The Issue The issues in this case are whether the statement contained in Respondent's letter dated September 9, 1997 (1997 Letter), establishing a $24.00 payment for hospital outpatient services billed as revenue code 451 constitutes a rule as defined by Subsection 120.52(15), Florida Statutes (2010),1 and, if so, whether Respondent violated Subsection 120.54(1), Florida Statutes, by not adopting the statement in accordance with applicable rulemaking procedures.
Findings Of Fact AHCA is the state agency responsible for the administration of the Florida Medicaid Program. § 409.902, Fla. Stat. Petitioners are acute care hospitals that are and were enrolled as Medicaid providers of outpatient services in Florida, at all times relevant to this proceeding. On September 9, 1997, AHCA issued a letter to hospital administrators, which provided the following: This letter is to inform you that Medicaid coverage for hospital emergency room screening and examination services is now in effect. Hospitals will be reimbursed a $24.00 flat fee for providing these services to Medipass and Medicaid fee-for-service recipients who do not require further treatment beyond the screening and examination services. This policy is retroactive to July 1, 1996. The letter further provides that the $24.00 reimbursement would be billed under the revenue code 451. The statement in the letter applies to hospitals which are Medicaid providers and, therefore, is a statement of general applicability. The statement meets the definition of a rule. AHCA concedes that the statement, which provides "payment of a $24 rate for Medicaid Hospital Outpatient Services billed under Revenue Code 451, constitutes a rule under s. 120.52(16), Fla. Stat." AHCA concedes that the statement has not been adopted as a rule by the rule adoption procedures provided in Section 120.54, Florida Statutes. AHCA has discontinued all reliance on the challenged statement.
The Issue Whether Respondent should recoup Medicaid payments made to Petitioner for health care services provided to eight patients.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Indian River Memorial Hospital, Inc., (Hospital), has contracted with Respondent, Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA), to provide services to Medicaid patients. The parties have agreed that there is a dispute for Medicaid reimbursement for goods and services provided to eight patients: S.G., J.D., R.J., C.A., G.M., S.S., M.P., and C.T. The Agency has paid the Hospital for the services rendered to these eight patients and seeks to recoup the payment based on a retrospective review by a peer review organization, Keystone Peer Review Organization (KePro). The Agency claims that either the admission or a portion of the length-of-stay for the eight patients was medically unnecessary. Services were provided to C.T. in 1994 and to the remainder of the patients at issue in 1995. Payment for Medicaid services is on a per diem basis. The rate for 1994 is $473.22 per day, and the rate for 1995 is $752.14. The Agency contracted with KePro to do a review of the Medicaid payments to the Hospital. KePro employs nurses to review the patient files based on criteria on discharge screens. If the services meet the criteria, there is no further review and the payment is approved. If the nurse determines that the services do not meet the criteria on the discharge screens, the patient's files are reviewed by a board certified physician, who in this case would be a psychiatrist. If the physician determines that the services are not medically necessary, a letter is sent to the Medicaid provider, giving the provider an opportunity to submit additional information. Additional information submitted by the provider is reviewed by a board certified physician. If the doctor concludes that the services are still medically unnecessary, the provider is notified that that services do not qualify for reimbursement and the provider may ask for a reconsideration of the denial. If the provider seeks reconsideration, the file is reviewed by a physician, and the provider has an opportunity to be present during the review. If the physician determines that the services are medically unnecessary, KePro sends a letter to the Agency stating the reasons for denial. The denial letters that KePro sends to the Agency are reviewed by the Medical Director of KePro, who is not a psychiatrist. Dr. John Sullenberger, the Agency's Medicaid physician, reviews the KePro denial letters sent to the Agency, and 99.9 percent of the time he agrees with the findings of KePro regarding whether the services were medically necessary. Dr. Sullenberger does not review the patient's charts when he does this review. The Agency sends a recoupment letter to the Medicaid provider requesting repayment for services provided. Patient S.G., a 12 year-old boy, was being treated pursuant to the Baker Act. He was admitted to the Hospital on March 8, 1995, and discharged on March 25, 1995. The Agency denied Medicaid reimbursement for the admission and the entire length-of-stay for S.G. based on KePro's determination that it was not medically necessary for the services to S.G. to be rendered in an acute care setting because the patient was neither suicidal nor homicidal. Three to five days prior to his admission to the Hospital, S.G. had attempted to stab his father. He also had further violent episodes, including jumping his father from behind and choking him and pulling knives on his parents. S.G. had a history of attention deficit and hyperactive disorder. He had been using multiple substances, such as alcohol, LSD, cocaine, and marijuana, prior to his admission. His behavior was a clear reference that he was suffering from a psychosis. A psychosis is a significant inability to understand what is reality, including delusions of false beliefs, hallucinations, hearing and seeing things which do not exist, and ways of thinking that are bizarre. Psychosis is a reason to admit a patient, particularly combined with substance abuse. S.G.'s treating psychiatrist noted that S.G. had tangentiality, which means that his thoughts did not stay together. He did not have a connection between thoughts, which is a sign of a psychosis. The chart demonstrated that S.G. had disorder thinking, which includes the possibility of a psychosis. There was also a reference in the charts to organic mental disturbance which could infer brain damage as the cause for the mental disturbance. Two days after admission, there was an issue of possible drug withdrawal because S.G. was agitated and anxious and showed other symptoms. Drug withdrawal, psychosis, and a demonstration of overt violence require a stay in an acute care facility. There was some indication that S.G. was suicidal. While in the Hospital he was placed under close observation, which is a schedule of 15-minute checks to determine if the patient was physically out of harm's way. S.G. was started on an antidepressant, Wellbutrin, because the treating physician thought S.G. was becoming increasingly depressed and was having trouble organizing his thoughts. Antidepressants, as contrasted to a medication such as an antibiotic, may take a minimum of two to three weeks before the patient will benefit from the full effect of the drug. It is difficult to stabilize the dosage for an antidepressant on an outpatient basis. S.G. was taking Ritalin, which is commonly used for children with attention deficit, hyperactivity disorders. During his stay at the Hospital, S.G. was engaging in strange behavior, including absence seizures. On March 16, 1995, he was still lunging and threatening harm. On March 20, 1995, he was still unstable and at risk. The dosage of Wellbutrin was increased. On March 21 and 22, 1995, S.G. was still threatening and confused. S.G. was discharged on March 25, 1995. The admission and length-of-stay for S.G. were medically necessary. Patient J.D. was a 16 year-old boy who was admitted to the Hospital on March 7, 1995, and discharged on March 14, 1995. The Agency denied the admission and entire length-of-stay based on KePro's determination that the patient was not actively suicidal or psychotic and services could have been rendered in a less acute setting. J.D. was admitted from a partial hospitalization program pursuant to the Baker Act because he was observed by a health care professional banging his head against the wall and throwing himself on the floor. He had a history of depression and out-of-control behavior, including being a danger to himself and running away. At the time of his admission, he was taking Prozac. Banging his head against the wall can mean that the patient is psychotic, can cause brain damage, and can be dangerous if the cause of the behavior is unknown. Admission to the Hospital was justified because the patient was extremely agitated and self abusive, requiring restraints and medication to decrease his agitation and self abusiveness. One of the tests administered during his hospital stay indicated that J.D. was a moderate risk for suicidal behavior. During his hospital stay, it was discovered that J.D. had threatened to kill himself while at school. He had been in a partial treatment program during the day, but that environment was not working. There was violence in the home, and J.D. was becoming overtly depressed. During his stay at the Hospital, J.D. was placed on close observation with 15-minute checks. His dosage of Prozac was increased. The admission and length-of-stay for J.D. were medically necessary. R.J., a 10 year-old male, was admitted to the Hospital on January 1, 1995, and discharged on February 9, 1995. The Agency denied Medicaid reimbursement based on a determination by KePro that the treatment in an acute care facility was not medically necessary because R.J. was not psychotic, not suicidal, and not a threat to others; thus treatment could have been provided in an alternate setting. R.J. had been referred by a health care professional at Horizon Center, an outpatient center, because of progressive deterioration over the previous fourteen months despite outpatient treatment. His deterioration included anger with temper outbursts, uncontrollable behavior at school, failing grades, sadness, depressed mood, extreme anxiety, extensive worrying and a fear of his grandmother. R.J. also suffered from encopresis, a bowel incontinence. He was agitated, lacked energy, neglected his hygiene, experienced crying spells, and had difficulty concentrating. R.J. needed to be admitted for an evaluation to rule out a paranoid psychosis. It was necessary to do a 24-hour EEG as opposed to a 45-minute EEG. In order to do a 24-hour EEG, the patient is typically placed in an acute care facility. The EEG showed abnormal discharge in the brain, which could be contributing to a psychiatric illness. At school R.J. had smeared feces on the walls, behavior that could be seen in psychotic persons. There was evidence that he had been hitting and throwing his stepbrother and 3 year-old brother. He was fearful of his grandmother and, based on his family history, there was reason to fear her. R.J. was placed on Buspar, a medication which generally takes two weeks to take effect. Contrary to the Agency's determination, R.J. was disorganized. He was also violent in terms of threatening danger and extreme anger. The admission and length-of-stay for R.J. at the Hospital were medically necessary. Patient C.A., a 9 year-old male, was admitted to the Hospital on June 1, 1995, and discharged on June 12, 1995. The Agency disallowed one day of the length-of-stay based on a determination by KePro that the services provided on June 11, 1995, could have been provided in a less restrictive setting. C.A. was admitted for violent and disruptive behavior. He also had an attention deficit, hyperactivity disorder and was taking Lithium and Depakote. These medications are used for patients who experience serious mood swings and abrupt changes in mood, going from depression to anger to euphoria. To be effective, medicating with Lithium and Depakote requires that the blood levels of the patient be monitored and the dosage titrated according to blood level. C.A. also was given Wellbutrin during his hospital stay. On June 11, 1995, C.A. was given an eight-hour pass to leave the hospital in the care of his mother. The physician's orders indicated that the pass was to determine how well C.A. did in a less restrictive setting. He returned to the Hospital without incident. He was discharged the next day to his mother. The treatment on June 11, 1995, could have been provided in an environment other than an acute facility; thus the stay on June 11, 1995, was not medically necessary for Medicaid reimbursement purposes. Patient G.M., an 11 year-old male with a history of being physically and sexually abused by his parents, was admitted to the Hospital on March 21, 1995, and was discharged on April 3, 1995. The Agency denied Medicaid reimbursement for inpatient hospital treatment from March 28 to April 3, 1995, based on KePro's determination that the length of hospital stay exceeded health care needs at an inpatient level and could have been provided in a less acute setting. At the time of admission, G.M. had suicidal ideation. His school had reported that G.M. had mutilated himself with a pencil, banged himself on the knuckles, and told the school nurse that he wanted to die. Prior to admission, G.M. had been taking Ritalin. His treating physician took G.M. off the Ritalin so that she could assess his condition and start another medication after a base-line period. The doctor prescribed Clonidine for G.M. Clonidine is a drug used in children to control reckless, agressive and angry behavior. Clonidine must be titrated in order to establish the correct dosage for the patient. During his hospital stay, G.M. was yelling and threatening staff. He was placed in locked seclusion, where he began hitting the wall. G.M. was put in a papoose, which is similar to a straitjacket. The papoose is used when there is no other way to control the patient. The patient cannot use his arms or legs while in a papoose. This type of behavior and confinement was occurring as late as March 31, 1995. G.M. was given a pass to go to his grandparents on April 2, 1995. He did well during his pass, and was discharged on April 3, 1995. Treatment in an acute facility was medically necessary through April 1, 1995. Treatment on April 2, 1995, could have been provided in a less acute setting. Patient S.S., a 5 year-old male, was admitted to the Hospital on March 9, 1995, and was discharged on April 3, 1995. The Agency denied Medicaid reimbursement for the admission and entire length of his hospital stay based on a determination by KePro that S.S. was not psychotic or an immediate danger to himself or others and the evaluation and treatment could have been rendered in a less acute setting. Prior to admission to the Hospital, S.S. was threatening suicide, ran into a chalk board at school, scratched his arms until they bled, and showed aggressive intent toward his sister, saying that he would kill her with a saw. S.S.'s condition had been deteriorating for approximately three months before his admission. At the time of admission, he had been suicidal, hyperactive, restless, and experiencing hallucinations. The hallucinations imply a psychosis. S.S. was put on Trofanil, an antidepressant which needs to be titrated. The patient's blood level had to be monitored while taking this drug. During his hospital stay, S.S. was on close observation. All objects which he could use to harm himself were removed from his possession. After he ate his meals, the hospital staff would immediately remove all eating utensils. On March 28, 1995, S.S. threatened to kill himself and became self-abusive. His blood level on March 31, 1995, was sub-therapeutic, and his medication dosage was increased. On April 1, 1995, S.S. had a temper tantrum. The admission and length-of-stay for the treatment of S.S. were medically necessary. Patient M.P., a 10 year-old male, was admitted to the Hospital on April 27, 1995, and was discharged on May 6, 1995. The Agency denied Medicaid reimbursement for the admission and entire length-of-stay based on a determination by KePro that the patient functions on an eighteen to twenty-four month level but is not psychotic and the treatment could have been provided in a less acute setting. M.P.'s IQ is between 44 and 51. He was diagnosed with a pervasive development disorder, which is a serious lack of development attributed to significant brain damage. His condition had deteriorated in the six months prior to his admission. He had episodes of inappropriate laughter, fits of anger, hit his head, hit windows, and put his arm in contact with the broken glass through the window. At the time of his admission, he had a seizure disorder. An EEG and an MRI needed to be performed on M.P. in order to evaluate his condition. M.P. had to have a regular EEG, a 24-hour EEG, and a neurological examination. The patient was aggressive, restless, and uncooperative. In order for the MRI to be performed, M.P. had to be anesthetized. The admission and length-of-stay for M.P. were medically necessary. Patient C.T., a 34 year-old female, was admitted to the Hospital on November 11, 1994, and was discharged on November 26, 1994. The Agency denied the treatment from November 17, 1994, to November 26, 1994, based on a determination by a peer review organization that the patient was stable by November 17, 1994, and psychiatric follow-up could have been performed in an outpatient setting. C.T. was admitted for kidney stones. She did pass the kidney stones but continued to have severe pain. Her doctor asked for a psychiatric consult. The psychiatrist diagnosed C.T. as having a personality disorder, chronic psychogenic pain disorder, and an eating disorder. Her depressive disorder exacerbated pain. C.T. had been given narcotics for the pain associated with the kidney stones. In order to assess her mental status, the physicians needed to taper the dosage of Demerol which she had been receiving. She was started on Sinequan, which is an anti-depressant given to alleviate the psychological condition and to help with the physical complaints. C.T. was later put on Vicodin, an oral narcotic, which seemed to bring the pain under control. The drugs used could cause a drop in blood pressure; therefore, they had to be titrated slowly. Her treating physician was trying to find an appropriate anti-depressant, while weaning the patient from intramuscular narcotics. On November 17, 1994, C.T. left her room and went to the hospital lobby, where she was found by nursing staff. C.T. was crying and saying that she was in pain and wanted to die. During her hospital stay, C.T. was in much distress; she would scream out that she was in pain. On November 18, 1994, she was found crying on the floor of the hospital chapel and had to be returned to her room. It was the opinion of Dr. Bernard Frankel, an expert retained by the Hospital, that C.T. probably could have been discharged a day earlier. The hospital stay for C.T. from November 17, 1994, to November 25, 1994, was medically necessary. The last day of her stay was not medically necessary.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered requiring Indian River Memorial Hospital, Inc., to pay to the Agency $752.14 for one day of service provided to G.M., $752.14 for one day of service provided to C.A., and $473.22 for one day of service provided to C.T. and finding that the Hospital is not liable for payment for any of the other services at issue in this proceeding. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of November, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of November, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas Falkinburg, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building 3 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 John D. Buchanan, Jr., Esquire Henry, Buchanan, Hudson, Suber & Williams, P.A. 117 South Gadsden Street Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Sam Power, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building 3 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Paul J. Martin, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building 3 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308
Findings Of Fact The facts, as stipulated to by the parties and as set forth above, are hereby adopted.
The Issue Whether respondent's license to practice medicine should be disciplined on grounds that: (1) he engaged in gross or repeated malpractice or failed to practice medicine with the required level of care, skill, and treatment, and (2) he is unable to practice medicine with the requisite skill and safety by reason of illness or as a result of a mental or physical condition.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence presented at hearing, the following facts are determined: Respondent is an 80-year-old physician licensed to practice medicine in Florida. He has been a general practitioner in the Miami area for over 40 years; during that time, he has earned the respect and esteem of the medical community. During the 1940s, he helped establish the first cancer clinic in Dade County; he is recognized as one of the community's early medical pioneers. He has never before been the subject of a disciplinary action for professional misconduct. (Testimony of Bishop, Boughton; R-2.) I. The Claresta Halloran Abortion On July 3, 1980, Ms. Claresta Halloran, age 35, visited respondent's office for a therapeutic abortion. She told respondent that her last menstrual period was "sometime in April." (P-3.) Respondent palpated her, examined her by use of a sounding instrument, and dilated her uterus. After determining that she was approximately 12 weeks pregnant, respondent attempted to abort the fetus by suction and curettage. Fearing that he had perforated Ms. Halloran's uterus, respondent had her transported to North Miami General Hospital for an exploratory laparotomy. Results of the exploratory surgery were negative; there was no evidence of perforation of the uterus or injury to the bowel. (Testimony of Boughton; P-3.) William Wickman, M.D., performed the exploratory surgery on Ms. Halloran at the hospital. His bimanual examination revealed an enlarged uterus, "the size of approximately [a] 12 week pregnancy." (Testimony of Boughton; P-3.) Two days after the surgery, Ms. Halloran passed a macerated fetus which, after pathological examination, was estimated to be of 17 weeks' gestation. Her convalescence from surgery was otherwise uneventful and she was discharged from the hospital the next day, July 6, 1980. (Testimony of Boughton; P-3.) Absent specialized training, abortions "from below," that is, by dilating the cervix and removing the contents of the uterus, should not be performed on pregnancies which have progressed beyond 12-weeks. This is because, after 12 weeks, the fetus's bones have developed calcium and sharp, razor-like edges which can perforate the uterus and endanger the health and safety of the patient. (Testimony of Rudolph.) Respondent has not received specialized training which would enable him to safely use the "from below" method on pregnancies beyond 12 weeks. However, his examination of Ms. Halloran led him to believe she had been pregnant for 12 weeks. In reaching that conclusion, he did not rely solely on the date of the patient's last menstrual period. His palpation and examination of the patient's uterus confirmed that the pregnancy was approximately 12 weeks. Dr. Wickman's subsequent examination of the patient at the hospital confirmed that the patient's uterus indicated an approximate 12-week pregnancy. (Testimony of Rudolph, Boughton; P-3.) There are other more advanced methods, such as sonography, which enable one to more accurately determine the gestational age of a fetus. However, the evidence does not support a finding that respondent's failure to use such methods constitutes malpractice or a failure to practice medicine with that level of care, skill, and treatment which is recognized by a reasonably prudent similar physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances. (Testimony of Rudolph.) Respondent admits that he erred in his diagnosis of the stage of Ms. Halloran's pregnancy. However, his diagnosis was not shown to have been unjustified or unreasonable in light of the facts known to him at the time. Both the date of the patient's last menstrual period and manual examination of the uterus supported a determination that the pregnancy was approximately 12 weeks. The "from below" abortion procedure which respondent utilized is only unacceptable for use on pregnancies in excess of 12 weeks. In short, respondent's treatment of the patient was consistent with his diagnosis. While the diagnosis was in error -- the fetus was of 17 weeks' gestation, not 12 weeks -- other physicians, under similar circumstances, would likely have made the same error. (Testimony of Boughton; P-3.) II. The Wilhemina Evans Abortion On August 5, 1980, Ms. Wilhemina Evans, age 18, visited respondent's office for a therapeutic abortion. She told respondent that her last menstrual period was at the end of April. He palpated her, placed a sounding instrument, and dilated her uterus. After concluding that she was at least 13 weeks pregnant; 2/ he attempted to abort the fetus "from below" by use of placental forceps and a curette. He thought the abortion had been successful and permitted the patient to, return home. (Testimony of Rudolph, Boughton; P-4.) The next day, the patient went to Jackson Memorial Hospital complaining of abdominal pain. Several minutes after arriving at the emergency room, she passed a 750-gram male still-born fetus. Subsequent pathological examination indicated that the fetus was of 24 weeks' gestation. (P-4.) Respondent failed, in several respects, to provide Ms. Evans with treatment which is recognized by a reasonably prudent similar physician as acceptable under similar circumstances. Without special training, the "from below" method of aborting the fetus should not have been used on a woman beyond 12 weeks pregnant. 3/ Moreover, if respondent was uncertain of the gestational age of the fetus, he should not have attempted to abort the fetus "from below" in an office setting. Despite the patient's obesity, respondent should have been able to determine the advanced gestational stage of the fetus. Finally, a reasonably prudent similar physician would have realized that the attempted abortion had been unsuccessful and would not have permitted the patient to immediately return home. Thus, it is concluded that respondent's treatment of Ms. Evans was inconsistent with acceptable medical practice. 4/ (Testimony of Rudolph.) III. Treatment of Skin Lesions of Bernice Riordan Since 1951, Bernice Riordan, age 68, has been a patient of respondent's. Over the years, he treated her for various ailments, including basal cell carcinomas and squamous cell carcinomas on her face and neck. He used different techniques to treat the carcinomas; electrocoagulation in 1955; electrodesiccation and silver nitrate in 1961, 1962, 1972, and 1976; bichloracetic acid in 1976; and 5-Fluorouracil in 1978. In April, 1961, respondent referred Ms. Riordan to a dermatologist for specialized treatment. In 1969, he referred her to Jackson Memorial Hospital for radiation therapy because of multiple lesions on her face. She was a difficult and eccentric patient; she continually resisted his efforts to refer her to specialists for treatment of her increasingly serious carcinomas. Finally, in 1980, he referred her to two specialists -- a plastic surgeon and another dermatologist. By 1980, the cancer of the skin on her face had destroyed the entire nose and perioral skin. (Testimony of Boughton; P-2.) The Department presented, by deposition, the testimony of Dr. Richard C. Childers, a dermatologist who had reviewed the patient records of Ms. Riordan. He graduated from medical school in 1969 and was licensed to practice medicine in Florida in 1971. Since 1974, he has engaged in the private practice of dermatology in Gainesville, Florida, with a clinical appointment at Shands Teaching Hospital. It was Dr. Childers' opinion that respondent should have referred Ms. Riordan, no later than 1959, to a specialist for treatment of recurring skin lesions. Dr. Childers also opined that respondent, on numerous occasions over the years, had used ineffective or inappropriate treatment techniques on Ms. Riordan's lesions. (P-2.) Dr. Childers' testimony is rejected as inadequate to establish that respondent failed to provide treatment to Ms. Riordan which is recognized by a reasonably prudent similar physician as being acceptable under similar circumstances. Dr. Childers is a specialist in dermatology, not a general practitioner. He practices in Gainesville, not Miami. When respondent applied many of the complained of treatment techniques to Ms. Riordan, Dr. Childers had not yet begun medical school. It would be patently unfair to measure treatment for carcinomas furnished by a general practitioner in 1961 by a specialist's with the standard of care applicable to general practitioners in the Miami area during the period in question. to establish an appropriate standard of care applicable to respondent's treatment of Ms. Riordan. (Testimony of Boughton; P-2.) IV. Respondent's Ability to Practice Medicine with Reasonable Safety to His Patients On April 27 and 30, 1981, a mental status examination was given psychiatrist's opinion, respondent's appearance, behavior, and overall thinking was intact; there was no evidence of psychosis. However, respondent's response was somewhat impaired. Dr. Bishop concluded that respondent suffers from of Bishop.) Respondent recognizes that his advanced age affects his ability to However, he believes that he is able to operate an office practice with reasonable skill and safety and without endangering his patients. He is willing his work. The practice of medicine is his avocation as well as his profession; it is the habit and pleasure of his life. (Testimony of Boughton.) interfere with his ability to practice medicine with reasonable skill and safety to his patients. The ability to remember facts is essential to a physician's patient's illness. (Testimony of Bishop.) However, the evidence is insufficient to demonstrate that respondent's his livelihood. The evidence on the extent which his impairment will affect his ability to practice is problematic. He is willing to submit to the supervision supervision of another physician, it is likely that he will be able to practice medicine with reasonable skill and safety to his patients. (Testimony of
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is That respondent's license to practice medicine be suspended until respondent submits to the Board an acceptable proposal which ensures that his the Board approves the proposal, respondent should be placed on a probationary status and his practice restricted to exclude the performance of surgery and DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 20th day of November, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. L. CALEEN, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of November, 1981.
The Issue With regard to Count I of the Administrative Complaint, the issue is whether the Respondent possessed a controlled substance for other than a legitimate purpose. The Respondent admits possession; therefore, the issue is whether she possessed the controlled substance for legitimate purposes. Count II alleges 47 specific instances in which the Respondent violated hospital policy by failing to account for a controlled substance by properly recording withdrawals and administrations of the controlled substance. The petitioner alleges that the Respondent made false reports or a record which she knew was false and, by the aforesaid conduct, failed to conform to minimal standards of acceptable and prevailing nursing practices. With regard to Count II, both factual and legal issues are controverted. The Petitioner submitted post hearing proposed findings of fact in the form of a proposed recommended order. To the extent the proposed findings of fact have not been included in the factual findings in this order, they are specifically rejected as being irrelevant, not being based upon the most credible evidence, or not being a finding of fact.
Findings Of Fact Count I The Respondent is a licensed registered nurse and duly certified registered nurse anesthetist (CRNA) holding license number 40895-A. At all times relating to the charges, the Respondent was so licensed and was employed as a CRNA at Bayfront Medical Center (Bayfront), a full-service hospital located in St. Petersburg, Florida. A CRNA essentially performs the acts of an anesthesiologist, inducing and maintaining in surgical patients a physical state which is appropriate for the particular surgical procedure to be performed through the administration of drugs to the patient. On March 4, 1981, the Respondent had been working in the operating room at Bayfront during her regular shift and had just completed a surgical procedure at 12:00 noon, when at approximately 1:00 p.m. she was called to the administrative offices. She changed from her operating room clothes, took off her warm-up operating room jacket, and put on a long lab coat. The Respondent proceeded to the administrative offices, where she remained until she accompanied Donna Roberts, Manager, Surgical Services, back to Respondent's locker, where a consent search was conducted by Roberts. Roberts' search revealed an ampule which was labeled Sublimaze, a trade name for the controlled substance fentanyl, in the pocket of Respondent's lab coat, which was in the Respondent's locker in the dressing room for female surgical staff at Bay front. Said locker room is located some 25 to 30 feet from the operating rooms. The record reveals that CRNAs and anesthesiologists at Bayfront checked out medications at the beginning of their shifts at approximately 7:00 a.m. and retained these medications throughout the day, returning the remaining medications at the end of the day at approximately 5:00 to 6:00 p.m. The record reveals that CRNAs and anesthesiologists have breaks, eat lunch, and are at the hospital when not involved in surgery. Count II The following procedures were in effect and followed by staff at Bayfront at the time involved in the Administrative Complaint. Although these procedures may not comport with the legal requirements, they were at that time and place the minimal acceptable standards of conduct accepted by the hospital administration. CRNAs and anesthesiologists drew their medications for the day early in the morning from the recovery room nurses in the recovery room. CRNAs and anesthesiologists on the hospital staff frequently drew medications for unknown patients, indicating type of surgery or in some instances giving the patient's name as John Smith. There was no requirement for CRNAs or anesthesiologists to initial narcotics records showing receipt of medications drawn from the recovery room nurse, who was charged with issuing these controlled substances. The names of patients were not required to be entered on the narcotics record. It was not uncommon for CRNAs and anesthesiologists on the hospital staff to be changed from one patient to another prior to the commencement of surgery. It was also not uncommon for one CRNA to relieve another CRNA during a surgical procedure and to finish the procedure. CRNAs and anesthesiologists were not required to show wastage. They used the quantity of drugs necessary during a surgical procedure, and if they ran out they had the circulating nurse in the operating room obtain additional medications from the recovery room nurse. Members of the hospital staff and other anesthesiologists turned in excess medication at the end of the day. Sublimaze or fentanyl was introduced as an anesthetic agent and for many years was treated much like sodium pentathol, which is not controlled. Sublimaze or fentanyl is a controlled narcotic substance. Some of the CRNAs employed at Bayfront use few, if any, controlled substances in their practice. However, many of the anesthesiologists use fentanyl regularly. The Respondent appears to have been the only CRNA who regularly used Sublimaze or fentanyl in her practice. The following findings regarding the lettered paragraphs of the Administrative Complaint are summarized below by date: On 02/02/81, the Respondent had signed out to her two ampules of Sublimaze for the patient Forman. She did not work on Forman. She did work on the patients Kilmark and Whitehead. She administered 3.5 cc (two ampules) of Sublimaze to Kilmark and 4 cc (two ampules) of Sublimaze to Whitehead. On 02/04/81, the Respondent had signed out to her ten ampules of Sublimaze for the patient Warren. She worked on Warren and administered 19 cc (ten ampules) of Sublimaze to him. On 02/06/81, the Respondent had signed out to her two ampules of Sublimaze for the patient Asaro, three ampules of Sublimaze for the patient Mastry, and three ampules of Sublimaze for an unknown patient. The records show that the Respondent administered 9 cc (five ampules) of Sublimaze to the patient McMullen. The Respondent did not turn in or account for three ampules of Sublimaze. On 02/09/81, the Respondent had signed out to her three ampules of Sublimaze for the patient Hull and four ampules of Sublimaze for an unknown patient. The records reveal she participated in three surgeries on this date on patients Braswell, Walker and Morgan. The patient Hill was assigned to another anesthesiologist. The record reveals that the Respondent administered 5 cc (three ampules) of Sublimaze to Braswell, 6 cc (three ampules) of Sublimaze to Walker, and none to Morgan. The Respondent failed to turn in or account for one ampule of Sublimaze. On 02/11/81, the Respondent had signed out to her five ampules of Sublimaze for the patient Brown and three ampules of Sublimaze for the patient Graham. She participated only in the surgery on Graham. It appears that CRNA Kolodzeij may have anesthetized Brown. The Respondent administered 6 cc (three ampules) to Graham. Kolodzeij drew no medications for her surgeries on the date in question. Kolodzeij relieved Respondent during the Graham surgery and finished the procedure. The Respondent left for Kolodzeij to use on Graham all the ampules of Sublimaze which she had checked out. On 02/13/81, the Respondent had signed out to her five ampules of Sublimaze for the patient Smith and five ampules of Sublimaze for an unknown patient. The records reveal no patient Smith. The Respondent's only surgery on this date was the patient Vielhauber. The record reveals that the Respondent administered 6 cc (three ampules) of Sublimaze to Vielhauber. She failed to turn in or account for seven ampules of Sublimaze. On 02/15/81, the Respondent had signed out to her four ampules of Sublimaze for the patient Jocalsky. She participated in no surgeries on the date in question. The Respondent did not turn in or account for four ampules of Sublimaze. On 02/16/81, the Respondent had signed out to her six ampules of Sublimaze for an unknown patient and four ampules of Sublimaze for the patient Smith. The records reveal that the Respondent participated in five surgeries on the date in question. She administered 4 cc (two ampules) of Sublimaze to the patient Harrison, 3.5 cc (two ampules) to the patient Stephens, 6 cc (three ampules) to the patient Miller, 6 cc (three ampules) to the patient Fuldaver, and none to the patient Flournay, for a total of ten ampules. The records reflect that CRNA Robbins participated in surgery on a patient Jacobson, for which Robbins drew no medications. On 02/18/81, the Respondent had signed out to her six ampules of Sublimaze for unnamed patients and five ampules of Sublimaze for the patient Nelson. She participated in two surgeries on the date in question. She administered 3.5 cc (two ampules) of Sublimaze to the patient Rothwell and 12 cc (six ampules) to Nelson. Ford, R.N., as recovery room nurse, received two ampules of Sublimaze on the date in question as turned in from an unrecorded source. These are credited against the ampules withdrawn by the Respondent. The Respondent failed to turn in or account for one ampule of Sublimaze. On 02/20/81, the Respondent had signed out to her four ampules of Sublimaze for the patient Baker. She administered 6 cc (three ampules) of Sublimaze to Baker. The Respondent failed to turn in or account for one ampule of Sublimaze. On 02/23/21, the Respondent had signed out to her ten ampules of Sublimaze for the patient Hicks. The record reflects that the Respondent administered 9 cc (five ampules) to Hicks. The Respondent failed to account for or turn in five ampules of Sublimaze. On 02/24/81, the Respondent had signed out to her two ampules of Sublimaze for the patient Jackson, two ampules of Sublimaze for the patient Marlin, and five ampules of Sublimaze for an unnamed patient. She participated in two surgeries on the date in question. She administered 5 cc (three ampules) of Sublimaze to Jackson and 3 cc (two ampules) of Sublimaze to the patient Lumpkin. The Respondent failed to account for or turn in four ampules of Sublimaze. On 02/27/81, the Respondent had signed out to her four ampules of Sublimaze for an obstetrical patient at 6:30 a.m. on the date in question and three ampules of Sublimaze for an obstetrical patient at 6:45 p.m. on the date in question. She participated in two surgeries on this date, one at 9:15 a.m. and one at 9:30 a.m. She administered 4 cc (two ampules) of Sublimaze to the patient Halstead at 11:30 a.m. The Respondent failed to turn in or account for three ampules of Sublimaze drawn at 6:45 p.m. On 03/04/81, the Respondent had signed out to her a total of eight ampules of Sublimaze for the patient Brown. She administered 5 cc (three ampules) to Brown. The Respondent failed to turn in or account for three ampules of Sublimaze. On or about March 4, 1981, the Respondent was discharged from Bayfront. The Administrative Complaint in this cause was issued on September 24, 1981. At the request of the Respondent, the final hearing in this matter was continued on three occasions: March, November and December 1982. Since the filing of the Administrative Complaint, the Respondent has been unable to work in her profession due to the unresolved charges against her. She has been employed as a secretary since 1981 and has suffered significant reduction in her income.
Recommendation Having found the Respondent guilty of one count of violating Section 464.018(1)(f), Florida Statutes, and considering that she has been effectively denied the right to practice for two years, it is recommended that the Respondent, Carolyn Wilder, be permitted to return to practice and placed on probation for one year. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 30th day of July, 1983, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of July, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: W. Douglas Moody, Jr., Esquire 119 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Robert W. Pope, Esquire 689 Central Avenue, 2nd Floor St. Petersburg, Florida 33701 Frederick Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Helen P. Keefe, Executive Director Board of Nursing Ill East Coastline Drive, Room 504 Jacksonville, Florida 32202
