The Issue The issue presented by this case concerns the question of whether the Respondent, State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services has exhausted all treatment for the Petitioner, Charles Peavy, through available sex offender programs administered by the Respondent. See Section 917.20, Florida Statutes (1977).
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner submitted a "Petition for Administrative Determination" to the State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. This Petition was received by the Division of Administrative Hearings on July 15, 1981, as transmitted by the State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. That Department has requested the Division to conduct a formal hearing in keeping with Subsection 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. The matter was originally set for hearing on August 14, 1981, and upon motion of the Petitioner, was reestablished for hearing on September 1, 1981. The hearing was conducted on the aforementioned date. In the course of the final hearing, the Petitioner offered no testimony or presentation in his own behalf. Respondent called as witnesses Robert Alcorn, Clinical Director for the mentally Disordered Sex Offender Program at Florida State Hospital Mike Pomeroy, Petitioner's attending clinical psychologist at Florida State Hospital Connie Smith, Petitioner's social worker at Florida State Hospital and Dr. M. M. Estes, Forensic Unit Psychiatrist at Florida State Hospital. Respondent's Exhibits 1 and 2 were admitted into evidence. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Petitioner has been in the custody of the Respondent in keeping with orders of court and the authority of Chapter 917, Florida Statutes (1977). During that time the Petitioner has resided in the Florida State Hospital, Chattahoochee, Florida, where he has undergone treatment in a hospital program for the benefit for mentally disordered sex offenders. This program and similar programs in other institutions administered by the Respondent require a high degree of motivation on the part of the patient in order to achieve success. Although the Petitioner has been subjected to a full range of treatment opportunities he has made no significant progress in the course of his stay, due to a persistent lack of motivation on his part. In the face of this circumstance, the Respondent has made a preliminary determination that it has exhausted all pertinent treatment for the Petitioner, through the program in which he is enrolled. Additionally, it has been concluded that similar programs within the State of Florida do not offer other opportunities for progress. Thus, the petitioner has requested the formal hearing which is the subject of this Recommended Order. The history of this case reveals that the Petitioner was originally admitted into the program from a commitment order of the court after being charged with the offense of involuntary sexual battery, that commitment coming in January, 1979. The Petitioner having failed to demonstrate reasonable progress, a decision was made in March, 1980, through a staffing conference to the effect that the hospital had exhausted treatment in the facility Florida State Hospital. Likewise, in a departmental screening conducted by the various clinical directors of the several sex offender programs in the State of Florida, held in May, 1980, it was concluded that the Petitioner should be returned to court for reason of exhaustion of treatment. On June 4, 1980, the Petitioner was recommitted to the sex offender program by order of court and the Florida State Hospital reinstituted its treatment of the Petitioner. In January, 1981, a staffing was held on the Petitioner and a decision was reached that the hospital had exhausted treatment for the benefit of the patient. This decision was followed by a decision in February, 1981, by the interdepartmental screening committee of several sex offender programs within the State, to the effect that the overall system had exhausted treatment. Following the February decision, counsel for the Petitioner requested a formal hearing; however, before that hearing could be convened, the Petitioner determined that he did not wish the hearing and was returned to court in April, 1981. The Petitioner was then returned to the Florida State Hospital by order of court on May 22, 1981, and has remained in the hospital since that time. At present, the Petitioner's underlying condition is diagnosed as that of a person with an antisocial personality disorder, severe, with a diagnostic profile which places him in the category of sex offender within the meaning of Chapter 917, Florida Statutes (1979). Contributing to this diagnostic impression is a severe case of substance abuse related to alcohol and substitutes for that chemical, together with a dependence on the psychotrogic medication Mellaril. While the patient has been involved in the program at Florida State Hospital, and has been exposed to the primary therapy of that hospital, namely group therapy, with certain adjunctive therapy and has been treated by numerous therapists, there has been no discernible success. The principal reason for the failure of the patient Peavy has been his lack of motivation, which is an essential prerequisite to success in the program. In this respect, in the course of his stay in the program, the Petitioner has not demonstrated an interest in making progress in the sex offender program. Mike Pomeroy, his primary therapist from May, 1980, until early 1981, through his testimony identified some of the features of the Petitioner's condition. As established by Pomeroy, the main problem with the Petitioner is that difficulty with substance abuse related herein, with the sex offense problem being an underlying feature of that difficulty. In this area, the Petitioner has been willing to discuss sex offenses to include the one for which he had been placed in the program and the others, but only in a superficial way. Pomeroy discovered that the substance abuse of Mellaril dates from approximately the 17th birthday of the patient, who was born on October 19, 1952. During the time of Pomeroy's involvement as therapist it has been necessary isolate the patient from any substance which might give him a "high." The patient has been known on five or six occasions to drink floor wax, 409 cleaner, etc., and at other times the staff has been suspicious that the patient has consumed this type material, in view of the patient's demeanor. While Pomeroy was the primary therapist, the Petitioner used the psychotropic medication Mellaril to maintain a mood, as opposed to a treatment for traditional thought disorders. Attempts to cut back on the amount of the Mellaril dosage have led to hostile episodes in which the patient made threats to hurt other persons. On one occasion, in an attempt to possibly have the patient relocated in a sex offender program in the South Florida State Hospital, the State tried to decrease the Mellaril from the dosage of 600 mgs. per day out of a possible 800 mgs., with 200 mgs. being an average dose. After one or two days, it was determined that the Petitioner was not making an effort to reduce his dependence on the medication Mellaril and it was necessary to isolate the Petitioner due to his behavior. (The Florida State Hospital was unable to effectuate a transfer to the South Florida State Hospital because that latter institution was unwilling to accept a person who had drug dependence, such as that of the Petitioner.) The reason for the isolation in this attempt to wean the Petitioner from the use of Mellaril, was due to confrontations with staff members. Pomeroy has spent more time with this patient than with any other patient in the history of Pomeroy's involvement as a therapist. He finds the Petitioner to be manipulative in playing members of the staff against each other, in the sense of reporting that one staff member has allowed him certain liberties, when in fact that has not proven to be true. The Petitioner, during his stay has agitated other patients in the sex offender program by his hyperactivity and constant attempts to borrow cigarettes from those patients and to do so in an intimidating way, and the Petitioner has even on one occasion thrown a chair at a patient. The Petitioner's attendance in the group therapy sessions which are the most vital phase of the treatment process has been irregular. When he has attended, his discussion in the course of the session has been of matters unrelated to the treatment program. Petitioner has also failed to attend adjunctive therapy sessions, notwithstanding the fact that he was allowed his choice of sessions to attend. In particular, he was allowed to attend the alcoholic rehabilitation program within the hospital and his attendance in those sessions was poor. This performance on the part of the patient has led therapist Pomeroy to comment that the Petitioner has done less to participate in the programs than any patient Pomeroy has known. This participation is essential especially for those persons who are suffering from substance abuse. The Petitioner has been made aware of the consequences of not participating in the sense of his possible return to court and court actions which might lead to further incarceration and more importantly of long term problems which the Petitioner would have in life should he fail to come to grips with his problems. Nonetheless, progress is not forthcoming, and the sexual problem which the Petitioner has is still in evidence, together with the substance abuse. The Florida State Hospital staff has also consulted professionals outside the sex offender program who might be able to deal with the problem with substance abuse however, the attempts have met with no success, in that the outside professionals have indicated that no progress will be made without proper motivation. In particular, the use of Antabuse as a deterrent to alcohol consumption would not be appropriate in view of the fact that this substance is dangerous if the patient is not well motivated. Other observations which are accepted, as made by therapist Pomeroy, establish that the Petitioner has only spoken about himself in one group session that the Petitioner continues to find it difficult to talk about things of a personal nature and that the Petitioner has no ability to get close to people as a means of breaking down the barriers necessary to come to some understanding of the myriad problems confronting him. In summary, from the point of view of Pomeroy and as accepted, the sex offender program has been exhausted in dealing with the Petitioner s circumstance and although the Petitioner continues to meet the definition of disordered sex offender, the placement of Petitioner in the programs administered by Respondent is not only inappropriate but is counterproductive. On the question of alternative placement, Pomeroy is of the persuasion that an institutional setting such as the prison system would allow the Petitioner to "get along about the same as here," meaning the Florida State Hospital. Connie Smith, a social worker who dealt with the Petitioner between January, 1981, and April, 1981, found his participation in group therapy, out of twenty (20) sessions, to be one of seven (7) appearances, within which he only stayed fifteen (15) minutes on two (2) occasions. Then he attended, he sat away from the group and offered no active participation. (At the time that he was attending the sessions, the Petitioner knew that a decision had been made on exhaustion of treatment and he expressed the desire to leave the hospital setting.) Staff psychiatrist, Dr. M. M. Estes, in the course of his testimony, concurred with the diagnostic impression of antisocial personality disorder, severe. He finds that the Petitioner gets along well with other persons as long as he is having his way. He finds that the Petitioner is intolerant of any regimented style of life, such as the hospital setting. In speaking to the issue of the use of Mellaril, the amount of 600 mgs. is a high amount and through the process of the De utilization of that substance, over the years, the patient now suffers from a side effect known as tardive dyskinesia. This condition and its appearance is close to that of Huntingtons-Cohrea. In this patient, the condition has manifested itself as an involuntary movement of the tongue and other muscles. Peavy has been advised not to use this medication as a mild palliative, this advice coming from Dr. Estes. As stated before, attempts have been made to have Peavy withdraw from the use of this medication, but when this has been attempted, Peavy has threatened violance in the sense of indicating his willingness to "tear up the place." Nonetheless, Dr. Estes is of the persuasion that the Petitioner's neurological condition as described will continue to get worse if he persists in the use of the psychotropic medication. Dr. Estes' observations established that the patient has the mental capacity to recognize what he is doing and he is found to be in touch with reality and in touch with time and knowledgeable of right and wrong, in the theoretical sense. Nevertheless, the Petitioner has never had to suffer the consequences of his criminal acts and remains unconvinced of those consequences. According to Dr. Estes and as established through his testimony, the patient is not benefiting from the sex offender program of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services and there is no real likelihood of improving in his condition through involvement in that program. Moreover, continued participation will only hinder the patient. Dr. Estes identified the fact that drug dependence does not impair the ability to make progress in the program, but the nature of the underlying diagnosis of antisocial personality is one which calls for external control and the need to learn conformity and the fact that the conformity is not threatening. The patient has not achieved those improvements in that he becomes frustrated and exasperated easily, as established by Dr. Estes. At this time, there is no sign of organic degeneration in the patient as a result of substance abuse, but that potential exists, per Dr. Estes. The report of Dr. Paul Deitchman, dated December 1980, was also admitted. Dr. Deitchman is a clinical psychologist, who examined the Petitioner upon request of Petitioner's counsel. In his report, Dr. Deitchman is supportive of the position of the Respondent on the question of returning the Petitioner to court for reason of exhaustion of treatment.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services finding that it has exhausted all appropriate treatment for Charles Peavy, and that said Charles Peavy be returned to the committing court for further disposition. DONE and ENTERED this 28th day of September, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of September, 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: Ken Driggs, Esquire Assistant Public Defender Post Office Box 671 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Ted Mack, Esquire Florida State Hospital Chattahoochee, Florida 32324 William Ploss, Esquire Assistant Public Defender 1351 Northwest 12th Street Miami, Florida 33125
The Issue Whether petitioner suffered sexual harassment for which respondent is answerable, or whether, on account of her sex, respondent discriminated against her by paying her unequal wages, or whether, in terminating her employment, respondent retaliated against her on account of statutorily protected activity?
Findings Of Fact In April, of 1982, the year after her 19-year marriage to a Mr. Powell, whose surname she originally kept, came to an end, petitioner Gloria Patricia Hord, as she has been known since her remarriage in August of 1984, began work for respondent Bell Aerospace Textron, which has since become the Textron Marine Systems Division of Textron, Inc. (Textron). A defense contractor that builds landing craft air cushion vehicles and trains Navy personnel to operate them, Textron employs perhaps 130 persons in Panama City alone. Textron has a written policy against sexual harassment by or of its employees. As Textron's director of logistics at its Panama City facility, George Gust Alepakos, told the petitioner she was hired on April 3, 1982. Robert L. Ormsby and Albert Eugene "Bud" Small, the supervisor of inventory control who, as her immediate supervisor, shared an office with her when she began, had already interviewed her. Bell hired her as a clerk, general class III in labor grade N-6. The duties of general class III clerks are: Under general supervision, performs a variety of clerical work, where there is individual responsibility for the accuracy and completeness of important records and where decisions within the limits of policies or rules are required. Performs duties such as or similar to the following: supervises and works with a small group of clerks; sets up and maintains record systems of a widely varying nature, including secret or confidential material or information; prepares and issues reports as required; contacts other personnel as necessary in maintaining accurate records; reads reports, correspondence, publications, etc., and abstracts therefrom information pertaining to a particular subject; may perform miscellaneous duties relate dot office work, such as filing, operating various machines, etc. (sic). Respondent's Exhibit No. 23. According to Bell's job description, "demonstrated supervisory ability", is a desirable qualification for general class III clerks. In addition to processing receipts and keeping inventory logs, Patty Powell, as her co-workers then called her, typed and did other secretarial chores for Textron. She worked in a trailer which housed other offices and other workers, including Carol Bjorgan, Robert L. Ormsby, Monica Mitchell, Mike Pate, Mike Smith, Betty Brandon, and George Alepakos, to whom Mr. Small reported. Mr. Alepakos was in the adjoining office. Witnesses described Mr. Alepakos as personable, fun loving, happy go lucky, warm, friendly, outgoing, talkative, loud, sometimes grouchy, displaying a temper at times without being a screamer, dedicated, conscientious, a hard worker and a firm manager. He looked at the hearing to be in his sixties. The time Ms. Powell told him he reminded her of her grandfather, he said she had hurt his feelings. One day as Ms. Powell, then 36 years old, was typing, Mr. Alepakos stood behind her and placed his hands on her shoulders, watching her finish a memorandum. Mr. Alepakos invited Ms. Powell to lunch on several occasions. He regularly took employees in his group to lunch, both male and female, individually and in groups. Conversations at lunch were "business-related" and "very professional" at first. The third or fourth time they ate lunch together, however, Mr. Alepakos professed his love for Ms. Powell. Thereafter, when Mr. Small left the office, Mr. Alepakos would stop in. Within a week of declaring himself at lunch, he said, "I really mean it." He told her she would grow to love him, would learn to, and began leaving notes for her, typically like the one that said, "I love you," signed "George ." She "tried to laugh it off," questioning his sincerity. He was married, and she had a boyfriend. Beginning in the summer of 1982, he asked her almost daily for lunch. He telephoned to inquire, "Have I told you today that I love you?" Sometimes she went to lunch with him during this period, but more often she declined. He promised to behave if she accepted his invitations for lunch, but, in Ms. Powell's view, he welshed on these promises. She had mixed feelings about George Alepakos. She discussed with Carol Bjorgan the possibility of a relationship with him. By this time, her boyfriend Chip McDill had left her in the lurch. It would be nice to have someone older to take care of her, she mused aloud; and she felt she would be better off materially. Never once did she complain to Carol Bjorgan about Mr. Alepakos' romantic interest in her. She left him notes. One note, signed "Patty" and written on notepaper depicting two smiling bees among azalea blossoms, read, "Have a wonderful vacation, then hurry back." Respondent's Exhibit No. 2. One night she and Carol were drinking during "happy hour." Saying she wanted to talk to George, she telephoned his home, but hung up when his wife answered. She sometimes seemed to boast about Mr. Alepakos' taking her to lunch, asking, "Guess who I'm going to lunch with?" At Peddlers Alley one night, Mlles. Hord and Bjorgan met Mr. Alepakos for drinks. When they arrived, Ms. Hord playfully pretended to sit in Mr. Alepakos' lap, and said to Ms. Bjorgan, "We can handle it from here." In December of 1982, both Mr. Alepakos and Ms. Powell attended a party at a bar or restaurant. Mr. Alepakos "didn't think much" of her going out with the 23-year old man who escorted her to the party, danced with her, kissed her while they were on the dance floor, and, later in the evening, wrestled with her in the back seat of an automobile parked outside the establishment. He felt that "it looked bad for the company." The next morning, he called her into his office, told her she had "fallen off [her] pedestal," and that somebody had said she had behaved like a slut. Over the Christmas holidays she was in the hospital, and afterwards visited her mother in Atlanta. Mr. Alepakos called her there at the number she had given him, to ask about her health and to learn when she was coming back to work. On her return she talked things over with Mr. Small, her immediate supervisor, although she never told him about Mr. Alepakos' touching her. He advised her to decline the luncheon invitations and avoid Mr. Alepakos as much as possible. He spoke to Mr. Ormsby about the matter, at her request. In deference to Ms. Powell, who asked that nobody say anything to Mr. Alepakos, Mr. Small spoke to Mr. Ormsby "off the record." At some point, Mr. Alepakos called on Ms. Powell at the apartment she had recently moved into at Panama City Beach. She had invited him. When he arrived he found her with her daughter and stayed only about 20 minutes. Eventually Patty Powell went herself to Mr. Ormsby, and Mr. Ormsby took the matter up with Clarence L. Forrest, then the vice-president in charge of Textron's Panama City operations. Messrs. Ormsby and Forrest decided to transfer Ms. Powell to a general secretarial and word processing assignment in "the training trailer." The transfer was "lateral" in the sense that neither Ms. Powell's official job description nor her labor grade changed. In her new situation, she was involved in the production of training manuals. Bell hired two other word processing clerks to assist in this effort, Diane Ansell and April Dawn Day. Ms. Powell had recommended both Ms. Ansell and Ms. Day. She helped train them when they began. Even after they had learned the ropes, she gave them work to do which she proofread afterwards. If she was out, Ms. Ansell would assume these duties. Ms. Powell wrote out evaluations for Ms. Ansell and Ms. Day, although she never signed them. She did once sign an overtime authorization form, but Mr. Forrest sent it back for Mr. Higgins' signature and resubmission. She assumed her new duties in February of 1983, but invitations to lunch and expressions of affection continued after the transfer. One afternoon, just after Ms. Powell left the office, Mr. Alepakos said to Diane Ansell, "I love that girl," referring to Ms. Powell. After she told Mr. Ormsby that Mr. Alepakos would not leave her be, Mr. Forrest instructed Mr. Alepakos to cease and desist from any activity involving Ms. Powell unrelated to professional requirements, and directed him to communicate with her, if at all, through third parties. During the ensuing eight or nine months, Mr. Alepakos avoided Ms. Powell entirely. He "went the other way around when he saw her coming." In the fall of 1983, however, they were both at an office party at the Long Glass. She grabbed his shirt and led him into another room, where she asked him why he had been avoiding her. According to a friend and co-worker, petitioner was not "an outward flirt," except when she drank. Encouraged by the evening's events, Mr. Alepakos resumed his attentions. He telephoned several times a day, unless he was angry, and they began lunching together again. At various times, she told him she was at the point of reconciliation with her ex-husband, that she was seeing a boyfriend, and that she was gay. But she accepted a good many of his luncheon invitations, which was enough to inspire him to several proposals of marriage. In November of 1983, Ms. Powell came to work early one morning and made her way in the still dark trailer to the word processing room. Suddenly Mr. Alepakos, whom she had not seen nor expected to be there, embraced her and tried to kiss her. When the lights came on, he said, "I'm sorry", and left. During this period, Ms. Powell worked under the immediate supervision of Frank Higgins, who left civilian employment with the Navy and began with Textron in August of 1983. In early December of that year, Ms. Powell spoke to Mr. Higgins about Mr. Alepakos. After a second conversation on the subject, on February 9, 1984, Mr. Higgins stated, in a "Memo For the Record": FOR BACKGROUND, PATTY IS AN EXTREMELY QUIET, SHY PERSON WITH A RATHER "FRAGILE" QUALITY. SHE IS A DEDICATED PROFESSIONAL IN HER APPROACH TO HER JOB. SHE HAS NEVER APPEARED TO PROJECT (AVERT OR OTHERWISE) HER SEXUALITY AT WORK, DRESSES CONSERVATIVELY - AN IDEAL FEMALE WORKER IN TERMS OF NOT BEING INVOLVED TO ANY EXTENT WITH HER MALE CO- WORKERS OTHER THEN PROFESSIONALLY. SHE HAS NOT AND PROFESSES NO[T] TO WANT TO DATE ANYONE FROM WORK. GEORGE IS APPARENTLY "LEANING" ON HER AT WORK TO THE POINT SHE'S BECOMING EMOTIONALLY FRAZZLED OVER IT. HE PROFESSES TO BE IN LOVE AND "WANTS HER." GEORGE IS INSANELY JEALOUS OF HER BEING SURROUNDED BY ALL THESE MEN AND TOLD HER THAT DAVE STULTS, BOB NISSLEY AND MYSELF ARE OR MAY WANT TO BE ROMANTICALLY INVOLVED. HE CALLS HER SEVERAL TIMES SOME DAYS, SOMETIMES ASKING HER TO COME TO HIS OFFICE WHERE "COMMENTS ARE MADE" TO HER. SHE IS AFRAID NOT TO GO OVER TO HIS OFFICE - APPARENTLY FEELS GEORGE IS A POWER BROKER AND IF SHE GETS HIM MAD, HE'LL TAKE IT OUT ON TRAINING BY NOT SUPPORTING OUR NEEDS. PATTY SAYS SHE HAS TRIED EVERY CONCEIVABLE APPROACH TO TELL GEORGE SHE IS NOT INTERESTED IN HIM AND HE'S ANNOYING HER & SHE WANTS IT STOPPED. YET HE REFUSES TO LEAVE HER ALONE. I TOLD HER THAT SHE NEEDS TO THREATEN HIM WITH HARASSMENT CHARGES & BE WILLING TO FOLLOW UP ON THEM TO THE BITTER END - IF GEO. KNEW SHE WAS SERIOUS AND HIS JOB WAS IN DANGER, I HOPE HE WOULD BE PRUDENT ENOUGH TO BACK AWAY. PATTY SEEMS RELUCTANT TO PRESS CHARGES FOR FEAR THAT SHE WILL END UP BEING FIRED AND PERCEIVED AS THE CAUSE OF THE PROBLEM. SHE FEELS CASEY WILL PROTECT GEORGE AND WOULD CONSIDER GEO. MORE IMPORTANT TO BELL THAN PATTY. IN PREVIOUS DISCUSSIONS WITH CASEY DATING BACK TO DECEMBER, I TOO SENSED THAT EITHER CASEY WASN'T BE[ING] OBJECTIVE OR FAIR IN HIS ASSESSMENT OF PATTY OR THAT POSSIBLY GEORGE HAD BEEN FEEDING CASEY LIES AND INNUENDO ABOUT PATTY'S POTENTIAL INVOLVEMENT WITH PERSONNEL IN TRAINING. THE APPARENT STRATEGY IS TO CAST DOUBTS ABOUT PATTY'S CHARACTER SUCH THAT IF HIS SITUATION EVER BOILED TO THE SURFACE HE COULD BLAME IT ON HER TO SAVE HIS JOB. I BELIEVE THERE IS ENOUGH INFO AVAILABLE TO HAVE GEO. REPRIMANDED OR FIRED OVER THIS. THERE ARE SEVERAL PEOPLE WHO HAVE SEEN OR HEARD GEO. MAKE APPROACHES TO HER WHO I'M SURE WOULD COME FORWARD TO SUPPORT PATTY'S POSITION. SINCE THE DISCUSSION WAS OFF THE RECORD I AGREED NOT TO APPROACH CASEY YET. I OFFERED TO SPEAK WITH GEO. BUT IF HE PERCEIVES ME AS A COMPETITOR FOR PATTY, HE OBVIOUSLY WOULD MISCONSTRUE MY INTENTIONS. I DO INTEND TO SPEAK TO LENNY MORGAN "OFF THE RECORD" NEXT WEEK IN NEW ORLEANS TO GAIN SOME ADDITIONAL INSIGHT IN HANDLING THIS ISSUE. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1. In a second "Memo For The Record," Mr. Higgins reported discussing the situation with Mr. Morgan, and summarized the latter's advice. * * * LENNY'S BOTTOM LINE WAS AS I SUSPECTED - DON'T LEAVE IT SIMMERING TAKE FIRM ACTION. BRING IT TO CASEY'S ATTENTION. LENNY INDICATED HE WOULD BE GLAD TO COME OVER AND BECOME DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN SOLVING THIS. * * * Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2. Although Mr. Higgins never showed these memoranda to "Casey" Forrest, who only learned of them after the present proceedings began, he did mention the situation to Mr. Forrest, who indicated that he wondered whether there was a "problem on both sides," but agreed to speak to Mr. Alepakos. By the time Mr. Higgins left Panama City, in July of 1984, he thought the situation had been resolved. About this time, Ms. Powell told Mr. Alepakos she planned to remarry. He responded that he would be there, if it did not work out. He said he still loved her, and he did not stop asking her out, although, after she became Mrs. Hord, she consistently declined. He continued to declare his love. Mrs. Hord again complained, this time to B. L. Nissley, Textron's director of training documentation, on or about December 15, 1985. Her complaint notwithstanding, she sent Mr. Alepakos a poinsettia for Christmas. At some point, she left a note on his desk, saying "Missing you, P.H." By a memorandum dated January 29, 1985, Mr. Nissley asked Mr. Forrest for a formal investigation "to assure that this problem be resolved once and for all." Respondent's Exhibit No. 6. On January 31, 1985, Mr. Forrest interviewed Mrs. Hord in Mr. Ormsby's presence. She reported the frequent invitations to lunch and a suggestion by Mr. Alepakos that they take a vacation together, but said nothing about his touching her. Messrs. Forrest and Ormsby also interviewed Mr. Alepakos. They decided it might be well for a disinterested third party to investigate, and asked Textron's Mr. Morgan to come over from New Orleans for the purpose. Mr. Morgan interviewed Mrs. Hord for two and a half hours on February 10 or 11, 1985. In answer to his questions, Mrs. Hord said that Mr. Alepakos had not asked her for sexual favors, and had not behaved vulgarly, lewdly or indecently. Nor did she advert to the early morning incident in the trailer, which Mr. Alepakos admitted at hearing, while denying any attempt to kiss her. When Mr. Morgan asked her if Mr. Alepakos had ever touched her, or tried to kiss her or to force himself on her, she answered no. Mr. Morgan asked Mrs. Hord to name others who could support her claim of harassment. She gave him only one name, Ms. Ansell's. Mr. Morgan also interviewed George Alepakos at length, and asked him to name others who could support his assertions. Mr. Alepakos gave him some five names. After interviewing these people and Ms. Ansell, Mr. Morgan returned to New Orleans and stated his conclusions in a memorandum dated February 15, 1985. Mr. Forrest wrote Mr. Alepakos a memorandum advising him that his "conduct in the matter lacked professionalism and good judgement." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 6. He was "warned to confine ... communications and relationships with Mrs. G. Hord to a professional/business environment." Id. This February 25, 1985, memorandum raised "the possibility of termination of [Alepakos'] employment," id. in the event "the cited harassments reoccur[ed]." Id. But the phrase "cited harassments" was a reference to the February 15, 1985, memorandum, Respondent's Exhibit No. 6, in which Mr. Morgan stated: Since the evidence indicates that the relationship was two sided, I find it difficult to describe the activity of Mr. Alepakos as one of harassment. Respondent's Exhibit No. 6, p. 2. Mr. Forrest did not warn or reprimand Mrs. Hord because he felt a supervisor or manager had a different responsibility in matters of this kind than an employee under supervision. At no time, did Mr. Alepakos tell her off color stories, show her pornographic photographs, explicitly solicit sexual favors, or make obscene gestures to or from Mrs. Hord. It fell to Messrs. Ormsby and Nissley to relay the results of Mr. Morgan's investigation to Mrs. Hord. The three of them gathered in Mr. Nissley's office, and he furnished her a copy to read. She had gotten part way through when she exclaimed, "That's a lie. I never sent him flowers. I never left notes on his desk." She threw down the report, and left the office, despite Mr. Nissley's telling her to stay. She dismissed the February 15, 1985, memorandum as a "bunch of bullshit." Mr. Nissley spoke to her afterwards and told her that he would not tolerate vulgar outbursts in the future. She telephoned Mr. Morgan and complained to him about the result of the investigation. She told him she did not think the report was fair or that it reflected what had happened. She became upset and characterized the report as "bullshit." To this he replied, "Wait a minute. I'll answer any question you want to ask." But she hung up the telephone. On January 30, 1985, Mrs. Hord had asked to take a leave of absence. Her request approved, she began thirty days' leave soon after she learned the results of Mr. Morgan's investigation. Upon her return, Mr. Nissley told her about the results of her annual evaluation, and informed her she had been given a raise of $.20 per hour. The $.20 raise took effect March 16, 1985. With the raise, Mrs. Hord was paid $7.90 per hour, a dollar an hour more than Diane "Dee" Ansell was paid. And Ms. Ansell was paid more than April Dawn Day, the third word processing clerk who helped produce training materials for Navy personnel. Mrs. Hord requested a meeting with Mr. Forrest to discuss the raise, which brought her salary to the highest authorized for her position; it was the same amount as the raise the other two word processing clerks in the training program received. But, since she was paid more than they were, the raise represented a smaller percentage of increase, and she objected. On the morning of March 27, 1985, when Mrs. Hord met with Mr. Forrest, Messrs. Ormsby and Nissley were also present. She told them Bell could keep the raise. Mr. Forrest began to explain the mechanics of Bell's merit raise system, when Mrs. Hord interrupted, "It's a bunch of bullshit. You can do anything you want." As she started to leave, Mr. Forrest told her to stay, but she refused. At one point, she called her bosses "jackasses." According to Mr. Forrest's secretary, who was outside, she "had a wild look" as she slammed the door on her way out. Before they dispersed, Mr. Forrest and the others decided to terminate her employment, unless Mr. Morgan advised against it. Mr. Forrest thought her language "unbecoming a lady." He certainly would not have expected a woman to use such language, and it did not affect him in the same way as it would have, if a man had used the same language. On the other hand, he would not have expected any of Bell's Panama City employees to use language of this kind in such a setting. Mr. Forrest testified under oath that Mrs. Hord was not fired because he found her language the more offensive on account of her femininity. Apprised of the situation, Mr. Morgan consulted a New York lawyer, then told management in Panama City he had no objection to firing Mrs. Hord. Mr. Ormsby then caused a memorandum to be addressed to Mrs. Hord, notifying her that her employment was "terminated as of this date (27 March 1985), for gross disrespect, incertituded (sic), premeditated and continued disregard for all levels of Management ... so as to challenge the management of this company and to incite disrespect of other employees ...." Respondent's Exhibit No. 10.
Recommendation It is, accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismiss Gloria Hord's petition for relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of September, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of September, 1987. APPENDIX Petitioner's proposed findings of fact Nos. 1, 5, 6, 7, 8, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 23, 24, 25, 26, 29, 30, 32, 33, 36, 37, 38, 39 and 40 have been adopted, in substance, insofar as material. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 2, the evidence showed that she worked as an acting supervisor for Columbia Research but not, as far as the hearing officer's notes reflect, for CSC. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 3, the evidence showed that Mr. Small interviewed her first. Mr. Alepakos, as his supervisor, could presumably have overruled Mr. Small's choice even if Mr. Small made the "basic decision" to hire. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 4 has been adopted, in substance, except that the evidence did not establish that he placed his hands on her shoulders more than once. With respect to petitioner's proposed findings of fact Nos. 9 and 10, the evidence did not reveal any sexual advances at this point, aside from declarations of love, which were not entirely unwelcome. Except for the last sentence, petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 11 has been adopted, in substance, insofar as material. With respect to the final sentence of No. 11 and the word "Again" in No. 13, it was not clear from the evidence that she went to Mr. Ormsby before Christmas. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 12, Mrs. Hord did not always go "to great lengths to avoid contact with Mr. Alepakos during this time period." She not infrequently accepted his invitations to lunch. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 14 has been rejected as against the weight of the evidence. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 16 has been adopted, in substance, insofar as material, except that Mr. Alepakos was not put on any formal probation. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact Nos. 21 and 22, the evidence showed that he resumed his attentions because of her advances. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 27, the evidence showed that he called, but not that he called frequently. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 28, he did not come by uninvited. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 31, he said she needed to see a doctor but not, in so many words, that the marriage would fail. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 34, nobody placed limits on Mr. Morgan's investigation. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 35 has been rejected as contrary to the evidence. She was not told she would be reprimanded for making good faith complaints. Respondent's proposed findings of fact Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 26, 29, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, the first two sentences of No. 38, Nos. 40, 41, 42, 43, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 58, 60, 61, 62, 65, 66, 70 and 72 have been adopted, in substance, insofar as material. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 4, she lived at Panama City Beach at one point. Respondent's proposed findings of fact Nos. 9 and 10 are immaterial or subordinate. Respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 11 is rejected. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 12, Ms. Bjorgan's testimony was that she was not sure Mrs. Hord wanted to see him that night. Respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 14 has been accepted, in substance, insofar as material, except for Small's suggested advice to change her manner of dress. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 25, Mrs. Hord was ambivalent about Mr. Alepakos before as after the incident. Respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 27 is rejected. Respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 28 blows a single incident out of proportion. Respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 30 is rejected. The final sentence of respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 38 is rejected, as is No. 39 to the extent it proceeds on the assumption there was any hiatus. Respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 44 has been adopted, in substance, except that the evidence did not establish that the poinsettia was flowering. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 57, the epithet was "jackasses." With respect to respondent's proposed findings of fact Nos. 59 and 64, Alepakos had no input, but the fact of her complaints was considered and inspired the call to Morgan. Respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 63 is immaterial, except that Alepakos' attentions did not cause great mental stress. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 67, his overtures were romantic. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 68, he did propose marriage. Respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 69 has been adopted, in substance, insofar as material, except for the final clause of the final sentence which is rejected. Respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 71 is immaterial or subordinate. COPIES FURNISHED: Alvin L. Peters, Esquire 36 Oak Avenue Panama City, Florida 32401 William B. deMeza, Jr., Esquire Holland and Knight Post Office Box 241 Bradenton, Florida 33506 Donald A. Griffin, Executive Director Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925 Dana Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925
The Issue The issue is whether Dr. Wise abused his position as a treating psychiatrist for five young women by using his influence over them to engage in sexual relationships with them in violation of Section 458.331(1)(k), Florida Statutes, (1979), [now codified as Section 458.331(1)(j), Florida Statutes (1987)] and whether he is therefore guilty of unprofessional or immoral conduct in violation of Section 458.1201(1), Florida Statutes, (1969) [now codified as Section 458.329, Florida Statutes, (1987)]. If Dr. Wise is guilty of any of these activities, he would also be guilty of violating Section 458.331(1)(x), Florida Statutes (1987), which proscribes the violation of any portion of Chapter 458. Sexual misconduct with patients would also constitute gross or repeated malpractice, which is forbidden by Section 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes (1987).
Findings Of Fact At all times material to the Administrative Complaint, Dr. Wise has been a licensed medical doctor, holding license ME0008520. He has been licensed in Florida since 1957 and practices in the area of Adult and Child Psychiatry in Miami. He has been a board certified psychiatrist in since 1965. Patient L. H. From July 1969 through April 1971, Dr. Wise treated L.H, who was 21 years of age. When she began treatment, she was experiencing panic attacks and had other problems resulting from sexual molestation as a child, rape, alcoholism, and family problems. At first she had visited Dr. Wise weekly, but toward the end of her 1 1/2 years of therapy, she saw him every other week. L.H. alleges that shortly before she terminated her treatment with Dr. Wise she had a severe panic attack which caused her to telephone Dr. Wise, who then offered to provide therapy at Dr. Wise's apartment. When she arrived, she says Dr. Wise was in his bathrobe, took her to the bedroom, told her to place her hand on his penis and had sexual relations with her. She also maintains that Dr. Wise saw her on one other occasion in his office, when no sex occurred. L. H. said nothing about Dr. Wise's conduct at the time the incident was to have taken place. Fourteen years later, L.H. was seeing a psychologist in St. Louis, Missouri, Dr. Gertrude Williams. In the course of therapy with Dr. Williams, L.H. stated that she had sexual intercourse with Dr. Wise while she was his patient. This disclosure to Dr. Williams is consistent with the testimony L. H. gave at the final hearing. In October of 1985, L.H. filed a complaint against Dr. Wise with the South Florida Psychiatric Society alleging sexual misconduct, but after a two-day hearing a panel of twelve doctors found against L.H. and in favor of Dr. Wise. The testimony of L. H. was no more persuasive in this case than it was before the Psychiatric Society. In October, 1985, L.H. also filed a complaint which the Department investigated, but found the charges unsubstantiated. No disciplinary action was initiated against Dr. Wise at that time. The evidence in the instant case with respect to the allegations of misconduct by Dr. Wise with L.H. was not clearly convincing or persuasive. Patient S.P. Dr. Wise treated S.P. from July, 1980 through July, 1981 at his office in Miami. She was then approximately 19 years old and had complaints of nervousness, insomnia and hyperventilation. She saw Dr. Wise approximately two times per week (on Tuesdays and Thursdays) for therapy. Although originally seen in the morning, her appointments were changed to late in the afternoon. S.P. alleges that within two months after beginning treatment, while she was sitting on the couch during a therapy session, Dr. Wise got up from another couch, sat down next to her and began to kiss her. She also alleges that during subsequent visits Dr. Wise had sexual intercourse with her. S.P. filed a civil lawsuit for malpractice against Dr. Wise alleging the same sexual misconduct alleged here as the basis for her damage claim. After a jury trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Dr. Wise. S.P.'s marriage failed while she was seeing Dr. Wise. She had often stayed out late, and told her husband that she was at therapy sessions with Dr. Wise. It is not clear whether these late night absences from home were actually the result of appointments with Dr. Wise or were the result of other appointments which she justified to her husband by claiming they were appointments with Dr. Wise. After terminating treatment with Dr. Wise, S.P. began seeing a Roman catholic priest who was also trained as a counselor. She told him that she had been seeing a local psychiatrist who, after a few sessions, had engaged in sexual intimacy with her. After moving back to her mother's home due to her breakup with her husband, S.P. also told her mother that she and Dr. Wise had been sexually intimate. These statements by S. P. were consistent with her testimony at final hearing; that the testimony is consistent, however, does not make it persuasive. Taken as a whole, the evidence that Dr. Wise may have engaged in a sexual relationship with S. P. is not clearly convincing. Patient L. M. Dr. Wise treated L.M. during the period from late 1972 through February of 1973. She was sixteen years old and was seeking to improve her relationship with her parents. She alleges that during one of her early visits Dr. Wise questioned her about the pimple on her forehead, and asked whether she had pimples on any other area of her body. She says she responded that she had a pimple on her back, and alleges that Dr. Wise then asked to see her back. When she lifted her pullover, she says Dr. Wise fondled her breasts briefly. Viewing the testimony of L.M. as a whole, the evidence is not clearly convincing that Dr. Wise ever fondled her breasts. Patient K. M. Dr. Wise treated K.M. from 1982, when she was 18 years old, until 1984. K. M. came to see Dr. Wise because of problems including an abortion she had when she was 15 years old, as well as a prior incestuous relationship with her brother. K.M. testified that she would go to Dr. Wise's office for treatment late in the evening, when they also would engage in sexual intercourse. She also testified that in 1985, after she terminated her therapeutic relation with Dr. Wise, she told her general practice physician, Dr. Peter Shea, during an office visit, that she had an affair with Dr. Wise. As with the foregoing witnesses, the statement made to Dr. Shea is consistent with K. M.'s testimony at final hearing, but that consistency does not enhance K. M.'s testimony. The testimony of K.M. concerning liaisons with Dr. Wise is not clearly convincing. Patient L. G. L.G. saw Dr. Wise beginning in April, 1974 when she was 21 years old. When she first came to Dr. Wise she complained of depression, unhappiness, and confusion. She told Dr. Wise that she was lonely and did not have a good relationship with men. Dr. Wise also treated L.G.'s sister, Joan. After about two months of seeing her on a weekly basis, L.G. alleges that Dr. Wise came over to the couch where she was sitting, embraced her, and during the course of the treatment, their physical relationship became more intimate. The intimacies were to have included oral sex which L.G. performed on Dr. Wise, which she thought was therapy for her psychological problems with sexual intimacy. L.G. terminated her relationship with Dr. Wise and began seeing a psychologist at the University of Miami, Edward Rappaport. During the course of treatment L.G. reported to Dr. Rappaport that she had been sexually involved with Dr. Wise. The testimony of L.G. at final hearing is consistent with the statement she made to Dr. Rappaport during therapy that Dr. Wise engaged in sex with her while she was seeing Dr. Wise for professional help. The consistency of the testimony does not make it persuasive. Considering the testimony of L.G. and Dr. Rappaport, the evidence offered to show that Dr. Wise had engaged in sexual intimacies with L.G. while she was seen as a patient is not clearly convincing.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Medicine enter a Final Order dismissing the second amended Administrative Complaint filed against Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 22rd day of May, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. DORSEY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22rd day of May, 1989. APPENDIX The following constitutes my rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes (1987). Rulings on Findings of Fact Proposed by the Department of Professional Regulation Covered in finding of fact 1. Covered in finding of fact 1. Accepted in findings of fact 2, 6, 10, 11 and 12. Covered in finding of fact 11. 6-7. Rejected for the reasons stated in finding of fact 11. Rejected as unnecessary. Covered in finding of fact 9. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Covered in finding of fact 11. 13 Covered in finding of fact 6. Covered in finding of fact 7, of the facts stated that are rejected. Rejected because the testimony of S.P. was not clearly convincing. Covered in finding of fact 9. Covered in finding of fact 9. The proposals concerning the telephone calls are rejected as unnecessary. Rejected because the testimony of S.P. was not clearly convincing. Covered in finding of fact 9. Rejected as subordinate to finding of fact 9. Rejected as subordinate to finding of fact 9. Covered in finding of fact 9. Covered in finding of fact 9. To the extent necessary, covered in finding of fact 24. The proposal concerning the telephone calls is rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. 26.-29. To the extent necessary, covered in finding of fact 10. Rejected as unnecessary. Covered in finding of fact 12. Rejected as unnecessary. Covered in finding of fact 13, although the proposals are rejected because L.G.'s testimony was not clearly convincing. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected because the testimony of L.G. is not clearly convincing. Rejected as unnecessary. 37.-38. To the extent necessary, covered in finding of fact 13. 39. Rejected as unnecessary. 40. Covered in finding of fact 13. 41.-42. Rejected because the testimony of L.G. was not clearly convincing. 43. Covered in finding of fact 2. Covered in finding of fact 3, although the proposed findings are rejected. Covered in finding of fact 3, although the proposed findings are rejected. Covered in finding of fact 3. Covered in finding of fact 4. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected because of the testimony of the complaining witnesses has not been clearly convincing. 50.-53. Rejected as unnecessary. 54. Rejected as unnecessary. Rulings on Findings of Fact Proposed By Dr. Wise Rejected as unnecessary. Covered in finding of fact 1. Covered in finding of fact 1. Covered in finding of fact 2. Covered in finding of fact 2 Covered in finding of fact 4. Covered in finding of fact 5. Rejected as unnecessary. Covered in finding of fact 5. Covered in finding of fact 6. Covered in finding of fact 6. Rejected as unnecessary. Covered in finding of fact 7. Covered in finding of fact 8. Covered in finding of fact 11. Rejected as unnecessary. Covered in finding of fact 11. Rejected as unnecessary. Covered in finding of fact 11. Covered in finding of fact 12. Covered in finding of fact 12. Covered in finding of fact 12, to the extent necessary. Covered in finding of fact 14. Covered in finding of fact 10. Covered in finding of fact 10. Rejected as unnecessary. Covered in finding of fact 10. Rejected as unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Susan Sewell, Esquire Law offices of Mark P. Lang 20 North Orange Avenue Suite 707 Post Office Box 2127 Orlando, FL 32802-2127 Jonathan King, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0750 Kenneth D. Easley, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0750 Dorothy Faircloth, Executive Director Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Medicine 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0750A =================================================================
The Issue Does the Department of Corrections' Sexual Harassment Policy, as contained in the Pamphlet "Sexual Harassment, Your Rights and Responsibilities", in a one-page document entitled "Department of Corrections Sexual Harassment Policy", and Chapter 7 of the Department's Personnel Procedures Manual, constitute umpromulgated rules, pursuant to Section 120.535 F.S.? Are existing Department of Corrections Rules 33-4.001(4)(a), 33-4.002(4), and 33-4.003(22) and (24), F.A.C. invalid exercises of delegated legislative authority due to vagueness, pursuant to Section 120.56 F.S.?
Findings Of Fact At all times material, Petitioner has been a career-service employee working as a Parole Officer I for DOC. He has earned a master's degree in criminology. At all times material, DOC has had in effect a one-page document entitled "Department of Corrections Sexual Harassment Policy" (P-5), a Pamphlet entitled "Sexual Harassment, Your Rights and Responsibilities" (P-3), and a Personnel Procedures Manual. Chapter 7 of the Personnel Procedures Manual is entitled "Sexual Harassment Complaints" (P-6). DOC has not adopted these documents as rules, and Petitioner here challenges them as unpromulgated rules. On February 22, 1996, Petitioner received written notice that he would be suspended without pay for ten days as a result of his violation of DOC Rules 33-4.001(4)(a), 33-4.002(4) and 33- 4.003(23)(25), F.A.C., (since renumbered) and the DOC's Policy on Sexual Harassment. The letter did not rely on Chapter 7 of the agency's Personnel Procedures Manual or its Pamphlet entitled "Sexual Harassment, Your Rights and Responsibilities". Petitioner appealed this action to PERC, which subsequently entered a recommended order upholding DOC's disciplinary action. Language from PERC's recommended order, which is pertinent to this instant rule challenge is: Florida Administrative Code Rule 33-4.001(4)(a) states, in pertinent part, that 'No . . . employee shall knowingly . . . commit any act or engage in any conduct which would violate any state statute, rule, directive or policy statement.' Florida Administrative Code Rule 33-4.002(4) states, in pertinent part, that 'Each employee . . . shall perform his duties fairly and impartially and otherwise conduct himself both on-duty and off-duty so as to command the respect of fellow employees, persons on parole, probation or otherwise under his supervision, inmates and the general public.' Florida Administrative Code Rule 33-4,.003(23) states that a first offense of conduct unbecoming a public employee is punishable by a written reprimand, up to a thirty day suspension or dismissal. Florida Administrative Code Rule 33-4.003(25) states that a first offense of willful violation of rules, regulations, directives or policy statements is punishable by a written reprimand, up to a thirty day suspension or dismissal. The DOC pamphlet entitled 'Florida Department of Corrections Sexual Harassment: Your Rights and Responsibilities,' provides, in pertinent part, as follows: Sexual Harassment requires two elements: The alleged conduct must be of a sexual nature, must be unwelcome and unwanted. Sexual harassment may be any of, but not limited to, the following: * * * continued suggestions regarding invi- tations to social events outside the work place, after being told such suggestions are unwelcome; * * * prolonged staring or leering to [sic] a person; * * * 32. State of Florida, Department of Corrections, Personnel Procedures Manual, Chapter 7, Sexual Harassment, provides, in pertinent part, as follows: * * * O. Sexual Harassment - Sexual Harassment is defined as unwelcome sexual advances, unwelcome requests for sexual favors, and other unwelcome verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature from or involving an employee's supervisors, peers, subordinates or any other persons in contact with an employee or applicant during the course of the conduct of the employee's or applicant's business when: Submission to such conduct is either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of employment; or Submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such individual; or Such conduct has the purpose or effect of interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive working environment. 33. The DOC Sexual Harassment Policy provides, in pertinent part, as follows: Sexual harassment may result from unwelcome sexual advances or a hostile environment created by conduct offensive to the victim such as suggestive or lewd comments, dirty jokes, offensive pictures or physical touching. Accordingly, all employees are being placed on notice that any employee found guilty of having engaged in sexual harassment will be severely disciplined, up to and including dismissal. * * * The charge of conduct unbecoming a public employee is a general charge that is subsumed if the Agency has a more specific charge that fully describes the alleged misconduct. Ford v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 9 FCSR Para. 148 (1993); Mathis v. Department of Corrections, 6 FCSR Para. 122 (1991). In this case, I conclude that the charge of unbecoming conduct is subsumed within the charge of sexual harassment and should be dismissed. PERC's recommended order also applied the foregoing provisions. At the date of formal hearing in the instant rule challenge, PERC had issued no final order. Before this instant Division of Administrative Hearings final order could be entered, PERC had extended the time for the parties to file exceptions to its hearing officer's recommended order, and ultimately, on August 13, 1996, PERC adopted its hearing officer's recommended order, thereby rendering Petitioner subject to future disciplinary action at the second occurrence level under Rule 33-4.003, F.A.C. The final order of PERC is now under appeal by Petitioner. These facts are officially recognized, sua sponte. Petitioner received copies of the Pamphlet, the Sexual Harassment Policy, and a copy of Chapter 33-4, F.A.C., on July 16, 1993, when he began employment with the agency. He did not receive a copy of Chapter 7 of the Personnel Manual and was unaware of it until his PERC proceeding. DOC imposes disciplinary action against its employees for conduct which constitutes sexual harassment. Petitioner received periodic training in agency seminars on the agency's Sexual Harassment Policy, including annual film presentations. He did not receive similar training regarding "conduct unbecoming a public employee", which is a term utilized in Section 110.227(1), F.S., and for which an employee may be disciplined. Section 110.227(1), F.S., also permits discipline of employees for "willful violation of the provisions of law or agency rules". Rule 33-4.001(4)(a), F.A.C., provides, in pertinent part: Responsibility for Conduct of Employees, Inmates and Others. No Administrator, Superintendent, Officer-In-Charge, Supervisor, or other employee shall knowingly permit any subordinate, inmate or other person to, nor shall he, commit any act or engage in any conduct which would violate any statute, rule, directive or policy statement . . . . Petitioner claims that Rule 33-4.001(4)(a), F.A.C., is vague as applied to him because he is not an administrator, superintendent, officer-in-charge, or a supervisor. According to Petitioner, this rule in only applicable to those who supervise subordinates. Rule 33-4.002(4), F.A.C., provides in pertinent part: (4) Each employee shall keep himself physically fit, mentally alert, personally neat and clean and shall perform his duties fairly and impartially, and otherwise conduct himself both on-duty and off-duty so as to command the respect of fellow employees, persons on parole, probation or otherwise under his supervision, inmates and the general public . . . . Rule 33-4.003, F.A.C., is entitled "Range of Disciplinary Actions" and lists a number of violations. Item (22) is "Conduct Unbecoming a Public Employee"; Item (24) is "Willful Violation of Rules, Regulations, Directives, or Policy Statements". The range of disciplinary penalties is increased at the second occurrence level under the rule. The agency Policy Statement, Pamphlet and Chapter 7 of the agency Personnel Manual state that sexual harassment is conduct unbecoming a public employee and contain definitions of sexual harassment, including hostile work place sexual harassment. The first sentence of the Pamphlet states that sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and is conduct unbecoming a public employee, as provided in Sections 110.105, 110.227 and 110.233, F.S., and Chapter 33-4, F.A.C. (Rules of the Department). The first page of the Pamphlet states EEOC guidelines defining sexual harassment, as recognized by the agency: Unwelcome sexual advances, unwelcome requests for sexual favors, and other unwelcome verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature when: Submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of a person's employment, or Submission to, or rejection of, such conduct by [sic] decisions affecting an individual, or Such conduct has the purpose or effect of substantially interfering with a person's work [sic] hostile or offensive working environment. The Pamphlet goes on to advise that sexual harassment requires two elements: conduct of a sexual nature/that is unwelcome and unwanted. It lists examples of harassing behavior, advises of the need to report such behavior, and explains the agency's internal complaint procedure and the procedure's protections against retaliation. It gives references for legal remedies outside the agency. Chapter 7 of the Personnel Procedures Manual states basically the same information as the Pamphlet, lists the same legal authorities and details the internal complaint procedure. It specifically provides, If there is a determination that there is cause to believe sexual harassment occurred, disciplinary action shall be taken in accordance with Chapter 33-4 Department of Corrections Rules. Chapter 7 was first effective on January 25, 1989 and last amended on March 5, 1993. It derives its authority from Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, Sections 110.105, 110.227, and 110.233, F.S., and Chapter 33-4, F.A.C. Both the agency Pamphlet and Chapter 7 of the Manual state that sexual harassment is conduct unbecoming an employee. Petitioner's position with regard to whether or not the Pamphlet and Chapter 7 of the Manual constitute unpromulgated rules appears to center on his belief that without them, employees are not on notice as to exactly what behavior constitutes sexual harassment, that they contain a subtext of what types of sexual harassment, i.e. hostile work environment, will be disciplined, or that they alone reveal that sexual harassment constitutes "conduct unbecoming". Petitioner testified that he understood blatant sexual harassment, such as unconsented physical contact, to be conduct unbecoming a public employee, but he did not have a clear understanding about the "gray areas", such as complimenting co- workers, socializing outside work, or what acts constituted hostile work place sexual harassment. However, Petitioner testified that he was on notice that the agency had an Anti-Sexual Harassment Policy and that at all times material, he knew that if he committed sexual harassment, he would be subject to discipline, up to and including termination. Petitioner admitted that if any employee engaged in actual sexual harassment against another employee, the offending employee would not command the respect of fellow employees, as described in Rule 33-4.002(4), F.A.C. He also was on notice through Rule 33-4.003, F.A.C., that he could be disciplined for "conduct unbecoming" or "willful violations of law or policy statements". He is charged at law with knowledge of Section 110.227(1) requiring discipline for "conduct unbecoming" or "willful violation" and Chapter 760 F.S., which implements Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. The agency routinely disciplines its employees for sexual harassment and has a long history of application of its Anti-Sexual Harassment Policy. Petitioner did not submit any evidence as to how Chapter 7 of the agency's Personnel Procedures Manual, the Pamphlet, or the one- page Policy Statement had any affect on him, beyond the discipline described, supra. Furthermore, there was no evidence presented to show that the agency's Sexual Harassment Policy, the Pamphlet, or Chapter 7 of the Personnel Procedures Manual have any affect on any person not employed by Respondent. There was no evidence that any of the provisions in these documents were self-executing.
The Issue The issue presented by this case concerns the question of whether the Respondent, State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services has exhausted all treatment for the Petitioner, James Guinn, through available sex offender programs administered by the Respondent. See Section 917.20, Florida Statutes (1977).
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner submitted a "Petition for Administrative Determination" to the State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. In turn, the Department requested the Division of Administrative Hearings to conduct a formal hearing to consider the matters set forth in the petition and this request was received by the Division of Administrative Hearings on January 15, 1981. A final hearing in this cause was scheduled for March 3, 1981, but was not conducted until April 2, 1981, to allow Petitioner to secure representation. In the course of the final hearing the Petitioner testified in his own behalf and called Michael Pomeroy, Staff Psychologist in the forensic service at the Florida State Hospital as his witness. The Respondent called as witnesses Michael Denny, Staff Psychologist in the forensic service at the Florida State Hospital and Robert H. Alcorn, Jr., Director of the Mentally Disordered Sex Offender Program at the Florida State Hospital. Respondent's Exhibit No. 1 was admitted as evidence. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, the Petitioner has been in the custody of the Respondent in keeping with the order of the Circuit Court of Bradford County, Florida, and the authority of Chapter 917, Florida Statutes (1977). Beginning May 22, 1978, through the present, Petitioner has resided in the Florida State Hospital at Chattahoochee, Florida, where he is undergoing treatment in a hospital program for the benefit of mentally disordered sex offenders. This program and similar programs in other institutions administered by the Respondent require a high degree of motivation on the part of the patient in order to achieve success. Although the Petitioner has made progress in the course of his stay, the Respondent has made a preliminary determination that it has exhausted all appropriate treatment for the Petitioner through the program in which he is enrolled and has additionally concluded that similar programs within the State of Florida do not offer other opportunities for progress. In that respect, the Respondent has exhausted treatment in the affiliated programs. The principal treatment modality in the mentally disordered sex offender program at Florida State Hospital is group therapy. The Petitioner has participated in the group therapy sessions during his current hospitalization but no significant change in his behavior has been observed during this period. His condition has been diagnosed as sexual deviation, pedophilia. This condition involves the use of young children as a sexual object to reach sexual gratification. In this instance, the Petitioner has been placed in the hospital unit for his involvement with a young child. During the Petitioner's stay, his most remarkable progress has been made in the area of adjunctive therapy, namely vocational education and rehabilitation and occupational therapy. He has learned the "trade" of small engine repair mechanic and has made sufficient progress to be marketable as a small engine repairman. In addition, he has worked as a voluntary laborer and has made progress in leather occupational therapy. As stated before, the primary treatment modality is group therapy, which involves group discussion between six to ten participants in the program and their primary therapist. These sessions meet two times a week for an hour. The members of the groups are persons who are experiencing similar problems, and the idea is to have those group members confront each other to divulge their problems and begin to correct those difficulties. By July, 1980, the treatment team, in conjunction with the Petitioner had overcome the Petitioner's difficulty with impulse control to a sufficient extent that the Petitioner was willing to discuss his past problems with his family and perhaps was ready to create an atmosphere of trust necessary to consider his underlying problem with sexual deviation. At that juncture, he was moved from his group conducted by a female therapist to a group with a male therapist. From that point forward, notwithstanding attempts to have the Petitioner deal with his problem in some detail, the Petitioner has remained superficial about his condition. The Petitioner is guarded and closed about his past and, to some extent, about his future desires. The Petitioner has been unwilling to examine his inner feelings to gain the necessary insight about his problems to develop an alternative coping mechanism for those times when he is confronted with the tendency to be sexually deviant. Without that insight, his progress has been minimal. In the group sessions, the Petitioner has found it easier to help others than to help himself. In the view of his silence, the therapist has been required to treat the outward manifestation of symptoms as opposed to treating the Petitioner's restatement of those symptoms. There has been some success in teaching the Petitioner assertion skills, that is to be assertive in exchanges as opposed to aggressive. The Petitioner intellectually understands the difference between expressing thought as opposed to expressing feelings, but he has had difficulty perceiving this emotionally. Guinn is at the place in the program which is described as a latter phase and in that phase, self motivation is essential. At the November 5, 1980, staffing to consider the question of whether the treatment has been exhausted, when confronted with questions about his sexual problem, the Petitioner was guarded, vague and evasive. When he received a negative report and an indication that it was the intention of the staff to recommend his return to court for reason of exhaustion of treatment, the Petitioner refused to attend the group therapy sessions until December 8, 1980. His return to the sessions was promoted by conversation with a staff psychologist. In January, 1981, he was moved to a new group with a different group therapist and has appeared at ease in the group therapy sessions recently held, but has failed to take the initiative and still appears superficial in his efforts to address his problem. At the November 5, 1980, staff conference there was one positive sign in that the Petitioner indicated that he no longer fantasizes about young boys in a sexual way but now fantasizes about women; however, he was unable to say when this change of attitude had occurred and it is, therefore, difficult to know how significant this statement would be, especially in view of the fact that his participation in the group therapy sessions is shallow. In addition to his improverent in impulse control, he has improved in his ability to relate to other persons on a superficial level. Guinn still has problems relating to persons on an interpersonal level. An example is his ability to relate facts about the crimes for which he has been placed in the program, as contrasted with his inability to state why he did those crimes. The Florida State Hospital has nothing further that they can offer the Petitioner in dealing with his sexual deviation and on December 11, 1980, the program administrators of the various sex offender programs within the State of Florida discussed the Petitioner's case and concluded that treatment had been exhausted in the entire system administered by the Respondent. The Petitioner wishes to stay in the program and feels that the program has a lot to offer and that he can learn more from the program. He feels that his problem of opening up in the group therapy sessions is associated with his fear of what people will think of what he has done. Nonetheless, he states that he would discuss his situation now, although he has not done so in the past. He feels that he has his problem under control and can go out and not commit crimes, although he still needs help for his condition because he is not completely under control. He states that he is willing to cooperate in further treatment. According to the Petitioner, he has not talked in the group sessions lately in view of the negative report in the staff conference of November 5, 1980.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby, RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services finding that it has exhausted all appropriate treatment for James Guinn, and that said James Guinn be returned to the committing courts for farther disposition. DONE and ENTERED this 14th day of April, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of April, 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: Claude Arrington, Esquire Assistant Public Defender Second Judicial Circuit 211 East Jefferson Street Quincy, Florida 32351 Gerry Clark, Esquire Florida State Hospital Chattahoochee, Florida 32324
The Issue The issue presented by this case is whether the Respondent, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, has exhausted all treatment for the Petitioner, Frank J. Lugo, Jr., through available sex offender programs administered by the Respondent. See Section 917.20, Florida Statutes (1977). The parties have submitted Proposed Recommended Orders. Those proposed findings not included in this Recommended Order were not supported by competent and substantial evidence or were considered immaterial to the results reached.
Findings Of Fact On January 19, 1981, the Petitioner submitted a "Petition for Administrative Determination" to the State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. The Department requested the Division of Administrative Hearings to conduct a formal hearing pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, to consider the matters set forth in the Petition. At the final hearing the Petitioner testified on his own behalf. Dr. Robert Berland, Ph.D., a psychologist and the Director of the Behavior Disorders Unit in the Forensic Service at the Florida State Hospital testified for the Respondent. Respondent's Exhibit 1, a composite exhibit consisting of a clinical summary, intradepartmental staffing report and an abstract of a staff conference, was admitted as evidence. At all times pertinent to this proceeding the Petitioner has been in the custody of the Respondent pursuant to an order of the Circuit Court of Pinellas County, Florida and Chapter 917, Florida Statutes (1977). From August 6, 1979 through the present, Petitioner has resided in the Florida State Hospital in Chattahoochee, Florida, where he has undergone treatment in a hospital program for mentally disordered sex offenders. This program and similar programs in other institutions administered by the Respondent require a high degree of motivation on the part of the patient in order to achieve success. The success rate within the program is very low due to patients' long established behavior patterns. Although the Petitioner has progressed during the course of his treatment, the Department has made a preliminary determination that it has exhausted all appropriate treatment for the Petitioner through the program in which he is participating and has also concluded that similar programs for sex offenders within the state do not offer viable treatment alteratives. The primary treatment modality for mentally disordered sex offenders at Florida State Hospital is group therapy. The Petitioner has participated in group therapy sessions during his current hospitalization, but no significant change in his behavior has occurred. Dr. Berland has diagnosed his present condition as (1) exhibitionism, (2) voyeurism, (3) other sexual deviations, (4) mixed substance abuse, (5) psychogenic pain disorder, (6) anti-social personality, (7) passive-aggressive personality with contained hostility, and (8) narcissism. Exhibitionism has been the Petitioner's primary problem with his first arrest for indecent exposure occurring in 1971. Group and milieu therapy are the basic treatments available in the sex offender program at Florida State Hospital. Milieu therapy consists of interacting with people who share similar problems. Petitioner has participated in both therapies since his admission to the hospital. From August, 1979 to January, 1980, Mr. Lugo regularly attended group therapy and participated in the group. He developed a degree of insight into his condition. During this period, the group was led by Sam Cuningham, a psychologist, and met for one hour each week. From February, 1980, to August, 1980, Petitioner regularly attended group but did not actively participate. Dr. Berland became head of the group and its size increased from five to ten members. When Mr. Lugo participated, his discussions centered on other patients' problems rather than his own. Although there is a benefit in listening and discussing other patients problems such benefit is not substantial when coupled with a denial of a patient's own problem as was the case with Mr. Lugo. One of the reasons given by Mr. Lugo for not participating was a CERonic sore throat. After Dr. Berland had the Petitioner examined by a physician who could find no medical basis for the problem, it was concluded by Dr. Berland that the disorder was psychogenic. During this period the Petitioner joined another group started by psychology interns at Florida State University which offered individual counseling in addition to group therapy. This group lasted for approximately two months. On August 6, 1980, Mr. Lugo was presented for staffing by his treatment team. He was informed that his group participation was inadequate and given three areas where improvements was necessary: (1) analysis of and solution to sexual problems, (2) anti-social, manipulative and rule-violating behavior, and (3) hostility in interactions with others. During the period September, 1980, to October, 1980, the Petitioner's behavior did not significantly change. Although he did attempt to cooperate by complaining less about his physical problems and changing his manner of dress, Petitioner's participation during group therapy remained superficial. After being informed by staff that his group participation remained inadequate, Mr. Lugo began writing summaries of his group experiences. He continued to write summaries after being informed by the staff that he should discuss experiences with the group rather than write summaries. During September to October, 1980, Mr. Lugo's attendance at group therapy was erratic. On October 29, 1980, the treatment team met and after reviewing the Petitioner's case, concluded that Mr. Lugo continued to meet the criteria of a sex offender under Chapter 917, Florida Statutes, and that he was not amenable to further treatment in the behavior disorder unit. Having exhausted Florida State Hospital's treatment capabilities, the staff recommended that the patient be presented to an Intra-Departmental Screening Committee to determine if further treatment capabilities existed within any other sex offender treatment programs in the Department. On December 24, 1980, the Committee considered Mr. Lugo's case and recommended that he be returned to the appropriate Circuit Court as a treatment failure. Petitioner has progressed in areas outside of group therapy including ward activities and vocational training. However, his involvement in these areas is insufficient to cause a meaningful alteration of Petitioner's aberrant behavior. Although individual therapy is available for patients such as the Petitioner, it was not attempted in this case because Mr. Lugo never achieved a level of progress necessary to make such therapy feasible. The Petitioner desires to remain in the program at Florida State Hospital and be given individual therapy and assignment to a different treatment team.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services finding that it has exhausted all appropriate treatment for Frank J. Lugo, Jr., and that the said Frank J. Lugo, Jr. be returned to the committing court for further disposition. DONE and ENTERED this 26th day of June, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. SHARYN L. SMITH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of June, 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: Steven L. Seliger, Esquire Post Office Box 324 Quincy, Florida 32351 Gerry L. Clark, Esquire Florida State Hospital Chattahoochee, Florida 32324
The Issue Did the Respondent, Zafar S. Shah, M.D. (Dr. Shah), commit the violations alleged in Counts 7-10 of the Administrative Complaint dated June 26, 2000, and, if so, what penalty should be imposed?
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: The Board is the agency charged with regulating the practice of medicine in the State of Florida. Dr. Shah is and, at all times material hereto, has been licensed to practice medicine in the State of Florida, having been issued license number ME0071706. Dr. Shah is board-certified in internal medicine. Dr. Shah was born, and spent the first 29 years of his life, in Pakistan. Dr. Shah is 35 years of age. Dr. Shah began working at MidTown Clinic in Zephyrhills, Florida, in October 1996, and continued to work at MidTown Clinic until he was terminated in 1999. Tammy Rachel (Tammy) worked as a certified nursing assistant at MidTown Clinic from June 1996 until she was terminated in March 1999. Tammy worked with Dr. Shah as his Medical Assistant during Dr. Shah's tenure at MidTown Clinic. At all times material to this proceeding, Tammy was married to, and lived with, Corey Rachel, her husband. Although T. H., Tammy's oldest daughter, age approximately 15 years, was at all times material hereto, living in the Rachel household, her biological father was the custodial parent. Tammy's two younger daughters also lived with their mother in the Rachel household. At all times material to this proceeding, Dr. Shah did not have any family living in the United States. After Tammy began working for Dr. Shah, she and Dr. Shah became close friends. As a result, Tammy, along with her husband and her daughters, including T. H., spent a great deal of time with Dr. Shah. Tammy and her family treated Dr. Shah as if he was a member of their family. Tammy and her family, including her husband, spent almost every weekend with Dr. Shah at his home or on outings with Dr. Shah. Dr. Shah visited Tammy's home on week nights during this period of time. This visitation, both weekend and week nights, between Dr. Shah and Tammy's family occurred between December 1996 and August 1999. Initially, the relationship between Dr. Shah and Tammy was a working relationship. However, in February 1997, Dr. Shah and Tammy began a sexual relationship which lasted until March 1999. When confronted by Corey Rachel about her relationship with Dr. Shah, Tammy denied having a sexual relationship with Dr. Shah. In fact, Tammy did not tell Corey Rachel of her sexual relationship with Dr. Shah until after August 5, 1999. During the period of time that Dr. Shah and Tammy's family were visiting back and forth, Dr. Shah established a close relationship with T. H., in that Dr. Shah: (a) gave more attention to T. H. than the other girls; (b) spent more time with T. H. than with the other girls; and (c) spent time alone with T. H. when she cleaned his house and at other times at the mall, etc. Tammy was aware of the relationship between Dr. Shah and T. H. and that T. H. was alone with Dr. Shah on occasions. However, there is no evidence that this relationship was intimate or in any way sexual in nature, notwithstanding the testimony of Tammy or Corey Rachel to the contrary, which I find lacks any credibility in this regard. A prescription in the name of T. H. with a date of January 18, 1999, for 60 250-milligram tablets of Erythromycin, an antibiotic, was presented to the Winn Dixie Pharmacy by Corey Rachael. The prescription was filled on January 20, 1999, and picked up by Corey and Tammy Rachel on that same date. The prescription carried what appeared to be the signature of Dr. Shah. However, Dr. Shah denies that he ever prescribed Erythromycin for T. H. or that he wrote or signed the prescription in question. Tammy gave the medication to T. H., which T. H. used, including the refills, for the acne on her face. However, it was T. H.'s testimony, which I find to be credible, that Dr. Shah never discussed the problem of acne with her, and did not prescribe Erythromycin or any other medication to treat the acne on her face. However, T. H. did discuss the acne problem with Tammy. It was not unusual for Dr. Shah to carry prescription pads home with him, which were then available to those in his home. Likewise, it was not unusual for a Medical Assistant, such as Tammy, to have access to Dr. Shah's prescription pads at work. In fact, it was not unusual for a Medical Assistant to fill in the necessary information on a prescription for the doctor's signature. The MidTown Clinic has no medical records or any other records reflecting that Dr. Shah ever saw T. H. as a patient. Likewise, Dr. Shah did not have any records reflecting that he had ever treated T. H. as a patient or that he had given T. H. a physical examination. T. H. did not have a regular physician. When she needed medical treatment, T. H. went to the Health Department or Tammy would secure medical treatment for T. H. from physicians with whom Tammy worked. Other than the allegation concerning the acne problem, there is no allegation that Tammy sought medical treatment for T. H. from Dr. Shah, or that Dr. Shah saw T. H. as a patient. An analysis by the Board's handwriting expert indicates that the signature on the prescription in question is consistent with the presumed, not known, signature of Zafar Shah, M.D. on 20 other prescriptions taken from the Wal- Mart Pharmacy in Zephyrhills, Florida. The Board offered no evidence that the signatures on the 20 prescriptions from Wal-Mart were in fact the signature of Zafar Shah, M.D., other than the testimony of the pharmacist from Wal-Mart that the signatures on those 20 prescriptions filled at Wal-Mart appeared to him to be the signature of Zafar Shah, M.D. Although the Board's handwriting expert was given the opportunity to compare current samples of Dr. Shah's signature, to be given by Dr. Shah prior to the hearing, with the signature on the prescription in question, he chose not to make this comparison. The Board's handwriting expert did not compare the signature in question to any known signature of Zafar Shah, M.D. There is insufficient evidence to establish facts to show that Dr. Shah wrote the prescription in question, notwithstanding the testimony of the Board's handwriting expert to the contrary, which I find lacks credibility in this regard. Likewise, there is insufficient evidence to establish facts to show that Dr. Shah ever treated T. H. for the acne on her face or for any other medical problem or that a patient- physician relationship ever existed between Dr. Shah and T. H., notwithstanding the testimony of Tammy or Corey Rachel to the contrary, which I find lacks credibility in this regard. On August 5, 1999, Dr. Shah had dinner with Tammy, Corey Rachel, T. H., and Tammy's two younger daughters at the Rachel's home in Dade City, Florida, as he had on many previous occasions. On August 5, 1999, Dr. Shah was to spend the night in the Rachel's home, as he had on many previous occasions. As usual, Dr. Shah was to sleep on an air mattress in the living room. Around 11:00 p.m. Tammy and Corey Rachel went to bed. Sometime thereafter, T. H. went to her room to prepare for bed and Dr. Shah proceeded to prepare for bed in the living room on the air mattress. Around 1:00 a.m. on August 6, 1999, Tammy testified that she was awakened by what she thought was a noise and got out of bed. After getting out of bed, Tammy checked on her two younger daughters, and then checked on T. H. who was not in her bedroom. Tammy then proceeded to look elsewhere in the house for T. H. Tammy also testified that when she walked into the living room she observed T. H. and Dr. Shah having, what appeared to her, to be sexual intercourse. Tammy became very upset and began beating Dr. Shah on the back and calling Corey Rachel. Dr. Shah attempted to protect himself from Tammy's onslaught by gathering his belongings and leaving the house. During the time Tammy was beating on Dr. Shah, she also slapped T. H.'s face. Corey responded to Tammy and instructed T. H. to go to her room. T. H. then went to her room. At this time, T. H. still had on the long T-shirt and under pants, which she had worn to bed. Likewise, Dr. Shaw had on the clothing that he had worn to bed. Tammy reported the incident to the Pasco County Sheriff's Department. Deputy Timothy Harris and Sergeant Rowan responded to the call by Tammy. Upon arrival at the Rachel home, the officers spoke with Tammy, Corey Rachel, and T. H. When T. H. was interviewed by Deputy Harris, she told Deputy Harris that she and Dr. Shah had been engaged in sexual intercourse at the time Tammy came into the living room. In fact, T. H. related a very explicit account of the incident, using language which was not in her normal vocabulary. T. H. also provided a written statement of the incident to Deputy Harris where she again admitted to having sex with Dr. Shah. After providing the written statement, T. H. went home with her father. T. H. was not under oath on either of these occasions. Deputy Harris inspected the scene of the incident for physical evidence that sexual intercourse had taken place between T. H. and Dr. Shah. Deputy Harris did not find any physical evidence that sexual intercourse had occurred. Deputy Harris also took some clothing that T. H. had been wearing as evidence for the purpose of examining for evidence of sexual intercourse. Upon examination, this clothing did not yield any evidence of sexual intercourse. Later in the morning of August 6, 1999, Detective Ball went to the home of Timothy Harvey and interviewed T. H. In this interview, T. H. again stated that she and Dr. Shah were engaged in sexual intercourse earlier that morning at the Rachel's home, and had, on previous occasions, had sexual intercourse at the Rachel's residence and at Dr. Shah's residence. She also related that she was in love with Dr. Shah and that they were going to be married when she turned 18 years of age. T. H. further related to Detective Ball that Tammy was jealous of her relationship with Dr. Shah. When Detective Ball requested that T. H. undergo a physical examination to uncover possible evidence of sexual intercourse between T. H. and Dr. Shah, T. H. refused to undergo the physical examination. T. H.'s reason for not taking the physical examination was that she loved Dr. Shah and any evidence found would obviously be used against him. Later, during the day of August 6, 1999, Tammy and Dr. Shah agreed to meet at Brewmasters, a restaurant in Wesley Chapel, halfway between Dr. Shah's house and Dade City, Florida. This meeting was arranged by Tammy at the request of the Pasco County Sheriff's office in an attempt to get Dr. Shah to admit to having had sexual intercourse with T. H. on August 6, 1999. Tammy was wired and the Detectives from the Pasco County Sheriff's office attempted to monitor the conversation. However, the monitoring was not too successful. During this meeting between Dr. Shah and Tammy, which lasted approximately 45 minutes, Dr. Shah repeatedly denied having sexual intercourse with T. H. At the conclusion of this meeting with Tammy, the Detectives approached Dr. Shah and requested that he accompany them to the County Jail. Although Dr. Shah was not officially placed under arrest at this time, he was unsure of his rights and felt intimated by the Detectives. The Detectives did not offer Dr. Shah the opportunity to drive his vehicle to the County Jail. Dr. Shah was transported to the County Jail by the Detectives. Once at the County Jail, the Detectives went through their interrogation (interview) routine. Dr. Shah's understanding was that the Detectives were giving him the choice of admitting to having had consensual sexual intercourse with T. H. or to having raped T. H. With that understanding, Dr. Shah admitted to having had consensual sexual intercourse with T. H. Dr. Shah was upset, confused and intimidated by the Detectives. Dr. Shah gave the Detectives the answers that he assumed they wanted. Upon being advised of Miranda rights, Dr. Shah requested an attorney and made no further statements. On September 28, 1999, Detective Ball and Bill Joseph, a Crime Scene Technician, went to the Rachel's home with a Lumalite for the purpose of illuminating body fluids that may have been left on the carpet or any other area as result of the alleged sexual intercourse. No evidence of body fluids was found. Under oath, during the State Attorney's investigation, T. H. recanted the story given in her written statement on August 6, 1999, and the story given verbally to Deputy Harris and Deputy Ball on August 6, 1999, and denied that she and Dr. Shah were engaged in sexual intercourse at the Rachel's home on August 6, 1999, when Tammy came into the living room or at any time previous to August 6, 1999. Subsequently, the State Attorney, on February 14, 2000, filed a No Information concluding that the facts and circumstances of this case did not warrant prosecution at that time. Again, under oath at the hearing, T. H. recanted the story given in her written statement on August 6, 1999, and the story given verbally to Deputy Harris and Deputy Ball on August 6, 1999, and denied that she and Dr. Shah were engaged in sexual intercourse at the Rachel's home on August 6, 1999, when Tammy came into the living room or at any other time. However, T. H. admitted to having a sexual relationship with two young males prior to August 1999. T. H.'s reason for not telling the truth in her recitation of the facts in her initial interview with Deputy Harris or her written voluntary statement to Deputy Harris or in her interview with Deputy Ball was that she was aware of Tammy's involvement with Dr. Shah and was attempting to make Tammy jealous because she was mad with Tammy due to their fight the previous evening and because of other problems that she was experiencing with Tammy. Additionally, T. H. had overheard a conversation between Tammy and Dr. Shah wherein Tammy was discussing divorcing Corey Rachel and marrying Dr. Shah, which upset T. H. T. H. testified that sometime after she and Dr. Shah had gone to bed in their respective rooms, she went in the living room to talk to Dr. Shah about the situation between she and Tammy as she had on other occasions. During their conversation, T. H. was sitting close to Dr. Shah. As their conversation progressed, T. H. became emotional and Dr. Shah "put his arm around her shoulder" to console her as he had on other occasions when she would discuss problems between her and Tammy. It was in this posture that Tammy found Dr. Shah and T. H. at approximately 1:00 a.m. on August 6, 1999. There is insufficient evidence to establish facts to show that T. H. and Dr. Shah were engaged in sexual intercourse at the Rachel's home on August 6, 1999, or at any time previous to that date, notwithstanding: (a) Tammy's testimony to the contrary, which I find lacks credibility due to her demeanor at the hearing and her involvement with Dr. Shah; (b) T. H.'s admission that sexual intercourse had occurred, which T. H. later recanted under oath, and which she testified was only done for the purpose of making Tammy jealous; and (c) Dr. Shah's admission, while being interrogated, that consensual sex had occurred between he and T. H., which he later recanted under oath at the hearing.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Board enter a final order finding Dr. Shah not guilty of the charges outlined in Counts 7-10 of the Administrative Complaint and dismissing the charges outlined in Counts 7-10 of the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of August, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___________________________________ WILLIAM R. CAVE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6947 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of August, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert C. Byerts, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Post Office Box 14229 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-4229 Jack D. Hoogewind, Esquire 33283 Cortez Boulevard Dade City, Florida 33523 Tanya Williams, Executive Director Board of Medicine Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 William W. Large, General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Theodore M. Henderson, Agency Clerk Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way Bin A00 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701
The Issue The issue presented by this case concerns the question of whether the Respondent, State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services has exhausted all treatment for the Petitioner, John P. Wordsman, III, through available sex offender programs administered by the Respondent. See Section 917.20, Florida Statutes (1977).
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner submitted a "Petition for Administrative Determination" to the State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. In turn, the Department requested the Division of Administrative Hearings to conduct a formal hearing to consider the matters set forth in the petition and this request was received by the Division of Administrative Hearings on January 13, 1981. A final hearing in this cause was scheduled for January 30, 1981, but was not conducted until March 3, 1981, to allow Petitioner to secure representation. In the course of the final hearing the Petitioner testified in his own behalf. The Respondent called as witnesses Lois P. Stevens, Staff Psychologist in the forensic service at the Florida State Hospital and Robert H. Alcorn, Jr., Director of the Mentally Disordered Sex Offender Program at the Florida State Hospital. Petitioner had two exhibits admitted. Respondent's Exhibit No. 1 was admitted into evidence. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, the Petitioner has been in the custody of the Respondent in keeping with the order of the Circuit Court of Duval County, Florida, and the authority of Chapter 917, Florida Statutes (1977). Beginning July 28, 1978, through the present, Petitioner has resided in the Florida State Hospital at Chattahoochee, Florida, where he is undergoing treatment in a hospital program for the benefit of mentally disordered sex offenders. This program and similar programs in other institutions administered by the Respondent require a high degree of motivation on the part of the patient in order to achieve success. Although the Petitioner has made progress in the course of his stay, the Respondent has made a preliminary determination that it has exhausted all appropriate treatment for the Petitioner through the program in which he is enrolled and has additionally concluded that similar programs within the State of Florida do not offer other opportunities for progress. In that respect, the Respondent has exhausted treatment in the affiliated programs. The principal treatment modality in the mentally disordered sex offender program at Florida State Hospital is group therapy. The Petitioner has participated in the group therapy sessions during his current hospitalization but no significant change in his behavior has been observed during this period. His condition has been diagnosed as (1) sexual deviation, pedophilia, (2) homosexuality, and (3) alcoholism. The petitioner has been placed with the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services following a plea or nolo contendere to the offense of sexual battery, involving an attempted rape. Referring again to the Petitioner's participation in the principal treatment modality, i.e., group therapy, Petitioner has worked in a group headed by a male psychologist, staff worker and subsequently, a group with a female staff worker. The change to the female staff worker was to assist the Petitioner in dealing with his relationship with females. His attitude toward females has been described as Victorian in that he had problems relating to women who fulfilled roles other than child bearing. Through the group discussions, the Petitioner has talked about his preference for homosexual life style and his problem with alcoholism. Wordsman has not discussed his problems with pedophilia. In the group sessions, his "feedback" under discussion of his life's circumstance is confusing and his motivation in those sessions is not genuine. In this connection, the Petitioner's attitude has been described as one of playing "head games," especially with his principal advisor and therapist, Lois Stevens. This attitude in essence means the Petitioner has feigned sincere participation. His explanation for this tactic is to the effect that he wanted the treatment but that he did not feel that he was up to the occasion of sincerely applying for it. The Petitioner does not wish to engage in specific topics in the group therapy sessions and is distrustful of people, to the extent that he would not confide in others. When pressed to give specific responses during the course of the group therapy sessions, the petitioner becomes stressful and will not give answers to the questions posed. The form of treatment in the sex offender program requires honesty in the responses of the participants and the Petitioner has difficulty complying with this standard. In the course of the group sessions and in dealing with the subject of his crime, the Petitioner would not give specific responses other than to say that he remembers events around the time period of the act; however, he indicates that he may have been on alcohol when it occurred. The only brief progress that the Petitioner has shown in relating to his problems in the group therapy sessions occurred immediately after he had been told that the staff was recommending his return to the committing court. At that juncture, he became more sincere in the first session, but immediately reverted back to a superficial and shallow manner of dealing with the treatment form. The Petitioner has been involved in other therapy activities to include music, leather and wood therapy, a program for alcoholics, and occupational therapy. Petitioner is an accomplished musician and has performed well in that form of therapy and in addition has made notable progress in occupational therapy. Notwithstanding the progress in these therapy areas, his failure to make satisfactory progress in the group therapy sessions, which sessions are the primary agent for change in the underlying condition of the patient, has lead the hospital staff to the conclusion that it has exhausted treatment of those conditions. Continued success in the other related therapy does not have a significant effect in alleviating his condition. This opinion is expressed in the most recent staffing summary of December 10, 1980, a copy of which has been admitted as Respondent's Exhibit No. 1. In addition to the staffing achieved by Florida State an interdepartmental screening was conducted of the Petitioner's condition and the question of exhaustion of treatment in the sex offender programs and it was the opinion of the unit directors of the sex offender programs within the Respondent Department's organization that the overall Department had exhausted treatment for the Petitioner in the sex offender programs. It is the opinion of the Department that the Petitioner continues to meet the definitions of sex offender within the meaning of Chapter 917, Florida Statutes. Wordsman feels that he has made progress in dealing with people around him and that he gets along better than he did before his commitment to the program. He has expressed concern that the staff is "out to get him" and that the group therapy sessions are not adequate to deal with his problem. He prefers to be placed in a program for behavior disorders with specific emphasis on drug abuse, in that he feels his problems arise when he becomes intoxicated. His reaction to the current program In which he is placed is summed up by his remark that he does net "understand what the staff wants from him."
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby, RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services finding that it has exhausted all appropriate treatment for John P. Wordsman, III, and that said John P. Wordsman, III, be returned to the committing court for further disposition. DONE and ENTERED this 19th day of March, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of March, 1981 COPIES FURNISHED: Gerry L. Clark, Esquire Florida State Hospital Chattahoochee, Florida 32324 J. Craig Williams, Esquire 335 East Bay Street Jacksonville, Florida 32201
The Issue Whether Petitioner, Andrew Anthony Taylor (“Petitioner”), timely filed a petition under the Victims of Wrongful Incarceration Act, chapter 961, Florida Statutes (2016)(“the Act”); and, if so, whether Petitioner demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence, his actual innocence, thereby entitling him to monetary compensation under the Act.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner seeks compensation pursuant to the Act after serving a prison term of 25 years for the sexual abuse of his stepdaughter, C.J. The jury verdict was vacated after C.J., in 2014, recanted her accusation that Petitioner sexually abused her in 1990, when she was eight years old. The undersigned will begin with a discussion of the events in 1990, when C.J. first reported the allegation of sexual abuse against Petitioner to Dr. Valerie Rao, a rape treatment medical examiner. On the evening of March 10, 1990, C.J. was brought to the Jackson Memorial Hospital Roxcy Bolton Rape Treatment Center by her mother and grandmother, at which time C.J. came under the care of Dr. Rao. Dr. Rao obtained a detailed history from C.J., during which C.J. reported that she had been sexually abused by her stepfather, “Andrew,” at two different locations--her old house and her new house. According to C.J., the most recent sexual encounter was when she was awoken by Petitioner on “Friday night,” March 8, 1990, and told to get up and go to her mother’s bed. C.J. did so, and Petitioner then told her to take off her pajamas, which she did. According to C.J., Petitioner got on top of her, put his “private part” in her, began kissing her, and put his mouth on her “private part.” C.J. also stated Petitioner made her touch his “private part,” and that he touched her in the anal area. C.J. also stated Petitioner often put his “private part” in her mouth. C.J. also stated Petitioner told her that if she told anyone, he would kill her. After obtaining the history, Dr. Rao examined C.J. and observed multiple bruises on her right arm and thighs, and abrasions on her back and on her left breast. The bruises and abrasions were caused when C.J.’s mother beat her with a baseball bat after C.J. told her mother of Petitioner’s sexual abuse. Dr. Rao immediately reported the mother to law enforcement, and C.J.’s mother was arrested at the rape treatment center for aggravated child abuse. Dr. Rao conducted a vaginal examination of C.J. and used a colposcope to observe and document the status of C.J.’s hymen. Dr. Rao observed and documented several healed tears of the hymen, which made the opening of C.J.’s hymen bigger than it should be for a child of her age. According to Dr. Rao, C.J. did not show any natural signs of progression of the hymen tissue that might be present due to a child approaching puberty. Dr. Rao persuasively and credibly testified at hearing that C.J.’s history was consistent with her physical examination. According to Dr. Rao, the healed tears could have resulted from Respondent “trying to push his penis into her” consistent with C.J.’s history. Dr. Rao acknowledged the tears also could have been caused by a finger, a pencil, or any object that is bigger than the opening of the hymen. However, no evidence was presented at hearing indicating that a finger, pencil, or any other object was placed in the opening of C.J.’s hymen. Dr. Rao further acknowledged there was no physical evidence that she could discern or collect that identified Petitioner as the assailant in this case. However, in 1990, obtaining DNA samples and the gathering of other types of physical evidence in an effort to specifically identify perpetrators of sexual abuse were not as advanced and reliable as it is today. Following Dr. Rao’s examination on March 10, 1990, C.J. was separated from her mother, and her mother no longer had custody of her. C.J. lived with her maternal great grandmother, and without her mother in her life, until she was 16 years old. On March 27, 1990, Mercy Restani, a trained interviewer who was employed by the Dade County Children’s Center within the office of the State Attorney, interviewed C.J. at the children’s center. C.J. provided a detailed history to Ms. Restani. C.J. told Ms. Restani that the sexual abuse by Petitioner happened in the old house and at the new house. C.J. told Ms. Restani that Petitioner would get her out of her bedroom and take her into her mother’s bedroom. C.J. told Ms. Restani that Petitioner would touch her “pocketbook” (the child’s word for a vagina) with his “private” (the child’s word for penis). C.J. told Dr. Restani that Petitioner got on top of her, that he moved very fast, and that it hurt when he did so. C.J. said Petitioner touched her breasts, put his mouth on her “pocketbook,” and his “private” in her mouth. C.J. also told Ms. Restani that Petitioner told her he would kill her if she told anyone. Ms. Restani asked C.J. if she had told her mother or anyone about what had happened to her. C.J. told Ms. Restani that she did not tell her mother because she was afraid. C.J. told Ms. Restani that her mother “had been asking her for several days if Andrew had been messing with her.” When C.J. eventually told her mother what had happened, C.J. said her mother beat her with a baseball bat. On April 3, 1990, C.J. was interviewed by a clinical forensic psychologist, Manuel E. Alvarez, Ph.D. The purpose of the interview was to assess C.J.’s current mental status and emotional therapeutic needs. According to Dr. Alvarez, C.J. was able to distinguish between the truth and a lie. C.J. had the intelligence to comprehend what had happened to her, to be able to relate it to others, and she was competent to testify. C.J. provided a detailed history to Dr. Alvarez. Dr. Alvarez observed that C.J. was able to provide a synopsis of her living arrangements at the time of the incidents. C.J. identified her stepfather, “Andrew,” as the perpetrator of the sexual abuse. C.J. told Dr. Alvarez it occurred at the old house and current house. C.J. told Dr. Alvarez it occurred when Petitioner would wake her, take her into the room, and tell her to get onto the bed. C.J. was reluctant to verbally tell Dr. Alvarez what Petitioner did to her, but C.J. wrote it down on a piece of paper (Petitioner’s Exhibit 4) in her own handwriting: He would get on me. He would start moving fast on me. He would take out his private part. On my private part and In my mouth. C.J. also told Dr. Alvarez that after the incidents, Petitioner threatened to kill her if she told anyone about it. On April 5, 1990, C.J. executed an affidavit, attesting to the fact of her name, that she was eight years old, that she lived with her mother and Petitioner at a specific street address in Dade County, Florida, and that: Early in the morning on Friday, March 9, 1990, Andrew woke me up and took me to his bedroom. Andrew told me to take off my panties. He touched my breasts. He put his private part into my pocketbook. It hurt. He kissed me on my mouth and on my pocketbook. He had done this before. He told me he would kill me if I told. My mother asked me if anyone was messing with me. For several days I wouldn’t tell her. When I did tell her what Andrew did, she beat me with a baseball bat. In August 1990, C.J.’s mother entered a plea of nolo contendere to the offense of aggravated child abuse against C.J. She was adjudicated guilty, sentenced to community control, and ordered not to have any contact with C.J. until approved by the court. On October 22, 1990, C.J. gave a videotaped deposition in Petitioner’s criminal case, in which she provided details of the sexual abuse by Petitioner. In the deposition, C.J. described how Petitioner woke her up, took her to her mother’s room, touched her “pocketbook” with his mouth, and placed his “wee-wee” in her “pocketbook.” C.J. testified he moved his body around while putting his “wee-wee” in her “pocketbook,” and that it hurt when he did so. She testified that on another evening, Petitioner woke her up again, took her to her mother’s room, and touched her “pocketbook” with his hand moving up and down as he did so. She testified it happened at the new house and at the old house. Petitioner’s criminal jury trial was held in March 1991, before the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in and for Dade County, Florida, in the case of State of Florida v. Andrew Anthony Taylor, Case No. F90-009928. At Petitioner’s criminal trial, C.J. testified via closed circuit television that Petitioner came to her bedroom, woke her up, and took her to her mother’s room. C.J. testified that she was wearing pajamas and panties and that Petitioner removed them. Using anatomically correct dolls, C.J. showed the jury that Petitioner touched her vagina with his hand and put his mouth on her breasts. She further indicated that Petitioner put his mouth on her vagina and demonstrated how he put his penis in her mouth and vagina. C.J. testified that it hurt when Petitioner placed his penis in her “private part.” She testified she did not tell her mother about this that night because Petitioner said he would do something bad to her. C.J. testified that another incident occurred that same week where Petitioner did the same things to her. C.J. also testified Petitioner put something “greasy” on his “private part” before he put his “private part” in her “private part.” C.J. indicated Petitioner’s sexual abuse of her also occurred at the old house. C.J. testified that when she told her mother about Petitioner’s sexual abuse of her after the last incident, her mother became upset and hurt her. C.J. testified that when she told Dr. Rao she got all the bruises when her mother hit her with a baseball bat, it was the first time her mother ever hit her with a bat. C.J. testified she has not been able to live with or have contact with her mom since her mother hurt her. C.J.’s mother did not testify at the criminal trial against Petitioner because she had an open warrant for her arrest at the time for violating her community control. Petitioner testified at his criminal trial. Although Petitioner denied he sexually abused C.J., he acknowledged that he was C.J.’s stepfather; he married C.J.’s mother in 1989; he had a son with C.J.’s mother in 1998; he was having an extramarital affair with another woman; and while he divided his time between Maryland and Miami because of work, he was sleeping in the same home as C.J. during the timeframe that C.J. indicated she had been sexually abused by him. Following the criminal trial, Petitioner was convicted on March 15, 1991, of three counts of capital sexual battery and one count of lewd and lascivious behavior for the sexual abuse of C.J. Petitioner was sentenced to life in prison on the three capital offenses. The judgment and sentences were per curiam affirmed on appeal in Taylor v. State, 610 So. 2d 644 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992). After reporting the incidents of sexual abuse, C.J. went through counseling two times per week for several years. At no time did C.J. tell any therapists that she was not sexually abused by Petitioner. In 2006, C.J. was approached at her grandmother’s home by a male private investigator for Petitioner. The investigator wanted to ask C.J. questions about what happened with Petitioner, but C.J. refused to speak with the investigator. In either late 2013 or early 2014, C.J. was again approached by a private investigator for Petitioner, this time a female who came to C.J.’s place of employment (“Walmart”). The investigator wanted to ask C.J. if anything had happened with Petitioner. In response, C.J. immediately told her “no.” The investigator then gave C.J. a card, and C.J. told the investigator she would call her in couple of weeks. On February 17, 2014, C.J. executed an affidavit formally recanting the accusation that Petitioner sexually abused her when she was eight years old. In this affidavit, C.J. asserted now, at the age of 32, that she made the allegation because her mother was either drunk or high on drugs who would ask her “if anybody touched me inappropriately.” C.J. asserted that late one night after telling her mother that nobody touched me, her mother beat her with a baseball bat and started yelling, “did Andrew touch you.” C.J. asserted that after telling her mother no, her mother began to beat her and beat her for hours. C.J. asserted that after an extensive beating, she told her mother that “Andrew” had touched her so that she would stop beating her, and after telling her that Andrew touched her, the beating stopped. However, by this time, C.J. had developed a close relationship with her half-brother Andrew Taylor, Jr. C.J. further asserted: A while back, I began to talk with my half- brother, Andrew Jr., and would see him interacting with his own son. This started me thinking about what I had done and only I knew the real truth that Andrew was innocent. My conscience started bothering me every time I would see Andrew, Jr. playing and interacting with his son and it got to the point where I couldn’t sleep and hardly eat. I finally called my half-brother, Andrew Jr., and told him I needed to meet with him and explain what had happened regarding his father. I told Andrew Jr. that his father never touched me or bothered me sexually and that I was so sorry for his dad not being in his life because of what I did. I asked Andrew Jr. to forgive me and he agreed. I also asked Andrew Jr. what I should do and who I could write in order to correct this situation. Investigator Jeannie Rogers came to see me a few months ago and spoke to me about coming forward. I have finally gotten the courage to stand up and do what is right. On June 23, 2014, Petitioner filed a Motion for Post- Conviction Relief Based on Newly Discovered Evidence in Case No. F90-009928. The newly discovered evidence was C.J.’s recantation of the sexual abuse allegation against Petitioner. On April 2, 2015, an evidentiary hearing was held on the motion before Circuit Court Judge Diane Ward. At the hearing before Judge Ward, Petitioner presented the live testimony of C.J., who testified she made up the allegation that Petitioner sexually abused her because her mother beat her with a baseball bat to make her provide a false allegation against Petitioner. C.J. testified she told her mother Petitioner sexually abused her because she wanted the beating to stop. However, C.J. also testified when she told her mother that Petitioner sexually abused her, the beating did not stop, and her mother continued to beat her with the baseball bat for not telling her about the sexual abuse sooner. During the hearing before Judge Ward, C.J. acknowledged she provided specific details of sexual abuse by Petitioner to Dr. Rao, Ms. Restani, Dr. Alvarez, and in her prior testimony in the underlying criminal proceedings involving Petitioner. C.J. was asked how she could have had such knowledge of sexual activity as an eight year old in order to provide the details that she did to Dr. Rao, Ms. Restani, Dr. Alvarez, and in her testimony in the underlying criminal proceedings. In response, C.J. testified she came up with the details by watching cable television and walking in on her mother and Petitioner while they were having sex. At the hearing before Judge Ward, Respondent presented the live testimony of C.J.’s mother, who acknowledged she was a cocaine addict in March 1990. C.J.’s mother testified on direct examination that she recalled an incident in which she had returned home one night on March 5, 1990, and found C.J. lying in bed with her hands covering her front “private parts.” She testified that she could smell a “sexual scent” in the room and that she asked C.J. “what was wrong.” She testified C.J. did not indicate anything was wrong, but she was still suspicious something was wrong because of the sexual odor in the room. C.J.’s mother testified that due to this suspicion, she asked C.J. a second time on March 9, 1990, if “anyone had been messing with her.” According to C.J.’s mother, C.J. indicated this time that Petitioner “[h]ad been bothering her,” which meant that he had been sexually molesting her. C.J.’s mother testified on direct examination that when C.J. began telling her specific details of the abuse by Petitioner, she became irate and beat C.J. with a baseball bat. However, C.J.’s mother’s testimony as to when she began to beat C.J. with a baseball bat is inconsistent. C.J. and her mother acknowledged their relationship over the past several years has been good, and there is no current animosity between them. At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, Judge Ward orally announced her ruling that C.J.’s change in testimony is newly discovered evidence. In reaching this conclusion, Judge Ward specifically found C.J.’s testimony “reliable and credible.” Judge Ward commented she “had the opportunity to view her, and observe her during the testimony, and as well as consider any motive that she had for the recantation of her testimony.” On the other hand, Judge Ward specifically found the live testimony of C.J.’s mother to be “incredible.” In reaching this conclusion, Judge Ward commented that at the time of the events, she was by her own admission using drugs, and she had a poor recollection of the events, which is attributable to her drug use rather than to the passage of time. Judge Ward further stated: There were multiple lengthy pauses between the attorney’s questions and her answers where she seemed to be searching in her memory for answers. The Court observed that she seemed very hesitant and unsure of her own recollection of the events, and I further find that this is attributable to her extensive drug use, and that, and her intoxication on drugs at the time that this occurred. With regards to the beating, but with a baseball bat, although at some times she did acknowledge, did state that she beat her child with the baseball bat after she implicated the Defendant in the sexual assault, there were times that she said that she couldn’t recall and it could have been before she implicated her. And this is the most damaging testimony you could possibly have given the fact that there was no direct evidence otherwise implicating the Defendant as the person who sexually assaulted her. She did have six healed tears on her hymen which could have occurred at any time, and been caused by any other person. There was no DNA, blood evidence, semen, eyewitnesses, or a confession, so the only evidence that the State had, or the strongest evidence that the State had was the victim’s testimony, which was obviously obtained through a beating with a baseball bat by her mother when she was a very tiny child. The pictures of her are very sad at such a young age. There is no doubt that if a jury were to hear that the victim, hear from the victim that the Defendant was not the person that sexually abused her, and that she lied because her mother beat her with a baseball bat when she was eight years old, would have produced an, could have, would have produced an acquittal on retrial, and that the Defendant would probably be acquitted on retrial, so based on the foregoing I’m going to grant the motion for post-conviction relief. We need to schedule it for trial now. I think it has to be set in ninety days; isn’t that correct? Okay, I’ll answer my own question yes. Pet. Ex. 14, pp. 245-247. On April 2, 2015, a written order was entered vacating the finding of guilt, judgment, and sentence, and a hearing was scheduled for April 10, 2015, at which time a new trial date would be set. On April 10, 2015, the State announced a nolle prose of all criminal charges against Petitioner. On June 30, 2015, Petitioner timely filed a Petition to Establish Wrongful Incarceration in Case No. F90-009928. On July 31, 2015, Respondent filed a response contesting the petition. After the filing of the initial petition, a grand jury returned an indictment recharging Petitioner for the same crimes. C.J. was notified of the grand jury proceeding, but she did not appear or request a continuance. After the criminal case was re-filed, Respondent and Petitioner were unable to reach a settlement. On December 12, 2016, the second set of charges were nolle prossed. On January 25, 2017, Petitioner filed an amended petition. On March 17, 2017, pursuant to section 961.03(4)(a), Judge Ward issued an “Order Finding That Defendant Was a ‘Wrongfully Incarcerated Person’ and Is ‘Eligible for Compensation’ Pursuant to Section 961.03, Florida Statutes.” Judge Ward held that the petition was timely filed and that Petitioner met his burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, his “actual innocence” of the charges. Central to Judge Ward’s conclusion that C.J.’s recantation is reliable and that Petitioner met his burden of establishing his actual innocence by a preponderance of the evidence is that she had the opportunity to observe C.J. and her mother’s demeanor when they testified live at the April 2, 2015, evidentiary hearing on Petitioner’s motion for post-conviction relief. Judge Ward’s findings are largely based on credibility assessments of C.J. and her mother based on observations of their demeanor while testifying. In concluding that Petitioner established his “actual innocence” by a preponderance of the evidence, Judge Ward relied on the evidence presented at the April 2, 2015, evidentiary hearing on Petitioner’s motion for post-conviction relief. In the instant proceeding, however, Petitioner failed to meet his burden of establishing his actual innocence by clear and convincing evidence. Whether Petitioner is actually innocent turns on whether Petitioner presented clear and convincing evidence that C.J.’s recantation is reliable. The evidence presented in this case does not clearly and convincingly establish the reliability of C.J.’s recantation. To begin with, C.J. consistently provided details about sexual conduct perpetrated against her by Petitioner in her visits with Dr. Rao, Ms. Restani, and Dr. Alvarez, and in her prior deposition and trial testimony in the underlying criminal proceeding against Petitioner. C.J. gave details about how Petitioner would wake her up and take her to another room. She gave details about oral sex by Petitioner on herself and that she performed on Petitioner. She gave details about Petitioner using a lubricant on his penis. She gave details about how he would place his penis in her vagina and move up and down really fast. She said it hurt when he did so. Dr. Rao persuasively and credibly testified that the injuries to C.J.’s hymen were consistent with her history. C.J. consistently stated in 1990 and 1991 that her mother beat her with a baseball bat after she told her of the sexual abuse by Petitioner. Over 20 years later, C.J.’s story changed, and she stated that her mother beat her with a baseball bat before she told her of the sexual abuse by Petitioner. In her recantation affidavit, C.J. stated that after telling her mother that Petitioner touched her, the beating stopped. However, in the hearing before Judge Ward, C.J. testified that her mother continued to beat her with the baseball bat after she told her about the abuse for not telling her about the abuse sooner. From March 10, 1990, when C.J. was removed from her mother until she was 16 years old, C.J. had many opportunities to come forward and recant the allegation of abuse against Petitioner. During this time, there was no reason for C.J. to fear her mother because her mother was not in C.J.’s life. Subsequently, C.J. and her mother developed a good relationship. However, Petitioner waited almost 24 years to recant. C.J. recanted after developing a relationship with her half-brother, Andrew Taylor, Jr. When Andrew Taylor, Jr., turned 18 years old, he began a relationship with his father, Petitioner. Prior to recanting, C.J. regretted her half-brother did not get to spend quality time with Petitioner because Petitioner was in prison. C.J.’s development of a relationship with her half-brother and her desire that he have a strong relationship with Petitioner could be a motive for her recantation. C.J. did not appear before the grand jury, she did not request a continuance, and she was not called as a witness at either of the hearings in the instant matter. The undersigned lacked the opportunity to observe C.J.’s demeanor because she was not called to testify as a live witness. However, the undersigned had the opportunity to observe C.J.’s demeanor while testifying in her videotaped deposition in 1990, at which time she testified credibly and persuasively to facts demonstrating that Petitioner sexually abused her. Petitioner was called as a witness at the August 8, 2017, hearing, at which he was simply asked on direct examination if he ever molested C.J., to which he responded no. Petitioner’s testimony at the hearing was unpersuasive.
