Findings Of Fact Appellant currently operates a retail boat sales business in a building he recently (December 1987) constructed at 1011 North Fort Harrison Avenue. In this variance request, he proposes to construct an addition to this building containing space for nine shops on the ground floor and space to exhibit boats for sale on the second floor. The addition will be approximately the same height as the existing building, and no height variances are required. The property on which the proposed addition will be located is zoned CN (neighborhood commercial). Contiguous property approximately 150 feet x 125 feet, owned by Appellant west of that property zoned CN, is zoned RM-8 (multi- family residential with a maximum of 8 residential units per acre). Appellant has removed some thirteen low income and dilapidated residential buildings from the property he acquired. In addition to reducing habitats in a high crime area, Appellant thereby acquired parking spaces for his business. Appellant presently is required to stow most of his boats in racks inside his existing building which makes it difficult, and dangerous, for a customer to take a close look at a boat in which the customer is interested. Boats can be removed from the rack for safe viewing by the customer, but this is a time consuming process requiring several boats to be moved. It is to improve the efficiency of selling boats that motivates Appellant to construct the proposed addition. Rental of the first floor as separate stores is necessary to provide the cash flow needed to pay the investment debt to be incurred. Usage permitted for CN zoned property includes sixteen dwelling units per net acre, minimum open space of thirty (30) percent of the lot area and maximum floor area ratio of three-tenths (0.3). The variances here requested involve open space, an increase of 9 percent to 39 percent and floor area ratio increase from 0.3 to 0.6 approximately. If the PM-8 zoned property was zoned CN, Appellant would not need the variances here requested.
The Issue The issue is whether a development order adopted by Respondent City of Marathon by Resolution PC00-09-04 is consistent with the comprehensive plan, land development regulations, and statutes.
Findings Of Fact Respondent City of Marathon (Marathon) was incorporated on November 30, 1999. It adopted as its land development regulations (LDR) the LDRs of Monroe County in effect at the time of Marathon's incorporation. Marathon is within The Florida Keys Area of Critical State Concern. This case involves a development order that Marathon issued to Respondent Banana Bay of Marathon, Inc. (BB). As Planning Commission Resolution 00-09-04, the development order authorizes BB to add 12 motel rooms to an existing motel in return for imposing certain restrictions on the use of wet slips at its adjacent marina that is part of the same motel/marina development. The restrictions require the removal of cable television connections from 12 slips and limitation upon vessels using these 12 slips to those without plumbing facilities. For the remaining wet slips at the marina, the development order requires BB to limit their use to no more than 18 vessels at one time and to provide mandatory sewage pumpout for these vessels. At various points in the record and this recommended order, references to a "transfer" of 12 marina slips for 12 motel rooms refer to the conditions set forth in this paragraph. BB owns 7.39 acres of upland and 2.67 acres of adjacent bay bottom in Marathon at mile marker 49.5 (Subject Property or, as developed, Banana Bay). The Subject Property runs from U.S. Route 1 to the water. The Subject Property contains 60 motel rooms in two buildings, a conference room, a motel office, support buildings, three apartments suitable for employee use, and a marina. The marina includes 40-50 slips, depending upon the size of the moored vessels. The Subject Property is zoned Suburban Commercial (SC) and Mixed Use (MU). About 2.4 acres (104,544 square feet) running about 350 feet from U.S. Route 1 is SC. About 4.99 acres (217,364 square feet) is zoned MU. The additional 2.67 acres of adjacent bay bottom are also zoned MU, although the submerged acreage is unimportant for reasons discussed below. Twenty-five of the motel rooms are in SC, and 35 of the motel rooms are in MU, although the distinction between zoning districts is also unimportant for reasons discussed below. LDR Code Section 9.5-267 authorizes ten "rooms" per ”acre" as "allocated density" for motel uses in SC and MU and 15 "rooms" per "buildable acre" as "maximum net density" for motel uses in SC and MU. (There is no difference between "hotels" and "motels" in this case; all references to "motels" include "hotels.") Three fundamental questions emerge concerning the application of these two density limitations to this case. The first is whether BB must satisfy both the "allocated density" and "maximum net density" limitation. This is not a difficult issue; BB's proposal must satisfy each of these density limitations. The second question is what is included in the areas under each of these density limitations. Notwithstanding the use of "gross acres" in the "allocated density" formula, it is necessary to net out certain areas--just less than is netted out in the "maximum net density" formula. The third question is what constitutes a "room." When applied to marine-based units, the definition of a "room" presents a difficult and important issue. As a whole, the LDRs imply that no marine-based dwelling units should count as "rooms," but one provision specifically requires the inclusion of "live-aboard" units in density calculations. The first question requires little analysis. As noted below in the discussion of the two types of areas, "allocated density" and "maximum net density" provide two separate measures of the intensity of use of land. The allowable density for "maximum net density" is never less than the allowable density for "allocated density" because "maximum net density" is a safeguard to ensure that, after netting out from the parcel those areas reserved for open space, setbacks, and buffers, the intensity of use will not be excessive. Nothing whatsoever in the LDRs suggests that Marathon may issue a development order for a proposal that satisfies the "maximum net density," but not the "allocated density." These two densities limitations operate in tandem, not in the alternative. The calculation of the "allocated density" requires consideration of the second and third questions identified above. The issue of area seems straightforward. LDR Code Section 9.5-4(D-3) defines "density or allocated density" as "the number of dwelling units or rooms allocated per gross acre of land by the plan." LDR Code Section 9.5-4(D-4) defines "maximum net density" as "the maximum density permitted to be developed per unit of land on the net buildable area of a site, as measured in dwelling units or rooms per acre." LDR Code Section 9.5-4(G-4) defines "gross area" as "the total acreage of a site less submerged lands and any dedicated public rights-of-way." LDR Code Section 9.5-4(N-4) defines "net buildable area" as "that portion of a parcel of land which is developable and is not open space required by section 9.5-262 or 9.5-343 or required minimum bufferyard under article VII division 11 or required setbacks under section 9.5-281." The area of land involved in determining "allocated density" is greater than the area of land involved in determining "maximum net density." But the area of land involved in determining "allocated density" is itself a net amount. The LDRs expressly require reducing the gross areas by any submerged land and dedicated public rights-of-way. However, any reasonable application of the LDRs also requires reducing the gross areas used for the motel "allocated density" calculation by the minimum areas required to support other uses on the Subject Property. If the only use of the Subject Property were motel rooms, the "allocated density" limit of ten units per acre (10:1) would allow 73.9 rooms. But the Marathon Planning Commission Staff Report dated September 18, 2000, correctly netted from the Subject Property the land areas required to support the commercial aspects of the hotel and the commercial apartments. These reductions leave a total of 5.86 acres available to support the motel rooms. At a density of 10:1, the Subject Property could therefore support a total of 58 motel rooms. The Planning Commission incorrectly used the 15:1 ratio for "maximum net density" in concluding that the Subject Property could support a total of 67.65 motel rooms. Evidently, the Planning Commission used the "maximum net density" because it was not using "gross area" or "gross acres" (the terms are synonymous under the Code) in calculating the area. The netting reduction necessary to calculate whether BB's proposal satisfies the "maximum net density" limitation would require the calculation of the area of the Subject Property that must be devoted to open space, setbacks, and buffers. The Planning Commission probably undertook this step in calculating the "maximum net density" for the Subject Property, as its figures seem to include unstated deductions for the 20 percent open space plus another factor, probably for setbacks and buffers--all of which are discussed in its report. However, the Planning Commission erroneously neglected to apply the "allocated density" limitation to the "gross acres," exclusive of submerged land, public rights-of-way, and the minimum land required to support the other upland uses. As noted above, doing so would have yielded no more than 58 motel rooms. At present, the Subject Property contains 60 hotel or motel rooms. The Subject Property therefore cannot support the addition of another 12 hotel or motel rooms, given its "allocated density" of only 58 rooms. In general, BB justifies the addition of 12 rooms to the front motel by arguing that it is only transferring these units from the 12 existing wet slips. It is unnecessary to determine whether a transfer under these facts is lawful when, if these 12 slips count as units, the Subject Property is already 14 units over its "allocated density." The resolution of the third question--what constitutes a "room"--dispenses with this argument. Thirty of the existing 40-50 boat slips in the marina have water, electric, and cable hook-ups and are presently used for some form of habitation. Most vessels berth at the marina for two or three days, although the average stay is slightly over one month. The average stay at the 30 slips offering utilities, though, is two to three months. Typically, two persons use a vessel berthed at the marina for more than a couple of days. BB seals the discharge ports of all vessels mooring at the marina for any appreciable period of time. BB provides a sewage pumpout service for these and other vessels. The wastewater from the marina operations goes to a septic tank, in contrast to the wastewater from the motel operations, which goes to an onsite package plant. Persons mooring at the marina for at least two months normally obtain telephone service and may obtain cable television service, in addition to the potable water and electrical services provided by BB. The marina also provides rest rooms, laundry facilities, showers, a bar, limited food service, and a mail box. However, BB rules require that all persons berthing at the marina register a permanent address because the slips are "not considered permanent housing." At the request of the Florida Keys Aqueduct Authority and the Monroe County Planning Department, BB has limited rental agreements at the marina to a maximum of one month, although some persons enter into back-to-back rental agreements. Persons staying more than one week often have cars. Contrary to BB's contentions, none of these slips provides additional density for the Subject Property, and therefore the 12 slips are not available for transfer to the motel. For the same reason, as discussed below, the proposed transfer of the 12 units would also violate the Rate of Growth Ordinance (ROGO). In two respects, the record reveals that the conversion of marine-based residential uses to upland residential uses might facilitate the achievement of important land use planning objectives. First, the wastewater collected from the marina is directed to a septic tank, and the wastewater collected from the motel is directed to a package plant. Absent a significantly reduced flow from the marine-based residential use, the upland residential use would therefore impact the adjacent waters to a lesser extent. Second, marine-based residential users may be more reluctant to evacuate for an approaching hurricane than upland residential users. Absent a significantly greater number of visitors during hurricane season if the 12 units were taken from the marina slips and added to the motel, the upland residential use might therefore facilitate timely hurricane evacuation of the vulnerable Keys. However, the record was relatively undeveloped on these two points, and these possible advantages to the conversion of marine-based residential uses to upland-based residential uses do not override the LDRs. The LDRs may treat the more intense residential use associated with "live-aboards" differently than the less intense residential use associated with other moored vessels. Although the LDRs' treatment of "live-aboards" may not be entirely consistent, any inconsistency is irrelevant in this case because the moored vessels at the Banana Bay marina do not qualify as "live-aboards." As stipulated for the purpose of this case, LDR Code Section 9.5-4(T-4) defines a "transient residential unit" as "a dwelling unit used for transient housing such as a hotel or motel room, or space for parking a recreational vehicle or travel trailer." LDR Code Section 9.5-4(D-31) defines a "dwelling unit" as "one (1) or more rooms physically arranged to create a housekeeping establishment for occupancy by one (1) family with separate toilet facilities." LDR Code Sections 9.5-4(D-23) through 9.5-4(D-30) identify the various types of dwellings that may contain "dwelling units.” These dwellings are, respectively, detached zero-lot-line dwellings, multifamily apartment dwellings, attached dwellings, detached individual dwellings, duplex dwellings, commercial apartment dwellings, rooftop dwellings, and townhouse dwellings. The frequent references to "open yards" in these definitions precludes the application of these definitions to moored vessels, even "live- aboards." The exclusion of all moored vessels, including "live-aboards," from density calculations is also suggested by two other portions of the LDRs. As is typical, LDR Code Section 9.5-120.1 provides that the mechanism for enforcing density limitations is in the issuance of building permits, but this enforcement mechanism is of doubtful use in regulating vessel moorings, which do not typically involve the issuance of a building permit. Also, the density definitions discussed above both refer to the development of various types of residential uses on "land." Moreover, none of the zoning districts established in Marathon's LDRs measures the intensity of marina uses, including vessels moored for extended periods as live-aboards, by imposing some sort of marine density limitation, either by including the moored dwelling units or the submerged acreage. Because the LDRs did not intend to include such marine-based uses in density calculations, LDR Code Section 9.5-267, which is a table setting forth "allocated densities" and "maximum net densities," covers only upland-based uses, including recreational vehicle or campground spaces per acre, and does not extent to marine-based uses, such as live-aboard marina slips. However, two provisions in the LDRs require density calculations to include "live-aboards." LDR Code Section 9.5-308, which seems to be an older provision in the LDRs, provides that "each live-aboard shall count as a dwelling unit for the purpose of calculating density limitations in the district in which it is permitted." Better incorporated into the present regulatory scheme of the LDRs, LDR Code Section 9.5-120.1 defines a "residential dwelling unit" as a "dwelling unit," including a "transient rental unit," as defined in LDR Code Section 9.5-4(T-3), and "live-aboard vessels," as defined in LDR Code Section 9.5-4(L-6). However, LDR Code Section 9.5-4((L-6) states that a "live-aboard vessel" is "any vessel used solely as a residence or any vessel represented as a place of business, a professional or other commercial enterprise, or a legal residence." The record does not suggest that any of the moored vessels were used "solely" as a residence, as distinguished, for instance, from a vessel used for residential and recreational purposes, or that any of the mixed-use vessels served as the occupants' legal residence. Absent a finding that the moored vessels constitute "transient residential units," ROGO does not support this proposed transfer of residential uses from marine-based to upland-based. LDR Code Section 9.5-123(f)(3) authorizes the transfer of an existing "residential dwelling unit" from one site to another within the same subarea. However, LDR Code Section 9.5-122 defines a "residential dwelling unit" to extend only to "live-aboards." For the reasons already discussed, the less intense residential uses associated with the vessels moored at Banana Bay's marina preclude their treatment as "residential dwelling units" eligible for transfer to the motel. Petitioner has proved that the development order is materially inconsistent with the LDRs. LDR provisions governing the density and intensity of residential development go to the heart of effective land use planning, especially in an area as sensitive as the Keys. For these reason, it is unnecessary to consider the consistency of the development order with the more general provisions of Marathon's comprehensive plan, on which Marathon's LDRs are based.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission enter a final order denying the request of Banana Bay of Marathon, Inc., to approve the transfer of 12 slips to 12 rooms in a motel on the Subject Property. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of December, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of December, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Barbara L. Leighty, Clerk Growth Management and Strategic Planning The Capitol, Suite 2105 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Charles Canaday, General Counsel Office of the Governor Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, Suite 209 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1001 Cari L. Roth, General Counsel Department of Community Affairs 2555 Shumard Oak Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Mitchell A. Bierman Weiss Serota 2665 South Bayshore Drive Suite 420 Miami, Florida 33133 James S. Mattson James S. Mattson, P.A. Post Office Box 586 Key Largo, Florida 33037
Findings Of Fact David Gangelhoff operates a boat sales and service facility on property he owns at 405 North Fort Harrison Avenue. This property is divided into two parcels by Hart Street, which dead end at the back of a building facing North Fort Harrison. For the past few years the Appellant has been buying lots in two parcels separated by Hart Street and intends to acquire all the lots in the entire two blocks. After acquiring all of the lots he proposes to request the City to vacate Hart Street. Appellant currently owns the property abutting both sides of Hart Street and the setback requirements for Hart Street will disappear if the City abandons its right- of-way over Hart Street. Building and zoning regulations require a 17' 3" side setback on a building siding on Hart Street, a 3' buffer zone between parking and the property line, landscaping in the 3' buffer zone between the parking area and the north property line, and a 3' setback in the fence parallel to the south property line along Hart Street. Variances (1) and (4) involve the property line abutting Hart Street and variances (2) and (3) involve the north property line of the property where parking is to be provided. Appellant apparently stores some of his boats in an open area toward the back of the property. He proposes to erect a one-story building on a portion of the property north of Hart Street and to construct the south side of this building one foot from the property line abutting Hart Street. This will provide more inside storage. A proposed canopy area along the main building on the north side of the property is to be used for additional storage and to provide better security in the high crime area in which this business is located. The property is zoned CG. The variance in setback in buffer zones for landscaping which are requested by Appellant are such that practically no setback would remain nor would there be a buffer zone if the variances are granted. Allowing Appellant use of his property to the boundary lines would be beneficial to Appellant's business as it would provide a better facility with more enclosed space to provide security for the boats and equipment. No evidence was presented that other property owners in the vicinity have been granted variances similar to those denied to Appellant or that the special conditions and circumstances exist which make this property unique so that denial of the variance would create an undue hardship on the Appellant.
Findings Of Fact By Application for Permit to Move Building over State Roads dated November 1, 1985, Eyal Sade, on behalf of Sade Housemovers applied for a permit to move a dwelling over state roads some 32 miles in Tampa and vicinity. Although this application showed the width of the building to be 32.2 feet, including eaves, E & S Construction/Sade Housemovers, was issued regular Permit No. B17531 on November 6, 1985 (Exhibit 1). Width, excluding eaves, was left blank on this application. This permit provided the building would be moved over state roads between the hours of 12:00 midnight and 6:00 A.M. and be escorted by local police. The application showed utility companies TECO, GTE and WRec [sic] had been notified of the move and the move had been cleared by the Florida Highway Patrol without comment regarding the need for escort. Also Seaboard railroad system had been notified (Exhibit 1). This move commenced shortly after midnight, November 19, 1985, with escorts from the Hillsborough County Sheriff's Department. The building had to be jacked up on the platform on which it rode and required a 90 degree turn to commence its trip south on Nebraska Avenue (U.S. 41). This delayed the start of the movement down Nebraska Avenue approximately 30 minutes. Shortly after the trip started, the portable generator that provided lighting on the building stopped functioning and the escorts told Mr. Sade he had to get the lights on the building. Sade attempted to have the generator repaired as the move progressed. When the movers stopped for approximately five minutes to repair the generator, the police escorts testified that the crew moving the building stopped working to eat. This was denied by Sade and the members of his crew who all testified that the sandwiches that Sade procured were eaten as the move progressed. The two deputies from the Sheriff's Office who escorted the move considered the move to be progressing slowly and told Sade several times that he should be ready to park the building before 6:00 A.M. Sade had spent three days surveying the route before November 19, and had taken measurements of all bridges and the elevation of lights. Mrs. Sade had contacted by telephone the City of Tampa Utilities Department to advise them of the move as well as Pasco County officials for the portion of the route in Pasco County. There was a conflict in the testimony of the deputies and Sade regarding the presence of a man on top of the building to clear traffic lights as the building passed under these lights. Sade testified he had a man on the building during the time the building was in the City of Tampa. The deputies testified they told Sade he needed someone on the top of the building. The bridge over the Hillsborough River on SR 39 was some twenty miles from the commencement of the trip and the building arrived at this bridge around 5:30 A.M. The escorts had told Sade several times that he should not be on the road after 6:00 A.M. and that hour was approaching. Sade was aware of a large lot on which the building could be parked off the highway located about one mile south of Hillsborough River bridge and decided to cross the bridge to get to that location. While crossing the Hillsborough River bridge, the building got stuck on the guardrail and had to be backed off. Sade's winch broke down but they were able to obtain a bulldozer from a business adjacent to the bridge which helped get the building off the pavement and along the right of way as demanded by the escorting officers. While this was going on, the traffic was totally blocked for about 20 minutes and delayed with one way traffic having to proceed past the building until the building was finally moved completely off the roadway. Even then the overhang of the building extended offer the road to the white line along the edge of the pavement. Sade's testimony that this eave was 17 feet above the pavement was not disputed; however, William Ledden opined that a semi-trailer would hit the roof of the building if it attempted to pass under this eave. By the time the building was parked along the right-of-way, it was approximately 8:40 A.M. and traffic had been stopped and delayed for almost three hours. The problem of getting the building stuck on the bridge, the resulting delay past 6:00 A.M. and that the building was still on the road was reported to Petitioner, and William Ledden, a certified officer employed by DOT as a weights and safety inspector, was dispatched to the scene. Ledden looked at the permit issued Sade for the move, saw it was a regular permit, saw that it expired at 6:00 A.M. and directed Sade not to move the building until a proper permit was issued. Ledden was present during the time the wrecker relocated the building alongside the paved road on the shoulder. For a building exceeding 30'6" in width a Special Permit is required (Rule 14-63.03, Florida Administrative Code). Ledden testified he made it clear to Sade that the building was not to be moved without a valid permit. On the morning of November 20, 1985, after midnight, the building was moved without incident across Hillsborough River bridge to the large lot south of the bridge that Sade had hoped to make the night before. Sade reapplied to DOT for a permit to move the building to its intended destination and on November 25, 1985, Special Permit No. B17546 (Exhibit 2) was issued to Respondent. This permit indicated all necessary parties were notified of the move. Shortly after midnight, November 27, 1985, the movement of this building recommenced pursuant to the Special Permit. The move progressed satisfactorily until the bridge on SR 39 over Blackwater Creek was reached. Petitioner's witness testified the building hit the rub rails on both sides of the bridge. Photograph admitted on Exhibit 4 shows one side of the building rubbing on the guardrail. Respondent acknowledged that the clearance was close and that to clear the guardrail on one side, the building had to be raised on that side. The driver of the towing truck acknowledged that he initially got off line and one side of the building touched the guardrail and it was necessary to back off the bridge to get realigned. To raise one side of the building to enable it to clear the guardrail on the right side, 2 x 12 planks were placed on the roadway for the right wheels of the carriage to ride on. These planks had to be moved continuously as the building progressed across the bridge. This materially slowed the progress across the bridge. Other than the initial rubbing of the guardrail, the only complaint of Petitioner regarding this part of the move is that the bridge was blocked to traffic for one and one-half hours while the building crossed the bridge. Sade testified the building was on the bridge for only 30 to 45 minutes; however, the longer period is deemed more reliable. After clearing the bridge, the building struck some tree limbs alongside the road and a railroad stop sign over the road which had to be realigned. This realignment was done by the moving crew and no safety hazard resulted. The carriage for the building had been raised as much as possible to clear the bridge guardrails and still be low enough to clear the overhanging traffic signals, hence the need to raise one side of the carriage to clear the guardrail at the Blackwater Creek bridge. The November 27 move was completed prior to 6:00 A.M. in accordance with the permit.
Findings Of Fact Antonios Markopoulos, Appellant, applied for seven variances on property located at 200 Coronado Drive, Clearwater, Florida, to allow the construction of a 7 to 9 story parking garage covering the property from lot line to lot line. The property in question is a 95 feet x 105 feet parking lot adjacent to a hotel, shops and restaurants owned by Appellant. The first waiver requested was of the minimum lot size of 150 feet on which to build. Since this property was unique in that regard and could never attain the 150 feet minimum dimension, the Board granted that variance. The other six requests for variances involved setbacks and open space requirements. Appellant proposes to build a parking garage with two elevators to lift cars to the various parking levels with the building extending to the lot lines in all four directions. The hotel, restaurants and stores located at this site and owned by Appellant are nonconforming uses. The hotel has 86 rooms and if built today would require a minimum of 86 parking spaces. The stores and restaurants would require additional parking spaces that are now not available. Appellant proposes to construct a garage with approximately 340 parking spaces which he contends are the minimum needed to provide adequate parking for patrons at the hotel, stores and restaurants. At the hearing before the Board, Appellant contended that the parking garage would also serve to relieve parking problems at other establishments in the vicinity. Appellant proposes to have parking customers drive up a ramp through a ticket machine which will dispense a ticket which can be validated at the hotel, restaurants or shops. The car will then be parked by attendants who will drive the car onto an elevator to lift the car to a floor with parking space. This clearly indicates that Appellant is proposing to construct a parking garage which will be open to the general public. Appellant presented testimony that if the setbacks required by the Code were followed on all sides, there would be insufficient square feet per floor to make the parking garage financially feasible. He also presented testimony of the City of Clearwater Traffic Engineer to the effect that construction of a parking garage at this location would not create a traffic problem. Although most, if not all, of the property surrounding Appellant's property are nonconforming with less setbacks than are required by the existing code, none of these properties have been covered lot line to lot line with a structure or structures. The primary emphasis of the evidence submitted by Appellant is that there is insufficient parking at Clearwater Beach, and erection of a parking garage will do much to alleviate this problem.
Findings Of Fact The signs in question are located on Interstate 10, an interstate highway. One sign is located one-half mile west of the intersection of Interstate 10 and State Road 79, and the other sign is located one mile east of said intersection. The first sign is located 120 feet and the second sign located 130 feet from the nearest edge of pavement of Interstate 10. Neither sign is located within an incorporated city or town, and neither has been issued a permit as required by Section 479.07, Florida Statutes. The owner of the signs holds leases from the owners of the land upon which the signs are located. The signs were constructed in the first week of December, 1978, after Interstate 10 was opened to public use and accepted as part of the interstate system. On July 2, 1979, Holmes County duly adopted a comprehensive land use plan, which provides in pertinent part as follows: It is the intent of this plan that a strip of land 50 feet wide, lying on either side of I-10 and extending east and west one mile from S.R. 79 interchange and one mile from S.R. 81 interchange, be considered commercial, for the express purpose of allowing the business of Holmes County to place signs along the side interstate highway, and be in conformance with the provisions of Chapter 479, Florida Statutes. Both signs in question are located in the area described above in the comprehensive land use plan. Having adopted the comprehensive land use plan, Holmes County is now developing its zoning plan in the manner outlined in Chapter 163, Florida Statutes. However, the zoning ordinance has not yet been adopted by Holmes County.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, tee Hearing Officer recommends that the Department of Transportation net grant permits to the subject signs and, having been found in violation of Section 479.07, Florida Statutes, said signs be removed. DONE and ORDERED this 13th day of November, 1979, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Charles G. Gardner, Esquire Department of Transportation Hayden Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 James E. Moore, Esquire 102 Bayshore Drive Post Office Box 746 Niceville, Florida 32578
The Issue This matter concerns the request by the Petitioner James A. Connell to be granted variances within the meaning of Section 131.016(b), City of Clearwater Building and Zoning Regulations. In particular the Petitioner has asked that he be given a variance from the side yard setback requirements for narrow parcels established by Section 131.200(b)(3)a.2., City of Clearwater Building and Zoning Regulations, and a variance to the requirements of Section 131.200(b)(3)e., dealing with clear space. The zoning classification in question is RM-8, as set forth in Section 131.048, City of Clearwater Building and Zoning Regulations.
Findings Of Fact On November 17, 1980, the Petitioner, James Connell, filed an application requesting a variance from the side setback requirements of Section 131.200(b)(3)a.2., City of Clearwater Building and Zoning Regulations, asking for a reduction from 30 feet to 10 feet and further requesting that the clear space requirement of having only one side yard setback to be used for parking, with the other side yard setback for clear space from street to water, with the further possibility that that space be used for driveways of parking below street grade, as stated in Section 131.200(h)(3)c., be modified to grant the Petitioner a variance. The extent of this latter variance would be for clear space offered in the center portion of the project which gives 24 feet in width essentially unobstructed clear space, with an additional 20 feet space street to water on each side of the 24 feet unobstructed space, which north/south 20 foot expansions are constituted of driveways for the eight (8) proposed dwelling units to be constructed by the Petitioner. The real property under consideration is owned by the Petitioner and zoned RM-8 within the meaning of Section 131.048, City of Clearwater Building and Zoning Regulations. The address is 1012-1016 North Osceola Avenue, Clearwater, Florida. This case was presented before the State of Florida, Division of Administrative Hearings, on March 25, 1981, following a public hearing of January 15, 1981, in which the Board of Adjustment and Appeal on Zoning, City of Clearwater, Florida, had made an adverse ruling to the position of the Petitioner. The tape of the proceeding on January 15, 1981, may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3, admitted into evidence. The site plan of the project in question has been reviewed by the Resource Development Committee of the City of Clearwater with a recommendation for approval of the project, conditioned upon the attainment of variance exceptions. A copy of the application for variance may be found in the City of Clearwater's Composite Exhibit No. 4, admitted into evidence. Through that application form, and in the course of the hearing, the Petitioner expressed concern about the survival of two 36 inch in diameter mature oak trees located on the property in question and also mentioned that the drop in elevation of the eastern side of the property front on Osceola Avenue North to the waterward western extreme of the property at Clearwater Harbour becomes dramatic approximately two thirds from the eastern extent of the property line making utilization of the latter third to the west difficult. In combination, this topographical reality and the location of the two oak trees, according to the Petitioner, would make it difficult to construct a project oriented to the center of the property, in an effort to comply with the "clear space" requirements. The Respondent, City's Exhibit No. 1, admitted into evidence, is a site plan which depicts the Petitioner's proposals and it shows that lot to be approximately 160 feet in width and from 355 to 360 feet in length, the width relating to a roughly north/south orientation and the length a roughly east/west orientation. The drawing depicts the proposed ten foot side setback, the 24 foot clear space with additional 20 feet north/south associated with the driveways. The proposal would leave in tact the aforementioned oak tree or trees located in the approximate center of the 24 foot vista space. (In that connection, although the Petitioner has attempted by his plan to save some of the trees, the plan as drawn for unit four of the eight unit townhouse complex depicts the removal of a 40 inch oak tree.) The lot drops from a 26 foot to a 17 foot elevation from the street to Clearwater Harbour. The effect of that drop would be to limit the percentage of an automobile that could be seen if located in a driveway toward the waterward side of the site. The Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1 and the City's Composite Exhibit No. 2 are photographs of the building site. Through the hearing process no one has objected to the grant of the variances in question and one person who resides In the neighborhood spoke in favor of the project.
Findings Of Fact The Parties Petitioner Kathleen Burson owns property and resides at 2950 Knox McRae Drive in Titusville. Her residence is located near the land affected by the FLUM amendment. Petitioner submitted comments and objections regarding the amendment to the Titusville City Commission. The City of Titusville is a municipality of the State of Florida and has adopted a comprehensive plan that it amends from time to time pursuant to Section 163.3167(1)(b), Florida Statutes. Intervenor Ravi Shah was the applicant for the comprehensive plan amendment and a companion zoning change. He signed a contract to purchase the property affected by the amendment. At the time of the hearing, the contract's expiration date had passed. However, Intervenor is pursuing mediation under the terms of the contract to contest and prevent the termination of his right to purchase the property. The Amendment The amendment changes the FLUM designations for a portion of a 18.17-acre parcel of land ("the property") located at the intersection of State Road 405 (South Street) and Fox Lake Road. The amendment was formally approved by Ordinance 72- 2007, issued by the City on December 11, 2007, and was designated Small Scale Amendment 15-2007. The property had two FLUM designations before the amendment, Residential High Density and Conservation. The amendment changes a portion of the Residential High Density area to Conservation. It changes an area formerly designated Residential High Density and Conservation to Commercial Low Intensity. It changes an area formerly designated Conservation to Residential Low Density. Respondent's Exhibit 10 and Petitioner's Exhibit 50, respectively, depict the "before" and "after" land use designations. Concurrent with the comprehensive plan amendment, the City approved a rezoning of the property. Petitioner and the City presented evidence related to the rezoning and to Intervenor's proposed development of a drug store and other retail shops on that portion of the property now designated Commercial Low Intensity. However, most of this evidence was irrelevant to the issue of whether the comprehensive plan amendment is "in compliance." The Property and Surrounding Land Uses The property is currently vacant. A wetland covers 3.71 acres in the southern portion of the property. The boundaries of the wetland were used to define the area designated Conservation by the amendment. It was the City's intent for the amendment to place in the Conservation designation on any part of the wetland that was not previously designated Conservation and to remove from the Conservation designation any land that was not part of the wetland. The upland portion of the property is used by wildlife, but it is not known to be used by any threatened or endangered wildlife species other than the gopher tortoise, which is a threatened species. Several gopher tortoise burrows were found and at least one burrow was "active." Petitioner claims that the amendment would destroy the rural character of the area. The City disputed that the area has much rural character. The property is bounded on the west by South Street, which is an arterial road. The land across South Street to the west includes commercial and industrial uses. The land on the northwest corner of the intersection of South Street and Fox Lake Road is designated Commercial Low Intensity and the City has approved a gas station/convenience store for the site. The property is bounded on the north partly by Fox Lake Road, a collector road, and partly by a small parcel which is designated Residential High Density. This small parcel has existing dwellings and has non-conforming density. Across Fox Lake Road to the north is land which is designated Residential High Density. To the east of the property, between the property and the neighborhood where Petitioner resides, is land which is designated Residential Low Density and is zoned for single- family homes on lots of at least one acre. Petitioner's neighborhood comprises 14 homes on lots that generally range in size from one acre to 4.5 acres, with one 10-acre lot. No other homeowners in Petitioner's neighborhood challenged the amendment, even those persons who live closer to the property than Petitioner. The southern border of the property is bounded by Commercial High Intensity, Conservation, and Educational land uses. The Education designation covers the site of Apollo Elementary School. The property has access to urban services, including public utilities. The land uses designations created by the amendment are compatible with the surrounding land uses. More specifically, the Commercial Low Intensity designation is compatible with Petitioner's neighborhood because the neighborhood is separated from the commercial use by almost 300 feet, with other residential land uses between. The Conservation Designation Petitioner's challenge to the amendment focuses primarily on the change in the area previously designated Conservation. She contends that the area should remain Conservation because she relied on the designation, and the former Conservation designation protects upland wildlife. When it adopted its first comprehensive plan in 1988, the City designated Conservation areas on the FLUM to correspond with wetlands as depicted on a 1988 National Wetland Inventory map prepared for the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. From time to time since 1988, the City has modified the boundaries of Conservation areas depicted on the FLUM when, in the process of reviewing land development proposals, the City has received more current and detailed information about the boundaries of particular wetlands. Petitioner claims that it is wrong for the City to use wetlands, alone, as a basis for designating Conservation areas. She cites statements made by the City in 1988 as evidence that the City intended for the Conservation designation to cover some upland areas as well as wetlands. Goal 1, Objective 6, Policy 3 in the Conservation Element states that "at a minimum," the 1988 Wetland Inventory Map will be used to define Conservation areas. Policy 3 allows the City to designate Conservation areas to correspond only with wetlands, and that has been the City's consistent practice. It is reasonable for the City to continue that practice in the adoption of the amendment at issue in this case. The amendment is consistent with this policy. Protection of the Wetland's Functional Values Petitioner contends that the amendment is inconsistent with comprehensive plan policies and with Florida Administrative Code 9J-5.013(3), related to protecting the functional values of wetlands. Petitioner did not present competent evidence that any functional values of the wetland on the property would be adversely affected by the amendment, but she does not think an adequate functional value assessment was done for the wetland. Goal 1, Objective 6 of the Conservation Element is to "encourage preservation/protection of wetlands according to their function." Policy 1, Strategy 1 states that "The protection of wetlands shall be determined by the functional value of the wetland." Other related policies and strategies in the Conservation Element indicate that this objective is to be accomplished in part through land development regulations. For example, Policy 3, Strategy 6 states that "Mitigation for unavoidable impacts to wetlands which possess significant functional value, as determined by a functional value assessment, will be addressed in the land development regulations." Florida Administrative Code 9J-5.013(3)(a) states: Wetlands and the natural functions of wetlands shall be protected and conserved. The adequate and appropriate protection and conservation of wetlands shall be accomplished through a comprehensive planning process which includes consideration of the types, values, functions, sizes, conditions and locations of wetlands, and which is based on supporting data and analysis. The City interprets its comprehensive plan policies as satisfied if wetland impacts are avoided. The wetland analysis conducted for the amendment at issue in this case was adequate because the entire wetland is included in the Conservation designation and, therefore, appropriate planning level protection is provided for the wetland. The adjacent Commercial Low Intensity designation, standing alone, does not mean that adverse impacts to the wetland will occur. Intervenor's proposed development, for example, provides a buffer from the wetland and does not propose to have an impact to the wetland. The City's interpretation and application of the comprehensive plan objectives and policies related to protecting wetland functional values was not shown to be unreasonable. The amendment was not shown to be inconsistent with the comprehensive plan nor with Florida Administrative Code Rule 9J- 5.013(3)(a). Compatibility Petitioner contends that the amendment also violates Florida Administrative Code Rule 9J-5.013(3)(b) because it directs incompatible land uses into wetlands. The amendment places all of the wetlands on the property under the Conservation land use designation. Neither the Residential Low Density designation nor the Commercial Low Intensity designation is placed in the wetlands. The amendment eliminates an incompatible Residential High Density designation that was formerly in the wetlands. Petitioner failed to show that the amendment directs incompatible uses into the wetlands. Petitioner contends the amendment is inconsistent with Objective 1.13 and Policy 1.13.1 of the Future Land Use Element (FLUE), which require compatibility with "environmentally sensitive areas;" and Policy 1.6.1 which requires elimination or minimization of negative impacts to environmentally sensitive areas caused by commercial land uses. "Environmentally sensitive areas" are not defined in the comprehensive plan, but discussed in the Conservation Element are (1) habitat for threatened and endangered species, (2) important natural resources, (3) critical habitat, and (4) streams, lakes, rivers, estuaries, and wetlands. The types of "environmentally sensitive areas" on the property are wetlands and habitat for a threatened species, the gopher tortoise. As found above, the amendment does not direct commercial uses into the wetlands. Petitioner did not show where the gopher tortoise habitat is located on the property but claims that Intervenor’s proposed commercial project fails to protect that habitat. The property has not been designated as critical habitat for the gopher tortoise. In fact, no critical habitat has been designated in Florida for the gopher tortoise because there are many areas in the state that provide suitable habitat for this species. In Florida, it is common for land developers to seek and obtain approval from state and federal regulatory agencies to remove and relocate gopher tortoises to other areas which have suitable gopher tortoise habitat. Developers also have the option to build near the burrows as long as they are not disturbed. Goal 1, Objectives 1 and 2, Policy 3 of the Conservation Element states that "any public or private use of land greater than three (3) acres in area shall require a management plan designed to minimize harm to the species and its habitat.” Such a management plan, however, would be submitted as part of a re-zoning or development proposal and, therefore, the adequacy of any management plan submitted by the Intervenor in this case is not a relevant inquiry. Petitioner argues that the relocation of the gopher tortoises to other suitable habitat would not be consistent with the comprehensive plan's policy to protect habitat. For threatened and endangered species ("listed species") other than the gopher tortoise, relocation might be impracticable or inappropriate, and, therefore, inconsistent with the comprehensive plan. However, for gopher tortoises, their relocation is often determined to be practicable and appropriate, and it has been the practice of the City and of the state and federal regulatory agencies to allow their relocation. There is no policy in the comprehensive plan that clearly requires gopher tortoises and their habitat to be managed differently in Titusville than in other areas of the state. A local government's future land use designation has no effect on the regulation and protection of listed species, including gopher tortoises, afforded under state and federal law. Any land use, including a single-family residence, has the potential to disturb the habitat of gopher tortoises. Although Petitioner is correct in her view that the Conservation designation is more likely to avoid habitat disturbances and the need to re-locate gopher tortoises on the property than the Commercial Low Intensity designation, that factor, standing alone, does not require a finding that the amendment is not in compliance. Restricting Development Petitioner contends that the amendment is inconsistent with FLUE Policy 1.6.1 E because the City did not impose conditions regarding hours of operation, visual impacts, and privacy factors on the Intervenor's proposed development in the Commercial Low Intensity area. This policy only requires that such matters be considered. The City approved the concurrent rezoning of property with a condition that a six-foot wooden fence be placed along the boundary between the commercial project and the adjacent residential area. The City also required Intervenor to place the wetland under a conservation easement, to provide a buffer zone around the wetland, and to prepare and submit a gopher tortoise management plan prior to development of the property. Petitioner failed to show that controls were not considered by the City or that the amendment is incompatible due to the lack of adequate controls. Road Access Petitioner contends the amendment is inconsistent with FLUE Policy 1.6.1 A, which states that sites for commercial development at collector/arterial intersections are appropriate "provided minimal access is necessary on the collector street." The site plan for the proposed commercial development shows a primary entrance on South Street, an arterial road. A secondary, side entrance is on the collector street, Fox Lake Road. Petitioner failed to show how the amendment was inconsistent with Policy 1.6.1 A. Open Space and Recreation Zoning Petitioner contends the amendment violates the City's land development regulations (LDRs) because the LDRs place an Open Space and Recreation (OR) zoning classification on all Conservation lands on the FLUM, and describe OR as a "permanent" classification. This argument is not persuasive, because the characterization of the OR zoning classification as "permanent" in the LDRs is merely to distinguish OR from certain other classifications which are used as "holding" or temporary classifications. The word "permanent" in this context merely means that the OR classification is treated the same way as normal zoning classifications, which are "permanent" unless there is a re- zoning by the City. The City has modified or eliminated OR districts many times in conjunction with updated wetland delineations. Market Analysis Petitioner contends the amendment in inconsistent with FLUE Policy 1.6.1 I because a market analysis was not conducted. The policy states: Commercial land use shall be limited to those areas designated as commercial or mixed use on the Future Land Use Map except as may be permitted by the Planned Development Regulations. Requests to increase and/or convey commercial land rights to an alternate site must be accompanied by adequate analysis to prove necessity for such request. The applicability of this policy was not shown. The first sentence of the policy appears to be self-evident; limiting commercial uses to land designated for commercial uses. The meaning of “Planned Development Regulations” was not explained. Perhaps it is a typographical error and was intended to refer to “Land Development Regulations.” The meaning intended for the term “commercial land rights” was not explained, nor was it explained how this amendment involves a request to increase or convey commercial land rights to an “alternate” site. A market analysis is more typically associated with a specific development proposal, because that allows the analysis to be focused on a particular service or product. Petitioner argues that the policy requires a market analysis for any FLUM amendment that creates a new commercial land use designation. If she is correct, the market analysis would necessarily be a more general one. The City conducted a general market analysis and determined that the residential development in the surrounding area provided a market for a commercial use on the property. That is a reasonable conclusion. If FLUE Policy 1.6.1 I is applicable to this amendment, the amendment is consistent with the policy. Archaeological Resources Petitioner amended her petition to allege that the amendment was improper because it was incompatible with the protection of an Indian mound on the property. However, no admissible evidence was presented to show that an Indian mound exists on the property, where it is located, or how the amendment would cause it to be disturbed. As with listed species, a local government's land use designations have no effect on the state regulation and protection of archaeological resources.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Community Affairs enter a final order determining that the amendment is "in compliance" as defined in Chapter 163, Part II, Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of June, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. BRAM D. E. CANTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of June, 2008.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner owns the residence located at 19 Heilwood Avenue, Clearwater Beach, Florida. The property is zoned RM-20 (high density residential). Petitioner requests a front and side setback variance, lot density variance, variance to impermeable lot coverage, and a variance to add 275 square feet of living area to a nonconforming structure. The existing property extends into the setback area on both the front and one side and exceeds the impermeable lot coverage and the house coverage currently allowed by the building code. Petitioner proposes to extend the entire front of the house to the line of the screen porch which now intrudes into the front setback 8.5 feet. This would reduce the front setback across the entire front of the house from the code prescribed 25 feet to 16.5 feet. The west side of the house now encroaches two feet into the code prescribed five feet, leaving only three feet setback on this side. To extend this side towards the front by 8.5 feet, a side variance of two feet is required for this extension. By adding 275 square feet to the area of the house, the lot coverage would be increased to 46.2 percent. The maximum coverage allowed by the code is 42 percent. By adding 275 square feet of impermeable area to the lot, the percent of the lot coverage with impermeable surface would increase to 95 percent. The maximum impermeable lot coverage permitted by the code is 65 percent. Petitioner contends he only wants to "square" up his house and to make the entire front of the house intrude into the setback area by 8.5 feet; that this addition will improve the looks and usability of the house; and that there is no objection by the neighbors.
The Issue The issue for determination is whether the Florida Department of Labor and Employment Security illegally rejected Petitioner's bid as nonresponsive.
Findings Of Fact Fred Boozer, Sr., (Boozer), the Petitioner, owns Boozer Properties, a family business which includes a building at 2235 South Babcock Street, Melbourne, Brevard County, Florida. The building is currently occupied by staff of the Florida Department of Labor and Employment Security (LES) and other tenants. In south Brevard, LES staff also occupies another building in Palm Bay. Because of staff expansion and the need to co-locate its offices, LES issued a Request for Proposal (RFP) for Lease No. 540:0904 on January 28, 1992. The RFP had been previously advertised but was successfully challenged on issues unrelated to the issues in this proceeding. The January 1992 RFP sought approximately 11,474 to 11,818 square feet of office space. The RFP also specified that 95 off-street parking spaces be provided for the exclusive use of LES employees and clients. The spaces were to be suitably paved and lined, and under the control of the bidder. The RFP advertised a pre-proposal conference on February 4, 1992. No bidder attended, and no objections to the RFP were filed. Six responses were received on the February 28th deadline, one of which was immediately determined to be nonresponsive. The remaining bid proposals were evaluated, and Boozer's bid, offering his Babcock Street site, and 95 parking spaces, received the highest points from the evaluation committee. During a recent LES bidding process for office space in West Palm Beach, a problem arose with a bidder's ability to provide the required parking spaces. Cognizant of this, the LES leasing manager contacted the City of Melbourne to determine whether the apparent bid winner, Boozer, could meet his obligation to provide 95 spaces. The written response dated March 20, 1992, from Dominic Mauriello, a Melbourne city planner, provides his estimation that, for the various uses in the Babcock Street building, 207 parking spaces would be required. The memo states that a site plan on file at the city planning office reflects that there are 165 spaces. The site plan attached to Boozer's bid proposal submitted to LES indicates that 175 spaces are available. LES staff person, Lynne Mobley, telephoned Fred Boozer on March 24, 1992, informing him of the memorandum from the city. He responded with a request that he be allowed twenty-four hours to provide additional information. By March 27, 1992, the LES leasing office had not received further information from Boozer. The RFP had advertised a 30-day deadline for the bid award, which deadline fell on a weekend. The agency considered that it needed to make the award on Friday, the 27th. After contacting the City of Palm Bay to assure that the next highest rated response could deliver the requisite parking spaces, a letter was sent notifying Woodlake S.W. No. 1, Ltd., (Woodlake) of its award. In a letter dated March 27, 1992, LES notified Boozer that its bid was determined nonresponsive based on the outcome of investigation and consultation with the city regarding his inability to produce the required 95 exclusive spaces. In the meantime, Fred Boozer had contacted Peggy Bray, the City's Planning and Zoning Administrator, who provided an amended estimation stating that 190 spaces would be required for the Babcock Street site, and that the site currently includes 184 parking spaces. Ms. Bray's letter, dated March 27, 1992, states that in order to provide 95 spaces for the Department of Labor, 1800 square feet of office space would need to remain vacant. The Bray letter was immediately sent by facsimile transmission to LES, and was received the afternoon of March 27th, after the award and rejection notices were sent. Boozer's building is approximately 39,000 square feet. Several tenants are month to month lessees, and another tenant is expected to move prior to the beginning of the LES lease term. Boozer is willing to keep vacant the 1800 square feet and contemplated that necessity when he submitted his bid proposal. He did not include this agreement in his written bid response, but neither did LES specifically ask, either in the bid form or at the time of the committee's site walk-through prior to the bid award. Boozer contends that he responded on the bid proposal that he would provide 95 exclusive spaces and he remains willing to provide those spaces. At hearing, Boozer disclosed that 20 additional parking spaces are located adjacent to the subject property and are available for use by HRS' County Health Services, another tenant in the Babcock Street building. The spaces would reduce by 20 the spaces required by the city code, but their existence was not disclosed in the bid proposal as they are not part of the attached site plan. Boozer's onsite parking spaces range from one-half to one foot short of the eleven-feet width required by the city code. No evidence was presented with regard to any pending or contemplated enforcement action, and LES did not base its decision on this defect. LES did base its decision on a good-faith reliance on the communication by a member of the City of Melbourne planning staff. Even when that initial communication was corrected by the planning administrator, the number of spaces available were still less than needed for LES purposes and to comply with the City's code. LES did not anticipate, nor was it informed prior to bid award, of Boozer's ability and willingness to keep space vacant to comply with his commitment to provide 95 parking spaces to LES.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby, recommended that a final order be entered dismissing Petitioner's protest of intended bid award. RECOMMENDED this 18th day of June, 1992, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of June, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-2372BID The following constitute specific rulings on the findings of fact proposed by the parties. Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Adopted in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4. Adopted in paragraphs 4 and 9. Adopted in paragraph 6. Adopted in substance in paragraph 7. Rejected as unnecessary. The testimony of Ms. Mobley is that she did not receive the message. Adopted in paragraph 10. Adopted in paragraphs 8 and 9. Adopted in paragraphs 10 and 13. Rejected as unnecessary. 10-13. Adopted in paragraph 11. Rejected as unsubstantiated by competent evidence. Adopted by implication in paragraph 5. Rejected as irrelevant, except as to Intervenor's spaces, which is adopted in paragraph 8. 1718. Rejected as unnecessary and irrelevant. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact 1. Adopted in paragraph 3. 2. Adopted in paragraph 1. 3. Adopted in paragraph 2. 4-5. Adopted in paragraph 4. 6-7. Adopted in paragraph 5. 8. Adopted in paragraph 6. 9. Adopted in paragraph 7. 10-11. Adopted in paragraph 8. 12. Adopted in paragraph 10. 13. Adopted in paragraph 12. 14. Adopted in paragraph 9. Intervenor's Proposed Findings of Fact 1-2. Adopted in substance in paragraph 3. 3. Rejected as unnecessary. 4-5. Adopted in paragraph 4. Adopted in paragraph 3. Adopted in paragraph 4. Adopted in paragraph 11. Adopted in paragraph 4. Adopted in paragraph 5. Adopted in paragraph 6. Adopted in paragraph 7. Adopted in paragraph 10. Adopted in paragraph 9. 15-16. Adopted in paragraph 8. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Preliminary Statement. 19-28. Rejected as unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Howard M. Swerbilow, Esquire Post Office Box 541271 Merritt Island, FL 32954-1271 Edward A. Dion, Esquire Department of Labor and Employment Security Suite 307, Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle Southeast Tallahassee, FL 32399-2189 Jack Spira, Esquire 5205 Babcock Street N.E. Palm Bay, FL 32905 Alan Taylor Elizabethan Development Corporation 245 Avenue O S.W. Winter Haven, FL 33880 Frank Scruggs, Secretary Department of Labor and Employment Security 303 Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle S.E. Tallahassee, FL 32399-2152 Cecilia Renn Chief Legal Counsel Department of Labor and Employment Security 303 Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle S.E. Tallahassee, FL 32399-2152
