upon payment of an admission fee, is invited into HLE on a daily basis. James and Bette Gantz are an elderly married couple who reside for part of each year in North Port, Florida. Both James and Bette are hard of hearing and have suffered from this affliction for many years. James and Bette each have a certified hearing ear dog which accompanies them almost everywhere they go. The dogs were present at the final hearing. On March 19, 2010, James and Bette accompanied by their service dogs and Bette's sister, Lois Wilcox, decided to visit HLE. Upon arrival, they were told that the HLE parking lot was full, but that additional parking was available across the street. James dropped off Bette, the dogs, and Lois in front of the HLE entrance, then went to park the car across the street. When Bette, Lois, and the dogs approached the ticket window to purchase admission into HLE, they talked to one of the employees about the service dogs to make sure the dogs could accompany them inside. The employee opted to call her superior, Jane Wilcox (no relation to Lois), to make a determination about the dogs. Jane Wilcox testified that she approached Bette and Lois in the lobby area, i.e., an enclosed area akin to a hotel lobby, which housed the ticket windows. Bette and Lois said they were never inside a building at HLE; rather, the discussions that occurred happened outside on the sidewalk area. It seems most likely from the evidence that the conversation commenced inside the lobby and then continued outside. Jane Wilcox did a cursory examination of the dogs and decided they did not appear to be service dogs. She also determined that the dogs appeared to be "frisky" in nature and were not like other service dogs she had seen. It was her practice to make a determination as to whether an animal was a service animal or not by asking reasonable questions. This is the way she handles each of the 100 or so cases a year in which guests show up with animals. Jane Wilcox has not had any formal training from the Commission or other regulatory entity regarding service dogs. She was given on-the-job training by her predecessor and has studied written materials on the subject. Her experience in this area is somewhat extensive during her three and a-half year tenure at HLE. After Jane Wilcox made an initial visual determination that the dogs appeared to be pets, Bette attempted to advise her that the dogs were certified and had certification documents on the capes they were wearing. Bette and James had taken the dogs into numerous other businesses and had been asked many times for proof of the dogs' certification. Thus, they kept the certification documents on the dogs at all times. Jane Wilcox refused to look at the certification documents because she has been provided bogus certification documents on occasion. That being the case, she did not put any stock in documents that were presented to her by guests. Rather, it was her normal practice to ask questions of the owners and to visually examine the animals. Based on the answers and her observation, Jane Wilcox would come to a conclusion about the animal in question. The discussion between Jane Wilcox and Bette became somewhat heated once Jane Wilcox made her initial determination about the dogs. Bette was talking loudly, but she is prone to do that because of her hearing impairment. Jane Wilcox viewed Bette as being very excited and possibly offended by the refusal to admit the dogs into HLE. After a few moments, Jane Wilcox determined that communication with Bette had broken down to the point that further conversation was useless. At that point, she called for security assistance.1/ It appears that the matter could have been resolved to everyone's satisfaction had the conversation not degenerated into a contentious debate between the parties. However, it is impossible to ascertain from the facts submitted whether one party or the other was more responsible for the verbal melee. Therefore, no finding can be made as to that point. The security officer who arrived took Bette and Lois to his small security building, where they were joined by James. The security officer said that Jane Wilcox was within her rights to refuse their admission into HLE with the service dogs. He advised them that there was a facility nearby that would care for the dogs while the guests were at HLE. The security officer allegedly told the Gantzes that HLE was a private facility and not subject to federal or state law regarding disabled persons. He also supposedly said that HLE considers dogs like those belonging to the Gantzes as pets, rather than service animals. According to Bette, this "colored" security officer would not listen to her or allow her to talk. A Caucasian guard, however, allegedly told Bette that maybe the dogs should be allowed into HLE, but he was overruled by the first guard. The Gantzes then asked the security officer to call the local (Orlando) police, which he did. When the police officer arrived, he advised the Gantzes that he could not force HLE to admit the dogs, but that he would write up a report. The report written by the police officer indicates that "security officer Santis" called in the request for assistance. It is not clear from the evidence at final hearing which of the two aforementioned security officers was Santis. The incident narrative in the police report simply states: Contact was made with all parties. 'Gantz' were acc[ompanied] by certified service dogs for hearing along with proper documentation. Upon Mngt request to leave, did so without incident. The Gantzes and Lois Wilcox opted not to board the dogs at the nearby facility. Rather, they left HLE and, ultimately, filed a complaint against Zion's Hope with the Commission. HLE does have a policy of admitting service animals inside the attraction. However, as a private religious facility, it does not believe that it has to do so, i.e., it does not believe it is governed by the Americans with Disabilities Act. Of the 100 or so service animals appearing for admission each year, about 70 percent of them are admitted. The others are boarded or the owners opt not to enter HLE. HLE does have a strict policy disallowing pets from admission to the park. Inasmuch as Jane Wilcox found the animals with the Gantzes to be pets, they were denied admission on that basis.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the Petitions for Relief filed by James Gantz and Bette Gantz in their entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of March, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of March, 2011.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner in violation of the Fair Housing Act by refusing to allow her to keep a dog in her condominium as an accommodation.
Findings Of Fact On April 5, 2006, Petitioner purchased a condominium (hereinafter "condo") at Point East Three Condominium Association, Inc. She has resided in Unit N-508 continuously since she purchased the condo. Breziner was provided the Association's Declaration of Condominium and Rules and Regulations, which both prohibited unit owners from keeping pets in their units. Point East is the entity responsible for operating and managing the condo property in which Breziner's unit is located. Breziner signed the association rules when she moved into the condo. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Respondent had a no pets written policy. Section 10.3 of the Declaration states in relevant part: No animals, birds, fish, reptiles, amphibians or pets of any nature and description shall be raised, bred, or kept in any apartment, the limited common elements or the common elements. Point East's rules that Breziner signed state in relevant part: 6. I understand that there is a restriction on pets and that I may not bring a pet, nor may any guest, visitor or tenant bring a pet into POINT EAST THREE CONDOMINIUM nor acquire one, either temporarily or permanently after occupancy. Petitioner's son gave her an American Cocker Spaniel dog after she moved into the condo. She keeps the dog in her unit. The dog is named Oossa. Breziner took the dog to 10 classes for 10 weeks, and the dog was trained to be obedient, sit, to listen to her, to walk near her, and not to eat food from the street. Oossa received a diploma from the local Pet Smart store for completion of the training. Oossa did not receive any training as an emotional support animal and has not been trained to perform tasks to assist with a disability. However, Petitioner paid $107.00 to Goldstar German Shepherds: All Breed Dog Training & Service Dogs training facility in Nevada to receive a certificate that says Oossa is a service animal. The certificate states: Goldstar dog training is a private entity not affiliated with the Dept. of Justice or any other state or Federal Agency. Goldstar dog training is not empowered to make legal decisions pertaining to your rights. Should you encounter issues pertaining to access for your service animal, use the number above to contact the United States Department of Justice (Disability Rights Section). Breziner is a holocaust survivor and on July 10, 1998, she was robbed, beaten and left to die. The incident caused her to be unconscious for several days and have major surgery. From the assault, she also lost her business. On July 18, 2007, Petitioner by letter requested a meeting with Point East regarding her dog. She indicated that she had a doctor's note for the dog. On July 19, 2007, Breziner requested that Point East allow her to keep her dog as a service dog under Section 413.08, Florida Statutes. On September 6, 2007, Point East sent Petitioner a letter notifying her of a violation of Section 10.3 of the Declaration of Condominium and informed Petitioner that she needed to remove the dog. On September 28, 2008, Petitioner provided Point East with documentation asserting emotional and physical disabilities and a request to keep her dog as a reasonable accommodation. Petitioner wants to keep the dog because Oossa provides companionship and comfort, which makes Petitioner happy. In addition, the dog has motivated Breziner to be more active. Breziner has an emotional bond with her dog. Petitioner saw Dr. Judith Chavin on July 3, 2006, and was given a prescription that stated: "Please allow Ms. Lillian Breziner to have her dog at her home. The dog is beneficial to her health." Dr. Cauvin also wrote a letter on September 27, 2007, that stated that "[i]t would be tragic if Mrs. Breziner were to lose her dog. I believe that her depression would be worse and that would impact on her mental and physical well being." On July 10, 2008, Dr. Vindimir Derenoncount, a family medical doctor, filled out a Medical Certification form for Petitioner. He noted that "I am a Physician temporarily covering the clinic which Mrs. Breziner attends. The following information has been gathered from her chart . . ."suffers from chronic severe depression and anxiety . . . partially deaf in l[eft] ear."1 Derenoncount did not independently diagnose or evaluate Breziner. Marilyn Miller, Breziner's Holocaust Survivor Case Manager, has known Breziner for nine years. She visits Petitioner's home and tracks her status. She works with Breziner because she is a holocaust survivor. Miller testified that she does not diagnose patients because she is a social worker. However, she reviewed Breziner's records and testified that the records indicate that she has anxiety and depression. Breziner takes antidepressant and anxiety medicine daily prescribed by her primary care doctor. Prior to January 12, 2009, Breziner's dosage of Celexa prescription was 20mm. The doctor increased it on January 27, 2009, to 30mm and to 40mm on Febraury 12, 2009. On September 11, 2008, Dr. Jose Rivas did a psychiatric evaluation on Breziner. He referred Petitioner to Richard Walsh at Bayview Center for Mental Health, Inc., for individual counseling regarding her multiple losses. Walsh is a licensed clinical social worker but has no advanced degrees in medicine. He agrees with the multiple diagnoses Breziner received prior to seeing him of post traumatic stress syndrome, anxiety and depression. Breziner's depression and anxiety do not substantially limit any life activities. She goes everywhere and takes Oossa with her to stores and restaurants. Breziner is capable and performs all life activities she chooses. Oassa is Breziner's companion.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of April, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JUNE C. McKINNEY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of April, 2009.
The Issue Should Petitioner impose discipline against Respondent's Pari-Mutuel Wagering Occupational License, and other relief for alleged violation of Section 550.2415(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2005)?
Findings Of Fact Between May 24, 2005 and June 18, 2005, Respondent held a Pari-Mutuel Wagering Occupational License, number 1102016- 1021, issued by Petitioner. On May 25, 2005, Respondent was the trainer of record of a racing greyhound named "Lips Are Sealed." On May 25, 2005, "Lips Are Sealed" was entered, and finished first (1st), in the second (2nd) race of the performance at Pensacola Greyhound Track. Immediately following the second (2nd) race of the performance at Pensacola Greyhound Track on May 25, 2005, urine sample number 129287 was collected from "Lips Are Sealed." The University of Florida Racing Laboratory tested urine sample number 129287 and found it to contain Benzoylecgonine (a metabolite of Cocaine), and/or a derivative thereof. Benzoylecgonine (a metabolite of Cocaine), and/or a derivative thereof, is an impermissible substance, that was carried in the body of "Lips Are Sealed" while participating in the second (2nd) race of the performance at Pensacola Greyhound Track on May 25, 2005. On June 1, 2005, Respondent was the trainer of record of a racing greyhound named "Red Eyed Fever." On June 1, 2005, "Red Eyed Fever" was entered, and finished first (1st), in the fourth (4th) race of the performance at Pensacola Greyhound Track. Immediately following the fourth (4th) race of the performance at Pensacola Greyhound Track on June 1, 2005, urine sample number 129348 was collected from "Red Eyed Fever." The University of Florida Racing Laboratory tested urine sample number 129348 and found it to contain Benzoylecgonine (a metabolite of Cocaine), and/or a derivative thereof. Benzoylecgonine (a metabolite of Cocaine), and/or a derivative thereof, is an impermissible substance, that was carried in the body of "Red Eyed Fever" while participating in the fourth (4th) race of the performance at Pensacola Greyhound Track on June 1, 2005. On June 16, 2005, Respondent was the trainer of record of a racing greyhound named "Stubborn Kind." On June 16, 2005, "Stubborn Kind" was entered, and finished first (1st), in the first (1st) race of the performance at Pensacola Greyhound Track. Immediately after the first (1st) face of the performance at Pensacola Greyhound Track on June 16, 2005, urine sample number 129469 was collected from "Stubborn Kind." The University of Florida Racing Laboratory tested urine sample number 129469 and found it to contain Benzoylecgonine (a metabolite of Cocaine), and/or a derivative thereof. Benzoylecgonine (a metabolite of Cocaine), and/or a derivative thereof, is an impermissible substance, that was carried in the body of "Stubborn Kind" while participating in the first (1st) race of the performance at Pensacola Greyhound Track on June 16, 2005. On June 17, 2005, Respondent was the trainer of record of a racing greyhound named "Drinktil Hescute." On June 17, 2005, "Drinktil Hescute" was entered, and finished first (1st), in the fifth (5th) race of the performance at Pensacola Greyhound Track. Immediately following the fifth (5th) race of the performance at Pensacola Greyhound track on June 17, 2005, urine sample number 129479 was collected from "Drinktil Hescute." The University of Florida Racing Laboratory tested urine sample number 129479 and found it to contain Benzoylecgonine (a metabolite of Cocaine), and/or a derivative thereof. Benzoylecgonine (a metabolite of Cocaine), and/or a derivative thereof, is an impermissible substance, that was carried in the body of "Drinktill Hescute" while participating in the fifth (5th) race of the performance at Pensacola Greyhound Track on June 17, 2005.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and the conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered revoking the occupational license held by Respondent, imposing a $5,000.00 fine and requiring the return of the race purses. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of June, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CHARLES C. ADAMS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of June, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Stefan Thomas Hoffer, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Thomas M. Dudley, Sr. 327 Northeast 434 Street Old Town, Florida 32680 David J. Roberts, Director Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Josefina Tamayo, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202
The Issue The issues in this proceeding are whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice against Petitioner in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act, and whether Petitioner’s Complaint of Employment Discrimination was timely filed.
Findings Of Fact Respondent operates a retail store located in Panama City Beach, Florida. At the time, William Todd Collins was the store manager. Petitioner is female. Around October 2011, Petitioner was first employed with Respondent in Puerto Rico as a jewelry sales expert, Level II. In October 2012, she transferred to Respondent’s Panama City Beach store as a Level II, jewelry sales expert. Towards the beginning of August 2013, Petitioner learned that she was pregnant. Shortly thereafter, she started displaying symptoms of her pregnancy and experienced dizziness from not eating due to her pregnancy. She was terminated on October 25, 2013. During her employment with Respondent, Petitioner performed her duties well and was not disciplined by Respondent until the incident that led to her termination. Additionally, the evidence demonstrated that Petitioner’s pregnancy was accommodated by allowing her breaks and to sit down as needed. She was also allowed to eat snacks as needed. On October 22, 2013, the store had closed for the evening. Petitioner and other sales associates were putting merchandise away and closing down the registers throughout the store. While standing at one of the sales counters, Petitioner was feeling dizzy from not eating, picked up a Godiva chocolate bar from the store’s inventory, and began to eat it. The Department Supervisor Mindy Watson saw her eating the chocolate bar and asked Petitioner what she was doing. Petitioner responded, “what does it look like I’m doing. I’m eating a candy bar.” Thereafter, Ms. Watson told Petitioner she needed to pay $4 for the chocolate bar. A discussion about the price of the chocolate bar ensued but, contrary to Petitioner’s claim that she offered to pay for the chocolate bar, the evidence showed that she did not offer to pay for the chocolate bar. The evidence was clear that it would have been easy to open a sales register so that Petitioner could pay for the chocolate with her credit card, which she had with her. Instead, Petitioner walked away from Ms. Watson and said she was going to place the wrapper in the vault as a reminder to pay for the candy bar. When Petitioner walked away with the chocolate bar, Ms. Watson informed Human Resources Supervisor Kelly Black about Petitioner not paying for the chocolate bar. At about the same time, Ms. Black approached the area where Petitioner was and saw Customer Service Specialist Pamela Wells also approaching the same area. Ms. Black heard Ms. Wells say to Petitioner, “oh you have chocolate,” to which Petitioner responded, “yes, and I stole it.” Once all the associates were gone for the day, Ms. Watson and Ms. Black checked the vault and the Fine Jewelry trash cans, but could not find the chocolate wrapper. Ms. Black called Mr. Collins that night and reported the incident. Additionally, both Ms. Black and Ms. Watson sent an email to Mr. Collins detailing these events. The day after the incident, Mr. Collins began an investigation. During the investigation, he interviewed Ms. Watson and Ms. Black, as well as other associates who were working the evening of October 22, 2013. Mr. Collins also learned that Petitioner was seen eating a Godiva chocolate bar from the store’s inventory several weeks before the October 22, 2013, incident. With that report, Mr. Collins checked Petitioner’s associate files to see whether she had purchased any chocolate over the last three months and to determine if she had purchased the chocolate bar from October 22, 2013. There was no record of Petitioner paying for any chocolate. On October 25, 2013, at 9:30 a.m., Petitioner returned to work. She did not pay for the chocolate bar either before or during her shift, even though, contrary to her claim at hearing that she could not pay for the chocolate during work, she had the ability to do so. After she did not pay for the chocolate bar during her shift, around 3:30 p.m., Sarah Menchaca, the manager on duty, told Petitioner that Mr. Collins, the store manager, wanted to speak to her. Petitioner went into Mr. Collins’ office and was terminated due to Misuse of Property/Assets. At the time of her termination, Petitioner signed dismissal papers agreeing to a summary of the events on October 22, 2013, and the reason for her termination. The dismissal papers did not mention Petitioner’s pregnancy and dizziness as the reason she took the candy bar. However, at the same meeting, Petitioner also wrote another two-paged detailed statement where she mentioned her pregnancy, the dizziness, and the fact that she had not eaten for hours. As indicated, Petitioner was terminated on October 25, 2013, and clearly was aware she had suffered an adverse employment action on that day. Thereafter, Petitioner obtained a Technical Assistance Questionnaire from FCHR. The questionnaire makes it clear on page 1 that it is not a substitute for filing an actual complaint with FCHR in a timely manner. It states, “REMEMBER, a charge of employment discrimination must be filed within 365 days of the alleged act of discrimination”. (emphasis in original). In this case, it is clear that Petitioner’s complaint was filed with FCHR on October 27, 2014, 367 days after she was terminated by Respondent. As such, her claims are time-barred and should be dismissed as a matter of law. Even assuming that Petitioner’s complaint was timely, the better evidence establishes that Respondent terminated Petitioner’s employment after a reasonable investigation determined that she took a Godiva chocolate bar from inventory and failed to pay for it. Petitioner provided no testimony or other evidence that other store personnel were allowed to take chocolate bars and not pay for them or that such individuals were not terminated for theft. Additionally, there was no evidence that Respondent discriminated against women who were pregnant or had difficult pregnancies. In fact, the evidence showed that Respondent employed pregnant women and made accommodations for such pregnancies when needed. Given these facts, the Petition for Relief should be dismissed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission of Human Relations enter a final order finding Respondent not guilty of discrimination and dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of October, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of October, 2015. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) Merrill W. Daily, Esquire JC Penney Headquarters Mail Station 1111 6501 Legacy Drive Plano, Texas 75024 Robert L. Thirston, II, Esquire Thirston Law Firm Post Office Box 19617 Panama City Beach, Florida 32417 (eServed) Derek Benjamin Lipscombe, Esquire JC Penney Corporation 6501 Legacy Drive, MS 1108 Plano, Texas 75024 (eServed) Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission of Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed)
The Issue Whether the Petitioners' application for relicensure of their foster home should be approved.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this case, Charles and Linda Grillo ("Grillos") operated a foster home licensed by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services ("DHRS"). The DHRS is the state agency charged with responsibility for licensure of foster parents and foster homes and with regulating and enforcing the standards of care of children placed in such foster homes. The Grillos were first licensed as a foster home in 1989 and have been relicensed annually until, by letter dated August 11, 1992, the DHRS informed that the Grillos that their foster home would not be relicensed. The letter identified the specific grounds for the agency's decision. Prior to licensure as a foster parent, and annually thereafter, the DHRS requires that each person execute a document entitled "Agreement to Provide Foster Care for Dependent Children." The Grillos executed the document for all years during which they were licensed. Paragraph number 7 of the agreement provides that the foster parents "will cooperate in arrangements made by the Department for visits with the child by his parent(s) or other relative(s)." Paragraph number 8 of the agreement provides that the foster parents "will cooperate with the Department in plans for the child, such as adoption placement, transfer to another foster home, or return to parent(s) or other relative(s)." Paragraph number 9 of the agreement provides that the foster parents "will accept dependent children into our home for care only from the Department and will make no plans for boarding other children or adults." Paragraph number 10 of the agreement provides that the foster parents "will accept...board payment per month on behalf of the child in accordance with the Department's established payment schedule for dependent children." One of the reasons cited by the DHRS for the decision to deny the Grillos relicensure as a foster home was their "[f]ailure to timely inform HRS that a foster child (T.F., DOB: 11/3/87) had an accident and was taken to an emergency room for examination and treatment." On September 25, 1991, a foster child residing with the Grillos received minor scrapes when attempting to close an automobile door. The Grillos took the child to the emergency room for examination, but the examination revealed no serious trauma. On the evening of the incident and on subsequent days, Mrs. Grillo made repeated unsuccessful attempts to contact Mary Nunley (the child's case worker) at her office and her home in order to let an agency representative know about the incident. Mrs. Grillo left messages requesting that Ms. Nunley return the call, however the messages did not make clear the reason for the calls and did not indicate that the foster child had been injured and taken to the hospital. On October 17, 1991, Ms. Nunley visited the Grillos home and noticed that T.F.'s face was discolored as if it had been injured. Ms. Nunley inquired as to the cause and was told that the child had fallen on the driveway while closing the car door. Mrs. Grillo also suggested that the child had fallen while learning to swim in an unidentified pool. Ms. Nunley apparently asked no further questions related to the accident. There is evidence that another foster parent in close contact with Ms. Nunley often spoke, and on the day of the incident or immediately thereafter, informed Ms. Nunley of the injury to the boy. Ms. Nunley does not recall the conversations and testified that she was unaware of the child's examination at the emergency room until after a child neglect report was received and an investigation was initiated. The evidence fails to establish that the Grillos explicitly disclosed the details of the incident, including the examination at the hospital emergency room, to Ms. Nunley. Mrs. Grillo feared that the children (whom she hoped to adopt) would be removed from her home by the DHRS. The children were, in fact, subsequently removed from their home by a DHRS protective services investigator, apparently based, at least in part, on the failure to fully disclose the details of the accident of September 25. As further grounds for denial of the relicensure application, the DHRS states that the "[f]oster parents had a poor working relationship with the birth mother of one of their foster children (D.R., DOB: 8/2/89)". Because reunification of children with natural parents is the primary goal of foster care, it is important that licensed foster parents cooperate with the agency's plans for such reunification. There were instances when, during visitation between the birth mother and the child, the child would be removed from the mother and would be taken by one of the Grillos or their other children. The mother was occasionally denied the opportunity to feed or bathe the child, who she sometimes found in an unclean condition. On two separate occasions, one of the Grillos asked the birth mother for money, once for diapers and then to pay a utility bill after the Grillos electrical service was cut off. Although there is no evidence that the Grillos were not focused on what they believed to be the best interests of the child, they became too attached to the child. The Grillos were not cooperative with the child's birth mother and the DHRS plan to reunify the child with the birth mother, despite the fact that the birth mother complied with the requirements of the performance agreement which outlined the objectives which the birth mother was required to meet before the child could be returned and which was designed to permit her an opportunity to regain custody of the child. The DHRS letter, citing additional support for the denial of the relicensure application, states that "[y]ou allowed your adult son, Charles Grillo, Jr., to return to your home after being advised that you could not continue to be licensed if he resided in your home. In addition you have allowed numerous unrelated individuals to reside in your home without the knowledge and permission of HRS." The evidence establishes that the Grillos were told that DHRS officials were extremely concerned about the continued residence of their son Charles, Jr., in the home. Charles, Jr., had been involved in personal and legal difficulties which the DHRS asserted were not in the best interest of the foster children residing with the Grillos. There is no evidence which suggest that the DHRS position in the matter was unreasonable. Although Charles, Jr., initially moved from the residence, he subsequently returned. The Grillos did not notify the DHRS that he had again taken up residence in their home. The evidence is unclear as to if and when the Grillos were told that their foster home would not continue to be licensed if their son, Charles, Jr., resided in the structure. However, it is reasonable to expect, given the nature of the discussions which clearly did occur, that the Grillos were aware of the DHRS concern. The Grillos have now moved to one half of a duplex apartment, the other half of which will be occupied by their son. This arrangement does not constitute reasonable compliance with the DHRS policy. The evidence further establishes that the Grillos opened their doors to numerous neighborhood teenagers who were in need of shelter due to family turmoil. The Grillos also permitted an unrelated adult who had been involved in legal difficulties which the DHRS asserted were not in the best interest of the foster children to reside in their household. There is no evidence which suggest that the DHRS position in the matter was unreasonable. The DHRS asserted that their inability to control temporary residents with access to the home and its inhabitants adversely affected the DHRS ability to protect the foster children placed in the home. There is no evidence which suggest that the DHRS position in this matter was unreasonable. Further, the Grillos intend to continue to permit such teenage children to reside in their home when the Grillos see fit to do so. In the DHRS letter of denial, the agency further noted that "[p]ast circumstances show that there is a significant level of distrust between you and HRS. Constructive communication is difficult, if not impossible. However, it is not possible to fulfill the functions of substitute care parents without a good working relationship with HRS." There is evidence that a substantial level of mistrust exists between DHRS officials and the Grillos. Witnesses identified instances of miscommunication between the Grillos and the DHRS officials responsible for the foster care program. At hearing, such miscommunication continued to exist and indicates that reestablishment of trust is highly unlikely. Although the letter denying the application for relicensure cites specific violations of Florida Administrative Code provisions which the agency asserted warranted denial of the application, such rules were generally not in existence at the time of the alleged violations. However, the Grillos have clearly failed to comply with the requirements set forth in the provisions of the "Agreement to Provide Foster Care for Dependent Children" noted previously herein.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services enter a Final Order DENYING relicensure of the Grillo Foster Home. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 2nd day of March, 1993 in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of March, 1993. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert L Powell, Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John Slye, General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Charles & Linda Grillo 6677 Fiesta Way North Fort Myers, Florida 33919 Eugenie Rehak, Esquire DHRS District Eight Post Office Box 06085 Fort Myers, Florida 33906
The Issue The issue for consideration in this case is whether Respondent’s pari-mutual wagering occupational license number 1102786-1081 should be disciplined because of the matters alleged in the Administrative Complaint filed herein.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Pari-Mutual Wagering, was the state agency in Florida responsible for the licensing of racing dog kennel owners and trainers and the regulation of the pari-mutual dog racing industry of this state. Respondent, William Kohler, holds an unrestricted “U1” professional pari-mutual wagering occupational license, number 1102786-1081, and was, at all times pertinent, operating under that license as a greyhound trainer at the Sarasota Kennel Club, a pari-mutual wagering race grounds in Sarasota County, Florida. As a licensed trainer of greyhounds, Respondent was responsible for the custody, care, treatment and training of the greyhounds in his care, consistent with the mandate of the Florida Legislature relating to the humane treatment of animals as found in Section 550.2415, Florida Statutes. On or about February 25, 1996, Respondent and his assistant, Brad Adams, were dipping their dogs for flea infestation. During the course of the procedure, as Respondent was working with an animal by the name of Lisa’s Beauty, the dog became uncooperative and resisted being dipped. This procedure was being observed by Josephine Jenkins, also a licensed owner and trainer, who recalled seeing the animal careen off the fence surrounding the area and fall into the dip tank which contained a mix of water and chemicals intended to kill fleas. At hearing, Ms. Jenkins claimed she could not recall whether Respondent threw the dog against the fence or whether the animal got away from him. In a prior sworn statement made to Division investigators, however, she indicated that she saw Respondent hold the dog’s head under the dip and then beat it because it would not behave to his satisfaction. In her earlier statement, she related that she did not see Respondent throw the dog against the fence but only strike her with his open hand and throw her against the dip tub. In light of the consistency of her testimony it is found that Respondent did not throw the dog against the fence nor did he strike the dog with his fist but only with his open hand, and he did hold her head under the dip. In the opinion of Ms. Jenkins and Ms. Nelson, the weather was too cool for dog dipping on February 25, 1996. That same date, Ms. Jenkins also saw Respondent kick another dog which was in the turn out pen at the time. This kick was witnessed by Ms. Nelson who did not see any provocation for the kick. At the time, Respondent was wearing boots. Respondent denies abusing his dogs on the days in question or at any other time. He admits to fighting with his dog on February 25, 1996 because he felt it was necessary to treat them all for fleas which had come in on a new batch of dogs. Because of the infestation, he had to dip all the dogs. To leave one dog undipped would render the entire process worthless. All the dogs would be infested again in a short time. In order to dip the dog in question, he grabbed her by the collar and held her up against the fence so that he could spray her with a bomb. He admits he sprayed her ears but claims he covered her eyes and her mouth so the spray would not get inside. He admits to using sufficient force to overcome the animal’s resistance to being dipped. Respondent claims the weather was not inappropriate for bathing dogs. As he recalls, it was “barefoot and shorts” weather - somewhere around 65 to 70 degrees. Respondent also admits to breaking up a dog fight on February 25, 10996, but claims he did not intentionally kick a dog. He inserted his foot in amongst the dogs in an attempt to break up the fight, but he also claims he has never gone up to a dog and kicked it as discipline or in anger. Respondent claims he makes his living from training dogs and keeping them in good shape. He claims he cannot do that by abusing his dogs, but he admits he will use force to break up a dog fight. With regard to the dog in question, Lisa’s Beauty, she was examined by two veterinarians shortly after the alleged abuse, and neither found any evidence of mistreatment. Though this may indicate no noticeable damage was done, it does not establish that the misconduct alleged did not take place. Considering the testimony as a whole, the undersigned has considered the allegations by Respondent that the statement of Mr. Adams and the testimony of Ms. Nelson were colored by the fact that they were boy and girlfriend and Respondent had recently terminated Mr. Adams’ employment. However, it was evident that Ms. Jenkins’ testimony was given with great reluctance, and considering that she is a qualified and licensed trainer, her appraisal of the Respondent’s actions are given substantial weight. Whereas a layman might consider less than gentle treatment of an animal to be abuse, a trained professional has more insight into what is appropriate treatment, and testimony of such an individual which, as here, indicates abuse, cannot easily be disregarded. Taken together, the evidence of record shows that Respondent intentionally held the dog in question’s head under the surface of the solution, struck it on the head with his open hand, and kicked another dog in the stomach and ribs. Whereas the open-handed striking may not have caused unnecessary pain to the animals in issue, clearly the other actions did, and it is so found.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Division of pari-Mutual Wagering enter a final order suspending Respondent’s occupational license for a period of two weeks, and imposing an administrative fine of $200.00. DONE and ENTERED this 24th day of February, 1997, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6947 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of February, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: James D. Martin, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007 William Kohler 18456 Monet Avenue Port Charlotte, Florida 33948 Lynda L. Goodgame General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Deborah R. Miller Director Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Pari-Mutual Wagering 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue The two issues in this case are whether Respondent, as the trainer of record for two greyhounds; M's Shamrock, that first place finisher in the fourth race on November 7, 2001, and greyhound Lapislazuli, first place finisher in the fourteenth race on November 7, 2001, is legally responsible for the prohibited substance found in each greyhound's urine sample taken immediately after the races, and if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant and material to this proceeding, Petitioner, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Pari-mutuel Wagering (Division), created by Subsection 20.165(2)(f), Florida Statutes, is the agency responsible for regulation of the pari-mutuel wagering industry pursuant to Section 550.0251, Florida Statutes. At all times relevant and material to this proceeding, Respondent, Curtiss D. Hughes, was the holder of a pari-mutuel license issued by the Division. Sanford-Orlando Kennel Club is a permit holder authorized to conduct greyhound racing and pari-mutuel wagering in the State of Florida. On November 7, 2001, Respondent was the trainer for a racing greyhound named M's Shamrock that finished first in the fourth race of the evening performance at Sanford-Orlando Kennel Club on that date. Immediately after each race the greyhounds who finish in the win, place and show positions are taken to the "cooling off" area where urine samples are taken by the Kennel's veterinarian assistant and urine sample collector. On November 7, 2001, Brandy Glaspey, veterinarian assistant, collected the urine sample of greyhound, M's Shamrock, and assigned, for identification purposes, number 738627 to M's Shamrock's urine sample. Urine sample 738627 was shipped to the University of Florida Racing Laboratory, Gainesville, Florida, where under the supervision of Dr. Ian R. Tebbett, Ph.D., professor and director of the racing laboratory at the University of Florida and qualified as an expert in forensic toxicology, it tested positive for illegal substance. On December 21, 2001, Respondent was the trainer for a racing greyhound named "Lapislazuli," which finished first in the fourteenth race of the matinee performance at Sanford- Orlando Kennel Club. Immediately after the race a urine sample was collected from Lapislazuli by Brandy Glaspey, veterinarian assistant, and assigned sample number 788210 for identification purposes. Urine sample numbered 788210 was shipped to the University of Florida Racing Laboratory, tested, and found to contain Benzoylecgonine, a metabolite of Cocaine. Cocaine is a Class 1 drug according to the Association of Racing Commissioners International classification system. Respondent testified that he did not administer the drug cocaine to greyhound, Lapislazuli, and he had never been cited for any prior drug violation while holding a Florida occupational license. Respondent's defense to the administrative complaint (Election of Right) alleged a possible breach of the "chain of custody" (from the end of the race, to bringing dogs to the ginny pit, to sample collection, to sample labeling, to sample examination and sample results) and a breach and/or lack of kennel security. There was no material evidence presented of a specific breach of security.
The Issue This is a license discipline proceeding in which the Petitioner seeks to take disciplinary action against the Respondent on the basis of allegations that the Respondent has violated Section 550.105(6), Florida Statutes and Rule 61D-1.006(3)(a)2, Florida Administrative Code, by having unpaid financial obligations that directly relate to racing being conducted at a pari-mutual facility within this state.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this case, David Monaci, an individual, held three pari-mutuel wagering occupational licenses, to-wit: Thoroughbred Trainer, DPMW license number 1079030-3050; Authorized Agent, DPMW license number 1079030- 1047; and an Unrestricted "U1" Professional license, DPMW license number 1079030-1081. David Monaci has some form of interest in, or relationship with, a corporation that is named either David Monaci Stable Inc., or D. Monaci Stable, Inc. The nature and extent of David Monaci's interest in, or relationship with, that corporation is not revealed by the evidence in this case. 3/ At some time during 1993, David Monaci, acting on behalf of the corporation named David Monaci Stable, Inc., or D. Monaci Stable, Inc., entered into an agreement with the Country Western Store in Davie, Florida, pursuant to which the Country Western Store would supply food and other necessities for the race horses being handled by David Monaci at the Gulfstream Park horse race track. The food and other necessities supplied by the Country Western Store were invoiced to "David Monaci Stable, Inc.", at an address in New Jersey. After the invoices went unpaid for a number of months, the Country Western Store quit providing anything for the race horses being handled by David Monaci. Shortly thereafter, the Country Western Store filed a lawsuit in Circuit Court in Broward County, Florida, against David Monaci Stable, Inc., seeking to recover the amount owed for the food and necessities it had furnished for race horses handled by David Monaci. On September 8, 1994, a Final Judgement was entered in favor of the Country Western Store and against David Monaci Stable, Inc. The Final Judgement provides, in pertinent part: 2. Plaintiff does have and recover from the Defendant, DAVID MONACI STABLE ,INC., the sum of $20,013.46 for damages, $224.76 for costs, $605.00 for attorneys fees, and $915.19 for interest, for all of which let execution issue. As of the date of the formal hearing in this case, nothing has been paid towards the satisfaction of the Final Judgement described immediately above. The Country Western Store did not sue David Monaci individually. The Country Western Store does not have a Final Judgement against David Monaci individually. The extent, if any, to which David Monaci in his individual capacity may or may not be responsible for the debts of David Monaci Stable, Inc., is not revealed by the evidence in this case.
Recommendation On the basis of all of the foregoing, it is Recommended that a Final Order be issued in this case dismissing all charges in the Administrative Complaint on the grounds that the evidence is insufficient to prove that the license holder, David Monaci, is responsible for any of the debts or obligations. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of August, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of August, 1996.
The Issue Whether Petitioner's application for a foster care license should be granted.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Joan Henry (Ms. Henry), was licensed by Respondent, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS), as a foster parent in 1992. She continued to be licensed until sometime in 1994. The foster home was officially closed September 19, 1994. She applied for relicensure as a foster parent, and her application was denied by HRS. During the time relevant to this proceeding, Ms. Henry cared for five foster children, B.W., S.W., S.A.W., T.W., and T.B. Ms. Henry's adult daughter, Jiliane, lived with Ms. Henry during this time. Jiliane took care of the children while Ms. Henry worked during the day. HRS was aware of this arrangement. On May 25, 1994, Ms. Henry signed an Agreement to Provide Substitute Care for Dependent Children for the five children in her care. Ms. Henry agreed to abide by the following provisions of the agreement. 2. We are fully and directly responsible to the department for the care of the child. * * * 6. We will not give the child into the care or physical custody of any other person(s), including the natural parent(s), without the consent of a representative of the department. * * * 11. We will notify the department immediately of any change in our address, employment, living arrangements, family composition, or law enforcement involvement. * * * 15. We will comply with all requirements for a licensed substitute care home as prescribed by the department. In late June, 1994 or early July, 1994, Ms. Henry received a call that her mother's best friend had died in London, England. Ms. Henry went to London. Ms. Henry could not get in touch with an HRS representative and asked Jiliane to notify HRS that she had been called out of the country unexpectedly. Jiliane failed to notify HRS. Ms. Henry was in London for several weeks. On July 5, 1994, HRS received a call that the Ms. Henry's children had been watching pornographic films in the Henry home and that the children were exhibiting inappropriate sexual behavior. A child abuse investigator visited the Henry household and found that Ms. Henry was away in London and that the children had been left in the care of Jiliane. Prior to leaving for London, Ms. Henry was unaware that Jiliane had pornographic films in the house. Ms. Henry did observe B.W. watching television in Jiliane's room. When Ms. Henry would go by the room, B.W. would quickly switch channels. This happened on numerous occasions. Ms. Henry was "very concerned" and "suspicious" about B.W. changing the channels each time Ms. Henry walked by, but she took no action to investigate the cause of B.W.'s behavior. After Ms. Henry returned from London, she learned that Jiliane did have some pornographic films which she kept in her room. B.W. had access to the films and did view them. Rosalyn Jackson is a licensed foster care parent. She was interested in adopting at least one of the children in Ms. Henry's care. She visited the children in Ms. Henry's home and would take the children to her home on weekends. While the children were in her home, she observed that the children used vulgar language. S.A.W. would try to kiss or touch Ms. Jackson's rear when Ms. Jackson would bend over to pick up something. B.W. would go into the bathroom and fondle herself. T.W. and S.A.W. would try to fondle each other. At that time B.W. was nine years old, S.A.W. was four, and T.W. was three. The children were removed from Ms. Henry's home. Two of the children were placed with Ms. Jackson's sister and one of the children was placed with Ms. Jackson. Ms. Jackson described the children as undernourished. T.W.'s hair was unkempt and dirty and looked as if it had not been cut or washed for a long time. When Ms. Jackson's sister had T.W.'s hair cut and washed, it was discovered that T.W.'s scalp was covered with a fungus. T.W.'s ears contained "black gook" which appeared to have been in his ears for quite a while. S.A.W. was wearing shoes that were two sizes too small.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered denying Joan Henry's application for a foster parent license. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of September, 1995, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of September, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 95-3042 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes (1993), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. Paragraphs 1-2: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 3: Rejected as not supported by the evidence. Ms. Henry testified that B.W. would switch channels not Jiliane. Paragraphs 4-5: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 6: Accepted in substance as it applies to the child, B.W. Rejected as to the other children because the only evidence presented was hearsay. Paragraphs 7-8: Accepted in substance. COPIES FURNISHED: Colleen Farnsworth, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 401 Northwest 2nd Avenue, Suite N-1014 Miami, Florida 33128 Ms. Joan Henry 18601 Northwest 22 Court Miami, Florida 33056 Robert L. Powell, Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Kim Tucker General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
