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BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS vs. JOSE RODRIGUEZ LOMBILLO, 86-003650 (1986)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 86-003650 Latest Update: Sep. 02, 1987

Findings Of Fact Respondent grew up in Havana, Cuba and was a university student there when Castro came into power. As did most university students, Respondent initially supported Castro but later became disenchanted with the regime. Respondent became interested in photography as a boy and became proficient to the point he sold photographs to the news media and helped defray the expense of his medical training through photography. Following the Bay of Pigs Invasion, Respondent smuggled out of Cuba photographs of the Russian missiles that had been delivered to Cuba. Respondent acknowledged that he took all of the photographs and videotapes entered into evidence in these proceedings. At all times relevant hereto, Respondent was licensed as a physician by the Florida Board of Medical Examiners. He graduated from medical school in Madrid, Spain in 1964, completed his internship at Johnson Willis Hospital, Richmond, Virginia, in 1965, and his residency in psychiatry at the Menninger School of Psychiatry, Topeka, Kansas in 1968. Respondent came to Naples, Florida in 1969 as Director of Collier County Mental Health Clinic which post he held for several years before devoting all of his time to his private practice. Respondent was married in 1962, and divorced in 1978. He is the father of three children. His two older daughters are working on advanced degrees while the younger son is entering high school. Following his divorce Respondent concluded that by marrying at a young age, he had perhaps missed out on much of life and decided to try a more libidinous life-style. In 1980, Respondent became attracted to a 19-year old licensed practical nurse who was working at Naples Community Hospital. Although he saw her several times in the hospital, they did not engage in conversation but made eye contact in passing each other. In October 1980, another doctor referred a patient who had suffered head injuries in a motorcycle accident to Respondent for treatment. This patient, Joseph DiVito, was seen in the hospital several times by Respondent and again after DiVito was released from the hospital. At the first hospital visit with DiVito, Respondent was surprised to see Laura Hodge, the LPN at Naples Community Hospital, whose eyes had attracted Respondent. She was the woman with whom DeVito was living at the time of his accident. The charges in the Administrative Complaint involving Laura Hodge are sustained only if a doctor-patient relationship existed between Respondent and Hodge. The doctor patient relationship, if it existed, was related solely to the treatment provided DiVito. Hodge testified that she was counseled by Respondent jointly with DiVito and also alone; that Respondent gave her the drug Artine to give DiVito in the event he suffered a reaction from the drug Haldol, which was given DiVito to aid in his memory loss; that after his release from the hospital DiVito was like a baby who had to be taught to feed himself, to walk, and to get around; that she had lunch with Respondent twice, once at Keewaydin Island, where they went by Respondent's boat, and once at a restaurant in North Naples; that following the lunch she felt dizzy and does not remember removing her clothes at her apartment when returned there by Respondent and having pictures taken of her; that after being shown nude photographs of herself, she was afraid of Respondent and feared he would show the pictures to DiVito; that she Accompanied Respondent on an overnight trip to Miami where they shared a motel room; that they went to dinner at a caberet where she drank some wine and began feeling strange; that when they returned to the motel that night, she does not remember anything until the following morning when she awoke upset and began crying; and that Respondent then drove her back to Naples. Shortly thereafter, Hodge left Naples with DiVito and went to Panama City where DiVito operated a boat leasing business during the summer of 1981. She returned to Naples that fall but had no further contact with Respondent. Respondent testified that he was surprised to see Hodge the first time he went to DiVito's room in the hospital; that Hodge told him that she didn't want to stay with DiVito; that the principal person who took care of DiVito when he was released from the hospital was his brother, William DiVito; that DiVito had been a very active man and was anxious to leave the hospital before he was physically ready to do so; that he was ambulatory, could feed himself and his principal problem was loss of memory; that Hodge was never his patient; that they had lunch twice, once at Keewaydin Island and again at a restaurant in North Naples; that both of these times Respondent took numerous photographs of Hodge and gave them to her; that following the lunch and picture-taking at Vanderbilt Beach (North Naples) he drove her to the apartment she had just moved into; that he visited her at this apartment at a later date and while she changed clothes, he took pictures of her in various stages of undressing; that he showed her these pictures after they had been developed; that she accompanied him to Miami where they shared a motel room and went out to dinner; and that they returned to Naples the following day because Hodge was upset. Photographs of Hodge which were admitted into evidence are of a person who appears fully aware that she is being photographed and in many of the pictures appears to be posing. Haldol, the drug given DiVito, can cause an epileptic type reaction; however, the treatment for this reaction is by injection and not orally because of the time it takes oral ingestion to work. The testimony of Hodge respecting Respondent entrusting to her the Artine tablets to place in DiVito's cheek if he had a reaction to the Haldol is less credible than is the testimony of Respondent. Although Respondent saw Hodge when he was treating DiVito and talked to the two of them, he did not thereby make Hodge his patient. Furthermore, no credible evidence was presented that Respondent surreptitiously gave Hodge any drug which could cause her to not remember the taking of the nude photographs. Her coordination and awareness shown in those photographs belie the contention that she was drugged. Diane Beck, R.N., arrived in Naples in 1981 and worked as a nurse at Naples Community Hospital where she met Respondent. After declining several dates with Respondent, Ms. Beck accepted an offer to go scuba diving from Respondent's boat. This involved a weekend trip to the Florida Keys on the boat and they had sex over this weekend. Respondent also took some nude photographs of Ms. Beck with her consent. Evidence presented to establish a doctor-patient relationship between Respondent and Beck included one instance where, following a D & C on Beck, the gynecologist asked Respondent if he had Tylenol #3 which Beck could take if needed for pain. When Respondent replied in the affirmative, the gynecologist did not write a prescription for medication for Beck. Although Beck testified that while they were living together, Respondent gave her Darvocet, Motrin and Tylenol #3 for dismenorreah from which she chronically suffered, Respondent denied prescribing these medications for her. The most likely scenario in this regard is that Respondent had such medication available in his home and Beck took them in accordance with instructions previously received from her gynecologist. This did not create a doctor-patient relationship between Respondent and Beck. Respondent prescribed benzodiasepines to many of his patients as a tranquilizer and sleeping pill. During the period December 1981 and October 1982 the Upjohn representative (detailer) whose territory included Respondent's office, gave Respondent 465 Xanax tablets as samples. Xanax is a benzodiasepine and the Xanax tablets were .25 mg and .5 mg in strength. The Upjohn company detailer who serviced the Naples area between October 1982 and June 1984 did not testify and no record of benzodiasepines left as samples with Respondent during this period was available at the hearing. Records of those drugs are maintained by Upjohn for the current year and two preceding years only. At the time of this hearing, the earliest record Upjohn had of drugs dispensed to physicians was January 1, 1985. Around November 1982, Upjohn came out with a benzodiasepine called Halcion. This drug was left with Respondent by detailers as samples. Halcion is packaged in sleeves with two tablets in a sleeve. Generally when Halcion is left as a sample, the box contains five sleeves with two tables per sleeve. Halcion has advantages over some other benzodiasepines that it works quickly, the effects wear off quickly and it leaves no hangover effect. Furthermore, the patient may have a memory lapse for the time sedated with Halcion. Use of Halcion is contraindicated by a woman of childbearing age because the drug can adversely affect and cause deformities in a fetus in the early stages of development. Halcion (as well as other drugs) may be obtained by a physician in a stockbottle which generally consists of 100 tablets in a square bottle with a round top. To obtain a stockbottle the physician places his order with the detailer, signs the appropriate FDA forms, the detailer sends the order to his area office and the stockbottle is mailed directly to the physician. No credible evidence was presented that Respondent ever obtained a stockbottle of Halcion from Upjohn. When benzodiasepines are taken in conjunction with the ingestion of ethyl alcohol, the effects of both are enhanced. Hence, there is a danger in taking sedatives while drinking alcoholic beverages. Alcohol alone is a sedative and it is quickly absorbed in the soft tissue such as the brain. When a benzodiasepine is taken at the same time ethanol is being ingested, the alcohol provides a vehicle which allows the benzodiasepine to be more quickly absorbed into the body. While Diane Beck was dating and living with Respondent, several videotapes were made of her and Respondent engaged in various sexual activities. Ms. Beck acknowledged that she voluntarily participated in some of these videotapes but that she was unaware that others were taken. She has no recollection that some of the tapes were being made, nor did she subsequently (before the charges here considered first arose) learn of these videotapes. In those tapes, Beck had been administered Halcion by Respondent without her knowledge or consent. This finding is based upon the following facts: Respondent told Beck he had given her a lot of Halcion. When Beck became pregnant by Respondent in mid-1983, Respondent told her of potential dangers caused by the use of Halcion and suggested she have an abortion. An appointment was made by Respondent with Dr. McCree, a gynecologist, to perform the abortion and on July 11, 1983, Dr. McCree performed a D & C on Beck, aborting the fetus. On one or more occasions Beck observed what appeared to be residue in her after dinner drink, and on at least one occasion asked Respondent about it. Respondent told her it was sugar from the old brandy she was drinking. Respondent acknowledged that he often performed sexual acts on Beck while she was "passed out" and unaware of what he was doing. However, he contended she enjoyed it and had given him permission. The videotapes of a comatose female being shifted around by Respondent to improve the angle for the pictures being taken. This does not appear to be a person merely intoxicated, certainly not one intoxicated with ethanol. This person is as limp as a rag with all muscles appearing to be totally relaxed who is certainly oblivious to what is going on. It is not believed a person merely intoxicated (unless dead drunk) could be moved and manipulated the way Beck was without some reaction. Had Beck been dead drunk, she would perhaps still be intoxicated when she awoke and/or be hung over. Neither of these events occurred. Respondent's steady relationship with Beck terminated in April 1984 after the date for a wedding could not be agreed upon. She moved out of his house but they remained on friendly terms until the existence of the videotapes became known. The third complaining witness, Sandi Karppi, met Respondent in June 1984 on the beach in Naples. At the time Ms. Karppi was an LPN on private duty with a patient where she had one hour off in the late afternoon which she used to walk on the beach. One day while walking along the beach, she was followed by Respondent who was attracted to the energy with which she walked. Respondent overtook her and engaged her in conversation. During the conversation Respondent disclosed his name and that he was a psychiatrist. Ms. Karppi disclosed to him that she had a pap smear taken which was suspicious, that a second test had been done, and she was anxious to obtain the results but her doctor did not return her calls. Respondent volunteered to obtain the results of the later test and inform her. Karppi told Respondent that she walked the beach almost every afternoon and Respondent began visiting the beach to meet her during her hour off from her nursing duties. A short time after the first meeting Respondent called Karppi to tell her that he had the results of her lab test and offered to take her to dinner to give her the results. She consented. Thereafter he continued to meet her on the beach and engage her in conversation. Respondent's version of the timing of the initial events of their relationship is a little different from the version testified to by Karppi; however, these differences are not material to the issue here presented. Respondent testified that Karppi told him of her problems with the pap smear test several days after their first meeting and that he agreed to get the results of the tests. Dr. King advised Respondent obtaining the results of the pap smear and passing them to Karppi. During the meetings on the beach and on boat trips Karppi took on Respondent's boat, Respondent took numerous photographs of Karppi. On one occasion, they went on an overnight trip to Keewaydin Island with Respondent's son Eric and a friend of Eric. The two boys slept in a tent on the beach leaving Karppi and Respondent on the boat. On another occasion they went alone on the boat to Captiva Island where they spent the night on board. Karppi testified that she went to sleep fully clothed while at Keewaydin Island in a bunk bed on one side of the cabin with Respondent in another bed and when she awoke, she was naked. Nude photographs of Karppi in a comatose state are contained in Exhibit 1. Karppi never consented to having her picture taken in the nude. Respondent's version of the nude photographs is that he frequently talked to Karppi about taking nude photographs but she never consented, saying only that maybe she would allow the photographs if out of town or if she was tipsy. Respondent contends these photographs were taken while they were at Captiva Island with only the two of them on the boat and that Karppi drank a lot of wine and passed out. He then disrobed her and took the photographs. Respondent contends he gave Karppi no drugs before she passed out. However, it is concluded that Karppi was given some sedative along with the wine she drank. This conclusion is based upon the following facts: Respondent had access to Halcion, Xanax, Tylenol #3, and other drugs that could induce coma. Respondent had used such drugs on Diane Beck and was aware of the potential for use of these drugs. In order to take some of the photographs in Exhibit 1, Karppi had to be moved around enough to awaken one who was just sleeping or only sleeping off ethanol induced sleep. Some of the actions of Respondent as depicted in these photographs would have awakened or aroused one who was not fully comatose. Karppi has no recollection such photographs were ever taken, though she was sober and had no hangover the next morning. Subsequent to the boat trips Respondent took a vacation during most of the month of July during which he travelled to Europe and the Caribbean. Upon his return to Naples, he renewed his courtship with Karppi and she moved into his home August 26, 1984, the day after Respondent's oldest daughter returned to college. Respondent's testimony that they first had sex that night which Karppi spent in his bedroom is not disputed by Karppi. If they engaged in sex before that time, Karppi was unconscious and unaware of it. During part of the time Karppi stayed at Respondent's home and shared his bedroom, her mother also visited and slept in another bedroom at Respondent's home. This relationship terminated around September when Karppi moved into her own apartment. She and Respondent remained friendly and saw each other occasionally. One night in late December 1984, Karppi called Respondent from the hospital to tell him she had a headache and to ask him to prescribe some medication for her. After learning that Karppi had tried without success to get her doctor on the telephone and that her doctor had prescribed Cafergot for her headaches, Respondent called in a prescription to the hospital pharmacy to give 4 Cafergot tablets to Karppi. The label from the bottle dated December 29, 1984 was admitted as Exhibit 16. In early January 1985, Respondent went to Vail, Colorado, with another woman and Karppi offered to stay at his house with Respondent's elderly mother while he was gone. He agreed and Karppi moved in. While looking for a book in Respondent's bedroom closet, Karppi discovered the nude photographs of her which were admitted into evidence as Exhibit 1. Having no recollection these pictures had been taken, she was quite shocked and called Respondent at his hotel in Vail. He told her to be calm and they would discuss the matter when he returned. Following a more extensive search, Karppi found numerous other photographs of naked women as well as several videotapes. Karppi contacted her doctor for advice, and he referred her to an attorney who in turn referred her to the State Attorney's Office. At the State Attorney's Office, she produced the photographs of herself she had removed from Respondent's residence and her affidavit was taken. On the basis of Karppi's affidavit and the photographs, a search warrant was obtained and on January 11, 1985, a search of Respondent's home was conducted. During this search, Exhibits 1 - 16 were seized. Subsequent to the conclusion of the hearing, those exhibits unrelated to any individual involved in these charges which were objected to at the hearing were not admitted into evidence as having no relevance to these charges. Following the search of Respondent's residence, criminal charges were brought against Respondent in the Circuit Court in and for Collier County alleging sexual battery and administering drugs to Karppi without her knowledge or consent. Respondent was acquitted of those charges.

Florida Laws (2) 458.329458.331
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DIVISION OF LICENSING vs GEORGE ROGER HESS, 94-002282 (1994)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Pierce, Florida Apr. 27, 1994 Number: 94-002282 Latest Update: Dec. 19, 1994

Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent held Class "D" Security Officer License Number D00-26960 and Class "DI" Security Officer Instructor License Number DI89-00304. Both licenses were duly issued by Petitioner pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 493, Florida Statutes. Respondent has held his Class "D" license since 1976 and has held his Class "DI" license since 1989. Respondent has no previous record of a felony or misdemeanor offense and was, at the time of the formal hearing, working at an adult community condominium complex as a security guard. Officer Charles Wharton is a detective with the Fort Pierce Police Department who was, at the times pertinent to this proceeding, assigned to the juvenile division. T.G. is a female who was eleven years of age as of July 1993. F.S. 1/ is a female who was fourteen years of age as of July 1993. Both F.S. and T.G. were described by Officer Wharton as appearing their stated ages. Both of these girls were from what Officer Wharton referred to as "Fort Pierce's ghetto" and both were described by Officer Wharton as being "street wise". On or about July 1, 1993, Respondent paid T.G. and F.S. to have sexual relations with him at his house in Fort Pierce. The sex with F.S. included the penetration of her vagina with his penis. The sex with T.G. included her having oral contact with his penis. Officer Wharton questioned Respondent and read to him his Miranda rights. Respondent waived his Miranda rights and admitted to Officer Wharton that he had paid these two girls to have sex with him as described above. Officer Wharton referred this matter to the State Attorney's Office, which subsequently dismissed all charges against Respondent.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order that adopts the findings of fact and the conclusions of law contained herein, imposes an administrative fine in the amount of $1,000, suspends Respondent's licensure for a period of three months, and thereafter places Respondent's licensure on probation for a period of one year. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of November, 1994, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of November, 1994.

Florida Laws (5) 120.57493.6101493.6106493.6118794.011
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BOARD OF MEDICINE vs RONALD L. COHEN, 94-003274 (1994)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Lauderdale, Florida Jun. 13, 1994 Number: 94-003274 Latest Update: Dec. 05, 1996

The Issue Whether Respondent violated Sections 458.331(1)(g), (j), (m), (q), and (t), Florida Statutes, and if so, what penalty should be imposed.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA), is the state agency charged with regulating the practice of medicine pursuant to Section 20.20 and Chapters 455 and 458, Florida Statutes. Respondent, Ronald L. Cohen, M.D. (Dr. Cohen), is and has been at all times material hereto a licensed physician in the State of Florida, having been issued license number ME 0024014. Dr. Cohen's last known address is 7800 West Oakland Park Boulevard, Suite 216, Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Dr. Cohen's area of practice is urology, and he is board certified. He has been practicing in Fort Lauderdale since 1976. During his years of practice, he has enjoyed an excellent professional reputation. Between on or about July 2, 1990, through on or about May 16, 1992, Dr. Cohen treated Patient R.G. for various complaints. On or about July 2, 1990, Patient R.G., a thirty-four year-old female with a history of chemical dependency from the age of twelve for which she first underwent treatment in or about 1986, presented to Dr. Cohen with voiding complaints including post void dysuria, frequency, urgency, and urgency incontinence. However, such information about chemical dependency was unknown to Dr. Cohen until a subsequent time. Patient R.G. did not reveal to Dr. Cohen either her history of chemical dependency or treatment of that dependency. Dr. Cohen performed a physical examination of Patient R.G. wherein Dr. Cohen dilated Patient R.G.'s uretha. Dr. Cohen noted that Patient R.G.'s urinalysis was entirely within normal limits. Dr. Cohen then diagnosed Patient R.G. with urethritis, urthrel stenosis, and trigonitis. Dr. Cohen prescribed Patient R.G. a three-day supply of Noroxin and pyridium to improve Patient R.G.'s symptoms. Noroxin is an antibacterial agent indicated for the treatment of adults with complicated urinary tract infections. Pyridium is an analgesic agent indicated for the symptomatic relief of pain, burning, urgency frequency and other discomfort arising from irritation of the lower urinary tract mucosa. Patient R.G.'s symptoms persisted. On or about July 13, 1990, Patient R.G. underwent a cystoscopy, urethal dilation, and hydraulic bladder distention by Dr. Cohen at Outpatient Surgical Services in order to rule out interstitial cystitis. Dr. Cohen's postoperative impressions were as follows: Interstitial cystitis (inflammatory lesion of the bladder) and urethral stenosis. On or about July 17, 1990, Patient R.G. presented to Dr. Cohen's office in severe pain secondary to the cystoscopy and bladder distention. At that time, Patient R.G. complained of feeling bloated suprapubically. Dr. Cohen instilled dimethyl sulfoxide to relieve Patient R.G.'s pain. Patient R.G.'s symptoms were subsequently temporarily resolved. On or about January 19, 1991, Patient R.G. next presented to Dr. Cohen with complaints of a recurrent episode of urinary frequency and burning on the previous day. Shortly thereafter, in early 1991, Dr. Cohen asked Patient R.G. to go to lunch. Dr. Cohen and Patient R.G. subsequently began a social relationship which included sexual intercourse. At the time that Dr. Cohen initiated the relationship with Patient R.G. he was aware of the prohibitions against such conduct, knew he had choices available to him, but declined to exercise professional self-discipline. Dr. Cohen did exercise influence as Patient R.G.'s physician for the purpose of engaging in sexual relations. Dr. Cohen has never had a sexual relationship with any other patient. On or about April 8, 1991, Dr. Cohen wrote a prescription for thirty units of Valium 10 mg. for Patient R.G. who had at that time complained to Dr. Cohen of anxiety due to marital difficulties. Valium is defined as a legend drug by Section 465.003(7), Florida Statutes, and contains diazepam, a Schedule IV controlled substance listed in Chapter 893, Florida Statutes. Valium is indicated for the management of anxiety disorders or for the short-term relief of symptoms of anxiety. Dr. Cohen's medical records of Patient R.G.'s urologic condition do not include any reference to the Valium prescription and therefore the records fail to justify his prescription of Valium, a controlled substance indicated for the treatment of anxiety, to Patient R.G. On May 16, 1992, Dr. Cohen wrote a prescription for thirty units of Prozac 20 mg. Prozac is defined as a legend drug by Section 465.003(7), Florida Statutes, and contains Fluoxetine Hydrochloride which is not a controlled substance. Prozac is indicated for the treatment of depression. Dr. Cohen's medical records of Patient R.G.'s urologic condition do not include any reference to the Prozac prescription and therefore the records fail to justify his prescription of Prozac. Dr. Cohen inappropriately prescribed Prozac, a legend drug indicated for the treatment of depression. Prozac, however, was not indicated in the treatment of Patient R.G.'s urologic condition, interstitial cystitis. Dr. Cohen admitted to having prescribed Prozac to Patient R.G. as a favor so that Patient R.G. did not have to see her psychologist for said prescription. Dr. Cohen admitted to having a sexual relationship with Patient R.G. Dr. Cohen, by virtue of his sexual relationship with Patient R.G. and his inappropriate prescribing of Prozac for Patient R. G., failed to practice medicine with that level of care, skill, and treatment which is recognized by a reasonably prudent physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances. Dr. Cohen underwent an evaluation by Thomas J. Goldschmidt, M.D., a specialist in neurology and psychiatry, in conjunction with Richard Westberry, Ph.D., a licensed psychologist. Dr. Goldschmidt issued a report on their evaluation in which he stated: We see no evidence of any exploitative tendency regarding Dr. [Cohen] in his relationship with this patient. There is no evidence of any sexual addiction component. And we do not feel that his is behavior that is likely to reoccur or compromise his ability to practice urology. We see this as an isolated incident that Dr. [Cohen] approached in a very naive fashion and was primarily orchestrated by the dynamics of a sexually provocative, aggressive female who proposed a sexual act that was nonthreating (sic) to the patient while simultaneously providing ego gratification for longstanding, underlying emotional conflicts dealing with castration fears and anxiety. Dr. Cohen voluntarily entered into a contract with the Physician's Recovery Network to assist him in dealing with his despondency and depression. Dr. Cohen continues to see Dr. Westberry on a weekly basis for his despondency. Dr. Cohen has never had any disciplinary action taken against his license nor has he been dismissed from any position at a hospital at which he had staff privileges. Dr. Cohen has staff privileges at four hospitals. Dr. Cohen was Vice Chief of Staff at one of the hospitals until he voluntarily resigned that position when this case surfaced in order to avoid embarrassment to the hospital.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding that Dr. Cohen violated Sections 458.331(1)(g), (j), (m), (q) and (t) as set forth in Counts 1-5 in the Administrative Complaint, and imposing a $5,000 fine for the violations of Sections 458.331(1)(g) and (j), Florida Statutes and a $5,000 fine for violations of Sections 458.331(1)(m), (q), and (t), Florida Statues, for a total of $10,000, and placing Dr. Cohen on probation for two years under terms and conditions to be set by the Board of Medicine. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of March, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of March, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-3274 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes (1995), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. Paragraphs 1-9: Accepted. Paragraphs 10-11: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 12-14: Accepted. Paragraph 15: Rejected as irrelevant because the administrative complaint did not state such a violationas it related to the valium but only as to the Prozac. The violation relating to valium was the record keeping. Paragraphs 16-19: Accepted. Paragraph 20: Accepted except as to the valium. The administrative compliant did not allege such a violationas it related to valium. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. Paragraphs 1-2: Accepted. Paragraph 3: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 4: Accepted as to his professional reputation. The remainder is rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 5: Rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 6: The first sentence is accepted. The remainder is unnecessary. Paragraphs 7-13: Accepted. Paragraph 14: Rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 15: Rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. Dr. Cohen is the party whoinitiated the social relationship with R.G. when heasked her out to lunch. He was physically attracted tothe patient and that is why he asked her out. Paragraph 16: Accepted. Paragraph 17: The first sentence is accepted. The last sentence is rejected as subordinate to the facts found because Dr. Cohen did prescribe medication forR.G. which had nothing to do with the complaints forwhich she was seeing Dr. Cohen. Paragraph 18: Rejected as subordinate to the facts found. See paragraph 17. Paragraphs 19-22: Rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 23: The first and second sentences are rejected as subordinate to the facts found. The thirdsentence is accepted to the extent that he has enteredcounseling. Paragraphs 24: Accepted to the extent that he is in counseling and that such a relationship will not likelyoccur again. Paragraph 25: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 26: The first two sentences are accepted in substance. The remainder is rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 27: Accepted in substance that such a relationship is unlikely to happen in the future. Rejected to the extent that it implies that R.G. gavefree, full informed consent to the sexual activity. Paragraphs 28-29: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 30: Rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraphs 31-34: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 35: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraphs 36-39: Accepted in substance. COPIES FURNISHED: Donald G. Korman, Esquire Korman, Schorr and Wagenheim The Dart Building 2101 North Andrews Avenue, Suite 400 Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33311 Paul Watson Lambert, Esquire 2851 Remington Green Circle, Suite C Tallahassee, Florida 32308-3749 Albert Peacock, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-6506 Dr. Marm Harris Executive Director Agency For Health Care Administration Board of Medicine 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0770 Jerome W. Hoffman General Counsel Agency For Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building 3, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403

Florida Laws (6) 120.57120.68458.329458.331465.003766.102
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FRANK J. LUGO vs. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, 81-000277 (1981)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 81-000277 Latest Update: Jul. 15, 1981

The Issue The issue presented by this case is whether the Respondent, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, has exhausted all treatment for the Petitioner, Frank J. Lugo, Jr., through available sex offender programs administered by the Respondent. See Section 917.20, Florida Statutes (1977). The parties have submitted Proposed Recommended Orders. Those proposed findings not included in this Recommended Order were not supported by competent and substantial evidence or were considered immaterial to the results reached.

Findings Of Fact On January 19, 1981, the Petitioner submitted a "Petition for Administrative Determination" to the State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. The Department requested the Division of Administrative Hearings to conduct a formal hearing pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, to consider the matters set forth in the Petition. At the final hearing the Petitioner testified on his own behalf. Dr. Robert Berland, Ph.D., a psychologist and the Director of the Behavior Disorders Unit in the Forensic Service at the Florida State Hospital testified for the Respondent. Respondent's Exhibit 1, a composite exhibit consisting of a clinical summary, intradepartmental staffing report and an abstract of a staff conference, was admitted as evidence. At all times pertinent to this proceeding the Petitioner has been in the custody of the Respondent pursuant to an order of the Circuit Court of Pinellas County, Florida and Chapter 917, Florida Statutes (1977). From August 6, 1979 through the present, Petitioner has resided in the Florida State Hospital in Chattahoochee, Florida, where he has undergone treatment in a hospital program for mentally disordered sex offenders. This program and similar programs in other institutions administered by the Respondent require a high degree of motivation on the part of the patient in order to achieve success. The success rate within the program is very low due to patients' long established behavior patterns. Although the Petitioner has progressed during the course of his treatment, the Department has made a preliminary determination that it has exhausted all appropriate treatment for the Petitioner through the program in which he is participating and has also concluded that similar programs for sex offenders within the state do not offer viable treatment alteratives. The primary treatment modality for mentally disordered sex offenders at Florida State Hospital is group therapy. The Petitioner has participated in group therapy sessions during his current hospitalization, but no significant change in his behavior has occurred. Dr. Berland has diagnosed his present condition as (1) exhibitionism, (2) voyeurism, (3) other sexual deviations, (4) mixed substance abuse, (5) psychogenic pain disorder, (6) anti-social personality, (7) passive-aggressive personality with contained hostility, and (8) narcissism. Exhibitionism has been the Petitioner's primary problem with his first arrest for indecent exposure occurring in 1971. Group and milieu therapy are the basic treatments available in the sex offender program at Florida State Hospital. Milieu therapy consists of interacting with people who share similar problems. Petitioner has participated in both therapies since his admission to the hospital. From August, 1979 to January, 1980, Mr. Lugo regularly attended group therapy and participated in the group. He developed a degree of insight into his condition. During this period, the group was led by Sam Cuningham, a psychologist, and met for one hour each week. From February, 1980, to August, 1980, Petitioner regularly attended group but did not actively participate. Dr. Berland became head of the group and its size increased from five to ten members. When Mr. Lugo participated, his discussions centered on other patients' problems rather than his own. Although there is a benefit in listening and discussing other patients problems such benefit is not substantial when coupled with a denial of a patient's own problem as was the case with Mr. Lugo. One of the reasons given by Mr. Lugo for not participating was a CERonic sore throat. After Dr. Berland had the Petitioner examined by a physician who could find no medical basis for the problem, it was concluded by Dr. Berland that the disorder was psychogenic. During this period the Petitioner joined another group started by psychology interns at Florida State University which offered individual counseling in addition to group therapy. This group lasted for approximately two months. On August 6, 1980, Mr. Lugo was presented for staffing by his treatment team. He was informed that his group participation was inadequate and given three areas where improvements was necessary: (1) analysis of and solution to sexual problems, (2) anti-social, manipulative and rule-violating behavior, and (3) hostility in interactions with others. During the period September, 1980, to October, 1980, the Petitioner's behavior did not significantly change. Although he did attempt to cooperate by complaining less about his physical problems and changing his manner of dress, Petitioner's participation during group therapy remained superficial. After being informed by staff that his group participation remained inadequate, Mr. Lugo began writing summaries of his group experiences. He continued to write summaries after being informed by the staff that he should discuss experiences with the group rather than write summaries. During September to October, 1980, Mr. Lugo's attendance at group therapy was erratic. On October 29, 1980, the treatment team met and after reviewing the Petitioner's case, concluded that Mr. Lugo continued to meet the criteria of a sex offender under Chapter 917, Florida Statutes, and that he was not amenable to further treatment in the behavior disorder unit. Having exhausted Florida State Hospital's treatment capabilities, the staff recommended that the patient be presented to an Intra-Departmental Screening Committee to determine if further treatment capabilities existed within any other sex offender treatment programs in the Department. On December 24, 1980, the Committee considered Mr. Lugo's case and recommended that he be returned to the appropriate Circuit Court as a treatment failure. Petitioner has progressed in areas outside of group therapy including ward activities and vocational training. However, his involvement in these areas is insufficient to cause a meaningful alteration of Petitioner's aberrant behavior. Although individual therapy is available for patients such as the Petitioner, it was not attempted in this case because Mr. Lugo never achieved a level of progress necessary to make such therapy feasible. The Petitioner desires to remain in the program at Florida State Hospital and be given individual therapy and assignment to a different treatment team.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services finding that it has exhausted all appropriate treatment for Frank J. Lugo, Jr., and that the said Frank J. Lugo, Jr. be returned to the committing court for further disposition. DONE and ENTERED this 26th day of June, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. SHARYN L. SMITH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of June, 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: Steven L. Seliger, Esquire Post Office Box 324 Quincy, Florida 32351 Gerry L. Clark, Esquire Florida State Hospital Chattahoochee, Florida 32324

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, BOARD OF MEDICINE vs ZAFAR S. SHAH, M.D., 00-004817PL (2000)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Dade City, Florida Nov. 28, 2000 Number: 00-004817PL Latest Update: Nov. 02, 2001

The Issue Did the Respondent, Zafar S. Shah, M.D. (Dr. Shah), commit the violations alleged in Counts 7-10 of the Administrative Complaint dated June 26, 2000, and, if so, what penalty should be imposed?

Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: The Board is the agency charged with regulating the practice of medicine in the State of Florida. Dr. Shah is and, at all times material hereto, has been licensed to practice medicine in the State of Florida, having been issued license number ME0071706. Dr. Shah is board-certified in internal medicine. Dr. Shah was born, and spent the first 29 years of his life, in Pakistan. Dr. Shah is 35 years of age. Dr. Shah began working at MidTown Clinic in Zephyrhills, Florida, in October 1996, and continued to work at MidTown Clinic until he was terminated in 1999. Tammy Rachel (Tammy) worked as a certified nursing assistant at MidTown Clinic from June 1996 until she was terminated in March 1999. Tammy worked with Dr. Shah as his Medical Assistant during Dr. Shah's tenure at MidTown Clinic. At all times material to this proceeding, Tammy was married to, and lived with, Corey Rachel, her husband. Although T. H., Tammy's oldest daughter, age approximately 15 years, was at all times material hereto, living in the Rachel household, her biological father was the custodial parent. Tammy's two younger daughters also lived with their mother in the Rachel household. At all times material to this proceeding, Dr. Shah did not have any family living in the United States. After Tammy began working for Dr. Shah, she and Dr. Shah became close friends. As a result, Tammy, along with her husband and her daughters, including T. H., spent a great deal of time with Dr. Shah. Tammy and her family treated Dr. Shah as if he was a member of their family. Tammy and her family, including her husband, spent almost every weekend with Dr. Shah at his home or on outings with Dr. Shah. Dr. Shah visited Tammy's home on week nights during this period of time. This visitation, both weekend and week nights, between Dr. Shah and Tammy's family occurred between December 1996 and August 1999. Initially, the relationship between Dr. Shah and Tammy was a working relationship. However, in February 1997, Dr. Shah and Tammy began a sexual relationship which lasted until March 1999. When confronted by Corey Rachel about her relationship with Dr. Shah, Tammy denied having a sexual relationship with Dr. Shah. In fact, Tammy did not tell Corey Rachel of her sexual relationship with Dr. Shah until after August 5, 1999. During the period of time that Dr. Shah and Tammy's family were visiting back and forth, Dr. Shah established a close relationship with T. H., in that Dr. Shah: (a) gave more attention to T. H. than the other girls; (b) spent more time with T. H. than with the other girls; and (c) spent time alone with T. H. when she cleaned his house and at other times at the mall, etc. Tammy was aware of the relationship between Dr. Shah and T. H. and that T. H. was alone with Dr. Shah on occasions. However, there is no evidence that this relationship was intimate or in any way sexual in nature, notwithstanding the testimony of Tammy or Corey Rachel to the contrary, which I find lacks any credibility in this regard. A prescription in the name of T. H. with a date of January 18, 1999, for 60 250-milligram tablets of Erythromycin, an antibiotic, was presented to the Winn Dixie Pharmacy by Corey Rachael. The prescription was filled on January 20, 1999, and picked up by Corey and Tammy Rachel on that same date. The prescription carried what appeared to be the signature of Dr. Shah. However, Dr. Shah denies that he ever prescribed Erythromycin for T. H. or that he wrote or signed the prescription in question. Tammy gave the medication to T. H., which T. H. used, including the refills, for the acne on her face. However, it was T. H.'s testimony, which I find to be credible, that Dr. Shah never discussed the problem of acne with her, and did not prescribe Erythromycin or any other medication to treat the acne on her face. However, T. H. did discuss the acne problem with Tammy. It was not unusual for Dr. Shah to carry prescription pads home with him, which were then available to those in his home. Likewise, it was not unusual for a Medical Assistant, such as Tammy, to have access to Dr. Shah's prescription pads at work. In fact, it was not unusual for a Medical Assistant to fill in the necessary information on a prescription for the doctor's signature. The MidTown Clinic has no medical records or any other records reflecting that Dr. Shah ever saw T. H. as a patient. Likewise, Dr. Shah did not have any records reflecting that he had ever treated T. H. as a patient or that he had given T. H. a physical examination. T. H. did not have a regular physician. When she needed medical treatment, T. H. went to the Health Department or Tammy would secure medical treatment for T. H. from physicians with whom Tammy worked. Other than the allegation concerning the acne problem, there is no allegation that Tammy sought medical treatment for T. H. from Dr. Shah, or that Dr. Shah saw T. H. as a patient. An analysis by the Board's handwriting expert indicates that the signature on the prescription in question is consistent with the presumed, not known, signature of Zafar Shah, M.D. on 20 other prescriptions taken from the Wal- Mart Pharmacy in Zephyrhills, Florida. The Board offered no evidence that the signatures on the 20 prescriptions from Wal-Mart were in fact the signature of Zafar Shah, M.D., other than the testimony of the pharmacist from Wal-Mart that the signatures on those 20 prescriptions filled at Wal-Mart appeared to him to be the signature of Zafar Shah, M.D. Although the Board's handwriting expert was given the opportunity to compare current samples of Dr. Shah's signature, to be given by Dr. Shah prior to the hearing, with the signature on the prescription in question, he chose not to make this comparison. The Board's handwriting expert did not compare the signature in question to any known signature of Zafar Shah, M.D. There is insufficient evidence to establish facts to show that Dr. Shah wrote the prescription in question, notwithstanding the testimony of the Board's handwriting expert to the contrary, which I find lacks credibility in this regard. Likewise, there is insufficient evidence to establish facts to show that Dr. Shah ever treated T. H. for the acne on her face or for any other medical problem or that a patient- physician relationship ever existed between Dr. Shah and T. H., notwithstanding the testimony of Tammy or Corey Rachel to the contrary, which I find lacks credibility in this regard. On August 5, 1999, Dr. Shah had dinner with Tammy, Corey Rachel, T. H., and Tammy's two younger daughters at the Rachel's home in Dade City, Florida, as he had on many previous occasions. On August 5, 1999, Dr. Shah was to spend the night in the Rachel's home, as he had on many previous occasions. As usual, Dr. Shah was to sleep on an air mattress in the living room. Around 11:00 p.m. Tammy and Corey Rachel went to bed. Sometime thereafter, T. H. went to her room to prepare for bed and Dr. Shah proceeded to prepare for bed in the living room on the air mattress. Around 1:00 a.m. on August 6, 1999, Tammy testified that she was awakened by what she thought was a noise and got out of bed. After getting out of bed, Tammy checked on her two younger daughters, and then checked on T. H. who was not in her bedroom. Tammy then proceeded to look elsewhere in the house for T. H. Tammy also testified that when she walked into the living room she observed T. H. and Dr. Shah having, what appeared to her, to be sexual intercourse. Tammy became very upset and began beating Dr. Shah on the back and calling Corey Rachel. Dr. Shah attempted to protect himself from Tammy's onslaught by gathering his belongings and leaving the house. During the time Tammy was beating on Dr. Shah, she also slapped T. H.'s face. Corey responded to Tammy and instructed T. H. to go to her room. T. H. then went to her room. At this time, T. H. still had on the long T-shirt and under pants, which she had worn to bed. Likewise, Dr. Shaw had on the clothing that he had worn to bed. Tammy reported the incident to the Pasco County Sheriff's Department. Deputy Timothy Harris and Sergeant Rowan responded to the call by Tammy. Upon arrival at the Rachel home, the officers spoke with Tammy, Corey Rachel, and T. H. When T. H. was interviewed by Deputy Harris, she told Deputy Harris that she and Dr. Shah had been engaged in sexual intercourse at the time Tammy came into the living room. In fact, T. H. related a very explicit account of the incident, using language which was not in her normal vocabulary. T. H. also provided a written statement of the incident to Deputy Harris where she again admitted to having sex with Dr. Shah. After providing the written statement, T. H. went home with her father. T. H. was not under oath on either of these occasions. Deputy Harris inspected the scene of the incident for physical evidence that sexual intercourse had taken place between T. H. and Dr. Shah. Deputy Harris did not find any physical evidence that sexual intercourse had occurred. Deputy Harris also took some clothing that T. H. had been wearing as evidence for the purpose of examining for evidence of sexual intercourse. Upon examination, this clothing did not yield any evidence of sexual intercourse. Later in the morning of August 6, 1999, Detective Ball went to the home of Timothy Harvey and interviewed T. H. In this interview, T. H. again stated that she and Dr. Shah were engaged in sexual intercourse earlier that morning at the Rachel's home, and had, on previous occasions, had sexual intercourse at the Rachel's residence and at Dr. Shah's residence. She also related that she was in love with Dr. Shah and that they were going to be married when she turned 18 years of age. T. H. further related to Detective Ball that Tammy was jealous of her relationship with Dr. Shah. When Detective Ball requested that T. H. undergo a physical examination to uncover possible evidence of sexual intercourse between T. H. and Dr. Shah, T. H. refused to undergo the physical examination. T. H.'s reason for not taking the physical examination was that she loved Dr. Shah and any evidence found would obviously be used against him. Later, during the day of August 6, 1999, Tammy and Dr. Shah agreed to meet at Brewmasters, a restaurant in Wesley Chapel, halfway between Dr. Shah's house and Dade City, Florida. This meeting was arranged by Tammy at the request of the Pasco County Sheriff's office in an attempt to get Dr. Shah to admit to having had sexual intercourse with T. H. on August 6, 1999. Tammy was wired and the Detectives from the Pasco County Sheriff's office attempted to monitor the conversation. However, the monitoring was not too successful. During this meeting between Dr. Shah and Tammy, which lasted approximately 45 minutes, Dr. Shah repeatedly denied having sexual intercourse with T. H. At the conclusion of this meeting with Tammy, the Detectives approached Dr. Shah and requested that he accompany them to the County Jail. Although Dr. Shah was not officially placed under arrest at this time, he was unsure of his rights and felt intimated by the Detectives. The Detectives did not offer Dr. Shah the opportunity to drive his vehicle to the County Jail. Dr. Shah was transported to the County Jail by the Detectives. Once at the County Jail, the Detectives went through their interrogation (interview) routine. Dr. Shah's understanding was that the Detectives were giving him the choice of admitting to having had consensual sexual intercourse with T. H. or to having raped T. H. With that understanding, Dr. Shah admitted to having had consensual sexual intercourse with T. H. Dr. Shah was upset, confused and intimidated by the Detectives. Dr. Shah gave the Detectives the answers that he assumed they wanted. Upon being advised of Miranda rights, Dr. Shah requested an attorney and made no further statements. On September 28, 1999, Detective Ball and Bill Joseph, a Crime Scene Technician, went to the Rachel's home with a Lumalite for the purpose of illuminating body fluids that may have been left on the carpet or any other area as result of the alleged sexual intercourse. No evidence of body fluids was found. Under oath, during the State Attorney's investigation, T. H. recanted the story given in her written statement on August 6, 1999, and the story given verbally to Deputy Harris and Deputy Ball on August 6, 1999, and denied that she and Dr. Shah were engaged in sexual intercourse at the Rachel's home on August 6, 1999, when Tammy came into the living room or at any time previous to August 6, 1999. Subsequently, the State Attorney, on February 14, 2000, filed a No Information concluding that the facts and circumstances of this case did not warrant prosecution at that time. Again, under oath at the hearing, T. H. recanted the story given in her written statement on August 6, 1999, and the story given verbally to Deputy Harris and Deputy Ball on August 6, 1999, and denied that she and Dr. Shah were engaged in sexual intercourse at the Rachel's home on August 6, 1999, when Tammy came into the living room or at any other time. However, T. H. admitted to having a sexual relationship with two young males prior to August 1999. T. H.'s reason for not telling the truth in her recitation of the facts in her initial interview with Deputy Harris or her written voluntary statement to Deputy Harris or in her interview with Deputy Ball was that she was aware of Tammy's involvement with Dr. Shah and was attempting to make Tammy jealous because she was mad with Tammy due to their fight the previous evening and because of other problems that she was experiencing with Tammy. Additionally, T. H. had overheard a conversation between Tammy and Dr. Shah wherein Tammy was discussing divorcing Corey Rachel and marrying Dr. Shah, which upset T. H. T. H. testified that sometime after she and Dr. Shah had gone to bed in their respective rooms, she went in the living room to talk to Dr. Shah about the situation between she and Tammy as she had on other occasions. During their conversation, T. H. was sitting close to Dr. Shah. As their conversation progressed, T. H. became emotional and Dr. Shah "put his arm around her shoulder" to console her as he had on other occasions when she would discuss problems between her and Tammy. It was in this posture that Tammy found Dr. Shah and T. H. at approximately 1:00 a.m. on August 6, 1999. There is insufficient evidence to establish facts to show that T. H. and Dr. Shah were engaged in sexual intercourse at the Rachel's home on August 6, 1999, or at any time previous to that date, notwithstanding: (a) Tammy's testimony to the contrary, which I find lacks credibility due to her demeanor at the hearing and her involvement with Dr. Shah; (b) T. H.'s admission that sexual intercourse had occurred, which T. H. later recanted under oath, and which she testified was only done for the purpose of making Tammy jealous; and (c) Dr. Shah's admission, while being interrogated, that consensual sex had occurred between he and T. H., which he later recanted under oath at the hearing.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Board enter a final order finding Dr. Shah not guilty of the charges outlined in Counts 7-10 of the Administrative Complaint and dismissing the charges outlined in Counts 7-10 of the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of August, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___________________________________ WILLIAM R. CAVE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6947 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of August, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert C. Byerts, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Post Office Box 14229 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-4229 Jack D. Hoogewind, Esquire 33283 Cortez Boulevard Dade City, Florida 33523 Tanya Williams, Executive Director Board of Medicine Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 William W. Large, General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Theodore M. Henderson, Agency Clerk Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way Bin A00 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701

Florida Laws (3) 120.57458.329458.331 Florida Administrative Code (3) 28-106.21664B8-8.00164B8-9.008
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PHILLIP M. WHISLER vs DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 96-002614RU (1996)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida May 30, 1996 Number: 96-002614RU Latest Update: Jun. 30, 1997

The Issue Does the Department of Corrections' Sexual Harassment Policy, as contained in the Pamphlet "Sexual Harassment, Your Rights and Responsibilities", in a one-page document entitled "Department of Corrections Sexual Harassment Policy", and Chapter 7 of the Department's Personnel Procedures Manual, constitute umpromulgated rules, pursuant to Section 120.535 F.S.? Are existing Department of Corrections Rules 33-4.001(4)(a), 33-4.002(4), and 33-4.003(22) and (24), F.A.C. invalid exercises of delegated legislative authority due to vagueness, pursuant to Section 120.56 F.S.?

Findings Of Fact At all times material, Petitioner has been a career-service employee working as a Parole Officer I for DOC. He has earned a master's degree in criminology. At all times material, DOC has had in effect a one-page document entitled "Department of Corrections Sexual Harassment Policy" (P-5), a Pamphlet entitled "Sexual Harassment, Your Rights and Responsibilities" (P-3), and a Personnel Procedures Manual. Chapter 7 of the Personnel Procedures Manual is entitled "Sexual Harassment Complaints" (P-6). DOC has not adopted these documents as rules, and Petitioner here challenges them as unpromulgated rules. On February 22, 1996, Petitioner received written notice that he would be suspended without pay for ten days as a result of his violation of DOC Rules 33-4.001(4)(a), 33-4.002(4) and 33- 4.003(23)(25), F.A.C., (since renumbered) and the DOC's Policy on Sexual Harassment. The letter did not rely on Chapter 7 of the agency's Personnel Procedures Manual or its Pamphlet entitled "Sexual Harassment, Your Rights and Responsibilities". Petitioner appealed this action to PERC, which subsequently entered a recommended order upholding DOC's disciplinary action. Language from PERC's recommended order, which is pertinent to this instant rule challenge is: Florida Administrative Code Rule 33-4.001(4)(a) states, in pertinent part, that 'No . . . employee shall knowingly . . . commit any act or engage in any conduct which would violate any state statute, rule, directive or policy statement.' Florida Administrative Code Rule 33-4.002(4) states, in pertinent part, that 'Each employee . . . shall perform his duties fairly and impartially and otherwise conduct himself both on-duty and off-duty so as to command the respect of fellow employees, persons on parole, probation or otherwise under his supervision, inmates and the general public.' Florida Administrative Code Rule 33-4,.003(23) states that a first offense of conduct unbecoming a public employee is punishable by a written reprimand, up to a thirty day suspension or dismissal. Florida Administrative Code Rule 33-4.003(25) states that a first offense of willful violation of rules, regulations, directives or policy statements is punishable by a written reprimand, up to a thirty day suspension or dismissal. The DOC pamphlet entitled 'Florida Department of Corrections Sexual Harassment: Your Rights and Responsibilities,' provides, in pertinent part, as follows: Sexual Harassment requires two elements: The alleged conduct must be of a sexual nature, must be unwelcome and unwanted. Sexual harassment may be any of, but not limited to, the following: * * * continued suggestions regarding invi- tations to social events outside the work place, after being told such suggestions are unwelcome; * * * prolonged staring or leering to [sic] a person; * * * 32. State of Florida, Department of Corrections, Personnel Procedures Manual, Chapter 7, Sexual Harassment, provides, in pertinent part, as follows: * * * O. Sexual Harassment - Sexual Harassment is defined as unwelcome sexual advances, unwelcome requests for sexual favors, and other unwelcome verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature from or involving an employee's supervisors, peers, subordinates or any other persons in contact with an employee or applicant during the course of the conduct of the employee's or applicant's business when: Submission to such conduct is either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of employment; or Submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such individual; or Such conduct has the purpose or effect of interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive working environment. 33. The DOC Sexual Harassment Policy provides, in pertinent part, as follows: Sexual harassment may result from unwelcome sexual advances or a hostile environment created by conduct offensive to the victim such as suggestive or lewd comments, dirty jokes, offensive pictures or physical touching. Accordingly, all employees are being placed on notice that any employee found guilty of having engaged in sexual harassment will be severely disciplined, up to and including dismissal. * * * The charge of conduct unbecoming a public employee is a general charge that is subsumed if the Agency has a more specific charge that fully describes the alleged misconduct. Ford v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 9 FCSR Para. 148 (1993); Mathis v. Department of Corrections, 6 FCSR Para. 122 (1991). In this case, I conclude that the charge of unbecoming conduct is subsumed within the charge of sexual harassment and should be dismissed. PERC's recommended order also applied the foregoing provisions. At the date of formal hearing in the instant rule challenge, PERC had issued no final order. Before this instant Division of Administrative Hearings final order could be entered, PERC had extended the time for the parties to file exceptions to its hearing officer's recommended order, and ultimately, on August 13, 1996, PERC adopted its hearing officer's recommended order, thereby rendering Petitioner subject to future disciplinary action at the second occurrence level under Rule 33-4.003, F.A.C. The final order of PERC is now under appeal by Petitioner. These facts are officially recognized, sua sponte. Petitioner received copies of the Pamphlet, the Sexual Harassment Policy, and a copy of Chapter 33-4, F.A.C., on July 16, 1993, when he began employment with the agency. He did not receive a copy of Chapter 7 of the Personnel Manual and was unaware of it until his PERC proceeding. DOC imposes disciplinary action against its employees for conduct which constitutes sexual harassment. Petitioner received periodic training in agency seminars on the agency's Sexual Harassment Policy, including annual film presentations. He did not receive similar training regarding "conduct unbecoming a public employee", which is a term utilized in Section 110.227(1), F.S., and for which an employee may be disciplined. Section 110.227(1), F.S., also permits discipline of employees for "willful violation of the provisions of law or agency rules". Rule 33-4.001(4)(a), F.A.C., provides, in pertinent part: Responsibility for Conduct of Employees, Inmates and Others. No Administrator, Superintendent, Officer-In-Charge, Supervisor, or other employee shall knowingly permit any subordinate, inmate or other person to, nor shall he, commit any act or engage in any conduct which would violate any statute, rule, directive or policy statement . . . . Petitioner claims that Rule 33-4.001(4)(a), F.A.C., is vague as applied to him because he is not an administrator, superintendent, officer-in-charge, or a supervisor. According to Petitioner, this rule in only applicable to those who supervise subordinates. Rule 33-4.002(4), F.A.C., provides in pertinent part: (4) Each employee shall keep himself physically fit, mentally alert, personally neat and clean and shall perform his duties fairly and impartially, and otherwise conduct himself both on-duty and off-duty so as to command the respect of fellow employees, persons on parole, probation or otherwise under his supervision, inmates and the general public . . . . Rule 33-4.003, F.A.C., is entitled "Range of Disciplinary Actions" and lists a number of violations. Item (22) is "Conduct Unbecoming a Public Employee"; Item (24) is "Willful Violation of Rules, Regulations, Directives, or Policy Statements". The range of disciplinary penalties is increased at the second occurrence level under the rule. The agency Policy Statement, Pamphlet and Chapter 7 of the agency Personnel Manual state that sexual harassment is conduct unbecoming a public employee and contain definitions of sexual harassment, including hostile work place sexual harassment. The first sentence of the Pamphlet states that sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and is conduct unbecoming a public employee, as provided in Sections 110.105, 110.227 and 110.233, F.S., and Chapter 33-4, F.A.C. (Rules of the Department). The first page of the Pamphlet states EEOC guidelines defining sexual harassment, as recognized by the agency: Unwelcome sexual advances, unwelcome requests for sexual favors, and other unwelcome verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature when: Submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of a person's employment, or Submission to, or rejection of, such conduct by [sic] decisions affecting an individual, or Such conduct has the purpose or effect of substantially interfering with a person's work [sic] hostile or offensive working environment. The Pamphlet goes on to advise that sexual harassment requires two elements: conduct of a sexual nature/that is unwelcome and unwanted. It lists examples of harassing behavior, advises of the need to report such behavior, and explains the agency's internal complaint procedure and the procedure's protections against retaliation. It gives references for legal remedies outside the agency. Chapter 7 of the Personnel Procedures Manual states basically the same information as the Pamphlet, lists the same legal authorities and details the internal complaint procedure. It specifically provides, If there is a determination that there is cause to believe sexual harassment occurred, disciplinary action shall be taken in accordance with Chapter 33-4 Department of Corrections Rules. Chapter 7 was first effective on January 25, 1989 and last amended on March 5, 1993. It derives its authority from Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, Sections 110.105, 110.227, and 110.233, F.S., and Chapter 33-4, F.A.C. Both the agency Pamphlet and Chapter 7 of the Manual state that sexual harassment is conduct unbecoming an employee. Petitioner's position with regard to whether or not the Pamphlet and Chapter 7 of the Manual constitute unpromulgated rules appears to center on his belief that without them, employees are not on notice as to exactly what behavior constitutes sexual harassment, that they contain a subtext of what types of sexual harassment, i.e. hostile work environment, will be disciplined, or that they alone reveal that sexual harassment constitutes "conduct unbecoming". Petitioner testified that he understood blatant sexual harassment, such as unconsented physical contact, to be conduct unbecoming a public employee, but he did not have a clear understanding about the "gray areas", such as complimenting co- workers, socializing outside work, or what acts constituted hostile work place sexual harassment. However, Petitioner testified that he was on notice that the agency had an Anti-Sexual Harassment Policy and that at all times material, he knew that if he committed sexual harassment, he would be subject to discipline, up to and including termination. Petitioner admitted that if any employee engaged in actual sexual harassment against another employee, the offending employee would not command the respect of fellow employees, as described in Rule 33-4.002(4), F.A.C. He also was on notice through Rule 33-4.003, F.A.C., that he could be disciplined for "conduct unbecoming" or "willful violations of law or policy statements". He is charged at law with knowledge of Section 110.227(1) requiring discipline for "conduct unbecoming" or "willful violation" and Chapter 760 F.S., which implements Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. The agency routinely disciplines its employees for sexual harassment and has a long history of application of its Anti-Sexual Harassment Policy. Petitioner did not submit any evidence as to how Chapter 7 of the agency's Personnel Procedures Manual, the Pamphlet, or the one- page Policy Statement had any affect on him, beyond the discipline described, supra. Furthermore, there was no evidence presented to show that the agency's Sexual Harassment Policy, the Pamphlet, or Chapter 7 of the Personnel Procedures Manual have any affect on any person not employed by Respondent. There was no evidence that any of the provisions in these documents were self-executing.

Florida Laws (6) 110.105110.227110.233120.52120.56120.68
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BOARD OF PSYCHOLOGICAL EXAMINERS vs. JEFFREY R ALSHIN, 86-000959 (1986)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 86-000959 Latest Update: Nov. 10, 1986

The Issue At issue is whether Jeffrey Alshin is subject to discipline for violation of Section 490.009(2)(k), Florida Statutes (1983), by committing an act upon a client which would constitute sexual battery or sexual misconduct as defined in Section 490.0111, Florida Statutes (1983). Sexual misconduct in the practice of mental health counseling is prohibited by Section 490.0111, Florida Statutes (1983); that statute states that sexual misconduct shall be defined by rule. According to the Administrative Complaint, Rule 21U-15.04, Florida Administrative Code, defines sexual misconduct. The Administrative Complaint also alleges a violation of Section 490.009(2)(s), Florida Statutes (1983), for failing to meet minimum standards of performance in professional activities when measured against generally prevailing peer performance. The factual basis for these various grounds for discipline is alleged to have been engaging in sexual activity with a client during the period March, 1984, through July 1984, when a counselor-client relationship existed with the client.

Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Jeffrey R. Alshin, is a mental health counselor who has been licensed by the State of Florida during the times material to the allegations made in the Administrative Complaint. The client with whom Alshin is accused of sexual involvement, J.S., was referred to him by a Dr. Lemberg, who saw J.S. on March 1, 1984 (Tr. 24). J.S. telephoned Alshin's office and made an appointment to see him on Monday, March 5, 1984 (Tr. 24). On March 5, 1984, J.S. went to Alshin's office for a therapy session and met Alshin for the first time. She had another session with him on March 9, 1984 (Tr. 24-25). From March 5, 1984 a counselor-client relationship existed between Alshin and J.S. (Tr. 82). On the morning of Sunday, March 11, 1986, Alshin invited J.S. to his home for a barbecue (Tr. 26). After the barbecue, Alshin and J.S. went to Respondent's apartment and that evening they engaged in sexual intercourse (Tr. 27-28). Alshin engaged in sexual intercourse with his client on five other occasions between March and June, 1984 (Tr. 29). During the period in which Alshin and J.S. were sexually involved, Alshin was counseling J.S. (Tr. 28-29). Alshin was never married to J.S. Expert testimony submitted at the hearing establishes that for a mental health counselor to have a sexual relationship with a client is conduct which falls below the minimum standards of performance in professional activities for a mental health counselor when measured against prevailing peer performance (Tr. 80).

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered by the Secretary of the Department of Professional Regulation finding the Respondent guilty of a violation of Sections 490.009(2)(q) and (s), Florida Statutes (1983), and that his license as a mental health counselor be REVOKED. DONE AND ORDERED this 10th day of November, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. DORSEY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of November, 1986.

Florida Laws (3) 120.57490.009490.0111
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GLORIA HORD vs. BELL AEROSPACE TEXTRON, 86-004083 (1986)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 86-004083 Latest Update: Sep. 22, 1987

The Issue Whether petitioner suffered sexual harassment for which respondent is answerable, or whether, on account of her sex, respondent discriminated against her by paying her unequal wages, or whether, in terminating her employment, respondent retaliated against her on account of statutorily protected activity?

Findings Of Fact In April, of 1982, the year after her 19-year marriage to a Mr. Powell, whose surname she originally kept, came to an end, petitioner Gloria Patricia Hord, as she has been known since her remarriage in August of 1984, began work for respondent Bell Aerospace Textron, which has since become the Textron Marine Systems Division of Textron, Inc. (Textron). A defense contractor that builds landing craft air cushion vehicles and trains Navy personnel to operate them, Textron employs perhaps 130 persons in Panama City alone. Textron has a written policy against sexual harassment by or of its employees. As Textron's director of logistics at its Panama City facility, George Gust Alepakos, told the petitioner she was hired on April 3, 1982. Robert L. Ormsby and Albert Eugene "Bud" Small, the supervisor of inventory control who, as her immediate supervisor, shared an office with her when she began, had already interviewed her. Bell hired her as a clerk, general class III in labor grade N-6. The duties of general class III clerks are: Under general supervision, performs a variety of clerical work, where there is individual responsibility for the accuracy and completeness of important records and where decisions within the limits of policies or rules are required. Performs duties such as or similar to the following: supervises and works with a small group of clerks; sets up and maintains record systems of a widely varying nature, including secret or confidential material or information; prepares and issues reports as required; contacts other personnel as necessary in maintaining accurate records; reads reports, correspondence, publications, etc., and abstracts therefrom information pertaining to a particular subject; may perform miscellaneous duties relate dot office work, such as filing, operating various machines, etc. (sic). Respondent's Exhibit No. 23. According to Bell's job description, "demonstrated supervisory ability", is a desirable qualification for general class III clerks. In addition to processing receipts and keeping inventory logs, Patty Powell, as her co-workers then called her, typed and did other secretarial chores for Textron. She worked in a trailer which housed other offices and other workers, including Carol Bjorgan, Robert L. Ormsby, Monica Mitchell, Mike Pate, Mike Smith, Betty Brandon, and George Alepakos, to whom Mr. Small reported. Mr. Alepakos was in the adjoining office. Witnesses described Mr. Alepakos as personable, fun loving, happy go lucky, warm, friendly, outgoing, talkative, loud, sometimes grouchy, displaying a temper at times without being a screamer, dedicated, conscientious, a hard worker and a firm manager. He looked at the hearing to be in his sixties. The time Ms. Powell told him he reminded her of her grandfather, he said she had hurt his feelings. One day as Ms. Powell, then 36 years old, was typing, Mr. Alepakos stood behind her and placed his hands on her shoulders, watching her finish a memorandum. Mr. Alepakos invited Ms. Powell to lunch on several occasions. He regularly took employees in his group to lunch, both male and female, individually and in groups. Conversations at lunch were "business-related" and "very professional" at first. The third or fourth time they ate lunch together, however, Mr. Alepakos professed his love for Ms. Powell. Thereafter, when Mr. Small left the office, Mr. Alepakos would stop in. Within a week of declaring himself at lunch, he said, "I really mean it." He told her she would grow to love him, would learn to, and began leaving notes for her, typically like the one that said, "I love you," signed "George ." She "tried to laugh it off," questioning his sincerity. He was married, and she had a boyfriend. Beginning in the summer of 1982, he asked her almost daily for lunch. He telephoned to inquire, "Have I told you today that I love you?" Sometimes she went to lunch with him during this period, but more often she declined. He promised to behave if she accepted his invitations for lunch, but, in Ms. Powell's view, he welshed on these promises. She had mixed feelings about George Alepakos. She discussed with Carol Bjorgan the possibility of a relationship with him. By this time, her boyfriend Chip McDill had left her in the lurch. It would be nice to have someone older to take care of her, she mused aloud; and she felt she would be better off materially. Never once did she complain to Carol Bjorgan about Mr. Alepakos' romantic interest in her. She left him notes. One note, signed "Patty" and written on notepaper depicting two smiling bees among azalea blossoms, read, "Have a wonderful vacation, then hurry back." Respondent's Exhibit No. 2. One night she and Carol were drinking during "happy hour." Saying she wanted to talk to George, she telephoned his home, but hung up when his wife answered. She sometimes seemed to boast about Mr. Alepakos' taking her to lunch, asking, "Guess who I'm going to lunch with?" At Peddlers Alley one night, Mlles. Hord and Bjorgan met Mr. Alepakos for drinks. When they arrived, Ms. Hord playfully pretended to sit in Mr. Alepakos' lap, and said to Ms. Bjorgan, "We can handle it from here." In December of 1982, both Mr. Alepakos and Ms. Powell attended a party at a bar or restaurant. Mr. Alepakos "didn't think much" of her going out with the 23-year old man who escorted her to the party, danced with her, kissed her while they were on the dance floor, and, later in the evening, wrestled with her in the back seat of an automobile parked outside the establishment. He felt that "it looked bad for the company." The next morning, he called her into his office, told her she had "fallen off [her] pedestal," and that somebody had said she had behaved like a slut. Over the Christmas holidays she was in the hospital, and afterwards visited her mother in Atlanta. Mr. Alepakos called her there at the number she had given him, to ask about her health and to learn when she was coming back to work. On her return she talked things over with Mr. Small, her immediate supervisor, although she never told him about Mr. Alepakos' touching her. He advised her to decline the luncheon invitations and avoid Mr. Alepakos as much as possible. He spoke to Mr. Ormsby about the matter, at her request. In deference to Ms. Powell, who asked that nobody say anything to Mr. Alepakos, Mr. Small spoke to Mr. Ormsby "off the record." At some point, Mr. Alepakos called on Ms. Powell at the apartment she had recently moved into at Panama City Beach. She had invited him. When he arrived he found her with her daughter and stayed only about 20 minutes. Eventually Patty Powell went herself to Mr. Ormsby, and Mr. Ormsby took the matter up with Clarence L. Forrest, then the vice-president in charge of Textron's Panama City operations. Messrs. Ormsby and Forrest decided to transfer Ms. Powell to a general secretarial and word processing assignment in "the training trailer." The transfer was "lateral" in the sense that neither Ms. Powell's official job description nor her labor grade changed. In her new situation, she was involved in the production of training manuals. Bell hired two other word processing clerks to assist in this effort, Diane Ansell and April Dawn Day. Ms. Powell had recommended both Ms. Ansell and Ms. Day. She helped train them when they began. Even after they had learned the ropes, she gave them work to do which she proofread afterwards. If she was out, Ms. Ansell would assume these duties. Ms. Powell wrote out evaluations for Ms. Ansell and Ms. Day, although she never signed them. She did once sign an overtime authorization form, but Mr. Forrest sent it back for Mr. Higgins' signature and resubmission. She assumed her new duties in February of 1983, but invitations to lunch and expressions of affection continued after the transfer. One afternoon, just after Ms. Powell left the office, Mr. Alepakos said to Diane Ansell, "I love that girl," referring to Ms. Powell. After she told Mr. Ormsby that Mr. Alepakos would not leave her be, Mr. Forrest instructed Mr. Alepakos to cease and desist from any activity involving Ms. Powell unrelated to professional requirements, and directed him to communicate with her, if at all, through third parties. During the ensuing eight or nine months, Mr. Alepakos avoided Ms. Powell entirely. He "went the other way around when he saw her coming." In the fall of 1983, however, they were both at an office party at the Long Glass. She grabbed his shirt and led him into another room, where she asked him why he had been avoiding her. According to a friend and co-worker, petitioner was not "an outward flirt," except when she drank. Encouraged by the evening's events, Mr. Alepakos resumed his attentions. He telephoned several times a day, unless he was angry, and they began lunching together again. At various times, she told him she was at the point of reconciliation with her ex-husband, that she was seeing a boyfriend, and that she was gay. But she accepted a good many of his luncheon invitations, which was enough to inspire him to several proposals of marriage. In November of 1983, Ms. Powell came to work early one morning and made her way in the still dark trailer to the word processing room. Suddenly Mr. Alepakos, whom she had not seen nor expected to be there, embraced her and tried to kiss her. When the lights came on, he said, "I'm sorry", and left. During this period, Ms. Powell worked under the immediate supervision of Frank Higgins, who left civilian employment with the Navy and began with Textron in August of 1983. In early December of that year, Ms. Powell spoke to Mr. Higgins about Mr. Alepakos. After a second conversation on the subject, on February 9, 1984, Mr. Higgins stated, in a "Memo For the Record": FOR BACKGROUND, PATTY IS AN EXTREMELY QUIET, SHY PERSON WITH A RATHER "FRAGILE" QUALITY. SHE IS A DEDICATED PROFESSIONAL IN HER APPROACH TO HER JOB. SHE HAS NEVER APPEARED TO PROJECT (AVERT OR OTHERWISE) HER SEXUALITY AT WORK, DRESSES CONSERVATIVELY - AN IDEAL FEMALE WORKER IN TERMS OF NOT BEING INVOLVED TO ANY EXTENT WITH HER MALE CO- WORKERS OTHER THEN PROFESSIONALLY. SHE HAS NOT AND PROFESSES NO[T] TO WANT TO DATE ANYONE FROM WORK. GEORGE IS APPARENTLY "LEANING" ON HER AT WORK TO THE POINT SHE'S BECOMING EMOTIONALLY FRAZZLED OVER IT. HE PROFESSES TO BE IN LOVE AND "WANTS HER." GEORGE IS INSANELY JEALOUS OF HER BEING SURROUNDED BY ALL THESE MEN AND TOLD HER THAT DAVE STULTS, BOB NISSLEY AND MYSELF ARE OR MAY WANT TO BE ROMANTICALLY INVOLVED. HE CALLS HER SEVERAL TIMES SOME DAYS, SOMETIMES ASKING HER TO COME TO HIS OFFICE WHERE "COMMENTS ARE MADE" TO HER. SHE IS AFRAID NOT TO GO OVER TO HIS OFFICE - APPARENTLY FEELS GEORGE IS A POWER BROKER AND IF SHE GETS HIM MAD, HE'LL TAKE IT OUT ON TRAINING BY NOT SUPPORTING OUR NEEDS. PATTY SAYS SHE HAS TRIED EVERY CONCEIVABLE APPROACH TO TELL GEORGE SHE IS NOT INTERESTED IN HIM AND HE'S ANNOYING HER & SHE WANTS IT STOPPED. YET HE REFUSES TO LEAVE HER ALONE. I TOLD HER THAT SHE NEEDS TO THREATEN HIM WITH HARASSMENT CHARGES & BE WILLING TO FOLLOW UP ON THEM TO THE BITTER END - IF GEO. KNEW SHE WAS SERIOUS AND HIS JOB WAS IN DANGER, I HOPE HE WOULD BE PRUDENT ENOUGH TO BACK AWAY. PATTY SEEMS RELUCTANT TO PRESS CHARGES FOR FEAR THAT SHE WILL END UP BEING FIRED AND PERCEIVED AS THE CAUSE OF THE PROBLEM. SHE FEELS CASEY WILL PROTECT GEORGE AND WOULD CONSIDER GEO. MORE IMPORTANT TO BELL THAN PATTY. IN PREVIOUS DISCUSSIONS WITH CASEY DATING BACK TO DECEMBER, I TOO SENSED THAT EITHER CASEY WASN'T BE[ING] OBJECTIVE OR FAIR IN HIS ASSESSMENT OF PATTY OR THAT POSSIBLY GEORGE HAD BEEN FEEDING CASEY LIES AND INNUENDO ABOUT PATTY'S POTENTIAL INVOLVEMENT WITH PERSONNEL IN TRAINING. THE APPARENT STRATEGY IS TO CAST DOUBTS ABOUT PATTY'S CHARACTER SUCH THAT IF HIS SITUATION EVER BOILED TO THE SURFACE HE COULD BLAME IT ON HER TO SAVE HIS JOB. I BELIEVE THERE IS ENOUGH INFO AVAILABLE TO HAVE GEO. REPRIMANDED OR FIRED OVER THIS. THERE ARE SEVERAL PEOPLE WHO HAVE SEEN OR HEARD GEO. MAKE APPROACHES TO HER WHO I'M SURE WOULD COME FORWARD TO SUPPORT PATTY'S POSITION. SINCE THE DISCUSSION WAS OFF THE RECORD I AGREED NOT TO APPROACH CASEY YET. I OFFERED TO SPEAK WITH GEO. BUT IF HE PERCEIVES ME AS A COMPETITOR FOR PATTY, HE OBVIOUSLY WOULD MISCONSTRUE MY INTENTIONS. I DO INTEND TO SPEAK TO LENNY MORGAN "OFF THE RECORD" NEXT WEEK IN NEW ORLEANS TO GAIN SOME ADDITIONAL INSIGHT IN HANDLING THIS ISSUE. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1. In a second "Memo For The Record," Mr. Higgins reported discussing the situation with Mr. Morgan, and summarized the latter's advice. * * * LENNY'S BOTTOM LINE WAS AS I SUSPECTED - DON'T LEAVE IT SIMMERING TAKE FIRM ACTION. BRING IT TO CASEY'S ATTENTION. LENNY INDICATED HE WOULD BE GLAD TO COME OVER AND BECOME DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN SOLVING THIS. * * * Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2. Although Mr. Higgins never showed these memoranda to "Casey" Forrest, who only learned of them after the present proceedings began, he did mention the situation to Mr. Forrest, who indicated that he wondered whether there was a "problem on both sides," but agreed to speak to Mr. Alepakos. By the time Mr. Higgins left Panama City, in July of 1984, he thought the situation had been resolved. About this time, Ms. Powell told Mr. Alepakos she planned to remarry. He responded that he would be there, if it did not work out. He said he still loved her, and he did not stop asking her out, although, after she became Mrs. Hord, she consistently declined. He continued to declare his love. Mrs. Hord again complained, this time to B. L. Nissley, Textron's director of training documentation, on or about December 15, 1985. Her complaint notwithstanding, she sent Mr. Alepakos a poinsettia for Christmas. At some point, she left a note on his desk, saying "Missing you, P.H." By a memorandum dated January 29, 1985, Mr. Nissley asked Mr. Forrest for a formal investigation "to assure that this problem be resolved once and for all." Respondent's Exhibit No. 6. On January 31, 1985, Mr. Forrest interviewed Mrs. Hord in Mr. Ormsby's presence. She reported the frequent invitations to lunch and a suggestion by Mr. Alepakos that they take a vacation together, but said nothing about his touching her. Messrs. Forrest and Ormsby also interviewed Mr. Alepakos. They decided it might be well for a disinterested third party to investigate, and asked Textron's Mr. Morgan to come over from New Orleans for the purpose. Mr. Morgan interviewed Mrs. Hord for two and a half hours on February 10 or 11, 1985. In answer to his questions, Mrs. Hord said that Mr. Alepakos had not asked her for sexual favors, and had not behaved vulgarly, lewdly or indecently. Nor did she advert to the early morning incident in the trailer, which Mr. Alepakos admitted at hearing, while denying any attempt to kiss her. When Mr. Morgan asked her if Mr. Alepakos had ever touched her, or tried to kiss her or to force himself on her, she answered no. Mr. Morgan asked Mrs. Hord to name others who could support her claim of harassment. She gave him only one name, Ms. Ansell's. Mr. Morgan also interviewed George Alepakos at length, and asked him to name others who could support his assertions. Mr. Alepakos gave him some five names. After interviewing these people and Ms. Ansell, Mr. Morgan returned to New Orleans and stated his conclusions in a memorandum dated February 15, 1985. Mr. Forrest wrote Mr. Alepakos a memorandum advising him that his "conduct in the matter lacked professionalism and good judgement." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 6. He was "warned to confine ... communications and relationships with Mrs. G. Hord to a professional/business environment." Id. This February 25, 1985, memorandum raised "the possibility of termination of [Alepakos'] employment," id. in the event "the cited harassments reoccur[ed]." Id. But the phrase "cited harassments" was a reference to the February 15, 1985, memorandum, Respondent's Exhibit No. 6, in which Mr. Morgan stated: Since the evidence indicates that the relationship was two sided, I find it difficult to describe the activity of Mr. Alepakos as one of harassment. Respondent's Exhibit No. 6, p. 2. Mr. Forrest did not warn or reprimand Mrs. Hord because he felt a supervisor or manager had a different responsibility in matters of this kind than an employee under supervision. At no time, did Mr. Alepakos tell her off color stories, show her pornographic photographs, explicitly solicit sexual favors, or make obscene gestures to or from Mrs. Hord. It fell to Messrs. Ormsby and Nissley to relay the results of Mr. Morgan's investigation to Mrs. Hord. The three of them gathered in Mr. Nissley's office, and he furnished her a copy to read. She had gotten part way through when she exclaimed, "That's a lie. I never sent him flowers. I never left notes on his desk." She threw down the report, and left the office, despite Mr. Nissley's telling her to stay. She dismissed the February 15, 1985, memorandum as a "bunch of bullshit." Mr. Nissley spoke to her afterwards and told her that he would not tolerate vulgar outbursts in the future. She telephoned Mr. Morgan and complained to him about the result of the investigation. She told him she did not think the report was fair or that it reflected what had happened. She became upset and characterized the report as "bullshit." To this he replied, "Wait a minute. I'll answer any question you want to ask." But she hung up the telephone. On January 30, 1985, Mrs. Hord had asked to take a leave of absence. Her request approved, she began thirty days' leave soon after she learned the results of Mr. Morgan's investigation. Upon her return, Mr. Nissley told her about the results of her annual evaluation, and informed her she had been given a raise of $.20 per hour. The $.20 raise took effect March 16, 1985. With the raise, Mrs. Hord was paid $7.90 per hour, a dollar an hour more than Diane "Dee" Ansell was paid. And Ms. Ansell was paid more than April Dawn Day, the third word processing clerk who helped produce training materials for Navy personnel. Mrs. Hord requested a meeting with Mr. Forrest to discuss the raise, which brought her salary to the highest authorized for her position; it was the same amount as the raise the other two word processing clerks in the training program received. But, since she was paid more than they were, the raise represented a smaller percentage of increase, and she objected. On the morning of March 27, 1985, when Mrs. Hord met with Mr. Forrest, Messrs. Ormsby and Nissley were also present. She told them Bell could keep the raise. Mr. Forrest began to explain the mechanics of Bell's merit raise system, when Mrs. Hord interrupted, "It's a bunch of bullshit. You can do anything you want." As she started to leave, Mr. Forrest told her to stay, but she refused. At one point, she called her bosses "jackasses." According to Mr. Forrest's secretary, who was outside, she "had a wild look" as she slammed the door on her way out. Before they dispersed, Mr. Forrest and the others decided to terminate her employment, unless Mr. Morgan advised against it. Mr. Forrest thought her language "unbecoming a lady." He certainly would not have expected a woman to use such language, and it did not affect him in the same way as it would have, if a man had used the same language. On the other hand, he would not have expected any of Bell's Panama City employees to use language of this kind in such a setting. Mr. Forrest testified under oath that Mrs. Hord was not fired because he found her language the more offensive on account of her femininity. Apprised of the situation, Mr. Morgan consulted a New York lawyer, then told management in Panama City he had no objection to firing Mrs. Hord. Mr. Ormsby then caused a memorandum to be addressed to Mrs. Hord, notifying her that her employment was "terminated as of this date (27 March 1985), for gross disrespect, incertituded (sic), premeditated and continued disregard for all levels of Management ... so as to challenge the management of this company and to incite disrespect of other employees ...." Respondent's Exhibit No. 10.

Recommendation It is, accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismiss Gloria Hord's petition for relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of September, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of September, 1987. APPENDIX Petitioner's proposed findings of fact Nos. 1, 5, 6, 7, 8, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 23, 24, 25, 26, 29, 30, 32, 33, 36, 37, 38, 39 and 40 have been adopted, in substance, insofar as material. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 2, the evidence showed that she worked as an acting supervisor for Columbia Research but not, as far as the hearing officer's notes reflect, for CSC. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 3, the evidence showed that Mr. Small interviewed her first. Mr. Alepakos, as his supervisor, could presumably have overruled Mr. Small's choice even if Mr. Small made the "basic decision" to hire. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 4 has been adopted, in substance, except that the evidence did not establish that he placed his hands on her shoulders more than once. With respect to petitioner's proposed findings of fact Nos. 9 and 10, the evidence did not reveal any sexual advances at this point, aside from declarations of love, which were not entirely unwelcome. Except for the last sentence, petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 11 has been adopted, in substance, insofar as material. With respect to the final sentence of No. 11 and the word "Again" in No. 13, it was not clear from the evidence that she went to Mr. Ormsby before Christmas. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 12, Mrs. Hord did not always go "to great lengths to avoid contact with Mr. Alepakos during this time period." She not infrequently accepted his invitations to lunch. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 14 has been rejected as against the weight of the evidence. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 16 has been adopted, in substance, insofar as material, except that Mr. Alepakos was not put on any formal probation. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact Nos. 21 and 22, the evidence showed that he resumed his attentions because of her advances. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 27, the evidence showed that he called, but not that he called frequently. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 28, he did not come by uninvited. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 31, he said she needed to see a doctor but not, in so many words, that the marriage would fail. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 34, nobody placed limits on Mr. Morgan's investigation. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 35 has been rejected as contrary to the evidence. She was not told she would be reprimanded for making good faith complaints. Respondent's proposed findings of fact Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 26, 29, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, the first two sentences of No. 38, Nos. 40, 41, 42, 43, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 58, 60, 61, 62, 65, 66, 70 and 72 have been adopted, in substance, insofar as material. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 4, she lived at Panama City Beach at one point. Respondent's proposed findings of fact Nos. 9 and 10 are immaterial or subordinate. Respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 11 is rejected. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 12, Ms. Bjorgan's testimony was that she was not sure Mrs. Hord wanted to see him that night. Respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 14 has been accepted, in substance, insofar as material, except for Small's suggested advice to change her manner of dress. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 25, Mrs. Hord was ambivalent about Mr. Alepakos before as after the incident. Respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 27 is rejected. Respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 28 blows a single incident out of proportion. Respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 30 is rejected. The final sentence of respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 38 is rejected, as is No. 39 to the extent it proceeds on the assumption there was any hiatus. Respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 44 has been adopted, in substance, except that the evidence did not establish that the poinsettia was flowering. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 57, the epithet was "jackasses." With respect to respondent's proposed findings of fact Nos. 59 and 64, Alepakos had no input, but the fact of her complaints was considered and inspired the call to Morgan. Respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 63 is immaterial, except that Alepakos' attentions did not cause great mental stress. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 67, his overtures were romantic. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 68, he did propose marriage. Respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 69 has been adopted, in substance, insofar as material, except for the final clause of the final sentence which is rejected. Respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 71 is immaterial or subordinate. COPIES FURNISHED: Alvin L. Peters, Esquire 36 Oak Avenue Panama City, Florida 32401 William B. deMeza, Jr., Esquire Holland and Knight Post Office Box 241 Bradenton, Florida 33506 Donald A. Griffin, Executive Director Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925 Dana Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925

USC (1) 29 CFR 1604.11(a)(1981) Florida Laws (2) 760.02760.10
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GRADY WILLIAM APLIN, JR. vs FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION, 90-001844 (1990)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Gainesville, Florida Mar. 26, 1990 Number: 90-001844 Latest Update: Oct. 02, 1990

The Issue Is the Petitioner qualified for licensure?

Findings Of Fact On October 4, 1989, Petitioner filed his application for licensure as a real estate salesman. Question #7 of the application asked whether the applicant (Petitioner) had ever been convicted of a crime, found guilty or entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere even if adjudication was withheld (Respondent's Composite Exhibit No. 1). The Petitioner admitted to having been arrested on July 3, 1984 and to pleading nolo contendere on October 17, 1985 to committing a sex offense against a child and the commission of lewd and lascivious acts. The Petitioner was placed on probation for ten (10) years for the first offense and was sentenced to three years imprisonment for the second offense with thirty-five (35) days credited for time served. A condition of his probation is that he cannot reside or stay overnight with a child under the age of 18. At the formal hearing in this case, Petitioner testified on his own behalf and admitted that he had molested his oldest daughter, age 11, and pleaded nolo contendere to said offense in 1984 and three (3) months later molested both his oldest daughter, then age 12, and his youngest daughter, then age 9, and pleaded guilty to said offenses. Petitioner further testified that the initial offense had been committed over a period of approximately two weeks and that the second offense had been committed over a period of approximately two months. The offenses occurred while he was undergoing rehabilitation therapy for the traumatic amputation of his leg. Since his release from jail, Petitioner has received treatment for his behavior at the Florida Mental Health Institute, North Florida Evaluation and Treatment Center and Community Behavioral Services. Petitioner's brother testified concerning his brother's life. The Petitioner had been an Eagle Scout; had been a scoutmaster; had been a member of the Navy Reserve and had had no problems prior to loosing his leg in an accident. Since his release from jail, the Petitioner has provided child support to his ex-wife and daughters. Petitioner had resided with and been employed by his brother until his brother adopted a child. The condition of the Petitioner's probation that the Petitioner can not reside with a child under the age of 18 required the Petitioner to change his residence and employment with his brother. He was employed by Kelly Temporary Services at the time of hearing and was working in a bank in customer service. The Petitioner has remained in therapy as required by his probation. The Petitioner has been in the presence of children when other adults were present since his release from jail and the Petitioner's behavior was exemplary. The Petitioner's brother opined that the Petitioner had "rehabilitated himself," and pointed out that very severe consequences would result to Petitioner for a third offense. The Petitioner admitted that the offenses had occurred in isolated settings when no other adults were present.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner's application to take the state examination for licensure as a real estate salesman be denied. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of October, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of October, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 90-1844 The Petitioner wrote a letter to the Hearing Officer, which was read and considered. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact 1-6. Adopted. 7. Rejected, as irrelevant. COPIES FURNISHED: Joselyn M. Price, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs 400 West Robinson Street, Suite 212 Orlando, FL 32801 Grady William Aplin, Jr. 905 South Kings Avenue Brandon, FL 33511 Darlene F. Keller, Director Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, FL 32802 Kenneth E. Easley, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792

Florida Laws (3) 120.57475.17475.25
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