The Issue Is the Petitioner qualified for licensure?
Findings Of Fact On October 4, 1989, Petitioner filed his application for licensure as a real estate salesman. Question #7 of the application asked whether the applicant (Petitioner) had ever been convicted of a crime, found guilty or entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere even if adjudication was withheld (Respondent's Composite Exhibit No. 1). The Petitioner admitted to having been arrested on July 3, 1984 and to pleading nolo contendere on October 17, 1985 to committing a sex offense against a child and the commission of lewd and lascivious acts. The Petitioner was placed on probation for ten (10) years for the first offense and was sentenced to three years imprisonment for the second offense with thirty-five (35) days credited for time served. A condition of his probation is that he cannot reside or stay overnight with a child under the age of 18. At the formal hearing in this case, Petitioner testified on his own behalf and admitted that he had molested his oldest daughter, age 11, and pleaded nolo contendere to said offense in 1984 and three (3) months later molested both his oldest daughter, then age 12, and his youngest daughter, then age 9, and pleaded guilty to said offenses. Petitioner further testified that the initial offense had been committed over a period of approximately two weeks and that the second offense had been committed over a period of approximately two months. The offenses occurred while he was undergoing rehabilitation therapy for the traumatic amputation of his leg. Since his release from jail, Petitioner has received treatment for his behavior at the Florida Mental Health Institute, North Florida Evaluation and Treatment Center and Community Behavioral Services. Petitioner's brother testified concerning his brother's life. The Petitioner had been an Eagle Scout; had been a scoutmaster; had been a member of the Navy Reserve and had had no problems prior to loosing his leg in an accident. Since his release from jail, the Petitioner has provided child support to his ex-wife and daughters. Petitioner had resided with and been employed by his brother until his brother adopted a child. The condition of the Petitioner's probation that the Petitioner can not reside with a child under the age of 18 required the Petitioner to change his residence and employment with his brother. He was employed by Kelly Temporary Services at the time of hearing and was working in a bank in customer service. The Petitioner has remained in therapy as required by his probation. The Petitioner has been in the presence of children when other adults were present since his release from jail and the Petitioner's behavior was exemplary. The Petitioner's brother opined that the Petitioner had "rehabilitated himself," and pointed out that very severe consequences would result to Petitioner for a third offense. The Petitioner admitted that the offenses had occurred in isolated settings when no other adults were present.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner's application to take the state examination for licensure as a real estate salesman be denied. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of October, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of October, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 90-1844 The Petitioner wrote a letter to the Hearing Officer, which was read and considered. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact 1-6. Adopted. 7. Rejected, as irrelevant. COPIES FURNISHED: Joselyn M. Price, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs 400 West Robinson Street, Suite 212 Orlando, FL 32801 Grady William Aplin, Jr. 905 South Kings Avenue Brandon, FL 33511 Darlene F. Keller, Director Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, FL 32802 Kenneth E. Easley, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792
The Issue Does the Department of Corrections' Sexual Harassment Policy, as contained in the Pamphlet "Sexual Harassment, Your Rights and Responsibilities", in a one-page document entitled "Department of Corrections Sexual Harassment Policy", and Chapter 7 of the Department's Personnel Procedures Manual, constitute umpromulgated rules, pursuant to Section 120.535 F.S.? Are existing Department of Corrections Rules 33-4.001(4)(a), 33-4.002(4), and 33-4.003(22) and (24), F.A.C. invalid exercises of delegated legislative authority due to vagueness, pursuant to Section 120.56 F.S.?
Findings Of Fact At all times material, Petitioner has been a career-service employee working as a Parole Officer I for DOC. He has earned a master's degree in criminology. At all times material, DOC has had in effect a one-page document entitled "Department of Corrections Sexual Harassment Policy" (P-5), a Pamphlet entitled "Sexual Harassment, Your Rights and Responsibilities" (P-3), and a Personnel Procedures Manual. Chapter 7 of the Personnel Procedures Manual is entitled "Sexual Harassment Complaints" (P-6). DOC has not adopted these documents as rules, and Petitioner here challenges them as unpromulgated rules. On February 22, 1996, Petitioner received written notice that he would be suspended without pay for ten days as a result of his violation of DOC Rules 33-4.001(4)(a), 33-4.002(4) and 33- 4.003(23)(25), F.A.C., (since renumbered) and the DOC's Policy on Sexual Harassment. The letter did not rely on Chapter 7 of the agency's Personnel Procedures Manual or its Pamphlet entitled "Sexual Harassment, Your Rights and Responsibilities". Petitioner appealed this action to PERC, which subsequently entered a recommended order upholding DOC's disciplinary action. Language from PERC's recommended order, which is pertinent to this instant rule challenge is: Florida Administrative Code Rule 33-4.001(4)(a) states, in pertinent part, that 'No . . . employee shall knowingly . . . commit any act or engage in any conduct which would violate any state statute, rule, directive or policy statement.' Florida Administrative Code Rule 33-4.002(4) states, in pertinent part, that 'Each employee . . . shall perform his duties fairly and impartially and otherwise conduct himself both on-duty and off-duty so as to command the respect of fellow employees, persons on parole, probation or otherwise under his supervision, inmates and the general public.' Florida Administrative Code Rule 33-4,.003(23) states that a first offense of conduct unbecoming a public employee is punishable by a written reprimand, up to a thirty day suspension or dismissal. Florida Administrative Code Rule 33-4.003(25) states that a first offense of willful violation of rules, regulations, directives or policy statements is punishable by a written reprimand, up to a thirty day suspension or dismissal. The DOC pamphlet entitled 'Florida Department of Corrections Sexual Harassment: Your Rights and Responsibilities,' provides, in pertinent part, as follows: Sexual Harassment requires two elements: The alleged conduct must be of a sexual nature, must be unwelcome and unwanted. Sexual harassment may be any of, but not limited to, the following: * * * continued suggestions regarding invi- tations to social events outside the work place, after being told such suggestions are unwelcome; * * * prolonged staring or leering to [sic] a person; * * * 32. State of Florida, Department of Corrections, Personnel Procedures Manual, Chapter 7, Sexual Harassment, provides, in pertinent part, as follows: * * * O. Sexual Harassment - Sexual Harassment is defined as unwelcome sexual advances, unwelcome requests for sexual favors, and other unwelcome verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature from or involving an employee's supervisors, peers, subordinates or any other persons in contact with an employee or applicant during the course of the conduct of the employee's or applicant's business when: Submission to such conduct is either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of employment; or Submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such individual; or Such conduct has the purpose or effect of interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive working environment. 33. The DOC Sexual Harassment Policy provides, in pertinent part, as follows: Sexual harassment may result from unwelcome sexual advances or a hostile environment created by conduct offensive to the victim such as suggestive or lewd comments, dirty jokes, offensive pictures or physical touching. Accordingly, all employees are being placed on notice that any employee found guilty of having engaged in sexual harassment will be severely disciplined, up to and including dismissal. * * * The charge of conduct unbecoming a public employee is a general charge that is subsumed if the Agency has a more specific charge that fully describes the alleged misconduct. Ford v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 9 FCSR Para. 148 (1993); Mathis v. Department of Corrections, 6 FCSR Para. 122 (1991). In this case, I conclude that the charge of unbecoming conduct is subsumed within the charge of sexual harassment and should be dismissed. PERC's recommended order also applied the foregoing provisions. At the date of formal hearing in the instant rule challenge, PERC had issued no final order. Before this instant Division of Administrative Hearings final order could be entered, PERC had extended the time for the parties to file exceptions to its hearing officer's recommended order, and ultimately, on August 13, 1996, PERC adopted its hearing officer's recommended order, thereby rendering Petitioner subject to future disciplinary action at the second occurrence level under Rule 33-4.003, F.A.C. The final order of PERC is now under appeal by Petitioner. These facts are officially recognized, sua sponte. Petitioner received copies of the Pamphlet, the Sexual Harassment Policy, and a copy of Chapter 33-4, F.A.C., on July 16, 1993, when he began employment with the agency. He did not receive a copy of Chapter 7 of the Personnel Manual and was unaware of it until his PERC proceeding. DOC imposes disciplinary action against its employees for conduct which constitutes sexual harassment. Petitioner received periodic training in agency seminars on the agency's Sexual Harassment Policy, including annual film presentations. He did not receive similar training regarding "conduct unbecoming a public employee", which is a term utilized in Section 110.227(1), F.S., and for which an employee may be disciplined. Section 110.227(1), F.S., also permits discipline of employees for "willful violation of the provisions of law or agency rules". Rule 33-4.001(4)(a), F.A.C., provides, in pertinent part: Responsibility for Conduct of Employees, Inmates and Others. No Administrator, Superintendent, Officer-In-Charge, Supervisor, or other employee shall knowingly permit any subordinate, inmate or other person to, nor shall he, commit any act or engage in any conduct which would violate any statute, rule, directive or policy statement . . . . Petitioner claims that Rule 33-4.001(4)(a), F.A.C., is vague as applied to him because he is not an administrator, superintendent, officer-in-charge, or a supervisor. According to Petitioner, this rule in only applicable to those who supervise subordinates. Rule 33-4.002(4), F.A.C., provides in pertinent part: (4) Each employee shall keep himself physically fit, mentally alert, personally neat and clean and shall perform his duties fairly and impartially, and otherwise conduct himself both on-duty and off-duty so as to command the respect of fellow employees, persons on parole, probation or otherwise under his supervision, inmates and the general public . . . . Rule 33-4.003, F.A.C., is entitled "Range of Disciplinary Actions" and lists a number of violations. Item (22) is "Conduct Unbecoming a Public Employee"; Item (24) is "Willful Violation of Rules, Regulations, Directives, or Policy Statements". The range of disciplinary penalties is increased at the second occurrence level under the rule. The agency Policy Statement, Pamphlet and Chapter 7 of the agency Personnel Manual state that sexual harassment is conduct unbecoming a public employee and contain definitions of sexual harassment, including hostile work place sexual harassment. The first sentence of the Pamphlet states that sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and is conduct unbecoming a public employee, as provided in Sections 110.105, 110.227 and 110.233, F.S., and Chapter 33-4, F.A.C. (Rules of the Department). The first page of the Pamphlet states EEOC guidelines defining sexual harassment, as recognized by the agency: Unwelcome sexual advances, unwelcome requests for sexual favors, and other unwelcome verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature when: Submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of a person's employment, or Submission to, or rejection of, such conduct by [sic] decisions affecting an individual, or Such conduct has the purpose or effect of substantially interfering with a person's work [sic] hostile or offensive working environment. The Pamphlet goes on to advise that sexual harassment requires two elements: conduct of a sexual nature/that is unwelcome and unwanted. It lists examples of harassing behavior, advises of the need to report such behavior, and explains the agency's internal complaint procedure and the procedure's protections against retaliation. It gives references for legal remedies outside the agency. Chapter 7 of the Personnel Procedures Manual states basically the same information as the Pamphlet, lists the same legal authorities and details the internal complaint procedure. It specifically provides, If there is a determination that there is cause to believe sexual harassment occurred, disciplinary action shall be taken in accordance with Chapter 33-4 Department of Corrections Rules. Chapter 7 was first effective on January 25, 1989 and last amended on March 5, 1993. It derives its authority from Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, Sections 110.105, 110.227, and 110.233, F.S., and Chapter 33-4, F.A.C. Both the agency Pamphlet and Chapter 7 of the Manual state that sexual harassment is conduct unbecoming an employee. Petitioner's position with regard to whether or not the Pamphlet and Chapter 7 of the Manual constitute unpromulgated rules appears to center on his belief that without them, employees are not on notice as to exactly what behavior constitutes sexual harassment, that they contain a subtext of what types of sexual harassment, i.e. hostile work environment, will be disciplined, or that they alone reveal that sexual harassment constitutes "conduct unbecoming". Petitioner testified that he understood blatant sexual harassment, such as unconsented physical contact, to be conduct unbecoming a public employee, but he did not have a clear understanding about the "gray areas", such as complimenting co- workers, socializing outside work, or what acts constituted hostile work place sexual harassment. However, Petitioner testified that he was on notice that the agency had an Anti-Sexual Harassment Policy and that at all times material, he knew that if he committed sexual harassment, he would be subject to discipline, up to and including termination. Petitioner admitted that if any employee engaged in actual sexual harassment against another employee, the offending employee would not command the respect of fellow employees, as described in Rule 33-4.002(4), F.A.C. He also was on notice through Rule 33-4.003, F.A.C., that he could be disciplined for "conduct unbecoming" or "willful violations of law or policy statements". He is charged at law with knowledge of Section 110.227(1) requiring discipline for "conduct unbecoming" or "willful violation" and Chapter 760 F.S., which implements Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. The agency routinely disciplines its employees for sexual harassment and has a long history of application of its Anti-Sexual Harassment Policy. Petitioner did not submit any evidence as to how Chapter 7 of the agency's Personnel Procedures Manual, the Pamphlet, or the one- page Policy Statement had any affect on him, beyond the discipline described, supra. Furthermore, there was no evidence presented to show that the agency's Sexual Harassment Policy, the Pamphlet, or Chapter 7 of the Personnel Procedures Manual have any affect on any person not employed by Respondent. There was no evidence that any of the provisions in these documents were self-executing.
The Issue The issue presented by this case concerns the question of whether the Respondent, State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services has exhausted all treatment for the Petitioner, Frank T. Henderson, through available sex offender programs administered by the Respondent. See Section 917.20, Florida Statutes (1977).
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner submitted a "Petition for Administrative Determination" to the State of Florida, Deportment of Health and Rehabilitative Services. In turn, the Department requested the Division of Administrative Hearings to conduct a formal hearing to consider the matters set forth in the petition and this request was received by the Division of Administrative Hearings on January 5, 1981. A final hearing in this cause was scheduled for January 30, 1981, but was not conducted until March 3, 1981, to allow Petitioner to secure representation. In the course of the final hearing the Petitioner testified in his own behalf. The Respondent called as witnesses Michael Denny, Staff Psychologist in the forensic service at the Florida State Hospital and Robert H. Alcorn, Jr., Director of the Mentally Disordered Sex Offender Program at the Florida State Hospital. Respondent's two exhibits were admitted as evidence. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, the Petitioner has been in the custody of the Respondent in keeping with that order of the Circuit Court of Duval County, Florida, and the authority of Chapter 917, Florida Statutes (1977). Beginning July 28, 1978, through the present, Petitioner has resided in the Florida State Hospital at Chattahoochee, Florida, where he is undergoing treatment in a hospital program for the benefit of mentally disordered sex offenders. This program and similar programs in other institutions administered by the Respondent require a high degree of motivation on the tart of the patient in order to achieve success. Although the Petitioner has made progress in the course of his stay, the Respondent has made a preliminary determination that it has exhausted all appropriate treatment for the Petitioner through the program in which he is enrolled and has additionally concluded that similar programs within the State of Florida do not offer other opportunities for progress. In that respect, the Respondent has exhausted treatment in the affiliated programs. The principal treatment modality in the mentally disordered sex offender program at Florida State Hospital is group therapy. The petitioner has participated in the group therapy sessions during his current hospitalization but no significant change in his behavior has been observed during this period. His condition has been diagnosed as (1) passive aggressive personality, passive type, (2) inadequate personality and (3) sexual deviation, incest. Henderson has been placed in this program as a result of incestuous activity with his daughter. His present condition is best described as a personality disorder with passive aggressive features. Metaphorically, an individual suffering from this form of personality disorder, if asked to mow the lawn and in doing so becomes confronted with flowers he would mow the flowers down rather than go around then. Typically, this type of disorder carries with it certain coping mechanisms such as problems with employment, substance abuse, and sexual deviation. Of these mechanisms, Henderson suffers from the latter two and in particular still has a propensity to act out in a sexually deviant manner. Group therapy has been described as the primary treatment form in the sex offender programs of the Respondent and the petitioner has advanced through the initial levels of the program and is now involved in the final level offered through group therapy. In that connection, his group meets one to one and one half hours, two or three times a week. The majority of his treatment while involved in Level III has been under the control of psychologist Michael Denny. This commenced in June, 1979, and ran through January, 1981. In the first five (5) months of the group work, Denny attempted to establish a rapport with the Petitioner and to discuss the Petitioner's marriage and personality style and from November, 1979, through January, 1981, attempted to treat this personality style and propensity to commit sexually deviant acts. Success in this effort was limited due to the Petitioner's failure to heed advice concerning his problems and personality style and problems with sexual deviancy. Henderson is aware of the dynamics of what lead him to commit sexual battery on his daughter and of his problems with his marriage which lead him to seek out alcoholism as a defense mechanism, to inappropriately keep people at a distance, and the ensuing problems. Nonetheless, the Petitioner has failed to alter his problem state and his present posture in such that the group therapy sessions will not assist in rehabilitation, and in view of the fact that the group therapy sessions are the means of ameliorating his sexual problems, treatment has been exhausted. The Petitioner is still likely to act out in a sexually deviant manner. The attempt of trying to get Henderson to be more assertive with other males and females has met resistence by Henderson through his internalization of feeling, and he would be prone to abuse substances to assist in this internalization, with the result being that the utilization of those substances would cause him to be abusive with others. Henderson continues to blame others for his problems and is superficial in interaction with others and lacks the depth of a close relationship. Only one time in the period of one and one half years that psychologist Denny dealt with Petitioner did the Petitioner express his inner feelings. Henderson also has problems following small rules or agreements with other persons. Finally Henderson has a tendency to use religion as a foil to discussing his disorder. Although asked not to use that defense mechanism in the course of the group sessions, Henderson has used religion as an unsatisfactory explanation for his deviancy. The clinical summary and report of the staff of the Florida State Hospital, rising from the November 12, 1980, staffing, may be found as Respondent's Exhibit No. 2, admitted into evidence, and this summary expresses the staff's opinion that treatment has been exhausted and the recommendation that the Petitioner be returned to the committing court. This determination was followed by an interdepartmental discussion of the Petitioner's case which was held by the various unit directors of the sex offender programs within the Department's control and it was the opinion of those unit directors that treatment of the Petitioner's condition has been exhausted. Petitioner has progressed in areas outside of the group therapy sessions to include participation in an alcoholics anonymous program in which he graduated and vocational participation in small engine repair and office education, wood therapy and leather therapy, participation with the Jaycees at the hospital and attendence at religious services. The quality of his performance in the adjunctive therapies is not sufficient to cause a change in the basic nature of the Petitioner's condition for which he was committed as a sex offender and is not such that it would cause a change in the determination that the Respondent has exhausted treatment for the Petitioner. Henderson states that he realizes what caused his crime in the sense that he was not assertive and was rejected and hurt to the extent that he was not performing normally and held hatred in his heart for his stepmother and wife. He said that he has enjoyed using hatred as a defense mechanism and was wrong and should take those problems to God and people. He feels that he has friends on the ward in his area and has had close relationships with the staff until he had problems with his back requiring surgery. (The staff feels that some of these problems are "psychosomatic.") He wanted to be removed from Denny's group and this was accomplished but he still feels bitter and hurt. He has expressed a willingness to work on his problems, but he conditions this on the fact that his willingness depends on the consensus of the staff of the Hospital that he needs further assistance, having determined in his own mind that his problem is under control.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby, RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services finding that it has exhausted all appropriate treatment for Frank T. Henderson, and that said Frank T. Henderson be returned to the committing court for further disposition. DONE and ENTERED this 19th day of March, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of March, 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: J. Craig Williams, Esquire 335 East Bay Street Jacksonville, Florida 32201 Gerry L. Clark, Esquire Florida State Hospital Chattahoochee, Florida 32324
The Issue Whether Petitioner, Andrew Anthony Taylor (“Petitioner”), timely filed a petition under the Victims of Wrongful Incarceration Act, chapter 961, Florida Statutes (2016)(“the Act”); and, if so, whether Petitioner demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence, his actual innocence, thereby entitling him to monetary compensation under the Act.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner seeks compensation pursuant to the Act after serving a prison term of 25 years for the sexual abuse of his stepdaughter, C.J. The jury verdict was vacated after C.J., in 2014, recanted her accusation that Petitioner sexually abused her in 1990, when she was eight years old. The undersigned will begin with a discussion of the events in 1990, when C.J. first reported the allegation of sexual abuse against Petitioner to Dr. Valerie Rao, a rape treatment medical examiner. On the evening of March 10, 1990, C.J. was brought to the Jackson Memorial Hospital Roxcy Bolton Rape Treatment Center by her mother and grandmother, at which time C.J. came under the care of Dr. Rao. Dr. Rao obtained a detailed history from C.J., during which C.J. reported that she had been sexually abused by her stepfather, “Andrew,” at two different locations--her old house and her new house. According to C.J., the most recent sexual encounter was when she was awoken by Petitioner on “Friday night,” March 8, 1990, and told to get up and go to her mother’s bed. C.J. did so, and Petitioner then told her to take off her pajamas, which she did. According to C.J., Petitioner got on top of her, put his “private part” in her, began kissing her, and put his mouth on her “private part.” C.J. also stated Petitioner made her touch his “private part,” and that he touched her in the anal area. C.J. also stated Petitioner often put his “private part” in her mouth. C.J. also stated Petitioner told her that if she told anyone, he would kill her. After obtaining the history, Dr. Rao examined C.J. and observed multiple bruises on her right arm and thighs, and abrasions on her back and on her left breast. The bruises and abrasions were caused when C.J.’s mother beat her with a baseball bat after C.J. told her mother of Petitioner’s sexual abuse. Dr. Rao immediately reported the mother to law enforcement, and C.J.’s mother was arrested at the rape treatment center for aggravated child abuse. Dr. Rao conducted a vaginal examination of C.J. and used a colposcope to observe and document the status of C.J.’s hymen. Dr. Rao observed and documented several healed tears of the hymen, which made the opening of C.J.’s hymen bigger than it should be for a child of her age. According to Dr. Rao, C.J. did not show any natural signs of progression of the hymen tissue that might be present due to a child approaching puberty. Dr. Rao persuasively and credibly testified at hearing that C.J.’s history was consistent with her physical examination. According to Dr. Rao, the healed tears could have resulted from Respondent “trying to push his penis into her” consistent with C.J.’s history. Dr. Rao acknowledged the tears also could have been caused by a finger, a pencil, or any object that is bigger than the opening of the hymen. However, no evidence was presented at hearing indicating that a finger, pencil, or any other object was placed in the opening of C.J.’s hymen. Dr. Rao further acknowledged there was no physical evidence that she could discern or collect that identified Petitioner as the assailant in this case. However, in 1990, obtaining DNA samples and the gathering of other types of physical evidence in an effort to specifically identify perpetrators of sexual abuse were not as advanced and reliable as it is today. Following Dr. Rao’s examination on March 10, 1990, C.J. was separated from her mother, and her mother no longer had custody of her. C.J. lived with her maternal great grandmother, and without her mother in her life, until she was 16 years old. On March 27, 1990, Mercy Restani, a trained interviewer who was employed by the Dade County Children’s Center within the office of the State Attorney, interviewed C.J. at the children’s center. C.J. provided a detailed history to Ms. Restani. C.J. told Ms. Restani that the sexual abuse by Petitioner happened in the old house and at the new house. C.J. told Ms. Restani that Petitioner would get her out of her bedroom and take her into her mother’s bedroom. C.J. told Ms. Restani that Petitioner would touch her “pocketbook” (the child’s word for a vagina) with his “private” (the child’s word for penis). C.J. told Dr. Restani that Petitioner got on top of her, that he moved very fast, and that it hurt when he did so. C.J. said Petitioner touched her breasts, put his mouth on her “pocketbook,” and his “private” in her mouth. C.J. also told Ms. Restani that Petitioner told her he would kill her if she told anyone. Ms. Restani asked C.J. if she had told her mother or anyone about what had happened to her. C.J. told Ms. Restani that she did not tell her mother because she was afraid. C.J. told Ms. Restani that her mother “had been asking her for several days if Andrew had been messing with her.” When C.J. eventually told her mother what had happened, C.J. said her mother beat her with a baseball bat. On April 3, 1990, C.J. was interviewed by a clinical forensic psychologist, Manuel E. Alvarez, Ph.D. The purpose of the interview was to assess C.J.’s current mental status and emotional therapeutic needs. According to Dr. Alvarez, C.J. was able to distinguish between the truth and a lie. C.J. had the intelligence to comprehend what had happened to her, to be able to relate it to others, and she was competent to testify. C.J. provided a detailed history to Dr. Alvarez. Dr. Alvarez observed that C.J. was able to provide a synopsis of her living arrangements at the time of the incidents. C.J. identified her stepfather, “Andrew,” as the perpetrator of the sexual abuse. C.J. told Dr. Alvarez it occurred at the old house and current house. C.J. told Dr. Alvarez it occurred when Petitioner would wake her, take her into the room, and tell her to get onto the bed. C.J. was reluctant to verbally tell Dr. Alvarez what Petitioner did to her, but C.J. wrote it down on a piece of paper (Petitioner’s Exhibit 4) in her own handwriting: He would get on me. He would start moving fast on me. He would take out his private part. On my private part and In my mouth. C.J. also told Dr. Alvarez that after the incidents, Petitioner threatened to kill her if she told anyone about it. On April 5, 1990, C.J. executed an affidavit, attesting to the fact of her name, that she was eight years old, that she lived with her mother and Petitioner at a specific street address in Dade County, Florida, and that: Early in the morning on Friday, March 9, 1990, Andrew woke me up and took me to his bedroom. Andrew told me to take off my panties. He touched my breasts. He put his private part into my pocketbook. It hurt. He kissed me on my mouth and on my pocketbook. He had done this before. He told me he would kill me if I told. My mother asked me if anyone was messing with me. For several days I wouldn’t tell her. When I did tell her what Andrew did, she beat me with a baseball bat. In August 1990, C.J.’s mother entered a plea of nolo contendere to the offense of aggravated child abuse against C.J. She was adjudicated guilty, sentenced to community control, and ordered not to have any contact with C.J. until approved by the court. On October 22, 1990, C.J. gave a videotaped deposition in Petitioner’s criminal case, in which she provided details of the sexual abuse by Petitioner. In the deposition, C.J. described how Petitioner woke her up, took her to her mother’s room, touched her “pocketbook” with his mouth, and placed his “wee-wee” in her “pocketbook.” C.J. testified he moved his body around while putting his “wee-wee” in her “pocketbook,” and that it hurt when he did so. She testified that on another evening, Petitioner woke her up again, took her to her mother’s room, and touched her “pocketbook” with his hand moving up and down as he did so. She testified it happened at the new house and at the old house. Petitioner’s criminal jury trial was held in March 1991, before the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in and for Dade County, Florida, in the case of State of Florida v. Andrew Anthony Taylor, Case No. F90-009928. At Petitioner’s criminal trial, C.J. testified via closed circuit television that Petitioner came to her bedroom, woke her up, and took her to her mother’s room. C.J. testified that she was wearing pajamas and panties and that Petitioner removed them. Using anatomically correct dolls, C.J. showed the jury that Petitioner touched her vagina with his hand and put his mouth on her breasts. She further indicated that Petitioner put his mouth on her vagina and demonstrated how he put his penis in her mouth and vagina. C.J. testified that it hurt when Petitioner placed his penis in her “private part.” She testified she did not tell her mother about this that night because Petitioner said he would do something bad to her. C.J. testified that another incident occurred that same week where Petitioner did the same things to her. C.J. also testified Petitioner put something “greasy” on his “private part” before he put his “private part” in her “private part.” C.J. indicated Petitioner’s sexual abuse of her also occurred at the old house. C.J. testified that when she told her mother about Petitioner’s sexual abuse of her after the last incident, her mother became upset and hurt her. C.J. testified that when she told Dr. Rao she got all the bruises when her mother hit her with a baseball bat, it was the first time her mother ever hit her with a bat. C.J. testified she has not been able to live with or have contact with her mom since her mother hurt her. C.J.’s mother did not testify at the criminal trial against Petitioner because she had an open warrant for her arrest at the time for violating her community control. Petitioner testified at his criminal trial. Although Petitioner denied he sexually abused C.J., he acknowledged that he was C.J.’s stepfather; he married C.J.’s mother in 1989; he had a son with C.J.’s mother in 1998; he was having an extramarital affair with another woman; and while he divided his time between Maryland and Miami because of work, he was sleeping in the same home as C.J. during the timeframe that C.J. indicated she had been sexually abused by him. Following the criminal trial, Petitioner was convicted on March 15, 1991, of three counts of capital sexual battery and one count of lewd and lascivious behavior for the sexual abuse of C.J. Petitioner was sentenced to life in prison on the three capital offenses. The judgment and sentences were per curiam affirmed on appeal in Taylor v. State, 610 So. 2d 644 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992). After reporting the incidents of sexual abuse, C.J. went through counseling two times per week for several years. At no time did C.J. tell any therapists that she was not sexually abused by Petitioner. In 2006, C.J. was approached at her grandmother’s home by a male private investigator for Petitioner. The investigator wanted to ask C.J. questions about what happened with Petitioner, but C.J. refused to speak with the investigator. In either late 2013 or early 2014, C.J. was again approached by a private investigator for Petitioner, this time a female who came to C.J.’s place of employment (“Walmart”). The investigator wanted to ask C.J. if anything had happened with Petitioner. In response, C.J. immediately told her “no.” The investigator then gave C.J. a card, and C.J. told the investigator she would call her in couple of weeks. On February 17, 2014, C.J. executed an affidavit formally recanting the accusation that Petitioner sexually abused her when she was eight years old. In this affidavit, C.J. asserted now, at the age of 32, that she made the allegation because her mother was either drunk or high on drugs who would ask her “if anybody touched me inappropriately.” C.J. asserted that late one night after telling her mother that nobody touched me, her mother beat her with a baseball bat and started yelling, “did Andrew touch you.” C.J. asserted that after telling her mother no, her mother began to beat her and beat her for hours. C.J. asserted that after an extensive beating, she told her mother that “Andrew” had touched her so that she would stop beating her, and after telling her that Andrew touched her, the beating stopped. However, by this time, C.J. had developed a close relationship with her half-brother Andrew Taylor, Jr. C.J. further asserted: A while back, I began to talk with my half- brother, Andrew Jr., and would see him interacting with his own son. This started me thinking about what I had done and only I knew the real truth that Andrew was innocent. My conscience started bothering me every time I would see Andrew, Jr. playing and interacting with his son and it got to the point where I couldn’t sleep and hardly eat. I finally called my half-brother, Andrew Jr., and told him I needed to meet with him and explain what had happened regarding his father. I told Andrew Jr. that his father never touched me or bothered me sexually and that I was so sorry for his dad not being in his life because of what I did. I asked Andrew Jr. to forgive me and he agreed. I also asked Andrew Jr. what I should do and who I could write in order to correct this situation. Investigator Jeannie Rogers came to see me a few months ago and spoke to me about coming forward. I have finally gotten the courage to stand up and do what is right. On June 23, 2014, Petitioner filed a Motion for Post- Conviction Relief Based on Newly Discovered Evidence in Case No. F90-009928. The newly discovered evidence was C.J.’s recantation of the sexual abuse allegation against Petitioner. On April 2, 2015, an evidentiary hearing was held on the motion before Circuit Court Judge Diane Ward. At the hearing before Judge Ward, Petitioner presented the live testimony of C.J., who testified she made up the allegation that Petitioner sexually abused her because her mother beat her with a baseball bat to make her provide a false allegation against Petitioner. C.J. testified she told her mother Petitioner sexually abused her because she wanted the beating to stop. However, C.J. also testified when she told her mother that Petitioner sexually abused her, the beating did not stop, and her mother continued to beat her with the baseball bat for not telling her about the sexual abuse sooner. During the hearing before Judge Ward, C.J. acknowledged she provided specific details of sexual abuse by Petitioner to Dr. Rao, Ms. Restani, Dr. Alvarez, and in her prior testimony in the underlying criminal proceedings involving Petitioner. C.J. was asked how she could have had such knowledge of sexual activity as an eight year old in order to provide the details that she did to Dr. Rao, Ms. Restani, Dr. Alvarez, and in her testimony in the underlying criminal proceedings. In response, C.J. testified she came up with the details by watching cable television and walking in on her mother and Petitioner while they were having sex. At the hearing before Judge Ward, Respondent presented the live testimony of C.J.’s mother, who acknowledged she was a cocaine addict in March 1990. C.J.’s mother testified on direct examination that she recalled an incident in which she had returned home one night on March 5, 1990, and found C.J. lying in bed with her hands covering her front “private parts.” She testified that she could smell a “sexual scent” in the room and that she asked C.J. “what was wrong.” She testified C.J. did not indicate anything was wrong, but she was still suspicious something was wrong because of the sexual odor in the room. C.J.’s mother testified that due to this suspicion, she asked C.J. a second time on March 9, 1990, if “anyone had been messing with her.” According to C.J.’s mother, C.J. indicated this time that Petitioner “[h]ad been bothering her,” which meant that he had been sexually molesting her. C.J.’s mother testified on direct examination that when C.J. began telling her specific details of the abuse by Petitioner, she became irate and beat C.J. with a baseball bat. However, C.J.’s mother’s testimony as to when she began to beat C.J. with a baseball bat is inconsistent. C.J. and her mother acknowledged their relationship over the past several years has been good, and there is no current animosity between them. At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, Judge Ward orally announced her ruling that C.J.’s change in testimony is newly discovered evidence. In reaching this conclusion, Judge Ward specifically found C.J.’s testimony “reliable and credible.” Judge Ward commented she “had the opportunity to view her, and observe her during the testimony, and as well as consider any motive that she had for the recantation of her testimony.” On the other hand, Judge Ward specifically found the live testimony of C.J.’s mother to be “incredible.” In reaching this conclusion, Judge Ward commented that at the time of the events, she was by her own admission using drugs, and she had a poor recollection of the events, which is attributable to her drug use rather than to the passage of time. Judge Ward further stated: There were multiple lengthy pauses between the attorney’s questions and her answers where she seemed to be searching in her memory for answers. The Court observed that she seemed very hesitant and unsure of her own recollection of the events, and I further find that this is attributable to her extensive drug use, and that, and her intoxication on drugs at the time that this occurred. With regards to the beating, but with a baseball bat, although at some times she did acknowledge, did state that she beat her child with the baseball bat after she implicated the Defendant in the sexual assault, there were times that she said that she couldn’t recall and it could have been before she implicated her. And this is the most damaging testimony you could possibly have given the fact that there was no direct evidence otherwise implicating the Defendant as the person who sexually assaulted her. She did have six healed tears on her hymen which could have occurred at any time, and been caused by any other person. There was no DNA, blood evidence, semen, eyewitnesses, or a confession, so the only evidence that the State had, or the strongest evidence that the State had was the victim’s testimony, which was obviously obtained through a beating with a baseball bat by her mother when she was a very tiny child. The pictures of her are very sad at such a young age. There is no doubt that if a jury were to hear that the victim, hear from the victim that the Defendant was not the person that sexually abused her, and that she lied because her mother beat her with a baseball bat when she was eight years old, would have produced an, could have, would have produced an acquittal on retrial, and that the Defendant would probably be acquitted on retrial, so based on the foregoing I’m going to grant the motion for post-conviction relief. We need to schedule it for trial now. I think it has to be set in ninety days; isn’t that correct? Okay, I’ll answer my own question yes. Pet. Ex. 14, pp. 245-247. On April 2, 2015, a written order was entered vacating the finding of guilt, judgment, and sentence, and a hearing was scheduled for April 10, 2015, at which time a new trial date would be set. On April 10, 2015, the State announced a nolle prose of all criminal charges against Petitioner. On June 30, 2015, Petitioner timely filed a Petition to Establish Wrongful Incarceration in Case No. F90-009928. On July 31, 2015, Respondent filed a response contesting the petition. After the filing of the initial petition, a grand jury returned an indictment recharging Petitioner for the same crimes. C.J. was notified of the grand jury proceeding, but she did not appear or request a continuance. After the criminal case was re-filed, Respondent and Petitioner were unable to reach a settlement. On December 12, 2016, the second set of charges were nolle prossed. On January 25, 2017, Petitioner filed an amended petition. On March 17, 2017, pursuant to section 961.03(4)(a), Judge Ward issued an “Order Finding That Defendant Was a ‘Wrongfully Incarcerated Person’ and Is ‘Eligible for Compensation’ Pursuant to Section 961.03, Florida Statutes.” Judge Ward held that the petition was timely filed and that Petitioner met his burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, his “actual innocence” of the charges. Central to Judge Ward’s conclusion that C.J.’s recantation is reliable and that Petitioner met his burden of establishing his actual innocence by a preponderance of the evidence is that she had the opportunity to observe C.J. and her mother’s demeanor when they testified live at the April 2, 2015, evidentiary hearing on Petitioner’s motion for post-conviction relief. Judge Ward’s findings are largely based on credibility assessments of C.J. and her mother based on observations of their demeanor while testifying. In concluding that Petitioner established his “actual innocence” by a preponderance of the evidence, Judge Ward relied on the evidence presented at the April 2, 2015, evidentiary hearing on Petitioner’s motion for post-conviction relief. In the instant proceeding, however, Petitioner failed to meet his burden of establishing his actual innocence by clear and convincing evidence. Whether Petitioner is actually innocent turns on whether Petitioner presented clear and convincing evidence that C.J.’s recantation is reliable. The evidence presented in this case does not clearly and convincingly establish the reliability of C.J.’s recantation. To begin with, C.J. consistently provided details about sexual conduct perpetrated against her by Petitioner in her visits with Dr. Rao, Ms. Restani, and Dr. Alvarez, and in her prior deposition and trial testimony in the underlying criminal proceeding against Petitioner. C.J. gave details about how Petitioner would wake her up and take her to another room. She gave details about oral sex by Petitioner on herself and that she performed on Petitioner. She gave details about Petitioner using a lubricant on his penis. She gave details about how he would place his penis in her vagina and move up and down really fast. She said it hurt when he did so. Dr. Rao persuasively and credibly testified that the injuries to C.J.’s hymen were consistent with her history. C.J. consistently stated in 1990 and 1991 that her mother beat her with a baseball bat after she told her of the sexual abuse by Petitioner. Over 20 years later, C.J.’s story changed, and she stated that her mother beat her with a baseball bat before she told her of the sexual abuse by Petitioner. In her recantation affidavit, C.J. stated that after telling her mother that Petitioner touched her, the beating stopped. However, in the hearing before Judge Ward, C.J. testified that her mother continued to beat her with the baseball bat after she told her about the abuse for not telling her about the abuse sooner. From March 10, 1990, when C.J. was removed from her mother until she was 16 years old, C.J. had many opportunities to come forward and recant the allegation of abuse against Petitioner. During this time, there was no reason for C.J. to fear her mother because her mother was not in C.J.’s life. Subsequently, C.J. and her mother developed a good relationship. However, Petitioner waited almost 24 years to recant. C.J. recanted after developing a relationship with her half-brother, Andrew Taylor, Jr. When Andrew Taylor, Jr., turned 18 years old, he began a relationship with his father, Petitioner. Prior to recanting, C.J. regretted her half-brother did not get to spend quality time with Petitioner because Petitioner was in prison. C.J.’s development of a relationship with her half-brother and her desire that he have a strong relationship with Petitioner could be a motive for her recantation. C.J. did not appear before the grand jury, she did not request a continuance, and she was not called as a witness at either of the hearings in the instant matter. The undersigned lacked the opportunity to observe C.J.’s demeanor because she was not called to testify as a live witness. However, the undersigned had the opportunity to observe C.J.’s demeanor while testifying in her videotaped deposition in 1990, at which time she testified credibly and persuasively to facts demonstrating that Petitioner sexually abused her. Petitioner was called as a witness at the August 8, 2017, hearing, at which he was simply asked on direct examination if he ever molested C.J., to which he responded no. Petitioner’s testimony at the hearing was unpersuasive.
The Issue Did the Respondent, Zafar S. Shah, M.D. (Dr. Shah), commit the violations alleged in Counts 7-10 of the Administrative Complaint dated June 26, 2000, and, if so, what penalty should be imposed?
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: The Board is the agency charged with regulating the practice of medicine in the State of Florida. Dr. Shah is and, at all times material hereto, has been licensed to practice medicine in the State of Florida, having been issued license number ME0071706. Dr. Shah is board-certified in internal medicine. Dr. Shah was born, and spent the first 29 years of his life, in Pakistan. Dr. Shah is 35 years of age. Dr. Shah began working at MidTown Clinic in Zephyrhills, Florida, in October 1996, and continued to work at MidTown Clinic until he was terminated in 1999. Tammy Rachel (Tammy) worked as a certified nursing assistant at MidTown Clinic from June 1996 until she was terminated in March 1999. Tammy worked with Dr. Shah as his Medical Assistant during Dr. Shah's tenure at MidTown Clinic. At all times material to this proceeding, Tammy was married to, and lived with, Corey Rachel, her husband. Although T. H., Tammy's oldest daughter, age approximately 15 years, was at all times material hereto, living in the Rachel household, her biological father was the custodial parent. Tammy's two younger daughters also lived with their mother in the Rachel household. At all times material to this proceeding, Dr. Shah did not have any family living in the United States. After Tammy began working for Dr. Shah, she and Dr. Shah became close friends. As a result, Tammy, along with her husband and her daughters, including T. H., spent a great deal of time with Dr. Shah. Tammy and her family treated Dr. Shah as if he was a member of their family. Tammy and her family, including her husband, spent almost every weekend with Dr. Shah at his home or on outings with Dr. Shah. Dr. Shah visited Tammy's home on week nights during this period of time. This visitation, both weekend and week nights, between Dr. Shah and Tammy's family occurred between December 1996 and August 1999. Initially, the relationship between Dr. Shah and Tammy was a working relationship. However, in February 1997, Dr. Shah and Tammy began a sexual relationship which lasted until March 1999. When confronted by Corey Rachel about her relationship with Dr. Shah, Tammy denied having a sexual relationship with Dr. Shah. In fact, Tammy did not tell Corey Rachel of her sexual relationship with Dr. Shah until after August 5, 1999. During the period of time that Dr. Shah and Tammy's family were visiting back and forth, Dr. Shah established a close relationship with T. H., in that Dr. Shah: (a) gave more attention to T. H. than the other girls; (b) spent more time with T. H. than with the other girls; and (c) spent time alone with T. H. when she cleaned his house and at other times at the mall, etc. Tammy was aware of the relationship between Dr. Shah and T. H. and that T. H. was alone with Dr. Shah on occasions. However, there is no evidence that this relationship was intimate or in any way sexual in nature, notwithstanding the testimony of Tammy or Corey Rachel to the contrary, which I find lacks any credibility in this regard. A prescription in the name of T. H. with a date of January 18, 1999, for 60 250-milligram tablets of Erythromycin, an antibiotic, was presented to the Winn Dixie Pharmacy by Corey Rachael. The prescription was filled on January 20, 1999, and picked up by Corey and Tammy Rachel on that same date. The prescription carried what appeared to be the signature of Dr. Shah. However, Dr. Shah denies that he ever prescribed Erythromycin for T. H. or that he wrote or signed the prescription in question. Tammy gave the medication to T. H., which T. H. used, including the refills, for the acne on her face. However, it was T. H.'s testimony, which I find to be credible, that Dr. Shah never discussed the problem of acne with her, and did not prescribe Erythromycin or any other medication to treat the acne on her face. However, T. H. did discuss the acne problem with Tammy. It was not unusual for Dr. Shah to carry prescription pads home with him, which were then available to those in his home. Likewise, it was not unusual for a Medical Assistant, such as Tammy, to have access to Dr. Shah's prescription pads at work. In fact, it was not unusual for a Medical Assistant to fill in the necessary information on a prescription for the doctor's signature. The MidTown Clinic has no medical records or any other records reflecting that Dr. Shah ever saw T. H. as a patient. Likewise, Dr. Shah did not have any records reflecting that he had ever treated T. H. as a patient or that he had given T. H. a physical examination. T. H. did not have a regular physician. When she needed medical treatment, T. H. went to the Health Department or Tammy would secure medical treatment for T. H. from physicians with whom Tammy worked. Other than the allegation concerning the acne problem, there is no allegation that Tammy sought medical treatment for T. H. from Dr. Shah, or that Dr. Shah saw T. H. as a patient. An analysis by the Board's handwriting expert indicates that the signature on the prescription in question is consistent with the presumed, not known, signature of Zafar Shah, M.D. on 20 other prescriptions taken from the Wal- Mart Pharmacy in Zephyrhills, Florida. The Board offered no evidence that the signatures on the 20 prescriptions from Wal-Mart were in fact the signature of Zafar Shah, M.D., other than the testimony of the pharmacist from Wal-Mart that the signatures on those 20 prescriptions filled at Wal-Mart appeared to him to be the signature of Zafar Shah, M.D. Although the Board's handwriting expert was given the opportunity to compare current samples of Dr. Shah's signature, to be given by Dr. Shah prior to the hearing, with the signature on the prescription in question, he chose not to make this comparison. The Board's handwriting expert did not compare the signature in question to any known signature of Zafar Shah, M.D. There is insufficient evidence to establish facts to show that Dr. Shah wrote the prescription in question, notwithstanding the testimony of the Board's handwriting expert to the contrary, which I find lacks credibility in this regard. Likewise, there is insufficient evidence to establish facts to show that Dr. Shah ever treated T. H. for the acne on her face or for any other medical problem or that a patient- physician relationship ever existed between Dr. Shah and T. H., notwithstanding the testimony of Tammy or Corey Rachel to the contrary, which I find lacks credibility in this regard. On August 5, 1999, Dr. Shah had dinner with Tammy, Corey Rachel, T. H., and Tammy's two younger daughters at the Rachel's home in Dade City, Florida, as he had on many previous occasions. On August 5, 1999, Dr. Shah was to spend the night in the Rachel's home, as he had on many previous occasions. As usual, Dr. Shah was to sleep on an air mattress in the living room. Around 11:00 p.m. Tammy and Corey Rachel went to bed. Sometime thereafter, T. H. went to her room to prepare for bed and Dr. Shah proceeded to prepare for bed in the living room on the air mattress. Around 1:00 a.m. on August 6, 1999, Tammy testified that she was awakened by what she thought was a noise and got out of bed. After getting out of bed, Tammy checked on her two younger daughters, and then checked on T. H. who was not in her bedroom. Tammy then proceeded to look elsewhere in the house for T. H. Tammy also testified that when she walked into the living room she observed T. H. and Dr. Shah having, what appeared to her, to be sexual intercourse. Tammy became very upset and began beating Dr. Shah on the back and calling Corey Rachel. Dr. Shah attempted to protect himself from Tammy's onslaught by gathering his belongings and leaving the house. During the time Tammy was beating on Dr. Shah, she also slapped T. H.'s face. Corey responded to Tammy and instructed T. H. to go to her room. T. H. then went to her room. At this time, T. H. still had on the long T-shirt and under pants, which she had worn to bed. Likewise, Dr. Shaw had on the clothing that he had worn to bed. Tammy reported the incident to the Pasco County Sheriff's Department. Deputy Timothy Harris and Sergeant Rowan responded to the call by Tammy. Upon arrival at the Rachel home, the officers spoke with Tammy, Corey Rachel, and T. H. When T. H. was interviewed by Deputy Harris, she told Deputy Harris that she and Dr. Shah had been engaged in sexual intercourse at the time Tammy came into the living room. In fact, T. H. related a very explicit account of the incident, using language which was not in her normal vocabulary. T. H. also provided a written statement of the incident to Deputy Harris where she again admitted to having sex with Dr. Shah. After providing the written statement, T. H. went home with her father. T. H. was not under oath on either of these occasions. Deputy Harris inspected the scene of the incident for physical evidence that sexual intercourse had taken place between T. H. and Dr. Shah. Deputy Harris did not find any physical evidence that sexual intercourse had occurred. Deputy Harris also took some clothing that T. H. had been wearing as evidence for the purpose of examining for evidence of sexual intercourse. Upon examination, this clothing did not yield any evidence of sexual intercourse. Later in the morning of August 6, 1999, Detective Ball went to the home of Timothy Harvey and interviewed T. H. In this interview, T. H. again stated that she and Dr. Shah were engaged in sexual intercourse earlier that morning at the Rachel's home, and had, on previous occasions, had sexual intercourse at the Rachel's residence and at Dr. Shah's residence. She also related that she was in love with Dr. Shah and that they were going to be married when she turned 18 years of age. T. H. further related to Detective Ball that Tammy was jealous of her relationship with Dr. Shah. When Detective Ball requested that T. H. undergo a physical examination to uncover possible evidence of sexual intercourse between T. H. and Dr. Shah, T. H. refused to undergo the physical examination. T. H.'s reason for not taking the physical examination was that she loved Dr. Shah and any evidence found would obviously be used against him. Later, during the day of August 6, 1999, Tammy and Dr. Shah agreed to meet at Brewmasters, a restaurant in Wesley Chapel, halfway between Dr. Shah's house and Dade City, Florida. This meeting was arranged by Tammy at the request of the Pasco County Sheriff's office in an attempt to get Dr. Shah to admit to having had sexual intercourse with T. H. on August 6, 1999. Tammy was wired and the Detectives from the Pasco County Sheriff's office attempted to monitor the conversation. However, the monitoring was not too successful. During this meeting between Dr. Shah and Tammy, which lasted approximately 45 minutes, Dr. Shah repeatedly denied having sexual intercourse with T. H. At the conclusion of this meeting with Tammy, the Detectives approached Dr. Shah and requested that he accompany them to the County Jail. Although Dr. Shah was not officially placed under arrest at this time, he was unsure of his rights and felt intimated by the Detectives. The Detectives did not offer Dr. Shah the opportunity to drive his vehicle to the County Jail. Dr. Shah was transported to the County Jail by the Detectives. Once at the County Jail, the Detectives went through their interrogation (interview) routine. Dr. Shah's understanding was that the Detectives were giving him the choice of admitting to having had consensual sexual intercourse with T. H. or to having raped T. H. With that understanding, Dr. Shah admitted to having had consensual sexual intercourse with T. H. Dr. Shah was upset, confused and intimidated by the Detectives. Dr. Shah gave the Detectives the answers that he assumed they wanted. Upon being advised of Miranda rights, Dr. Shah requested an attorney and made no further statements. On September 28, 1999, Detective Ball and Bill Joseph, a Crime Scene Technician, went to the Rachel's home with a Lumalite for the purpose of illuminating body fluids that may have been left on the carpet or any other area as result of the alleged sexual intercourse. No evidence of body fluids was found. Under oath, during the State Attorney's investigation, T. H. recanted the story given in her written statement on August 6, 1999, and the story given verbally to Deputy Harris and Deputy Ball on August 6, 1999, and denied that she and Dr. Shah were engaged in sexual intercourse at the Rachel's home on August 6, 1999, when Tammy came into the living room or at any time previous to August 6, 1999. Subsequently, the State Attorney, on February 14, 2000, filed a No Information concluding that the facts and circumstances of this case did not warrant prosecution at that time. Again, under oath at the hearing, T. H. recanted the story given in her written statement on August 6, 1999, and the story given verbally to Deputy Harris and Deputy Ball on August 6, 1999, and denied that she and Dr. Shah were engaged in sexual intercourse at the Rachel's home on August 6, 1999, when Tammy came into the living room or at any other time. However, T. H. admitted to having a sexual relationship with two young males prior to August 1999. T. H.'s reason for not telling the truth in her recitation of the facts in her initial interview with Deputy Harris or her written voluntary statement to Deputy Harris or in her interview with Deputy Ball was that she was aware of Tammy's involvement with Dr. Shah and was attempting to make Tammy jealous because she was mad with Tammy due to their fight the previous evening and because of other problems that she was experiencing with Tammy. Additionally, T. H. had overheard a conversation between Tammy and Dr. Shah wherein Tammy was discussing divorcing Corey Rachel and marrying Dr. Shah, which upset T. H. T. H. testified that sometime after she and Dr. Shah had gone to bed in their respective rooms, she went in the living room to talk to Dr. Shah about the situation between she and Tammy as she had on other occasions. During their conversation, T. H. was sitting close to Dr. Shah. As their conversation progressed, T. H. became emotional and Dr. Shah "put his arm around her shoulder" to console her as he had on other occasions when she would discuss problems between her and Tammy. It was in this posture that Tammy found Dr. Shah and T. H. at approximately 1:00 a.m. on August 6, 1999. There is insufficient evidence to establish facts to show that T. H. and Dr. Shah were engaged in sexual intercourse at the Rachel's home on August 6, 1999, or at any time previous to that date, notwithstanding: (a) Tammy's testimony to the contrary, which I find lacks credibility due to her demeanor at the hearing and her involvement with Dr. Shah; (b) T. H.'s admission that sexual intercourse had occurred, which T. H. later recanted under oath, and which she testified was only done for the purpose of making Tammy jealous; and (c) Dr. Shah's admission, while being interrogated, that consensual sex had occurred between he and T. H., which he later recanted under oath at the hearing.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Board enter a final order finding Dr. Shah not guilty of the charges outlined in Counts 7-10 of the Administrative Complaint and dismissing the charges outlined in Counts 7-10 of the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of August, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___________________________________ WILLIAM R. CAVE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6947 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of August, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert C. Byerts, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Post Office Box 14229 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-4229 Jack D. Hoogewind, Esquire 33283 Cortez Boulevard Dade City, Florida 33523 Tanya Williams, Executive Director Board of Medicine Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 William W. Large, General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Theodore M. Henderson, Agency Clerk Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way Bin A00 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701
The Issue The issue presented by this case concerns the question of whether the Respondent, State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services has exhausted all treatment for the Petitioner, William Thomas Massey, through available sex offender programs administered by the Respondent. See Section 917.20, Florida Statutes (1977).
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner submitted a "Petition for Administrative Determination" to the State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. In turn, the Department requested the Division or Administrative Hearings to conduct a formal hearing to consider the matters set forth in the petition and this request was received by the Division of Administrative Hearings on December 9, 1980. A final hearing in this cause was scheduled for January 30, 1981, but was not conducted until February 4, 1981, so that Petitioner might secure representation. In the course of the final hearing the Petitioner testified in his own behalf and called as witness Michael Pomeroy, Staff Psychologist in the forensic service at the Florida State Hospital. The Respondent called Robert H. Alcorn, Jr., Director of the Mentally Disordered Sex Offender Program at the Florida State Hospital as its witness. Respondent's Exhibit No. 1 was admitted into evidence. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, the Petitioner has been in the custody of the Respondent in keeping with the order of the Circuit Court of Duval County, Florida, and the authority of Chapter 917, Florida Statutes (1977). Beginning March 1, 1979, through the present, Petitioner has resided in the Florida State Hospital at Chattahoochee, Florida, where he is undergoing treatment in a hospital program for the benefit of mentally disordered sex offenders. This program and similar programs in other institutions administered by the Respondent require a high degree of motivation on the part of the patient in order to achieve success. Although the Petitioner has made progress in the course of his stay, the Respondent has made a preliminary determination that it has exhausted all appropriate treatment for the Petitioner through the program in which he is enrolled and has additionally concluded that similar programs within the State of Florida do not offer other opportunities for progress. In that respect, the Respondent has exhausted treatment in the affiliated programs. The principal treatment modality in the mentally disordered sex offender program at Florida State Hospital is group therapy. The Petitioner has participated in the group therapy sessions during his current hospitalization but no significant change in his behavior has been observed during this period, in fact, no significant change has been observed in the petitioner's sexually deviant condition which dates from 1960. That condition has been diagnosed as homosexuality with a secondary diagnosis of personality disorder, inadequate type. This latter condition is manifested by maladapted behavior in the sense of lack of impulse control, in the sense that the Petitioner has a short temper when matters do not transpire in a fashion that he would approve. Referring again to the Petitioner's participation in the group therapy sessions, he lacks personal involvement. In this connection, the Petitioner has a problem becoming open and honest with the other members of the group, notwithstanding his ability to deal with their problems in the group session. He presents himself superficially to the members of the group, getting along with those members but not letting the group participants get close to him nor he to them. In summary, the Petitioner has cooperated superficially but has not progressed. If the Petitioner remains in the program, he is not expected to progress in group therapy. The Petitioner was placed in the program having been found guilty by jury on a charge of sexual battery on a seventeen year old male. The Petitioner does not acknowledge that he has committed a crime and he has not progressed in dealing with his propensity to commit homosexual acts with younger men. In other words, there has been no basic personality change in the Petitioner. Petitioner, having a past history of alcohol abuse, has participated in and completed the alcohol abuse program for the forensic service at the Hospital. He still participates in the Alcoholics Anonymous program on the ward, is a member of the Jaycees and is a ward representative for grievance matters. The Petitioner has been involved in the ancillary therapies; leather and music in the past, and was involved in wood occupational therapy at the time of the hearing, but his attendance was below average. He lacked interest in that therapy program. The Petitioner also writes articles for the Hospital newspaper. The Petitioner has the freedom of movement on the grounds of the facility that includes walks and attendance at dances. At the November, 1980, staffing conference concerning the Petitioner's case, Petitioner expressed an interest in vocational rehabilitation. The ancillary programs as discussed herein in the absence of progress in the primary treatment modality, i.e., group therapy, will not promote satisfactory progress and change the determination that the Respondent has exhausted treatment on the patient. On December 11, 1980, the Petitioner's case was presented to the screening committee of Unit Directors of all mentally disordered sex offender units within the State of Florida, and it was the unanimous opinion of those members that the Respondent had exhausted treatment for the Petitioner as a mentally disordered sex offender. This determination comports with the conclusion reached at the staffing conference held at the Florida State Hospital and reported as Respondent's Exhibit 1, admitted into evidence, which determined that the facility where the Petitioner was assigned had exhausted treatment. The Petitioner feels like he continues to be helped by the & program and is making progress and has greater self esteem, in addition to being able to relate to others better. Specifically, the Petitioner feels that he is able to control his temper better and has gained an insight into his problem with alcoholism. Nevertheless, the Petitioner would not benefit sufficiently from further hospitalization in the sex offender program, to cause a change in the determination that the Respondent has exhausted treatment for the Petitioner.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby, RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services finding that it has exhausted all appropriate treatment for William Thomas Massey, and that said William Thomas Massey be returned to the committing court for further proceedings. DONE and ENTERED this 5th day of March, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of March, 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: Claude Arrington, Esquire Assistant Public Defender Second Judicial Circuit 211 East Jefferson Street Quincy, Florida 32351 Gerry L. Clark, Esquire Florida State Hospital Chattahoochee, Florida 32324
The Issue The issue is whether respondent's teaching certificate should be disciplined for the reasons cited in the administrative complaint.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Background At all times relevant hereto, respondent, Jonathan W. Whyte, held teaching certificate number 517135 issued by the Department of Education. The certificate covers the area of physical education and is valid through June 30, 1996. When the relevant events herein occurred, respondent was certified as a teacher and was employed in various positions (both instructional and non- instructional) at Terry Parker High School (TPHS) in Jacksonville, Florida. The school is a part of the Duval County School District (District). Respondent was married to and lived with Cathy Whyte until they separated in November 1989. They had two children, S. W., born on November 22, 1985, who is the alleged victim in this case, and C. W., an older brother whose age is unknown. In addition, Cathy had two older boys from a prior marriage. The six lived together in Jacksonville, Florida, where respondent was employed as a teacher and coach at TPHS. Shortly after the separation, or in March 1990, dissolution proceedings were initiated by the wife, and a somewhat acrimonious and lengthy custody battle for the two biological children ensued. A dissolution of the marriage was eventually granted, and Cathy was given primary custody of the two children while respondent received visitation rights during parts of the summer and Christmas holidays. In 1990, or after the two were separated but before the marriage was dissolved, Cathy relocated to Connecticut with her boyfriend and another male friend taking all four children with her. In December 1990, charges that respondent may have sexually abused S. W. were allegedly made by the daughter to the mother who reported these allegations to Connecticut authorities. The charges were subsequently reported to Florida authorities, and after learning of them, the District temporarily removed respondent from the classroom in 1991 and reassigned him with pay to the media center for the remainder of the school year. Because the charges still remained unresolved at the beginning of school year 1992-93, respondent was temporarily reassigned with pay to the transportation center for that school year. By the summer of 1993, respondent had not taught in a classroom for two consecutive years, and this constituted a ground for the District to refuse to renew respondent's annual contract for school year 1993-94. Consequently, he was forced to seek employment in an unrelated field pending the outcome of this complaint. In September 1992, petitioner, Betty Castor, as Commissioner of Education, issued an administrative complaint against respondent charging him with sexually abusing his daughter in July 1990. The complaint was later amended to add the charge that he also sexually abused his daughter during Christmas holidays of 1992. The filing of the complaint prompted respondent to request a hearing. The Allegations The origin of the charges The administrative complaint, as amended, alleges that from July 15, 1990, to July 31, 1990, the Respondent committed sexual acts upon his five year old daughter. Such acts included but were not limited to kissing with an open mouth, engaging in oral sex, fondling of genitals, and penile penetration of the vagina. The complaint goes on to allege that on or about December of 1992, when the Respondent's daughter was visiting him for Christmas vacation in Florida, while the Respondent's daughter was at her Grandparent's home, the Respondent again committed sexual acts upon his daughter. Such acts included but were not limited to fondling of genitals, penile penetration of the vagina, and other inappropriate touching. The Respondent thereupon told his daughter, "Don't tell anyone I did this." The veracity of these allegations, which respondent strongly denies, is discussed in greater detail below. In December 1990, or after Cathy had moved to Connecticut and while she and respondent were in the midst of a custody battle, charges that respondent had sexually abused his daughter first arose. These charges were lodged by his estranged wife after she allegedly heard these complaints from her then five year old daughter. The matter was referred to the state police, and the daughter was interviewed on videotape by a female state trooper. This videotape was later furnished to the Florida circuit court having jurisdiction over the dissolution and custody matters. In March 1991, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) also received the same report that respondent had abused his daughter in July 1990. After an investigation was conducted, the report was classified by HRS as unfounded. In late 1992 or early 1993, the mother again reported to Connecticut authorities that respondent sexually abused his daughter while she visited him during Christmas holidays of 1992. The charges were referred to the Jacksonville sheriff's office in January 1993 and were later incorporated by petitioner into an amended complaint. The validity of the charges In support of the complaint, petitioner has relied upon the testimony of the alleged victim, two psychologists, an HRS investigator, and a sheriff's detective. The mother did not testify. Although the alleged victim made statements concerning the allegations to each of these witnesses, petitioner has conceded that, with one exception, all of these statements are hearsay and can be used only for the purpose of supplementing and explaining other competent evidence, if any. As to the one claimed exception, which involves the statements made by the child during an interview with Dr. D'Amato, a psychologist, the circumstances surrounding the making of the child's statements indicate a lack of reliability, and they are accordingly deemed to be hearsay. The specific reasons relied upon by the undersigned in making this finding are cited below. The validity of the charges turns in large measure on the veracity of the alleged victim's testimony. Bearing on this issue are several considerations. First, the allegations in the amended complaint arose during the course of a protracted child custody battle. Where there is marital conflict, divorce or custody proceedings, false sexual abuse allegations are not uncommon. Indeed, according to the accepted testimony of one expert, Dr. Krop, a higher percentage of false sexual allegations are made by a parent in this type of case. At the same time, there was evidence here of the presence of the parental alienation syndrome. In other words, one parent (the mother) was attempting through negative statements to alienate the children, including S. W., towards respondent, the estranged parent. When such alienation occurs, it tends to cast doubt on the credibility of the complaints of the alleged victim. Further, the evidence showed that during the child's first interview concerning the alleged abuse in late 1990 or early 1991 with a Connecticut state trooper, she was "contaminated" by inappropriate questioning and improper interview techniques. For example, during that interview, the trooper improperly interrogated, rather than questioned, the child. In addition, and contrary to accepted practice, the mother was allowed to remain in the room during the interview and was asked to verify some of the child's responses. Also, the interrogator repeatedly used leading questions and prompted the child with the desired responses. When contamination such as this occurs, any further allegations of abuse must be viewed "suspiciously" and are placed in doubt since the child is vulnerable to figures of authority and may give an answer, whether truthful or not, simply because she believes that the answer given is expected by the interrogator. Moreover, by being "interviewed" in this manner, the child was "conditioned" to give the same responses in subsequent interviews to authority figures. It is also noted that during the child's videotaped deposition in May 1993, which has been received in evidence as petitioner's exhibit 2, her answers lacked sponteneity, and she was repeatedly led by counsel and answered many questions only after being given the suggested answer. At that time, she acknowledged that "someone" had told her that by confirming that abuse had occurred, it would "help" her father. It is noteworthy that during the deposition, while claiming that some abuse occurred, the alleged victim specifically denied the allegations of oral sex, penile penetration and kissing with an open mouth, all being charges in the amended complaint. She also changed her testimony as to the number of times she was abused, and she used and understood the meaning of the words "vagina" and "penis" because of knowledge imparted to her by her mother. It is extremely unusual for a child of that age to use and understand those anatomical words. Collectively, these considerations cast considerable doubt on the credibility of the alleged victim's testimony and lead the undersigned to find that it should not be accepted. Given this finding, the hearsay testimony (consisting of statements made by the child during various interviews) offered by the HRS investigator, sheriff's detective and two psychologists does not supplement or explain any competent evidence of record and has been disregarded. Finally, the undersigned has also considered other pertinent testimony that supports the above findings, and that accepted testimony has been set forth below. The charge that respondent sexually abused his daughter during Christmas holidays of 1992 does not comport with other competent evidence. Due to the earlier allegations of abuse (that allegedly occurred in July 1990) being leveled against respondent, he agreed to certain restrictions during his visitation periods with the children. Under the terms of that agreement, when the two children visited him in Florida, they were to stay at his parents' home in Neptune Beach, and S. W. was to sleep in her grandparents' bedroom. Also, respondent agreed to never be alone with the children and to have one or both of the grandparents with them at all times. During her visit at Christmas 1992, S. W. was never alone with her father or out of sight of one of the grandparents except on one occasion when the girl accompanied her father out of the home during the day with another adult but not the grandparents. This was confirmed by uncontroverted testimony. During that same period of time, respondent slept on a couch at his parents' home, and his two children shared a bedroom directly across from his parents' bedroom. As to the alleged abuse in July 1990, the only time that the child was in Jacksonville without her brothers or mother being present was for one three day period, a Saturday afternoon to the following Tuesday. During that time, S. W. stayed at her grandparents' home while respondent spent the nights at his apartment. Respondent was working from five until midnight at a second job on Monday through Saturdays, by which time S. W. had already gone to bed, and he was attending classes at the University of Florida each work day until mid-afternoon when he returned to Jacksonville to go to work at his second job. On the only days he saw his daughter, a Saturday afternoon and all day Sunday, his parents were constantly present. Three psychologists testified in this cause. The first, Dr. Krop, a witness for respondent, became involved with evaluating respondent's family in October 1990 after being appointed by a circuit judge to evaluate the family and make a recommendation for the childrens' primary residence and visitation arrangements. The second, Dr. Kaplan, was appointed by the same circuit judge in July 1992 to offer his recommendation as to visitation arrangements for S. W. Both psychologists interviewed the alleged victim and her family, including respondent, and became aware of the sexual abuse allegations during the course of their interviews. Doctor Kaplan, who testified on behalf of petitioner, had extremely limited experience in the area of child sexual abuse, and before this case, had never been proffered as an expert in that area. Although he was accepted as an expert in psychology, he was not accepted as an expert in child sexual abuse, and very little weight, if any, has been accorded his opinions on this subject. The third psychologist, Dr. D'Amato, a Jacksonville psychologist, and also a witness for petitioner, first interviewed the child in April 1991 after the case was referred to him by the Jacksonville state attorney, presumably in response to the allegations referred to that office by Connecticut authorities. At the request of the mother's divorce attorney, and for the purpose of "monitoring" the child on the mother's behalf, Dr. D'Amato continued to see the child on four occasions in July and August 1992 for either fifteen or thirty minute sessions when she was visiting Florida. During those sessions, the psychologist found the child to be free of anxiety, comfortable with her father, and "enjoying herself." The testimony of Dr. Harry Krop, an expert in the field of child sexual abuse and who testified on behalf of respondent, has been accepted as being the most credible and persuasive of the three psychologists who testified. Based on his interviews with the child and family, and review of videotapes, depositions and other pertinent medical records, Dr. Krop concluded that the alleged sexual abuse of S. W. cannot be validated. The undersigned concurs with this finding. In summary, for the reasons cited above, it is found that respondent did not sexually abuse his daughter as alleged in the amended complaint. Therefore, the charges must fail.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Education Practices Commission enter a final order dismissing the amended administrative complaint with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of November, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of November, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-6173 Petitioner: 1-2. Partially accepted in finding of fact 1. 3-4. Partially accepted in finding of fact 3. 5-9. Rejected as being contrary to the more credible and persuasive evidence or hearsay which does not supplement or explain other competent, accepted evidence. 10. Partially accepted in findings of fact 10 and 12. The remainder has been rejected as being hearsay which does not supplement or explain other competent, accepted evidence. 11-13. Rejected as being hearsay which does not supplement or explain other competent, accepted evidence. Rejected as being contrary to the more credible and persuasive evidence. Rejected as being hearsay which does not supplement or explain other competent, accepted evidence. 16-20. Rejected as being contrary to the more credible and persuasive evidence. 21. Partially accepted in finding of fact 12. 22-24. Rejected as being contrary to the more credible and persuasive evidence. 25-26. Rejected as being hearsay which does not supplement or explain other competent, accepted evidence. 27-30. Rejected as being contrary to the more credible and persuasive evidence. 31. Rejected as being unnecessary. 32-33. Rejected as being hearsay which does not supplement or explain other competent, accepted evidence. 34. Partially accepted in finding of fact 12. 35-37. Rejected as being unnecessary. Rejected as being hearsay which does not supplement or explain other competent, accepted evidence. Rejected as being unnecessary or contrary to the more credible and persuasive evidence. 40-41. Rejected as being irrelevant. Note - Where a proposed finding has been partially accepted, the remainder has been rejected as being irrelevant, unnecessary, subordinate, cumulative, not supported by the evidence, or a conclusion of law. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert J. Boyd, Esquire Post Office Box 26 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Wm. Bruce Muench, Esquire 438 East Monroe Street Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Karen Barr Wilde, Executive Director Education Practices Commission 301 Florida Education Center 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Jerry L. Moore, Administrator Professional Practices Services 352 Florida Education Center 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto the Defendant was a registered real estate broker in the State of Florida, and held License Number 0060094. On or about December 5, 1978 Defendant pleaded no contest in Case No. 78-2506CF in the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit in and for Broward County, Florida, to the offenses of criminal attempt, as defined in Section 777.04(1), Florida Statutes, and indecent assault upon a female child, within the contemplation of Section 800.04, Florida Statutes. Thereafter, on or about February 9, 1979, the Defendant was committed by Judge James M. Reasbeck to the department of Health and Rehabilitative Services for care, treatment, and rehabilitation as a mentally disordered sex offender in accordance with the provisions of Section 917.19, Florida Statutes. In his order Judge Reasbeck specifically found that the Defendant "... suffers from a non-psychotic mental or emotional disorder, yet is competent and that the Defendant would be likely to commit further sex offenses if permitted to remain at liberty." Subsequently, on or about April 17, 1979, Defendant was admitted to the Mentally Disordered Sex Offender Program at South Florida State Hospital in Pembroke Pines, Florida. Defendant has remained in the Mentally Disordered Sex Offender Program at South Florida State Hospital since that time. The Defendant has made admirable efforts, both during his confinement at South Florida State Hospital and, prior to that time, in the Broward County jail to address both his problems with alcohol consumption and with his sexual deviation. The Defendant has been placed in positions of trust and responsibility in both these institutions, and has, apparently, discharged his duties in exemplary fashion. Although the Defendant has made some progress in the Mentally Disordered Sex Offender Program at South Florida State Hospital, he has not, as yet successfully completed that program. The Defendant remains within the jurisdiction of the committing court until such time as he is released from the Mentally Disordered Sex Offender Program and criminal proceedings involving the offenses to which he pleaded no contest have been concluded in the Circuit Court. In short, the Defendant is not free to come and go as he pleases, nor would he be automatically allowed to remain at liberty should he choose not to participate further in the Mentally Disordered Sex Offender Program. The Defendant did not advise The Board of the fact that he had pleaded no contest to the offenses with which he was charged within thirty days after the entry of his plea.
Findings Of Fact Respondent grew up in Havana, Cuba and was a university student there when Castro came into power. As did most university students, Respondent initially supported Castro but later became disenchanted with the regime. Respondent became interested in photography as a boy and became proficient to the point he sold photographs to the news media and helped defray the expense of his medical training through photography. Following the Bay of Pigs Invasion, Respondent smuggled out of Cuba photographs of the Russian missiles that had been delivered to Cuba. Respondent acknowledged that he took all of the photographs and videotapes entered into evidence in these proceedings. At all times relevant hereto, Respondent was licensed as a physician by the Florida Board of Medical Examiners. He graduated from medical school in Madrid, Spain in 1964, completed his internship at Johnson Willis Hospital, Richmond, Virginia, in 1965, and his residency in psychiatry at the Menninger School of Psychiatry, Topeka, Kansas in 1968. Respondent came to Naples, Florida in 1969 as Director of Collier County Mental Health Clinic which post he held for several years before devoting all of his time to his private practice. Respondent was married in 1962, and divorced in 1978. He is the father of three children. His two older daughters are working on advanced degrees while the younger son is entering high school. Following his divorce Respondent concluded that by marrying at a young age, he had perhaps missed out on much of life and decided to try a more libidinous life-style. In 1980, Respondent became attracted to a 19-year old licensed practical nurse who was working at Naples Community Hospital. Although he saw her several times in the hospital, they did not engage in conversation but made eye contact in passing each other. In October 1980, another doctor referred a patient who had suffered head injuries in a motorcycle accident to Respondent for treatment. This patient, Joseph DiVito, was seen in the hospital several times by Respondent and again after DiVito was released from the hospital. At the first hospital visit with DiVito, Respondent was surprised to see Laura Hodge, the LPN at Naples Community Hospital, whose eyes had attracted Respondent. She was the woman with whom DeVito was living at the time of his accident. The charges in the Administrative Complaint involving Laura Hodge are sustained only if a doctor-patient relationship existed between Respondent and Hodge. The doctor patient relationship, if it existed, was related solely to the treatment provided DiVito. Hodge testified that she was counseled by Respondent jointly with DiVito and also alone; that Respondent gave her the drug Artine to give DiVito in the event he suffered a reaction from the drug Haldol, which was given DiVito to aid in his memory loss; that after his release from the hospital DiVito was like a baby who had to be taught to feed himself, to walk, and to get around; that she had lunch with Respondent twice, once at Keewaydin Island, where they went by Respondent's boat, and once at a restaurant in North Naples; that following the lunch she felt dizzy and does not remember removing her clothes at her apartment when returned there by Respondent and having pictures taken of her; that after being shown nude photographs of herself, she was afraid of Respondent and feared he would show the pictures to DiVito; that she Accompanied Respondent on an overnight trip to Miami where they shared a motel room; that they went to dinner at a caberet where she drank some wine and began feeling strange; that when they returned to the motel that night, she does not remember anything until the following morning when she awoke upset and began crying; and that Respondent then drove her back to Naples. Shortly thereafter, Hodge left Naples with DiVito and went to Panama City where DiVito operated a boat leasing business during the summer of 1981. She returned to Naples that fall but had no further contact with Respondent. Respondent testified that he was surprised to see Hodge the first time he went to DiVito's room in the hospital; that Hodge told him that she didn't want to stay with DiVito; that the principal person who took care of DiVito when he was released from the hospital was his brother, William DiVito; that DiVito had been a very active man and was anxious to leave the hospital before he was physically ready to do so; that he was ambulatory, could feed himself and his principal problem was loss of memory; that Hodge was never his patient; that they had lunch twice, once at Keewaydin Island and again at a restaurant in North Naples; that both of these times Respondent took numerous photographs of Hodge and gave them to her; that following the lunch and picture-taking at Vanderbilt Beach (North Naples) he drove her to the apartment she had just moved into; that he visited her at this apartment at a later date and while she changed clothes, he took pictures of her in various stages of undressing; that he showed her these pictures after they had been developed; that she accompanied him to Miami where they shared a motel room and went out to dinner; and that they returned to Naples the following day because Hodge was upset. Photographs of Hodge which were admitted into evidence are of a person who appears fully aware that she is being photographed and in many of the pictures appears to be posing. Haldol, the drug given DiVito, can cause an epileptic type reaction; however, the treatment for this reaction is by injection and not orally because of the time it takes oral ingestion to work. The testimony of Hodge respecting Respondent entrusting to her the Artine tablets to place in DiVito's cheek if he had a reaction to the Haldol is less credible than is the testimony of Respondent. Although Respondent saw Hodge when he was treating DiVito and talked to the two of them, he did not thereby make Hodge his patient. Furthermore, no credible evidence was presented that Respondent surreptitiously gave Hodge any drug which could cause her to not remember the taking of the nude photographs. Her coordination and awareness shown in those photographs belie the contention that she was drugged. Diane Beck, R.N., arrived in Naples in 1981 and worked as a nurse at Naples Community Hospital where she met Respondent. After declining several dates with Respondent, Ms. Beck accepted an offer to go scuba diving from Respondent's boat. This involved a weekend trip to the Florida Keys on the boat and they had sex over this weekend. Respondent also took some nude photographs of Ms. Beck with her consent. Evidence presented to establish a doctor-patient relationship between Respondent and Beck included one instance where, following a D & C on Beck, the gynecologist asked Respondent if he had Tylenol #3 which Beck could take if needed for pain. When Respondent replied in the affirmative, the gynecologist did not write a prescription for medication for Beck. Although Beck testified that while they were living together, Respondent gave her Darvocet, Motrin and Tylenol #3 for dismenorreah from which she chronically suffered, Respondent denied prescribing these medications for her. The most likely scenario in this regard is that Respondent had such medication available in his home and Beck took them in accordance with instructions previously received from her gynecologist. This did not create a doctor-patient relationship between Respondent and Beck. Respondent prescribed benzodiasepines to many of his patients as a tranquilizer and sleeping pill. During the period December 1981 and October 1982 the Upjohn representative (detailer) whose territory included Respondent's office, gave Respondent 465 Xanax tablets as samples. Xanax is a benzodiasepine and the Xanax tablets were .25 mg and .5 mg in strength. The Upjohn company detailer who serviced the Naples area between October 1982 and June 1984 did not testify and no record of benzodiasepines left as samples with Respondent during this period was available at the hearing. Records of those drugs are maintained by Upjohn for the current year and two preceding years only. At the time of this hearing, the earliest record Upjohn had of drugs dispensed to physicians was January 1, 1985. Around November 1982, Upjohn came out with a benzodiasepine called Halcion. This drug was left with Respondent by detailers as samples. Halcion is packaged in sleeves with two tablets in a sleeve. Generally when Halcion is left as a sample, the box contains five sleeves with two tables per sleeve. Halcion has advantages over some other benzodiasepines that it works quickly, the effects wear off quickly and it leaves no hangover effect. Furthermore, the patient may have a memory lapse for the time sedated with Halcion. Use of Halcion is contraindicated by a woman of childbearing age because the drug can adversely affect and cause deformities in a fetus in the early stages of development. Halcion (as well as other drugs) may be obtained by a physician in a stockbottle which generally consists of 100 tablets in a square bottle with a round top. To obtain a stockbottle the physician places his order with the detailer, signs the appropriate FDA forms, the detailer sends the order to his area office and the stockbottle is mailed directly to the physician. No credible evidence was presented that Respondent ever obtained a stockbottle of Halcion from Upjohn. When benzodiasepines are taken in conjunction with the ingestion of ethyl alcohol, the effects of both are enhanced. Hence, there is a danger in taking sedatives while drinking alcoholic beverages. Alcohol alone is a sedative and it is quickly absorbed in the soft tissue such as the brain. When a benzodiasepine is taken at the same time ethanol is being ingested, the alcohol provides a vehicle which allows the benzodiasepine to be more quickly absorbed into the body. While Diane Beck was dating and living with Respondent, several videotapes were made of her and Respondent engaged in various sexual activities. Ms. Beck acknowledged that she voluntarily participated in some of these videotapes but that she was unaware that others were taken. She has no recollection that some of the tapes were being made, nor did she subsequently (before the charges here considered first arose) learn of these videotapes. In those tapes, Beck had been administered Halcion by Respondent without her knowledge or consent. This finding is based upon the following facts: Respondent told Beck he had given her a lot of Halcion. When Beck became pregnant by Respondent in mid-1983, Respondent told her of potential dangers caused by the use of Halcion and suggested she have an abortion. An appointment was made by Respondent with Dr. McCree, a gynecologist, to perform the abortion and on July 11, 1983, Dr. McCree performed a D & C on Beck, aborting the fetus. On one or more occasions Beck observed what appeared to be residue in her after dinner drink, and on at least one occasion asked Respondent about it. Respondent told her it was sugar from the old brandy she was drinking. Respondent acknowledged that he often performed sexual acts on Beck while she was "passed out" and unaware of what he was doing. However, he contended she enjoyed it and had given him permission. The videotapes of a comatose female being shifted around by Respondent to improve the angle for the pictures being taken. This does not appear to be a person merely intoxicated, certainly not one intoxicated with ethanol. This person is as limp as a rag with all muscles appearing to be totally relaxed who is certainly oblivious to what is going on. It is not believed a person merely intoxicated (unless dead drunk) could be moved and manipulated the way Beck was without some reaction. Had Beck been dead drunk, she would perhaps still be intoxicated when she awoke and/or be hung over. Neither of these events occurred. Respondent's steady relationship with Beck terminated in April 1984 after the date for a wedding could not be agreed upon. She moved out of his house but they remained on friendly terms until the existence of the videotapes became known. The third complaining witness, Sandi Karppi, met Respondent in June 1984 on the beach in Naples. At the time Ms. Karppi was an LPN on private duty with a patient where she had one hour off in the late afternoon which she used to walk on the beach. One day while walking along the beach, she was followed by Respondent who was attracted to the energy with which she walked. Respondent overtook her and engaged her in conversation. During the conversation Respondent disclosed his name and that he was a psychiatrist. Ms. Karppi disclosed to him that she had a pap smear taken which was suspicious, that a second test had been done, and she was anxious to obtain the results but her doctor did not return her calls. Respondent volunteered to obtain the results of the later test and inform her. Karppi told Respondent that she walked the beach almost every afternoon and Respondent began visiting the beach to meet her during her hour off from her nursing duties. A short time after the first meeting Respondent called Karppi to tell her that he had the results of her lab test and offered to take her to dinner to give her the results. She consented. Thereafter he continued to meet her on the beach and engage her in conversation. Respondent's version of the timing of the initial events of their relationship is a little different from the version testified to by Karppi; however, these differences are not material to the issue here presented. Respondent testified that Karppi told him of her problems with the pap smear test several days after their first meeting and that he agreed to get the results of the tests. Dr. King advised Respondent obtaining the results of the pap smear and passing them to Karppi. During the meetings on the beach and on boat trips Karppi took on Respondent's boat, Respondent took numerous photographs of Karppi. On one occasion, they went on an overnight trip to Keewaydin Island with Respondent's son Eric and a friend of Eric. The two boys slept in a tent on the beach leaving Karppi and Respondent on the boat. On another occasion they went alone on the boat to Captiva Island where they spent the night on board. Karppi testified that she went to sleep fully clothed while at Keewaydin Island in a bunk bed on one side of the cabin with Respondent in another bed and when she awoke, she was naked. Nude photographs of Karppi in a comatose state are contained in Exhibit 1. Karppi never consented to having her picture taken in the nude. Respondent's version of the nude photographs is that he frequently talked to Karppi about taking nude photographs but she never consented, saying only that maybe she would allow the photographs if out of town or if she was tipsy. Respondent contends these photographs were taken while they were at Captiva Island with only the two of them on the boat and that Karppi drank a lot of wine and passed out. He then disrobed her and took the photographs. Respondent contends he gave Karppi no drugs before she passed out. However, it is concluded that Karppi was given some sedative along with the wine she drank. This conclusion is based upon the following facts: Respondent had access to Halcion, Xanax, Tylenol #3, and other drugs that could induce coma. Respondent had used such drugs on Diane Beck and was aware of the potential for use of these drugs. In order to take some of the photographs in Exhibit 1, Karppi had to be moved around enough to awaken one who was just sleeping or only sleeping off ethanol induced sleep. Some of the actions of Respondent as depicted in these photographs would have awakened or aroused one who was not fully comatose. Karppi has no recollection such photographs were ever taken, though she was sober and had no hangover the next morning. Subsequent to the boat trips Respondent took a vacation during most of the month of July during which he travelled to Europe and the Caribbean. Upon his return to Naples, he renewed his courtship with Karppi and she moved into his home August 26, 1984, the day after Respondent's oldest daughter returned to college. Respondent's testimony that they first had sex that night which Karppi spent in his bedroom is not disputed by Karppi. If they engaged in sex before that time, Karppi was unconscious and unaware of it. During part of the time Karppi stayed at Respondent's home and shared his bedroom, her mother also visited and slept in another bedroom at Respondent's home. This relationship terminated around September when Karppi moved into her own apartment. She and Respondent remained friendly and saw each other occasionally. One night in late December 1984, Karppi called Respondent from the hospital to tell him she had a headache and to ask him to prescribe some medication for her. After learning that Karppi had tried without success to get her doctor on the telephone and that her doctor had prescribed Cafergot for her headaches, Respondent called in a prescription to the hospital pharmacy to give 4 Cafergot tablets to Karppi. The label from the bottle dated December 29, 1984 was admitted as Exhibit 16. In early January 1985, Respondent went to Vail, Colorado, with another woman and Karppi offered to stay at his house with Respondent's elderly mother while he was gone. He agreed and Karppi moved in. While looking for a book in Respondent's bedroom closet, Karppi discovered the nude photographs of her which were admitted into evidence as Exhibit 1. Having no recollection these pictures had been taken, she was quite shocked and called Respondent at his hotel in Vail. He told her to be calm and they would discuss the matter when he returned. Following a more extensive search, Karppi found numerous other photographs of naked women as well as several videotapes. Karppi contacted her doctor for advice, and he referred her to an attorney who in turn referred her to the State Attorney's Office. At the State Attorney's Office, she produced the photographs of herself she had removed from Respondent's residence and her affidavit was taken. On the basis of Karppi's affidavit and the photographs, a search warrant was obtained and on January 11, 1985, a search of Respondent's home was conducted. During this search, Exhibits 1 - 16 were seized. Subsequent to the conclusion of the hearing, those exhibits unrelated to any individual involved in these charges which were objected to at the hearing were not admitted into evidence as having no relevance to these charges. Following the search of Respondent's residence, criminal charges were brought against Respondent in the Circuit Court in and for Collier County alleging sexual battery and administering drugs to Karppi without her knowledge or consent. Respondent was acquitted of those charges.
