The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Respondent's employment by the School Board of Miami-Dade County, Florida, should be terminated.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, the Respondent was employed by the Petitioner as a bus driver and was assigned to Central East Regional Transportation Center (Central East), which is within the school district of Miami-Dade County. The Respondent is a member of the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Local 1184 (AFSCME) bargaining unit. At all times material, Randy Mazie (Mazie) was the Director of Central East. Juan Perez was the Coordinator of Central East (reporting to Mazie), and Frank Hernandez and Florence Birch were Administrative Assistants (reporting to Perez and Mazie). When a bus driver is absent without advance notice, it often has a substantial impact on the work site. Absenteeism of bus drivers causes delays on that particular route and typically puts stress on both students and school site employees. On a number of occasions, Mazie personally had conversations with the Respondent about her poor attendance record and the consequences of her absenteeism. In addition, employees, including the Respondent, received training about attendance policies and procedures. In March 2000, the Respondent was referred to the Employee Assistance Program. On April 28, 2000, the Petitioner received notification that the Respondent declined to participate in the Employee Assistance Program. The Petitioner accommodated the Respondent by approving leaves of absence for the Respondent during the following time- frames: January 21, 1998, through April 1, 1998; April 2, 1998, through April 1, 1999; November 29, 1999, through January 2, 2000; January 3, 2000, through January 31, 2000; and February 25, 2000, through March 3, 2000. On November 19, 1999, School Board administrators held a conference with the Respondent to address the Respondent’s excessive absenteeism. At the conference the Respondent was advised that she had been absent a total of 52.5 days since April 1999, including 18 days of unauthorized absences. In addition, the Respondent was advised that continued absenteeism would result in a second conference. At the conference, the Respondent was asked if there were any mitigating circumstances for her absences. The Respondent did not provide any explanation for her unauthorized absences. Shortly thereafter, the Respondent received a written summary of the conference. On March 2, 2000, School Board administrators held a second conference with the Respondent to address the Respondent’s continued excessive absenteeism. At the conference, the Respondent was advised that she had been absent without authorization for 6.5 days since the first conference. In addition, the Respondent was advised that she had been absent a total of 74 days during the past 12-month period, including 24.5 days of unauthorized absences. The Respondent was instructed that continued absenteeism would result in a third and final conference, which could result in termination of her employment. At the second conference, the Respondent was asked if there were any mitigating circumstances for her absences. The Respondent did not provide any explanation for her unauthorized absences. Shortly thereafter, the Respondent received a written summary of the second conference. On May 31, 2000, School Board administrators sent a memorandum to the Respondent regarding the Respondent’s continued absenteeism. In the memorandum, the Respondent was directed to report to duty daily, as all of her leave time had been exhausted. The Respondent refused to sign a copy of the memorandum. Notwithstanding the above directive, the Respondent’s excessive absenteeism continued. From November 30, 2000, to December 19, 2000, the Respondent was absent from work. On January 4, 2001, the Respondent presented the School Board Administrators with a medical document signed by the Respondent’s physician purporting to excuse the Respondent from work from November 27, 2000, through January 3, 2001. On January 6, 2001, the School Board Administrators discovered that the Respondent’s physician did not excuse the Respondent from work from November 27, 2000, through January 3, 2001, and that the medical document provided by the Respondent had been falsified. On January 22, 2001, School Board administrators held a third conference with the Respondent to address the Respondent’s continued excessive absenteeism and submission of fraudulent medical documentation. At the conference, the administrators advised the Respondent that she had been absent a total of 38 days during the past 12-month period. The Respondent was also informed that, since March 2000, she had been absent without authorization for 18 days. At the conference, the Respondent was afforded an opportunity to refute the charges that she had submitted fraudulent medical documentation. Despite this opportunity, the Respondent did not refute the charges or provide an explanation. Thereafter, the Respondent received a written summary of the conference; however, the Respondent refused to sign the summary. On February 22, 2001, the Office of Professional Standards held a conference with the Respondent to address the Respondent’s excessive absenteeism and submission of fraudulent medical documentation. At the conference, the Respondent was afforded an opportunity to refute the charges that she had submitted fraudulent medical documentation. Despite this opportunity, the Respondent did not refute the charges or provide an explanation. The Respondent received a written summary of the conference. During the hearing, the Respondent testified that she went to the emergency room (but was not admitted to the hospital) during the time-frame from November 30, 2000, through December 19, 2000. The emergency room personnel told her to follow up with her physician. Notwithstanding these directions, the Respondent admitted that she failed to follow up with her physician. During the time-frame from November 30, 2000, through December 19, 2000, School Board administrators directed the Respondent to submit documents indicating that she was under medical care. Thereafter, the Respondent falsified the medical note. The Respondent also generally testified during the hearing that she was undergoing counseling by a social worker for stress related to her personal life. However, the Respondent never offered as evidence any records from the social worker, and Mazie testified that she never had a conversation with him about meeting with a social worker. Moreover, the Respondent admitted that the School Board Administrators authorized absences related to her daughter’s pregnancy/illness, as well as housing problems she encountered during a storm. In addition, the Respondent conceded that the School Board never denied the Respondent a requested leave of absence. Between April 1, 1999, and November 19, 1999, the Respondent was absent without authorization for 20.5 days. During that same time-frame, the Respondent was absent with authorization (and without pay) for 20 days. Between November 19, 1999, and March 2, 2000, the Respondent was absent without authorization for 8.5 days. Between March 3, 1999, and March 2, 2000, the Respondent was absent without authorization for 28.5 days. During that same time-frame, the Respondent was absent with authorization (and without pay) for 51 days. Between January 23, 2000, and January 22, 2001, the Respondent was absent without authorization for 22 days. During that same time-frame, the Respondent was absent with authorization (and without pay) for 12 days. Between March 3, 2000, and March 3, 2001, the Respondent was absent without authorization for 21 days. During that same time-frame, the Respondent was absent with authorization (and without pay) for 8 days. Between November 30, 2000, and December 19, 2000, the Respondent was absent without authorization for 14 consecutive days. Based on the Respondent’s leave history records, she was absent without authorization, between March 3, 2000, and March 3, 2001, as follows: March 10, 2000 (½ day); April 10, 2000 (½ day); April 13, 2000 (½ day); May 30, 2000 (½ day); May 31, 2000 (½ day); June 2, 2000 (½ day); July 18, 2000 (½ day); July 21, 2000 (½ day); November 30, 2000 (1 day); December 1, 2000 (1 day); December 4, 2000 (1 day); December 5, 2000 (1 day); December 6, 2000 (1 day); December 7, 2000 (1 day); December 8, 2000 (1 day); December 11, 2000 (1 day); December 12, 2000 (1 day); December 13, 2000 (1 day); December 14, 2000 (1 day); December 15, 2000 (1 day); December 18, 2000 (1 day); December 19, 2000 (1 day); January 10, 2001 (½ day); January 11, 2001 (½ day); February 15, 2001 (1 day); February 22, 2001 (½ day); and February 27, 2001 (½ day). As a result of the Respondent's conduct, School Board administrators recommended dismissal of the Respondent. Thereafter, the Petitioner suspended the Respondent without pay and initiated these dismissal proceedings.
Recommendation On the basis of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered terminating the Respondent's employment and denying all other relief sought by the Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of March, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of March, 2002.
The Issue Whether Respondent's employment by the Petitioner should be terminated.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to this case, Hodgson was employed by the School Board as a custodian. She has been so employed since 1981. In 1999, Hodgson became deficient in the most basic element of a custodian's job--the duty to show up for work at her assigned school, in this case Miami Park Elementary (Miami Park). By July 1, 1999, Hodgson had accumulated ten unauthorized absences, enough to draw the attention of Principal Henry N. Crawford, Jr. (Crawford), and enough, standing alone, to justify termination under Petitioner's contract with the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Local 1184 (AFSCME) the bargaining unit to which Hodgson belongs. At this time Crawford did not seek to terminate Hodgson's employment, although he could have. Instead, he counseled her regarding the School Board's reasonable and lawful requirement that she, like all employees, had the responsibility to inform the school's administration in advance of an absence, or as soon as practicable in an emergency. Nevertheless, on July 30, 1999, Hodgson left work at 6:46 p.m. instead of at the end of her shift at 11:30 p.m. Her area of the building was not cleaned properly and she was docked one half day's pay. For a considerable time after that incident, Hodgson's attendance improved. But in March 2000, her attendance again became a problem. Hodgson was absent 13 times between March 3 and March 20. Crawford again attempted to work with Hodgson, authorizing six of those absences. At the same time, he informed her of the obvious: that this level of absenteeism impeded the effective operation of the worksite. Crawford encouraged Hodgson to consider taking advantage of the School Board's generous leave-of-absence policy in order to preserve her good standing at work while taking the time necessary to deal with the issues which were causing her to miss work. Respondent neither replied to Crawford's proposal that she consider a leave of absence nor improved upon her by now sporadic attendance. Thereafter, Crawford requested assistance from OPS. On April 11, 2000, OPS wrote to advise Hodgson that she was absent without authority and that her absences were deemed abandonment of position. She was directed to provide written notification to OPS to review her situation or her employment would be terminated by the School Board. For a short time, Hodgson took this threat seriously enough to improve her attendance, but by now Crawford had a much shorter fuse with respect to Hodgson's disregard for workplace policies regarding attendance. When, on May 11, 2000, Respondent was an hour and a half late to work, Crawford sent her a memorandum the next day, again reminding her that she must report to work on time and that she was to report any absences or tardiness to school administration in a timely manner. Crawford wrote two additional warning memos to Hodgson in June 2000, but was unsuccessful in persuading her to improve her attendance or to discuss her situation, including the advisability of a leave of absence, in a forthright manner. Finally, Crawford directed Respondent to attend a disciplinary conference known as a Conference for the Record (CFR) on July 3, 2000, to discuss her absenteeism. At the CFR, Crawford again gave Respondent face-to-face directives to be present at work and when absences were unavoidable, to call the school in a timely manner. Two additional formal disciplinary conferences were held between the July 3 CFR and Respondent's termination. Crawford, having been unsuccessful in his efforts to generate honest communication with Hodgson about why a 20-year employee had stopped fulfilling her most basic job requirement, attempted to refer her to the School Board's Employee Assistance Program (EAP). EAP offers employees assistance in resolving personal problems in a manner which allows the employee to also fulfill work obligations. If such accommodations cannot be made, EAP counselors assist in helping the employee separate from his employment in a manner which does not blemish his resume. Supervisors such as Crawford may make referrals to the EAP whenever they feel an employee can and should be helped, and EAP services are also available for the asking to any School Board employee who wishes to take advantage of those services. No one is required to use EAP services, and Hodgson declined to do so. Hodgson's by now chronic absenteeism persisted. Her colleagues on the custodial staff tried, some more graciously than others, to cover her assigned duties, but Crawford was fielding an increasing number of complaints from teachers regarding their classrooms not being serviced. Morale among custodians declined in the face of the administration's seeming inability to control Hodgson. During the last two years of Hodgson's employment, she had 175 unauthorized absences. Eighty-one of those occurred in the last 12 months prior to her termination. By way of defense, Hodgson said that she developed diabetes in the past three years and that most of her absences were medically necessary. She offered voluminous stacks of paper which she claims document legitimate medical problems which made it impossible for her to work. Additional exhibits relate to a young relative she felt obligated to drive to medical appointments during her work hours. These exhibits prove little, if anything. Individually and collectively they are neither self-authenticating nor self-explanatory, and many had not been previously provided to Crawford in connection with her failure to appear for work, nor disclosed to the School Board in compliance with the pre-hearing order in this case. But even if these documents had been properly authenticated and would have in fact justified an extended medical and/or family hardship leave of absence, the evidence fails to establish that they were tendered to Crawford at the time Hodgson was absent. Hodgson did not seek medical or disability leave, either individually or through her collective bargaining unit. Hodgson offered no testimony to contradict the School Board's evidence regarding the dozens of occasions on which she failed to show up for work. Neither did she offer any evidence that her repeated failure to comply with attendance policies was justified due to any misconduct on the part of any of Petitioner's employees. At all times material to this case, the School Board was in compliance with applicable statutory and contractual provisions concerning employee discipline and termination with respect to Hodgson.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered, sustaining Respondent's suspension without pay and terminating her employment. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of June, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. FLORENCE SNYDER RIVAS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of June, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Janice E. Hodgson 14020 Northeast 3rd Court, No. 5 North Miami, Florida 33161 Madelyn P. Schere, Esquire Miami-Dade County School Board 1450 Northeast Second Avenue Suite 400 Miami, Florida 33132 Merrett R. Stierheim, Interim Superintendent Miami-Dade County School Board 1450 Northeast Second Avenue Suite 912 Miami, Florida 33132 Honorable Charlie Crist, Commissioner Department of Education The Capitol, Plaza Level 08 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 James A. Robinson, General Counsel Department of Education The Capitol, Plaza Level 08 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Juvenile Welfare Board of Pinellas County (Petitioner) should have treated John Bucci as a mandatory member of the Florida Retirement System from April 1984, through July 1988, and therefore, should be required to submit retroactive adjustments for retirement and social security based upon his earnings during this period.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is an independent taxing district created by Special Act in 1945 to provide funding in Pinellas County for services to children. It timely filed a request for hearing on the Respondent's decision to consider John Bucci a mandatory member of the Florida Retirement System (FRS) from April 1984, through July 1988. The position of the Petitioner is that John Bucci was an independent contractor, and therefore, should not be considered a mandatory member of the FRS. Bucci worked as a janitor for the Petitioner between April 1984, and July 1988. He opened the building in the morning, deactivated the building alarm, made coffee, cleaned the employee restrooms, emptied waste baskets, vacuumed and dusted. From time to time, he also painted and made minor repairs in the building, and took mail to the post office when directed to do so. While Bucci did not receive daily assignments, his duties were routine and had been worked out with representatives of Petitioner when he was initially employed. If there were problems with his cleaning, he would be told to reclean an area, and he was expected to take care of the problem as soon as possible. The Petitioner provided Bucci with all supplies and equipment necessary to do his job. While he worked with the Petitioner, Bucci did not have a written contract, but rather, he had an annually renewable verbal contract. He was paid on an hourly basis, and submitted a monthly record of hours worked each day, which was reviewed and approved for payment by Petitioner. Bucci received annual increases from the Petitioner, but did not negotiate these increases. The Petitioner simply gave him what it considered to be a cost of living increase each year. According to Petitioner, Bucci was not in an established position, and therefore, did not receive fringe benefits. At the time, Bucci was the only person working with the Petitioner which it considered to be an independent contractor. Subsequent to his leaving, Petitioner bid, and now has a written contract for janitorial services with an agency in Pinellas County that offers employment opportunities to retarded citizens. That agency provides all equipment and supplies necessary for janitorial duties. After several counseling sessions with Carole Gunnels, Petitioner's operations manager at the time, Bucci was terminated because of continued problems with his work. Thereafter, it was determined by the Division of Unemployment Compensation, Department of Labor and Employment Security, that he qualified for unemployment benefits. The Comptroller's Office of the State of Florida has issued Memorandum No. 7 (1988-89) regarding determinations of a person's status as an independent contractor or employee. In pertinent part, that Memorandum sets forth twenty factors to be considered in determining if sufficient control is present to establish an employee-employer relationship, and states: The Internal Revenue Service has provided guidance in making this determination in Revenue Ruling 87-41. It provides generally, that the relationship of employer and employee exists when the person or persons for whom the services are performed have the right to control and direct the individual who performs the services, not only as to the result to be accomplished by the work but also as to the details and means by which that result is accomplished. That is, an employee is subject to the will and control of the employer not only as to what shall be done but as to how it shall be done. In this connection, it is not necessary that the employer actually direct and control the manner in which the services are performed; it is sufficient if the employer has the right to do so. The Respondent has adopted Rule 22B-6.001(15), Florida Administrative Code, which defines the term "independent contractor" as an individual who: agrees to provide certain services; works according to his own methods; is not subject to the control of his employer, except as to the results of his work; and does not receive the fringe benefits offered by the employer. A consultant or independent contractor usually: is compensated from another salaries and wages account; does not earn annual or sick leave; and may frequently do a majority of his work in his own office rather than on the employer's premises. In order to determine if Bucci should have been considered to be an employee of the Petitioner, rather than an independent contractor, the Respondent provided Petitioner with a copy of its Employment Relationship Questionnaire, which Petitioner completed on or about April 10, 1989. The information provided by Petitioner on this Questionnaire indicates that Bucci was required to follow regular routines or schedules, the Petitioner could change the methods by which he performed his work or otherwise direct him in the performance of his duties, the work was to be performed by Bucci personally, the Petitioner could discharge him at any time, and he could quit at any time. It was also indicated that Bucci was not filling a regularly established position, but was retained under an oral contract to perform personal services. Bucci did not work full-time with the Petitioner. Rather, he worked an average of between 4 to 5 hours a day with the Petitioner. On rare occasion during the time he was employed with the Petitioner, he did take other part-time cleaning jobs with other employers. However, he did not have any occupational license as a janitorial service, did not advertise as such, had no yellow page listing for janitorial services, and did not have any equipment or supplies necessary to carry out his duties, other than what Petitioner provided him. The characteristics, terms and conditions of Bucci's employment with the Petitioner from April 1984, through July 1988, support the Respondent's determination that he was an employee, rather than an independent contractor, and that he was, therefore, a mandatory member of the FRS.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is recommended that the Respondent enter a Final Order concluding that John Bucci was a mandatory member of the FRS, and as such denying Petitioner's request for relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of November, 1989 in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD D. CONN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of November, 1989. APPENDIX (DOAH CASE NO. 89-4067) Rulings on the Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact: Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Rejected as purely procedural matters and not a relevant proposed finding of fact. 3-4. Rejected in Findings of Fact 2-5, 8-10. The Respondent did not timely file Proposed Findings of Fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Terry A. Smiljanich, Esquire P. O. Box 1578 St. Petersburg, FL 33731 Stanley M. Danek, Esquire General Counsel's Office 440 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 Aletta L. Shutes, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 Augustus Aikens, Jr., Esquire General Counsel 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550
The Issue Whether the Petitioner's position of employment with the Respondent was properly reclassified from Career Service to Selected Exempt status.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: Dr. Edouard is a physician who was employed by the Department as the Senior Human Services Program Manager for the Miami-Dade County Childhood Lead Poisoning Prevention Program. This program operates under a grant from the federal Centers for Disease Control, and Dr. Edouard worked out of the Epidemiology and Disease Control Department of the Miami-Dade County Health Department. Prior to July 2001, Dr. Edouard's position was classified as a Career Service System position. As Senior Human Services Program Manager, Dr. Edouard supervised a staff of four to five persons, including an epidemiologist, an environmental specialist, a nurse, and a secretary specialist, and she spent the majority of her time supervising these employees: Dr. Edouard prepared the work assignments for her staff; trained the members of her staff; monitored the progress of the staff members in completing their assignments; prepared evaluations for each staff member and made recommendations for improvement; approved or disapproved requests for leave; had the authority to recommend members of her staff for disciplinary action; had the authority to recommend salary increases and/or to recommend promotion for members of her staff; and prepared the budget for her program grant. Dr. Edouard was considered by her supervisor to be a very creative, hardworking, dedicated healthcare professional who established Miami-Dade County's Childhood Lead Poisoning Prevention Program. In July 2001, Dr. Edouard's position was reclassified from a Career Service System position to a Selected Exempt Service position because the position included substantial supervisory responsibilities. After the reclassification, the formal job description for the Senior Human Services Program Manager position remained the same in all material respects as the job description for the Career Service System position. Dr. Edouard was terminated from her position several months after it was reclassified. At the time Dr. Edouard's position was reclassified from a Career Service System position to a Selected Exempt Service position, there were other supervisory employees of the Epidemiology and Disease Control Department of the Miami-Dade County Health Department whose positions were not reclassified but remained Career Service System positions. These employees were registered nurses serving as nursing program specialists.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the decision to reclassify the position of employment with the Department of Health formerly held by Marie-Michelle Edouard be sustained. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of April, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S PATRICIA HART MALONO Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of April, 2004.
The Issue The central issue in this cause is whether Petitioner abandoned his position and thereby resigned his career service position at Children, Youth, & Families Services.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the testimony of the witnesses and the documentary evidence received at the hearing, I make the following findings of fact: Petitioner was employed as a counselor working with the District XI Children, Youth, & Families (CYS) Services. Petitioner was assigned to monitor approximately twenty-five foster care children. After some past employment disputes, Petitioner was reinstated by the Department effective March 31, 1987. Petitioner returned to work on April 17, 1987, however, he was not satisfied with the working environment. In a memorandum dated April 22, 1987, Petitioner alleged: The same pattern of capricious, arbitrary and discriminatory practices which led to my previous illegal dismissal from services at a time I was disable, as the result of an accident which had occurred while fulfilling my duties for this Department, are still present. All my fundamental rights have been thoroughly violated. Even workman compensation has been denied to me. With so painful experience and in light of outstanding losses I have consequently suffered, any idea of subsidizing HRS with my own car, car insurance, car repairs and advance funding for gasoline purchase as an obligatory condition for employment at CYF is being rejected as unfair practices; and violate the equal Employment Opportunity Laws. Various efforts made to have this abusive situation corrected have been met with the flagrant opposition of fierce administrators of this department, totally obstinated not to let fairness and logic prevail. In light of all these facts, it is my conclusion that my interests can be better preserved by my abstention from any involvement at HRS until these matters are properly attended by your diligence in the best of the delays, or by a court of law. In consequence effective Friday April 24, 1987 I have decided to temporarily not to be in attendance at Unit 462 Foster Care. In response, the District Program Manager for Social Services, Frank Manning, wrote to Petitioner on April 23, 1987, and advised him that failure to report to work as scheduled would be cause for action pursuant to Chapter 22A- 7.010(2). Petitioner failed to appear or to call in to work for hour consecutive work days, to wit: April 27-30, 1987. Petitioner was not authorized to take leave during the time in question.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Administration enter a Final Order affirming the decision that Petitioner abandoned his position and thereby resigned from the Career Service. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 5th day of February, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of February, 1988. COPIES FURNISHED: Morton Laitner, Esquire Dade County Health Unit 1350 North West 14th Street Miami, Florida 33215 Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Sam Power, Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Louis C. Germaine 308 Northeast 117th Street Miami, Florida 33161 Adis Vila, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner was overpaid in the amount of $809.46; and, if so, whether she should be required to repay that amount to Respondent.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this matter, Petitioner was a career service employee of Respondent until her separation in October 2018. Petitioner went into labor unexpectedly in December 2017, and as a result, she began maternity leave. Petitioner was not present at work and did not submit a timesheet for the timeframe of December 29, 2017, through July 2, 2018. Petitioner testified that she was unable to submit her timesheets electronically and for this reason, someone else submitted them on her behalf. The evidence presented at hearing did not show who submitted her timesheets. By May 23, 2018, Petitioner had exhausted all of her annual, sick, and donated leave. Once an employee of Respondent no longer has sick leave remaining, annual leave is used to cover any shortages of sick leave. An employee may use donated leave to cover any shortages. Once an employee has exhausted annual, sick, and donated leave, the employee cannot be paid for additional time taken as leave. The additional time during leave is considered “leave without pay” (“LWOP”). Petitioner was placed on LWOP from March 23, 2018, through July 2, 2018, because she had exhausted all of her leave. Although Petitioner was on LWOP during the pay period of May 4, 2018, through May 17, 2018, a pay warrant for 80 hours of work was inadvertently issued on May 25, 2018, for that pay period. Consequently, Petitioner was overpaid $809.46. Petitioner was not responsible for the overpayment. She did not submit her timesheets and, thus, did not falsify them. Petitioner testified that her supervisor verbally advised her that she had received donated leave, but she could not recall the amount. Petitioner also did not offer any written representation from her supervisor or otherwise regarding her leave. The overpayment resulted because Petitioner's timesheet for LWOP for the pay period of May 4, 2018, through May 17, 2018, was not timely approved. Upon discovery of this error, Respondent’s human resources office conducted a manual audit of Petitioner’s leave. Ms. Anderson completed the leave audit and discovered that Petitioner had been overpaid for the May 4, 2018, through May 17, 2018, pay period. On May 30, 2018, the Department sent Petitioner a certified letter requesting the overpaid amount of $809.46. Petitioner became aware of the error when she received the Department’s letter. Petitioner’s pay was transmitted to her bank account electronically via direct deposit. However, she was not monitoring her bank account closely and did not immediately realize that she had been erroneously overpaid. At the time of the final hearing, Petitioner had not paid the overpayment. Petitioner stated she could only pay $40 per month to repay the overpayment.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Health enter a final Order requiring Shanace Isaac to repay Respondent $809.46. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of March, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S YOLONDA Y. GREEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of March, 2019. COPIES FURNISHED: Shanace Isaac Post Office Box 101 Hastings, Florida 32145 (eServed) Riley Michelle Landy, Esquire Department of Health Bin A-02 5052 Bald Cypress Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) Shannon Revels, Agency Clerk Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1703 (eServed) Louise Wilhite-St Laurent, Interim General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C65 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) State Surgeon General Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A00 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 (eServed)
The Issue Whether the Respondent committed the violations alleged in the letter dated February 14, 2002, and in the Notice of Specific Charges filed April 3, 2002, and, if so, whether the Respondent should be dismissed from his employment with the Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The School Board is responsible for operating, controlling, and supervising the free public schools in the Miami-Dade County school district and has the power to suspend and dismiss employees. Article IX, Section 4(b), Florida Constitution; Sections 230.03(2) and 230.23(5)(f), Florida Statutes (2001). Mr. Fullington is employed by the School Board as a journeyman Plumber II, and, prior to his suspension in February 2002, he was assigned to the North Satellite office of the School Board's Maintenance Department. He is represented by the Dade County School Maintenance Employee Committee, which has a contract with the Miami-Dade County public school system ("DCSMEC Contract") effective June 2001 through September 30, 2002.3 Mr. Fullington has worked for the School Board for 19 years; he began in 1983 as a laborer and worked his way up to journeyman plumber, which requires a five-year apprenticeship. In 1994, the School Board suspended Mr. Fullington and initiated proceedings to dismiss him from his employment, alleging that he had committed misconduct in office by forging the signatures of two of his supervisors on school district documents. After an evidentiary hearing, a Recommended Order was entered by a School Board hearing officer, who noted that Mr. Fullington admitted the charges but was remorseful and presented evidence of mitigating factors. The hearing office concluded that Mr. Fullington should not be dismissed from employment and recommended that Mr. Fullington be suspended without pay for four months. The School Board entered a Final Order on August 23, 1995, in which it adopted the hearing officer's Recommended Order and imposed the penalty recommended by the hearing officer. Mr. Fullington was promoted from an apprentice plumber to a journeyman Plumber II in January 1998. Leo Akers has been Mr. Fullington's foreman for seven or eight years.4 According to Mr. Akers, Mr. Fullington's job performance was, until his suspension, adequate, although his work was excellent when he was an apprentice. In Mr. Akers' experience working with Mr. Fullington, he has always performed his job assignments. Mr. Akers has never reported Mr. Fullington to his superiors for a discipline problem, he has had no difficulties working with Mr. Fullington, and he has received no complaints about Mr. Fullington from his co-workers. Prior to the incidents giving rise to this proceeding, the only disciplinary action taken by the School Board against Mr. Fullington was the four-month suspension in 1995. In June 1997, Mr. Fullington and his co-worker Steven Montgomery were commended by the principal of a Miami-Dade County elementary school, who wrote a letter to Max Metzger, the Director of the North Satellite of the Maintenance Department, praising Mr. Fullington and Mr. Montgomery for their work re- piping the school's broken water system. The principal stated among other things that "[t]he actions, behavior and cooperativeness of these two men deserve great recognition and applause, because our school operation was normal and free of major disruption as they worked." Solicitation for prostitution. Mr. Fullington was assigned overtime work on Saturday, August 18, 2001. When he reported to work at approximately 6:00 a.m., Mr. Akers, his foreman, met Mr. Fullington and told him to drive a School Board van to a plumbing supply house to pick up a load of pipe needed for the job. Mr. Fullington was then to meet Mr. Akers and two other plumbers at the job site, where they were installing the plumbing for a kitchen at one of Miami-Dade County's trade schools. On the way to the supply house, Mr. Fullington initially drove down Interstate 95, but he decided to avoid the traffic and take Second Avenue. As he drove down Second Avenue, he saw a young woman standing on the corner of Northwest 79th Street and Second Court, and he thought he recognized her as someone he knew in high school and from his neighborhood. Mr. Fullington turned the van around and drove back to speak to the woman. He pulled the van over to the side of the street, and he and the young woman engaged in a short conversation. According to Mr. Fullington, the encounter consisted of the following: He approached the young woman in the School Board van and told her that she looked familiar and that he thought he knew her. She responded that he looked familiar, and she asked him what he was doing. He responded that he was working; she responded that she was working, too. Mr. Fullington testified that, when he realized what the woman meant, he began to laugh because he was embarrassed that he had stopped, and he drove away. The young woman was actually Officer Robin Starks, an undercover police officer working on a "prostitution detail," posing as a decoy. During her time with the Miami Police Department vice unit, Officer Starks has participated in at least 200, and maybe more, prostitution details. On August 18, 2001, she was assigned to work on the prostitution detail from 4:00 a.m. to 9:00 a.m., during which time she made five or more arrests. Officer Starks testified that, when she is working as a decoy on a prostitution detail, she does not do anything that would make a person think she was a prostitute: She does not walk provocatively or wave at passers-by but just stands on a corner; she normally wears shorts or a skirt, and she never dresses like a prostitute but always dresses the way she would normally dress at home. She did not recall specifically what she was wearing on August 18, 2001. After the short conversation, Officer Starks turned and walked away from Mr. Fullington, who had remained seated in the van, and he drove away. She gave a signal to another person on the detail that Mr. Fullington should be arrested, and she proceeded to a nearby police vehicle and completed the narrative portion of an arrest affidavit with the following information: While working in an undercover capacity, defendant drove up in a large silver utility van bearing tag 100195 and M-768 affixed on the back of the vehicle. Defendant called this officer over and offered $10.00 dollars for some head. Take down signal was provided, units were notified and the defendant was apprehended.[5] The Arrest Affidavit was not signed by a notary in Officer Starks' presence, and Officer Starks' did not participate further in the events surrounding Mr. Fullington's arrest. According to that portion of the Arrest Affidavit completed by the officer who actually took him into custody, Mr. Fullington was arrested at 7:48 a.m. at Second Avenue and Northwest 75th Street and charged with soliciting to commit prostitution. He was taken in a police car to a substation, and the School Board's utility van was impounded. Mr. Fullington was in a panic after his arrest. The police officer tried to calm him and explained that he would not be put in jail but that he must sign the Arrest Affidavit before he could be released to return to work. Mr. Fullington signed the arrest affidavit, indicating that he would appear in court, and the police officer then told him he would have to pay $1,000.00 to get the School Board's vehicle out of the impoundment lot. The police officer drove Mr. Fullington to a Publix supermarket in his squad car so that Mr. Fullington could get cash from his savings account from the ATM. Mr. Fullington had only $860.00 in his savings account, and the police officer loaned him the additional $140.00. Mr. Fullington paid the $1,000.00 and got the School Board van out of impoundment. Before he left the substation, Mr. Fullington called Mr. Akers and told him he had an emergency and could not pick up the plumbing supplies. Mr. Akers told Mr. Fullington to report to the work site when he had taken care of the emergency. He reported for work at around 11:00 a.m. and told Mr. Akers a totally fabricated story to explain his absence. At the hearing, Mr. Fullington expressed remorse for having told Mr. Akers a lie but explained that, at the time, he was not thinking rationally and did not want anyone to know that he had been arrested for soliciting prostitution.6 On October 2, 2001, the criminal case against Mr. Fullington on the charges of offering to commit prostitution was closed with adjudication withheld and community service. Overtime hours. In accordance with the usual procedure, Mr. Akers completed a Facilities Support Services Weelky [sic] Overtime Report for each of the plumbers working on August 18, 2001, and left the forms at the job site. Each plumber was to sign his form at the end of the day to certify the number of overtime hours he had worked; the forms were then to be submitted to Mr. Akers for his review. Mr. Fullington signed the Weekly Overtime Services form with his name on it, which reflected that, on August 18, 2001, he had worked at the "Dorsey Skill" site from 6:00 a.m. until 4:30 p.m., for a total of 10 hours of overtime. Above his signature, was the following statement: "I certify that the work and hours indicated above are true and correct." It was Mr. Fullington's responsibility to ensure that the correct number of overtime hours was reported on the form. Mr. Fullington also signed a Daily Status Form for Maintenance and Operations on August 18, 2001, that showed that he had worked a total of 10 hours overtime, consisting of one hour of overtime travel and 9 hours of overtime. At the hearing, Mr. Fullington explained that he was so distracted by the events of August 18, 2001, that he signed both forms without looking at them. After Maintenance Department administrators learned that Mr. Fullington had inaccurately reported his overtime hours for August 18, 2001, he was advised that he could submit a Weekly Overtime Report and a Daily Status Report reflecting the number of hours that he had actually worked on August 18, 2001, and that he would get paid for those hours. Mr. Fullington did not submit the corrected forms and has not been paid for the hours of overtime that he actually worked on August 18, 2001. Additionally, Mr. Fullington never asked for, or received, reimbursement from the School Board for the $1,000.00 he paid to recover the School Board van from the impoundment lot. Post Office incident At around 12:30 p.m. on October 31, 2001,7 during their lunch hour, Robert Brown, the District Director of Maintenance Operations for the Miami-Dade County public school system, and Peter Vadas, Mr. Brown's co-worker, stopped at a post office so Mr. Vadas could purchase stamps. Mr. Brown saw a School Board van parked in the post office parking lot, and he waited in the car while Mr. Vadas went into the post office so he could keep the van under observation. After a few minutes, Mr. Vadas returned to the car. While Mr. Vadas was buckling his seat belt, Mr. Brown saw Mr. Fullington walking across the post office parking lot with a letter in his hand. The letter Mr. Fullington picked up was a certified letter from the School Board's Office of Professional Standards. Mr. Fullington was in the post office approximately 10 minutes. Mr. Brown observed Mr. Fullington get into the School Board van, where he sat and read the letter. As he and Mr. Brown sat in the post office parking lot observing Mr. Fullington read his letter, Mr. Vadas telephoned Kenny McFarland to report that Mr. Fullington was at the post office in a School Board van. Mr. McFarland, a Coordinator II at the North Satellite of the Maintenance Department, is a senior administrator who was in the supervisory chain-of-command for Mr. Fullington.8 After reading the letter, Mr. Fullington drove off, and Mr. Brown and Mr. Vadas returned to their office. Mr. Fullington's regular, assigned lunch half-hour was 11:30 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. This time could be changed with permission from his foreman. The post office that Mr. Fullington visited was located approximately 10 miles from the schools at which he was assigned to work that day. Incident involving Mr. Akers. On November 2, 2001, Mr. Fullington picked up his work assignments as usual from the "foreman's table" in the large office in which a number of maintenance foremen had their desks and work areas. At the time, there were perhaps 15 or 20 people in the foremen's office. The paperwork for Mr. Fullington's work assignments was affixed to a clipboard made of aluminum. Mr. Fullington was assigned to work with Steven Montgomery and, as they were walking to the truck with their assignments, Mr. Montgomery told Mr. Fullington that he overheard Mr. Akers telling someone that Mr. Fullington never showed up at a particular school to complete a work order. Mr. Montgomery believed that Mr. Akers was repeating something that someone else had told him about Mr. Fullington, and Mr. Montgomery told Mr. Fullington that he needed to clear up the misunderstanding. Mr. Fullington was upset to hear that Mr. Akers believed he had not completed a work assignment, and he wanted Mr. Akers to know that the information he was repeating was not correct. Mr. Fullington asked Mr. Montgomery to go back to the foremen's office with him so he could resolve the matter immediately. Mr. Fullington and Mr. Montgomery went back into the foremen's office area. Mr. Akers was sitting at his desk, which was made of metal. Mr. Fullington approached the desk and dropped the metal clipboard he was carrying onto the top of Mr. Aker's desk, next to his computer, in such a manner that it made a loud noise. Mr. Fullington began "hollering" at Mr. Akers, saying something about Mr. Akers trying to set him up.9 It was clear to Mr. Akers that Mr. Fullington was upset and angry, but Mr. Akers did not have any idea what Mr. Fullington was talking about. At the time, Mr. Akers felt threatened by Mr. Fullington; he was caught off guard by the outburst and does not recall saying anything in response to Mr. Fullington's accusations. When Mr. Fullington left the foremen's office, he forcefully kicked or pushed open the door to the hallway. Although Mr. Akers considered the incident very serious, he did not report the incident to his supervisor or call the police or security. Another foreman, John DiGregorio, who was in the room at the time of the incident, became nervous during the incident, primarily because of Mr. Fullington's size.10 Mr. DiGregorio immediately called his supervisor, Frank Brighton, whose office was on the floor above that of the foremen. Mr. Brighton came down to the foremen's office and questioned Mr. DiGregorio and Mr. Akers about the incident. Mr. Brighton reported the incident to Mr. Akers supervisor, Anthony Adams. Several days after the incident, Mr. Fullington asked Mr. Akers if he had felt threatened during the incident; Mr. Akers responded in the affirmative, and Mr. Fullington apologized. At the hearing, Mr. Fullington testified that he felt very badly about having raised his voice to Mr. Akers in anger. He explained that, at the time, he was under a lot of pressure because the Conference-for-the-Record to discuss the events of August 18, 2001, was scheduled for November 6, 2001, and he was concerned that his job with the School Board was in jeopardy. Mr. DiGregorio, who has been a maintenance foreman with the School Board for 10 years, had never previously seen Mr. Fullington act in any way that could be considered hostile or threatening. Mr. DiGregorio described Mr. Fullington's demeanor as generally gentle and non-threatening. In the years that Mr. Akers has worked with Mr. Fullington as his foreman, the only time Mr. Fullington ever raised his voice in Mr. Akers' presence was during the November 2, 2001, incident. Subsequent to the incident, Mr. Akers did not feel that he needed any protection from Mr. Fullington, they continued their usual good working relationship, and Mr. Fullington's job performance continued to be satisfactory. November 6, 2001, Conference-for-the-Record. On November 6, 2001, Reinaldo Benitez, an Executive Director of the School Board's Office of Professional Standards, held a Conference-for-the-Record with Mr. Fullington to address Mr. Fullington's arrest for offering to commit prostitution, to review his record with the School Board, and to discuss his future employment status with the Miami-Dade County public school system. Mr. Fullington's inaccurate reporting of the overtime hours he worked on August 18, 2001, was also discussed. Mr. Fullington's prior disciplinary record was set forth in the Summary of the Conference-for-the-Record. With the exception of the four-month suspension in 1995, the only disciplinary action taken against Mr. Fullington was a verbal reprimand in 1990 for improper conduct. Mr. Fullington was given an opportunity at the Conference-for-the-Record to consider resigning his position; he refused. The following directives were given to Mr. Fullington on November 6, 2001: Adhere to all M-DCPS School Board Rules at all times, especially 6Gx13-4A-1.21, Responsibilities and Duties/Employee Conduct. Honor your work hours from 7:00 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. Adhere to all maintenance procedures and regulations at all times. Adhere to the most direct route when traveling from location to location, unless you obtain authorization from your supervisor. Refrain from submitting any fraudulent documents to M-DCPS at any time. Mr. Fullington was advised that dismissal from his employment was a potential disciplinary action. After the November 6, 2001, Conference-for-the-Record, Mr. Vadas, District Director of Maintenance Operations; Max Metzger, the Director of Maintenance Operations at the North Satellite; and James Monroe, Executive Director of Facilities Operations, met and reviewed the data submitted at the conference. As a result of their deliberations, Mr. Vadas sent a memorandum, dated November 13, 2001, to the Office of Professional Standards recommending that Mr. Fullington be terminated from his employment with the School Board.11 No one asked for Mr. Akers' input on the recommendation, discussed the recommendation with him, or explained to him the reasons for the recommendation that Mr. Fullington's employment be terminated. There is no evidence that, prior to his suspension in February 2002, Mr. Fullington violated any of the directives given on November 6, 2001. November 16, 2001, Conference-for-the-Record. On November 16, 2001, Mr. Metzger, held a Conference- for-the-Record, the purpose of which was "to address your [Mr. Fullington's] failure to follow the Maintenance Department's policies and procedures as they pertain to the use of M-DCPS vehicles, your verbal abuse towards your foreperson, and other performance-related issues."12 The administrators at the Conference-for-the-Record discussed a number of the issues with Mr. Fullington, including Mr. Fullington's use of a School Board vehicle to visit a post office on personal business and Mr. Fullington's angry confrontation with Mr. Akers.13 No formal directives were given to Mr. Fullington as a result of this Conference-for-the-Record. Mr. Fullington was, however, reminded of the School Board policy that School Board vehicles are not to be used for personal business,14 of the School Board rules relating to employee conduct and to violence in the workplace, and of several other concerns.15 On January 15, 2002, a meeting was held during which Mr. Fullington was advised of the recommendation that he be dismissed from his employment with the School Board. Mr. Fullington was again offered the option of resigning his position. In a letter dated January 30, 2002, the Superintendent of Schools for Miami-Dade County notified Mr. Fullington that he was recommending to the School Board that, at its February 13, 2002, meeting, it suspend and initiate dismissal proceedings against him for "just cause." A letter to Mr. Fullington dated February 14, 2002, contained confirmation that the School Board had followed the Superintendent's recommendation. Summary Offering to commit prostitution. In the Notice of Specific Charges, the School Board included the allegation that Mr. Fullington "solicited prostitution from an undercover police officer."16 The School Board has, however, failed to establish by the greater weight of the evidence that Mr. Fullington solicited prostitution from Officer Starks. The testimony of Officer Starks and Mr. Fullington has been carefully considered, and there is nothing in either the testimony or the demeanor of Mr. Fullington and Officer Starks or in the other evidence presented on this issue that offers a cogent reason to accept Officer Starks' version of the incident over that of Mr. Fullington. This finding is based on a careful consideration of the totality of the evidence presented in this case relevant to the issue of whether Mr. Fullington solicited prostitution and a careful assessment of the credibility of Officer Stark and Mr. Fullington and of the persuasive value of their testimony.17 Consequently, discipline cannot be imposed on Mr. Fullington based on the allegations in the Notice of Specific Charges that he solicited prostitution. Additionally, the allegations that Mr. Fullington committed the offense while working overtime and while driving a School Board vehicle and that the School Board vehicle was impounded cannot form the basis for the imposition of discipline because the underlying allegation that he solicited prostitution has not been established.18 Reporting incorrect number of overtime hours worked on August 18,2001. In the Notice of Specific Charges, the School Board alleged that Mr. Fullington "falsely reported that he worked ten hours on that date [August 18, 2001]." Mr. Fullington does not dispute that he signed the Weekly Overtime Report and the Daily Status Report on August 18, 2001, certifying that he had worked 10 hours of overtime on that date and that the actual amount of time he worked on that day was not accurately reported on the forms. Even though credence is given to Mr. Fullington's explanation that he was so distraught by the events of August 18, 2001, that he did not look at the number of hours included on the forms, by signing the forms, Mr. Fullington certified that the number of overtime hours shown on the forms was correct. Mr. Fullington, therefore, submitted false information to the School Board, and he was not honest in his dealings with the School Board with respect to the overtime hours he worked on August 18, 2001. There was, however, no evidence presented by the School Board to support a finding that Mr. Fullington's inaccurate reporting of his hours for August 18, 2001, was so serious that his effectiveness as a School Board employee was impaired, and the totality of the evidence is insufficient to support a factual inference of impaired effectiveness. The School Board has failed to prove by the greater weight of the evidence that Mr. Fullington intentionally misrepresented the number of overtime hours that he worked on August 18, 2001. There is no evidence that Mr. Fullington intended to submit inaccurate information or that he engaged in any type of deceitful conduct in an attempt to ensure that he was paid for more overtime hours than he actually worked on August 18, 2001. And, given his many years of employment in the School Board's Maintenance Department, it is reasonable to infer that Mr. Fullington knew that Mr. Akers would have noted the discrepancy before submitting the forms to payroll. Use of the School Board van to go to the post office on personal business. The School Board has proven by the greater weight of the evidence that Mr. Fullington used a School Board vehicle for personal business when he went to the post office at about 12:30 p.m. on October 31, 2001, to collect a certified letter from the School Board. In doing so, Mr. Fullington violated the School Board's policy, set forth in the Maintenance Handbook that expressly prohibits the use of a School Board vehicle for personal business. Under the circumstances, Mr. Fullington committed a minor violation of Maintenance Department policy. Nonetheless, even though a minor offense, Mr. Fullington's use of the School Board's vehicle to go to the post office on October 31, 2001, constitutes the use of his access to School Board vehicles for his personal advantage. There was, however, no evidence presented by the School Board to support a finding that Mr. Fullington's use of a School Board vehicle for personal business on this occasion was so serious that his effectiveness as a School Board employee was impaired, and the totality of the evidence is insufficient to support a factual inference of impaired effectiveness. The School Board failed to present any creditable evidence to support its allegation in paragraph 7 of the Notice of Specific Charges that Mr. Fullington reported that he had worked at Barbara Goleman Senior High School from 7:30 a.m. to 1:00 pm. on October 31, 2001.19 Confrontation with Mr. Akers. Mr. Fullington did not controvert the evidence presented by the School Board that, on the morning of November 2, 2001, he confronted his foreman, Mr. Akers, about a negative comment Mr. Akers reportedly made about Mr. Fullington to other School Board employees; that he was angry and upset; that he shouted at Mr. Akers; and that he angrily and forcefully pushed the door open when he left the foremen's office. The evidence presented by the School Board is also sufficient to establish that Mr. Akers and Mr. DiGregorio perceived Mr. Fullington's behavior as threatening and that Mr. Akers felt fear during the confrontation. The impact of Mr. Fullington's conduct on this occasion is, however, mitigated by the testimony of Mr. Akers that he and Mr. Fullington worked together in a satisfactory supervisor-employee relationship after the November 2, 2001, incident and by the testimony of both Mr. Akers and Mr. DiGregorio that they have never felt threatened by or nervous around Mr. Fullington before or since the November 2, 2001, incident. The School Board has, therefore, established by the greater weight of the evidence that Mr. Fullington committed three offenses: He submitted two forms containing an inaccurate statement of his overtime hours on August 18, 2001; he used a School Board vehicle for personal business; and he confronted Mr. Akers in anger. However, none of the three offenses is inconsistent with the standards of public conscience and good morals or impaired Mr. Fullington's service in the community; none of the three offenses involves the constant or continuing intentional refusal to obey a direct order; none of the three offenses constitutes repeated violations of the law or repeated acts of indiscretion that persisted over an extended period of time, and none of the offenses was so serious that it impaired Mr. Fullington's effectiveness as a School Board employee. In light of Mr. Fullington's 19-year employment record with the School Board, which is marred by only one verbal reprimand and one four-month suspension, these three offenses, whether considered separately or cumulatively, are not sufficient to constitute "just and good cause" to suspend and dismiss Mr. Fullington from his employment with the School Board.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Miami-Dade County School Board enter a final order Dismissing Counts I, II, IV, and V of the Notice of Specific Charges against Benjamin Fullington; Finding that Mr. Fullington engaged in conduct unbecoming a School Board employee, in violation of School Board Rule 6Gx13-4A-1.21(I); Reinstating Mr. Fullington to his position as a Plumber II with the School Board's Maintenance Department, with full back pay and benefits; and Issuing a written reprimand to be placed in Mr. Fullington's personnel file. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of September, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. PATRICIA HART MALONO Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of September, 2002.
The Issue The issue is whether Brian T. Kidd is entitled to additional reimbursement of medical care expenses under the State of Florida Employees' Group Insurance Plan.
Findings Of Fact Mr. Kidd is a state employee and has been diagnosed as having Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis (ALS), commonly known as Lou Gehrig's Disease. When the disease was diagnosed, Mr. Kidd was covered by Capital Health Plan (CHP). CHP refused to cover the expenses of testing and treatment at the ALS clinic in Houston, Texas. During the October, 1989, open enrollment period, Mr. Kidd opted to change his medical insurance coverage to the State of Florida Employees' Group Insurance Plan (the State Plan). He made the change hoping to get coverage for the testing and treatment at the ALS clinic in Texas. The effective date of his coverage under the State Plan was January 1, 1990. Prior to leaving for the ALS clinic, Mr. Kidd talked to Lee Peacock and William Seaton in the Department's Division of State Employee Insurance. Mr. Kidd was told that the only way to determine the extent of coverage for the testing and treatment was to get prior approval from the Department's prior approval program. Mr. Kidd did not file a claim under the prior approval program. Instead, on January 29, 1990, Mr. Kidd sent a letter to William Seaton, together with a copy of a letter from Bernard. M. Patten, M.D., a doctor with the Baylor College of Medicine in Houston, Texas. Mr. Kidd's letter advises that he wants a predetermination regarding tests he is having from January 31 to February 8, 1990. Knowing that his letter requesting a predetermination could not have even been received by the Department, Mr. Kidd left for Texas and the scheduled tests and treatment. Mr. Peacock responded to the January 29, 1990, letter on February 13, 1990, advising that prior approval could not be given because the letter contained inadequate information and a prior approval claim had not been filed. Mr. Kidd did receive medical testing and treatment from January 31 to February 8, 1990. The State Plan paid approximately $8,400 of the total bills. Mr. Kidd believes that the State Plan should have paid more. Mr. Kidd offered no credible evidence to show entitlement to greater payment of benefits. While he did place numerous benefit payment schedule forms into evidence, he did not identify a single unpaid charge and show that it should have been paid. Further, his testimony in this regard is not entitled to great weight because some of his statements are plainly inaccurate. For example, Mr. Kidd identified a benefit payment schedule bearing a number of 00731581300 in which payment for $85.00 was excluded. He claimed that this charge should have been paid. On cross-examination, Mr. Kidd had to acknowledge that this charge was in fact paid on benefit payment schedule number 01271871300 except for $20.00 which was an ineligible expense. Mr. Kidd was unclear on and unable to identify those charges which had not been paid and the reasons he believed he was entitled to the benefits. The State Benefit Document limits payments for hospital services for non-PPC services at 80% of the hospital's average rate, not to exceed $152.00 per day. The Plan also requires a deductible of $200.00 per hospital admission. For example in this case Mr. Kidd had 9 days of hospitalization and was charged $230.00 per day. The eligible expenses were only $190.00 per day or $1710 leaving a total of $360 of ineligible expenses. Further, The Plan pays only 80% of eligible expenses (.80 x 1710=1368), leaving $342 or 20% as the patient's responsibility. Adding the ineligible expenses and the patient's responsibility leaves a total of $702 of the hospital room and board not paid under the Plan. The amount paid was correct. While there are other examples such as this where the Plan clearly paid the proper amount, there is no evidence to show one single example where the Plan did not pay all that was owed. All of Mr. Kidd's claims were properly paid under the Plan in accordance with the Benefit Document.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Administration enter a Final Order denying Brian T. Kidd's request for additional reimbursement and dismissing Mr. Kidd's petition for relief. DONE and ENTERED this 19th day of October, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE K. KIESLING Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of October, 1990. APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties in this case. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Petitioner, Brian T. Kidd The proposed findings of fact submitted by Petitioner are in a format which combines findings of fact, conclusions of law and argument. The proposed findings of fact cannot be separated in such a way as to allow specific rulings on each proposed finding of fact. Hence the only ruling that can be made is that the proposed findings of fact are subordinate to the facts actually found in this Recommended Order. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Respondent, Department of Administration Each of the following proposed findings of fact is adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding of fact: 1-5(1-7) and 9(12). Proposed finding of fact 6 is subordinate to the facts actually found in this Recommended Order. Proposed findings of fact 7 and 8 are unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Brian T. Kidd Route 3, Box 4381 Quincy, Florida 32351 Augustus D. Aikens General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Aletta Shutes, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550
Findings Of Fact The findings of fact in the recommended order are supported by competent, substantial evidence. They are adopted with modification together with the following supplemental findings of fact and as such both constitute the complete set of findings of fact for purposes of this final order. Albury also engages in the private practice of law as a member of a law firm. He devotes a majority of his working hours in that practice and is prohibited from representing other school boards because of his work relationship with the Monroe County School Board (the School Board). Until 1980 or 1981, Albury utilized his private law office and his private secretary to perform his duties as school board attorney. There is no evidence that this was for the convenience of the School Board, and it was a known fact that he performed his work from his private law office. The new school board office was renovated in 1980 or 1981, but no office was set up for Albury until late 1983. At that time, one room was made available to both the school board members and to Albury as school board attorney who jointly shared the one room. Prior to late 1983, that room was used by a school board employee who retired in mid-1983. Albury spends very little time in this office since a majority of his duties are performed elsewhere. Until relatively recently, Albury's private secretary did most of his secretarial work in connection with his school board representation. She was a long time employee and very familiar with his working habits, etc. When he left his employment, his new secretary who was less familiar with his habits and school board matters did less work in this area. Consequently, Albury used any one of three school board secretaries for assistance. He does not supervise any of the three secretaries and must request permission from their supervisors before having them perform work for him.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Division enter a final order declaring Hilary U. Albury eligible for membership in the Florida Retirement System both before and after July 1, 1979. RECOMMENDED this 22nd day of May, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of May, 1984.
The Issue Should Respondent, Priscilla Phillips, forfeit her rights and benefits under the retirement system of the City of Tampa (Tampa) on account of the termination of her employment because she admitted aiding or abetting a “specified offense?”
Findings Of Fact Background Ms. Phillips worked for Tampa from December 10, 1984, to September 1, 2011. In 2007, Tampa suspended Ms. Phillips for one day for violating computer use policies. Otherwise, Ms. Phillips’ employment history is discipline-free. Throughout her employment, Ms. Phillips worked for the Tampa Police Department as a Data Terminal Operator. Her responsibilities included identifying stolen goods in pawn shops. Ms. Phillips was a public employee of Tampa and a participant in the City of Tampa General Employees Retirement Fund. The Retirement Fund is a public retirement system. On September 1, 2011, Tampa terminated Ms. Phillips’ employment for violating the following provisions of Tampa’s Manual of Regulations: #1814-Restrictions on Revealing Information, #1104-Interference with Cases, and #1005-Standard of Conduct. Tampa relied also on violations of the following provisions of its Personnel Manual as a basis for termination: “B28.2A(3)c(11), Neglect of Duty-Unauthorized release of information or records” and “B28.2A(3)d(2), Moral Turpitude- Violation of City Code or other City policies relating to impartiality, use of public property, conflict of interest, disclosure and/or confidentiality.” Facts Admitted by Ms. Phillips On January 22, 2011, Ms. Phillips received and reviewed a confidential Officer Safety Alert issued by the police department’s Strategic Investigations Bureau. The Strategic Investigation Bureau is responsible for undercover investigations. Ms. Phillips knew this. The Officer Safety Alert included names and pictures of three subjects of an investigation. One was Reginald Preston. Ms. Phillips knew Mr. Preston and had met him about five times. She knew that he was a convicted felon who had been recently released from incarceration. Mr. Preston is the nephew of Ms. Phillips’ friend Beverly Harvin. At the time, Ms. Harvin worked for the police department as a Community Service Officer. The Officer Safety Alert stated: The above listed subjects are part of an on going [sic] investigation. S.I.B./Enforcement Group 2 has purchased firearms from these subject(s) that were taken in a residential burglary. The subjects are still in possession of additional firearms. The subjects are not wanted at this time due to the ongoing nature of the investigation. Use caution when coming into contact with the listed subjects and vehicles. Also use caution if responding to calls at the listed addresses. Due to the ongoing investigations, only distribute to TPD Personnel. LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE The information contained within this bulletin is the property of the Tampa Police Department and constitutes active criminal intelligence information, and is exempt from public records[.] Ms. Phillips read the alert when she received it. She understood that providing the information in the alert to the subjects identified in it could cause them to flee. Ms. Phillips called Ms. Harvin after reading the alert. Ms. Harvin was at home on medical leave recovering from a broken collar bone.1/ Ms. Phillips told Ms. Harvin about the alert, including the fact that Ms. Harvin’s nephew was identified in it. Ms. Phillips photographed the alert with her cellphone and sent the picture to Ms. Harvin. Ms. Phillips asked Ms. Harvin “could she get in touch with him [Mr. Preston] to come down and talk with the police officer.” Ms. Phillips intended for Ms. Harvin to contact Mr. Preston with the information that he was being investigated. In her words, Ms. Phillips “wanted him to come down and clear himself if he was not involved in this.” Ms. Harvin told Ms. Phillips that she would contact Mr. Preston, and she did. During the entire period of her employment with the police department, Ms. Phillips knew of only one time when an individual turned himself in after learning that he was wanted. Additional Information During an internal investigation of the incident, Ms. Phillips admitted the preceding facts to the investigating officers. Her termination on September 1, 2011, followed. The information in the alert about the stolen guns investigation was not available to the general public. Ms. Phillips obtained the information because she was a public employee. If Mr. Preston learned he was the subject of an undercover investigation, that would have obstructed and impeded the investigation. It would also have endangered the lives of the undercover officers.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner, City of Tampa General Employees Retirement Fund, enter a final order finding that the employment of Respondent, Priscilla Phillips, with the City of Tampa was terminated because of her admission to committing the commission of a “specified offense” as identified in section 112.3173, Florida Statutes, and that she forfeited her rights and benefits under the General Employees Retirement Fund. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of March, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN D. C. NEWTON, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of March, 2017.
