Findings Of Fact Culmer Place Tenants Association and Allapattah Tenant Association are not-for-profit corporations chartered by the State of Florida (Exhibits 1 and 2). Allapattah has received IRS tax-exempt status as a publicly supported corporation. Culmer Place has applied for such status but has not as yet received the IRS designation. Both Culmer Place and Allapattah are tenant associations at Housing and Urban Development (HUD) projects in Miami, Florida. These HUD projects are low- income residences sponsored and managed by HUD. The principal source of funds for each Petitioner is HUD. The Associations submit a budget to HUD and receive funds semiannually. Culmer Place received $453 from HUD in 1980 and Allapattah received a slightly less amount. The Associations sponsor activities in their projects principally oriented towards children. These projects, which have been presented by both Petitioners, are the Easter project, family picnic on July 4, Christmas project, community movies, and trips to the circus or other attractions. In addition, one or both Associations have sponsored dances and held rummage sales. Allapattah is currently proposing the establishment of a softball team if funds can be obtained. The Easter project consists of purchasing candy and eggs, getting volunteers to dye the eggs and putting these treats in bags which are given to the children who participate. At Culmer they have an Easter egg hunt but lack of space for hiding the eggs requires the bag approach at Allapattah. The Christmas project is similar to the Easter project in that the Petitioners use the money provided by HUD to purchase candy, fruits and stockings which are taken around and given to the children who live in the project. At the family picnic on July 4, barbeque is provided, as is other food and drinks. It appears that the Associations primarily provide "refreshments" at the projects they sponsor. No picnic was held in 1981 because funds were not available. Other activities sponsored by the Associations include cleanup campaigns at which the young people are assembled to pick up trash and generally "clean up" around the projects. The Associations provide refreshments for the workers and HUD provides the funds to pay these youngsters for their cleanup work. The money for the refreshments is budgeted by the Associations and provided by HUD. The summer lunch program is carried out at these projects with the food for the participants provided by the City, County, or HUD. The volunteers who supervise the serving of the food and activities that accompany this project are members of the Associations and are paid by HUD for the three hours they are so engaged each day. Movies are occasionally shown at the projects. The film is usually rented and the residents are invited by "flyer" to attend. Sometimes cartoons are obtained to show to the children. Occasionally, free tickets to the circus or to some local attraction are obtained by the Associations who arrange the transportation for the children and supervisors to participate in these field trips. These-projects and activities are provided free to the participants and participation is not limited to children, or others, who live in the Petitioner organizations. "Flyers" advertising these projects are prepared and delivered to the residents, placed on the bulletin boards at the housing project office, and some flyers are distributed outside the housing projects by putting them on poles, in stores (that permit) and in washerettes.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Rule 15A-10.043, Florida Administrative Code, and certain forms incorporated therein, constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority to the extent that the rule interprets the term "drug" to include alcohol.
Findings Of Fact The following facts, stipulated to by the parties in the Stipulated Facts, are hereby accepted: On March 16, 1993, Lee Eyer was convicted of his second DUI within 5 years, and his license was suspended for a period of five years (5) pursuant to section 322.28(2)(a)2, Florida Statutes. Under section 322.271(2)(b), Florida Statutes, a person whose license has been suspended for a period of 5 years or less may seek a reinstatement of a license for employment purposes (known as a hardship license). The statutory language requires that the person seeking the hardship license must "have been drug free for a least 12 months immediately prior to such reinstatement " Pursuant to Lee Eyer's request for a reinstatement of driving privileges restricted to business and employment purposes (hardship license), a hearing officer of the [Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles] conducted an administrative hearing on January 24, 1997. (Exhibit A). Pursuant to the direction of the hearing officer, Lee Eyer went to Bridgeway Center, Inc., in Ft. Walton Beach, Florida, on February 18, 1997, for the purpose of being evaluated for admission to its Special Supervision Services (SSS) Program, completion of which is required by the [Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles] in order to receive a hardship license. As part of the initial screening for the SSS Program at Bridgeway Center, Mr. Eyer completed a questionnaire, HSMV Form 72748 (re- numbered in 1/97 as Form 77013), on which he indicated that he consumes alcohol "4/week" and that he drank a beer on January 22, 1997. (Exhibit B). At the time of his initial screening at Bridgeway Center, Mr. Eyer was given DHSMV Form 72062 (11/96), which states that an applicant "[m]ust not have consumed any alcohol or drugs . . . for 1 year prior to reinstatement." (Exhibit C). Additionally, Mr. Eyer was given DHSMV Form 72747 (re-numbered in 1/97 as Form 77012), which states that "[a]n applicant with a revocation of 5 years or less must have not used any drugs for at least the past twelve (12) months. Drugs include alcohol . . . ." (Exhibit D). By letter dated February 19, 1997, Mr. Eyer received written notice that he was denied entry into the DUI SSS Program because of his "reported last use of alcohol on [1/22/97]." The letter further stated that he must be "drug/alcohol free for a minimum of one year prior to acceptance" into the SSS Program. (Exhibit E). Through section 15A-10.043, Florida Administrative Code (1997), the [Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles] specifically adopts and incorporates by reference Forms 77012 (formerly numbered 72747) and 77013 (formerly numbered 72748). On March 3, 1997, Lee Eyer filed a rule challenge petition with the Division of Administrative Hearings. After a hearing on March 31, 1997, Mr. Eyer was given leave to file an amended petition, which was filed on April 4, 1997. Pursuant to a hearing on May 16, 1997, Petitioner was given leave to file a second amended petition, which was filed on May 20, 1997, and which alleged that the rule promulgated by the [Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles] was an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. Should Lee Eyer be successful in his rule challenge, he intends to seek admission into the SSS Program offered by Bridgeway Center, Inc., in Fort Walton Beach, Florida. The following facts, which were contained in the Petition for Leave to Intervene filed by the Florida Association of D.U.I. Programs, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as "FADP"), and stipulated to by the parties, are hereby accepted: . . . . FADP is a not-for-profit Florida corporation. Its membership is composed entirely of licensed DUI programs. FADP's primary goal is to enhance the safety of all Floridians through a strong statewide system of DUI enforcement, education and treatment. FADP seeks to achieve this goal by promoting high standards and uniformity in all licensed DUI programs throughout the state, and by promoting substance abuse safety education related to drinking, drugs and driving. FADP represents its members by means of education, public relations, and participation in legislative activities, administrative proceedings, and court litigation. FADP has 24 member programs, all of which are licensed DUI programs. FADP and its members will be substantially affected by any interpretation of the rules at issue in this proceeding because FADP and its members are subject to regulation by the rules, and because DUI programs must apply the challenged rule to DUI offenders on a regular basis. Bridgeway Center, Inc., the DUI program to which Petitioner applied and was denied admission pursuant tot he challenged rule, is a member of FADP. The relief sought by FADP in this proceeding is appropriate for an association to receive on behalf of its members. Pursuant to the Second Amended Petition Seeking Administrative Determination of Validity of Rule filed in this case, Mr. Eyer has challenged Rule 15A-10.043, Florida Administrative Code, to the extent that it adopts by reference HSMV Forms 77012 (formerly numbered 72747), 77013 (formerly numbered 72748), and 72062 (hereinafter referred to as the "Challenged Rule"). The Challenged Rule is a rule adopted by Respondent, the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicle (hereinafter referred to as the "Department"), to implement Section 322.271(2)(b), Florida Statutes. In pertinent part, Section 322.271(2)(b), Florida Statutes, provides that "the Department shall require [applicants for a restricted driver license] to have not driven and to have been drug free for at least 12 months immediately prior to such reinstatement. . . ." In implementing this language, the Department has provided the following on HSMV Form 72062, "Administrative Hearing Requirements for Revocations" for persons who have been convicted of a second DUI conviction within 5 years of the first conviction: 2. Must complete DUI school and be enrolled in DUI Special Supervision Services and receive a favorable evaluation from that program . . . . . . . . Must not have consumed any alcohol or drugs or driven a motor vehicle for 1 year prior to reinstatement* . . . . *Drugs include alcohol and those so-called non- alcoholic beers or wines which contain less than .5% of alcohol. . . . HSMV Form 77013 (formerly numbered 72748) is a "Screening Form" completed at the time of registration at the DUI Special Supervision Services school. In pertinent part, this form provides the following: 5. How often do you presently consume alcohol, including the so-called non-alcoholic beers or wines which contain less that [sic] 0.5% of alcohol? HSMV Form 77012 (formerly numbered 72747), an "Information Sheet," is also provided at the time of registration. In pertinent part, this form provides the following: An applicant with a revocation of 5 years or less must have not used any drugs for at least the past twelve (12) months. Drugs include alcohol and those so-called non-alcoholic beers or wines which contain less than .5% of alcohol. . . . Mr. Eyer is challenging the Department's interpretation of the term "drug" as used in Section 322.271(2)(b), Florida Statutes, to include alcohol.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent committed a discriminatory housing practice in violation of chapter 760, Florida Statutes (2010). All statutory references will be to Florida Statutes (2010), unless otherwise indicated.
Findings Of Fact On or about November 18, 2010, Petitioner filed a Housing Discrimination Complaint. The complaint was the second or third of such complaints filed encompassing the same or similar issue: Petitioner's desire to have a laundry within his personal condominium unit. Pursuant to FCHR procedure, an investigation of the matter was completed that resulted in a Notice of Determination of No Cause. Essentially, FCHR found that based upon the allegations raised by Petitioner, there was no cause from which it could be found that Respondent had violated the Florida Fair Housing Act. Thereafter, Petitioner elected to file a Petition for Relief to challenge the determination and to seek administrative relief against Respondent for the alleged violation. FCHR then forwarded the matter to DOAH for formal proceedings. Petitioner and his wife own and reside in a condominium unit on the second floor of the Ocean Park Condominium complex. The property is located in Brevard County, Florida, and is subject to covenants and restrictions adopted at the time the unit was converted from an apartment to a condominium. There is no elevator to service Petitioner's second-story unit. Previously, the building and all units therein were designed and occupied as rental apartments. Although the property was converted several years ago, the basic structure of the building was not materially changed. The condominium complex has amenities that include a commonly owned laundry facility. At all times material to the allegations of this case, Petitioner knew or should have known that a laundry could not be located within his unit as no owner may lawfully have a laundry. Further, it was evident to Petitioner that his unit was located on the second floor accessed only by stairs at the time he purchased the condominium. Although Petitioner's unit is plumbed and wired for a washer and dryer, the laundry connections were not constructed in accordance with, or approved by, condominium rules and regulations. Should Petitioner attempt to connect a washer and/or dryer within the unit, Respondent would take legal action to enforce the condominium rules and seek an injunction prohibiting the use of the appliances. Respondent does not believe the units were constructed so that each unit could have laundry facilities. Additionally, Respondent will take legal action to remove laundry facilities found in any unit of the complex. Petitioner is 90+ years old and announced that hauling laundry from his second-story unit to the common laundry facility is difficult, if not impossible for him to continue to do. Petitioner has numerous medical conditions that make climbing stairs and carrying laundry very difficult. Additionally, Petitioner's wife has medical issues that preclude her from transferring the laundry down and back to the condominium unit. Although the medical evidence submitted by Petitioner is hearsay, it is accepted that Petitioner and his wife have great difficulty navigating to their second-story unit. It is also accepted that carrying laundry to and from the laundry facilities would be a great burden to them. Petitioner previously filed a complaint against Respondent and asked for relief based upon disability or handicap, since neither he nor his wife can do laundry as prescribed by the condominium. In settlement of the prior complaint with FCHR, Respondent agreed to provide an aide to Petitioner who will carry the laundry down from Petitioner's unit to the condominium laundry, and return the laundry up to the apartment. Petitioner must do the actual work of loading, unloading, and preparing the laundry for return to the unit. The parties voluntarily executed a Conciliation Agreement that provided, in pertinent part: It is understood that this Agreement does not constitute an admission on the part of the Respondent that it violated the Fair Housing Act of 1983, as amended. Complainant agrees to waive and release any and all claims against the Respondent with respect to any matters which were or might have been alleged in the complaint filed with the Commission or with the United States Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, and agrees not to institute a lawsuit based on the issues alleged in these complaints under any applicable ordinance or statute in any court of appropriate jurisdiction as of the date of this Agreement. Said waiver and release are subject to Respondent’s performance of the premises and representations contained in 1a, 1b, and 2b herein. After entering into the conciliation agreement, Petitioner, his wife, and Respondent executed a Settlement of Laundry Complaint. Petitioner did not employ a lawyer to give him legal advice before signing the conciliation agreement or the settlement agreement. The settlement outlines the terms upon which Respondent is to provide assistance to Petitioner to facilitate laundry duties. Petitioner claims the only acceptable remedy at this time, is to allow Petitioner to connect a washer and dryer within his unit so that he and his wife may do laundry without leaving their home, and at such times as they may wish to perform the laundry. Petitioner maintains that this remedy will eliminate the expense of paying the aide to assist him and will be an overall savings to the condominium association. Respondent maintains that it is willing to abide by the terms of the settlement agreement previously reached with Petitioner and that the terms of the settlement control the instant case. Further, Respondent asserts no facts support a legal basis for setting aside the agreement. The only changes in circumstances since the execution of the settlement are: Petitioner is older, Petitioner and his wife are more infirm, and Petitioner does not want to have to schedule the laundry as previously agreed, due to medical appointments. With the exception of the number of medical appointments, all of the "changed circumstances" were reasonably foreseeable at the time the settlement was signed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing Petitioner's claim of discrimination, but reminding Respondent of the terms of the parties' agreement regarding accommodation for Petitioner's laundry needs. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of May, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of May, 2011. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Sebastian Barbagallo 311 Taylor Avenue, Apartment G19 Cape Canaveral, Florida 32920 Joe Teague Caruso, Esquire The Law Offices of Caruso, Swerbilow & Camerota, P.A. 190 Fortenberry Road, Suite 107 Merritt Island, Florida 32952 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondents discriminated against Petitioners based on race regarding the renting of a house.
Findings Of Fact LM Rentals owns 80 houses, which it rents. Mr. Peeples manages LM Rentals. LM Rentals contracts with Vantage to provide management of the rental properties, and Ms. Mossow is employed by Vantage. LM Rentals rented a house to the Odoms for approximately eight years, beginning in 2003. Mrs. Odom is a Native American. Mr. Odom is White and is not a Native American. No evidence was presented to establish that either anyone from LM Rentals or Ms. Mossow was aware that Mrs. Odom is a Native American. Mrs. Odom's physical appearance, her speech, and her surname could reasonably lead one to think that she is not a Native American. Her appearance would lead one to believe that she is White. The application which the Odoms filled out to rent the house did not require the Odoms to state their race. Mrs. Odom never informed employees of LM Rentals or Ms. Mossow that she is a Native American. Mrs. Odom claims that her children have darker skin than she, and, therefore, Ms. Mossow and employees of LM Rentals should have known that she is a Native American by looking at her children. However, no testimony was presented that Ms. Mossow or anyone from LM Rentals ever met Mrs. Odom's children prior to the filing of the discrimination complaint. Ms. Mossow did not meet any of Mrs. Odom's children until a short time before the final hearing when she delivered copies of exhibits to the Odoms' home. Mr. Peeples, the representative of LM Rentals, did not meet the Odoms' children and never met the Odoms until a few days before the final hearing. The house which the Odoms rented from LM Rentals developed a mold problem. Instead of bringing the mold problem to the attention of Ms. Mossow or anyone at LM Rentals, the Odoms contacted the Polk County Health Department (Health Department), which sent an environmental specialist to investigate the mold situation in January 2010. LM Rentals received a letter from the Health Department concerning the mold. LM Rentals hired a third-party testing company to test the house for mold. The coils on the air conditioner were replaced. The Odoms were not satisfied and requested that Ms. Mossow find them another rental house in the same school district in which they currently resided. LM Rentals has an average vacancy rate of five percent, which equates to about four houses at any given time. At the time that the Odoms requested to be relocated, there was only one house vacant in the school district which the Odoms wanted. The Odoms did not like the house and refused to relocate. Mrs. Odom claims that there were other houses available, but could not point to any specific house. Her claim is based on sheer speculation. The Odoms requested that the carpet be replaced, but, based on the tests of the third-party testing company, LM Rentals refused to do so. About the time they were having the mold problems, the Odoms' daughter was suspended from school. Mrs. Odom attributes the suspension to discrimination by Respondents. Mrs. Odom called, as a witness, the teacher who made the referral which resulted in Mrs. Odom's daughter being suspended. The teacher did not know Ms. Mossow and did not know Mr. Peeples. The teacher, who is also an attorney, was not sure if she had ever represented LM Rentals in the past as an attorney. The suspension was totally unrelated to any mold problems and any alleged discrimination. Mrs. Odom also claims that her son was arrested for disorderly conduct about the time of the mold problem, and she lays the arrest at the door of Respondents. Her rationale for her claim is that the arrest happened at the time they were dealing with the mold issues and that LM Rentals knew people. There is not a scintilla of evidence to connect the arrest of the Odoms' son to any actions by Respondents. In April 2010, during the period in which the mold was an issue, a code enforcement inspector saw a small grill on the Odoms' driveway, which was apparently a code violation. The inspector told the Odoms that the grill needed to be removed. LM Rentals received a letter from the code enforcement department stating that LM Rentals would be fined if the violation was not corrected. Ms. Mossow contacted the Odoms in an attempt to get the grill removed in order to avoid being fined. Mrs. Odom claims that Ms. Mossow and LM Rentals caused the code enforcement inspector to come to the Odoms' home and ask that the grill be removed. Mrs. Odom's claim is without merit. It is unlikely that Ms. Mossow or LM Rentals would request a code enforcement inspector to find a code violation which would result in LM Rentals, as owner of the property, being fined. No evidence was presented to show that Respondents treated non-minorities any differently than the Odoms were treated.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Lawrence and Candace Odom's Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of December, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUSAN BELYEU KIRKLAND Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of December, 2011.
Findings Of Fact The defendants Polly E. and Joseph J. Schwey were, during the time material herein, registered real estate brokers with the commission and during times pertinent were operating and registered with the commission t/a Schwey Real Estate, Vero Beach, Florida. During July, 1973, the defendant Joseph J. Schwey entered into an oral agreement with Mid Lakes/Mid-River Packing Company, Inc., through messengers A. Victor Cancelmo and R. D. Goolsby, officers and managers thereof, for the purchase and sale of one thousand pallet boxes for a total purchase price of $20,000.00 F.O.B. Costa Rica to be imported therefrom to Miami, Florida, on or before September 1, 1973. According to messenger Goolsby, the general manager and vice-president of Mid Lakes/Mid-River Packing Company, Inc., he entered in an agreement with the defendant Joseph J. Schwey whereby he was to pay one third of the purchase price as a down payment, the remaining one third to be paid when the pallet boxes were constructed and the remaining one third down payment to be paid upon deliverance to Miami. He testified that the $20,000.00 price was one factor and the other price that motivated him to enter into the agreement with the defendant Joseph J. Schwey was the extremely high quality of the boxes, samples of which he had observed and which were manufactured in Costa Rica. On July 10, 1973, messenger Goolsby drew a check in the amount of $2500 payable to Schwey Real Estate Escrow Account and on August 1, 1973, another check for $4000 was paid (FREC Exhibits 3, 4 and 5). According to messenger Goolsby, messenger Schwey was to begin delivery of the pallet boxes during July. Repeated efforts to obtain delivery of the boxes were unavailing and on January 18, 1974, messenger Goolsby demanded the return of the $6500 forthwith. (FREC Composite Exhibit 6). According to Goolsby, defendant Polly Schwey had no obligation to fulfill the terms of the contract. In this regard he testified on cross- examination that the agreement was solely between defendant Joseph J. Schwey and the officers of Mid Lakes/Mid-River Packing Company, Inc. He testified that Joseph Schwey's obligation was to have the boxes manufactured by a manufacturing firm in Costa Rica to his specifications. Goolsby was told by defendant Joseph Schwey that the manufacturer went bankrupt and was unable to recover his $6500 down payment which he had turned over to the manufacturer. In this regard, the testimony revealed that Mid-River Packing Company placed no restrictions on how the $6500 down payment was to be spent. In any event, no directives were given by Mid-River Packing Company that the money was to be held in escrow until delivery of the pallet boxes was effected. To this date, delivery of the pallet boxes has not been made and, in fact, the defendant Joseph Schwey caused to be executed a sworn affidavit that the manufacturer went bankrupt and he was unable to recoup any of the $6500 down payment paid to the manufacturer. He testified that the purpose of the check was to make a deposit to the manufacturer who was to construct and export the pallet boxes from Costa Rica to Miami, Florida.
Conclusions The record herein fails to establish that the Defendants Joseph and Polly Schwey engaged in acts and/or conduct violative of Chapter 475.25(1)(a) and (c), F.S., as alleged. By the complaining witnesses' own testimony, the $6500.00 payment was to be advanced to the manufacturer as a pre-payment to commence construction of the pallet boxes. (Exhibit B of Defendant Polly Schwey's motion for continuance) While this statement is not per se evidence that the pre-payment was tendered to the manufacturer, no evidence was offered to the contrary and of course the burden of proof in these cases rest with the Commission. State ex rel. Vining v. Florida Real Estate Commission, 281 So.2d 487 (Fla. 1973). In this regard the proof is lacking. No evidence was entered to establish the complaint allegations that the pre-payment was to be held in trust or escrow as alleged. Finally, the evidence reveals that Defendant Polly Schwey was in no way obligated pursuant to the contractual agreement with Mid- River Packing Company to supply the pallet boxes. Based on this record it can only be concluded that pursuant to an agreement between Joseph Schwey and Mid- River Packing Company, Defendant Joseph Schwey received an agreed upon payment which was tendered to the manufacturer. Prior to delivery of the pallet boxes the manufacturer went bankrupt and Defendant Schwey was unable to obtain a refund of the pre-payment. I shall therefore recommend that the complaint filed herein be dismissed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, I recommend that the complaint filed herein be dismissed in its entirety. RECOMMENDED this 16th day of December, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of December, 1977.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a registered residential contractor having been issued license number RR 0008633, and is the qualifier for Merkle Custom Homes Inc. Respondent's last known address is 877 SW 124th Street, Miami, Florida 33176. Sunshine Ready Mix Concrete Company ("Sunshine") provided Respondent with the materials to be used on construction jobs located at 9600 SW 103rd Street and 8715 SW 129th Terrace, both in Miami, Florida. Respondent did not pay in full for such materials. Sunshine sued Merkle Custom Homes and obtained a judgment against that Florida corporation in the amount of $4,379.24 for money owed by the corporation on various jobs, to include the two projects referred to in paragraph 2 of this order. Said judgment has not been satisfied. One of the subject construction projects was undertaken for Dr. Robert Boyett and-his wife. This project was at 8715 SW 129th Terrace, and was the Boyett home. The other project at 9600 SW 103rd Street was an investment for Henry Arman and Errol Eisinger, a general partnership known as Ski Investors. This project was known as the "Ski Job." The contract between Boyett and Respondent was a standard contract, and the contractor would be responsible to make disbursements to subcontractors and materialmen. After the commencement of construction on the Boyett job, a disagreement arose between Boyett and Respondent. Boyett had the checks from the lending institution cut to him and Respondent, and did not pass all of the draw to Respondent. Boyett assumed responsibility for paying the subcontractors and materialmen. Prior to the Boyett and Ski Job projects, the Respondent applied for and established an open account for Merkle Custom Homes with Sunshine. The concrete for the Boyett job was charged to the Merkle Custom Homes account. Respondent's uncontroverted testimony was that he phoned Mr. Iglesias of Sunshine and advised him that Boyett was responsible for the concrete. The situation between Boyett and the Respondent worsened, and they eventually severed their contract. Boyett owed Respondent substantial sums of money at that time from draws paid to Boyett by the lender. In settlement of their dispute, Respondent waived any claims on the money Boyett held in return for Boyett's promise to assume all financial responsibility to the subcontractors and materialmen. Boyett did pay some $1500 to Sunshine on this debt but refused to pay all of the Sunshine bills, even though Respondent urged Boyett to honor his commitment. As a result, the Respondent received a partial satisfaction of judgment. Boyett and the contractor who took over from Respondent and assumed responsibility for the project both executed documents indicating that all materialmen had been paid. Sunshine failed to file and perfect a materialman's lien on the Boyett job. On the Ski Job, Respondent never had any control over the distribution of funds. Although the first checks were made out to the partners and the Respondent, control over payments to subcontractors and materialmen was exercised by the financial institution and Arman and Eisinger, the two individuals in the partnership for whom the project was done. The money was controlled by the partnership, who paid subcontractors directly. Respondent told Mr. Iglesias by phone that the partners were responsible for payment of the materialmen. Sunshine delivered to the Ski Job and billed to Merkle Custom Homes 40 yards of concrete at $27.75 per yard, for a total (including tax) of $1,154.40. Sunshine was paid for this concrete, and Respondent obtained a release from Sunshine for this amount. Sunshine delivered an additional 39 yards of concrete to the Ski Job after the date of the release at $34 per yard for a total (including tax) of $1,409.04. There is no evidence that the partners ever received a bill for the remainder of the concrete from Sunshine or the Respondent. No request for payment was made to the savings and loan for money to pay Sunshine for concrete. Merkle Custom Homes was replaced as the contractor, on this project, and the new contractor and owners agreed to assume responsibility for money owed to any subcontractors or materialmen. Sunshine did not file or perfect a materialman's lien on the Ski Job.
Recommendation Having found Respondent not guilty of violating Section 489.129(1)(d), Florida Statutes, it is recommended that the Amended Administrative Complaint filed against Respondent be dismissed. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 24th day of February, 1983, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of February, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael J. Cohen, Esquire Kristin Building, Suite 101 2715 East Oakland Park Boulevard Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33306 Robert C. Eber, Esquire 9595 North Kendall Drive, Suite 102 Miami, Florida 33176 Frederick Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 J. K. Linnan, Executive Director Construction Industry Licensing Board Post Office Box 2 Jacksonville, Florida 32201
The Issue The issue is whether Boyer Produce, Inc. and its surety, Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company, owe petitioner $1,751.80 as alleged in the complaint.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: In July 1993, petitioner, Patricia Thomas, was given authority by her brother to sell all remaining watermelons on his farm located in Citra, Florida. This amounted to approximately one truckload. She eventually sold them to respondent, Boyer Produce, Inc., a dealer (broker) in agricultural products located in Williston, Florida. Its owner and president is Kennedy Boyer (Boyer), who represented his firm in this proceeding. As an agricultural dealer, respondent is required to obtain a license from and post a surety bond with the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services (Department). In this case, the bond has been posted by respondent, Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company, and is in the amount of $75,000.00. Although the parties had never had business dealings before this transaction, through a mutual acquaintance, Randy Rowe, respondent learned that petitioner was interested in selling her watermelons. After Boyer visited the field and examined three watermelons which he described as "good," Boyer offered to purchase a truckload for 4 per pound if all melons were of the same quality. Thomas declined and counteroffered with a price of 5 per pound. The parties then agreed to split the difference and arrived at a sales price of 4 per pound. During the negotiations, Rowe acted as an intermediary between the parties and observed the formation of the contract as well as the loading of the goods onto the truck. Although the matter is in dispute, it is found that both parties agreed that Thomas would be paid 4 per pound for "good" watermelons delivered. This meant that petitioner would not be paid unless and until the watermelons were delivered to their final destination in "good" condition. In the trade, being in "good condition" meant that the watermelons would meet U. S. Grade No. 1 standards. Respondent also agreed to provide a truck and driver at petitioner's field and to transport the produce to Brooklyn, New York, the final destination. At the same time, petitioner was given the responsibility of loading the watermelons on the truck. To assist petitioner in meeting her up- front labor costs, respondent advanced $500.00 as partial payment for the shipment. Winston Smith was hired by respondent to transport the melons to New York. He arrived at petitioner's field on Saturday, July 16, 1993, and remained there while approximately 46,000 pounds of melons were loaded on an open top flat bed trailer. One of the loaders said the melons were "packed real tight," and four bales of straw were used in packing. According to Rowe, who observed the loading, the watermelons packed that day were in "good" condition, and any nonconforming watermelons were "kicked" off the truck. Also, by way of admission, the driver, as agent for Boyer, acknowledged to Rowe that the melons loaded were in "good" condition. Late that afternoon, a thunderstorm came through the area and, due to lightening, no further loading could be performed. Since around 46,000 pounds had already been loaded, petitioner desired for the truck to be sent on its way north. Smith, however, told petitioner he wanted 50,000 pounds in order to make his trip to New York worthwhile and he would not go with anything less. Acceding to his wishes, petitioner agreed to meet Smith the next morning and load an additional two hundred watermelons, or 4,000 pounds, on the truck. Smith then drove the loaded truck to a nearby motel where he spent the night. That evening it rained, and this resulted in the uncovered watermelons and straw getting wet. The next morning, Smith telephoned petitioner and advised her to meet him at 9:00 a. m. at a local Starvin' Marvin store, which had a weight scale that could certify the weight of the shipment. Petitioner carried two hundred watermelons to the store at 9:00 a. m., but Smith did not arrive. Around noon, she received a call from Smith advising that his truck was broken down at the motel and would not start. The watermelons were then taken to the motel and loaded onto the trailer. In all, 50,040 pounds were loaded. Smith's truck would still not start after the watermelons were loaded, and Smith refused to spend any money out of his own pocket to repair the truck. Not wanting to delay the shipment any longer, petitioner gave Smith $35.00 to have someone assist him in starting the vehicle. In order for the repairs to be made, the loaded trailer had to be jacked up and the truck unhooked from and later rehooked to the trailer. This was accomplished only with great difficulty, and Smith was forced to "jostle" the trailer with the power unit for some two hours altogether. According to Rowe, he warned Smith that such jostling could bruise the melons and "mess them up." Smith was also cautioned early on that he should make the necessary repairs as soon as possible so that the load of watermelons would not continue to sit uncovered in the sun. The truck eventually departed around 9:00 p. m., Sunday evening after the uncovered trailer had sat in the sun all day. The shipment was delivered to Brooklyn on the following Tuesday afternoon or evening, and it was inspected by a government inspector on Wednesday morning. According to the inspection report, which has been received in evidence, the load was split evenly between crimson and jubilee melons, and 23 percent and 21 percent, respectively, of the two types of melons failed to meet grade. No greater than a 12 percent "margin" is allowed on government inspections. Almost all of the defects cited in the report were attributable to the melons being "over-ripe." The buyer in New York rejected the entire shipment as not meeting standards. Respondent then sold the shipment for only $1350.00 resulting in a loss of $350.00 on the transaction. In addition, respondent says the driver (Smith) accepted $1200.00 instead of the $2,000.00 he would have normally charged to transport a load to New York. When petitioner asked for her money a few weeks later, respondent declined, saying the goods had not met specification when delivered to their destination, and if she had any remedy at all, it was against Smith, the driver. If petitioner had been paid 4 per pound for the entire shipment, she would have been entitled to an additional $1,751.80, or a total of $2,251.80. Petitioner contends that the melons failed to meet grade because of the negligence of the driver. More specifically, she says the loaded melons sat in the sun for almost two days, including all day Sunday after being soaked from the Saturday evening rain. If wet melons are exposed to the hot sun for any length of time, they run the risk of "wet burning," which causes decay. But even if this occurred, only 1 percent of the shipment was found to have "decay" by the government inspector. Petitioner also says that by being jostled for two hours on Sunday, the melons were bruised. Again, however, the melons were rejected primarily because they were over-ripe, not bruised. Therefore, and consistent with the findings in the inspection report, it is found that the jostling and wet burning did not have a material impact on the quality of the melons. Respondent contended the melons were close to being fully ripened when they were picked and loaded. In this regard, Charles Strange, Sr. agreed that if the melons sat in the field for another four or five days, they would have started "going bad." By this, it may be reasonably inferred that, unless the melons were loaded and delivered in a timely manner, they would have become over-ripe and would not meet grade within a matter of days. Therefore, a timely delivery of the melons was extremely important, and to the extent respondent's agent, Smith, experienced at least a twenty-four hour delay in delivering the melons through no fault of petitioner, this contributed in part to their failure to meet grade. Petitioner is accordingly entitled to some additional compensation, a fair allocation of which is one-half of the value of the shipment, or $1125.90, less the $500.00 already paid.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services requiring respondent to pay petitioner $625.90 within thirty days from date of the agency's final order. In the event such payment is not timely made, the surety should be liable for such payment. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of December, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of December, 1993. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Brenda D. Hyatt, Chief Bureau of Licensing & Bond 508 Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Richard A. Tritschler, Esquire The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company Post Office Box 1985 Jackson, Mississippi 39215-1985 Patricia Thomas Post Office Box 522 Archer, Florida 32618 Kennedy Boyer 15A South West 2nd Avenue Williston, Florida 32696
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the application of Hayward Trucking, Inc. for certification as a minority business enterprise be GRANTED. DONE and ENTERED this 11th day of June, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of June, 1982.
