The Issue Whether the Order of Summary Suspension of Respondent's license as a greyhound trainer filed September 20, 2002, is appropriate.
Findings Of Fact The Department presented the laboratory reports from the University of Florida, College of Veterinary Medicine, Racing Laboratory, showing positive test results in seven samples for Benzoylecgonine, a metabolite of cocaine. Cocaine is a topical anesthetic and a Class 1 drug. The Benzoylecgonine was found in the following samples: 865286, 865667, 865724, 865725, 889275, 889359, and 889492. The Department presented documentation establishing that all the samples were taken from greyhounds that raced at Naples-Fort Myers Greyhound Track, identified as Track 142. Petrillo was the trainer for the greyhounds at the time the samples were taken and, as the owner's witness, witnessed the taking of the samples after each greyhound had completed its race. Petrillo was issued a greyhound trainer's license, number 1558181, by the Department on May 4, 2002. Petrillo denied that he administered the drug to the animals. According to his testimony, others may have had access to the greyhounds prior to the races in which the dogs participated.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered continuing the summary suspension of Steven M. Petrillo's license until the entry of a final order on the pending administrative complaints. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of October, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of October, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph M. Helton, Jr., Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Steven M. Petrillo 17401 Butler Road Fort Myers, Florida 33912 Hardy L. Roberts, III, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 David J. Roberts, Director Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue Should Petitioner impose discipline against Respondent's Pari-Mutuel Wagering Occupational License, and other relief for alleged violation of Section 550.2415(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2005)?
Findings Of Fact Between May 24, 2005 and June 18, 2005, Respondent held a Pari-Mutuel Wagering Occupational License, number 1102016- 1021, issued by Petitioner. On May 25, 2005, Respondent was the trainer of record of a racing greyhound named "Lips Are Sealed." On May 25, 2005, "Lips Are Sealed" was entered, and finished first (1st), in the second (2nd) race of the performance at Pensacola Greyhound Track. Immediately following the second (2nd) race of the performance at Pensacola Greyhound Track on May 25, 2005, urine sample number 129287 was collected from "Lips Are Sealed." The University of Florida Racing Laboratory tested urine sample number 129287 and found it to contain Benzoylecgonine (a metabolite of Cocaine), and/or a derivative thereof. Benzoylecgonine (a metabolite of Cocaine), and/or a derivative thereof, is an impermissible substance, that was carried in the body of "Lips Are Sealed" while participating in the second (2nd) race of the performance at Pensacola Greyhound Track on May 25, 2005. On June 1, 2005, Respondent was the trainer of record of a racing greyhound named "Red Eyed Fever." On June 1, 2005, "Red Eyed Fever" was entered, and finished first (1st), in the fourth (4th) race of the performance at Pensacola Greyhound Track. Immediately following the fourth (4th) race of the performance at Pensacola Greyhound Track on June 1, 2005, urine sample number 129348 was collected from "Red Eyed Fever." The University of Florida Racing Laboratory tested urine sample number 129348 and found it to contain Benzoylecgonine (a metabolite of Cocaine), and/or a derivative thereof. Benzoylecgonine (a metabolite of Cocaine), and/or a derivative thereof, is an impermissible substance, that was carried in the body of "Red Eyed Fever" while participating in the fourth (4th) race of the performance at Pensacola Greyhound Track on June 1, 2005. On June 16, 2005, Respondent was the trainer of record of a racing greyhound named "Stubborn Kind." On June 16, 2005, "Stubborn Kind" was entered, and finished first (1st), in the first (1st) race of the performance at Pensacola Greyhound Track. Immediately after the first (1st) face of the performance at Pensacola Greyhound Track on June 16, 2005, urine sample number 129469 was collected from "Stubborn Kind." The University of Florida Racing Laboratory tested urine sample number 129469 and found it to contain Benzoylecgonine (a metabolite of Cocaine), and/or a derivative thereof. Benzoylecgonine (a metabolite of Cocaine), and/or a derivative thereof, is an impermissible substance, that was carried in the body of "Stubborn Kind" while participating in the first (1st) race of the performance at Pensacola Greyhound Track on June 16, 2005. On June 17, 2005, Respondent was the trainer of record of a racing greyhound named "Drinktil Hescute." On June 17, 2005, "Drinktil Hescute" was entered, and finished first (1st), in the fifth (5th) race of the performance at Pensacola Greyhound Track. Immediately following the fifth (5th) race of the performance at Pensacola Greyhound track on June 17, 2005, urine sample number 129479 was collected from "Drinktil Hescute." The University of Florida Racing Laboratory tested urine sample number 129479 and found it to contain Benzoylecgonine (a metabolite of Cocaine), and/or a derivative thereof. Benzoylecgonine (a metabolite of Cocaine), and/or a derivative thereof, is an impermissible substance, that was carried in the body of "Drinktill Hescute" while participating in the fifth (5th) race of the performance at Pensacola Greyhound Track on June 17, 2005.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and the conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered revoking the occupational license held by Respondent, imposing a $5,000.00 fine and requiring the return of the race purses. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of June, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CHARLES C. ADAMS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of June, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Stefan Thomas Hoffer, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Thomas M. Dudley, Sr. 327 Northeast 434 Street Old Town, Florida 32680 David J. Roberts, Director Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Josefina Tamayo, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202
The Issue The issues in this proceeding are whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice against Petitioner in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act, and whether Petitioner’s Complaint of Employment Discrimination was timely filed.
Findings Of Fact Respondent operates a retail store located in Panama City Beach, Florida. At the time, William Todd Collins was the store manager. Petitioner is female. Around October 2011, Petitioner was first employed with Respondent in Puerto Rico as a jewelry sales expert, Level II. In October 2012, she transferred to Respondent’s Panama City Beach store as a Level II, jewelry sales expert. Towards the beginning of August 2013, Petitioner learned that she was pregnant. Shortly thereafter, she started displaying symptoms of her pregnancy and experienced dizziness from not eating due to her pregnancy. She was terminated on October 25, 2013. During her employment with Respondent, Petitioner performed her duties well and was not disciplined by Respondent until the incident that led to her termination. Additionally, the evidence demonstrated that Petitioner’s pregnancy was accommodated by allowing her breaks and to sit down as needed. She was also allowed to eat snacks as needed. On October 22, 2013, the store had closed for the evening. Petitioner and other sales associates were putting merchandise away and closing down the registers throughout the store. While standing at one of the sales counters, Petitioner was feeling dizzy from not eating, picked up a Godiva chocolate bar from the store’s inventory, and began to eat it. The Department Supervisor Mindy Watson saw her eating the chocolate bar and asked Petitioner what she was doing. Petitioner responded, “what does it look like I’m doing. I’m eating a candy bar.” Thereafter, Ms. Watson told Petitioner she needed to pay $4 for the chocolate bar. A discussion about the price of the chocolate bar ensued but, contrary to Petitioner’s claim that she offered to pay for the chocolate bar, the evidence showed that she did not offer to pay for the chocolate bar. The evidence was clear that it would have been easy to open a sales register so that Petitioner could pay for the chocolate with her credit card, which she had with her. Instead, Petitioner walked away from Ms. Watson and said she was going to place the wrapper in the vault as a reminder to pay for the candy bar. When Petitioner walked away with the chocolate bar, Ms. Watson informed Human Resources Supervisor Kelly Black about Petitioner not paying for the chocolate bar. At about the same time, Ms. Black approached the area where Petitioner was and saw Customer Service Specialist Pamela Wells also approaching the same area. Ms. Black heard Ms. Wells say to Petitioner, “oh you have chocolate,” to which Petitioner responded, “yes, and I stole it.” Once all the associates were gone for the day, Ms. Watson and Ms. Black checked the vault and the Fine Jewelry trash cans, but could not find the chocolate wrapper. Ms. Black called Mr. Collins that night and reported the incident. Additionally, both Ms. Black and Ms. Watson sent an email to Mr. Collins detailing these events. The day after the incident, Mr. Collins began an investigation. During the investigation, he interviewed Ms. Watson and Ms. Black, as well as other associates who were working the evening of October 22, 2013. Mr. Collins also learned that Petitioner was seen eating a Godiva chocolate bar from the store’s inventory several weeks before the October 22, 2013, incident. With that report, Mr. Collins checked Petitioner’s associate files to see whether she had purchased any chocolate over the last three months and to determine if she had purchased the chocolate bar from October 22, 2013. There was no record of Petitioner paying for any chocolate. On October 25, 2013, at 9:30 a.m., Petitioner returned to work. She did not pay for the chocolate bar either before or during her shift, even though, contrary to her claim at hearing that she could not pay for the chocolate during work, she had the ability to do so. After she did not pay for the chocolate bar during her shift, around 3:30 p.m., Sarah Menchaca, the manager on duty, told Petitioner that Mr. Collins, the store manager, wanted to speak to her. Petitioner went into Mr. Collins’ office and was terminated due to Misuse of Property/Assets. At the time of her termination, Petitioner signed dismissal papers agreeing to a summary of the events on October 22, 2013, and the reason for her termination. The dismissal papers did not mention Petitioner’s pregnancy and dizziness as the reason she took the candy bar. However, at the same meeting, Petitioner also wrote another two-paged detailed statement where she mentioned her pregnancy, the dizziness, and the fact that she had not eaten for hours. As indicated, Petitioner was terminated on October 25, 2013, and clearly was aware she had suffered an adverse employment action on that day. Thereafter, Petitioner obtained a Technical Assistance Questionnaire from FCHR. The questionnaire makes it clear on page 1 that it is not a substitute for filing an actual complaint with FCHR in a timely manner. It states, “REMEMBER, a charge of employment discrimination must be filed within 365 days of the alleged act of discrimination”. (emphasis in original). In this case, it is clear that Petitioner’s complaint was filed with FCHR on October 27, 2014, 367 days after she was terminated by Respondent. As such, her claims are time-barred and should be dismissed as a matter of law. Even assuming that Petitioner’s complaint was timely, the better evidence establishes that Respondent terminated Petitioner’s employment after a reasonable investigation determined that she took a Godiva chocolate bar from inventory and failed to pay for it. Petitioner provided no testimony or other evidence that other store personnel were allowed to take chocolate bars and not pay for them or that such individuals were not terminated for theft. Additionally, there was no evidence that Respondent discriminated against women who were pregnant or had difficult pregnancies. In fact, the evidence showed that Respondent employed pregnant women and made accommodations for such pregnancies when needed. Given these facts, the Petition for Relief should be dismissed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission of Human Relations enter a final order finding Respondent not guilty of discrimination and dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of October, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of October, 2015. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) Merrill W. Daily, Esquire JC Penney Headquarters Mail Station 1111 6501 Legacy Drive Plano, Texas 75024 Robert L. Thirston, II, Esquire Thirston Law Firm Post Office Box 19617 Panama City Beach, Florida 32417 (eServed) Derek Benjamin Lipscombe, Esquire JC Penney Corporation 6501 Legacy Drive, MS 1108 Plano, Texas 75024 (eServed) Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission of Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed)
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent, Zion's Hope, Inc., d/b/a Holy Land Experience (hereinafter "HLE"), discriminated against Petitioners, James Gantz and Bette Gantz, by refusing Petitioners entry into HLE due to the Gantzes's disability, i.e., being hard of hearing and requiring the service of hearing ear dogs.
Findings Of Fact Zion's Hope, Inc., is a Florida not-for-profit corporation formed in 1989. It is a religious entity with a Section 501(c)3 designation under the U.S. Tax Code as a bona fide charitable organization. HLE is a privately-owned religious theme park operated by Zion's Hope. Religious services are conducted at HLE seven days a week. HLE is located at 4655 Vineland Road, Orlando, Florida. The public, upon payment of an admission fee, is invited into HLE on a daily basis. James and Bette Gantz are an elderly married couple who reside for part of each year in North Port, Florida. Both James and Bette are hard of hearing and have suffered from this affliction for many years. James and Bette each have a certified hearing ear dog which accompanies them almost everywhere they go. The dogs were present at the final hearing. On March 19, 2010, James and Bette accompanied by their service dogs and Bette's sister, Lois Wilcox, decided to visit HLE. Upon arrival, they were told that the HLE parking lot was full, but that additional parking was available across the street. James dropped off Bette, the dogs, and Lois in front of the HLE entrance, then went to park the car across the street. When Bette, Lois, and the dogs approached the ticket window to purchase admission into HLE, they talked to one of the employees about the service dogs to make sure the dogs could accompany them inside. The employee opted to call her superior, Jane Wilcox (no relation to Lois), to make a determination about the dogs. Jane Wilcox testified that she approached Bette and Lois in the lobby area, i.e., an enclosed area akin to a hotel lobby, which housed the ticket windows. Bette and Lois said they were never inside a building at HLE; rather, the discussions that occurred happened outside on the sidewalk area. It seems most likely from the evidence that the conversation commenced inside the lobby and then continued outside. Jane Wilcox did a cursory examination of the dogs and decided they did not appear to be service dogs. She also determined that the dogs appeared to be "frisky" in nature and were not like other service dogs she had seen. It was her practice to make a determination as to whether an animal was a service animal or not by asking reasonable questions. This is the way she handles each of the 100 or so cases a year in which guests show up with animals. Jane Wilcox has not had any formal training from the Commission or other regulatory entity regarding service dogs. She was given on-the-job training by her predecessor and has studied written materials on the subject. Her experience in this area is somewhat extensive during her three and a-half year tenure at HLE. After Jane Wilcox made an initial visual determination that the dogs appeared to be pets, Bette attempted to advise her that the dogs were certified and had certification documents on the capes they were wearing. Bette and James had taken the dogs into numerous other businesses and had been asked many times for proof of the dogs' certification. Thus, they kept the certification documents on the dogs at all times. Jane Wilcox refused to look at the certification documents because she has been provided bogus certification documents on occasion. That being the case, she did not put any stock in documents that were presented to her by guests. Rather, it was her normal practice to ask questions of the owners and to visually examine the animals. Based on the answers and her observation, Jane Wilcox would come to a conclusion about the animal in question. The discussion between Jane Wilcox and Bette became somewhat heated once Jane Wilcox made her initial determination about the dogs. Bette was talking loudly, but she is prone to do that because of her hearing impairment. Jane Wilcox viewed Bette as being very excited and possibly offended by the refusal to admit the dogs into HLE. After a few moments, Jane Wilcox determined that communication with Bette had broken down to the point that further conversation was useless. At that point, she called for security assistance.1/ It appears that the matter could have been resolved to everyone's satisfaction had the conversation not degenerated into a contentious debate between the parties. However, it is impossible to ascertain from the facts submitted whether one party or the other was more responsible for the verbal melee. Therefore, no finding can be made as to that point. The security officer who arrived took Bette and Lois to his small security building, where they were joined by James. The security officer said that Jane Wilcox was within her rights to refuse their admission into HLE with the service dogs. He advised them that there was a facility nearby that would care for the dogs while the guests were at HLE. The security officer allegedly told the Gantzes that HLE was a private facility and not subject to federal or state law regarding disabled persons. He also supposedly said that HLE considers dogs like those belonging to the Gantzes as pets, rather than service animals. According to Bette, this "colored" security officer would not listen to her or allow her to talk. A Caucasian guard, however, allegedly told Bette that maybe the dogs should be allowed into HLE, but he was overruled by the first guard. The Gantzes then asked the security officer to call the local (Orlando) police, which he did. When the police officer arrived, he advised the Gantzes that he could not force HLE to admit the dogs, but that he would write up a report. The report written by the police officer indicates that "security officer Santis" called in the request for assistance. It is not clear from the evidence at final hearing which of the two aforementioned security officers was Santis. The incident narrative in the police report simply states: Contact was made with all parties. 'Gantz' were acc[ompanied] by certified service dogs for hearing along with proper documentation. Upon Mngt request to leave, did so without incident. The Gantzes and Lois Wilcox opted not to board the dogs at the nearby facility. Rather, they left HLE and, ultimately, filed a complaint against Zion's Hope with the Commission. HLE does have a policy of admitting service animals inside the attraction. However, as a private religious facility, it does not believe that it has to do so, i.e., it does not believe it is governed by the Americans with Disabilities Act. Of the 100 or so service animals appearing for admission each year, about 70 percent of them are admitted. The others are boarded or the owners opt not to enter HLE. HLE does have a strict policy disallowing pets from admission to the park. Inasmuch as Jane Wilcox found the animals with the Gantzes to be pets, they were denied admission on that basis.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the Petitions for Relief filed by James Gantz and Bette Gantz in their entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of March, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of March, 2011.
The Issue Whether Respondents discriminated and retaliated against Petitioner because of her disability, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act; and, if so, the relief to which Petitioner is entitled. More specifically, the issues raised in this case are (1) whether Petitioner’s dog was a “service animal” pursuant to section 413.08, Florida Statutes (2018)1/; (2) whether Respondents took adverse action against Petitioner because of her disability; and (3) whether Respondents retaliated against Petitioner by not renewing her lease after she filed a housing discrimination complaint.
Findings Of Fact The parties stipulated at the final hearing that Petitioner suffers from anxiety and neck issues; and she qualifies as a person who is disabled for the purposes of the Florida FHA. Parties and Property Respondent Pelican Bay is a residential community owned and operated by Sun Homes. Respondent Cheryl Merrifield is the manager of Pelican Bay and an employee of Sun Homes. On June 24, 2016, Petitioner entered into a Manufactured Home Option to Purchase Agreement with Sun Homes (Agreement). The Agreement gave Petitioner a two-year period to lease the manufactured home located on Lot 56 of the Pelican Bay residential community. The Agreement allows the purchase of the home, but not the Lot in Pelican Bay. The Agreement contained a “rent to own” component which also allowed Petitioner to be credited 50% of her first year’s lease payments, and 25% of her second year’s lease payments towards the purchase of the manufactured home. Under the terms of the Agreement, after the first two years, the Petitioner would not accrue any credits toward the purchase of the home. The Agreement clearly anticipated that if Petitioner was to exercise the option to purchase, she would do so within two years. The Agreement refers to separate “Home Lease” and “Site Lease” agreements, but neither was admitted into evidence. Petitioner moved into the property in July 2016 with her five-pound Chihuahua, Buttons. At the time she moved into Pelican Bay, Petitioner informed Respondents she suffered from anxiety and needed Buttons for psychological and emotional support. As a result Pelican Bay waived the pet deposit and fees for Button. Petitioner claims she was discriminated against because she had a service dog and cites the following incidents: (1) in July 2016, she was prohibited from bringing Buttons into the Pelican Bay Clubhouse (Clubhouse) during a Fourth of July neighborhood party; (2) in November 2016, she was told that Buttons could not be in the kitchen or on the furniture in the Clubhouse and must be on a leash and controlled at all times during a Thanksgiving event; and (3) she was harassed by her neighbors and Pelican Bay staff for having the dog in the pool area. Petitioner also alleges she was retaliated against for filing a housing discrimination complaint when Pelican Bay did not renew her lease in July 2018. Respondents dispute Petitioner’s version of the facts and deny that their actions were discriminatory. Buttons As an initial matter, there is a factual dispute as to whether Buttons is a “service animal” for the purposes of the Florida FHA. Although it is unclear when Buttons became her service animal, Petitioner had Buttons as a pet prior to being prescribed a service animal for her anxiety by her psychologist, Dr. Donna Marks. Dr. Marks is certified in addiction therapy, psychoanalysis, and Gestalt psychology. She has no training in orthopedics or treating back and neck injuries. Dr. Marks has been treating Petitioner for anxiety intermittently since 2009. In 2014, Petitioner began regular twice a week therapy sessions with Dr. Marks. Thereafter, Dr. Marks prescribed a “psychological service animal” for Petitioner’s anxiety disorder. In a letter dated January 21, 2016, to allow Buttons to ride on an airplane, Dr. Marks wrote: Ms. Taylor has been seen by me and I am familiar with her history and with function limitations and needs imposed by an anxiety order. In order to help alleviate these difficulties and to enhance her ability to function independently, I have prescribed Ms. Taylor to obtain a psychological service animal. The presence of this animal is necessary for her emotional health because it will mitigate the symptoms she experiences and a preferable alterative to medication. (emphasis added). Later, after Petitioner moved into Pelican Bay, Dr. Marks changed her prescription for Petitioner from a “psychological service animal” to a “service animal.” Although no written prescription of this change was admitted into evidence, Dr. Marks claimed she made this change due to Petitioner’s neck and back surgeries. On cross-examination, however, Dr. Marks admitted she altered the prescription for Petitioner’s convenience. Petitioner had reported to her that she was having difficulty at Pelican Bay and was not allowed to take Buttons to neighborhood events. Dr. Marks felt a “service animal” would have more access than an “emotional support animal.” When asked what service Buttons provides or tasks Buttons performs for Petitioner, both Petitioner and Dr. Marks testified Buttons calms Petitioner and keeps her from becoming anxious. In addition, Petitioner testified she has difficulty turning her neck and needs Buttons to warn Petitioner when people are approaching and warn people not to come to close to her. Buttons does this by barking. Buttons did not go through any professional training to learn to keep Petitioner calm or how to bark. Dr. Marks was not involved in training Buttons, made no recommendations on how Buttons should be trained, and did not know of a training protocol for teaching animals anxiety-reducing techniques or conduct. Petitioner claimed she trained Buttons by giving it treats when it behaved the way she wanted, but admits she did not follow any specialized training program. Buttons is registered with the United States Animal Registry (USAR) as an “Emotional Support Dog” and a “Service Dog.” Based on her USAR identification and letters from Dr. Marks, Buttons has been allowed to accompany Petitioner at restaurants, the hospital, and on airplanes. Petitioner, however, provided no evidence of the requirements for registering Buttons with the USAR registry. For example, there was no evidence of an USAR application or questionnaire; nor was there evidence Buttons had been evaluated or tested by USAR as part of the registration process.3/ As explained below, the undersigned finds Buttons is not a “service dog” for purposes of the Florida FHA. Fourth of July In early July 2016, a Fourth of July potluck celebration was held in the Clubhouse. When Petitioner arrived at the Clubhouse with her potluck contribution she was told by Reni Thompson that she could not bring Buttons into the area where the food was being served. Upon hearing this, Petitioner immediately left the Clubhouse and did not participate in the event. The uncontroverted evidence established the celebration was not sponsored by Pelican Bay, nor was staff in attendance. Instead it was arranged by the Pelican Bay Home Owner’s Association (HOA). Although Petitioner testified Ms. Thompson told her she was an HOA board member, Ms. Merrifield testified Ms. Thompson was not on the HOA board, nor was Ms. Thompson a Pelican Bay employee. Other than Petitioner’s hearsay there is no evidence that Ms. Thompson was a board member. Moreover, the HOA was not affiliated with or managed by Pelican Bay, nor were its board members employees of Pelican Bay. As such, any conduct by Ms. Thompson cannot be imputed onto Pelican Bay. Regardless, when Ms. Merrifield received Petitioner’s complaint about what had occurred at the Fourth of July incident, she immediately arranged a meeting with Petitioner. Ms. Merrifield also met separately with Ms. Thompson to inform Ms. Thompson that Petitioner should be allowed in the Clubhouse with Buttons. The undersigned finds Respondents are not liable for Ms. Thompson’s conduct, and took corrective measures once it learned of the incident. Thanksgiving Restrictions on Buttons On November 1, 2017, Ms. Merrifield sent an email titled “Thanksgiving Dinner Nov. 23” to the residents of Pelican Bay. That email stated as follows: Attached to this email is what Sandy Weidner is posting in the Clubhouse today. If anyone is interested please go and sign up. She also has a list of what will be needed if anyone wants to help with the side dishes. The email then listed the side dishes that were needed and contact information for Sandy Weidner for any questions. The evidence established the event was not sponsored by Pelican Bay (although it was contributing the turkey) and Ms. Weidner was not a Pelican Bay employee. Instead of contacting Ms. Weidner, Petitioner emailed Ms. Merrifield and asked, Cheryl, Is this an Event that Buttons, “My Service Dog” and I will be welcomed to without anyone rejecting us or harassment?” Ms. Merrifield replied, In response to your request we understand your dog is an emotional support animal. It may be with you in the clubhouse. It may not go in the kitchen, it may not be put on furniture. It must be on a leash and controlled at all times. It is unclear whether this response deterred Petitioner from attending the Thanksgiving event. Nonetheless, the undersigned finds Ms. Merrifield’s actions did not constitute a violation of the Florida FHA. Pool Incidents In July 2017, Pelican Bay staff received a complaint from residents that Buttons was in the community pool, in violation of the community pool rules. Later, Ms. Merrifield spoke to Petitioner who admitted she had taken Buttons in the pool. Ms. Merrifield told Petitioner Buttons was not allowed inside the pool and should not be left in the pool area unrestrained. Petitioner later researched the issue and agreed she would not take Buttons in the pool in the future. In August 2017, Josephine Hillier, a Sun Homes employee, received another complaint from residents that Buttons was in the pool. When Ms. Hillier investigated the complaint she did not see the dog in the pool, but did find Petitioner with Buttons in the pool area. At the time, Petitioner denied Buttons was in the pool and claimed Ms. Hillier’s questioning was harassment in violation of housing discrimination laws. At the hearing, Petitioner testified that after researching and learning Buttons could not be in the pool, she continued to sit in the pool with Buttons on her shoulder. Petitioner did not consider this to be a violation of the pool rules as long as Buttons was not in the water. She also allowed Buttons to sit on the pool furniture unrestrained while she was in the pool, because her veterinarian told her Buttons was too small for a leash. Regardless, Pelican Bay took no further action against Petitioner regarding Buttons being in the pool. Petitioner complains Respondents repeatedly questioned her about Buttons being in the pool. Ms. Merrifield testified she was aware of two complaints of Petitioner letting Buttons in the pool; Ms. Hillier testified she was aware of two complaints about Buttons being in the pool, one of which she investigated. The undersigned finds that although Petitioner may have been approached by residents with complaints about Buttons, Respondents only spoke with her about Buttons being in the pool twice. The undersigned finds Pelican Bay’s conduct in questioning Petitioner about Buttons being in the pool, and warning her Buttons must be restrained did not constitute harassment. As explained below, this was justified under the circumstances. Non-Renewal of Purchase Agreement On March 20, 2018, Sun Homes sent an unsigned form letter to Petitioner stating her lease would not be renewed and that she would be required to vacate the property on or before June 30, 2018. Petitioner believes she received this letter because she filed a complaint of housing discrimination. The Agreement allowing the option to purchase the home anticipates a lease period of two years, although a longer period is not prohibited. Respondents asked Petitioner after the first year if she was planning to exercise her option to buy the home. At that time, June 2017, she declined because she felt it was too expensive and did not make financial sense. Petitioner did not take any steps toward exercising her option to purchase the home at the end of the second year because she was recovering from neck and back surgeries, her son was living with her, and she was not financially able to purchase it. Ms. Merrifield testified that it was common business practice to not allow renters to remain in Pelican Bay for more than two years. Sun Homes’ business model was to sell the manufactured homes; it was not interested in long-term rental relationships. The evidence established Petitioner was not the only resident that received the form non-renewal letter. The renters in the homes on Lot 48 and Lot 30 also received similar letters. Ms. Merrifield was unaware of whether these other residents had disabilities, but neither had made any kind of housing complaints. Based on the evidence and testimony presented at the final hearing, Petitioner did not demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Respondents discriminated against her based on her disability or retaliated in violation of the FHA.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding that Respondents, Pelican Bay Communities, LLC, and Cheryl Merrifield, did not commit a discriminatory housing practice against Petitioner, Paula C. Taylor, and dismiss her Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of November, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HETAL DESAI Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of November, 2018.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner in violation of the Fair Housing Act by refusing to allow her to keep a dog in her condominium as an accommodation.
Findings Of Fact On April 5, 2006, Petitioner purchased a condominium (hereinafter "condo") at Point East Three Condominium Association, Inc. She has resided in Unit N-508 continuously since she purchased the condo. Breziner was provided the Association's Declaration of Condominium and Rules and Regulations, which both prohibited unit owners from keeping pets in their units. Point East is the entity responsible for operating and managing the condo property in which Breziner's unit is located. Breziner signed the association rules when she moved into the condo. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Respondent had a no pets written policy. Section 10.3 of the Declaration states in relevant part: No animals, birds, fish, reptiles, amphibians or pets of any nature and description shall be raised, bred, or kept in any apartment, the limited common elements or the common elements. Point East's rules that Breziner signed state in relevant part: 6. I understand that there is a restriction on pets and that I may not bring a pet, nor may any guest, visitor or tenant bring a pet into POINT EAST THREE CONDOMINIUM nor acquire one, either temporarily or permanently after occupancy. Petitioner's son gave her an American Cocker Spaniel dog after she moved into the condo. She keeps the dog in her unit. The dog is named Oossa. Breziner took the dog to 10 classes for 10 weeks, and the dog was trained to be obedient, sit, to listen to her, to walk near her, and not to eat food from the street. Oossa received a diploma from the local Pet Smart store for completion of the training. Oossa did not receive any training as an emotional support animal and has not been trained to perform tasks to assist with a disability. However, Petitioner paid $107.00 to Goldstar German Shepherds: All Breed Dog Training & Service Dogs training facility in Nevada to receive a certificate that says Oossa is a service animal. The certificate states: Goldstar dog training is a private entity not affiliated with the Dept. of Justice or any other state or Federal Agency. Goldstar dog training is not empowered to make legal decisions pertaining to your rights. Should you encounter issues pertaining to access for your service animal, use the number above to contact the United States Department of Justice (Disability Rights Section). Breziner is a holocaust survivor and on July 10, 1998, she was robbed, beaten and left to die. The incident caused her to be unconscious for several days and have major surgery. From the assault, she also lost her business. On July 18, 2007, Petitioner by letter requested a meeting with Point East regarding her dog. She indicated that she had a doctor's note for the dog. On July 19, 2007, Breziner requested that Point East allow her to keep her dog as a service dog under Section 413.08, Florida Statutes. On September 6, 2007, Point East sent Petitioner a letter notifying her of a violation of Section 10.3 of the Declaration of Condominium and informed Petitioner that she needed to remove the dog. On September 28, 2008, Petitioner provided Point East with documentation asserting emotional and physical disabilities and a request to keep her dog as a reasonable accommodation. Petitioner wants to keep the dog because Oossa provides companionship and comfort, which makes Petitioner happy. In addition, the dog has motivated Breziner to be more active. Breziner has an emotional bond with her dog. Petitioner saw Dr. Judith Chavin on July 3, 2006, and was given a prescription that stated: "Please allow Ms. Lillian Breziner to have her dog at her home. The dog is beneficial to her health." Dr. Cauvin also wrote a letter on September 27, 2007, that stated that "[i]t would be tragic if Mrs. Breziner were to lose her dog. I believe that her depression would be worse and that would impact on her mental and physical well being." On July 10, 2008, Dr. Vindimir Derenoncount, a family medical doctor, filled out a Medical Certification form for Petitioner. He noted that "I am a Physician temporarily covering the clinic which Mrs. Breziner attends. The following information has been gathered from her chart . . ."suffers from chronic severe depression and anxiety . . . partially deaf in l[eft] ear."1 Derenoncount did not independently diagnose or evaluate Breziner. Marilyn Miller, Breziner's Holocaust Survivor Case Manager, has known Breziner for nine years. She visits Petitioner's home and tracks her status. She works with Breziner because she is a holocaust survivor. Miller testified that she does not diagnose patients because she is a social worker. However, she reviewed Breziner's records and testified that the records indicate that she has anxiety and depression. Breziner takes antidepressant and anxiety medicine daily prescribed by her primary care doctor. Prior to January 12, 2009, Breziner's dosage of Celexa prescription was 20mm. The doctor increased it on January 27, 2009, to 30mm and to 40mm on Febraury 12, 2009. On September 11, 2008, Dr. Jose Rivas did a psychiatric evaluation on Breziner. He referred Petitioner to Richard Walsh at Bayview Center for Mental Health, Inc., for individual counseling regarding her multiple losses. Walsh is a licensed clinical social worker but has no advanced degrees in medicine. He agrees with the multiple diagnoses Breziner received prior to seeing him of post traumatic stress syndrome, anxiety and depression. Breziner's depression and anxiety do not substantially limit any life activities. She goes everywhere and takes Oossa with her to stores and restaurants. Breziner is capable and performs all life activities she chooses. Oassa is Breziner's companion.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of April, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JUNE C. McKINNEY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of April, 2009.
