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SUWANNEE RIVER WATER MANAGEMENT DISTRICT vs FLORIDA CONFERENCE OF THE ASSOCIATION OF SEVENTH-DAY ADVENTISTS, INC., 03-000955 (2003)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Live Oak, Florida Mar. 20, 2003 Number: 03-000955 Latest Update: Aug. 13, 2004

The Issue The issue is whether Respondent's water use permit should be revoked for nonuse of the permit for a period of two years or more.

Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Background The District is a state agency charged with the responsibility of issuing water use permits under Chapter 373, Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Chapter 40B- 2 for the geographic area under its statutory jurisdiction. Alachua County is within that geographic jurisdiction. Respondent is a Florida corporation with offices at 700 Northwest Cheeota Avenue, High Springs, in northern Alachua County. It owns approximately 700 acres in High Springs (west of Interstate Highway 75) on which it operates a church retreat and summer camping and recreational facility known as Camp Kulaqua. The property surrounds, and is contiguous to, Hornsby Spring, a first-order magnitude spring (having a flow rate of 100 CFS or greater) which, under normal conditions, discharges into the nearby Santa Fe River. Hornsby Spring is one of 296 documented springs within the District's jurisdiction. After receiving an overture from a representative of a private water bottling company, on September 28, 1999, Respondent filed an application for a General Water Use Permit in Township 7 South, Range 17 East, Section 26, in High Springs. In its application, Respondent represented that it desired a daily allocation of 2,000,000 gallons; that it intended to install two 12-inch wells, each having a capacity of 1,400 gallons per minute, just east of, and upgradient from, Hornsby Spring; and that all water withdrawals would be used in conjunction with a privately-owned commercial spring water bottling facility to be located on its property. The application also represented that the facility would employ 36 persons and operate 168 hours per week. The application was reviewed by a former District hydrogeologist, William H. Kirk. During the review process, and in response to Mr. Kirk's request for more information, Respondent provided a comparison of the requested allocation with the overall flow of Hornsby Spring. This was because Mr. Kirk was concerned that the requested allocation was "a bit high," and he wanted to ensure that the issuance of the permit would not cause harm to, or adversely affect, the water resources. Under a professional guideline that Mr. Kirk used, if the applicant could show that the cumulative amount being withdrawn was to be less than ten percent of what the available data showed to be the mean spring flow, the District would consider it to be "an acceptable impact." Notwithstanding Mr. Kirk's use of this guideline, the District points out that there is no District rule or policy sanctioning the ten percent rule, and at hearing it denied that this standard is used by the District in assessing water use applications. Further, the Permit itself does not refer to a relationship between spring flow and the size of the allocation. Even so, this analysis was considered by Mr. Kirk in determining whether Respondent had given reasonable assurance that the spring would not be impacted. In its response to the request for additional information, Respondent reduced its requested allocation to 750,000 gallons per day and indicated that if a bottling plant were to be constructed on its property, approximately 700,000 gallons of the total allocation would be consumed in "bulk transfer and bottling," with the remainder for camp use. More specifically, Respondent indicated that it would allocate 490,000 gallons per day for bulk transport, 210,000 gallons per day for spring bottling water, and 50,000 gallons per day for incidental uses at its property. By reducing the allocation from 2,000,000 gallons per day to 750,000 gallons per day, Respondent's requested average daily allocation represented only 0.4 percent of the average daily spring flow as measured over the last 28 years. The reduced allocation satisfied Mr. Kirk's concern that Respondent demonstrate a reasonable demand and a reasonable need for that allocation, and he recommended approval of the application.2 On February 25, 2000, the District approved the application and issued Water Use Permit No. 2-99-00130 (Permit).3 The Permit authorizes an average daily withdrawal of 0.7500 million gallons per day (750,000 gallons per day) or a maximum daily withdrawal and use of 0.7500 million gallons per day with an annual allocation not to exceed 273.750 million gallons (273,750,000 gallons) per calendar year in conjunction with the operation of a privately-owned water bottling plant. The Permit expires on February 25, 2020. After the Permit was issued, under the regulatory process in place, Respondent was required first to obtain a permit for a temporary test well which would be used to collect information concerning the site of the proposed activity, and to then file an application for permits authorizing the construction and operation of the two 12-inch production wells. The Permit contains a number of conditions, two of which require a brief comment. First, Condition No. 2 provides that "[t]his permit is classified as unconfined [F]loridan aquifer for privately owned bottled water plant." This means that all water withdrawals must be made from the unconfined Floridan aquifer, as opposed to the spring head of Hornsby Spring. (Respondent's proposed siting of its two production wells 660 yards east of the spring is consistent with this provision.) Second, Condition No. 4 provides that "[t]he permittee shall submit daily pumpage records on a monthly basis to the [District]." Pumpage reports are filed by permittees so that the District can determine whether the permit is actually being used, and if so, to ensure that the amount of water being withdrawn under the permit does not exceed the authorized allocation. As it turned out, pumpage reports were never filed by Respondent. (However, the record shows that the District has never strictly enforced this requirement for any permittee.) In late 2002, the District staff undertook a review of the nine water bottling permit holders within its jurisdiction, including Respondent. That category of permit holders was selected for review because of the small number of permits and the limited resources of the District staff. (In all, the District has probably issued several thousand permits to other types of users.) On February 4, 2003, the District served its Complaint under the authority of Sections 120.60 and 373.243, Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 40B-2.341. As grounds for revoking the permit, the District alleged that there was "non-use of the water supply allowed by the permit for a period of two (2) years or more." Although Respondent contends that it should have been given an opportunity to correct the nonuse allegation before the Complaint was issued, nothing in the Administrative Procedure Act or District rules requires that this be done. Until the issuance of the Complaint against Respondent in early 2003, and similar Complaints against eight other permit holders at the same time, the District had never invoked this statutory provision.4 There is no evidence to support Respondent's contention that the Complaints were issued for "purely political reasons." On March 4, 2003, Respondent requested a formal hearing challenging the District's proposed action. In the parties' Pre-Hearing Stipulation, the issues have been broadly described as follows: whether Section 373.243(4), Florida Statutes, is to be strictly or liberally construed; whether Respondent's nonuse is based upon extreme hardship for reasons beyond its control; and whether the District is equitably estopped from permit revocation. (According to the District, even if the Permit is revoked, such revocation is without prejudice to Respondent reapplying for, and receiving, another permit so long as it meets all applicable requirements.) Equitable Estoppel Respondent first contends that the District is estopped from revoking its Permit on the theory that, under the circumstances here, the doctrine of equitable estoppel applies. For that doctrine to apply, however, Respondent must show that the District made a representation as to a material fact that is contrary to a later asserted position; that Respondent relied upon that representation; and that the District then changed its position in a manner that was detrimental to Respondent. See, e.g., Salz v. Dep't of Admin., Div. of Retirement, 432 So. 2d 1376, 1378 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). The District issued Respondent's Permit on the condition that Respondent operate in conformity with all pertinent statutes and regulations. This finding is consistent with language on the face of the Permit, which states that the Permit "may be permanently or temporarily revoked, in whole or in part, for the violation of the conditions of the permit or for the violation of any provision of the Water Resources Act and regulations thereunder." Respondent relied on the District's representation that it could use the Permit so long as it complied with all statutes and regulations. In reliance on that representation, in addition to staff time, after its Permit was issued, Respondent expended "somewhere around" $70,000.00 to $74,000.00 for conducting water quality testing; sending cave divers underground to ascertain the correct location of the portion of the aquifer on which to place its production wells; drilling a 6-inch test well in August 2000; obtaining the City of High Springs' approval in March 2000 for industrial zoning on a 10-acre tract of land on which to site a "water plant"; and engaging the services of a professional who assisted Respondent in "seeking out businesses and getting the right qualifications of the spring water to make sure that it was a marketable water." The District has never asserted anything different from its original position: that if Petitioner complied with all statutes and rules, it could continue to lawfully make water withdrawals under its Permit. The issuance of the Complaint did not represent a change in the District's position. Because a change in position in a manner that was detrimental to Respondent did not occur, the necessary elements to invoke the doctrine of equitable estoppel are not present. Was the Permit Used? A preliminary review by District staff indicated that Respondent had never filed the daily pumpage reports on a monthly basis and had never requested permits authorizing the construction of the two 12-inch production wells. These preliminary observations were confirmed at final hearing, along with the fact that Respondent has never entered into an agreement with a water bottling company (although draft agreements were once prepared); that Respondent has never constructed a water bottling facility; and that no operations were ever conducted under the Permit. Therefore, the evidence supports a finding that Respondent did not use its Permit for the two-year period after it was issued, as alleged in the Complaint. Respondent's contention that the evidence fails to support this finding belies the evidence of record. In an effort to show that it actually used the Permit, Respondent points out that in August 2000 it applied for, and received a permit to construct, an unmetered 6-inch test well in association with its General Water Use Permit. (Respondent sometimes erroneously refers to the test well as a test production well. This is incorrect as the well is a test well, and not a production well.) After the test well was installed, at some point Respondent says it began withdrawing approximately 50,000 gallons per day of water from that well for incidental uses associated with the operation of Camp Kulaqua.5 These withdrawals were made on the assumption that the test well permit fell under the broad umbrella of the General Water Use Permit. (Respondent also has a permitted 6- inch diameter well and an unregulated 4-inch well on its premises, both of which are used for water supply needs at Camp Kulaqua.) It is true, as Respondent asserts, that its Permit authorized incidental withdrawals of up to 50,000 gallons per day for unspecified uses at Camp Kulaqua. However, these withdrawals are authorized under the General Water Use Permit and not the test well permit. The two permits are separate and distinct. On the one hand, a test well is intended to be temporary in nature and used only for the purpose of test well development and collecting information regarding the height of the aquifer and water quality at the site of the proposed activity. Conversely, withdrawals for any other purpose, even incidental, must be made from the production wells, which are only authorized by the General Water Use Permit. Before a test well can be used for normal consumptive purposes, the permit holder must seek a modification of the permit to include it as a part of its general water use permit. Here, no such modification was sought by Respondent, and no authorization was given by the District. Therefore, Respondent's incidental water uses associated with its test well cannot be counted as "uses" for the purpose of complying with the use requirement in Section 373.243(4), Florida Statutes. In light of the District's credible assertion to the contrary, Respondent's contention that it is common practice to lawfully withdraw water from a test well for incidental consumptive purposes has been rejected. (It is noted, however, that the District has not charged Respondent with violating the terms of its test well permit.) Extreme Hardship Under Section 373.243, Florida Statutes (which was enacted in 1972), the District is authorized to revoke a water use permit "for nonuse of the water supply allowed by the permit for a period of 2 years." However, if the user "can prove that his or her nonuse was due to extreme hardship caused by factors beyond the user's control," revocation of the permit is not warranted. The phrase "extreme hardship caused by factors beyond the user's control" is not defined by statute or rule. In the context of this case, however, the District considers an extreme hardship to occur under two scenarios. First, if the aquifer level has dropped so low due to drought conditions that a permit holder cannot access the water through its well, its nonuse is excusable. Alternatively, if an emergency order has been issued by the District directing permit holders (including Respondent) to stop pumping due to certain conditions, an extreme hardship has occurred. (Presumably, a severe water shortage would precipitate such an order.) In this case, the District issued a water shortage advisory, but not an emergency order, due to a "severe drought," indicating that users could still pump water, but were encouraged to voluntarily reduce their usage. This advisory remained in effect from the summer of 1998 until the spring of 2003, when a severe drought ended. However, no emergency order was ever issued by the District. Respondent contends that its nonuse was due to an extreme hardship caused by factors beyond its control. More specifically, it argues that a severe drought occurred in Alachua County during the years 1998-2003, and that under these conditions, federal regulations prevented it from withdrawing water for bottling purposes, which was the primary purpose for securing a permit. Further, even if it had withdrawn water during these drought conditions, such withdrawals could have adversely impacted Hornsby Spring and constituted a violation of a District requirement that water resources not be adversely impacted. Because an investment of several hundred thousand dollars was required to drill and install the two production wells, Respondent contends it was not financially prudent to make that type of investment and begin operations until normal spring conditions returned. These contentions are discussed in greater detail below. Around September 7, 1999, a representative of a water bottling company first approached Respondent about the possibility of the two jointly operating a water bottling plant and/or transporting water in bulk from Respondent's property. Prompted by this interest, less than three weeks later Respondent filed its application for a water use permit (although at that time it did not mention on the application that off-site bulk transfers would occur), and a permit was eventually issued in February 2000. Later, and through a professional firm it employed, Respondent had discussions with representatives of several bottling companies, including Great Springs Waters of America (Great Springs) and Perrier Group of America. Apparently, these more serious discussions with a potential suitor did not take place until either late 2000 or the spring of 2001. Periodic measurements taken by District staff at Hornsby Spring reflected natural drought conditions from April 2000 to April 2003. As noted earlier, this was the product of a "severe drought" which took place between the summer of 1998 and the spring of 2003; the drought was one of a magnitude that occurs only once in every 50 to 100 years. During the years 2000 through 2002, the spring had zero flow or was barely flowing much of the time.6 Had Respondent pumped water during 20 out of the 24 months after the Permit was issued, it could have potentially violated the requirement that it not harm Hornsby Spring. This fact is acknowleged by a District witness who agreed that if the "spring is not flowing, . . . [pumping] would have an [adverse] impact." Even as late as October 2003, the spring had tannic discoloration caused by the lengthy drought conditions. The parties agree, however, that there is no water shortage in the District at the present time. To illustrate the difficulty that it experienced in obtaining a joint venture partner for water bottling purposes, Respondent established that in the spring of 2001, a Great Springs representative visited the site when the spring was "barely flowing." For obvious reasons, Respondent could not "bring a party there who would want to enter into a business [agreement]" under those conditions. These same conditions remained in effect during most of the two year period. The District points out, however, that even though the spring was low or barely flowing, so long as the aquifer itself was not too low, Respondent could still withdraw water from the aquifer, since Condition 2 of the Permit authorizes withdrawals from the aquifer, and not the spring. The reason for this apparent anomaly is that when a spring ceases to flow, the aquifer has simply dropped below the level of the spring vent; even under these circumstances, however, there may still be a substantial quantity of water in the aquifer available for pumping. Assuming that it could still lawfully pump water when the spring was dry or barely flowing without causing adverse impacts to the spring, Respondent was still subject to federal regulations which govern the bottling of spring water. See Title 21, Part 165, C.F.R. For spring water to be marketed as bottled "spring water," 21 C.F.R. § 165.119(2)(vi) requires that the water "be collected only at the spring or through a bore hole tapping the underground formation feeding the spring." This means that the bore hole had to be physically connected with the cave system feeding Hornsby Spring or produce water of the same quality as that discharging from the spring. The regulation goes on to provide that "[i]f spring water is collected with the use of an external force [such as by a pump], water must continue to flow naturally to the surface of the earth through the spring's natural orifice." While this regulation obviously does not prohibit Respondent from pumping water, since that authority lies within the District's exclusive jurisdiction, it does provide that in order to use spring water for bottling purposes, the water must continue to flow naturally from the aquifer to the spring. If it does not, the water cannot be used for this purpose. Because Hornsby Spring had zero flow for parts of 2001 and 2002, and severely reduced flows during most of the other time during the two-year period ending February 2002, Respondent was effectively prevented by the foregoing regulation from using the water for bottling purposes. Therefore, Respondent's nonuse was due to extreme hardship caused by factors beyond its control -- a severe drought lasting throughout the two-year period after the Permit was issued, and federal regulations which prevented it from using water for the purpose for which the Permit was issued. Thus, the nonuse is excusable.

CFR (2) 21 CFR 165.11021 CFR 165.119(2)(vi) Florida Laws (4) 120.569120.57120.60373.243
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH vs MARTIN A. GUFFEY, 11-000388PL (2011)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Port Charlotte, Florida Jan. 21, 2011 Number: 11-000388PL Latest Update: Dec. 23, 2024
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BEN F. WARD, JR., AND E. L. C. PARTNERSHIP vs. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, 87-003541 (1987)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 87-003541 Latest Update: Feb. 18, 1988

The Issue Whether a septic tank permit, should be granted for lot 2, Whispering Oaks Subdivision. More specifically, does the' requirement of no more than four lots per acre require a minimum lot size of 1/4 acre? In the alternative, must the subject lot be grouped with three contiguous lots to determine whether the density requirement is met? If a permit should be denied, is a variance appropriate under HRS' rules and the circumstances of the case?

Findings Of Fact The essential facts in this case are uncontroverted. Ben F. Ward is the President and sole stockholder of Ben Ward, Incorporated. His business for over eighteen years has been real estate, construction and development. He has built over 300 homes and is familiar with the procedures for developing a subdivision, including obtaining septic tank permits. In 1979, Ben Ward purchased the property now designated Whispering Oaks Subdivision, located in the City of Oviedo, Seminole County, Florida. The property contains approximately six acres, net. That is, the paved right of ways have been disregarded. There are no streams, lakes or other bodies of surface water on the property. Ward subdivided his property into 26 lots, two of which, lots number 12 and 17, are dedicated for recreational use and will not have homes. Some of the lots are less than 1/4 acre; others are more. Lot number 2 has 9,137 square feet, 1,753 square feet less than 1/4 acre. As a condition of plat approval, the City of Oviedo required Ward to obtain approval from the Seminole County Health Department. Val Roberts was the county health officer with whom Ward consulted. A process was devised for "borrowing" acreage from lots of over 1/4 acre to meet the minimum requirements for lots less than 1/4 acre. In other words, it was determined that the total net acreage in the subdivision would be considered in computing the four lots per acre minimum. The plat was approved and was recorded in 1980. Between 1981 and 1987, 19 residences were built and septic tank permits were obtained. There is city water service in the subdivision. In 1985, Ward sold 16 lots to the Erie Land Company, a partnership comprised of Mary Ellen Hines and her husband. In reliance on the arrangement worked out with the health department, Ward assured ELC that the lots were buildable. He remained trustee of the property. On February 26, 1987, the Seminole County Health Department (HRS) denied Ward's application for a septic tank permit for lot number 2, including a 3-bedroom, 2-1/2-bath home, comprising 2100 square feet. The denial letter cites rule 10D-6.46(7)(b), F.A.C., and says "Four lots grouped together lack approximately 3000 square feet of meeting the required lot size...". The letter provides the procedure for petition for a variance to Rule 10D-6, F.A.C. Ward applied for the variance, and its approval was recommended by a vote of 3-2 by the HRS Review Group for Individual Sewage Disposal. The recommendation was denied by the HRS State Health Officer, E. Charlton Prather, M.D. in a letter dated May 7, 1987 which states, in pertinent part: Grouping of lots to determine whether the subdivision meets the four lot per acre requirement must be done in a logical manner to maximize the homogenous dissemination of sewage effluent or prevent a concentration of sewage effluent in a small or limited area. Once a specific area is utilized in calculating sewage flow dispersal for a group of lots, that area cannot be further used for another lot or group of lots. Lot number 2 meets all requirements of HRS for septic tanks, with the exception of the density methodology. Ward surveyed the homes built and occupied for approximately a year and found that the subdivision as a whole is about 60% of allowable capacity. Ms. Haynes has lived on lot number 22 for six years and has never had septic tank problems. She holds an inactive real estate license, and before purchasing the property found the subdivision high and dry and well-developed.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby RECOMMENDED: That the application for septic tank permit for lot 2, Whispering Oaks subdivision, be GRANTED. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 18th day of February, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of February, 1988. COPIES FURNISHED: Ben F. Ward, Jr. Ben Ward Agency, Inc. P. O. Box 670 Oviedo, Florida 32765 John A. Baldwin, Esquire Baldwin & Baum 7100 S. Highway 17-92 Fern Park, Florida 32730 James A. Sawyer, Jr., Esquire HRS District 7 Legal Counsel 400 W. Robinson St., Suite 911 Orlando, Florida 32801 Sam Power, Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Building One, Suite 407 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John Miller, Esquire Acting General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH vs HERMAN CAMPBELL, 97-004598 (1997)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Shalimar, Florida Oct. 09, 1997 Number: 97-004598 Latest Update: Mar. 19, 1998

The Issue The issue is whether Respondent should have an administrative fine imposed for allegedly providing septic tank contracting services without a license.

Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: When the events herein occurred, Respondent, Herman Campbell, operated a back-hoe service in Santa Rosa County, Florida. He presently holds no licenses with, or registrations from, Petitioner, Department of Health (Department), to engage in the septic tank contracting business. In April 1997, Wayne Sullivan, who resides in Navarre, Florida, made arrangements with a local contractor, Robert Hoover, to dig up the drainfield and replace the pipe on a septic tank system at his mother-in-law's home at 8207 Laredo Street, Navarre. Hoover purchased the necessary pipe but then backed out of the job at the last minute. Sullivan then called Mary Esther Plumbing, who recommended that Respondent be used. Respondent was a former licensed septic tank contractor who had installed the original septic tank at the residence more than ten years earlier. Sullivan agreed to purchase all materials (pipe and gravel) needed for the job. Although Sullivan claims that Respondent told him he was licensed to do the work, it is found that Respondent indicated to Sullivan that he held no license or registration and could not obtain any permits. Notwithstanding Respondent's lack of licensure, Sullivan nonetheless asked Respondent to perform the work. Respondent undertook the job on or about Thursday, April 24, 1997. Charging a rate of $45.00 per hour to operate his back-hoe, Respondent replaced the pipe in the drainfield. In addition, he dug up a number of stumps in the front yard. The total charge for all work, including the stump removals, was $1,375.00, which was paid by check from the mother-in-law. The amount related to the septic tank work is not known. The following Monday, the Department received an anonymous complaint that an unlicensed person had performed septic tank contracting services for Sullivan's mother-in-law. After an investigation was conducted by a Department environmental specialist, an administrative complaint was issued. Respondent did not register with the Department before performing the work, and he did not obtain the required permit from, and inspection by, the Department. By failing to do so, Respondent acted in contravention of Department rules. Although the complaint alleges that Respondent caused monetary harm to the customer, there is no evidence that Sullivan's mother-in-law suffered any damages by virtue of Respondent's work. Indeed, at hearing, Sullivan indicated that he was pleased with Respondent's workmanship. While the Department suggests that the mother-in-law has been left with an "unauthorized drainfield," there is no evidence that this caused her to incur additional expense. Respondent contended that he was merely "digging a ditch" with his back-hoe and was not providing septic tank contracting services. However, the evidence shows that he dug the ditch, removed the old pipe, placed gravel in the bed, and laid the new pipe into the ditch, all of which relate to septic tank contracting services. While Sullivan may have assisted Respondent in performing these tasks, it does not relieve Respondent of the responsibility of complying with Department rules. Respondent also contended that he was being singled out for enforcement purposes because he is black. There was no evidence, however, to support this contention. In mitigation, Respondent believed he was working with Sullivan, as the owner of the property, in jointly performing the work, and there was no intent on his part to evade the licensing requirements. In addition, there was no danger to the public, and the customer's property was not damaged. Although the Department contends that Respondent has installed many septic tanks and drain fields "without a permit," there is no evidence in the record of specific jobs performed illegally by Respondent. Finally, the $2,000.00 administrative fine suggested by the Department would appear to have an adverse impact on Respondent's livelihood.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Health enter a Final Order finding Respondent guilty of violating Rules 64E-6.022(1)(a) and (b), Florida Administrative Code, and that Respondent be issued a letter of warning as to the first violation and that an administrative fine in the amount of $250.00 be imposed for the second violation. The allegation that Respondent violated a third rule should be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of January, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of January, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Angela T. Hall, Agency Clerk Department of Health Building 6, Room 102 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Rodney M. Johnson, Esquire 1295 West Fairfield Drive Pensacola, Florida 32501 Herman Campbell 621 Oak Lane Fort Walton Beach, Florida 32548 Willie Harmon Post Office Box 733 Fort Walton Beach, Florida 32548 Pete Peterson, Esquire Department of Health Building 6, Room 102 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700

Florida Laws (1) 120.57 Florida Administrative Code (1) 64E-6.022
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES vs. ROGER R. NEWTON, 86-000922 (1986)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 86-000922 Latest Update: Jan. 05, 1988

Findings Of Fact On December 28, 1984, Respondents Newton and Taylor applied to the Franklin County Public Health Unit for permits authorizing construction of septic tanks and drain field systems on properties they own adjoining the Apalachicola River. Respondent Newton filed two applications for two contiguous lots he owned on the river, while Taylor's application was for a parcel of property approximately 200 feet north of Newton's property, also adjoining the river. Sometime during the following two weeks, Donald Shirah, then environmental health specialist with the Franklin County Public Health Unit, a subdivision of HRS, performed a site evaluation of the sites referred to in the permit applications. The site evaluation performed by Mr. Shirah indicated that on each lot soil composition consisted of gray sand down to 45 inches, with "mottling" at 45 inches and wet soil from 46 inches to 60 inches. The soil composition reflected a wet season high water table lying at 45 inches below the ground surface. The soil report further indicated that the percolation rate of 2 units per minute was "an excellent percolation rate." Based on these tests, Shirah approved the sites for construction of the septic tanks and drain fields and established the points on the property where the septic tanks should be located. Thereafter, in May, 1985, the District II office of HRS, which directs the Franklin County Public Health Unit in matters concerning septic tanks and their installation, directed the Public Health Unit to reevaluate certain septic tank construction permits. Consequently, a letter from the Department went to all permit holders in Franklin County on August 5, 1985, including the Respondents. This letter informed them that their permits were subject to reevaluation. A considerable public furor ensued and, in an attempt to abate the discord and explain its intended action, HRS arranged a meeting with some of its public health officials and the Franklin County Commission on August 14, 1985. Respondent Newton attended this public hearing and exhibited his existing permit to HRS personnel in attendance. E. Charlton Prather, M.D., the state health officer for HRS, in attendance at this meeting, assured Respondent Newton that because his application had been made in 1984, prior to the designation of Franklin County as an "area of critical state concern," (effective July 1, 1985) and prior to the amendments to Chapter 10D-6, Florida Administrative Code, effective February 5, 1985, that his septic tank permits were still valid. Thereafter, Newton arranged with a contractor, to have the septic tanks installed, which was accomplished in approximately late October, 1985. Newton had received a letter on October 11, 1985, from the Franklin County Public Health Unit, instructing him to contact the County Public Health Unit before proceeding with construction of his septic tank systems. Notwithstanding this letter, and in reliance on Dr. Prather's assurance that his permits were valid, Newton proceeded to install his septic tank systems. The installations were completed, and Newton paid the installer for the work on or before November 5, 1985, some two weeks after installation. The installation of the systems came to the attention of the Franklin County Public Health Unit on approximately December 10, 1985, when the septic tank installer informed Gerald Briggs, the environmental health specialist with the Franklin County Public Health Unit, that Newton's septic tank systems had been installed and were ready for inspection. Mr. Briggs gave the final inspection and informed the installer that the tanks were installed in accordance with the specifications contained in the permits. He also informed the installer that he could not issue final approval of the systems because they were located within 20 feet of "marsh land" and that, because he observed standing water on or about the site, the soil conditions were such that the system would not operate properly. Mr. Briggs discussed the situation with environmental health director, John Kinlaw, who decided that the permits should be revoked because they were located within a "wetland" area as defined by the rules of the Department of Environmental Regulation; so called "jurisdictional wetlands." Mr. Briggs made measurements and examination of the soil and water conditions at the site and his measurements revealed standing water at a depth of 12 to 15 inches below the surface, contrary to the findings of Mr. Shirah, who performed the inspection which resulted in the issuance of the permits. Mr. Briggs also observed a "marsh are all visible within 20 feet of the systems characterized by a growth of "marsh grass." Mr. Briggs' inspection was made at a time shortly after the hurricane which struck this area in late November of 1985, characterized by a severe and extensive period of rainfall. Mr. Briggs also observed mottling near the surface of the soil, at all three sites, which indicates water being present intermittently, such that the soil, being alternately wet and exposed to air, oxidizes, leaving a rust colored stain. The septic tanks were installed at about a 5 1/2 or 6 foot depth. There is about 2 to 3 feet of fill sand at the site, below which the installer had to dig to place the tanks. The fill sand is underlain by muck at a depth of 4 to 6 feet below the ground surface. As a necessary part of the installation of the tanks, some of that muck had to be excavated and placed on top of the ground in the vicinity of the tanks and remained on or near the surface of the ground at the time of Mr. Briggs' inspection. The water table exists at a level of approximately 4 feet below the ground surface and when that wet muck was excavated, some of it necessarily remained visible on the surface of the sites in question. The systems constructed on Newton's lots are between 110 and 115 feet from the mean high water line of the Apalachicola River. The site description contained in the applications for the systems stated that the sites were to be 152 feet from the river. Nevertheless, there is no question that the sites are more than 75 feet from the Apalachicola River and that inspector Shirah assured the respondents that their sites were appropriately located. Indeed, he assisted in the location of them and informed the Respondents that the systems met pertinent regulatory requirements. That decision resulted in the issuance of the construction permits. Mr. Shirah established that the septic tank systems met all pertinent criteria concerning setback distances from lakes, streams, canals or other surface water bodies, including the Apalachicola River. Roger Newton, a Respondent and Bob Engle, former director of research for the Department of Natural Resources, both testified concerning their familiarity with the property in question and the general physical description and topography of the land. The general physical nature of the property in 1987 was the same as it was prior to and at the time of the issuance of the permits on January 14, 1985. They established that there was no lake, canal, stream or surface water within 75 feet of the septic tank systems or sites in question. A consent order was introduced into evidence which reveals, as a result of prior litigation in Franklin County Civil Case No. 75-55, that the Department of Environmental Regulation and the Army Corp of Engineers issued permits to the former owners of the property, which authorized them to fill the land at issue to a depth of 150 feet from the bank of the Apalachicola River westward. That fill was placed over the westward portion of this property, including the septic tank and drain field sites in question, to a depth of 2 to 3 feet. This had the result of raising the property to an elevation of approximately 10 feet above the surface waters of the Apalachicola River, which elevation dropped slightly to a road going through the middle of the lots, and remaining level thence westward to a point where the lots terminate in a marsh area. The consent order in evidence does not establish on its face that the fill was actually placed in a jurisdictional wetland area, for purposes of the Department of Environmental Regulation's jurisdiction over the landward extent of state water as defined by the vegetative index contained in Chapter 17-4, Florida Administrative Code. The testimony of a representative of the DER does not establish what dominant vegetational species might prevail on the sites in question which would render those sites within jurisdictional wetlands of the DER. The representative of the DER established that a jurisdictional wetland may be commonly referred to as a "swamp" or "marsh" and that, under prevailing policy of the DER, the fact that fill dirt has been placed on land does not render such land non-jurisdictional. Although this witness described DER's policy that issuance of a dredge and fill permit implies that the land in question is jurisdictional wetland, the fact remains that the face of the circuit court consent order in evidence does not establish that this indeed was jurisdictional wetland at the time the consent order was entered, nor at the present time. The consent order was the result of a settlement of that litigation, in effect a negotiated contract between the parties by which the dredge and fill permit was issued, in 1978. Further, although HRS purportedly has a policy that the term "surface waters," for purposes of the rules cited herein, includes within its ambit "swamps and marshes," the fact remains that in Rule 10D-6.42(38), the admitted 1985 clarification of that policy, surface water is defined as "...a recognizable permanent body of water, including swamp or marsh areas, contained within a recognizable boundary or bank..."(emphasis supplied). The septic tanks in question are not within 50 feet (for purposes of the pre-February 1985 rules) nor even within 75 feet of a swamp or marsh area which is contained within a recognizable boundary or bank. Even if marsh grass, (the species of grass has not been established) was observed growing within 20 feet of the septic tanks in question, it has not been established that was the boundary of a swamp or marsh area or other form of surface water body for purposes of the HRS rules in question. The testimony of the Petitioner's witnesses that marsh grass was observed growing close to the septic tanks does not overcome the showing by witnesses Newton and Engle that the actual water body, consisting of the marsh lying westward of the lots and disposal systems in question, was not within 75 feet of those systems. In addition to the question of the setback distance of the septic tank systems from the surface waters in question, it has not been established that this property is wetland within the DER's jurisdiction. The Petitioner purports to regulate the location of the systems by reference to Chapter 17-4, Florida Administrative Code, whereby the DER, by the use of the vegetative index, defines wetlands or the landward extent of state waters. Thus HRS seeks also to justify revocation of the permits on the basis that these tanks are located not 50 feet or less from a marsh, but rather in it. As found above however, such has not been proven to be the case. Although HRS purports to have a policy that any change which takes place on a piece of property, for which a septic tank permit has been issued, which creates a discrepancy between the actual state of the land and that represented on the permit application, renders the permit invalid, that situation has not occurred. In fact, it was shown that the fill in question has been on the property much longer than the period of time since the permit application and that the configuration and topography of the property remains the same as prior to December, 1984. Finally, it has not been proven that the surface waters observed standing on the lands of Newton and Taylor, shortly after the extensive rainfall associated with the hurricane in November, 1985, are such waters as contemplated by Rule 10D-6.046(3) or 10D-6.042(38). There has been no proof that this was other than rainfall nor that the water remained on the surface of the land in question for more than 24 hours. See Rule 10D-6.046(3), Florida Administrative Code.

Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, and the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, it is, therefore RECOMMENDED that the administrative complaints filed by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services seeking revocation of the septic tank construction permits issued to Jack Taylor and Roger Newton be dismissed in their entirety. DONE and ORDERED this 5th day of January, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of January, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NOS. 86-0922, 86-1528 Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact: Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. 4-6. Rejected as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter and contrary to the preponderant weight of the evidence. Rejected as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. Accepted. Rejected as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter and not in its entirety supported by competent substantial evidence. Rejected as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. Accepted, but not dispositive of material issues presented. 12-15. Rejected as irrelevant and immaterial. Accepted, but not in itself dispositive of any material issue presented. Rejected as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter and contrary to the competent substantial evidence of record. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact: 1-6. Accepted. Accepted in part, but subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. Accepted, but not dispositive of any material issues presented. Accepted, but not in itself dispositive of any material issue presented. Accepted, but not dispositive of any material issue presented and subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. Accepted. Rejected as contrary to competent substantial evidence of record and subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. 13-14. Accepted. Rejected as irrelevant and immaterial. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected as constituting a conclusion of law and not a finding of fact. Accepted. Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: John L. Pearce, Esquire HRS District II Legal Counsel Suite 200-A 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32303 John R. Perry, Esquire Suite 200-A 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32303 J. Ben Watkins, Esquire 41 Commerce Street Apalachicola, Florida 32320 John A. Kinlaw Environmental Health Director Franklin County Public Health Unit Post Office Box 490 Apalachicola, Florida 32320 Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Mr. Sam Power, Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 ================================================================= AGENCY REMAND ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, Petitioner, vs. CASE NO.: 86-0922 ROGER R. NEWTON, Respondent. / DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, Petitioner, vs. CASE NO.: 86-1528 JACK TAYLOR, Respondent. / ORDER REMANDING TO THE DIVISION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS I conclude that this case should be remanded to the Division of Administrative Hearing for a reweighing of the evidence. In Friends of Children vs. HRS, 504 So2d 1345 at 1348 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987), the Court held that where a Hearing Officer erroneously excluded evidence, the case should be remanded for the Hearing Officer to reweigh the evidence and make findings of fact on the basis of all admissible evidence. Returning to the present case, the Hearing Officer did not consider HRS exhibit Y, which he excluded as irrelevant, and the testimony of Larry Olney, an environmental specialist with the Department of Environmental Regulations, on the issue of whether the subject lots were jurisdictional land (for explanation see the rulings on exceptions number nine 9 and 11 to the findings of fact and exception number 1 to the conclusion of law). This evidence is relevant; thus, the evidence as a whole must be reweighed and findings made on whether the 75 foot setback requirement of Section 381.272(6)(c), Florida Statutes (1983) is satisfied. RULINGS ON EXCEPTIONS FILED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES HRS excepts to the findings on page 5 of the Recommended Order concerning the statements of Dr. Prather at a meeting in August, 1985, on the grounds the statements are irrelevant. Exception number one (1) is denied as this finding simply Provides background for the case. HRS excepts to the finding in the paragraph spanning pages 6 and 7, regarding standing water. On this point as well as many others throughout the case the evidence is conflicting The Hearing Officers findings of fact are entitled to the same weight as the verdict of a jury. Gruman vs. State, 379 So2d 1313 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1980). It is the Hearing Officers function to resolve conflicts in the evidence, judge the credibility of witnesses, draw permissible inferences from the evidence, and make findings of fact; and the agency may not reject a finding unless there is no competent, substantial evidence from which the finding could reasonably be inferred. Heifetz vs. Department of Business Regulation, 475 So2d 1277 at 1281 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). The finding to which HRS objects is supported by competent, substantial evidence; therefore, it cannot be rejected. This Order requires that the evidence be reweighed. In exception number three (3) HRS asks that the Hearing Officer's findings regarding "mottling" be clarified. Exception number three (3) is granted. The presence of mottling indicates that water stays at a certain level for a considerable length of time on a regular basis. HRS excepts to the finding on page 7 of the Recommended Order, that "the water table exists at a level of approximately 4 feet below the ground surface." The finding is based on competent, substantial evidence; therefore, it cannot be rejected. This Order requires that the evidence be reweighed. HRS excepts to the finding on page 8 of the Recommended Order, that no surface water existed within 75 feet of the septic tank systems in question. The finding is based on competent, substantial evidence; therefore, it cannot be rejected. This Order requires that the evidence be reweighed. HRS excepts to the finding that the subject lots were not DER jurisdictional wetlands. This finding cannot be rejected as it was the subject of contradictory evidence. There was evidence that the lots had been filled and were no longer swamp or marsh. This Order requires that the evidence be reweighed. In exception number seven (7), HRS maintains that the subject lands were wetlands and that there was no conflicting evidence on this point. This issue was the subject of sharply conflicting evidence. As Pointed out in exception number two (2), it is the function of the Hearing Officer to resolve conflicting evidence. This Order requires that the evidence be reweighed. HRS excepts to the finding on page 10 of the Recommended Order, that the species of marsh grass which HRS personnel identified as such were not established. Again, this Order requires that the evidence be reweighed. It is noted that several species were identified in HRS exhibit Y which the Hearing Officer ruled was irrelevant. HRS excepts to the Hearing Officer's finding with respect to HRS' reliance on the jurisdictional evaluation by DER authorized by Chapter 17-4, Florida Administrative Code. HRS does not regulate the location of on-site sewage disposal systems by reference to this chapter. Rather, HRS regulates the location of such systems by reference to Chapter 10D-6, Florida Administrative Code, and in this instance reads the terms "swamp" and "marsh", which were undefined in Chapter 10D-6, Florida Administrative Code, in pari materia with the definitions of wetlands in Chapter 17-4, Florida Administrative Code. Exception number nine (9) is granted. A determination by DER that property is wetlands under its rule is highly relevant to whether the property is swamp or marsh under the HRS rule. HRS excepts to the statement in the Recommended Order that HRS has a policy that any change which takes place on a piece of property, for which a septic tank permit has been issued, which creates a discrepancy between the actual state of the land and that represented on the permit applicant, renders the permit invalid. This is not HRS' policy. This portion of exception number ten (10) is granted. Regarding the Hearing Officer's finding on the extent of surface water, again the evidence was conflicting. HRS objects to the finding in the conclusions of law section, that HRS has "changed" its interpretation of the rules regarding permitting of on-site sewage disposal systems in DER jurisdictional areas. It has been and remains HRS' policy to deny the permitting of such systems in DER jurisdictional areas. This is a sound policy as it is likely to be very unusual that land which is "wetlands" under the DER rule would nevertheless meet the criteria for installation of a septic tank under HRS rules. HRS is obligated to enforce its own rules, Section 120.68(12)(b), Florida Statutes; and if the facts are such that a septic tank is lawful under HRS statutory and rule authority it must be approved. While not applicable to this case, I direct that serious consideration be given to amending the HRS rule to adopt by reference the DER rule. The Apalachicola River is a fragile and irreplacable jewel in Florida's ecological crown. If that river and the bay nourished by it are destroyed it is likely to be caused by the cumulative effect of many small decisions, each of which, individually have an almost imperceptible effect. The enforcement of HRS' septic tank rules will hopefully help prevent loss of the river. Exception number eleven (11) is granted. EXCEPTIONS TO CONCLUSIONS OF LAW HRS excepts to the Hearing Officer's ruling excluding from evidence HRS exhibit Y, the DER jurisdictional report. This exception is granted as the exhibit is highly relevant on the issue of whether the septic tanks were installed in or within 75 feet of marsh or swamp surface water areas. HRS excepts to the conclusion that under the rules prevailing at the time the applications for permits were filed, a 50 foot setback was required. The statutory requirement was 75 feet; thus, the rule was repealed by implication. Section 381.272(6)(c), Florida Statutes (1983). This exception is granted. HRS excepts to the conclusion that HRS was attempting to expand its jurisdiction of wetlands. See the ruling on exception number eleven (11) to the findings of fact. Here HRS further argues the jurisdictional issue. See the ruling on exception number eleven (11) to the findings of fact. HRS maintains that the Hearing Officer concluded that the high water line of the swamp or marsh could not be determined. From a review of the transcript and exhibits it is clear that conflicting evidence was received on the setback issue and that findings were made. This Order requires that the evidence be reweighed. HRS excepts to the conclusion that the permits must be honored because they were not shown to contain knowingly false or misleading information. The decision on these permits must be based on application of the setback law; thus, this exception is granted. Here HRS further argues the jurisdictional issue. See the ruling on exception number eleven (11) to the findings of fact. Based on the foregoing, it is adjudged that this case be remanded to the Division of Administrative Hearing for further proceedings consistent with this Order. DONE and ORDERED this 15th day of February, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. Gregory L. Coler Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services Assistant Secretary for Programs COPIES FURNISHED: John R. Perry, Esquire District 2 Legal Counsel 2639 North Monroe Street Suite 200-A Tallahassee, Florida 32303 J. Ben Watkins, Esquire WATKINS & RUSSELL 41 Commerce Street Apalachicola, Florida 32320 Michael Ruff Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 John L. Pearce, Esquire District 2 Legal Counsel 2639 North Monroe Street Suite 200-A Tallahassee, Florida 32303 John A. Kinlaw Environmental Health Director Franklin County Public Health Unit Post Office Box 490 Apalachicola, Florida 32320 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing was sent to the above-named people by U.S. Mail this 16th day of February, 1988. R. S. Power, Agency Clerk Assistant General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Building One, Room 407 Tallahassee, Florida 32299-0700 (904)488-2281 ================================================================= ORDER DECLINING REMAND =================================================================

Florida Laws (3) 120.57120.68479.08
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ELSBERRY AND ELSBERRY vs. SOUTHWEST FLORIDA REGIONAL PLANNING COUNCIL, 75-002095 (1975)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 75-002095 Latest Update: Mar. 21, 1977

Findings Of Fact Application 7500165 requested average withdrawal of water of 1,804,750 gallons per day from 4 wells located about a mile east of Highway 41 and a mile north of Apollo Beach. The four wells would be for irrigation of tomato crops on total acreage of 4 acres located in Hillsborough County (Exhibit 1, Testimony of Elsberry and Boatwright). Notice of hearing as to the application was published in a newspaper of general circulation in accordance with statute and rule (Exhibit 3). A letter of objection from Joseph S. Benham, Apollo Beach, Florida, dated November 19, 1975 was submitted to the Water Management District, wherein he expressed concern regarding water shortages and, although he does not seek to totally deny the application, is of the belief that the district must insure sufficient controls and management of irrigation activities so that resources are not wasted, water runoff to drainage ditches is eliminated and renewed justification is given each year for the withdrawal (Exhibit 2). A representative of the District staff established that there would be no violation of statutory or regulatory requirement for issuance of a consumptive water use permit in this case except as to the fact that potentiometric level of the applicant's property would be lowered below sea level as a result of withdrawal. It was agreed at the hearing that a period of thirty days should be granted both parties to formulate a stipulation as to control of runoff. An unsigned stipulation was received from the Water Management District by the hearing officer on March 1, 1976, which provided that the permit would be granted with the following stipulations: Runoff from the property will be limited to 25 percent of the quantity pumped and by December 31, 1980 shall be reduced to 16.5 percent of the quantity pumped. The District may at its own expense install metering devices for the purpose of monitoring runoff. The permittee will be notified in advance of such action. The Permit will expire on December 31, 1980. (Testimony of Boatwright, Exhibit 4).

Recommendation That application 8500165 submitted by Elsberry and Elsberry, Inc. Route 2, Box 70 Ruskin, Florida, for a consumptive water use permit be granted with the conditions as follow: Runoff from the property will be limited to 25 percent of the quantity pumped and by December 31, 1980 shall be reduced to 16.5 percent of the quantity pumped. The District may at its own expenseinstall metering devices for the purpose of monitoring runoff. The permittee will be notified in advance of such action. The Permit will expire on December 31, 1980. That the Board grant an exception to the provision of Rule 16J- 2.11(4)(e), F.A.C., for good cause shown. DONE and ENTERED this 15th day of March, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Jay T. Ahern, Esquire Southwest Florida Water Management District Post Office Box 457 Brooksville, Florida 33512 Elsberry & Elsberry, Inc. Route 2, Box 70 Ruskin, Florida

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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES vs JOSEPH LOIACANO, D/B/A GULF COAST FOOD DISTRIBUTORS, INC., 92-001017 (1992)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:New Port Richey, Florida Feb. 17, 1992 Number: 92-001017 Latest Update: May 29, 1992

The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Petitioner, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS), should fine the Respondent, William Loiacano, d/b/a Gulf Coast Food Distributors, Inc., for maintaining a sanitary nuisance.2/

Findings Of Fact In 1990,6/ the Respondent, William Loiacano, d/b/a Gulf Coast Food Distributors, Inc., purchased property at 8402 Lemon Road, Port Richey, Florida, for purposes of relocating his on-going food distributing business. The prior owner operated a carpet business, with approximately five employees, at the location. The Respondent had about 45-50 employees. Shortly after the Respondent started doing business at the new location, he began to have problems with the existing septic tank system. The problem seemed to relate to the increased use of the toilets in the building by the added number of the Respondent's employees. In September, 1990, an HRS environmental health specialist inspected the premises and observed evidence of raw sewage bubbling to the surface from the septic system's drain field and flowing into a stormwater retention pond on the property.7/ The Respondent was directed to abate the nuisance, and a discussion of the Respondent's alternatives ensued. The Respondent rejected the first proposed alternative of connecting to a central public sewer. The nearest connection was over 1000 feet away and would entail significant cost to the Respondent. (The cost would have been even higher if gravity flow was not possible, and it became necessary to pump to the connection point.) The Respondent chose, with HRS' permission, the next alternative of trying to solve the problem by installing a second septic tank system on the property. The second septic tank system for which the Respondent applied, and which he had built, was designed for domestic use by 15 employees. In addition, after installation of the second septic tank system, the Respondent began processing a relish pack and a salad mix on the premises. The processing method for these products required the use of a great deal of water. On or about February 7, 1991, another HRS environmental health specialist inspected the premises and again found evidence of raw sewage bubbling to the surface, this time from the new septic system's drain field, and flowing into the stormwater retention pond. The amount of water flowing into the drainfields, from a combination of the use of the toilets in the building, together with the new processing operations taking place in the building, had overtaxed the double septic tank system, and the system failed. Given the quantities of water needed to process the new products, the Respondent should have anticipated, and probably was aware of, the system failure. The Respondent was directed to fix the problem within a week or stop the processing the new products on the premises. The Respondent tried several water conservation methods in an attempt to address the problem without having to either stop processing the new products or incur the cost of connecting to the central public sewer system. He knew, or should have known, that his efforts were futile, given the quantities of water needed to process the relish pack and salad mix. HRS also referred the matter to the Florida Department of Environmental Regulation. DER inspected on or about February 18, 1991, and told the Respondent that he could not dispose of the industrial waste from the operation of his business in the on-premises septic system without an industrial waste disposal permit. In connection with this, DER apparently advised the Respondent that he would be required to test the water in the stormwater retention pond for certain contaminants. The Respondent was unable to understand what he needed to test for, and how, and sought assistance from DER and HRS. Although there is evidence that HRS tried to help the Respondent by referring him to certain individuals employed by the DER for answers, the Respondent did not follow HRS' guidance. In any case, the efforts would have been futile, as the Respondent did not have enough property to dispose of the industrial wastes from the operation of his business on-site using a septic tank system. On or about June 19, 1991, a neighbor complained to the Respondent about the smell of raw sewage coming from the Respondent's septic system. The Respondent did not receive his neighbor's observations kindly. The neighbor complained to HRS and the Pasco County Sheriff's office. An HRS inspection on June 20, 1991, confirmed the existence of a sanitary nuisance on the premises. Again, raw sewage was bubbling to the surface from the new septic system's drain field and was flowing into the stormwater retention pond. HRS arranged for another meeting with the Respondent on June 27, 1991. At the June 27, 1991, meeting, HRS required that the Respondent stop processing the relish pack and the salad mix until he could hook up to the central public sewer. It was felt that the septic tank systems might be adequate pending connection to the central public sewer if the quantities of water required for processing those products on the premises were eliminated and if other preventive measures were taken. From June 27, 1991, forward to the date of the hearing, the Respondent purchased relish pack and salad mix from other suppliers rather than process them on the premises at 8402 Lemon Road. In addition, the Respondent continued to attempt to conserve water, had the septic tanks pumped out as frequently as required (sometimes practically daily), and had his employees utilize portable toilets in an attempt to avoid additional septic tank failures. After learning that excessive water use at the premises was partially a result of plumbing leaks, the Respondent also had the plumbing fixed. The Respondent also immediately initiated the long process of connecting to the central public sewer. He had a meeting with the assistant county administrator for utilities service for Pasco County on July 3, 1991. They discussed alternatives for connecting the Respondent's business. Initially, the County wanted the Respondent to pay to run a sewer line over 1000 feet to the south of his property to enable the County to efficiently connect other businesses and property owners in that area. But this option would have been costly to the Respondent, and there was no guarantee that gravity flow was possible between the Respondent's property and the connection point. If not, the Respondent also would have to pay the cost of pumping to the connection point. The Respondent hired an engineer to design an alternative that would be less costly. He also sought the cooperation of his neighbors, who would be required to connect to central sewer when the Respondent did. The engineer also worked with those neighbors in designing an alternate connection. On or about September 9, 1991, another meeting was held among the Respondent and his engineer and the county's utilites construction team. As a result of this meeting, the County agreed to modify the connection route in accordance with the Respondent's proposal. The Respondent's engineer continued his work on the design of the connection. HRS inspections on or about September 11 and 25, 1991, revealed that the Respondent's septic system was failing again and that raw sewage again was bubbling to the surface from the new septic system's drain field and flowing into the stormwater retention pond. HRS arranged to meet with the Respondent again on October 4, 1991, along with a Pasco County deputy sheriff and a DER industrial wastewater compliance inspector. At this meeting, the Respondent felt that the deputy sheriff was threatening to arrest him for violation of the law, and he angrily terminated the meeting and asked all of them to leave the premises. In December, 1991, the Respondent arranged a meeting with the County and his neighbors to discuss sharing the cost of the connection route the Respondent was proposing to build. The neighbors, realizing the Respondent's weak bargaining position, refused to share the Respondent's costs. At this point, the County conceded to pay the approximate $9,000 to jack and bore under the road, but the Respondent was required to pay to run a sewer line approximately 300 feet to the south and to construct a manhole on his neighbors' side of the road, as well as on his side of the road. (The second manhole would be used by the neighbors to connect their properties to the line the Respondent was building when the County required them to connect.) The total cost to the Respondent for his part of the construction of the connection to the public sewer will be approximately $24,000. On January 17, 1992, the Respondent paid a $3,428 impact fee for connecting to the central public sewer, based on projected water use. On January 23, 1992, the Respondent applied for a force main interconnect permit. At the time of the final hearing, the jack and bore and the construction of the new sewer line connecting the Respondent's property to the central sewer were about to begin. The evidence indicates that, once HRS made it clear to the Respondent on or about June 27, 1991, that connection to the central public sewer was the Respondent's only remaining option, the Respondent moved with reasonable dispatch. The time it took to arrange to be connected to the public sewer was within normal ranges, and there is no evidence that the Respondent did anything to cause unnecessary delays. (Delays, if any, were caused by the need for the Respondent's engineer to work with and get cooperation from the Respondent's neighbors, who were not as anxious as the Respondent to have the new sewer line built.) There also is no evidence that the Respondent processed relish pack or salad mix on the premises after June 27, 1991. In addition, the Respondent continued to attempt to conserve water, had the septic tanks pumped out frequently (sometimes practically daily), and had his employees utilize portable toilets in an attempt to avoid additional septic tank failures. The evidence also indicates that, after June 27, 1991, all concerned were hopeful that the measures the Respondent was taking would prevent, or at least minimize, septic system failures pending connection to the public sewer. After June 27, 1991, HRS presented direct evidence of septic tank system failures only on two occasions in September, 1991. The evidence is that, after becoming aware of the system failures in September, 1991, HRS sought the imposition of a fine against the Respondent. The evidence suggests two other important motivating reasons for HRS' action: first, not being aware of the actions the Respondent took between June 27 and September, 1991, to connect to the central sewer, HRS mistakenly believed that the Respondent was ignoring its instructions; and, second, HRS mistook the Respondent's angry outburst at the meeting at the Respondent's place of business in September, 1991, when he felt he was being threatened with arrest for violation of the law, as being evidence that the Respondent was not genuine in his apparent concern and efforts to respond to HRS' guidance and instruction.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) enter a final order fining the Respondent, William Loiacano, d/b/a Gulf Coast Food Distributors, Inc., in the amount of $5,000. RECOMMENDED this 29 day of April, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this day of April, 1992.

Florida Laws (5) 120.57381.0061386.01386.03386.041
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ROBERT R. WASZAK vs. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, 81-000347 (1981)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 81-000347 Latest Update: Jul. 20, 1981

Findings Of Fact Petitioner Robert R. Waszak, a resident of Broward County, Florida, purchased Lot 258-A, a 1.25-acre lot in an unrecorded subdivision, Pinetree Estates Subdivision, in Parkland, Broward County, Florida. He cleared the property of a major portion of the sawgrass, pine trees, willows and other types of vegetation and placed thereon fill consisting of sand, rock, shell and other porous material. He obtained a test boring report from Nutting Engineers of Florida, Inc. (Petitioner's Exhibit 2). On December 16, 1980 he filed an application for a septic tank permit on a form provided by the Broward County Health Department together with residential plans and a survey of the property, which application was subsequently denied on January 15, 1981 by the environmental engineering section of the health department. Respondent made an on-site inspection of the Petitioner's lot on December 18, 1980 and at least one other inspection subsequent thereto. A report was filed as part of the notification of denial (Respondent's Exhibit 1). The uncompacted fill placed on the subject property by Petitioner created a mound considerably less than six (6) feet in depth on the obviously low, swampy property. Under the fill and the layer of top soil on the lot there is a layer of cap rock overlying the property. The largely impervious cap rock is visible in areas where the fill does not cover it (Respondent's Exhibit 1). Samples of the fill material and also of the cap rock were examined at the hearing by the Hearing Officer. The fill placed on the property has many rock fragments and rock fines in it which, according to the uncontroverted testimony of the Respondent's witness, are subject to chemical reaction which "cements up" a drainfield area when it comes in contact with septic tank effluent. This "cementing" would take from one to two (2) years after installation on the subject property. There was no evidence presented as to the depth of the water table at the wettest season. Petitioner did not dispute the testimony and evidence presented by the Respondent but was interested in further improvement so that he could use his property as a residential site. He noted that a new subdivision was being built near his property. Respondent pointed out that said subdivision had a central disposal system planned.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law the Hearing Officer recommends that the application of Petitioner Robert R. Waszak for a septic tank permit be denied. DONE and ORDERED this 29th day of June, 1981, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of June, 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Robert R. Waszak 60 NW 56th Court Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33302 Alan W. Ludwig, Esquire Broward County Health Department 2421 SW Sixth Avenue Post Office Box 14608 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33302 Alvin J. Taylor, Secretary Department of HRS 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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JOHN M. WILLIAMS vs DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, 02-004406 (2002)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Destin, Florida Nov. 15, 2002 Number: 02-004406 Latest Update: Jul. 28, 2003

The Issue Whether Respondent John M. Williams deposited fill in waters of the state without a permit from the Department of Environmental Protection. If so, what is the appropriate corrective action and penalty?

Findings Of Fact Mr. Williams and the Cowford Subdivision Petitioner John M. Williams is a retired mechanic. In 1992, he became acquainted with the Cowford subdivision in Walton County, near Bruce, Florida. The subdivision fronts the Choctawhatchee River. Mr. Williams purchased lot 29 of the subdivision. Three or four years later, he bought lot 30. All told, Mr. Williams paid approximately $47,000 for the lots, an electric power line and an "above-ground" septic tank. The purchase price of the lots was $38,000. Running an electric line and installation of an electric light pole cost about $4,000. Mr. Williams paid about $5,000 for the septic tank and its installation. Mr. Williams' ultimate goal in purchasing the lots and adding the improvements was to build a house on the property for use in his retirement. Attempt to Obtain the Necessary Permits The septic tank was not purchased by Mr. Williams until after he had obtained a permit for its construction. At the county offices where he went to obtain the necessary permit, he was "sent over to the power company." (Tr. 216). At hearing, he described what happened there: I paid my money to get my power and they -- well, they informed me . . . once I got my power on I had 6 months to get my septic tank in the ground or they would turn my lights off. So here I had a $3,500 light pole put up and I couldn't very well see this thing going down. So, I went ahead to the Health Department. (Id.) Mr. Williams' testimony is supported by a Walton County Environmental Health Notice dated March 8, 1999, that states, "The Walton County Building Department will not be issuing approval for power for any residence until final approval of the septic system is obtained from the Walton County Environmental Health Office." P7, the first page after Page 3 of 3, marked in the upper right hand corner as PAGE 10. At the Health Department, on April 12, 1999, Mr. Williams applied for an "Onsite Sewage Treatment and Disposal System" permit on a form bearing the following heading: STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH ONSITE SEWAGE DISPOSAL SYSTEM APPLICATION FOR CONSTRUCTION PERMIT Authority; Chapter 381, FS & Chapter 10D-6, FAC P7, page 1 of 3. According to the form, he paid the $200 fee for the permit on April 29, 1999. The payment was made within a month or so after the installation of the power line. An attachment to the "Walton County Environmental Health Onsite Sewage Treatment and Disposal System Application," made out by Mr. Williams on April 12, 1999, contains the following warning: OTHER AGENCY PERMITS: As the owner or agent applying for an OSTDS permit it is my responsibility to determine if the proposed development is in compliance with the zoning requirements of Walton County. I further assume responsibility to obtain any applicable permits from other State and Local Government Agencies. P15, page 2. (emphasis supplied) (See also P7, the second page after Page 3 of 3, marked in the upper right hand corner as PAGE 11). On May 5, 1999, about three weeks after Mr. Williams submitted the construction permit application, the site where the septic tank would be installed was evaluated by an EH Specialist, an inspector. On the same day, an Onsite Sewage Treatment and Disposal System Construction Permit was issued for an "above-ground" 900-gallon septic tank. Installation With county personnel present and under county supervision, the septic tank was installed on a ridge on Mr. Williams property about 17 feet above mean sea level. Fill dirt was brought onto the site and placed on top of the tank to create a septic tank mound. No dredging of the property was done in connection with the installation. Chance Discovery After a complaint was registered with DEP about dredge and fill activity on one of the lots near Mr. Williams, Gary Woodiwiss, then an environmental specialist in the Department assigned to conduct inspections in Walton and Holmes Counties, visited the Cowford subdivision in July 2000. During the visit, Mr. Woodiwiss noticed the septic tank mound on Mr. Williams' property and that the mound, in part, consisted of fill dirt. Being of the opinion that the both the fill dirt and the septic tank system constituted "fill" and that the fill may have been deposited in jurisdictional wetlands, that is, "waters of the state," Mr. Woodiwiss consulted with DEP personnel about the status of the site and DEP jurisdiction. Ultimately, DEP determined that the site of the septic tank mound, within the flood plain of the Choctowhatchee River, was jurisdictional wetlands. The Department took action. DEP Action On November 16, 2000, Mr. Woodiwiss issued a memorandum to the DEP file with regard to "John Williams. Unauthorized Fill in Flood Plain." The memo states: Site is located next to Charles Riley who is the subject of Department action for filling jurisdictional wetlands. Williams was erroneously given a permit by Walton County health Dept. to install a septic system in 1999, which he subsequently installed. I visited the site with the administrator for the septic tanks program in Walton and she indicated that they would pay for the installation of a new system on a new lot for Mr. Williams. I recommend that the removal of the system and relocation of the inhabitants of the lot to an area outside of the immediate flood plain. P6. (emphasis supplied) Five days later, on November 21, 2002, a warning letter was generated by Mr. Woodiwiss under the signature of Bobby A. Cooley, Director of District Management for DEP. The letter advised Mr. Williams as follows: Recent Department survey data established at your property has determined that your entire lot is below the mean annual flood line of the Choctawhatchee River and is subject to dredge and fill jurisdiction of the Department. Any construction on the property including placement of a mobile home, septic tank and drainfield or other structures must first receive a dredge and fill permit from the Department. Preliminary assessment of your proposed development of the property indicates that you may not meet the public interest criteria of Chapters 403 and 373 Florida Statutes for qualifying for a permit. R5. By this letter the Department informed Mr. Williams both that he was in violation of the law by not having secured a permit for the filling of the site and warned that, on the basis of a preliminary assessment, it was not likely that he would be eligible for an after-the-fact permit. The assessment of whether the site was eligible for a permit was re-stated in writing again, but with added certainty in a Compliance Assessment Form (the Form) prepared by DEP personnel. In Section V. of the form, there appears, together with the signature of the "Section Permit Processor and a date of "11/09/2000", the following: Project is not permittable due to type of wetland system being impacted and project must not be "Contrary to the Public Interest". The project could affect the public health, safety and welfare and property of others. The project is of a permanent nature. P13. Although the permit processor entered her assessment on November 9, 2000, and other sections of the form were entered on November 1, 2000, by Mr. Woodiwiss, the Compliance Assessment Form bears a final date of February 1, 2001. The Form shows the "Event Chronology" that led to the issuance of the NOV. The chronology, consistent with the testimony at hearing, reveals the following: 25 Jul.00. Complaint inspection for fill in wetlands on adjacent lot. Found isolated fill areas in a slough and adjacent to an apparent upland area. Vegetation is 100% jurisdictional but soil is composed of alluvial deposits in ridge like configurations, one of which the respondent wished to live on. Solicited the jurisdictional team for a district assist in determining jurisdiction. 21 Aug.00. District assist. Hydrologic indicators and vegetation present in sufficient quantities to establish jurisdiction. John Tobe PhD. Requested that the mean annual flood be established on the site in order to augment his determination. October 11, 2000. District assist by Bureau of Survey and mapping and the establishment of a survey line of the 2.33 year (16.42 feet above MSL) mean annual flood elevation on the adjacent violation site. The whole site is clearly under the MAF, which extends approximately 200 meters up grade towards SR 20. The elevation of the MAF is consistent with hydrological indicators (porella pinnatta) that indicate such a flood elevation, as reported in previous studies. November 7, 2000. Met with Crystal Steele and Mike Curry of Walton County DOH to establish why Mr. Williams has a septic tank permit. They indicated that the permit was issued in error and that they would require the system to be moved. Ms. Steele stated that the County would pay for Mr. Williams to have a new system installed on another site because of the oversight. There are currently two moveable vehicles on the site, one of which is connected to the system, the other has a contained service for sewage. November 21, 2000. WLI [presumably Warning Letter Issued] November 27, 2000. Call to Mr. Williams. He wants to get money back or swap property for higher. I advised him to approach the owner Mr. Martin and make his situation known. January 22, 2000. Mr. Williams has refused to remove the fill and requests an NOV. P13, (emphasis supplied) MAF and Wetland Delineation There was considerable testimony introduced at hearing about establishment of the mean annual flood ("MAF") line for the purpose, among others, of its relationship to the elevation of the septic tank mound. The issue stemmed, no doubt, from Dr. Tobe's request that MAF be established in order to "augment his determination" with regard to DEP jurisdiction based on employment of the methodology in DEP's wetland delineation rule, see paragraph 13, above. Resolution of the issue is not necessary to augment the determination that all of lots 29 and 30 of the Cowford subdivision are located in wetlands that constitute "waters of the state." That the septic tank and the fill dirt were deposited on wetlands under the jurisdiction of DEP was clearly established by Dr. Tobe in his testimony at trial and the evidence in support of it. Petitioner concedes as much in his Proposed Final Order. Environmental Harm and Human Health Exposure Wetlands whose surface area is covered by the septic tank mound have been filled. The filling has caused environmental damage. An assessment of the damage was not offered at hearing but it appears from this record that the damage is minimal. During the time the septic tank has been on Mr. Williams' property, it has never been below the flood waters of the Choctawhatchee River and therefore has not yet caused direct hazard to human health. Corrective Action and Penalty It will be expensive to remove the septic tank; the expense will be more than the cost of installation. Petitioner fears, moreover, that it will render his property worthless. There is no evidence that Petitioner's violation of Department permitting requirements was willful. He has no history of violations previous to this one. Options to continued retention of a septic system through use of a portable wheeled waste remover or use of an upland drain field on another property are either not viable or so problematic as to be impractical. DEP Modification of its Position At the outset of the hearing, DEP announced that it no longer intended to seek civil penalties of $1,500 as it had intended when the NOV was issued. All that is sought by DEP by way of corrective action or penalty is removal of the septic tank and monetary reimbursement for the cost of the investigation of $250 (see Tr. 9, lls. 17-25, and Tr. 10, lls. 1-5.)

Florida Laws (5) 120.569120.57120.68403.031403.121
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MARIO RAMOS AND ELVIRA GONZALEZ vs. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, 87-000178 (1987)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 87-000178 Latest Update: Oct. 12, 1987

Findings Of Fact Petitioners own two contiguous residential lots, Lots 7 and 8, in Block 436 of the subdivision of Block 111 in the City of Clewiston, Florida, which were transferred to them by warranty deed dated September 27, 1978. There is no issue regarding ownership of both lots. Petitioners obtained a building permit from the City of Clewiston to construct a duplex residence on Lot 7 at a cost of approximately $40,000 to match the one already existing on Lot 8. Lot 8 now contains a 1050 gallon septic tank for the use of that building and in February, 1985, Petitioners applied for a permit to install another 1050 gallon septic tank for the use of the new construction. The tank was to straddle the property line between Lots 7 and 8. No written denial of the permit was ever furnished to Petitioners. The evidence indicates, however, that at some point around that time, Petitioner Gonzalez was advised verbally, by someone in the County Office, that her application was denied because the projected septic tank was to be located at least partly on both lots which is not permissible unless the lots were to be in some way irrevocably tied together. According to the pertinent DHRS rule, a septic tank may not be located within 5 feet of a property line. Petitioners took no action to install the septic tank (although the second structure was constructed). In late July, 1986, Petitioner again applied for a permit to install the 1050 gallon tank in the same location and again the application was denied, this time in writing. The reason for denial given this time included the fact that the additional tank would far exceed the allowable maximum daily sewage flow for the parcel of land in question. Under applicable rules of DHRS, maximum daily residential sewage flow allowable is 2500 gallons per day per acre. The two lots taken together cover approximately 1/4 acre which would permit approximately 625 gallons of sewage flow per day. The existing tank on Lot 8 utilizes or exceeds the daily allowable sewage flow even without the installation of the subject tank which would double the flow. When the second application was denied, Petitioner requested a variance from DHRS which, on October 22, 1986, was denied for the reasons stated in the paragraph next above. The city of Clewiston's current sewage system is presently at full capacity and a moratorium on new hook-ups is and has, at all times pertinent hereto, been in effect. Consequently, Petitioners have not been able to hook up to the city system which is not expected to have available capacity until 1990 or 1991. In the interim, the new construction cannot be occupied since it cannot be connected to the existing septic tank, a new septic tank, or the city sewer system. When the new city system is available, hook-ups of both the new and the existing construction will be mandatory. The current Environmental Health Director, Mr. McDougle, contends that under the current state of the law regarding the location of septic tanks. The county would consider the property owned by the Petitioners as two separate lots even though they were conveyed on the same warranty deed. Therefore, the lots would be 50 x 115 feet each and the proposed installation, which straddles the joint line between the lots, would violate the setback requirements. This defect could be remedied , however , by the construction of a building on the joint line, by a deed restriction preventing the separation of the lots, or by some other approved action which would insure the two lots would always be treated as one. Petitioners have invested their life savings in the construction of the second building ( the one on Lot 7), which, while completed, perforce stands empty. Economically, the current situation is hurting them. There was no evidence to show, even if material, that installation of the septic tank in question would permit occupancy of the building, however.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that Petitioners' application for a permit to construct a 1050 gallon septic tank on Lots 7 & 8, Block 436, Clewiston, Florida be denied. RECOMMENDED this 12th day of October, 1987, at Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of October, 1987. COPIES FURNISHED: Elvira Gonzalez 601 Saginaw Avenue Clewiston, Florida 33440 Anthony N. DeLuccia, Jr., Esquire District Legal Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services Post Office Box 06085 Fort Myers, Florida 33906 Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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