The Issue Whether the Department of Transportation's intended action to reject all quotes and re-advertise Lease No. 550:0318 was illegal, arbitrary, fraudulent, or dishonest.
Findings Of Fact In October of 1999, the Department advertised for office space for use as the Toll Data Center - Audit Section, Office of Toll Operations (Toll Office) located in Broward County. The lease was clearly advertised as a negotiated lease. It was not advertised as a competitive bid lease. Under the negotiated lease process before letting any lease, the Department must submit to the Department of Management Services (DMS) a Request for Space Need (RSN) and Letter of Agency Staffing (LAS). From DMS the Department receives the authority to directly negotiate a lease for space under 5,000 square feet with prospective lessors. 1/ Consistent with procedure, the Department received approval of the RSN on October 18, 1999. Pursuant to statute, DMS has strongly suggested that prior to selection of the apparent successful lessor, the Department should obtain a minimum of three documented quotes for a lease that has not been competitively bid. The Department has consistently followed that suggestion in negotiated leases. Under special circumstances, where it is clear it is improbable that three quotes cannot be obtained, the Department may waive its requirement that three documented quotes be received. However, the agency must certify to DMS that attempts to receive the required number of documented quotes were unsuccessful and/or special circumstances exist to negotiate the lease with less than three quotes. In this case, no special circumstances exist. In an effort to obtain more than the minimum three documented quotes, the Department opted to advertise for lease space on the Internet. The Internet is utilized by the DMS, among other state agencies, to disseminate information provided in the RSN to the private sector. Additionally, the Internet site may also be used by the private sector to provide notice of space they have available for review by the agency seeking space. A total of three submittal packages were distributed for Lease No. 550:0318. Despite the Department's advertisement over the Internet, only two requests for quote submittal packages were received. Of the three quote submittal packages distributed, the Department received only one documented quote in response to the advertisement for the Toll Office. Atlantic Investment submitted a Quote Submittal Form to the Department in late October for office space in North Fort Lauderdale. Atlantic Investment became aware of the Department's advertisement for lease space from Sheldon M. Schermer, employed by Atlantic Investment as its real estate agent. Mr. Schermer learned of the Department's need for lease space from an advertisement placed on the Internet. On November 8, 1999, the Department informed Atlantic Investment via Sheldon M. Schermer, Real Estate Agent for Atlantic Investment, of the Department's intent to reject all quotes and re-advertise for Lease No. 550:0318. This decision was not arbitrary, capricious, fraudulent, or dishonest and well within the Department's discretion and procedures for negotiated leases. The basis for the decision was the Department's modification of the lease specifications pursuant to a recommendation by DMS to modify the lease space terms to hopefully generate more interest and more quotes. In a competitive negotiation, DMS was aware of agencies who modified leases and advertised as many as five times before three documented quotes were received. Moreover, the evidence showed that the Broward County commercial real estate market could easily generate three quotes for the space required by the Toll Office.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered dismissing the Petitioner's protest. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of April, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of April, 2000.
Findings Of Fact By a NOTICE TO SHOW CAUSE dated August 25, 1982, proposing the issuance of a Cease and Desist Order and/or the imposition of civil penalties against Respondent, the Petitioner alleged that Respondent failed to refund to a proposed buyer all deposits and interest, made on a contract, after the contract was properly terminated by the buyer, in violation of Chapter 7D-18.01(9), Florida Administrative Code, and Section 718.503, Florida Statutes. No other allegations as to fact or law have been made by Petitioner against Respondent in this cause. The only witness presented by Petitioner was a Condominium Enforcement Specialist for the Division of Florida Land Sales and Condominiums whose only knowledge of the facts involved in this cause was hearsay in nature and no testimony upon which a finding of fact could be based was elicited from the witness. By stipulation of the parties, two exhibits were admitted into evidence. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1 is a copy of a purchase contract between Asbury Arms Development Corporation, Respondent herein, and Cora H. S. Wasser. In that purchase contract Asbury Arms is the seller and Wasser is the buyer of a condominium. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2, admitted pursuant to stipulation of the parties, is a letter from an attorney representing Wasser to the Asbury Arms Development Corporation. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2 was admitted far the sole purpose of establishing that Wasser attempted to void the purchase contract within fifteen days after execution in accordance with the contract language prescribed by Subsection 718.503(1), Florida Statutes. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2 was not admitted for the purpose of establishing any facts alleged therein other than as stated above. Cora H. S. Wasser was not present at the final hearing in this cause, nor was she represented by counsel at the hearing. The following facts were all stipulated and agreed to by the parties and are hereby found to be fact. The purchase contract, Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, was entered into at an auction where the Respondent was selling, by auction, certain condominiums. Cora H. S. Wasser was present at that auction. The auctioneer announced at the outset of the auction that bids would be accepted only if the bidder waived the right to void the purchase contract within fifteen days as set forth in paragraph 8 of the purchase contract as required by Section 718.503, Florida Statutes. Wasser, during the auction, made a bid on a condominium which was accepted by Respondent resulting in the purchase contract, Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1. At that time, May 3, 1982, Wasser gave to Respondent a deposit of $5,000. The purchase contract, in paragraph 8, page 3, contains without error the language required to be in a contract for sale of a condominium unit by Section 718.503(1), Florida Statutes. That language provides that the purchase agreement is voidable by the buyer by delivering written notice of the buyer's intention to cancel the agreement within fifteen days after the date of execution of the agreement by the buyer and receipt by the buyer of all of the items required to be delivered to the buyer by the developer. However, the purchase agreement also contains an executed document denominated a "rider." The parties have stipulated and agreed that this rider was executed and agreed to by Wasser and the Respondent and that this rider purports to waive the right of Wasser, the buyer, to void the purchase agreement within fifteen days as provided by Section 718.503, Florida Statutes. Notwithstanding that purported waiver, Wasser, by letter from her attorney dated May 13, 1982, Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2, attempted to void the purchase agreement in accordance with the rights established in a buyer by Section 718.503, Florida Statutes. There have been no allegations made nor evidence presented purporting to establish that Wasser did not understand that Section 718.503, Florida Statutes, gave a buyer such as herself a right to void a purchase agreement within fifteen days of execution. Indeed, the facts as stipulated to by the parties and found herein, show that the purchase contract entered into by Wasser contained, in clear unequivocal language, a statement of the right to void as required by Section 718.503, that the rider attached to that purchase contract was clearly for the purpose of waiving the right to void the contract given by Section 718.503, Florida Statutes, and finally, that at the auction at which Wasser entered a bid, the auctioneer at the outset announced the existence of the right to void the purchase agreement and stated as a prerequisite to entering a bid a waiver of that right. The Respondent had not, at the time of final hearing in this cause, returned to Wasser the deposit made by her pursuant to the purchase contract.
The Issue Whether Respondent, prior to being licensed as a real estate salesman, committed, among other things, fraud and misrepresentation in violation of Section 475.25(1) and negligence in violation of Section 475.25(3), Florida Statutes (1978), by selling promissory notes which he represented were secured by first mortgages, when they were, in fact, secured by subordinate mortgages; and, if so, the appropriate disciplinary penalty which should be imposed by the Board of Real Estate.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Evers qualified for, and was issued real estate salesman's license no. 0132634 by the Board on June 28, 1974. His license, at his request, has been placed on inactive status since April, 1979. (Testimony of Evers, P.E. 1) During 1972 and 1973, Evers was a mortgage broker and registered security salesman licensed by the Florida Division of Finance and Department of Banking and Finance, Division of Securities. He was employed as a mortgage broker and security salesman by the Washington Development Corporation, with headquarters in St. Petersburg, Florida. (Testimony of Evers, P.E. 2) As a mortgage broker and security salesman, Evers agreed to advertise and sell promissory notes, secured by what purported to be first mortgages, prepared and executed by the Washington Development Corporation ("Corporation"). He was to receive a commission on each completed sale. The Corporation supplied Evers with advertising forms and its promissory notes and mortgage forms. Its salesman, Gary George, taught him how to effectively explain and sell the notes and mortgages, and pointed out the express provision in the mortgage form where the Corporation covenants that the property covered by the mortgage was free and clear of all encumberances except real estate taxes. . . ." George advised Evers to inform prospective purchasers that they would receive a first mortgage, advice which Evers customarily followed. Evers' representations made in connection with sales to Gerald Pendry, Richard C. Tymick, and Eva Baird form the basis for this disciplinary proceeding. [SALE OF NOTE AND MORTGAGE TO GERALD PENDRY] On April 1, 1973, Evers sold to Gerald C. Pendry and his wife a promissory note, with mortgage executed by the Corporation in the amount of $2,000. The mortgage covered Lot 1, Block 18, of the Carlton Village subdivision, Lake County7 Florida. The note obligated the Corporation to pay Pendry 1 percent interest per month, over a period of 24 months. The mortgage, on its face, purported to be a first mortgage. In negotiating the sale with Pendry, Evers expressly represented that the mortgage securing the note was a first mortgage, and such representation induced Pendry to purchase the note. (Testimony of Pendry, Evers, P.E. 4) Subsequently, the Corporation defaulted on its payments; when Pendry brought a foreclosure action against the mortgaged property, he learned that his mortgage was subordinate to a prior and superior mortgage held by Melvin J. Haber. As a result of his subordinate mortgage, Pendry suffered financial loss. (Testimony of Pendry, P.E. 3) [SALE OF NOTE AND MORTGAGE TO RICHARD C. TYMICK] On March 1, 1973, Evers sold to Richard C. Tymick and his wife two promissory notes, one in the amount of $2,500 and the other in the amount of $2,900, each executed and secured by a mortgage given by the Corporation. The mortgages securing the notes covered Lot 8, Block 41, and Lot 12, Block 22, Carlton Village subdivision, Lake County, Florida. The notes obligated the Corporation to pay interest of 1 percent per month over a 48-month period. In negotiating the sale of the two notes, Evers led Tymick to reasonably believe that the notes were secured by first mortgages. (Testimony of Tymick, P.E. 5) The Corporation subsequently defaulted on its payments under the note. When Tymick Instituted a foreclosure proceeding, he learned that his mortgages were subordinate and inferior to a prior mortgage covering the same property held by Melvin Haber. Because of the subordinate nature of his mortgage, Tymick suffered financial loss. (Testimony of Tymick, P.E. 3) [SALE OF NOTE AND MORTGAGE TO EVA BAIRD] On or about October 20, 1972, Evers sold two Corporation promissory notes, secured by mortgages, to Eva R. and Joseph T. Baird. The notes were issued in the total amount of $10,000. The mortgages covered lots located in the Carlton Village subdivision, Lake County, Florida, and Evers affirmatively represented to Eva Baird that they were first mortgages. Without such representation, Eva Baird would not have purchased the promissory notes in question. (Testimony of Eva Biard, P.E. 6) Tie Corporation eventually defaulted on its payments under the notes. It was not until Eva Baird initiated a foreclosure proceeding against the properties that she learned her mortgages were subordinate and inferior to prior mortgages covering the same properties. As a result of her inferior mortgages, she suffered financial loss. (Testimony of Eva Baird) In 1975, the Department of Banking and Finance, Division of Securities, brought a disciplinary action against Evers alleging that he committed fraud by selling the Corporation mortgages and notes to certain persons, including Pendry, Tymick and Baird. After a formal evidentiary hearing, the Department entered a final order dated December 22, 1976, concluding that Evers, by failing to disclose the existence of prior mortgages and ensure that the mortgages were first mortgages (as he represented), committed fraud and a violation of Section 517.301, Florida Statutes. As a result, the Department suspended Evers' security salesman's license for a period of one year. (P.E. 2) At the time he sold the notes and mortgages to Pendry, Tymick and Baird, Evers did not know that the Corporation's mortgages were not, in fact, first mortgages; he believed and wholly relied on Gary George's assurances to him that the mortgages were what they purported to be-first mortgages. He made no attempt to investigate or independently verify the status of these mortgages. Evers, however, had no intent to falsely represent these mortgages to the purchasers; neither did he intend to mislead or deceive them. (Testimony of Evers) [EVIDENCE IN MITIGATION] Evers did not learn that the mortgages in question were not first mortgages until the latter part of 1974. He then made an honest effort to notify and assist those persons who had purchased Corporation notes and mortgages through him. He helped to arrange legal representation for them and defray the cost of having abstracts of title prepared. (Testimony of Evers, R.E. 1-8) Evers suffered considerable financial loss and interruption of Iris livelihood because of his sale of Corporation mortgages and notes. Because he had also purchased a Corporation mortgage which later turned out to be other than a first mortgage, he lost $2,700. Because of the Board's investigation and prosecution of this case, he placed his real estate salesman's license on inactive status to avoid embarrassment to his employer. (Testimony of Evers) There is no evidence to indicate that Evers has been other than a competent and conscientious salesman since obtaining his real estate salesman's license in 1974. A registered real estate salesman who worked with Evers described him as an exceptional salesman who paid close attention to details and made a special effort to keep clients advised of his progress. (Testimony of James Bradfield)
Recommendation Conclusion: The Board is without statutory authority and jurisdiction to discipline the Respondent for misconduct which occurred prior to his being licensed as a real estate salesman. The Amended Administrative Complaint, and the charges therein, should he dismissed. Recommendation: That the Board dismiss its Amended Administrative Complaint. Background By Amended Administrative Complaint filed January 18, 1979, the Petitioner Hoard of Real Estate ("Board") charged Respondent Dovard J. Evers ("Evers") with three counts of violating Sections 475.25(1)(a) and 475.25(3), Florida Statutes (1978), by selling notes which he represented were secured by first mortgages when, in fact, they were secured by second mortgages. The alleged misconduct occurred during 1972 and 1973, before Evers qualified for and received his real estate salesmans license. On February 6, 1979, Evers timely requested a Section 120.57 hearing to dispute the allegations in the Board's Administrative Complaint and filed a Motion to Quash Complaint. After oral arguments, Evers' Motion to Quash was denied by the Board on March 14, 1979. It was not until February 13, 1980, that Evers' request for a hearing was forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings for assignment of a Hearing Officer. The final hearing was initially set for April 15, 1980. On April 11, 1980, upon motion of the Board and without objection by Evers, the hearing was continued in order to allow the Board to reconsider its decision to prosecute this complaint. Subsequently, final hearing was reset for July 7, 1980. At hearing, the Board called Gerald Pendry, Richard C. Tymick, and Eva Baird as its witnesses and offered Petitioner's Exhibits No. 1-6, 1/ inclusive, each of which was received into evidence. Respondent Evers called James Bradfield as his witness and testified in his own behalf. Evers offered Respondent's Exhibits No. 1-10, 1/ inclusive, each of which was received. At the outset, the Board dropped Count IV and moved to amend its complaint by adding an allegation that Evers' alleged misconduct was of such a nature that had the Board been aware of it at the time Evers applied for his real estate salesman's license the application would have been denied. The proposed amendment fell within the scope of the complaint, and the motion was granted. Evers also renewed his previous motion to quash the amended complaint on the ground that he was not a licensed real estate salesman at the time of the alleged misconduct; the motion was denied. At close of hearing, the parties requested the opportunity to submit memoranda of law by July 23, 1980, which request was granted. The parties further agreed that the thirty-day time period for filing the recommended order in this case would begin on July 23, 1980. Based upon the evidence submitted at hearing, the following facts are determined:
The Issue Is Respondent guilty of operating as a real estate salesperson, without being the holder of a valid and current license as a real estate salesperson, in violation of Section 475.42(1)(a), Florida Statutes, and thereby in violation of Section 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes?
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a state government licensing and regulatory agency charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute administrative complaints pursuant to the laws of Florida related to the practice of real estate. Authority for the conduct of Petitioner's duties is found in Section 20.165, Florida Statutes; Chapters 120, 455, and 475, Florida Statutes; and associated rules. At present, Respondent holds a license as a real estate salesperson, license no. SL0631299, issued by Petitioner. From January 3, 1997, until February 13, 1998, Respondent was employed as an active salesperson in association with Marita Ann Dorr, Inc. (the Dorr firm), a broker corporation trading as Home Town Property Management. During that time Marita Dorr served as Respondent's employing broker. The Dorr firm was located at 109 West Lakeview Street, Lady Lake, Florida 32159. Respondent's duties during the time she was affiliated with the Dorr firm was that of an independent contractor real estate salesperson engaged in the sale of real estate at Sandlewood Condominiums, in Wildwood, Florida. In that time period, Respondent was also acting as the manager of Sandlewood Condominiums, which involved bookkeeping, supervision of maintenance, and serving as a receptionist. On February 13, 1998, Ms. Dorr informed Respondent that Respondent was terminated as a real estate salesperson affiliated with the Dorr firm. On that same date Ms. Dorr executed a form 400.5 which reflected the request for change of status in Respondent's license, noting that Respondent was terminated from employment with the Dorr firm. That form was received by Petitioner on February 13, 1998. In addition, Ms. Dorr wrote to Respondent on February 13, 1998, to enclose the executed form 400.5 noting the termination of Respondent's employment of the Dorr firm. On February 17, 1998, Respondent received the letter and a copy of the request for change of status of her license under form 400.5. From February 14, 1998, through March 22, 1998, Respondent did not have a current active license to practice real estate as a salesperson because Respondent was not associated with a real estate broker. Mr. Michael D. Remmel was interested in possibly purchasing a condominium unit at the Sandlewood Condominiums and had a conversation with Respondent concerning the possible purchase. His initial contact with Respondent predated her termination as a real estate salesperson affiliated with the Dorr firm. On February 17, 1998, after being told that she was terminated and receiving the letter from Ms. Dorr with the attached form 400.5, concerning the termination, Respondent again had contact with Mr. Remmel about the possible purchase of a condominium unit. Mr. Remmel initiated that purchase contract. On February 17, 1998, Mr. Remmel made an offer to purchase a unit in the Sandlewood Condominiums by executing a contract for sale and purchase as buyer. Respondent helped complete the contract form in its details by filling out the form, with the exception of Mr. Remmel's signature. The form noted that Home Town Property Management was the cooperating broker. A copy of the contract for sale and purchase is found as Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1. At the time that Respondent assisted Mr. Remmel in preparing the contract for sale and purchase, Respondent acknowledged to Mr. Remmel that she had been terminated as a salesperson and that her salesperson's real estate license was no longer active. Respondent told Mr. Remmel that she would have to call Ms. Dorr and find out if she could make the offer to the listing broker for the unit Mr. Remmel wished to purchase. Before writing the contract, Respondent spoke to Ms. Dorr. In the conversation Ms. Dorr commented on the fact that the form 400.5 had already been submitted to Petitioner and Respondent acknowledged receiving the copy of the form. Ms. Dorr reminded Respondent that Respondent should not be writing or soliciting real estate business. Respondent replied that she understood that but contended that Respondent was not soliciting the business. Respondent referred to the fact that Mr. Remmel was in the office and wanted to make an offer. Respondent asked Ms. Dorr if Ms. Dorr wanted Respondent to write up the contract and put Ms. Dorr's name on the bottom of it. Ms. Dorr responded "yes." Respondent asked what date to place. Ms. Dorr said to put "today's date." Notwithstanding Ms. Dorr's remarks Respondent recognized that she had not been rehired formally by Ms. Dorr and that, in the eyes of Petitioner, Respondent's real estate salesperson license was still inactive based upon the fact that Respondent did not have a named qualifying broker. Respondent acknowledges that she should have known better than to write the contract but that she wrote the contract because Ms. Dorr told her to. The property that Mr. Remmel made an offer on was listed with Myra Paxton, the broker for Paxton Realty. During the course of the transaction that took place between Respondent and Mr. Remmel concerning the property, Respondent called Ms. Paxton on February 17, 1998, and told Ms. Paxton that a copy of the contract was being faxed to Ms. Paxton. Respondent asked Ms. Paxton if Ms. Paxton wanted to write the contract or wanted Respondent to write it. Ms. Paxton reminded Respondent that Ms. Paxton was not Respondent's broker and could not tell Respondent what Respondent should do. Respondent then called Ms. Paxton again and told Ms. Paxton that "Marita," which name is inferred as a reference to Ms. Dorr, had told Respondent to write the contract under Ms. Dorr's authority and to bring it to Ms. Dorr. On February 17, 1998, Respondent faxed Ms. Paxton a copy of the contract for sale and purchase.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered finding Respondent in violation of Sections 475.42(1)(a) and 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes, and issuing a letter of reprimand. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of November, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of November, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Daniel Villazon, Esquire Division of Real Estate Department of Business and Professional Regulation Suite N-308 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 Kevin Palley, Esquire Kevin Palley, P.A. Suite B-2 520 Southeast Fort King Street Ocala, Florida 34471 Barbara D. Auger, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Herbert S. Fecker, Director Division of Real Estate Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801
The Issue Whether the Petitioner, Willis Phillips, may challenge the specifications of the invitation to bid at issue in this proceeding? Whether the Petitioner has standing to challenge the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services' proposed award of lease number 590:2166 to the Intervenor, Rutherford Rentals, Inc.?
Findings Of Fact The Department issued an Invitation to Bid for Existing Facilities, lease number 590:2166 (hereinafter referred to as the "ITB"), seeking to rent office space in Madison, Florida. Responses to the ITB were to be filed with the Department by 2:00 p.m., March 6, 1990. Included as part of the ITB was a map of the City of Madison (hereinafter referred to as the "Map"). Joint Exhibit 1. On page 1, paragraph 3, of the Bid Submittal Form which was included as part of the ITB it was indicated that "[s]pace to be located in Madison, Florida within boundaries depicted in the attached map (Attachment B.) Bidder to mark location of site on map Attachment B." The ITB referred to the Map as a "Map showing bid zone boundaries." See page 4 of the ITB. The Map was labeled as "Attachment B" and included the following language at the bottom of the Map: "WITHIN CITY LIMITS WITH EXCEPTIONS OF UNDESIRABLE LOCATIONS AS INDICATED." The Map included two areas within the City of Madison which were cross- hatched. At the bottom of the Map the word "UNDESIRABLE" had been written in black. This word only appears below the larger of the two cross-hatched areas. The Department intended to exclude any office space located within both of the cross-hatched areas on the Map. The Petitioner spoke by telephone with Robert Smith, a Facilities Services Managers Assistant for the Department, prior to submitting a response to the ITB. The Petitioner initiated the conversation. Based upon this conversation, the Petitioner was aware that property located within either of the cross-hatched areas on the Map was excluded from consideration under the ITB. The property which the Petitioner intended to offer to the Department in response to the ITB is located in the smallest of the two cross-hatched areas on the Map. The Petitioner was informed by Mr. Smith that the property located within the smaller cross-hatched area was excluded as undesirable. Mr. Smith informed the Petitioner that he could not submit a response to the ITB offering to rent property located in the small cross-hatched area. The exclusion from consideration of property located in the areas within the City of Madison which were located in the two cross-hatched areas of the Map could have been more clearly designated. The Department's designation of the excluded areas, however, was not ambiguous. It was clear that the Petitioner's property was located in an excluded portion of the City of Madison and that the Petitioner was aware of the exclusion of his property. Despite the Petitioner's knowledged that his property was located within an excluded area, the Petitioner submitted a response dated March 6, 1990, to the ITB proposing property located in the smaller cross-hatched area. In the Petitioner's response to the ITB he did not indicate the location of his property on the Map. Instead, the Petitioner submitted a different map of a portion of the City of Madison which included his property. Rules 10-13.006 and 10-13.007, Florida Administrative Code, require that protests of the bid specifications of the Department must be filed within 72 hours of receipt of notice of the bid specifications. The ITB did not indicate that persons adversely affected by the ITB could challenge the specifications of the ITB or that any such challenge had to be filed within 72 hours of receipt of notice of the ITB. The following statement appears of the last page of the Bid Submittal Form included with the ITB and submitted by the Petitioner: I hereby certify as owner, officer, or authorized agent that I have read the Invitation to Bid Package and all its attachments, and agree to abide by all requirements and conditions contained therein. . . . This certification was signed by the Petitioner. The Department decided to award the lease to the Intervenor. The Department determined that the Petitioner's bid should be rejected because the proposed property was located in an excluded area. The Petitioner filed a Formal Protest and Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing on April 23, 1990, with the Department. The Petitioner challenged the Department's proposed award of the lease to the Intervenor and asserted that he was the lowest and best bidder. The Petitioner did not challenge the specifications of the ITB. The Department filed a Motion to Dismiss on Mazy 4, 1990. The Petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to File Amended Petition and an Amended Formal Protest and Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing on May 14, 1990. For the first time, the Petitioner challenged the specifications of the ITB.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order granting the Department's Motion to Dismiss and dismissing with prejudice the Formal Protest and Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing filed by the Petitioner. DONE and ENTERED this 12th day of July, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of July, 1990. APPENDIX The Petitioner and the Department have submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. The Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection 1-2 See 9. 3-5 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 6 6-7. 7 and 11 Not relevant. 8-10 and 12-15 These proposed findings are consistent with Ms. Goodman's testimony. Ms. Goodman's opinions, however, are not supported by the weight of the evidence. Although this proposed finding of fact is generally true, the weight of the evidence failed to prove that the Petitioner was not aware that both cross-hatched areas were excluded areas. See 9. The Department's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection 1 1. 2 2 and hereby accepted. 3 5-8. 4 7. 5 6. 6 12. 7 9. 8 13 and 17. 9 4. 10 12. 11 17. 12 15. 13 16. 14 18 and hereby accepted. 15 20. 21 and hereby accepted. 22 and hereby accepted. Hereby accepted. Cumulative. Hereby accepted. Copies Furnished To: John C. Pelham, Esquire Gary Walker, Esquire Post Office Box 13527 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-3527 John L. Pearce, Esquire District Legal Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32303-2949 Clay A. Schnitker, Esquire Post Office Drawer 652 Madison, Florida 32340 Sam Power, Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to these proceedings, Respondent, Private Money Mortgage Company (PMMC), was a mortgage brokerage business in the State of Florida holding License Number HB592732699 that had been issued by Petitioner. At all times pertinent to these proceedings, Frank Donahue was a licensed mortgage broker in the State of Florida holding License Number HA267474770 that had been issued by Petitioner. The Department of Banking and Finance, the Petitioner in these proceedings, is the agency of the State of Florida charged with the responsibility of enforcing the provisions of Chapter 494, Florida Statutes. In 1985, Mr. and Mrs. A. Charles Cinelli bought a house in Palm Beach County, Florida, and moved from upstate New York to Palm Beach County, Florida. Respondent, Frank Donahue, assisted Mr. and Mrs. Cinelli in obtaining financing for the home the Cinellis purchased in Palm Beach, County. In connection with this 1985 transaction, Mr. Donahue forwarded to the Cinellis an "Exclusive Broker Agreement", which they executed and returned to him. Because this 1985 transaction involved a purchase, Mr. Donahue ordered an appraisal for this property and charged its cost as a part of the Cinelli's closing costs. Subsequent to that transaction, Mr. Donahue and his wife, Brenda, saw Mr. and Mrs. Cinelli at occasional social events. Franklin T. Smith is a certified public accountant who performed professional services for Mr. and Mrs. Cinelli and for Mr. and Mrs. Donahue. Mr. Smith referred the Cinellis to Mr. Donahue in 1985 and advised the Cinellis during the transaction that is the subject of this proceeding. Prior to December 2, 1988, Mr. Cinelli contacted several mortgage brokers in the Palm Beach County area to discuss the possibility of obtaining a mortgage on certain real property located in upstate New York. Mr. Cinelli contacted Mr. Donahue by telephone and discussed with him his desire to raise capital to begin a business in Florida. Mr. Cinelli estimated that he would require approximately $1,000,000 to start this business. Mr. Cinelli told Mr. Donahue that he and Mrs. Cinelli owned certain commercial real property in upstate New York and that State Farm Insurance Company held an option to purchase this property for the sum of $1,450,000. Mr. Cinelli did not want to wait to learn whether State Farm intended to exercise this option to purchase and he discussed with Mr. Donahue the possibility of obtaining the desired capital by securing a mortgage on this property. Mr. Donahue advised Mr. Cinelli that he could expect to secure a mortgage for approximately $700,000 (which was approximately 50% of the amount of the option contract) and that he would need a current appraisal. Mr. Donahue also informed Mr. Cinelli that he would require the sum of $2,500 as a non-refundable deposit to begin seeking such a commitment. On or about December 2, 1988, Mr. Cinelli provided Mr. Donahue with a copy of the option agreement with State Farm and with a copy of the agreement dated September 21, 1988, which extended the time within which State Farm could exercise its option for an additional six months. Mr. Cinelli reiterated to Mr. Donahue that the option price was for $1,450,000 and that he wanted to mortgage the property for $1,000,000. Mr. Cinelli also provided Mr. Donahue with the name, address, and telephone number of Mr. Wayne Lupe, who was represented by Mr. Cinelli to be his MAI appraiser in Schenectady, New York. On December 15, 1988, Mr. Donahue sent to Mr. Cinelli a letter which attached an "Exclusive Broker Agreement" that had been executed by Mr. Donahue on December 15, 1988. This was the same "Exclusive Broker Agreement" form that Mr. Donahue had used for the 1985 Cinelli transaction. The body of the letter provided as follows: Enclosed please find a copy of my exclusive brokers agreement detailing the probable terms of the loan which you are seeking. This agreement is the same agreement which you signed when you purchased your current resi- dence. The agreement calls for both you & Joan to sign and return along with a nonrefundable deposit in the amount of $2500.00 to Private Money Mortgage Corp. The above noted deposit shall be credited towards your closing costs at the time of closing, if a commitment is offered. I have spoken to several of my investors about your concerns and I am awaiting confirmation of their substantial interests prior to ordering the appraisal. I will contact you as soon as I have received the return of this agreement along with your deposit in order to fill you in on our efforts to secure you the most competitive loan on your desired terms. The Exclusive Broker Agreement reflected that the amount of the mortgage would be $700,000 and disclosed that the total estimated costs that would be incurred in securing the mortgage was $78,346, which included a broker's fee of $35,000 and an estimated appraisal fee of $3,500. The Exclusive Broker Agreement, signed by Mr. Donahue on December 15, 1988, contained the following provision: DEPOSIT: In consideration of the sum of $2,500, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, and in compliance with Chapter 494, Florida Statutes, Broker accepts this application and agrees to exert his/her best effort to obtain a commitment for loan in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth herein. This deposit shall be credited toward closing costs at the time of closing the permanent loan or commitment, less Broker's expenses. Among the "Standards" which were incorporated as terms and conditions of the Exclusive Broker Agreement was the following: Deposit. Client simultaneously with execution of this agreement has deposited with broker the amounts stated in this agreement in order to secure the obligations owed by client to broker in the event of default of client as provided in the agreement and to reimburse broker of any and all expenses, including telephone charges, lodging, and administrative fees for credit checks and processing appraisals and the like, including upon any cancellation by client, reimbursement for broker's time expended incurred by broker, whether or not a loan commitment is obtained by broker. Mr. Cinelli was concerned that he would be incurring substantial fees and costs if Mr. Donahue obtained a commitment and Mr. Cinelli decided not to accept it. Mr. Smith advised Mr. Cinelli that the estimated expenses were not abnormally high, but he suggested that his liability should be limited. In response to those concerns, Mr. Donahue prepared and delivered between December 15, 1988, and the end of the year an addendum to the Exclusive Broker Agreement that would have limited Mr. Cinelli's liability to the sum of $7,500. That addendum provided, in pertinent part, as follows: It is hereby understood and agreed by the parties that in the event a loan commitment is offered to the applicants & they decide to refuse this commitment, the applicants liability will be limited to the sum of Five Thousand Dollars plus the original deposit of $2,500.00 for a total amount of $7,500.00. It is further understood that said commitment must bear approximately the same terms and conditions as the attached agreement. Mr. and Mrs. Cinelli gave Mr. Smith the sum of $2,500 in cash to deliver to Mr. Donahue, but there is conflicting testimony as to when this money was delivered to Mr. Smith for delivery to Mr. Donahue. Mr. Cinelli testified that the money was delivered before the Exclusive Broker Agreement dated December 15, 1988, was prepared. Mr. Donahue testified that the money was delivered after both the Exclusive Broker Agreement and the addendum thereto had been delivered to Mr. Cinelli. Mr. Donahue also testified that the statement contained in the Exclusive Broker Agreement that he signed on December 15, 1988, acknowledging his receipt of the $2,500 deposit was false. He did not explain why the addendum referred to the sum of $2,500 as "the original deposit". Mr. Smith did not recall when he delivered this money to Mr. Donahue, but he did recall having delivered the cash the same day he received it from the Cinellis. While his testimony is that he received the $2,500 during his initial meeting with Mr. and Mrs. Cinelli (which would be before Mr. Cinelli received the Exclusive Broker Agreement) this testimony lacks credibility because of Mr. Smith's lack of certainty as to dates. In addition, this testimony conflicts with the letter Mr. Smith wrote to Mr. Donahue at Mr. Donahue's request on August 28, 1989, which clearly indicates that the $2,500 was not paid until after the addendum to the Exclusive Broker Agreement had been prepared. This conflict is resolved by finding that the greater weight of the evidence establishes that the sum of $2,500 was delivered by Mr. Smith to Mr. Donahue after Mr. Cinelli had received both the Exclusive Broker Agreement and the addendum thereto. Mr. Donahue did not provide the Cinellis with any type of written agreement, other than his letter of December 15, 1998, the Exclusive Broker Agreement, and the addendum when he received the cash from Mr. Smith. There was no written receipt for these funds, nor was there any written memorandum of understanding between Mr. Donahue and the Cinellis as to whether payment for the appraisal that Mr. Donahue and Mr. Cinelli had discussed would be made from the $2,500. Mr. Cinelli was of the belief that $2,000 of the $2,500 deposit would be earmarked for the payment of the appraisal. Mr. Donahue was of the belief that the $2,500 was a non-refundable retainer and he treated that sum as an earned fee. There was no meeting of the minds between Mr. Cinelli and Mr. Donahue as to the nature of the $2,500 deposit, other than it was non-refundable. Specifically, there was no agreement as to what costs, if any, would be paid from that deposit. Mr. Donahue's normal business practice in transactions involving a refinance of property is different than his practice in transactions involving a purchase of property. In purchase transactions (such as the 1985 Cinelli transaction), Mr. Donahue arranges for the appraisals and treats the costs of the appraisal as an expense to be paid by the purchaser at closing. In refinance transactions (such as the 1988 Cinelli transaction), it is his practice to require his customer to deal directly with the appraiser in ordering and paying the costs of the appraisal. Respondents failed to establish that in the subject transaction, Mr. Donahue made it clear that Mr. Cinelli would be responsible for ordering and paying the cost of the appraisal. Mr. Cinelli believed that $2,000 of the $2,500 he later gave Mr. Donahue would be earmarked for the payment of the appraisal. Neither Mr. Donahue's letter of December 15, 1998, the Exclusive Broker Agreement, nor the addendum clearly resolved the dispute. There was a dispute between Mr. Donahue and Mr. Cinelli as to who ordered the appraisal. Mr. Cinelli denied that he ordered the appraisal and that his calls to his appraiser, Mr. Lupe, was only to advise him of Mr. Donahue's forthcoming call. Mr. Donahue denied that he ordered the appraisal and that his contacts with Mr. Lupe were after Mr. Cinelli had ordered the appraisal. Mr. Donahue contends that his contacts with the appraiser were merely to give the appraiser instructions as to the information that should be reflected by the appraisal. This dispute is resolved by finding that Mr. Cinelli ordered the appraisal through Mr. Lupe and that Mr. Donahue advised Mr. Lupe as to the information that should be reflected by the appraisal. It was determined from conversations between Mr. Donahue and Mr. Lupe that Mr. Lupe was not qualified to perform the appraisal and that Mr. Lupe would engage Albert L. Friedman, MAI and William J. McEvoy of Capitol Real Estate and Appraisal Company of Schenectady, New York, on Mr. Cinelli's behalf to perform the work. Messrs. Friedman and McEvoy prepared the appraisal and certified the same to Mr. Cinelli on March 13, 1989. The appraised value of the property was $2,100,000. As of the date of the formal hearing, the appraiser's bill of $2,000 had not been paid. Capitol Real Estate and Appraisal Company had billed both Mr. Donahue and Mr. Cinelli and an attorney representing Capitol Real Estate and Appraisal Company had written Mr. Cinelli a demand letter. It was the dispute over the payment of the appraiser's fee that prompted the complaint the Cinellis filed against Respondents. The Cinellis did not execute the Exclusive Broker Agreement and the addendum because they wanted to wait on the appraisal to see if the appraised value would permit them to borrow more than $700,000 and because they were not satisfied with the amount of the projected costs of consummating the transaction. Mr. Cinelli misled Mr. Donahue as to his intentions to execute these agreements. Mr. Donahue made several requests to the Cinellis that they execute the Exclusive Broker Agreement and addendum and return them to him. Despite the absence of an executed brokerage agreement, Mr. Donahue exerted considerable effort to seek a commitment consistent with the Exclusive Broker's Agreement and succeeded in securing such a commitment in April 1989. No part of the $2,500 Mr. Donahue received from Mr. Smith on behalf of the Cinellis was placed in escrow by Mr. Donahue. Respondents have made no accounting of the $2,500 and have paid no part of the appraisal bill. Mr. Donahue claims the deposit as a non-refundable earned fee, despite the absence of a written agreement to that effect. The Cinellis sold the subject property to State Farm in June 1989.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that a Final Order be entered by Petitioner which finds: that Respondents violated the provisions of Rule 3D-40.006(5), Florida Administrative Code, by accepting the $2,500 deposit from the Cinellis without a written agreement as to the disposition of those funds; that Respondents violated the provisions of Section 494.055(1)(e), Florida Statutes, and Rule 3D-40.006(6)(a), Florida Administrative Code, by failing to place said deposit in escrow; and that Respondents violated the provisions of by Section 494.055(1)(f), Florida Statutes, by failing to account for said deposit. It is further recommended that an administrative fine be levied against Respondents in the total amount of $1,000.00 for said violations. It is further recommended that the final order place the licenses of Respondents on probation for a period of one year with three special conditions of probation. The first special condition of probation would require Respondents to pay Capitol Real Estate and Appraisal Company the sum of $2,000 within sixty days of the Final Order. The second special condition of probation would terminate Respondents' probation upon timely compliance with the first special condition of probation. The third special condition of probation would prohibit Respondents from conducting any business as mortgage brokers within the State of Florida for a period of six months should Respondents fail to timely comply with the first condition of probation. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 9th day of January, 1991. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of January, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 90-4708 The following rulings are made on the proposed findings of fact submitted on behalf of the Petitioner. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 1, 3-10, and 13 are adopted in material part by the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 2 and 11 are adopted in part by the Recommended Order, and are rejected in part as being contrary to the findings made. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 12 are adopted in part by the Recommended Order, and are rejected in part as being argument. The following rulings are made on the proposed findings of fact submitted on behalf of the Respondent. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 1-3 are adopted in material part by the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 4-6, 14, and 17 are rejected as being subordinate to the findings made. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 7 are adopted in part by the Recommended Order. The characterization of the Cinellis having a "long standing relationship" with Mr. Donahue is rejected as being ambiguous and unnecessary to the conclusions reached. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 8 are rejected as being unnecessary to the conclusions reached. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 9-11 are adopted in part by the Recommended Order, but are rejected to the extent that they are subordinate to the findings made. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 12 and 13 are rejected as being recitation of testimony or as being subordinate to the findings made. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 15 are rejected as being subordinate to the findings made or as being contrary to the findings made or to the conclusions reached. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 16 are adopted in part by the Recommended Order, and are rejected in part as being unnecessary to the conclusions reached. COPIES FURNISHED: Deborah Guller, Esquire Office of the Comptroller 111 Georgia Avenue, Suite 211 West Palm Beach, Florida 33401-5293 Marie A. Mattox, Esquire Douglass, Cooper, Coppins & Powell Post Office Box 1674 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1674 Honorable Gerald Lewis Comptroller, State of Florida The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 William G. Reeves General Counsel The Capitol Plaza Level, Room 1302 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350
Findings Of Fact At all times here relevant David Y. Coverston, Respondent, was registered as a real estate broker with the Florida Real Estate Commission and, on his registration renewal request dated February 28, 1980, he listed an office at 1231 Kapp Drive, Clearwater, Florida, and one at Gainesville, Florida. The Clearwater office was managed by Eugene Bailey, a licensed real estate salesman, and Respondent visited the office at infrequent intervals. Michael Sedwick held an inactive real estate salesman's license and in 1980 was engaged in real estate development. He worked out of the Respondent's office at 1231 Kapp Drive, Clearwater, Florida, and knew Respondent. Specifically, Sedwick was developing 12 waterfront townhouse condominiums. On February 4, 1980, Sedwick opened an escrow account in the Bank of Clearwater under the name of David Coverston. Checks were printed with the heading David Coverston, Registered Real Estate Broker, Escrow Account. Sedwick was the authorized signatory on this account. During the month of February 1980 deposits of $42,600 were placed in this account and checks totaling $41,719.08 were written against this account, leaving a balance of $880.92. During December 1980 a deposit of $4,000 was made in this account and a check for $4,000 was written against this account. On December 20, 1980, a check for $500 drawn against this account was written payable to David Coverston. This check was endorsed by Coverston and paid by payor bank on March 20, 1981, leaving a balance of $330.92 in the account (Exhibit 2) On April 8, 1981, Indian Harbor Condominiums No. 2, by its developer, Michael Sedwick, entered into a contract to sell 11 of the 12 units in this condominium to Bieder Equity Corporation and a $100,000 earnest money deposit was given by Bieder payable to David Coverston Escrow Account (Exhibit 3) and was deposited in this account. Due to defects in the title this contract failed to close and by letter dated March 22, 1982, Bieder Equity Corporation demanded return of the deposit, less certain authorized expenditures, from Sedwick (Exhibit 7). A copy of that letter was sent to Respondent. Sedwick failed to refund the deposit, and by letter dated April 6, 1982 (Exhibit 8), Bieder Equity Corporation demanded return of its deposit from Respondent. The $100,000 check was deposited in the David Coverston Escrow Account on April 10, 1981 (Exhibit 2). During the next few months small deposits were made to this escrow account and checks were written against this account. The final deposit of $200 in this account on October 2, 1981, brought the balance in the account to $91.33. It has remained at this balance since that time. Although Respondent did not open this escrow account or have signature authority on this account, he was aware the account existed. He was also aware that the contract for the sale of the 11 condominiums was being run through the Clearwater office and he anticipated the office would receive a commission on this transaction. The checkbook for this account was maintained by the real estate office secretary who prepared checks for Sedwick's signature. Neither Sedwick nor Respondent have delivered the monies due Bieber Equity Corporation.
The Issue The issue posed for decision herein is whether or not the Respondent, based on conduct set forth hereinafter in detail, unlawfully withdrew and transferred monies from an escrow account and is therefore guilty of fraud, dishonest dealing by trick, scheme or device, or breach of trust and conversion within the purview of Subsection 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1979) At the final hearing, Petitioner called Donald Lloyd, Respondent, Donald Reda and Kenneth Viviano as its witnesses. Petitioner offered Exhibits 1 through 7 which were received into evidence. Respondent called no witnesses and offered Respondent's Exhibits 1 through 4 which were received into evidenced.
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the documentary evidence received, posthearing memoranda and the entire record complied herein, I hereby make the following relevant findings of fact. By its administrative complaint filed herein on July 29, 1981, Petitioner seeks to take disciplinary action against the Respondent as licensee and against his license as a real estate salesman. During times material herein, Respondent was a licensed real estate salesman and has been issued license No. 0188032. During times material herein, Century 21, Lloyds of Lauderdale, Inc., was a Florida licensed real estate corporate broker with its offices located at 3300 NE 33rd Street, Fort Lauderdale, Florida corporate entity was licensed under that name on October 12, 1979. The predecessor entity was known as Lloyds' of Lauderdale, Inc., and had its escrow account at Gulfstream Bank H.A., formerly known as Gulfstream American Bank and Trust Company H.A., formerly known as American National Bank and Trust Company of Fort Lauderdale, which account number was 005-1-00160-3. Upon obtaining the change of name, i.e. Century 21, Lloyds of Lauderdale, Inc., the successor entity maintained the same escrow account number at the same bank and continued using the checks on that account bearing its former name, Lloyds of Lauderdale, Inc. During times material herein, Respondent was a salesman associated with Century 21 and was an authorized signatory on the above-referred escrow account. Respondent was also a stockholder, officer and director of Century 21, Lloyds of Lauderdale, Inc. Respondent was also the owner of an unrelated business known as Brewer's Care Center, which in turn operated a motel located in Georgia. During times material, Respondent owned a one-third (1/3) interest in Century 21, Lloyds of Lauderdale, Inc. On February 3, 1981, Respondent issued a check, No. 79-228, drawn on the Century 21, Lloyds of Lauderdale, Inc., escrow account, payable to Brewer's Care Center in the amount of $11,903.12. Approximately fifteen days later, on February 18, 1981, Respondent issued another check, No. 79-223, drawn on the above-referenced escrow account payable to Brewer's Care Center in the amount of $2,500. On March 3, 1981 Respondent verbally authorized the Gulfstream Bank to withdraw $399.66 from the referenced escrow account to pay interest on loan No. 59-004-00-058-3866-4. Also, on March 18, 1981 Respondent verbally authorized the withdrawal of $799.32 to be applied against the same loan. Neither of the above-referenced checks or verbal loan authorizations were, in any wise, connected with any real estate transactions from which monies were held in escrow by the Respondent. The verbal withdrawals and checks, either authorized or drawn by the Respondent, reduced the escrow account by a sum of approximately $15,602.10 and depleted the account to such an extent that Century 21, Lloyds of Lauderdale, Inc. was unable to meet demands for the return of the escrow funds held in trust (See Petitioner's Composite Exhibit No. 1). Respondent took the position that the monies represented by the payments of the two checks made payable to Brewer's Care Center were repayments of loans and that he was unaware that the accounts which the checks were drawn against were, in fact, escrow accounts. In this regard, evidence reveals that the Respondent suffered a heart attack during November of 1980 and his health regressed to the degree that he was placed in the intensive care unit at a hospital in Cleveland, Ohio for an extended period of time. At the conclusion of the Petitioner's case in chief, Respondent's counsel filed an ore tenus motion to continue the subject hearing until the following day. The undersigned afforded Respondent's counsel an opportunity to submit, for the record, his basis for the continuance. However, that motion was denied based on the numerous continuances which had been previously granted by the undersigned to Respondent's counsel (See Order dated November 16, 1982 - Copy attached).
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the allegations contained herein, Respondent was licensed by the State of Florida as a registered real estate broker under license #0001869, which was issued to him as a broker in care of American Heritage Realty, Inc., 102 East Leeland Heights Boulevard, Lehigh, Florida 33936. At all times pertinent to the allegations contained herein, Respondent owned American Heritage Builders, Inc. (AHB). Rudolph L. Ferster, a certified contractor, served as vice-president in charge of construction for American Heritage Builders, Inc., from August 1978 until October 13, 1984. As a licensed contractor, he qualified American Heritage Builders as a residential contractor in the State of Florida. During the time he was with AHB, he supervised the construction of nearly 100 houses for the company. Most of these houses were one of four basic models. When Mr. Ferster left his association with AHB, another contractor, Warren Fuller, had been hired by Respondent to work with the company. He does not know whether Mr. Fuller ever qualified AHB or not. On January 23, 1983, employees of the Respondent entered into a contract with William D. Thomas for the construction and purchase of a lot and house to be constructed thereon by AHB. Contract price was $30,737 for the entire package and Mr. Thomas put down a $4,000 deposit. The balance of $26,737 was to be paid at the start of construction which, in the contract, was stated to be April 15, 1983. The Administrative Complaint alleges that Respondent delayed construction of the Thomas property for over two years and then abandoned it, causing a $6,000 plus loss to Mr. Thomas. The Thomas property was contracted initially to be a shell home. Mr. Thomas was going to do much of the work himself. When Respondent could no longer do the work due to the lack of licensure status, Mr. Thomas contracted with Fred D. Elliott, a certified residential contractor to complete the property which at the time was 50 percent done. Respondent took Mr. Elliott to Mr. Thomas with whom Elliott made an agreement directly. At that time, Mr. Thomas still owed approximately $8,000 on the work agreed upon in the original contract. The additional $6,000 alleged in the Administrative Complaint was for work agreed upon by Mr. Thomas over and above that called for in the initial contract and was in no way connected to the work left undone by Respondent. On January 30, 1984, employees of the Respondent entered into a similar contract with Clarence and Lillian Tap for the construction and purchase of a house and lot in Lehigh Acres to be built by AHB. Mr. Tap intended to pay cash for his purchase and agreed to the construction of a residence on a particular lot which had been shown to him by Respondent's employees. Several days after signing the contract, however, Respondent's employees telephoned him telling him that though the lot he had selected was not available, he could have the lot next door. Since the lot he had selected was a corner lot and the lot subsequently offered was an interior lot, he rejected this offer and Respondent's employees offered to show him other lots with the caveat that if the new lot he selected was more expensive than the original, he would have to pay the difference. Mr. Tap agreed and selected a new lot for an additional cost of $2,500. The original contract was for a total purchase price of $34,995 with $18,250 to be paid down at start of construction on March 1, 1984, and three additional payments to be made periodically at various stages of construction. When the new lot was decided upon, however, a new contract was drawn up and signed by the parties which reflected the new purchase price. It also called for Mr. Tap to apply for a mortgage in the amount of $8,500 with appropriate adjustments to other cash payments. At the time, Mr. Tap was not sure he would be able to make the total cash payment called for since his prior owned mobile home had not yet sold. Because of this development regarding the application for mortgage, Respondent included this parcel in the security given for his half million dollar line of credit with Florida Federal Savings and Loan. As Mr. Tap was not going to make the total cash payment, Respondent would need to secure a fund draw from Florida Federal in order to complete construction. This created a substantial problem not only for Respondent, but for Tap as well. The Taps did not have to take out a mortgage after all, but were able to pay cash for the entire property when it was completed. However, because of financial difficulties that had come up between Respondent and Financial Federal by that time, the lending institution was unwilling to release the Tap property from its security agreement even though Respondent was willing to pay the entire amount due on that property. When the Taps could get no satisfaction from Respondent, they hired an attorney who got him to sign a warranty deed in favor of the Taps, transferring title to the property in question. At the time, Respondent and the Taps' attorney both knew that there was still a security interest in the property in the hands of Florida Federal but Respondent was of the opinion, based on conversations and correspondence he had with the institution, that they were going to release the Tap property. As a result, he signed the warranty deed and advised the Taps at the time that they should receive their copy of the deed within four to six weeks. This time was supposedly sufficient to allow payment of the outstanding obligation to Florida Federal and Florida Federal's recordation of the deed from AHB to the Taps. However, Florida Federal refused to release the Taps' property and has subsequently initiated foreclosure action against it to recover the $30,400 they claim to be due and owing on that section of the line of credit. Mr. Tap has offered to pay the entire $30,400 to Florida Federal in addition to the full amount of the contract price he has already paid to Respondent, but Florida Federal refuses to accept any partial payment. Instead, it insists upon satisfaction of the entire line of credit which now is approximately $200,000. On April 17, 1984, employees of the Respondent entered into a contract with Davis and Reba Williamson as purchasers of a new house to be constructed by AHB on a lot already owned by the Williamsons which they had purchased separately from the Lehigh Corporation for $8,000. Mr. Williamson paid AHB approximately $12,000 down payment on a home to cost $34,245. The house was not completed until October 1985, at which time the Williamsons took possession. They noticed that mechanics' liens had been placed on the property but these were satisfied by the Respondent with funds coming from Financial Federal prior to the Williamsons taking possession. It would appear that the liens were the result of the failure of the actual building contractor, Mr. Price, of New Homes of Lee County, to pay suppliers and subcontractors. When Mr. Williamson looked at the permit posted outside the construction, he first learned AHB was not actually doing the construction. Prior to that time, though Respondent, Mr. Anglickis had not so represented, Williamson had assumed AHB was the actual constructor. When Mr. Williamson spoke with Mr. Price about the liens, he was advised that the construction had stopped because Respondent owed Price money. Respondent denies this and there is no evidence presented by either side to establish the truth of that allegation. The house was subsequently completed by Mr. Williamson acting as his own contractor and hiring subcontractors to do the actual work through the assistance of Mr. Ohlhausen, the DPR investigator, to whom he had complained previously. The materialmen and subcontractors were paid by Mr. Anglickis who issued funds from the construction loan. No additional funds were required of Mr. Williamson. Respondent did not do the final construction to complete the property because, not being a licensed contractor, he could not lawfully do so. On July 26, 1984, the employees of the Respondent entered into a contract with Samuel J. and Dorothy Sapp to construct a house on a lot already owned by the Sapps for a total price of $56,347. The contract called for the Sapps to apply for a mortgage in the amount of $36,000. To facilitate the transaction, the Sapps conveyed the lot they owned to AHB. Respondent admits the home was not built even though the lot was conveyed and Mr. Sapp paid in a deposit of $21,324. When the property was not constructed, Respondent reimbursed Mr. Sapp in the amount of $20,000 which constituted his deposit minus certain expenses incurred for such things as survey fee, attorney fee, mortgage fees and the like. Respondent claims that prior to 1978 when Mr. Ferster came on board, there had always been a licensed contractor to qualify AHB. Initially, upon first purchasing the business, Respondent used all licensed contractors who had worked for the corporation when it was owned by Lehigh Corporation. Respondent assumed that the contractors he utilized were doing the same thing for him as the owner of the corporation in order to keep matters legal as they had done when the corporation was owned by Lehigh Corporation, and for many years this was the case. Mr. Ferster maintained AHB as a qualified contractor until he left in 1984. It was at point that the new contractors utilized by Respondent, Mr. Price in particular, failed to qualify the corporation with their licenses. However, Respondent contends, and the evidence seems to establish, that at no time did Respondent ever represent himself as a licensed contractor to the buyer of the homes in question here. In fact, he did not even speak with them until well after the contracts were signed by the purchasers and his signature appearing thereon in each case is an ex post facto action on his part. The problems which confront Respondent herein deal with his relationship with Florida Federal with whom he had established a half million dollar line of credit. Just about the time these current houses were coming up for construction, Respondent's relationship with Florida Federal deteriorated. It well may be that his financial arrangements with the institution were less than satisfactory. Evidence of this was not forthcoming from either party. However, it has been shown that each of the properties in question was made a part of the security for Respondent's line of credit which had fallen delinquent. Florida Federal indicated its intention to foreclose and, with few exceptions, took the position that the mortgage which it held on Respondent's properties did not provide for releases of individual parcels. Though this may have been the case, and the mortgage was not introduced, Respondent testified, and there is no reason to disbelieve him, that prior to the time in question, as a practice, Florida Federal did release individual parcels upon payment of the amount represented as the construction loan in each case. Respondent assumed that this practice would continue but in the case of the Sapps' property, it did not. Respondent has, from the very beginning, made a good faith effort to secure the release of the Taps' property which should not have been made a portion of the security in the first place. The Williamson property was released and they acquired a clear title to it. When the Tap property was completed and ready for closing, Mr. Tap brought the $8,500 still outstanding with him to the closing. Florida Federal, however, would not accept this money because it was not the full payoff on Respondent's construction loan. While Respondent brought with him the amount he thought was due, the figure was wrong and Florida Federal would not accept the amount offered since both his amount and the $8,500 Tap payment still did not constitute the full amount due under the construction loan. Thereafter, Florida Federal would not accept the correct amount due on this particular property even though Respondent offered and had available to him sufficient funds to make the full payment. The $500,000 line of credit was not renewed by the Respondent at his own choice when it became time for the rollover. However, because there were still four homes still in work, Respondent offered to roll over a lesser amount, $161,000, which was agreed upon by Florida Federal by letter dated March 14, 1985. At the time of this letter, Mr. Tap's property had been completed three months previously and Respondent had given Tap a warranty deed. Respondent asked Florida Federal on an almost daily basis for the payoff on the Tap loan so that he could have that portion of the mortgagee released. However, he was never given it. At the time, Respondent was working with Florida Federal to get as many properties released as he could and though Florida Federal verbally agreed to work with Respondent, it appears he never got any cooperation. In fact, by letter dated April 3, 1985, Financial indicated that if the unpaid principal balance was not paid in full by April 13, 1985, foreclosure action would be initiated. When Respondent received this letter he immediately called Florida Federal. He was advised orally that he could have a second chance and that papers would be forwarded for him to sign, but he never received them. Instead, on April 18, 1985, he received a letter stating that he had failed to meet the terms and conditions of the previous offer and that it was rescinded. Respondent wrote back on April 24 protesting the decision and alleging a mistake. Nothing was done until July 17, almost three months later, when he was again advised in writing that the bank would consider a proposal from him. Respondent responded quickly and on August 27, received a reply from the bank apologizing for the failure to respond to his proposal and indicating that the matter was still open for negotiation. Nonetheless, Mr. Tap has still not been given the opportunity to pay off his property. Florida Federal refuses to accept any pay off for individual homes unless the entire line of credit is paid in full. During the period of these negotiations, Florida Federal accepted two other loans for Respondent's line of credit but has refused to advance any funds under these loans. One of these is the Sapp house. Florida Federal took the Sapp lot previously deeded to AHB as security for the line of credit and refuses to release it though no funds have been advanced for any construction on that lot. Respondent, in addition to reimbursing Mr. Sapp $20,000 of his deposit, has offered payment for the lot or an exchange of lots, but Mr. Sapp has declined. With regard to the Tap house, covered by a $30,400 construction loan, Respondent has offered Florida Federal $50,000 in cash to release this property but the institution refuses insisting that the full line of credit be paid off. Respondent contends that he has never received a complaint from Mr. Williamson or any of the other individuals listed in the Administrative Complaint. This is so found. Charles Matheny, assistant to the President of Lehigh Corporation, the developer of Lehigh Acres, has known the Respondent for nearly 19 years, having first met him when Respondent worked for the corporation in advertising and promotion. Respondent left Lehigh Corporation at some point in the interim. When he did so, he purchased certain assets of the corporation which included the name American Heritage Builders, Inc., and the model site owned by the corporation. At that point, Respondent went in business for himself and started American Heritage Realty in order to market the property and homes he built. According to Mr. Matheny, Respondent was active in little league in years past though he had, at the time, no children of his own, and when doing so, was instrumental in molding the character of the children who played for him for the better. Respondent has also been active in the junior Chamber of Commerce and reportedly was President of the statewide organization. He has also been active in other community activities such as the local Chamber of Commerce and the Community Day Care Center. He is known to be quite charitable and devotes a considerable amount of time and money to charitable activities. As Mr. Matheny knows it, Respondent's reputation for truth and honesty in the community is good. He has never heard any reports to the contrary. Respondent was interviewed by Mr. Ohlhausen in 1984 in regard to a complaint filed by the Construction Industry Licensing Board relating to Respondent serving as a contractor without a license. When Ohlhausen advised Respondent he was operating in violation of the law, Respondent appeared not be to aware of this. When so advised, he immediately agreed to sign a cease and desist agreement and stopped all further construction activity. He cooperated fully with efforts of the Department to get the properties completed and in the hands of the owners.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that the Administrative Complaint against Respondent herein be dismissed. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 20th day of April, 1988. ARNOLD H. POLL0CK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 (904) 488-9765 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of April, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 87-2619 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. By the Petitioner 1 - 4. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Rejected as contra to the weight of the evidence. Accepted and incorporated herein. Rejected as contra to the weight of the evidence. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Irrelevant. By the Respondent Not a Finding of Fact. Not a Finding of Fact - more a comment on the pleadings. 3 - 4. Accepted and incorporated herein. 5a. Accepted and incorporated herein. 5b. Accepted and incorporated herein. 5c. Accepted and incorporated herein. 5d. Accepted and incorporated herein. 5e. Accepted and incorporated herein. 5f. Accepted and incorporated herein. 5g. Accepted and incorporated herein. 6. Accepted and incorporated herein. COPIES FURNISHED: James H. Gillis, Esquire DPR, Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801 Howard Anderson, Esquire Post Office Box 767384 Roswell, Georgia 30076-7384 Darlene F. Keller Acting Executive Director DPR, Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801 William Bilenky, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750
