The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner's request for an exemption from disqualification from employment in a position of special trust should be granted.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: This case involves a request by Petitioner, Charles W. Leverson, Sr., for an exemption from disqualification from employment in a position of special trust. If the request is approved, Petitioner would be allowed to return to work as a unit treatment rehabilitation specialist in a unit for developmentally disabled adults at Florida State Hospital (FSH). Respondent, Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS), is the state agency charged with the responsibility of approving or denying such requests. In a preliminary decision entered on an unknown date, a DCFS committee denied the request principally on the ground that Petitioner had minimized or denied the gravity of his disqualifying offenses. Petitioner is now barred from doing such work because of disqualifying offenses which occurred on December 16, 1990, and March 24, 1992. On the first date, Petitioner was arrested for the offense of aggrevated battery on his wife, a misdemeanor under Section 784.04, Florida Statutes (1990). On the second date, Petitioner was again arrested for five offenses, including battery on his wife in violation of Section 784.03, Florida Statutes (1991). As to the first charge, on January 26, 1993, Petitioner entered a plea of nolo contendere to the charge of battery and was placed on one year's supervised probation. He was also required to "[s]pend 15 weekends in the county jail." In addition, Petitioner was ordered "not [to] possess or consume any alcohol during the term of [his] probation," and to "[c]ontinue with counseling" (of an undisclosed nature). As to the second charge, Petitioner was found guilty by a jury on July 24, 1992, of committing battery on his wife in violation of Section 784.03, Florida Statutes. A "not guilty" verdict was entered as to the remaining four charges. The record does not indicate the sentence, if any, that he received for this offense. Petitioner successfully completed all terms of his probation. Since his arrest in March 1992, he has not consumed any alcoholic beverages. This is an important consideration since both disqualifying offenses occurred when he was intoxicated. Petitioner began working at FSH on September 26, 1979. He was first employed as a support service aide but was eventually promoted to the position of unit treatment rehabilitation specialist, a position involving supervision of developmentally disabled adults. Because of a background screening which occurred in 1997, Petitioner's disqualifying offenses were discovered, and he was forced to resign effective February 12, 1998. He has requested an exemption so that he can return to his employment. Since being forced to resign some four months ago, he has not been employed. The two disqualifying offenses involve battery on Petitioner's long-time wife, Shirler. In both cases, she suffered injuries serious enough to require treatment at a local hospital. Shirler says, however, that Petitioner has "changed" since his 1992 arrest, and he no longer drinks, is communicative with her and the three children, and is a good father. Petitioner attends church, is a member of a lodge in Quincy, Florida, and has a much better attitude since he stopped drinking. He has received good work evaluations during his most recent years of employment at FSH. Former co-workers and supervisors attested to the fact that Petitioner has good rapport with his co-workers and residents, and he performs his stressful job with a "cheerful" and "pleasant" attitude. He was also described as one of the "better" employees in the forensic unit. In March 1987, or more than eleven years ago, Petitioner received a five-day suspension because of an altercation with an inmate in the FSH forensic section laundry room. The suspension was meted out after Petitioner became involved in an argument with an inmate and drew an opened knive in a threatening fashion. Although Petitioner denied that the blade was exposed, testimony by a co-worker established that it was exposed in a threatening fashion. The altercation was resolved, however, before any violence occurred. In mitigation, it was established that Petitioner's possession of a knive in the laundry room was not unlawful since it was necessary for him to use a knive to open the sealed buckets of detergents. On October 13, 1993, Petitioner received a written reprimand for "Abusive and/or Threatening Language." On that occasion, Petitioner was instructed by his supervisor to help fold some laundry in the laundry room. Petitioner replied that he would not and told him "to get off my fucking back." Petitioner also pointed his fist at the supervisor in a threatening manner and "threatened to kick his butt." On June 27, 1994, Petitioner was suspended for fifteen work days effective July 8, 1994, for using threatening and/or abusive language towards a supervisor. This disciplinary action was taken after Petitioner had again refused to comply with instructions by his supervisor. On that occasion, he became "real mad," called her a "motherfucker," shook his fist at her, and threatened to "get her." Although the supervisor stood her ground against Petitioner, she was "afraid" for her safety. Petitioner was less than candid in describing the incidents which led to him receiving disciplinary action by his employer in 1987, 1993, and 1994. He has, however, expressed remorse for striking his wife in 1990 and 1992, and he regrets the embarrassment he caused his wife and children. For the last four years, Petitioner has had a blemish-free record at FSH, including good evaluations from his supervisors and a reputation as one of the "better" employees in his section. Given these considerations, it is found that Petitioner has sufficiently rehabilitated himself since the disqualifying incidents, and that he will pose no threat to the FSH clients and inmates.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Family Services enter a final order granting Petitioner's request for an exemption from disqualification for employment in a position of special trust. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of June, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of June, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Gregory D. Venz, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John S. Slye, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Ben R. Patterson, Esquire Post Office Box 4289 Tallahassee, Florida 32315-4289 John R. Perry, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 2639 North Monroe Street, Suite 252A Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2949
Findings Of Fact At the time of her daughter's treatment by the North Florida Regional Medical Center Hospital emergency room, Petitioner was an insured under the State Of Florida Employees' Group Health Self-Insurance Plan (Plan). Petitioner's daughter was treated at the emergency room on November 21, 1995, after having ingested an undetermined amount of Tylenol PM tablets for possible side effects of over-ingestion of the acetaminophen product. The parties stipulated that the diagnoses made by the emergency room's attending physician, T. Paul Rast, D.O., who was on duty the evening of November 21, 1995, shall be regarded as truth and fact. His diagnoses were "1. Adjustment disorder with depressive symptoms; 2. Suicidal gesture versus attempt." Medical records admitted in evidence indicate that a history was given to the emergency room staff that Petitioner's daughter had taken the Tylenol PM because she was mad after having broken up with a friend and tried to hurt herself and make everyone feel sorry for her. (Joint Exhibit 2) There is no dispute that Petitioner's daughter intentionally and volitionally ingested approximately 20 Tylenol PM tablets (one bottle) at approximately 6:30 p.m. on November 21, 1995, or that she did so as part of her depressed state. Petitioner's daughter's treatment at the emergency room was comprised of being lavaged clear, given charcoal and Sorbitol 50 mg. Health care was limited to the over-ingestion of the acetaminophen product. Treatment for depression was not provided at that time in the emergency room. Petitioner's daughter was not admitted or treated as an "inpatient", but was released to her parents. However, Petitioner's daughter subsequently was treated privately for depression. That treatment for depression has been declared "covered" by the Plan's Administrator and has been paid for according to the Plan's scheduled rates. The Florida State Legislature determines what services and supplies will, and will not, be covered under the Plan. The Florida Employees' Group Health Self-Insurance Plan Booklet and Benefit Document (Joint Exhibit 1) is the contract of insurance in this case and provides, in pertinent part, as follows: DEFINITIONS 48. "Mental or Nervous Disorder" means any and all disorders set forth in the diagnostic categories of the most recently published edition of the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, regardless of the underlying cause, or effect, of the disorder. Examples include, but are not limited to, . . . anxiety and depression. (Itallics supplied) COVERED HOSPITAL AND OTHER FACILITY SERVICE The following services shall be covered when ordered by a physician and are medically necessary for the treatment of an insured as a result of a covered accident, illness or mental or nervous disorder. 8. Covered Inpatient Services; PPC: [List omitted] COVERED MEDICAL - SURGICAL SERVICES AND SUPPLIES Payment of Covered Medical-Surgical Services and Supplies shall be subject to the limitations, exclusions or provisions of the Plan except as provided in Paragraphs C. 5. and 7. * * * Ninety percent . . . of the PPC Schedule for medically necessary inpatient/outpatient services and supplies provided to an insured by a preferred patient care physician for the treatment of the insured as a result of a covered accident, illness or mental or nervous disorder shall be paid by the Plan. G. EXCLUSIONS: The following services, supplies or equipment are not covered services and supplies under the Plan. The insured is solely responsible for the payment of charges for all such services, supplies or equipment excluded in this Section. * * * Any services and supplies received due to the following circumstances: (b) Resulting from an intentional self-inflicted injury whether the insured was sane or insane. The parties stipulated as fact that the definition of "effect", according to Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary is: "1) to cause to come into being. 2) to bring about, often by surmounting obstacles; accomplish"; and that the definition of "effect", according to Taber's Cyclopedic Medical Dictionary, Edition 15, is, "result of an action or force". Petitioner has proposed, and the undersigned has determined in accord with the parties' stipulation as to authoritative texts, that the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition (1994) recognizes "adjustment disorder" and "major depressive episode". Thoughts of death and attempts or gestures at suicide are recognized as sequelae of a major depressive episode. Suicide is listed as the most derious possible consequence of a major depressive episode.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services, Division of State Employees' Insurance, enter a Final Order denying the Petitioner's request for benefit coverage of emergency room charges on November 21, 1995. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of January, 1997, in Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of January, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: William H. Lindner, Secretary Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Paul A. Rowell, General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Mary Kathy Stalnaker 7700 Southwest 24th Avenue Gainesville, Florida 32607 Sharon D. Larson, Esquire Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
The Issue Whether Petitioner was discriminated against based on his race in violation of Chapter 760.10, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Fabian L. Dixon, is an African-American male. At all times relevant to this Petition, Petitioner was employed by the Florida Department of Children and Families as a Unit Treatment and Rehabilitation Specialist–Forensic Corrections at Florida State Hospital, Chattahoochee, Florida. Petitioner was aware of Florida State Hospital’s strict policies regarding Falsification of Records or Statements; Willful Violation of Rules, Regulations or Policies and Conduct Unbecoming a Public Employee. Petitioner was also aware that violations of such policies could result in dismissal of the employee. Violations of these policies had resulted in dismissal of both non-minority and minority employees in the past. 4. On June 22, 2001, at 8:32 a.m. and 8:33 a.m., Unit 21 received two faxed copies of Inter Agency Leave Transfer forms from Petitioner, each donating twenty-four hours of sick leave for a total of forty-eight hours and both purportedly signed by Norman Torres. Mr. Torres subsequently discovered that over twenty-four hours had been deducted from his sick leave balance, and discovered that forty-seven hours had been used by Fabian L. Dixon. Mr. Torres then informed his timekeeper that he only donated twenty-four hours of sick leave to Petitioner. In reviewing the sick leave donation forms it appeared the date was changed on one of the forms, then the two forms were faxed to Unit 21. Written statements from Mr. Torres indicated that he only donated twenty-four hours of sick leave to Petitioner. Because of the serious nature of the violation, and given Petitioner's past history of discipline, Respondent terminated Petitioner on September 21, 2001. The employment decision was not based on Petitioner's race and was consistent with Respondent’s disciplinary policy. On October 1, 2001, AFSCME elected to file a grievance on behalf of Petitioner under the provisions of the Master Contract between the State and the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees. The grievance was initially reviewed by the Department of Children and Family Services and it was determined that there was cause for Petitioner’s dismissal. The grievance was then appealed to Step 3 of the grievance procedure, which provided for review of agency action by the Department of Management Services. The issue determined at Step 3 was whether the Department had just cause to discipline Petitioner. Review of the Department’s actions revealed that the Department had just cause to discipline Petitioner and that the penalty imposed was within the range for each charged violation. The grievance and relief requested was denied. On December 4, 2001, a “Request for Arbitration” was filed by AFSCME on behalf of Petitioner and a hearing was scheduled for June 2, 2003. On May 20, 2003, AFSCME filed a Notice of Withdrawal of Arbitration. In response to the notice, the hearing was cancelled and an Order Closing the File of the Department of Management Services was issued on May 20, 2003. At hearing, Petitioner admitted that he altered the Inter Agency Leave Transfer Form, but contended that the hospital did not terminate other white employees for similar offenses. However, Petitioner failed to present any independent testimony to corroborate this claim and made absolutely no showing that there was any relationship between his race and his termination.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the Petition for Relief in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of July, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850)488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of July, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Fabian L. Dixon 4634 Century Road Greenwood, Florida 32443 Kathi Lee Kilpatrick, Esquire Florida State Hospital Department of Children and Family Services Post Office Box 1000 Chattahoochee, Florida 32324-1000 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether J. Glenn Brown, Jr., was an "employee" of Northwest Florida Community Hospital for purposes of the State of Florida retirement system?
Findings Of Fact The Parties. Petitioner, Board of Trustees of the Northwest Florida Community Hospital (hereinafter referred to as the "Board of Trustees"), is the governing body of the Northwest Florida Community Hospital. Petitioner, Board of County Commissioners of Washington County, Florida (hereinafter referred to as the "County Commissioners"), is the governing body of Washington County, Florida, and the owner of the Northwest Florida Community Hospital. The Respondent, the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement (hereinafter referred to as the "Division"), is the agency charged with responsibility for administering the Florida retirement system established by Chapter 121, Florida Statutes. Operation of Northwest Florida Community Hospital Prior to February of 1988. The Northwest Florida Community Hospital (hereinafter referred to as the "Hospital"), is a small, rural acute-care hospital located in Chipley, Washington County, Florida. During the mid-1980's, the Hospital suffered from a financial crisis that threatened its continued existence. As a consequence thereof, it was concluded that the Hospital should be sold. A contract was negotiated and entered into for the sale of the Hospital to National Healthcare, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as "NHI"). As a part of the contract entered into with NHI, NHI was to operate the Hospital before the contract for sale was completed. J. Glenn Brown was an employee of NHI. NHI assigned Mr. Brown to the Hospital to act as the administrator of the Hospital. As administrator of the Hospital, Mr. Brown was the top manager of the Hospital. Mr. Brown, while employed by NHI, acted as the administrator of the Hospital from September 1986, until approximately September or October of 1987. At some time prior to February 1988, the contract for sale of the Hospital to NHI was cancelled and the Board of Trustees began to operate the Hospital. The Consulting Contracts. On or about February 1, 1988 the Hospital and Mr. Brown entered into a Consulting Contract (hereinafter referred to as the "First Contract"). Petitioner's exhibit 1. Mr. Brown agreed in the First Contract to operate the Hospital. Mr. Brown operated the Hospital pursuant to the First Contract until its expiration. Although the term of the First Contract ended January 31, 1991, Mr. Brown continued to operate the Hospital. A second Consulting Contract (hereinafter referred to as the "Second Contract"), was entered into on or about May 29, 1992 between Mr. Brown and the Hospital. The Second Contract applied to the period February 1, 1992, through February 1, 1993. Mr. Brown continued to perform services for the Hospital between the end of the First Contract and the beginning of the Second Contract. The differences between the First Contract and the Second Contract (hereinafter referred to jointly as the "Consulting Contracts"), were not substantial other than the amount of the annual fee to be paid to Mr. Brown. The Treatment of Mr. Brown for Purposes of the Florida Retirement System. During the period of time that Mr. Brown operated the Hospital from February 1, 1988 until he departed in the fall of 1992, the Hospital treated Mr. Brown as an "independent contractor" and not an "employee" for purposes of the Florida retirement system. Although the Hospital could have requested a determination of Mr. Brown's status for purposes of the Florida retirement system, the Hospital was not required to do so. The Hospital, as it was authorized to do pursuant to Chapter 121, Florida Statutes, made the initial decision to treat Mr. Brown as an independent contractor. After Mr. Brown had left the Hospital, an audit of the Hospital was conducted by the management review section of the Division. As a result of the audit, the Division raised a question about the status of Mr. Brown for purposes of the Florida retirement system. As a result of the audit of the Hospital, the Division required the Hospital to submit a Florida Retirement System Employment Relationship Questionnaire form requesting a determination of Mr. Brown's status as an employee or independent contractor. The Hospital did so. See Respondent's exhibit 2. The Division reviewed the Questionnaire and determined that Mr. Brown was an "employee" for purposes of the Florida retirement system, and so notified the Hospital. The Hospital filed a request for a formal administrative hearing to contest the Division's determination that Mr. Brown was an employee. Based upon the foregoing, it is the Division that is attempting to change the status quo in this matter. But for the Division's audit and requirement that the Hospital file a Questionnaire, the Hospital's treatment of Mr. Brown as an independent contractor for purposes of the Florida retirement system would have been final. Services to be Provided by Mr. Brown Pursuant to the Consulting Contracts and Mr. Brown's Relationship with the Board of Trustees. Mr. Brown, referred to as the "consultant" in the Consulting Contracts, agreed to provide the following services: 1:1 The Hospital hereby contracts with Consultant to provide services to the Hospital to perform such services as may be necessary to properly and efficiently run the Hospital for the purpose of providing quality healthcare to the citizens of Washington County and a more productive business operation. 1:2 Consultant hereby contracts with the Hospital to perform such services as may be necessary to provide the Hospital advice, expertise and a more efficient and productive business operation. The Consulting Contracts also contained the following provision pertaining to Mr. Brown's operation of the Hospital: 2:1 Consultant agrees to devote such of his time and efforts to the performance of such services as are necessary to perform and achieve the objectives set forth in Article I above. Consultant agrees that he will not directly or indirectly render any service of a business, commercial or professional nature to any other Hospital in Northwest Florida, whether for compensation or otherwise, during the term of this Agreement without the prior written consent of the Board of Trustees of the Hospital. Consultant agrees to comply with the Hospital's policies, rules and regulations as determined from time to time by the Board of Trustees of the Hospital. It was the intent of the Hospital and Mr. Brown that he would act as an independent contractor, and not an employee, in performing the services contemplated by the Consulting Contracts. Mr. Brown was to, and did, provide his services personally. Mr. Brown did not operate through a corporation or other business entity. Between February 1988 and the Fall of 1992, Mr. Brown administered the Hospital in essentially the same manner that he had prior to 1988 while employed by NHI. The Board of Trustees established policies for the operation of the Hospital during the term of the Consulting Contracts. Mr. Brown carried out policies adopted by the Board of Trustees. Mr. Brown was involved in the formulation of policies by the Board of Trustees and he advised the Board of Trustees concerning policies it adopted. The Board of Trustees had little experience in operating the Hospital. The day- to-day operations of the Hospital had been handled by NHI prior to entering into the First Contract. Prior to NHI's operation of the Hospital, the Hospital was administered by Hospital Corporation of America (hereinafter referred to as "HCA"). HCA had operated the Hospital through an employee, Buel Sapp. The Board of Trustees, therefore, relied heavily on Mr. Brown and his expertise in developing polices and for his efficient operation of the Hospital. The manner in which Mr. Brown administered the Hospital was also largely the same as the manner in which the Hospital has been administered by the person who replaced by Mr. Brown. The new administrator has been treated as an "employee" by the Hospital. Training. Mr. Brown was a professional hospital administrator with a number of years of experience operating hospitals, including the Hospital. In light of Mr. Brown's experience, especially at the Hospital, training was not required when Mr. Brown undertook the services contemplated by the First Contract. Integration. The services to be performed pursuant to the Consulting Contacts were integral to the operation of the Hospital. Mr. Brown performed services normally performed by an "administrator" or top manager of any hospital. Manner In Which Mr. Brown Performed Services. Mr. Brown did not hire any assistants or employees to assist him in the performance of the services required by the Consulting Contracts. The Consulting Contracts did not prevent Mr. Brown from using the services of others to carry out the services to be provided. Although Mr. Brown was ultimately obligated to insure that the services contemplated by the Consulting Contracts were provided, the manner in which services required by the Consulting Contracts were to be carried out was not specified. Continuing Relationship. Mr. Brown was required, as a condition of the Hospital entering into the First Contract, to move to Washington County. Pursuant to the First Contract, Mr. Brown was obligated to perform services for the Hospital for a period of four years. The First Contract expired February 1, 1991. The Second Contract obligated Mr. Brown to perform services for the Hospital for a period of one year. The Second Contract was effective February 1, 1992. Mr. Brown continued to perform services for the Hospital between February 1, 1991 and February 1, 1992, although the First Contract had expired and the Second Contract had not yet been entered into. The evidence failed to prove why Mr. Brown continued to perform services for the Hospital between February 1, 1991, and February 1, 1992. Mr. Brown performed services for the Hospital after he left NHI for between 3 and 4 years. Mr. Brown's Working Hours. Mr. Brown's working hours were not specified in the Consulting Contracts. Mr. Brown, therefore, was not legally required to perform services during any set period of time. Mr. Brown generally performed services for the Hospital from the early morning until the early evening. Mr. Brown's hours were consistent with the hours worked by employees of the Hospital. Mr. Brown did not keep time-sheets indicating the hours he worked. Nor did Mr. Brown use, or "punch," a time-clock which employees of the Hospital used. Full-Time or Part-Time Work. Mr. Brown was not required to work any set amount of hours pursuant to the Consulting Contracts. The services expected of Mr. Brown pursuant to the Consulting Contracts reasonably contemplated that Mr. Brown would perform services full- time, only if necessary. The Consulting Contracts also provided that Mr. Brown was not required to perform services on days he attended seminars or meetings to improve his position. The Consulting Contracts also required that Mr. Brown make himself available "for all reasonable meetings, engagements, and any and all other reasonable attempts by the Hospital to promote the Hospital." Mr. Brown did not receive annual or sick leave. Mr. Brown did not work at the Hospital every day of the week. During some weeks, he only worked three or four days. Where Mr. Brown Performed Services. Although not specifically required to do so, Mr. Brown performed the services contemplated by the Consulting Contracts essentially on the premises of the Hospital. In order to effectively administer the Hospital, it was necessary that Mr. Brown be available at the Hospital. Reports from Mr. Brown to the Hospital. Mr. Brown regularly reported to the Board of Trustees and kept the Board informed of his actions. Compensation for Mr. Brown's Services. Pursuant to the First Contract, Mr. Brown was paid an annual fee of $70,555.00. The annual fee was paid biweekly in twenty-six equal installments. Payments were made on the last day of every other week. The annual fee to be paid to Mr. Brown pursuant to the First Contract was agreed upon during negotiations based upon the average salary paid to administrators of similarly sized hospitals who were serving as employees, and adding thereto the amount of withholding tax, retirement contributions and other amounts which would be paid on behalf of an "employee." Had Mr. Brown been hired as an "employee", presumably he would have only been paid an amount based upon the average salary of other employee/administrators. Pursuant to the Second Contract Mr. Brown was paid an annual fee of $98,770.00. The annual fee was paid monthly on the first day of each month and upon the submission of an invoice from Mr. Brown. The Consulting Contracts also provided the following: Consultant hereby acknowledges and agrees that he is an independent contractor individually liable for self employment and all other taxes of any nature due on the fees paid by the Hospital to Consultant. Payments of Mr. Brown's annual fee were made to him by the Hospital out of a separate account and not the Hospital's "payroll" account from which Hospital employees were paid. Payments were made at the same time that Hospital employees were paid. The Hospital also paid for group health insurance for Mr. Brown. Health insurance benefits provided to Mr. Brown were the same benefits provided to Hospital employees. The Hospital also paid for disability insurance for Mr. Brown and a life insurance policy larger than provided to Hospital employees. Mr. Brown's Expenses; Tools and Materials; Investment. Pursuant to the Consulting Contracts, the Hospital paid dues Mr. Brown was required to pay to maintain "membership in applicable organizations or associations deemed necessary for promotion of the Hospital " The Hospital paid expenses incurred by Mr. Brown to attend meetings and seminars on new federal and state health care regulations which impacted the operation of the Hospital. The Hospital paid Mr. Brown a vehicle allowance of $250.00. The Hospital also provided Mr. Brown with an office, furniture, office supplies, a secretary (who was an employee of the Hospital) and with telephone and other services necessary to operate as the administrator of the Hospital. The office provided to Mr. Brown was the office used by the Hospital administrator. Other then Mr. Brown's education, Mr. Brown did not have any substantial investment in his position with the Hospital. Capital investment necessary for Mr. Brown to carry out his duties was provided by the Hospital. Profit and Loss Potential. In light of the fact that Mr. Brown was guaranteed payment for his services and the lack of investment and expenses Mr. Brown was required to provide, there was no reasonable potential Mr. Brown would incur a loss. Mr. Brown operated as an individual. Offer of Services to the General Public. The Consulting Contracts prohibited Mr. Brown from providing his services to others in "Northwest Florida." Mr. Brown was, therefore, free to perform services elsewhere. During the term of the Consulting Contracts, Mr. Brown did perform services for other companies located outside of Florida. Article X of the Consulting Contracts provided, in pertinent part, the following: . . . . Consultant further agrees that he shall not participate, directly or indirectly, individually or as a partner, shareholder, employee, agent, consultant, officer, director or otherwise, in any other business where such participation will in any manner interfere (as reasonably determined by the Board of Trustees and Consultant) with the business of the Hospital or which ultimately, in the final opinion of the Board of Trustees, could result in the integrity of the Hospital being subject to doubt. Right to Terminate Mr. Brown and Mr. Brown's Right to Quit. Pursuant to the Consulting Contracts, the Hospital had the right to terminate Mr. Brown's services for "good cause" as determined by majority vote of the Board of Trustees and "upon sixty (60) calendar days written notice of termination to the Consultant." The Hospital was required, however, to pay Mr. Brown for four months of service. The Hospital also had the right to terminate Mr. Brown's services if he were convicted of a felony, required to take treatment for drug or alcohol abuse, engaged in activity harmful to the reputation of the Hospital or failed to comply with the terms of the Consulting Contract. Mr. Brown was authorized by the Consulting Contracts to terminate his services upon sixty days written notice. The Consulting Contracts provide that the agreement terminated upon the death of Mr. Brown. Weighted Consideration of the Facts. Several of the facts in this case indicate that Mr. Brown was an independent contractor of the Hospital and several of the facts indicate that he was an employee. Based upon a weighted consideration of the facts in this case, it is concluded that Mr. Brown operated as an independent contractor, and not an employee, for the Hospital.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, enter a Final Order concluding that J. Glenn Brown, Jr., was not a compulsory member of the Florida retirement system pursuant to Section 121.051, Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of November, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of November, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-1635 The parties have submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. The Hospital's Proposed Findings of Fact Accepted in 1. Accepted in 2 and hereby accepted. Accepted in 7-8. Accepted in 28. Accepted in 10. See 11-13 and 38-39. The First Contract expired January 31, 1991, and not January 31, 1992. Accepted in 16 and 24. Accepted in 35. Accepted in 54 and hereby accepted. The last sentence is not relevant. 9 Accepted in 26, 42-43, 52, 57 and 63. Hereby accepted. Accepted in 68. Accepted in 48. Accepted in 50. Accepted in 30-31. Accepted in 3. The Division's Proposed Findings of Fact Accepted in 4-6. Accepted in 7. Accepted in 9 and hereby accepted. 4 Accepted in 10,53-54, 58-59 and 62. Accepted in 28. Accepted in 23. Accepted in 23 and 69. The first sentence is not relevant. 8 Accepted in 41-42, 44, 47, 52-53 and 63. See 41-43 and hereby accepted. Although Ms. Ward did testify consistent with this finding of fact, the testimony was not sufficiently detailed to conclude that Mr. Brown and Mr. Mason provided services in exactly the same manner. Accepted in 61. 12 Accepted in 11-14, 38-39 and 55. Accepted in 14, 25 and 66. Accepted in 23. Accepted in 60-61. See 73. See 53-62. The conclusion on page 10 is not supported by the weight of the evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Gerald Holley, Esquire Post Office Box 268 Chipley, Florida 32428 William S. Howell, Jr., Esquire Post Office Box 187 Chipley, Florida 32428 Stanley M. Danek, Esquire Division of Retirement Department of Management Services 2639 North Monroe Street, Building C Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 A. J. McMullian, III, Director Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Sylvan Strickland, Esquire Department of Management Services Knight Building, Suite 309 Koger Executive Center 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, as well as the facts stipulated to by the parties, the following relevant facts are found: Petitioner Frank Robert Gentile was born in New York on August 14, 1942, and is a citizen of this country. He attended St. John's Preparatory School in New York from 1956 through 1960, and received his undergraduate degree from Seton Hall University in New Jersey in 1964. His medical degree was received from the University of Bolgona, Bolgona, Italy, in 1972. In 1973, petitioner's credentials were evaluated by the Educational Commission for Foreign Medical Graduates and he received a passing grade on the examination administered by that organization. Between July, 1972 and June, 1973, petitioner trained as a clinical clerk at Maimonides Medical Center and Wyckoff Heights Hospital in Brooklyn, New York. From July, 1973 through January, 1974, petitioner completed his medical externship at the Veteran's Administration Hospital in Brooklyn, New York. From January, 1974 through January, 1975, petitioner completed an approved internship at Jersey Shore Medical Center in Neptune, New Jersey. From July, 1975 through June, 1978, petitioner completed his residency at Methodist Hospital in Brooklyn, New York. Petitioner received a passing grade in the examination administered by the Federation of State Medical Boards of the United States, Inc. (FLEX) in September of 1977. From July, 1978 through June, 1979, petitioner trained as a Hematology Fellow I at Cabrini Medical Center, New York, New York. From July, 1979 through June, 1980, petitioner trained as a Hematology Fellow II at Downstate Medical Center-Kings County Hospital Center in Brooklyn, New York. From July, 1980 through June, 1981, petitioner trained as a Medical Oncology Fellow at Downstate Medical Center-Kings County Hospital Center in Brooklyn, New York. Petitioner has been continuously and actively engaged in the practice of medicine, specializing in the fields of hematology and oncology, from June, 1981 to the present. Petitioner currently holds licenses to practice medicine in the states of New York and North Carolina. These licenses are in good standing, have never been revoked or suspended and petitioner is not under investigation in either state. From July, 1981 through January, 1982, petitioner was employed by Memorial Hospital of Alamance County, Burlington, North Carolina, as a hematologist and oncologist. He considered this employment to be temporary and so informed the Chief of Staff. While at Memorial Hospital, petitioner treated patients, did consultations and trained the oncology nurse. During the first part of his work there, his patients and charts were reviewed by a panel of doctors. He never received any complaints from his patients or from his fellow physicians concerning his medical skills. The Medical Staff Bylaws required a six-month review. In January, 1982, petitioner was informed by the Chief of Medicine that the review board had met, that petitioner's charts were not complete enough and that the board felt that petitioner should immediately resign from the Hospital. When petitioner inquired as to the problems the board found with respect to his charts, he was not given a specific answer. Petitioner received no prior warning and he considered his charts acceptable. Rather than contesting the charges against him, petitioner resigned from Memorial Hospital inasmuch as he had no intention of remaining there on a permanent basis. On March 17, 1982, petitioner applied to the Florida Board of Medical Examiners for licensure by endorsement pursuant to Section 458.313, Florida Statutes (1981). His application was complete in all respects and was accompanied by the required application fee. During the application process, petitioner was requested to furnish additional information as to what he was doing from June, 1981 to the present. He responded that he had finished his training near the end of June and then had been trying to find a place to start a private practice. He further explained that he took over a doctor's practice while that doctor was on vacation and that he had worked in the emergency rooms in the North Carolina area. No mention was made by respondent of his employment with the Memorial Hospital of Alamance County. Upon a standard inquiry to the North Carolina State Board of Medical Examiners, the respondent board learned of petitioner's affiliation with the Memorial Hospital of Alamance County. That Hospital was requested to complete a form regarding petitioner. The form was completed by "Susan Denault, Assistant Administrator," and was returned to the respondent and placed in petitioner's application file. To the question "Does he perform competently?" the answer "Questionable" appears on the form. To the question "Have any restrictions ever been placed on him beyond the original period of probation?" the following answer appears: On January 18, 1982, the Department of Medicine reviewed the work of Dr. Frank R. Gentile acting in accordance with the Medical Staff Bylaws, Rules and Regula- tions which require a six-months review. At that meeting the Department of Medicine decided the work of Dr. Frank R. Gentile had not been up to the standards expected by the department, and was not in accordance with that standard that should be appropriate for practice in the Memorial Hospital of Alamance County. Before further action could be taken, Dr. Frank R. Gentile voluntarily resigned his membership and clinical privileges to the Medical Staff of Memorial Hospital of Alamance County, Inc. Dorothy Faircloth, the Executive Director of the Florida Board of Medical Examiners, in response to petitioner's inquiry as to the status of his application, informed petitioner that the Board had received the form from the Memorial Hospital of Alamance County and related the contents to him. She advised petitioner that the normal procedure of her office was to request further information from an institution providing such information and also to request the applicant to provide a written response to such a report. However, petitioner indicated that he wished to personally address the Board on this matter at its upcoming Board meeting. Petitioner did appear at the Board meeting but felt that the Memorial Hospital matter was not fully addressed by the Board and that he was not given the opportunity to speak to the Board on that matter. By Order dated June 24, 1982, the Board of Medical Examiners denied petitioner's application for licensure by endorsement, finding that The Petitioner has not demonstrated to the Board that he is capable of safely engaging in the practice of medicine with reasonable skill and safety to his patients based upon his voluntary resignation of his membership and clinical privileges at Memorial Hospital of Alamance County, Inc., Burlington, North Carolina, just prior to disciplinary action taken by the hospital. Based on this finding, the Board concluded that petitioner had not demonstrated that he meets the statutory requirements of Sections 458.313 and 458.331(3), Florida Statutes.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited above, it is RECOMMENDED that petitioner's application for licensure by endorsement be GRANTED. Respectfully submitted and entered this 17th day of January, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of January, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Edward P. de la Parte, Jr., Esquire de la Parte & Gilbert 705 East Kennedy Boulevard Tampa, Florida 33602 Chris D. Rolle, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs Suite 1602, Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Dorothy Faircloth Executive Director Board of Medical Examiners 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Fred Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS FRANK ROBERT GENTILE, M.D. Petitioner, vs. DOAH CASE NO. 82-1994 DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION and BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS, Respondent. /
The Issue Whether Respondent violated Sections 456.072(1)(k) and 464.204(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2001), and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Effective July 1, 1997, Petitioner is the state agency charged with regulating the responsibility for regulation and discipline of the nursing practice within the State of Florida. Respondent is a certified nursing assistant (CNA) holding Florida nursing certificate number CX 0993266675590. In December 2001, Respondent was employed as a CNA at Beverly Health Care, now known as Seacrest Health Care of Largo. Patient F.K. was a dementia patient in her advanced years and was not coherent or responsive. She was a total care patient, which required staff to perform all activities of daily living for her, such as mouth care, showers, feeding, dressing, bathing, and getting her into and out of bed. Patient F.K. did not speak, but did have a tendency to hum loudly and continuously. On December 20, 2001, Respondent was in Patient F.K.'s room following Patient F.K.'s return from lunch. Respondent called another CNA, Sheleta Cunningham-Talley, into Patient F.K.'s room, and Respondent engaged her in conversation. At that time, Patient F.K. was humming, as she often did. Respondent said to Talley, "watch how I shut this bitch up" and then proceeded to strike Patient F.K. on the face and throat. Patient F.K.'s face and neck turned red, and she became visibly upset after being struck. Beverly Health Care has a policy that residents have a right not to be physically abused. CNAs are under a legal or statutory duty not to hit or abuse patients. Striking a patient in the face and throat is a violation of that duty to not physically abuse a patient. Agnes Kelly is a registered nurse who was employed at Beverly Health Care during Respondent's employment there. Kelly has practiced as a registered nurse since 1994. She was a weekend supervisor at Beverly Health Care and supervised approximately 25 nursing employees which included a number of CNAs. Kelly has supervised nursing staff and CNAs for approximately nine years, and, as such, is familiar with the duties and responsibilities of CNAs. It is her opinion that Respondent violated her duty not to physically abuse a patient. Based on the foregoing, the evidence is clear and convincing that Respondent violated Sections 456.072(1)(k) and 464.204(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2001), by intentionally violating the statutory and legal obligation of CNAs to not physically abuse or hit a patient.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner issue a final order finding Respondent guilty of violating Sections 456.072(1)(k) and 464.204(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2001), and revoking Respondent's certification and requiring Respondent to pay the costs of investigation and prosecution of this matter. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of July, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of July, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Kim M. Kluck, Esquire Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-65 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3265 Pearla M. Mixon 4365 Tuna Drive, Southeast St. Petersburg, Florida 33705 Dan Coble, R.N., Ph.D., C.N.A.A. C., B.C. Executive Director Board of Nursing Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3252 R. S. Power, Agency Clerk Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 William W. Large, General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701
