Findings Of Fact The facts relevant to the charges here preferred are largely undisputed. In May 1978 Respondent's business address as reported by him to Petitioner was 2812 North 34th Street, Tampa, Florida. This address was visited by Petitioner's investigators on 23, 24, 25, and 30 May 1978. The building located at that address is owned and used by Scaglione Construction Company as its main office. There is no sign on the exterior of this building indicating a bail bondsman's office is located inside. While visiting the address, the investigators were advised that Respondent had no office there but Frank Puig did have a bail bond office in the building. Although there was some dispute regarding whether the investigators were shown Puig's office, or even allowed to go to the door of that office, whether they did or not is immaterial because Respondent readily admitted he had no files at this location and conducted no business therefrom. Again witnesses differed on whether there was a sign on the door of the office occupied by Puig. Whether there was a sign on that door reading "Frank Puig - Bail- bondsman" is irrelevant to the charge that Respondent had no sign designating his office. During the period in question, in fact, during most, if not all, of 1978, Respondent testified he was without power [of attorney] to write bonds. Exhibit 1 shows that three companies, Midland Insurance Company, Allied Fidelity Insurance Company, and Cotton Belt Insurance Company, Inc. all renewed Respondent's limited surety agency in October 1977 and all cancelled his limited surety agency 12-14-78. Respondent's testimony indicated that he was an agent only for Cotton Belt and that his power to write bonds had been withdrawn. According to Respondent's own testimony, he had no permanent office in which to keep his files and records and that these records were carried in his car and stored at his residence when not in his car. He was using Puig's telephone number as a place at which messages could be left for him. Respondent also testified that during 1978 he wrote no bonds and was only servicing existing accounts which preceded 1978.
The Issue The issue in the case is whether the allegations of the Administrative Complaints filed by the Petitioner against the Respondents are correct and if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is the state agency responsible for licensure and regulation of limited surety agents (bail bondsmen) operating in the State of Florida. The Respondents are individually licensed as limited surety agents in Florida and are officers and directors of "Big John Bail Bonds, Inc.," a bail bond agency. In November of 1999, Gustavo Porro contacted the Respondents regarding bail for Jessie James Bray, a friend of Mr. Porro's son. Mr. Porro did not know Mr. Bray. Based on the charges against Mr. Bray, four bonds were issued, two for $1,000 each and two for $250 each, for a total bond amount of $2,500. The $1,000 bonds were related to pending felony charges and the small bonds were related to pending misdemeanor charges. Mr. Porro signed a contingent promissory note indemnifying American Bankers Insurance Company for an amount up to $2,500 in the event of bond forfeiture. Bray did not appear in court on the scheduled date and the two $1,000 bonds were forfeited. For reasons unclear, the two $250 bonds were not forfeited. The contingent promissory note signed by Mr. Porro provided that no funds were due to be paid until the stated contingency occurred, stated as "upon forfeiture, estreature or breach of the surety bond." After Bray did not appear for court, the Respondents contacted Mr. Porro and told him that the bonds were forfeited and he was required to pay according to the promissory note. On April 15, 2000, Mr. Porro went to the office of Big John Bail Bonds and was told that he owed a total of $2,804, which he immediately paid. Mr. Porro was not offered and did not request an explanation as to how the total amount due was calculated. He received a receipt that appears to have been signed by Ms. Vath. After Mr. Porro paid the money, Ms. Vath remitted $2,000 to the court clerk for the two forfeited bonds. The Respondents retained the remaining $804. Bray was eventually apprehended and returned to custody. The Respondents were not involved in the apprehension. On July 11, 2000, the court refunded $1,994 to the Respondents. The refund included the $2,000 bond forfeitures minus a statutory processing fee of $3 for each of the two forfeited bonds. On August 9, 2000, 29 days after the court refunded the money to the Respondents, Mr. Porro received a check for $1,994 from the Respondents. Mr. Porro, apparently happy to get any of his money back, did not ask about the remaining funds and no explanation was offered. In November of 2000, Ms. Vath contacted Mr. Porro and informed him that a clerical error had occurred and that he was due to receive additional funds. On November 6, 2000, Mr. Porro met with Ms. Vath and received a check for $492. At the time, that Ms. Vath gave Mr. Porro the $492 check she explained that he had been overcharged through a clerical error, and that the additional amount being refunded was the overpayment minus expenses. She explained that the expenses included clerical and "investigation" expenses and the cost of publishing a notice in a newspaper. There was no documentation provided of the expenses charged to Mr. Porro. At the time the additional refund was made, there was no disclosure that the two $250 bonds were never forfeited. At the hearing, the Respondents offered testimony asserting that the charges were miscalculated due to "clerical" error and attempting to account for expenses charged to Mr. Porro. There was no reliable documentation supporting the testimony, which was contradictory and lacked credibility.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Insurance enter a Final Order requiring that the Respondents be required to refund $318 to Mr. Porro, which, combined with the previous payments of $1,994 and $492, will constitute refund of the total $2,804 paid by Mr. Porro to the Respondents. It is further recommended that the limited surety licenses of Matilda M. Vath and John L. Vath be suspended for a period of not less than three months or until Mr. Porro receives the remaining $318, whichever is later. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of February, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of February, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: James A. Bossart, Esquire Department of Insurance Division of Legal Services 200 East Gaines Street, Room 612 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Joseph R. Fritz, Esquire 4204 North Nebraska Avenue Tampa, Florida 33603 Mark Casteel, General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, Lower Level 26 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0307 Honorable Tom Gallagher State Treasurer/Insurance Commissioner Department of Insurance The Capitol, Plaza Level 02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether petitioner's application for licensure by examination as a professional bail bondsman should be approved.
Findings Of Fact By application dated April 20, 1991, and filed with respondent, Department of Insurance and Treasurer (Department), on April 26, 1991, petitioner, Fatmir Frank Haxho, requested that he be licensed by examination as a professional bail bondsman. Such application was executed by petitioner, under oath, before a Notary Public of the State of Florida, and he did solemnly swear that all answers to the questions contained in the application were true and correct to the best of his knowledge and belief. Among the questions contained in the application was one designed to secure information concerning petitioner's criminal history, if any. That question, as well as petitioner's response, read as follows: Q: Have you ever been charged with or convicted of or pleaded guilty or no contest to a crime involving moral turpitude NO, or a felony NO, or a crime punishable by imprisonment of one (1) year or more under the law of any state, territory or county, whether or not a judgment or conviction has been entered? No If yes, give date(s): What was the crime:? Where and when were you charged? Did you plead guilty or nolo contendere? Were you convicted? Was adjudication withheld? Please provide a brief description of the nature of the offense charged: If there has been more than one such felony charge, provide an explanation as to each charge on an attachment. Certified copies of the information or indictment and Final Adjudication for each charge is required. Petitioner's response to such question was false. On January 29, 1987, a True Bill was filed in the Superior Court of Clayton County, Georgia, Case No. 87-CR-26344-4, which charged petitioner with the offense of trafficking in cocaine, a felony. Thereafter, on April 7, 1987, petitioner was convicted of such charge, and sentenced to a term of thirteen years and fined $100,000.00. Such conviction was, however, reversed on March 16, 1988, by the Georgia Court of Appeals, and petitioner, who had been incarcerated in the Georgia Penitentiary in the interim, was released from confinement. On April 21, 1987, while petitioner was incarcerated in Georgia, an information was filed in the Circuit Court of Dade County, Florida, Case No. 87- 9159, which charged him with having failed to redeliver a hired motor vehicle, a felony. Section 817.52(3), Florida Statutes. Upon petitioner's release from confinement and return to Miami, Florida, he was arrested on such outstanding charge. Petitioner entered a plea of nolo contendere to the charge, and on April 13, 1989, the court entered an order which withheld adjudication of guilt, sentenced petitioner to credit for time served (2 days), directed that petitioner make restitution in the amount of $1,276.00 to Hertz, and imposed costs in the sum of $225.00. 2/ At hearing, petitioner averred that he did not intend to mislead the Department by his response to the foregoing question, and sought to ascribe any fault in his response to his difficulty with written English. Notably, however, the application also required petitioner to list his residence address and record of employment for the past five years, and with respect to the period in which he was incarcerated in the Georgia Penitentiary he answered "out of country." Overall, petitioner's explanation, as well as the proof offered to support it, are not compelling. Rather the proof supports the conclusion that petitioner's failure to disclose such criminal history was not occasioned by any difficulty he may have had with written English, but by his desire to conceal such information from the Department. 3/
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that a final order be rendered denying petitioner's application for licensure as a professional bail bondsman. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 21st day of May 1992. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of May 1992.
The Issue Whether the Agency for Persons with Disabilities’ (Agency’s) intended action to deny Petitioner’s application for exemption from disqualification from employment is an abuse of the Agency’s discretion.
Findings Of Fact Background Petitioner is a 29-year-old male who lives in Leesburg, Florida, with his wife, Jasmine Hall. Petitioner has four daughters whom he is actively engaged in parenting.2/ Petitioner is employed by a bail bond agency owned by his father-in-law. Petitioner is pursuing his bachelor’s degree in organizational management at Lake Sumter State College and anticipates graduating Spring 2017. Petitioner is the second oldest of five children raised by their mother, not knowing their fathers. Petitioner described his childhood as difficult, being raised without a male role model and in a rough area of town where violent crime was prevalent. Petitioner explained that he was studious, made good grades, and worked odd jobs throughout his childhood and young adulthood to help support the family. Despite his work ethic and good grades, he did make some poor decisions and fell in with the wrong crowd. Petitioner was exposed to violent acts in his community. In one incident, Petitioner witnessed his best friend being shot in the head at a nightclub. Petitioner has overcome many of the hardships he encountered in his childhood and desires to improve the future for himself and his children, provide for his family with a steady full-time job, and be financially secure, rather than living paycheck-to-paycheck as his mother did. The Disqualifying Offense On April 24, 2011, following a visitation with his two children at the time, Petitioner returned the children to their mother’s home. The details of the disqualifying offense are in dispute, but the record supports the following findings. Petitioner and the children’s mother became involved in a verbal altercation, during which Petitioner threw a can of soda at her. The record did not clearly establish that the soda can struck the children’s mother, but did establish that soda was splashed on her. After throwing the soda, Petitioner entered his vehicle with the intention to leave. The children’s mother followed him and hit the driver’s side window of Petitioner’s vehicle, causing the driver’s door to close before Petitioner’s hand was completely inside the vehicle. This angered Petitioner, who then exited the vehicle. The victim ran away from Petitioner, who proceeded to the victim’s vehicle and kicked the side of her vehicle leaving a dent in the vehicle. Petitioner then left the scene. Petitioner’s children, who were inside their mother’s home, did not witness the incident. According to the police report of the incident, the victim had no physical marking on her body, but her shirt was wet at the shoulder consistent with being hit with a soda can. On May 11, 2011, Petitioner pled nolo contendere to one count of domestic battery and one count of criminal mischief in an amount of $200 or less. Adjudication was withheld and Petitioner was ordered to serve 12 months’ probation, which terms required him to make restitution for the property damage, attend a batterer’s intervention course, maintain no contact with the victim, and incur no new law violations. Petitioner was granted early termination of probation on November 7, 2011, having complied with all terms of the probation. Subsequent Criminal History Petitioner has had no criminal history subsequent to the disqualifying offense. Petitioner has been cited for a number of traffic infractions since the incident: three for speeding, one for running a stop sign, and one for driving without a seatbelt.3/ Petitioner was also cited for driving without a license in May 2014. Petitioner’s license was in effect, but he failed to have it on his person at the time of the traffic stop. Petitioner has disposed of all his traffic infractions. Subsequent Employment History Petitioner has been continuously employed since the disqualifying offense, mostly as a laborer. He has unloaded trucks and tracked inventory for Target, cleaned the plant and maintained machines for American Cement Company, and worked as a day laborer for Labor Ready. Petitioner began working for Angle Truss in June 2015 in truss fabrication. Angle Truss is owned by Petitioner’s father-in-law, Pernell Mitchell. Mr. Mitchell testified on Petitioner’s behalf. Mr. Mitchell was, until recently, a law enforcement officer with the Leesburg Police Department, and served as school resource officer and D.A.R.E. instructor at Petitioner’s elementary school.4/ Mr. Mitchell has known Petitioner since Petitioner was in the fifth grade. Mr. Mitchell has chosen to personally mentor Petitioner, and has had significant interactions with him over the past seven or more years. Mr. Mitchell owns a bail bonding agency. As of the date of the hearing, Petitioner was employed at Mr. Mitchell’s bail bond agency. Mr. Mitchell finds Petitioner trustworthy enough to leave him in charge of the agency when Mr. Mitchell is out of town. Mr. Mitchell also owns Wings of Love, a group home and Medicaid Waiver provider in Leesburg, Florida. Mr. Mitchell hosts his group home clients at his personal residence for a family dinner once each week. Petitioner and his family attend the dinners, along with the clients’ families. Petitioner interacts with the clients during dinner, and often plays basketball or other games with them following dinner. Mr. Mitchell describes Petitioner as caring, patient, and compassionate with the clients. He has observed that the clients gravitate toward him because he treats them with respect. Subsequent Education and Personal History Petitioner has attained significant educational goals and taken on many new responsibilities since the 2011 incident. In 2012, Petitioner joined Citadel of Hope, a church in Leesburg. The following year, Petitioner joined the church’s security team, volunteering to guard doorways and patrol the parking lot during services. In 2014, Petitioner joined the church’s outreach ministry, which raises funds to support missionaries abroad and to provide food and toiletries for the local community in need. Petitioner completed an Associate in Arts degree from Lake Sumter State College in May 2014, and an Associate in Science degree (Criminal Justice Technology) from the college in August 2015. Petitioner continues to pursue his education, and anticipates completing his Bachelor’s degree in organizational management in the spring of 2017. Petitioner has continuously maintained his employment while in school. James Cason, a librarian at the college, submitted a character reference letter for Petitioner’s exemption application. Mr. Cason became familiar with Petitioner through Petitioner’s use of the library during 2014 and 2015. In the letter, Mr. Cason described Petitioner as determined and having a positive attitude. Mr. Cason was impressed with Petitioner’s character, his dependability, and his ability to manage his school and work schedules. In 2014, Petitioner voluntarily took a parenting class. After pursuing premarital counseling, Petitioner married his wife, Jasmine Hall, in June 2015. Together, Petitioner and his wife, along with the birth mother, are raising his four children. Petitioner’s Exemption Request On his exemption questionnaire, Petitioner described the events of the disqualifying offense as follows: On 4/24/11, the mother of my kids and I had a verbal disagreement as I attempted to return my children home after my weekend visitation. She became irate [and] slammed the car door on my wrist. At that point, I threw the remainder of my soda on her. Although it was wrong at the time I thought it was better than physically retaliating and striking her. I also put a small dent in her vehicle before I left. I was subsequently arrested 15 minutes later. Petitioner indicated that there were no stressors in his life at the time of the incident, but that he “was just a little upset about having [his] wrist shut in [his] car door.” Michael Sauvé is the Agency’s deputy regional operations manager for the central region. Mr. Sauvé reviewed Petitioner’s exemption request and made the recommendation to the director to deny the request. According to Mr. Sauvé, he recommended denial of Petitioner’s exemption request because, in his application, Petitioner was not forthcoming with the details of the offense, minimized the offense, shifted blame to the victim, and did not genuinely express remorse. Further, due to the number of moving violations for which Petitioner has been cited since the disqualifying offense, Mr. Sauvé doubts Petitioner’s ability to safely transport clients. Mr. Sauvé questioned the veracity of Petitioner’s account of the disqualifying offense, particularly with Petitioner’s claim that he sustained an injury to his wrist during the altercation. He speculated that Petitioner fabricated the injury “after the fact” to justify his actions on the day in question. In support of this opinion, Mr. Sauvé twice pointed to the fact that the police report contains no documentation of Petitioner’s injury. He testified that “[i]f there was something in the police report that talked about the wrist, if there was something in any of the other documents that we saw that mentioned this injury to his wrist, I would feel a lot differently than I do today.”5/ Petitioner testified that he did report his injury to the arresting officer, who did not include it in the report. Petitioner also credibly described, in some detail, how the injury to his wrist occurred during the altercation with the victim. The evidence does not support a finding that Petitioner fabricated the injury. Next, in Mr. Sauvé’s opinion, Petitioner’s response that he “put a small dent in her vehicle” was an attempt to minimize the damage he caused to the victim’s vehicle. Mr. Sauvé explained, “The criminal records show that it--the criminal mischief charge was $500 in property damage. I don’t know very much about cars, but that seems like it might be more than a small dent.” While the arresting officer estimated the damage to the vehicle at $500, Petitioner was actually charged with criminal mischief in the amount of $200 or less. No automobile repair expert is needed to establish that a small dent may very well cost at least $200 to repair. Mr. Sauvé’s conclusion, that Petitioner’s response was an attempt to minimize the damage, is inconsistent with Petitioner’s response to question four, in which he acknowledged causing approximately $500 in property damage to the victim’s car. It is illogical to conclude that Petitioner was attempting to minimize damage to the vehicle in his answer to question one, when three questions later, Petitioner disclosed the exact amount of vehicle damage reported on the arrest affidavit. Mr. Sauvé was particularly troubled by Petitioner’s answer to question number four, which required the applicant to explain the “[d]egree of harm to victim or property (permanent or temporary), damage or injuries[.]” In response to that question, Petitioner wrote, “There was no harm to the victim. There was approximately $500 worth of property damage to the victims [sic] car that I made restitution for.” Mr. Sauvé questioned Petitioner’s conclusion that there was no harm to the victim. He explained, as follows: If I give him the benefit of the doubt by his statements and I go back to his account that’s set forth on page 27, question 1, it-- it doesn’t sound to me like there was no harm that the [mother of his children] encountered. She--he took a soda and threw it at her. When you throw something at someone and physically injure them, whether or not it’s something that just leaves a bruise or anything, that’s scary.6/ Apparently, Mr. Sauvé would have liked Petitioner to state, in answer to this question, that Petitioner scared the victim. The victim may have indeed been fearful, but the question does not ask the applicant to speculate as to the victim’s state of mind at the time of the incident. The question is phrased to elicit factual information from the applicant. Petitioner’s statement that the victim suffered no physical harm is both factual and supported by the police officer’s observation at the scene that the victim had no physical markings on her.7/ Mr. Sauvé’s recommendation to deny the exemption request was further influenced by his belief that the children witnessed the altercation between their parents. He testified as follows: It’s especially scary when the children that he just finished his visitation with were potentially within earshot. The statements in the police report indicate that the children were--they had just went [sic] inside the house. So if they’re outside--in my mind, was trying to envision the circumstances. And in my mind, I saw them outside, the children inside. I don’t know if they heard. I don’t know what happened.8/ The only evidence on this issue is the arresting officer’s statement, as advised by the children’s mother, that the children went inside the house before the altercation took place. There is no evidence to support a finding that the children either witnessed or overheard the altercation between their parents. Mr. Sauvé’s speculation, or his “envision[ing of] the circumstances,” is irrelevant. The factual circumstances surrounding the incident are relevant, not what Mr. Sauvé saw in his mind. Finally, in Mr. Sauvé’s opinion, Petitioner’s answers on the questionnaire do not express remorse for the disqualifying offense. In particular, Mr. Sauvé pointed to the following two statements made by Petitioner on the questionnaire: (1) “Although it was wrong at the time I thought it was better than physically retaliating and striking her”; and (2) “I regret that I reacted during the situation as opposed to calling the police and filing a report for the physical pain that I endured.” In Mr. Sauvé’s opinion, the first statement was “peculiar and off putting” and he was concerned that five years after the incident, Petitioner would remark (in Mr. Sauvé’s words), “well, I didn’t hit her.” On the one hand, Petitioner’s statement does appear to minimize the offense. However, it cannot be overlooked that, on the continuum of battery offenses, throwing soda at a person (with a force such that it leaves absolutely no physical mark) is on the lower, or minimal, end of the scale. On the other hand, the first statement documents Petitioner’s awareness that he had other choices available to him during the incident, and that, even during the heat of the moment, Petitioner exercised some degree of restraint. Throwing the soda was indeed a better choice than hitting the mother of his children. The second statement is indeed concerning. It is flippant and may be interpreted to shift blame to the victim. It is understandable how Mr. Sauvé could have been persuaded, based solely on these two statements, that Petitioner was not sincerely remorseful for his offense. Fortunately, the undersigned had an advantage not afforded the Agency--live testimony from the Petitioner in connection with his application. Final Hearing At the final hearing, Petitioner exhibited none of the flippant attitude that might be gleaned from the two statements discussed above. Petitioner took responsibility for his actions and admitted that he knew it was wrong to throw the soda on the victim. In fact, Petitioner testified that he never should have let the incident escalate and he should have avoided reacting at all. Petitioner presented as a soft-spoken, intelligent, and earnest individual, whose concern for both his family and the developmentally-disabled community was profound and genuine. His testimony underlined his motivation to improve his circumstances, attain meaningful employment, and provide a better quality of life for his family. Petitioner was justifiably proud of the educational achievements he has attained since the offense. His dedication to school was equaled by his dedication to the church and the ministries with which he has chosen to volunteer. While the Agency did consider a character reference letter from Mr. Mitchell, which was included in Petitioner’s application, the Agency did not have the benefit of Mr. Mitchell’s live testimony. The letter did not cover the extent of the relationship between Mr. Mitchell and the Petitioner, nor Mr. Mitchell’s dedication to mentoring Petitioner over the last several years. Mr. Mitchell’s testimony was both credible and compelling. He exhibited a deep understanding of the negative social circumstances Petitioner has overcome, and wisdom regarding the excellent role model Petitioner could serve for young black men and boys. The fact that Mr. Mitchell has been, since June 2015, Petitioner’s father-in-law, does not diminish the credibility of his testimony. To the contrary, the fact that Petitioner has so recently married into Mr. Mitchell’s family is strong evidence of the trust and confidence that has been earned by Petitioner. Moreover, Mr. Mitchell is Petitioner’s current employer, a fact not evident from his character reference letter. As an employer, Mr. Mitchell has been in a position to observe Petitioner’s ability to cope with stressful situations in a business setting. Mr. Mitchell’s account of Petitioner’s interaction with current clients at Wings of Love was also unavailable to the Agency during formulation of its intended decision to deny. This testimony was compelling as it underscores Petitioner’s compassion toward persons with developmental disabilities, and his demonstrated ability to deal with them respectfully. In addition, Petitioner introduced in evidence three letters of reference which were not included with his application. The most significant of the letters was submitted by Tanya Harris-Rocker. Ms. Harris-Rocker was one of Petitioner’s college instructors with whom he remains in contact. She described Petitioner as both diligent and personable. Ms. Harris-Rocker observed that Petitioner meets deadlines, submits quality work, and puts in many hours toward his studies. She highlighted Petitioner as an independent thinker and praised him for his ability to separate himself from his peers who have chosen less productive paths. Ms. Harris-Rocker attested to Petitioner’s goals of attaining educational achievements and providing an exemplary role model for his children. Despite the isolated incident occurring more than five years ago, Petitioner has a cordial relationship with the mother of his children and they work cooperatively to raise their children in a positive environment. Petitioner is determined to give his children the stability and support of two loving, devoted parents, an advantage he was denied. The record is devoid of evidence that Petitioner would pose a threat to residents of a group home for the developmentally disabled.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order by the Agency for Persons with Disabilities be entered granting Petitioner’s request for an exemption from disqualification. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of September, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE VAN WYK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of September, 2016.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Pat LaFratta, applied for a Bail Bond Runner's License, which application was sworn to and subscribed on the 11th day of June, 1978. Petitioner had previously, on July 9, 1976, submitted an application for professional Bail Bondsman. The Respondent, by letter from the Chief of the Bureau of Licensing, Mrs. Onez O'Neal, dated August 31, 1978, informed Mr. LaFratta that his application for Bail Bond Runner's License was denied and stated that "the investigation conducted by this Department reflects that you do not meet the qualifications as set forth in Sections 648.27(2)(4), and 648.34(2)(f), Florida Statutes." The Petitioner requested an administrative hearing. A deposition of Howard Paul Sabin, who was at the time imprisoned for bribery, was entered into the evidence without objection. The deposition was taken at the Hendry Correctional Institute in Immokalee, Florida, on December 20, 1978, by counsel for the Respondent after Respondent had denied Petitioner's application for licensure. Counsel for the Petitioner, Herb Fried, Esquire, 1461 NW 17th Avenue, Miami, Florida 33125, and the Petitioner, Pat LaFratta, were present. Sabin's testimony was that the Petitioner, whom he identified at the taking of the deposition, shared commissions in performing bail bond activities and that Petitioner acquiesced and participated in bribing a police officer. Mr. Sabin testified that Mr. LaFratta used LaFratta's apartment as an office. Telephone calls were made from the apartment to call the jail and speak to people to see if Sabin could help them make bond while only Sabin, not Mr. LaFratta, was licensed. Sabin testified that the name of the agency was AABBEE Bail Bonds and that LaFratta paid Sabin a percentage of bonds solicited by Mr. Sabin and referred to Mr. LaFratta. The time frame Sabin testified about was approximately from September of 1975, to December of 1975. The Petitioner's attorney questioned Sabin about any promises made to him for his testimony and about other bondsmen, but there were no questions or contradictions by Petitioner or his attorney as to testimony concerning the subject of this hearing. A yellow page from a Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company Directory, dated 1976, was submitted into evidence in which there was an advertisement "Bail Bonds, 24-Hour Service Any Court - State, Federal, Criminal, Narcotic - Pat LaFratta, Manager - AABBEE Bail Bonds" and a telephone number. Also submitted into evidence was a copy of a business card "AABBEE Bail Bonds - Pat LaFratta - 24-Hour Service" with the same telephone number as advertised in the yellow pages of the 1976 telephone directory. It is obvious upon examination that the telephone advertisement and card were advising the public using the directory that Petitioner LaFratta was in the bail bond business. Petitioner was not then licensed. On the application for Bail Bond Runner's License of June 11, 1978, Question 14: "Have you ever been charged with or convicted of a felony?" was answered "Yes." The remainder of the question stated: "If so, complete the following and submit a full and detailed report on a separate sheet." This was answered: "1970 - Broward Cty. Ct. - Ft. Lauderdale, Fl. - Poss. Stolen Prop. - 23 counts, 1 yr. cty. jail 2-5 yrs. probation conc." Petitioner listed no other charges or convictions on the application or on a separate sheet. Respondent submitted in defense of its denial a number of exhibits which were entered into evidence as follows: Exhibit 3(a) concerns the offense of receiving stolen property and is dated October 20, 1969. The solicitor announced a Nolle Prosequi, and the Judge released Petitioner from custody. Exhibit 3(b) concerns the offense of receiving stolen property and is dated October 23, 1967. The solicitor announced a Nolle Prosequi. Petitioner was released from custody. Exhibit 3(c) concerns the offense of auto theft and is dated April 4, 1969. The solicitor announced "No Information," and the Respondent was released from custody. Exhibit 3(d) concerns the offense of uttering a forged instrument and is dated June 30, 1971. The solicitor announced a Nolle Prosequi, and the Judge released Petitioner from custody. Exhibit 3(e) concerns the offense of two counts of receiving stolen property and is dated April 5, 1971. The solicitor announced a Nolle Prosequi. The Judge released the Petitioner from custody. Exhibit 3(f) concerns the offense of receiving stolen property and is dated January 22, 1969. Petitioner was acquitted by a jury and released from custody. Exhibit 3(g) concerns the offense of receiving stolen property and is dated April 5, 1971. The solicitor announced a Nolle Prosequi, and the Judge released Petitioner from custody. Exhibit 3(h) concerns the offense of receiving or aiding in the concealment of parts of a 1968 Chevrolet Impala and is dated October 31, 1969. The State was allowed 30 days to amend because of the vagueness of the charge. Exhibit 3(i) concerns the offense of receiving stolen property and is dated April 5, 1971. The solicitor announced a Nolle Prosequi, and the Judge released Petitioner from custody. Exhibit 3(j) concerns the offense of aggravated assault and is dated October 27, 1967. The Hearing Officer finds that Petitioner was not the defendant in said case. Exhibit 3(k) concerns the offense of receiving stolen property and is dated December 13, 1968. Petitioner was acquitted by a jury and released from custody. Exhibit 3(l) concerns the offense of receiving stolen property arid is dated October 1, 1969. The Petitioner was acquitted by the court and released from custody. Exhibit 3(m) concerns the offense of receiving stolen property and is dated June 25, 1968. The Petitioner was acquitted by the court arid released from custody. Exhibit 3(n) concerns the offense of assault and battery, a misdemeanor, and is dated October 30, 1967. Exhibit 3(o) is a judgment and sentence for the crime of receiving stolen property and is dated October 5, 1971. Petitioner was placed on probation for five years. Exhibit (p) is a judgment and sentence dated April 5, 1971. Petitioner was sentenced to one year in prison and an assessment. Exhibit 3(q) concerns the violation of parole. Respondent's Exhibit 3(e), (g), (i), (o), and (p), supra, are part of a 23-count information which was submitted as Petitioner's Exhibit #6 in Case No. 70-25492, an information for Receiving Stolen property. Respondent's Exhibit 3(a), (b), (c), (d), (f), (h), (k), (l), and (m), supra, refer to felony charges of receiving stolen property, uttering a forged instrument and auto theft, which were not listed on the Petitioner's application and were not part of the 23-count information, which information concerned receiving stolen property. Exhibit 3(a), (b), (f), (k), (l), and (m), supra, concern stolen property preceding the dates of the offenses mentioned in the 23-count information. The failure to list the foregoing felony charges shows the Petitioner made material misstatements on his application. Petitioner LaFratta testified that he sent a package regarding the 23 counts mentioned in Findings of Fact No. 3, supra, with both application for Professional Bail Bondsman and for subject license to the Respondent. His testimony was not backed by evidence that he in fact sent the materials to the Respondent, which were required to have been sent at the time the application was made and listed on his application. His testimony that he had requested the clerk to "make out a whole booklet on everything that pertains to me," if true, was not adequate to truthfully answer Question 14, Findings of Fact No. 3, supra. The Hearing Officer finds that Petitioner did not furnished a full and detailed report and information as required by Question 14. It is the finding of the Hearing Officer that Petitioner did not intend to furnish the required information. Petitioner testified that he did not think that he had ever been arrested for assault, but the Respondent presented evidence showing that Petitioner had in fact been arrested for assault and battery. On subject application the Petitioner also failed to fully answer the question as to his employment history for the past five years. He failed to disclose that he had worked for Abel Bail Bonds. On the question as to his residence for the past five years, Mr. LaFratta failed to show that he had been incarcerated at Florida State Prison during that period of time. The herein mentioned 23-count information and the Restoration of Civil Rights were certified in June of 1976, and application for Professional Bail Bondsman was submitted in July of 1976. It is the finding of this Hearing Officer that these instruments were the only information submitted by the Petitioner to the Respondent as to his charges and convictions, despite his testimony. The certificate of Restoration of Civil Rights to Pat LaFratta, dated June 8, 1976, was previous to the application for Bail Bond Runner's License sworn to and subscribed by the Petitioner on June 11, 1978, and to the application for Bail Bondsman sworn to and subscribed by the Petitioner on July 9, 1976. The certificate of Restoration of Civil Rights is dated June 8, 1976, and within a few weeks thereafter Petitioner failed to truthfully answer questions under oath on his application on July 9, 1976, and failed to fully and truthfully answer the question on his application for Bail Bond Runner's License of July 11, 1978.
Recommendation Reject the application of Petitioner, Pat LaFratta, for a license as a Ball Bond Runner. DONE and ORDERED this 29th day of March, 1979, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of March, 1979. COPIES FURNISHED: Patrick F. Maroney, Esquire Florida Department of Insurance Legal Division 428-A Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Max P. Engel, Esquire 1461 North West 17th Avenue Miami, Florida 33125
Findings Of Fact Respondent Leroy Ellsworth Hardman has been licensed by petitioner as a limited surety agent since 1974. In January of 1976, he opened an office in Sanford, Florida, under the name of Action Bail Bonds. By December of 1978, he had qualified with the clerks of court in Orange, Seminole and Volusia Counties, and had written bonds in all three counties. Respondent decided to open an office in Deland, in addition to his office in Sanford. He leased office space on December 1, 1978, and began renovation. He had arranged for an advertisement to appear in the yellow pages of the Deland telephone directory, effective December 18, 1978, but did not succeed in opening the Deland office until December 19, 1978. Respondent hired Barbara Linkel to be in the office weekdays until four o'clock in the afternoon. He himself visited the office daily. Respondent, who had a 24 hour answering service and wore an electronic pager, instructed Ms. Linkel to notify him if anybody wanted a bond written. Respondent had charge of his Deland office while continuing to have charge of his office in Sanford. On January 29, 1979, John Wolmac, a limited surety agent, registered at the courthouse and began working for respondent, taking charge of the Deland office. On January 31, 1979, respondent executed the first bond written at the Deland office. Respondent's exhibit No. 8. Records of all bonds written at the Deland office were kept on file there until that office closed on May 31, 1979, when the records were transferred to respondent's office in Sanford. At all pertinent times, respondent's records were complete and open to the public for inspection. At the time of the hearing, respondent still had records of every bond executed or countersigned by him.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That petitioner dismiss the administrative complaint against respondent. DONE and ENTERED this 8th day of October, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas A. T. Taylor, Esquire Office of the Insurance Commissioner The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 James C. Weart, Esquire 201 West Firth Street Suite 206, Paulucci Building Sanford, Florida 32771
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner is eligible for licensure as a temporary resident limited surety agent.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner applied to the Department for licensure as a temporary resident limited surety agent on February 11, 2008. Petitioner completed his application for licensure on-line by accessing the Department's website. One of the questions on the application for licensure as a temporary resident limited surety agent was the following: Have you been charged, convicted, found guilty, or pled guilty or nolo contendere (no contest) to a felony or crime under the laws of any municipality, county, state, territory or country, whether or not adjudication was withheld or a judgment of conviction was entered? Initially, Petitioner responded "yes" to the question requiring that he disclose whether he had a criminal history. However, when Petitioner typed in "yes" to the question, the Department's website posted the "Stop" sign, and the Department's website did not allow Petitioner to proceed further on the application. Petitioner, with the aid of David DelGrosso, called the Department's customer service number. Petitioner told an unidentified customer service representative that after he answered "yes" to the question involving his criminal history, the Department's website had denied him further access and prevented him from answering subsequent questions on the licensure application. The Department's unidentified customer service representative then advised Petitioner to enter "No" to the question regarding any criminal history and to provide the Department with a written explanation as to his criminal history. After speaking with the unidentified customer representative, Petitioner changed his answer to the question related to his criminal history to "No." By doing so, he was able to complete and submit the on-line application for licensure. However, the answer that Petitioner gave to the question related to his criminal history was not truthful. When Petitioner submitted his application, he did not provide the Department with a written explanation as to his criminal history, as the customer service representative directed or suggested. Rather, Petitioner provided a written explanation concerning his criminal history about two months after he submitted his application and only in response to the Department's request that he do so, after its investigation revealed that Petitioner had a criminal record. On May 5, 1989, Petitioner entered a guilty plea to two felony counts of assault and was adjudicated guilty of those offenses before the Superior Court of the State of Washington for Pierce County. Petitioner was sentenced to and served 48 months in prison. Petitioner served his term of confinement and fulfilled all the terms of his sentence, including payment of a fine. Thereafter, on June 15, 1993, the Superior Court of the State of Washington for Pierce County entered a Certificate and Order of Discharge, which discharged Petitioner from the custody of the State's Department of Corrections and restored his civil rights. Since completing his sentence about 15 years ago, Petitioner has become a productive citizen in the community, has been employed in positions of trust, and has not committed any other crimes. For example, in 1994, Petitioner was licensed as a certified nursing assistant by the Florida Department of Health and, subsequently, worked as a certified nursing assistant in a nursing home and at the Sarasota Memorial Hospital. Petitioner also has been issued licenses by the Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services-- a License D (concealed weapon permit) issued on July 5, 2007, and a License G (statewide firearm license) issued February 26, 2008. The foregoing licenses were issued to Petitioner despite his disclosure of his criminal history and/or because his civil rights were restored and/or his proven rehabilitation. Petitioner does not dispute that he entered a plea of guilty to two felony counts of assault and that he was adjudicated guilty of those offenses. However, Petitioner believes that given his record after being released from prison and the circumstances surrounding the incident which led to his conviction, his application for licensure as a temporary resident limited surety agent should be approved.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Department of Financial Services, enter a final order that: (1) finds Petitioner, A.D., ineligible for licensure; and (2) denies Petitioner's application for licensure as a temporary resident limited surety agent. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of December, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of December, 2008.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, as well as the stipulated facts, the following relevant facts are found: At all times relevant to this proceeding, respondent Joseph Aloysius Von Waldner has been licensed as a limited surety agent. He has been in the bail bond business for nine years and has had no previous or subsequent complaints issued against him. On five occasions during January and February of 1979, respondent did authorize, hire and remunerate Delbert Leroy Sams to pick up principals or skips and surrender them to the Orange County Jail. Delbert Leroy Sams was not and has not been previously licensed in any capacity by the Department of Insurance. On March 2, 1979, Mr. Sams was denied a license by the Department of Insurance. At the time respondent engaged the services of Mr. Sams, respondent believed that Mr. Sams was working as a bail bond runner for another bail bondsman. Respondent did not inquire of Sams as to whether Sams was or was not licensed by the Department of Insurance. Respondent knew that other bail bondsmen had used Sams as a runner, and Sams showed respondent some business cards and forms which Sams used when picking up principals. Respondent admits that he was negligent for not inquiring into Mr. Sams' licensure. Respondent was called in for an investigation by the petitioner's chief investigator, Melvin R. Thayer, on February 28, 1979. After talking with Mr. Thayer and becoming aware that Mr. Sams was not licensed, respondent no longer used Sams as a runner.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Insurance enter a final order finding that respondent violated the provisions of Florida Statutes, s648.45(1)(j) and imposing an administrative penalty against respondent in the amount of $100.00, said penalty to be paid within thirty (30) days of the date of the final order. Respectfully submitted and entered this 27th day of June, 1980, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 101 Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of June, 1980. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas A. T. Taylor, Esquire Room 428-A, Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Richard L. Wilson, Esquire 100 South Orange Avenue Orlando, Florida 32801 Insurance Commissioner Bill Gunter The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Respondent's license as a limited surety agent should be revoked or the licensee otherwise disciplined for alleged violations of Chapter 648, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 4-1, Florida Administrative Code, as set forth in the Administrative Complaint dated October 16, 1979. In this proceeding, Petitioner seeks to take disciplinary action against Respondent for various alleged violations of Chapter 648, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 4-1, Florida Administrative Code, arising out of alleged irregularities in connection with a bonding transaction in 1978. Two witnesses testified for the Petitioner and the parties stipulated to the admission of seven documentary exhibits. The Respondent testified in his own behalf at the hearing.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Timothy Michael Paletti is currently licensed as a limited surety agent to represent Cotton Belt Insurance Company, Inc., at Orange Lake, Florida, and was so licensed during the periods alleged in the Administrative Complaint. (Petitioner's Exhibit 1, Stipulation) On November 23, 1978, Respondent executed an appearance bond in the Gilchrist County Circuit Court in the sum of $10,000 as agent of the surety, Cotton Belt Insurance Company, in behalf of Rodney D. Lovett, who was charged with robbery. Respondent did not attach either an affidavit or statement, as prescribed in Rule 4-1.14, Florida Administrative Code, to the bail bond at the time it was filed in the office of the Circuit Court clerk. It was not until January 31, 1979, that Respondent filed a statement concerning collateral security for the bond under Rule 4-1.141 in lieu of the affidavit required by Rule 4-1.14, F.A.C. Lovett's wife paid a $1,000 premium for the bond and his sister-in-law, Deborah Johnson, executed a demand note for $10,000, together with a mortgage deed on a dwelling which she owned in Deland, Florida, on November 23, 1978, as collateral security for the bond. During the transaction, Respondent provided Johnson with a business card bearing his Orange Lake telephone number. (Testimony of Johnson, Petitioner's Exhibits 2-4) On January 8, 1979, a Notice of Sentencing was issued by the Gilchrist County Circuit Court Clerk in Lovett's case for January 22, 1979 at Trenton, Florida. On January 13, Respondent contacted Lovett and Johnson by telephone at their respective homes and advised them of the date of the required court appearance. (Testimony of Respondent, Petitioner's Exhibit 5) During January 1979, Lovett and his wife talked to Johnson about the possibility of "leaving and not going to court." Johnson became concerned about these disclosures and attempted to reach Respondent at his Orange Lake telephone number. Numerous calls to that number on January 15th were unanswered. After unsuccessful attempts to reach Respondent through the Cotton Belt Insurance Company and at another telephone number provided by Petitioner, Respondent finally called Johnson's house on January 20, at which time Johnson and a friend, Barry S. Beatty, told Respondent about Lovett's statements concerning his intentions and requested that Respondent pick up Lovett and surrender him to court so the collateral security could be released. Respondent told Johnson that he would look into the matter. He then telephoned Lovett's attorney and the Lovett home, and was assured that everything was all right. (Testimony of Johnson, Beatty, Respondent) On January 22, 1979, Lovett failed to appear at court for sentencing and the bond was therefore declared to be forfeited. Respondent and law enforcement authorities there after made efforts to locate Lovett and he was eventually apprehended and sentenced to confinement. On July 2, 1979, the Gilchrist County Circuit Court ordered that the bond previously estreated be remitted less the cost expended by the State in apprehending the defendant in the amount of $500. The collateral security posted by Johnson is still outstanding due to a dispute over costs sought by Respondent. (Testimony of Johnson, Respondent, Petitioner's Exhibit 6-7) Respondent testified at the hearing that he felt he had made reasonable efforts to assure that Lovett would appear in court. Although Respondent moved his office in late January 1979, his office phone was in operation and his office was open during the week of January 15-22. (Testimony of Respondent)
Recommendation That the charges against Respondent Timothy Michael Paletti be DISMISSED. DONE and ORDERED this 9th day of July, 1980, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 101 Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of July, 1980. COPIES FURNISHED: S. Strom Maxwell, Esquire Department of Insurance 428-A Larson Building Legal Division Tallahassee Florida 32301 Robert J. Costello, Esquire Bates and DeCarlis - Suite B 726 Northwest Eighth Avenue Gainesville, Florida 32601
Findings Of Fact Based upon the testimony of the witness and the documentary evidence received at the hearing, the following findings of fact are made: At all times material to the allegations of the administrative complaint, Respondent was licensed and was eligible for licensure as a limited surety agent in the State of Florida. Respondent's application for examination for limited surety agent was filed in June, 1986. This application represented that Respondent would be employed by Carroll Collins Bonding when licensed. At the time of the hearing, Respondent was not licensed as a bail bondsman. During the period January through June, 1988, Respondent was licensed as a limited surety agent for Allegheny Mutual Casualty Company (Allegheny). This license had been issued in April, 1987, based upon a form application submitted on Respondent's behalf by an employee of Carroll Collins Bonding. The information submitted on that application (such as social security number, date of birth, and home address) was accurate and was identical to that which had been included in Respondent's application for examination. While Respondent admitted he had signed a contract to work with Collins, he claimed that he was unaware that the Allegheny license had been sought and approved. I find such claim not credible. Respondent did not, however, work for Carroll Collins in a bonding capacity. Whether he worked for him in some other role was not addressed at the hearing. Respondent did not timely provide statistical reports to the Department for Allegheny. When contacted by the Department, Respondent submitted a report which indicated no activity for Allegheny for the subject period, and requested that the license be cancelled. No one from Carroll Collins Bond testified at the hearing. Consequently, no explanation for why the Allegheny application was filed for Respondent was offered. It can reasonably be inferred that Carroll Collins Bond pursued the Allegheny application based upon information Respondent had given them and that Respondent should have known of its submittal.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Insurance and Treasurer enter a final order imposing an administrative fine in the amount of $250.00 against Respondent, Kenneth Alford Durham. DONE and ENTERED this 31st day of October, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of October, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 89-2193 Rulings On The Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted By Petitioner: 1. Paragraphs 1 through 3 are accepted. Rulings On The Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted By Respondent: Since Respondent submission was in one paragraph, each sentence has been considered a separate proposed fact and is ruled upon accordingly. The first six sentences are accepted The seventh sentence is rejected as unsupported by the record or hearsay. The ninth and tenth sentences are accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Clyde W. Galloway, Jr. Office of Legal Services 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Ralph L. Flowers Post Office Box 3668 Fort Pierce, Florida 34948 Honorable Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Don Dowdell General Counsel Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
