Findings Of Fact Based on the stipulations of the parties, on the exhibits received in evidence, and on the testimony of the witnesses at the hearing, I make the following findings of fact. Facts stipulated to by the parties Winston Towers 600 condominium was created by Winston Capital, Inc., which still owns units for sale in the condominium. Control of the association has been relinquished by the creator/developer and turned over by it to the unit owners including joint intervenors. In May of 1983, six Michigan limited partnerships each purchased a number of units in the condominium from Winston Capital, Inc. In March of 1984, four Texas limited partnerships each purchased a number of units in the condominium from Winston Capital, Inc. The joint intervenors consist of the six Michigan limited partnerships and the four Texas limited partnerships. The number of units so purchased gives the joint intervenors, as a block, a controlling interest in the condominium association. The association is controlled by the joint intervenors, who elected two of the three directors of the association. The association hired Hall Management Company, Kent Security Services, Inc., and an unnamed cleaning company. Records of the Secretary of State reveal that among other officers of Hall Management Company are Craig Hall, President and Director, and Christine Erdody, Vice-President. The records of the Secretary of State reveal no entity known as the Hall Real Estate Group. The public records of Dade County, Florida, reveal no fictitious name affidavit for any entity trading as the Hall Real Estate Group. The records of the Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes reflect that Winston Towers 600 is a residential condominium, located in Dade County, Florida. The joint intervenors are not now offering and have not ever offered condominium units for sale. The joint intervenors are not now offering and have not ever offered condominium units for lease for periods in excess of five years. Winston Towers 600 Condominium Association, Inc., is the non-profit condominium association established to maintain and operate the condominium. In July, 1984, a meeting of the condominium association was held upon instructions of the developer, Winston Capital, Inc. Winston Capital, Inc., scheduled and held the condominium association meeting in July 1984, under the good faith impression and belief that the threshold requirements in Section 718.301 mandating turnover of control of the association board of directors had been met. Joint intervenors, collectively, own more than 50 per cent of the units in the condominium. Joint intervenors, as developers, did not turn over control of the condominium association in July 1984. The declaration of condominium for the condominium and the Florida Statutes grant certain rights and privileges to the developers. The joint intervenors have a substantial economic investment in the condominium. The joint intervenors desire to have the condominium operated and maintained by competent professional management so as to protect and enhance the condominium project. The annual fee being paid to Hall Management Company for management of the condominium is the same fee as had been previously paid by the developer, Winston Capital, Inc., to the prior manager, Keyes Management Company. The names of the board of directors elected to the board of administrators of the association on July 16, 1985, were Ms. Christine Erdody, Mr. James Sherry, and Mr. Joseph Pereira. Ms. Christine Erdody and Mr. James Sherry are general partners in each of the ten limited partnerships. Mr. Craig Hall is President and Ms. Christine Erdody is Vice- President. Other findings based on evidence Adduced at hearing At the turnover meeting in July of 1984, Ms. Erdody cast votes on behalf of each of the ten limited partnerships, voting once for each unit owned by all ten of the limited partnerships. There has never been a meeting of the unit owners in which the limited partnerships turned over control of the association to unit owners other than the ten limited partnerships. The ten limited partnerships have no business ventures or income producing activities other than attempting to offset expenses of operations by leasing the units owned by the limited partnerships and attempting to increase their equity in the condominium units. The units acquired by the joint intervenors were not acquired for their own occupancy. The limited partnerships, while in control of the association, employed Hall Management Company, pursuant to contract, to manage the condominium and to lease the units owned by the limited partnerships. The rental office used by the management company consists of a unit owned by one of the limited partnerships. The contract specifically requires that Hall Management Company attempt to lease those condominiums units owned by the limited partnerships. The limited partnerships have no income producing mechanism other than the disposition of condominium units owned by the listed partnerships pursuant to the contract with the Hall Management Company. A regular, normal, and common activity of each of the ten limited partnerships is to offer to lease and to enter into leases of the condominium units owned by the limited partnerships. They typically engage in this activity through their agent, the Hall Management Company. None of the ten limited partnerships have ever offered any of their units for sale. None of the ten limited partnerships have ever offered any of their condominium units for leases in excess of five years. Ultimately, all of the ten limited partnerships intend to sell all of their condominium units. There is no relationship or affiliation between the creator/developer, Winston Capital, Inc., and any of the joint intervenors. Each of the joint intervenors is a separate limited partnership. However, due to the facts that each of the joint intervenors have a common purpose, each has at least several general partners in common, each has entered into a management contract with a closely related management company, and each has acted in concert with the others in prior matters concerning the condominium facility and the association, for all practical purposes relevant to this case, the joint intervenors may be regarded as a single entity. This is true even though there is no agreement or contract between the joint intervenors requiring them to act collectively in any matter involving or affecting their vote in condominium association matters at Winston Towers 600 Condominium. In all the actions of the joint intervenors in voting their interests at association meetings, they have never thought or acted on the understanding that the joint intervenors were developers of the condominium. The unit owners other than the joint intervenors have selected one-third of the Board of Directors of the Association. The right to vote for a majority of the board of directors of the condominium association is a significant and valuable right which the joint intervenors believed they would be entitled to upon purchasing a majority of the units in the condominium. A substantial number of the purchasers of Florida condominium units are non-residents of Florida. A substantial number of purchasers of condominium units intend to rent their condominiums under leases with a duration of two years or less.
Recommendation On the basis of all of the foregoing, it is recommended that the Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes issue a declaratory statement to the following effect: That the joint intervenors, individually and collectively, constitute concurrent and successor developers, and that as such concurrent and successor developers who collectively own more than fifty per cent but less than eighty-five per cent of the units, they are entitled to appoint two-thirds of the members of the board of administration of the condominium association. The statement should also note that the joint intervenors should comply with Section 718.3025(1)(e), Florida Statutes, by disclosing any financial or ownership interest which the joint intervenors have, if any, in Hall Management Company That the issue of whether the joint intervenors may have violated the provisions of the declaration of condominium is not a proper subject for a declaratory statement. DONE AND ORDERED this 9th day of April, 1986, at Tallahassee, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of April, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Arnold Belkin Apartment 912 210 - 174 Street Miami, Florida 33160 Thomas A. Bell, Esquire Deputy General Counsel Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Karl M. Scheuerman, Esquire Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 323301 Joseph D. Bolton, Esquire Stephen Gillman, Esquire SHUTTS & BOWEN 1500 Edward Ball Building Miami Center 100 Chopin Plaza Miami, Florida 33131 Linda McMullen, Esquire McFARLAIN, BOBO, STERNSTEIN, WILEY & CASSEDY P. O. Box 2174 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 James Kearney, Jr., Acting Director Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 James Kearney, Jr., Secretary Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 APPENDIX The Following are my specific rulings on each of the proposed findings of fact submitted by all of the parties. Rulings on findings proposed by the Division Paragraphs 1 through 23 of the Division's proposed findings are accepted and incorporated into the findings in this Recommended order. Paragraph 24 is rejected as irrelevant and as not supported by persuasive competent substantial evidence. Paragraph 25 is rejected as irrelevant in part and is redundant in part. The substance of paragraph 26 is accepted with the deletion of certain redundant information. The substance of paragraphs 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, and 33 is accepted with some modifications in the interest of clarity and accuracy and with the deletion of certain redundant information. Rulings on findings proposed by the Joint Intervenors Paragraphs 1 through 12 of the Joint Intervenors' proposed findings are accepted and incorporated into the findings in this Recommended Order. Paragraph 13 is rejected as irrelevant, subordinate, and not supported by competent substantial evidence. Paragraphs 14 and 15 are accepted. Paragraphs 16 and 17 are accepted with additional findings for the purpose of clarity and accuracy. The substance of paragraphs 18, 19, 23, and 26 is accepted. Paragraphs 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, and 27 are accepted. Rulings on findings proposed by Petitioner Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 4 of Petitioner's proposed findings are accepted in substance. Paragraph 5 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraphs 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 are accepted in substance with the deletion of the reference to the Hall Group of real estate limited partnerships. Paragraph 11 is rejected in part because it is subordinate, in part because not supported by competent substantial evidence and in part because it is a conclusion of law. Paragraphs 12, 13, 14, and 15 are accepted in substance. Paragraph 16 is rejected because it is not supported by competent substantial evidence. Paragraph 17 is rejected because it is irrelevant and subordinate. Paragraphs 18, 19, and 20 are accepted in substance. Paragraphs 21 and 22 are rejected because they constitute argument or conclusions of law and are not supported by competent substantial evidence. Paragraph 23 is rejected because it is irrelevant to the issues to be decided in this case and because portions of it are not supported by competent substantial evidence. Paragraph 24 is accepted. Paragraph 25 is rejected because it is irrelevant to the issues to be decided in this case, because portions of it are not supported by competent substantial evidence, and because portions of it constitute argument or conclusions of law. Paragraph 26 is rejected because it is not supported by competent substantial evidence. Paragraph 27 is rejected because it constitutes argument. Paragraph 28 is rejected because it is irrelevant and redundant. Paragraphs 29 and 30 are rejected because they constitute argument or conclusions of law. Paragraphs 31 and 32 are rejected because they are not supported by competent substantial evidence. Paragraph 33 is rejected because it constitutes argument or conclusions of law. Paragraphs 34 and 35 are rejected because they are irrelevant and because they constitute argument.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a licensed real estate salesman and held such license at all times material to this proceeding. She was a salesman with Miller, Cowherd and Kerver, Inc. Realtors (MCK) at the time of the transactions relevant to this proceeding. Complainant Loretta Fram listed her home in Ft. Lauderdale with Respondent and utilized her services as realtor in the purchase of a condominium apartment in Plantation. Another member of the MCK firm had previously prepared a contract for Fram to purchase the same condominium unit, but it was not executed. The first condominium contract included a contingency clause that required return of Fram's $5,000 deposit if she did not sell her house prior to the condominium closing. This clause was not included in the contract prepared by Respondent even though Fram told her she could not make the condominium down payment due at closing without the proceeds from the sale of her house. Respondent assured Fram the house would be sold in time or that she would work something out. Just prior to the scheduled condominium closing, Respondent arranged a 90-day "swing loan" for $15,000, since funds from the house sale were not forthcoming. Without this loan, Fram would not have been able to close on the condominium and may have had to forfeit her deposit. The swing loan interest and fees amounted to $2,030. Fram paid this amount in January, 1980, on Respondent's assurance that she would be reimbursed. Respondent reduced such assurance to writing in a document dated January 8, 1980 (Petitioner's Exhibit 6). However, after three years, Fram has not been reimbursed. At the time Fram attempted to move into her condominium unit, she was refused admittance by the condominium association. Respondent has reasonably relied on an acceptance the association issued in conjunction with the initial contract. The association thereafter held a meeting and ratified its earlier decision to accept Fram.
Recommendation From the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order suspending Respondent's license as a real estate salesman for a period of three years. DONE and ENTERED this 12th day of July, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. T. CARPENTER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of July, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Joel S. Fass, Esquire 626 Northeast 124th Street North Miami, Florida 33161 Edward Oddo, Esquire 2660 Northwest 32nd Street Boca Raton, Florida 33432 Harold Huff, Executive Director Division of Real Estate Department of Professional Regulation Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 William M. Furlow, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Fred M. Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Eden Isles Condominiums are residential condominiums consisting of 7 identical buildings with 52 units in each building. Each building has a separate Declaration of Condominium which declaration is identical with the other 6 Declarations of Condominiums except as to the identification of the condominium. There are 4 swimming pools, parking areas, etc., the expenses for which are shared by the 7 condominiums. The Declarations of Condominiums provide for the percentage of the common ownership and expense associated with each unit in the condominium. The Declarations provide that the affairs of each condominium will be managed by the Eden Isles Condominium Association, Inc., Respondent. Duties of the Association include the preparation of budgets, collection of assessments for expense of maintaining common elements from each unit owner, maintenance of all common elements and generally conducting all of the business dealings associated with the common elements. From the inception of the Association in 1972 a common budget has been prepared for the 7 condominiums which is assessed against unit owners by taking total expenses for the common elements of the 7 buildings, dividing this by 7 and then allocating to each of the 52 unit owners in each building his pro rata share of those expenses. This has the effect of requiring the unit owners housed in Building D to share the cost for the replacement of an elevator in Building P or the replacement of a roof on Building C. The net result of the consolidated budget is to treat the 7 condominiums as one for the purpose of maintaining the common elements. When built and the Declarations of Condominiums recorded, Eden Isles was not a phased development.
The Issue The issues are whether Respondents are guilty of the following: (a) breach of fiduciary relationship in violation of Section 718.111(1)(a), Florida Statutes; (b) failure to respond in writing to written inquiries in violation of Section 718.112(2)(a)2., Florida Statutes; (c) failure to properly notice a meeting in which regular assessments were discussed in violation of Section 718.112(2)(c), Florida Statutes; (d) failure to proportionately excuse payment of common expenses for all units owners after doing so for one unit owner in violation of Section 718.116(9)(a), Florida Statutes; and (e) willfully and knowingly violating Chapter 718, Florida Statutes, in violation of Section 718.501(d)(4), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Ocean Gate is a unit-owner controlled condominium located in St. Augustine, Florida. A three-member board of directors governs Ocean Gate. However, Article V of Ocean Gate's Articles of Incorporation states as follows in relevant part: This corporation shall have three (3) directors initially. Thereafter, the number of directors may be increased from time to time in the manner provided by the Bylaws, but shall never be fewer than three. Ocean Gate's original developer was Robert Laurence/Ocean Gate Development, Inc. On or about June 16, 1999, the developer recorded Ocean Gate's Declaration of Condominium in the official record book 1417, page 1932, of the public records of St. Johns County, Florida. At that time, Ocean Gate's directors, as set forth in the Articles of Incorporation, were Roger W. McClain, Leslie Gallagher, and Robert J.L. Laurence. The property at issue includes two buildings (2.1 and 2.2) containing a total of 10 units. Units 600, 604, 608, 612, 616, and 620 are located in Ocean Gate's 2.1 building. Units 605, 609, 613, and 617 are located in Ocean Gate's 2.2 building. On June 16, 1999, the following deeds were recorded in the official record book of St. Johns County, Florida: (a) unit 600 to Mr. and Mrs. Grissom (later sold to the Mr. Barrow/Flag Development Corporation); (b) unit 604 to Mr. and Mrs. McNeely; (c) unit 608 to Dr. and Mrs. Blankenship; (d) unit 612 to Mr. and Mrs. Klinehoffer; (e) unit 616 to Mr. and Mrs. Pittman (later sold to Mr. and Mrs. Weaver); and (f) unit 620 to Mr. and Mrs. Carabetta. The unit owners in the 2.1 building had to lend the developer funds to complete the construction of their units. Even so, these unit owners had to foreclose on that loan and spend additional funds to complete the construction on their units. On or about July 1, 1999, Ocean Gate issued a Notice of Owners Meeting. The meeting was scheduled for July 17, 1999. The agenda attached to the notice included the following: (a) call to order; (b) establish a quorum; (c) waiver of 60-day notice; (d) introduction of May Management Services, Inc. (May Management); (e) official approval of management contract; (f) discussion of board members; (g) discussion of contract; and (h) adjournment. Ocean Gate held its first unit owners' meeting on July 17, 1999. Mr. Klinehoffer, Mr. and Mrs. Pittman, Dr. and Mrs. Blankenship, Mr. and Mrs. McNeely, Mr. Grissom, and Mr. and Mrs. Carabetta attended the meeting. The developer did not attend the meeting. During the July 17, 1999, meeting, the unit owners accepted the resignation of Les R. Gallagher, as a director, and elected the following directors/officers: Mr. Grissom, president; Mr. Kleinhoffer, vice president; and Mrs. Pittman, secretary/treasurer. The representative of May Management announced that the developer had turned over $8,308.44 to the unit owners. Ocean Gate conducted a unit owners meeting on December 4, 1999. Mr. Grissom and Dr. Blankenship attended the meeting. Mrs. Pittman attended by proxy. A representative of the developer was also in attendance. During the meeting, the unit owners approved Ocean Gate's 2000 operating budget. On or about January 14, 2000, Mrs. Pittman resigned as a director and secretary/treasurer. A unit owners meeting took place on January 29, 2000. Mr. Grissom, Dr. and Mrs. Blankenship, Mr. Carabetta, Mr. and Mrs. McNeely, and Mr. Weaver were in attendance. In a notice dated March 22, 2000, Ocean Gate scheduled a unit owners meeting for April 15, 2000. The agenda included the following: (a) call to order; (b) establish a quorum; (c) approval of minutes of January 29, 2000; (d) financial report; (e) old business (release of lien payment for John M. Williams); (f) new business, including election of director; (g) date of next meeting; and (h) adjournment. During the meeting, Mr. Weaver was elected to fill a vacancy on Ocean Gate's board of directors. The Carabettas' unit, which is located in the 2.1 building, is the largest unit on the property. Mr. Carabetta refused to pay some of Ocean Gate's assessments because he did not believe Ocean Gate was properly maintaining his unit. In time, he filed at least one lawsuit against Ocean Gate and its board of directors. He also filed defamation and discrimination lawsuits against some of the unit owners in their individual capacities. Mr. Carabetta testified at hearing that Ocean Gate failed to maintain his unit while expending funds to maintain the units of the Weavers, the Blankenships, the McNeelys, and the Klinehoffers. There is no persuasive evidence that the directors of Ocean Gate improperly refused to pay for maintenance/repair of the common elements in the 2.1 building, including the limited common elements directly affecting Mr. Carabetta's unit. The 2.2 building was the subject of a foreclosure suit. It was sold on the courthouse steps to Flag Development Corporation on June 13, 2000. Pursuant to that sale, Flag Development Corporation also bought two additional condominium developments, Ocean Gate Phase II and Ocean Gate Phase III, which are not a part of the property at issue here. The record contains a Certificate of Title conveying real and personal property to Flag Development Corporation. The certificate refers to a description of real and personal property, "Exhibit A," which is not attached to the copy of the certificate in the record. John Williams and Mr. Barrow are business associates affiliated with Flag Development Corporation. After receiving title to the 2.2 building, their company did nothing more than clean up the property. They did no construction, maintenance, or repair work. In two letters, Jones & Pellicer, Inc., civil engineers and land surveyors, responded to Mr. Weaver's request for a survey to determine the square footage for each unit. The first letter dated May 31, 2000, referred to the survey of units 600, 604, 608, 612, 616, and 620 in the 2.1 building. The second letter dated July 31, 2000, referred to the survey of units 605, 609, 613, and 617 in the 2.2 building. According to the letters, the surveys determined the square footage for each unit using the floor area, as defined by Section 4.7-Unit Boundaries "A" and "B" in the Ocean Gate Declaration of Condominium. Mr. Walters purchased the four units in Ocean Gate's 2.2 building from John Williams/Flag Development Corporation in late July or early August 2000. The purchase price was approximately one million dollars. The record contains a copy of the corporate warranty deed conveying the 2.2 building to Mr. Walters. The deed states that the transfer of title is "subject to taxes for the current year, covenants, restrictions, and easements of record, if any." The attachments to the deed describing the property include Schedule A, Exhibit A, and Exhibit A Continued. The document identified as Exhibit A Continued, and which appears to be signed by the original developer, is not legible. When Mr. Walters bought the four units, the 2.2 building had a roof, windows, walls, and doors from which the square footage of each unit could be determined. The building was about 45 percent complete but not sufficiently complete to qualify any of the units in the building for a certificate of occupancy. Mr. Walters hired a contractor to complete the construction on his units. The construction, which involved a considerable sum of money, included work on the common elements and the interior of the units. There were liens on the 2.2 building for Ocean Gate's assessments when Mr. Walters purchased his four units. Mr. Walters refused to pay any past or ongoing assessments on his four units. In turn, Ocean Gate refused to expend any funds to maintain or repair the 2.2 building. Ocean Gate continued to impose assessments on all unit owners, including Mr. Walters and Mr. Carabetta. Ocean Gate also had to impose special assessments on some unit owners to make up the shortfall when Mr. Walters and/or Mr. Carabetta refused to pay their regular assessments. On October 17, 2000, Ocean Gate filed a Revised Claim of Lien against Mr. Walters for unpaid assessments and late charges. The Revised Claim of Lien alleged that Mr. Walters owed Ocean Gate a balance of $20,983.42. In a letter dated October 18, 2000, Ocean Gate advised Mr. Walters that a foreclosure suit would be instituted if he did not pay the assessments and charges. Early in 2001, Ocean Gate filed a Complaint seeking foreclosure of the liens against Mr. Walters in Case No. CA-01- 85, in the Circuit Court, Seventh Judicial Circuit, in and for St. Johns County, Florida. On or about March 1, 2001, Mr. Walters filed a Motion to Dismiss in Case No. CA-01-85, in the Circuit Court, Seventh Judicial Circuit, in and for St. Johns County, Florida. Mr. Walters took the position that he was not obliged to pay condominium assessment until a certificate of occupancy was issued and that the original developer had never relinquished control of Ocean Gate. Mr. Walters and Mr. Carabetta together owned over 51 percent of the total square footage in all units. Therefore, they controlled a majority of Ocean Gate's voting interests, which are directly proportional to the square footage in each unit. Specifically, Mr. Walters controlled a total of 36.207 percent of the membership voting interests and Mr. Carabetta controlled a total of 15.990 percent of the membership voting interests. Mr. Weaver was Ocean Gate's president in September 2001. Mr. McNeely and Mr. Klinehoffer were also directors/officers. All three of the directors were named as defendants in one or more of Mr. Carabetta's lawsuits. On or about September 26, 2001, Mr. Weaver issued the second notice of Ocean Gate's annual meeting of unit owners. The notice included the following agenda items: (a) roll call; (b) reading of minutes of last meeting; (c) reports of officers; (d) election of directors; (e) unfinished business; (f) original resolutions and new business; and (g) adjournment. The annual meeting of Ocean Gate's unit owners took place on October 27, 2001. During the meeting Mr. Walters and Mr. Carabetta, in concert with one additional unit owner, used their majority voting interests to elect themselves as directors. Mr. Walters and Mr. Carabetta received 64 percent of the votes. Dr. Blankenship, receiving 84.69 percent of the votes, became Ocean Gate's third director and "acting" president. After the election of the directors, Mr. Walters expressed his frustration about the liens on his property and the pending foreclosure action involving at that time approximately $50,000 in assessments and interest. In an effort to resolve the conflict, Dr. Blankenship proposed the following as a global concept: Homer Barrow and the newly elected Ocean Gate Phase I Condo Association Board will attempt to satisfy the concerns of the Carabetta's [sic] with regard to correction of deficiencies on their unit. The Carabettas will dismiss all lawsuits and complaints against other unit owners and boards and pay overdue assessments. Richard Walters will contribute $10,000 to the Phase I Association as final settlement of lien/foreclosure action. Unit owners will end foreclosure action against Richard Walters and forgive existing liens against Richard Walters. It is understood that the above action and commitments are interdependent and sequential in the order listed above. Minutes of Meeting of the Unit Owners, October 27, 2001. Mr. Walters initially objected to paying the $10,000. However, John Williams persuaded Mr. Walters to join in the proposed agreement. After Dr. Blankenship's motion regarding the proposed agreement was seconded, the unit owners who were present at the October 27, 2001, meeting verbally approved the proposed agreement. The unit owners never reduced the proposed agreement to writing. They never signed a copy of the minutes containing the proposed agreement. Mr. Klinehoffer was the only unit owner who was not present at the meeting. Mr. Klinehoffer had not given Mr. Weaver or any other unit owner his proxy to vote in favor of a settlement of the pending litigation against Mr. Walters. More importantly, the consideration of assessments and a settlement agreement regarding the foreclosure suit were not included as agenda items in the notice of the unit owners' meeting. On November 17, 2001, Ocean Gate's directors held another meeting. They elected the following officers: Dr. Blankenship, president; Mr. Walters, vice-president; and Mr. Carabetta, secretary/treasurer. During the November 17, 2001, meeting, Mr. Walters wanted to discuss implementing the proposed settlement agreement from the October 27, 2001, unit owners' meeting. In other words, Mr. Walters wanted Ocean Gate to drop the foreclosure suit against him in exchange for $10,000. However, the minority unit owners asserted that Mr. Carabetta had not dropped his lawsuits against Ocean Gate and the other unit owners in the 2.1 building. Mr. Weaver took the position that the proposed settlement agreement was not valid unless it was implemented sequentially beginning with coming to terms with Mr. Carabetta and Mr. Carabetta dropping all of his lawsuits. Mr. McNeely asserted that he would not agree to participate in the global agreement. Mr. Klinehoffer stated that he did not agree to the global agreement and specifically objected to any change in Mr. Walters' assessment responsibilities or liabilities. On December 10, 2001, Mr. Walters and Mr. Carabetta conducted a board of directors meeting. A facsimile transmission had been sent to Dr. Blankenship as notice of the meeting, but he was out of town and had no actual prior knowledge about the meeting or its agenda. The notice for the December 10, 2001, board of directors meeting was posted on Ocean Gate's property 48 hours in advance of the meeting. The agenda attached to the notice made reference to a non-specific item identified as "approval of resolutions" without reference to the subject matter and without mention of assessments or settlement agreements. During the December 10, 2001, board of directors meeting, Mr. Walters proposed a resolution to allow him to pay $10,000 in lieu of his past due assessments, to release the liens on his four units, and to dismiss the foreclosure action. After Mr. Walters proposed the resolution, Mr. Carabetta provided a second and voted to pass the resolution. Mr. Weaver and Mr. McNeely protested that Mr. Walters could not vote due to a conflict of interest and that without Mr. Walters' vote, the board of directors did not have a quorum. Mr. Walters then recused himself. Next Mr. Weaver contacted Dr. Blankenship by telephone. However, on faulty advice from Mr. Carabetta's personal attorney, Mr. Walters and Mr. Carabetta refused to let Dr. Blankenship vote on the resolution. Mr. Walters and Mr. Carabetta also refused to let Ocean Gate's attorney, Roseanne Perrine, participate in the meeting by telephone. Before the meeting adjourned, Mr. Walters declared that the resolution had passed and the matter was closed based on Mr. Carabetta's sole affirmative vote. Next, Mr. Walters proposed that Ocean Gate terminate its contract with May Management. Mr. Walters then introduced a representative of Coastal Realty and Property Management, Inc. (Coastal). Over Mr. Weaver's objections, Mr. Walters and Mr. Carabetta voted to replace May Management with Coastal. The greater weight of the evidence indicates that May Management was a reputable company with no major complaints from the unit owners. In a letter dated December 11, 2001, Ms. Perrine reminded Mr. Walters and Mr. Carabetta that her firm represented Ocean Gate in the foreclosure action against Mr. Walters. She claimed that the resolution passed on December 10, 2001, was invalid. She asserted that she would withdraw as counsel of record if requested to dismiss the lawsuit based on the December 10, 2001, resolution. In a letter dated December 12, 2001, Mr. Carabatta enclosed a copy of a check made payable to Ocean Gate in the amount of $8,062.54. According to the letter, the check represented the amount of Mr. Carabetta's assessments though year 2001. The letter stated that the check had been delivered to Coastal for deposit into an operating account for Ocean Gate. Finally, the letter demanded that May Management stop all foreclosure proceedings against Mr. Carabetta and release the lien of record against his property. On December 12, 2001, Mr. Carabetta authorized Coastal to open new bank accounts for Ocean Gate using his check as an initial deposit. Dr. Blankenship wrote a letter dated December 13, 2001, to Mr. Walters and Mr. Carabetta. In the letter, Mr. Blankenship objected to the lack of notice regarding the December 10, 2001, board of directors meeting and its agenda. Dr. Blankenship's letter complained that he had not been allowed to vote when he was called during the meeting. On or about December 16, 2001, the Circuit Court Judge in Case No.: CA-01-85, in the Seventh Judicial Circuit, in and for St. Johns County, Florida, entered an Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants Motion to Dismiss. The order states as follows in pertinent part: Third, the Defendants assert the Plaintiff is without standing to assess maintenance fees, file liens, or foreclose any lien because the developer never turned over control of the association to the unit owners pursuant to Article 8.5 of the Declaration of Condominium of Ocean Gate Phase I, A Condominium. Nothing contained in Article 8.5 of the Declaration supports the Defendant's assertion. The Association was given the authority to assess fees in Paragraph 7 of the Declaration, not Article 8.5. Paragraph 7 states: Assessments. To provide the funds necessary for proper operation and maintenance of the Condominium, the Phase I Association has been granted the right to make, levy, and collect Assessments and Special Assessments against all Unit Owners and Units. Fourth, the Defendants' assert the condominium association had no authority to charge condominium fees since the buildings have not yet been completed, nor have certificates of occupancy been issued. According to Ris Investment Group, Inc. v. Dep't of Business and Professional Regulation, 695 So. 2d 357 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997), the question before the Court is whether, in accordance with the Declaration, the term "unit" was intended to encompass raw land and/or condominiums which had not yet been purchased, or just land upon which the condominium units had already been built and/or purchased. A review of the pertinent portion of the Declaration is necessary to answer the foregoing questions. Paragraph 7 of the Declarations states: Assessments. To provide the funds necessary for proper operation and maintenance of the Condominium, the Phase I Association has been granted the right to make, levy, and collect Assessments and Special Assessments against all Unit Owners and Units. Paragraph 3 of the Declaration states: Definitions. ‘Unit’ means a part of the Condominium Property, which is to be subject to exclusive private ownership as defined in the Condominium Act. ‘Condominium Property’ means the parcel of real property described in Exhibit "A" attached hereto, together with all improvements built or to be built thereon, and the easements and rights appurtenant thereto. A review of Exhibit ‘A’ and ‘A-1’ reveals that the term "Condominium Property" refers to the entire condominium complex, not just one unit. Reading the pertinent portions of the Declaration, in toto, it appears as though the parties intended that the Association could assess fees from "units" which encompass any portion of the condominium property, whether improvements have been built or are to be built thereon. Accordingly the Defendant's assertion is without merit and the Motion to Dismiss in this regard is denied. Around the first of January 2002, Mr. Walters tendered a check to Ocean Gate in the amount of $10,000. The front side of Mr. Walter's check, number 652, indicates that it was for association dues in full through December 31, 2001. The backside of the check states, "Endorsement of this instrument constitutes payment in full for association dues on 605, 609, 613, and 617, Mediterranean Way, thru December 31, 2001." There is no evidence that the $10,000 check was deposited to Ocean Gate's bank account. After the December 2001 meeting, the Weavers, McNeelys, Klinehoffers, and Blankenships sent numerous letters by certified mail to Mr. Walters and Mr. Carabetta. The letters protested the manner in which Mr. Walters and Mr. Carabetta had conducted the December 10, 2001, and subsequent meetings, demanding that they remove themselves as directors, and inquiring about many other matters relating to the operation and management of Ocean Gate. Many of the letters specifically requested Mr. Walters and Mr. Carabetta to respond in writing within 30 days as required by Section 718.112(2)(a)2., Florida Statutes. Mr. Carabetta responded to one of the complaint letters. All subsequent complaint letters were referred to Alan Scott, Esquire. Mr. Scott did not provide a written response to the letters unless specifically directed to do so by Mr. Walters and/or Mr. Carabetta. Mr. Scott responded to one complaint letter. On or about January 24, 2002, Mr. Scott, writing on behalf of Mr. Walters and Mr. Carabetta, sent a letter to Dr. Blankenship and May Management. The letter stated that a majority of Ocean Gate's voting interests (Mr. Walters and Mr. Carabetta) had entered into written agreements to remove Dr. Blankenship from his position as a director. On January 29, 2002, Mr. Carabetta filed a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal without Prejudice in one of his lawsuits naming Ocean Gate as defendant. That case was Case No. CA01-858 in the Circuit Court, Seventh Judicial Circuit, in and for St. Johns County, Florida. Competent evidence indicates the Mr. Carabetta dismissed all of his lawsuits against his neighbors after the December 2001 meeting. Ocean Gate's directors issued a notice dated February 4, 2002. The notice indicated that the directors would meet on February 7, 2002. The agenda for that meeting included the following: (a) call to order; (b) roll call; (c) appointment of new director; (d) fill officer vacancies; (e) consider discharge of association attorneys and appointment of new association legal counsel; (f) consider discharge of May Management and appointment of Coastal; and (g) consider change of association mailing address and resident agent. During the directors' meeting on February 7, 2002, Mr. Walters and Mr. Carabetta appointed Mr. Barrow as a director. The directors then elected Mr. Walters as president, Mr. Barrow as vice-president, with Mr. Carabetta retaining his office as secretary/treasurer. Next, the directors voted to make the following changes: (a) to fire May Management and hire Coastal as Ocean Gate's management company; (b) to discharge Ms. Perrine and retain Mr. Scott as Ocean Gate's attorney; and (c) to update the corporate report data showing Mr. Scott as registered agent. In a letter dated February 8, 2002, Mr. Klinehoffer, Mr. Weaver, Mr. McNeely, and Dr. Blankenship advised Mr. Walters and Mr. Carabetta that the February 7, 2002, directors' meeting had not been properly noticed. The letter alleged that the notice had not been posted on the property 48 hours in advance of the meeting and that none of the minority unit owners had received notice by fax, phone, or letter. By letter dated March 1, 2002, Mr. Walters, Mr. Carabetta and Mr. Barrows advised Ms. Perrine's law firm that her services as counsel for Ocean Gate were terminated. The letter directed Mr. Perrine to turn over her foreclosure file to Mr. Scott, who would replace her as counsel for Ocean Gate. By letter dated March 25, 2002, the minority unit owners objected to the termination of Ms. Perrine as Ocean Gate's attorney. During an April 10, 2002, directors' meeting, Mr. Carabetta and Mr. Barrows voted to accept Mr. Walters' payment of $10,000 in satisfaction of his past due assessments, penalties and interest. Thereafter, Mr. Walters tendered his check for $10,000 on the same day that Ocean Gate's new attorney, Mr. Scott, dismissed the foreclosure suit against Mr. Walters. In a letter dated April 17, 2002, Mr. Weaver protested the actions taken by Mr. Walters, Mr. Carabetta, and Mr. Barrows during the April 10, 2002, directors' meeting. Additionally, the minority unit owners continued to send Mr. Walters, Mr. Carabetta, and Mr. Barrow letters complaining about various problems in the management of Ocean Gate and requesting a response within 30 days. The minority unit owners did not receive any responses to these letters. In a letter dated April 17, 2002, Petitioner's investigator, Eurkie McLemore, advised Mr. Walters about the complaints filed against him and Mr. Carabetta by the minority unit owners. Ms. McLemore requested a response to the allegations by April 30, 2002. The letter contained the following warning: Please note that if you as a MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND OFFICER OF THE ASSOCIATION fail to respond to this letter, or if another complaint is received, the Division will pursue an enforcement resolution, which may result in civil penalties of up to $5,000 per violation. Therefore, you are urged to respond appropriately to this warning letter and to use your best efforts to comply with sections 718.111(1)(a), 718.116(9)(a), 718.112(2)(c), 718.112(2)(a)2., Florida Statutes, now and in the future. By letter dated April 30, 2002, Ocean Gate's attorney, Mr. Scott, responded to Ms. McLemore's letter. According to the letter, Mr. Walters and Mr. Carabetta denied the allegations and did not indicate that any corrective action would be taken. In June 2002 Ocean Gate's directors authorized Mr. Scott, as Ocean Gate's counsel, to file a voluntary dismissal with prejudice in the foreclosure suit against Mr. Walters. Mr. Walters sold his units at an on-site auction in July 2002. Mr. Walters executed warranty deeds for the three successful bidders in August 2002. As of January 31, 2002, Mr. Walters owed Ocean Gate past-due assessments plus interest in the amount of $62,943.56. The accrued interest on that amount as of June 16, 2003, was $15,767.36. Mr. Walters paid his quarterly assessments at the end of March and June 2002. He also paid Ocean Gate $10,000 when the foreclosure suit was dismissed in June 2002. Therefore, the total amount that Mr. Walters owed Ocean Gate as of June 16, 2003, was $68,710.92 During the hearing, Mr. Walters presented evidence that he was entitled to an offset for his expense in maintaining and repairing the 2.2 building. However, the evidence presented is insufficient to determine whether Mr. Walters' expenses were related to maintenance and repair of common elements. The greater weight of the evidence indicates that Mr. Walters is not entitled to an offset.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner issue a final order imposing a civil penalty on Respondents in the amount of $10,000 each and requiring Mr. Walters to make restitution to Ocean Gate in the amount of $68,710.92 plus interest on this amount from June 16, 2003, until the date payment is made. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of August, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of August, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: John B. Bamberg, Esquire Post Office Box 2210 St. Augustine, Florida 32085 Joseph S. Garwood, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Ross Fleetwood, Division Director Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0892 Hardy L. Roberts, III, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202
Findings Of Fact Petitioner herein is the State of Florida, Department of Business Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales Condominiums and Mobile Homes. One Respondent in this matter is Tanwin Corporation (hereinafter "Tanwin") the developer of two residential condominiums known as Vista Del Lago Condominium I and Vista Del Lago Condominium II, located in West Palm Beach, Florida. The other Respondent is Vista Del Lago Condominium Association, Inc. (hereinafter "Association"), the condominium association for Vista Del Lago Condominiums I and II. Transition from developer control of the Association has not occurred, and at all times pertinent hereto, Respondent Tanwin has in fact controlled the operation of the Respondent Association. The Declaration of Condominium for Vista Del Lago Condominium I (hereinafter "Condo I") was recorded in the public records on December 12, 1980. The Declaration of Condominium for Vista Del Lago Condominium II (hereinafter "Condo II") was recorded in the public records on March 11, 1982. Condo I contains 16 units; and Condo II contains 18 units. Herbert and Judith Tannenbaum are the President and Secretary, respectively, of both Tanwin and the Association and are members of the Association's Board of Directors. The developer-controlled Association failed to provide a proposed budget of common expenses for Condo I for the fiscal year 1982. The developer-controlled Association failed to provide a proposed budget of common expenses for Condo I and Condo II for 1983 until the unit owner meeting in March or April of 1983. The budget provided at that time contained no provision for reserves. Although the document alleged to be the 1983 proposed budget admitted in evidence as Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 17 does contain an allocation for reserves, Petitioner's Exhibits numbered 17 is not the 1983 budget disseminated to unit owners at the annual meeting in 1983. In addition, the 1983 budget was received by the unit owners at the meeting at which the proposed budget was to be considered and not prior to the budget meeting. Statutory reserves were not waived during the period December, 1980 through December, 1983. The "start-up" budgets contained as exhibits to the Declarations of Condominium indicate that reserves were to be collected from unit owners at the rate of $15 per month per unit at least during the first year commencing December of 1980 with the first closing. Hence, reserves were not waived December, 1980 through December, 1981. From November, 1981 through December, 1983, no vote to waive reserves was taken by the unit owners. Although reserves were discussed at the 1983 meeting, no vote was taken during the period in question including 1983, to waive reserves. The developer as owner of unsold units; has failed to pay to the Association monthly maintenance for common expenses during the period December, 1980 through December, 1983. The developer Tanwin has, in the nature of an affirmative defense, alleged the existence of a guarantee of common expenses pursuant to Section 718.116(8), Florida Statutes, which purportedly ran from the inception of the condominiums to date. Accordingly, the initial issue for resolution is whether the developer pursuant to statute guaranteed common expenses. Section 718.116(8)(b) provides that a developer may be excused from payment of common expenses pertaining to developer-owned units for that period of time during which he has guaranteed to each purchaser in the declaration of condominium, purchase contract or prospectus, or by an agreement between the developer and a majority of unit owners other than the developer, that their assessments for common expenses would not increase over a stated dollar amount during the guarantee period and the developer agrees to pay any amount necessary for common expenses not produced by the assessments at the guaranteed level receivable from other unit owners, or "shortfall". Actual purchase agreements were admitted in evidence. Respondents seek to label certain unambiguous language in the purchase contracts as a guarantee. This language, uniform throughout all those contracts as well as the form purchase contract filed with Petitioner except that of Phillip May, provides as follows: 9. UNIT ASSESSMENTS. The Budget included in the Offering Circular sets forth Seller's best estimation of the contemplated expenses for operating and maintaining the Condominium during its initial year. Purchaser's monthly assessment under the aforementioned Budget is in the amount of $109.00. Until Closing of Title, Seller has the right (without affecting Purchaser's obligation to purchase in accordance with the provisions hereof, to modify the estimated Budget and assessments periodically if then current cost figures indicate that an updating of estimates is appropriate). [Emphasis added]. That portion of the purchase agreement set forth above does not constitute a guarantee. Instead, the purchase agreement simply includes a best estimation of expenses for the initial year. It does not govern assessments after the expiration of one year, and even as to the initial year, the language in the contract sets forth only a "best estimation" and not a guarantee that the assessments would not increase during the "guarantee period." Phillip May's purchase agreement reflects that he purchased his unit in August of 1983; after condominium complaints had been filed by the unit owners with the Florida Division of Land Sales Condominiums and Mobile Homes. His purchase agreement has been altered from the purchase agreement of earlier purchasers in that his purchase agreement expressly, by footnote contains a one- year guarantee running from closing. The guarantee contained in his purchase agreement was presented by the developer without any request from Mr. May for the inclusion of a guarantee in his purchase agreement. The guarantee language in this purchase agreement is useful for the purpose of comparing the language with those portions of the pre-complaint contracts which Respondents assert contain or constitute a guarantee. Similarly it is determined that no guarantee of common expenses exists in the Declarations of Condominium for Condo I and II or in the prospectus for Condo II. While Respondents seek to assert the existence of a guarantee in those documents, the portions of those unambiguous documents which according to Respondents contain a guarantee, have no relation to a guarantee or do not guarantee that the assessments for common expenses would not increase. Respondent Tanwin also seeks to prove the existence of an oral guarantee which was allegedly communicated to purchasers at the closing of their particular condominium units. However, purchasers were told by Herbert or Judith Tannenbaum only that assessments should remain in the amount of $109 per month per unit unless there existed insufficient funds in the Association to pay bills. This is the antithesis of a guarantee. During a guarantee period the developer in exchange for an exemption from payment of assessments on developer- owned units agrees to pay any deficits incurred by the condominium association. Accordingly, no guarantee was conveyed at the closing of condominium units. Further Respondent Tanwin's additional contention that an oral guarantee arose when the condominiums came into existence is plainly contradicted by the express language throughout the condominium documents and purchase agreements that there exist no oral representations and that no reliance can be placed on any oral representations outside the written agreements. Further, prior to December, 1983, no reference was ever made by the developer either inside or outside of unit owner meetings as to the existence of the alleged guarantee. Moreover, a comparison between on the one hand, the 1981 and 1982 financial statements prepared in March of 1983, and on the other hand, the 1983 financial statements, clearly reveals that even the accountant for Tanwin was unaware of the existence of a guarantee during the period in question. While the 1983 statements, prepared in 1984 after unit owners filed complaints with Petitioner contain references to a developer guarantee, the 1981 and 1982 statements fail to mention a guarantee. Instead, included in the 1981 and 1982 statements of the Association are references under the current liabilities portion of the balance sheets for those years, to a "Due to Tanwin Corporation" liability in the amounts of $2,138 for 1981 and $2,006 for 1982. Petitioner through Ronald DiCrescenzo, the C.P.A. for Tanwin, established that at a minimum, the $2,006 figure reflected in the 1982 balance sheet was in fact reimbursed to Tanwin. Section 7D-18.05(1),(c), Florida Administrative Code, entitled "Budgets" and effective on July 22, 1980, was officially recognized prior to the final hearing in this cause. That section requires each condominium filing to include an estimated operating budget which contains "[a] statement of any guarantee of assessments or other election and obligation of the developer pursuant to Section 718.116(8); Florida Statutes." The estimated operating budgets for Condo I and Condo II do not include a statement of any guarantee of assessments or other election or obligation of the developer. The testimony of Herbert Tannenbaum with regard to an oral (or written) guarantee is not credible. He first testified that an oral guarantee was communicated to purchasers at the closing of each unit. In contrast, Tannenbaum also testified that the first discussion he had regarding a guarantee occurred with his attorney after the filing of the Notice to Show Cause in this action. Tannenbaum further testified that he did not understand what a guarantee was until after this case had begun and was unaware of the existence of any guarantee prior to consulting with his attorney in regard to this case. Moreover, Ronald DiCrescenzo, the C.P.A. for Tanwin testified that it was Tannenbaum who informed DiCrescenzo of the existence of a guarantee but DiCrescenzo was unable or unwilling to specify the date on which this communication occurred. Respondent Tanwin also seeks to establish the existence of a guarantee through Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 5 which is a document signed by less than the majority of unit owners even including Tannenbaum and his son, and signed on an unknown date during 1984. The document provides: The undersigned Unit Owners at the Vista Del Lago Condominium do not wish to give up the benefits of the developer's continuing guarantee which has been in effect since the inception of the condominium and agreed to by a majority of unit owners and whereby the developer has continuously guaranteed a maintenance level of no more than $109.00 per month per unit, until control of the condominium affairs is turned over to the unit owners in accordance with Florida's Condominium law. According to Respondent Tanwin, Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 5 constitutes a memorandum signed by unit owners evidencing their belief that a continuous guarantee of the developer has been in effect. First, however, this document was never admitted into evidence for that purpose; rather the document was admitted only to establish the fact that a unit owner had signed the document. Second, this document, unlike the purchase agreements or other condominium documents is ambiguous and is not probative of the existence of a guarantee. Instead, the evidence is overwhelming that the document was prepared by the developer in the course of this litigation for use in this litigation. Moreover, unit owner testimony is clear regarding what Mr. and Mrs. Tannenbaum disclosed to unit owners as the purpose for the document when soliciting their signatures, to- wit: that the document was a petition evidencing the unit owners' desire that their monthly maintenance payments not be increased and that prior confusion as to whether reserves had been waived needed resolution. Respondent Tanwin did pay assessments on some developer-owned units during the period December, 1980 through December, 1983, a fact which is inconsistent with its position that a guarantee existed. Noteworthy is the statement by Ronald DiCrescenzo, the C.P.A. for Tanwin, in his August 16, 1983, letter to Herbert Tannenbaum wherein it is stated: "It is my understanding that you are doing the following: . . .[Playing maintenance assessments on units completed but not sold." It is inconceivable that a developer during a "guarantee period" would pay assessments on some developer units as the purpose of the statutory guarantee is to exempt the developer from such assessments. The assessments for common expenses of unit owners other than the developer have increased during the purported guarantee period. At least some, if not all, unit owners paid monthly assessments of $128 - $130 for at least half of 1984. This fact is probative of the issue of whether a guarantee existed because unit owner assessments must remain constant during a guarantee period. At the Spring 1984 meeting chaired by Mr. Tannenbaum a vote was taken for the first time as to whether reserves should be waived. Although only 21 owners were present in person or by proxy; the vote was tabulated as 12 in favor and 12 opposed. Mr. Tannenbaum, therefore, announced an increase in monthly maintenance payments to fund reserves. Thereafter owners began paying an increased assessment. The fact that the developer-controlled Association collected increased assessments from unit owners during 1984, and had up to the time of the final hearing in this cause made no effort to redistribute those funds suggests that the developer-controlled Association and the developer considered themselves to be under no obligation to keep maintenance assessments at a constant level. There was no guarantee of assessments for common expenses by Tanwin from December, 1980, through at least December, 1983. Since there was no guarantee during the time period in question, Respondent Tanwin is liable to the Respondent Association for the amount of monthly assessments for common expenses on all developer-owned units for which monthly assessments have not been paid. In conjunction with the determination that Tanwin owes money to the Association (and not vice versa), Respondent Tanwin attempted to obtain an offset by claiming the benefit of a management contract between either Tannenbaum or Tanwin and the Association. No such management contract exists, either written or oral. Although a management contract is mentioned in one of the condominium documents there is no indication that one ever came into being, and no written contract was even offered in evidence. Likewise, no evidence was offered to show the terms of any oral contract; rather, Tannenbaum admitted that he may never have told any of the unit owners that there was a management contract. Tannenbaum's testimony is consistent with the fact that no budget or financial statement reflects any expense to the Association for a management contract with anyone. Likewise, the "budget" contained within Condo II's documents recorded on March 11, 1982, specifically states that any management fee expense was not applicable. Lastly, Tannenbaum's testimony regarding the existence of a management contract is contrary to the statement signed by him on February 10, 1981, which specifically advised Petitioner that the Association did not employ professional management. To the extent that Respondent Tanwin attempted to establish some quantum meruit basis for its claim of an offset, it is specifically found that no basis for any payment has been proven for the following reasons: Tannenbaum had no prior experience in managing a condominium, which is buttressed by the number of violations of the condominium laws determined herein; Tannenbaum does not know what condominium managers earn; no delineation was made as to specific duties performed by Tannenbaum on behalf of the Association as opposed to those duties performed by Tannenbaum on behalf of Respondent Tanwin; since there was no testimony as to duties performed for the Association, there was necessarily no testimony as to what duties were performed on behalf of the Association in Tannenbaum's capacity as President of the Association and member of the Association's Board of Directors as opposed to duties allegedly performed as a "manager." Tannenbaum's testimony as to the value of his "services" ranged from $10,000 to $15,000 a year to a lump sum of $60,000; it is interesting to note that the value of his services alone some years exceeded the Association's annual budget. Respondent Tanwin has failed to prove entitlement to an offset amount, either pursuant to contract or based upon quantum meruit. The financial statements of the Association--including balance sheets, statements of position, and statements of receipts and expenditures--for 1980-81 and for 1982 reveal consolidation of the records for Condo I and Condo II in these statements. Additionally, DiCrescenzo admitted that separate accounting records were not maintained for each condominium and Herbert Tannenbaum also admitted to maintaining consolidated records. Accordingly, the developer- controlled Association failed to maintain separate accounting records for each condominium it manages. The By-Laws of the Association provide: SECTION. 7. Annual Audit. An audit of the accounts of the Corporation shall be made annually by a Certified Public Accountant - and a copy of the Report shall be furnished to each member not later than April 1st of the year following the year in which the Report was made. The financial statement for 1981 bears the completion date of February 9, 1983. The 1982 financial statement contains a completion date of March 1, 1983. Both the 1981 and the 1982 statements were delivered to the unit owners in March or April, 1983. Accordingly, Respondents failed to provide the 1981 financial report of actual receipts and expenditures in compliance with the Association's By-Laws. As set forth hereinabove, statutory reserves were not waived during the period of December, 1980 through December, 1983. Being a common expense, reserves must be fully funded unless waived annually. In the instant case, Respondents, rather than arguing that reserves had in fact been fully funded, sought to prove that reserves had been waived during the years in question. The fact that reserves were not fully funded is established by reviewing the financial statements. In accordance with the start-up budgets, reserves were initially established at the level of $15.00 per unit per month. Therefore, during 1981, for Condo I containing sixteen units, the Association's reserve account should contain 16 multiplied by $15.00 per month multiplied by 12 months, or $2,880. Since the Declaration of Condominium for Condo II was not recorded until March 11, 1982, assessments for common expenses including allocations to reserves, were not collected from Condo II during 1981. Therefore, the balance in the reserve account as reflected in the balance sheet for the year 1981 should be no less than $2,880. The actual balance reflected in this account is $2,445. Both Tannenbaum and DiCrescenzo testified that most of the balance in that account was composed of purchaser contributions from the closing of each condominium unit "equivalent to 2 months maintenance to be placed in a special reserve fund" as called for in the purchase contracts. Tannenbaum further admitted that instead of collecting $15.00 per month per unit for reserves, the money that would have gone into the reserve account was used "to run the condominium." Similarly, for the year ending 1982, the balance in the reserve account also reflects that reserves were not being funded. First, the amount of reserves which should have been set aside in 1981 of $2,880 is added to the total amount of reserves which should have been collected for 1982 for Condo I ($2880), giving a total figure of $5,760. To this figure should be added the reserves which should have been collected from units in Condo II during 1982. This figure is derived by multiplying the total number of units in Condo II, 18 units, by $15.00 per unit multiplied by 8 months (since Condo II was recorded in March of 1982) to yield a figure for Condo II of $2,160. Adding total reserve assessments for Condo I and II, $2,160 plus $5,760 equals $7,920 the correct reserve balance at the close of 1982. The actual balance for the period ended December 31, 1982, is reflected to be $4,138. Similarly, the amount of reserves required for Condos I and II as of December 31, 1983, can be calculated using the same formula. Although the 1983 financial statement prepared in 1984 reflects the existence of a funded reserve account, both DiCrescenzo and Tannenbaum admitted there was no separate reserves account set up during the time period involved herein. Statutory reserves were not waived and were not fully funded for the period of December, 1980 through December, 1983. All parties hereto presented much evidence, unsupported by the books and records of the corporations, for the determination herein of the amounts of money owed by Respondent Tanwin to the Association to bring current the total amount which Tanwin should have been paying to the Association from the inception of each condominium for monthly maintenance on condominium units not yet sold by the developer, together with the amount owed by Tanwin to the Association so that a separate reserve account can be established and fully funded for all years in which the majority of unit owners including the developer have not waived reserves. No findings of fact determining the exact amount Tanwin owes to the Association will be made for several reasons: first, the determination of that amount requires an accounting between the two Respondents herein which is a matter that can only be litigated, if litigation is necessary, in the circuit courts of this state; second, the determination of the amount due between the private parties hereto is not necessary for the determination by Petitioner of the statutory violations charged in the Amended Notice to Show Cause; and third, where books and records exist; one witness on each side testifying as to conclusions reached from review of those records, even though the witnesses be expert, does not present either the quantity or the quality of evidence necessary to trace the income and outgo of specific moneys through different corporate accounts over a period of time, especially where each expert opinion is based upon questionable assumptions. It is, however, clear from the record in this cause that Respondent Tanwin owes money to the Respondent Association and further owes to the Respondent Association an accounting of all moneys on a specific item by item basis.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered: Finding Respondent Tanwin Corporation guilty of the allegations contained in Counts 1-7 of the Amended Notice to Show Cause; Dismissing with prejudice Count 8 of the Amended Notice to Show Cause; Assessing against Respondent Tanwin Corporation a civil penalty in the amount of $17,000 to be paid by certified check made payable to the Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes within 45 days from entry of the Final Order herein; Ordering Respondents to forthwith comply with all provisions of the Condominium Act and the rules promulgated thereunder; And requiring Tanwin Corporation to provide and pay for an accounting by an independent certified public accountant of all funds owed by the developer as its share of common expenses on unsold units and the amount for which Tanwin is liable in order that the reserve account be fully funded, with a copy of that accounting to be filed with Petitioner within 90 days of the date of the Final Order. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 9th day of August, 1985, at Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of August, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: Karl M. Scheuerman, Esquire Thomas A. Bell, Esquire Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Joseph S. Paglino, Esquire 88 Northeast 79th Street Miami, Florida 33138 E. James Kearney, Director Department of Business Regulation Division of Florida Land Sales Condominiums and Mobile Homes 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Richard B. Burroughs, Jr., Secretary Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL CONSENT ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION DIVISION OF FLORIDA LAND SALES, CONDOMINIUMS AND MOBILE HOMES DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION, DIVISION OF FLORIDA LAND SALES, CONDOMINIUMS AND MOBILE HOMES, Petitioner, CASE NO. 84-0437 DOCKET NO. 84001MVC TANWIN CORPORATION and VISTA DEL LAGO CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC. Respondents. / FINAL CONSENT ORDER The Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes, (hereinafter the Division), Vista Del Lago Condominium Inc., (hereinafter the Association), and Tanwin Corporation, (hereinafter Tanwin), hereby stipulate and agree to the terms and issuance of this Final Consent Order as follows: WHEREAS, the Division issued a Notice to Show Cause directed to Respondents and, WHEREAS, after issuance of the Recommended Order in this cause, the parties amicably conferred for the purpose of achieving a settlement of the case, and WHEREAS, Tanwin is desirous of resolving the matters alleged in the Notice to Show Cause without engaging in further administrative proceedings or judicial review thereof, NOW, THEREFORE, it is stipulated and agreed as follows:
The Issue Whether Respondents committed the unlawful housing discrimination practices alleged in the Housing Discrimination Complaint filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations ("FCHR") and, if so, what relief should Petitioner be granted.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an African-American female. Petitioner is a "unit owner" of a condominium located at 210-174th Street #310, Sunny Isles Beach, Florida. Said unit is located in the Winston Towers 600 Condominium ("Condominium"). Respondent, the Association, is a Florida non-profit corporation and the entity responsible for the operation of the Condominium. Respondent, Board of Directors, possesses the powers and duties necessary for the administration of the affairs of the Condominium. Pursuant to the Association By-Laws, the affairs of the Association are to be governed by a board of initially three, and not less than three, nor more than nine directors. Respondent, Jorge Nunez, was the President of the Association's Board of Directors at all times material to the Complaint. During his tenure, Mr. Nunez was also the chairman of the financial committee.4/ Respondent, Monica Zarante, possesses a Florida Community Association Manager ("CAM") license and at all times material was the Association's manager. Condominium Facilities and Services Pursuant to the Condominium prospectus, the following facilities have been constructed in the Condominium, and form a part of the "common elements" of the Condominium and are to be used exclusively by the unit owners, their tenants, and guests: clubroom and entertainment areas (billiard room, library, men's and women's card rooms, meeting room and kitchen, bicycle room, and large screen television room); (b) main lobby; (c) mail room; (d) laundry room and vending machine room; (e) association office; (f) four elevators; (g) recreational facilities (tennis court, recreation pavilion, men and women's health clubs, party room, and sun deck); (h) L-shaped swimming pool; (i) jogging trail; (j) two shuffleboard courts; and (k) an irregularly-shaped reflecting pool. Pursuant to the Condominium prospectus, the following are the delineated utilities and services available to the Condominium: electricity, telephone service, waste disposal, domestic water supply, sanitary sewage, storm drainage, and master antenna service. Association Committees As noted above, Petitioner's Complaint alleges that, "sometime in 2012 she was denied her right to participate on Association committees because of her race." Association By-Law 5.2 addresses committees and provides as follows: Committees. The Board of Directors may designate one or more committees which shall have the powers of the Board of Directors for the management of the affairs and business of the Association to the extent provided in the resolution designating such a committee. Any such committee shall consist of at least three members of the Association, at least one of whom shall be a Director. The committee or committees shall have such name or names as may be determined from time to time by the Board of Directors, and any such committee shall keep regular minutes of its proceedings and report the same to the Board of Directors as required. The foregoing powers shall be exercised by the Board of Directors or its contractor, manager or employees, subject only to approval by Unit Owners when such is specifically required. Respondent Nunez credibly testified that the availability to participate on committees is open to all unit owners. If an owner wishes to be on a committee, he or she simply needs to communicate that desire to the particular committee chairperson. Mr. Nunez, at some point in time, was apparently the chairman of the financial committee. In Petitioner's direct examination of Respondent Nunez, the following exchange occurred: Q. Okay. Did you say, "You sit at this table with us, never?" A. Never. I can't say that. I can't say "never." I cannot reject anybody to belong to any committee. I can't. It's impossible. Q. Okay. A. I like you, I don't like you, you want to be on the committee, you have a right to be on the committee. Petitioner testified that she was denied access to the financial committee to which Mr. Nunez chaired. Petitioner failed, however, to present sufficient evidence for the undersigned to determine whether this alleged denial occurred during the time relevant to the allegations of Petitioner's Complaint. Even if relevant, outside of her bare assertion, which is not credited, Petitioner failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that she was ever denied the right to participate on any Association committee. As a subset, Petitioner argues that she was denied "meaningful participation" on the committees, and thus, in condominium decision-making. In support of this contention, Petitioner references the testimony from Association Board Member Audrey Bekoff. In response to Petitioner's question of "why did the Petitioner point her finger at you?," Ms. Bekoff responded as follows: I haven't got the slightest idea. When you get angry, you pull your hair, you scream, you yell, you wipe the things off Monica's desk. You knock the things off. Everybody knows you on the Board. When you come into the meeting, everybody leaves. Petitioner contends that the "refusal to allow her to participate arose from Respondents' extreme dislike for her, and this extreme dislike was likely based, at least in part, on her race." Petitioner's contention, however, is belied by the record evidence. Indeed, audio recordings of various Association meetings provide multiple examples of Petitioner's robust participation in a variety of condominium issues. Assuming, arguendo, that Petitioner provided evidence to support the position that she is not well-liked, aside from her bald allegation, she failed to present any evidence of discriminatory animus in regards to Association committee participation. Association Records Petitioner claims she was denied access to the Association's financial records (in general) and records related to a particular condominium unit, Unit 2007, on the basis of her race. Petitioner alleges that the records requests were made on July 30, 2012, and November 1, 2012. Monica Zerante testified that the Association's protocol for requesting records from the Association included submitting a request in writing, and, thereafter, the Association provides a copy of the requested document or the requesting party may be given access to find the document. She further explained that the Association's policy is to charge 25 cents per copy; however, that charge is frequently waived. Mr. Nunez provided the further detail that once the Association receives a records request, the Association has ten days to accommodate the request. Although the Association has established rules regarding the frequency and time of record inspections and copying, Mr. Nunez credibly testified that same were not enforced concerning Petitioner. It is undisputed that on at least one occasion, while Petitioner was present in the Association's office for the purpose of inspecting/reviewing Association documents, a conflict arose between Petitioner and Monica Zerante such that Ms. Zerante requested law enforcement assistance. In support of her contention that she was treated differently because of her race, Petitioner testified as follows: Okay. Mr. Nunez, while not on the Board, goes to the office and he gets a monthly statement of the Association operating budget on a monthly basis and he is entitled to that. I go and request the same thing and I'm told I have to pay for it. And if I object to paying for it, then the police is called. * * * Q. You have no evidence that Mr. Nunez, when he was off the Board, did not similarly have to pay for records, correct? A. I have seen with my eyes that he has not. Q. Well, you have no idea if he actually paid for those records separately, do you? A. I've never seen him pay for that. Inconsistently, Petitioner subsequently testified that, at times, like Mr. Nunez, she was also provided documents free of charge. Petitioner failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that any document that the Association was required to maintain (and not prohibited from disclosure) was not, in fact, provided or made available for inspection. Respondents' witnesses credibly testified that Petitioner had access to all available documents, and their testimony was buttressed by the record evidence. Furthermore, a review of the record reveals that Respondents' legal counsel, on multiple occasions, provided written responses to Petitioner's document requests.5/ Even if Petitioner had presented sufficient evidence to establish that she was denied access to the Association's records, Petitioner failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that any such denial was due to any discriminatory animus on the basis of her race.6/ Access to Property Petitioner's Access The original Condominium Rules and Regulations provided that, "[a]utomobiles belonging to residents must at all times bear the identifying garage sticker provided by the Association." On July 27, 2011, Ms. Zarante, on behalf of the Condominium, authored a memorandum to all residents. The contents of the memorandum are as follows: DEAR RESIDENT, PLEASE BE INFORMED THAT AS OF TODAY, YOU MUST DISPLAY THE CAR BARCODE LABEL IN YOUR CARS AT ALL TIMES, WHILE COMING INTO THE BUILDING SO YOU CAN USE THE RESIDENT'S ENTRANCE GATE AND WHILE YOUR CAR IS PARKED IN YOUR ASSIGNED PARKING SPACE. ALSO, THE DRIVER SIDE OF THE CAR'S WINDSHIELD MUST DISPLAY THE WINSTON TOWERS LABEL SHOWING THE SPACE NUMBER. IN CASE YOU DO NOT HAVE THE BARCODE LABEL OR THE WINSTON TOWERS LABEL, PLEASE, STOP BY THE OFFICE IN ORDER TO GET THEM. IF YOU ALREADY HAVE THE CAR BARCODE LABEL DISPLAYED IN YOUR CAR, WE ASK YOU TO PLEASE REFRAIN FROM USING THE VISITOR'S GATE AND TO ALWAYS USE THE RESIDENT'S ENTRANCE GATE. On that same date, Ms. Zarante, on behalf of the Condominium, authored a memorandum to the gate security personnel. Said memorandum set forth the same information as above, and further advised the gate personnel to advise residents without the requisite barcode and label to stop by the office to obtain the same. The memorandum further instructed the security personnel as follows: SHOULD THE RESIDENT WITH A CAR BARCODE LABEL ALREADY PLACED IN THE CAR STILL DECIDES [sic] TO USE THE VISITOR'S GATE, PLEASE TELL THEM THAT YOU WILL ONLY OPEN THAT TIME FOR THEM, THAT IN THE FUTURE THEY MUST USE THE RESIDENT'S ENTRANCE GATE AS YOU WILL NOT OPEN FOR THEM. SHOULD THEY HAVE ANY PROBLEM WITH THE BARCODE LABEL, PLEASE TELL THEM TO STOP BY THE OFFICE. On September 8, 2011, the Board of Directors issued a memorandum to "Residents Using Visitor's Gate" entitled "FINAL NOTICE/RESIDENT BUILDING ACCESS." The memorandum advised the residents as follows: DEAR RESIDENT, PLEASE BE INFORMED THAT YOU MUST DISPLAY THE CAR BARCODE LABEL IN YOUR CARS AT ALL TIMES. YOU MUST USE THE CAR BARCODE LABEL AND USE THE RESIDENT'S ENTRANCE WHEN ENTERING OUR BUILDING. SHOULD YOU CONTINUE USING THE VISITOR'S GATE, WHICH IS FOR VISITORS AND DELIVERIES ONLY, YOU WILL NOT BE ADMITTED. AS AN OWNER/RESIDENT YOU WILL BE PERMITTED TO ENTER; HOWEVER, YOUR AUTOMOBILE WILL NOT. IF YOU LEAVE YOUR AUTOMOBILE IN THE VISITOR'S ENTRANCE THE POLICE WILL BE NOTIFIED AND YOUR AUTOMOBILE WILL BE TOWED. PLEASE, ABIDE BY THE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO AVOID FUTURE PROBLEMS. The Condominium maintained regular office hours of 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. for residents to obtain the aforementioned barcode/label. On or about September 14, 2011, Petitioner attempted to enter the Condominium using the visitors' gate. Despite being advised of the barcode/label requirement and the admonition against using the visitors' gate, Petitioner had not acquired the barcode/label. After the security officer advised Petitioner that he was not permitted to open the visitors' gate for residents, Petitioner entered the security gate house and opened the gate herself. As a result of her actions, law enforcement was called to the scene, and ultimately Petitioner gained access to the Condominium. Subsequently, as a result of Petitioner's actions, she was advised via correspondence that her actions were improper.7/ After obtaining the requisite barcode/label, there is no evidence that Petitioner experienced any further inconvenience regarding the gate. The undersigned finds that Petitioner was not denied access to her property. The undersigned further finds that Petitioner presented no evidence that any inconvenience regarding the gate was due to her race. Petitioner's Son Visitors of unit owners were required to pay $2.00 to park in the guest parking lot. Unit owners, like Petitioner, for the convenience of their guests, were permitted to pre-pay for a guest if the guest was anticipated to arrive that day. Carlos Devesa, a security guard at the front gate, testified that a special exception was made for Petitioner, wherein she was allowed to accept a deposit for her guests for a longer period of time. Petitioner testified that on one occasion, a security guard, who is not an employee of the Condominium or the Association, delivered a package to Petitioner's son at the front gate. Petitioner extrapolates that benefit into a denial of access to her property: Security was trying to be nice by greeting him off the property with a package that was left on the property for him. Q. Okay. What evidence do you have that was based on race? A. In the case of my son, again, he was denied access to come to the property. It wasn't because of parking, so maybe you should have been asking security what was his motivation. Q. I'm asking you because you made the allegation. A. Well, I believe that he met him out at the street because he wanted to interfere with his right to come on the property. The undersigned finds that Petitioner's son was not denied access to Petitioner's property. The undersigned further finds that Petitioner failed to present any evidence that Petitioner's son's access to Petitioner's property was denied due to her or his race. Lien Between the twelfth and fifteenth day of each month, the Association runs a "delinquency report." If it is determined that a unit owner or resident is delinquent (in maintenance fees, assessments, etc.) an initial letter is issued reminding of the delinquency. If the delinquency is not then satisfied, a thirty (30) day certified letter is issued. Thereafter, if the delinquency is not cured, the Association ceases to be involved and refers the matter to the Association's legal counsel for further handling. It is undisputed that Petitioner became delinquent in maintenance fees. Following the above protocol, a lien was ultimately placed on Petitioner's unit. Thereafter, Petitioner satisfied the maintenance fees; however, she refused to pay the attorneys' fees associated with the legal process. Petitioner contends that she was treated differently in the lien process due to her race. In support of her position, Petitioner believes that Unit 2007 was not subject to the same protocol. The evidence establishes that Unit 2007 was delinquent for a longer period of time than Petitioner's unit prior to being sent to the Association's counsel. Unlike Petitioner's unit, however, Unit 2007 was placed in foreclosure, and was ultimately sold through a foreclosure sale. The undersigned finds that a lien was placed on Petitioner's unit. The undersigned finds that Petitioner presented no evidence to establish that the lien process was initiated due to her race.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of July, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S TODD P. RESAVAGE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of July, 2014.
The Issue On February 27, 1987, petitioner issued a Notice to Show Cause which alleged that respondent had violated various provisions of Chapter 718, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 7D-17 and 7D-23, Florida Administrative Code. On March 20, 1987, respondent served petitioner with a Response to Notice to Show Cause and Request for Formal Hearing. The Notice to Show Cause and response identify the specific violations alleged and issues to be resolved as follows: CHARGE: Respondent, while in control of the association, violated Section 718.116(1)(a) and (8)(a), Florida Statutes (1985), by excusing itself from the payment of its share of common expenses pertaining to assessments on unbuilt developer-owned units in Phase VI and VII of Glenwood Manor by failing to pay assessments on the units until certificates of occupancy were issued; RESPONSE: Respondent denied that it had any liability for assessments on unbuilt developer-owned units in Phases VI and VII of Glenwood Manor Condominiums, and alleged that respondent paid assessments on developer-owned units commencing with the creation of the unit pursuant to Section 718.403, Florida Statutes (1985). CHARGE: Respondent, while in control of the association, violated Section 718.112(2)(k), Florida Statutes (1980 Supp.), Section 718.112(2)(f), Florida Statutes (1985), and Rule 7D- 23.04(2), Florida Administrative Code (1985), by failing to properly waive or fully fund reserve accounts for capital expenditures and deferred maintenance for the years 1981, 1982, 1984, 1985 and 1986; RESPONSE: Respondent denied that reserve accounts were improperly waived or funded as alleged in the notice, asserting that reserves were properly waived for the years 1981, 1982, and 1984, were not waived for the year 1985, and that respondent was without knowledge as to 1986 because the turnover of the condominium took place prior to the 1986 annual meeting. CHARGE: Respondent, while in control of the association, violated Section 718.112(2)(h), Florida Statutes (1982 Supp.), and Section 718.112(2)(g), Florida Statutes (1985), by failing to adopt budgets and make assessments for the fiscal years 1984, 1985 and 1986 in an amount no less than required to provide funds in advance for payment of all anticipated current operating expenses and all of the unpaid expenses previously incurred, in that respondent loaned the association $8,000 from May 19, 1983 to May 19, 1985, to cover operating expense, with repayment plus interest due after turnover; RESPONSE: Respondent denied that it failed to adopt budgets and make assessments for fiscal years 1984, 1985 and 1986 in amounts sufficient to provide funds in advance for payment of anticipated current operating expenses and for all of the unpaid expenses previously incurred. Respondent alleged that it adopted in good faith budgets which the association estimated would be required to meet these expenses. Respondent admitted loaning money to the association to meet the needs of the association. CHARGE: Respondent failed to follow its plan of phase development as stated in the original declaration of condominium or amend the plan of phase development, in violation of Sections 718.403(1), (2)(b), (6) and 718.110(4), Florida Statutes (1983), in that the original declaration describes Phase IV as containing eight units while the amendment adding Phase IV created only seven units; RESPONSE: Respondent denied that it failed to follow its plan of phase development as stated in the original declaration of condominium in that the Declaration of Condominium provided that the developer would have the option of constructing a swimming pool in Phase IV and that the construction of the pool would require a reduction in the number of units contained in Phase IV from eight to seven. CHARGE: Respondent violated Section 718.104(4)(f), Florida Statutes (1985), by creating a condominium in which the aggregate undivided share in the common elements appurtenant to each unit, stated as a percentage, does not equal the whole, in that Glenwood Manor consists of 55 units with each unit owning a 1/56th share of the common elements. RESPONSE: Respondent denied that it created a condominium in which the aggregate undivided shares in the common elements appurtenant to each unit did not equal the whole, and alleged that any reference to a unit owner owning 1/56th undivided share in the common elements is due to a scrivener's error which respondent would be willing to correct to clarify that each unit owner owns 1/55th undivided share in the common element. CHARGE: Respondent offered 33 condominium units for sale, and entered into purchase contracts in Phase II, III, V, VI and VIII of Glenwood Manor prior to filling the subsequent phase documents with the Division of Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes (Division) on February 5, 1986, in violation of Section 718.502(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1984 Supp.), and Rule 7D- 17.03(2), Florida Administrative Code; CHARGE: Respondent closed on 33 units prior to obtaining Division approval on February 10, 1986, of subsequent phase documents for Phases II, III, V, VI and VII, in violation of Section 718.502(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1984 Supp.), and Rule 7D- 17.01(3), Florida Administrative Code; RESPONSE TO (6) AND (7): Respondent admitted that due to the death of one of its attorneys, it inadvertently did not file the subsequent phase documents for Phases II, III, V, VI and VII prior to offering some of those units for sale and closing on the sale, but filed the necessary documents with the Division and obtained the necessary approvals upon realizing that the documents had not been filed. CHARGE: Respondent accepted a deposit on the purchase contract for unit 605, Phase V, without filing a fully executed escrow agreement for Venice Realty, Inc., with the Division, in violation of Rule 7D-17.02(6), Florida Administrative Code. RESPONSE: Respondent admitted that due to confusion between respondent and the realtor involved, Venice Realty, Inc. inadvertently accepted a deposit on a contract for the purchase of Unit 605, Phase VI, but that prior to closing on the unit, respondent directed Venice Realty to transfer the deposit to the proper escrow agent which transfer was accomplished. Respondent requested a formal hearing on the issues thus joined, and on April 9, 1987, this matter was forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings for further proceedings. At the hearing, petitioner presented the testimony of Glen Turnow, a resident of Glenwood Manor Condominium and association board member; Candy McKinney, Examination Specialist with the Bureau of Condominiums; John Benton, Financial Analyst, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes; and Marcel Cloutier, Secretary/Treasurer of Waterside Land Corporation. Petitioner's exhibits 1-8 were admitted into evidence. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, Petitioner's First Request for Admissions and responses, and petitioner's Exhibit No. 2, Petitioner's First Set of Interrogatories, were admitted into evidence as late-filed exhibits. Marcel Cloutier, an officer of Waterside Land Corporation, was accepted as the authorized representative for respondent and testified on respondent's behalf. Respondent did not enter any exhibits into evidence. A prehearing stipulation was submitted by the parties prior to the hearing. No transcript of the hearing has been filed. However, both petitioner and respondent have filed proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, and a ruling on each of the proposed findings of fact is included in the Appendix to this Recommended Order.
Findings Of Fact At all times between October 21, 1981, and February 27, 1987, respondent was the developer, as that term is defined by Section 718.103(14), Florida Statutes (1985), of Glenwood Manor Condominium. Glenwood Manor Condominium is a phased condominium consisting of seven (7) phases with fifty-five (55) units located in Sarasota County, Florida. Between October 21, 1981, and February 17, 1986, respondent was in control of the Board of Directors of Glenwood Manor Owners Association, Inc. (Association). Control of the Board of Directors of the Association was turned over to the unit owners on February 17, 1986. The Declaration of Condominium of Glenwood Manor Condominium was recorded in the public records of Sarasota County, Florida, on October 21, 1981. Paragraph II of the Declaration of Condominium provides, in pertinent part, as follows: Developer does hereby declare the property owned by it and first described above, to be Condominium property under the Condominium Act of the State of Florida, now in force and effect, to be known as: GLENWOOD MANOR CONDOMINIUMS, hereinafter referred to as the CONDOMINIUM??, and does submit said Condominium property to Condominium ownership pursuant to said Act. Developer may, but is not obligated to create additional Phases of Development of GLENWOOD MANOR CONDOMINIUMS ... which said Phases, if any, shall be operated and managed in conjunction with this Condominium through that certain nonprofit corporation known as: GLENWOOD MANOR OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., and hereinafter referred to as the "ASSOCIATION." The creation of any such further Phases will merge the common elements of this Condominium with the common elements of such additional Phases. As Developer creates such additional Phases, Developer shall ... record an amendment to this Declaration of Condominium describing the lands and improvements so added and the revised percentage of owner- ship in the common elements of this Condominium as so enlarged. (e.s.) The details of the phase development are set forth on Exhibit B to the Declaration of Condominium, entitled Phase Development Exhibit, which provides as follows: This Condominium is being developed as a Phase Development under Florida Statute 718.403. The first Phase of Development, which is the Phase hereby submitted to Condominium ownership, is designated on the Condominium plat described in paragraph II of the Declaration of Condominium above as Phase I. It consists of 8 Condominium Units numbered 1 through 8. Each Unit owner will own 1/8th of the common elements and share 1/8th of the common expenses and is entitled to 1/8th of common surplus relative to this Condominium. Phase II consists of 8 proposed Condominium Units as depicted on said condominium plat. At such time as Phase II is added to this Condominium by appropriate amendment of this Declaration of Condominium, if that be the case, the two phases shall then and there be considered as merged. Upon such merger each unit shall be vested with a 1/16th ownership of the common elements of said phases as merged, bear 1/16th of the common expenses of the merged phases and be entitled to 1/16th of the common surplus of the merged phases. At such time as Phase III is added to this Condominium by appropriate amendment of this Declaration of Condominium, if that be the case, the three phases shall then and there be considered as merged. Upon such mercer each unit shall be vested with a 1/24th ownership of the common elements of said phases as merged, bear 1/24th of the common expenses of the merged phases and be entitled to 1/24th of the common surplus of the merged phases. At such time as Phase IV is added to this Condominium by appropriate amendment of this Declaration of Condominium, if that be the case, the four phases shall then and there be considered as merged. Upon such merger each unit shall be vested with a 1/32nd ownership of the common expenses of said phases as merged, bear 1/32nd of the common expenses of the merged phases and be entitled to 1/32nd of the common surlus [sic] of the merged phases. At such time as Phase V is added to this Condominium by appropriate amendment of this Declaration of Condominium, if that be the case, the five phases shall then and there be considered as merged. Upon such merger each unit shall be vested with a 1/40th ownership of the common elements of said phases as merged, bear 1/40th of the common expenses of the merged phases and be entitled to 1/40th of the common surplus of the merged phases. At such time as Phase VI is added to this Condominium by appropriate amendment of this Declaration of Condominium, if that be the case, the six phases shall then and there be considered as merged. Upon such merger each unit shall be vested with a 1/48th ownership of the common elements of said phases as merged, bear 1/48th of the common expenses of the merged phases and be entitled to 1/48th of the common surplus of the merged phases. At such time as Phase VII is added to this Condominium by appropriate amendment of this Declaration of Condominium, if that be the case, the seven phases shall then and there be considered as merged. Upon such merger each unit shall be vested with a 1/56th ownership of the common elements of said phases as merged, bear 1/56th of the common expenses of the merged phases and be entitled to 1/56th of the common surplus of the merged phases. (e.s.) The units in Phases II - VII were submitted to condominium ownership pursuant to amendments to the Declaration of Condominium filed in the public records of Sarasota County, Florida, on the following dates: First Amendment Phase II November 16, 1981 Second Amendment Phase III June 10, 1983 Third Amendment Phase IV November 3, 1983 Fourth Amendment Phases V, VI and VII April 5, 1984 Each amendment provided for the merger of the common elements of the new phase with the previous phases, listed all units included in the condominium, and indicated the new share of ownership in and expenses for the common elements of the condominium for each unit. For example, the First Amendment of Declaration of Condominium, which added Phase II, consisting of eight units, to the condominium, which initially consisted of eight units, provided: As a result of the addition of the Phase II lands to the Condominium, as set forth above, each unit of Glenwood Manor, Condominiums as amended heretofore and hereby, shall be vested with a 1/16th owner- ship of the common elements of the merged Phases I and II lands and each unit shall bear a 1/16th share of the common expenses and be entitled to a 1/16th share of the common surplus of said merged phases of development. Both the First and Second Amendments added eight units to the condominium in accordance with the Phase Development Exhibit included in the Declaration of Condominium. However, the Third Amendment, adding Phase IV, added only seven units to the condominium, resulting in a total of 31 units. The Third Amendment correctly stated that each unit "shall be vested with a 1/31st ownership of the common elements of the merged Phases I, II, III and IV lands and each unit shall bear a 1/31st share of the common expenses ..." However, when the Fourth Amendment was filed, adding Phases V, VI and VII, each consisting of eight units, the share of ownership in the common elements for each unit was stated as 1/56th, whereas the total number of units included in the condominium was correctly shown as 55. Each amendment to the Declaration of Condominium ratified and confirmed the declaration and plat "[e]xcept as expressly modified" by the amendment. Unit owner and board member Glen Turnow stated that it was his understanding that he owns 1/55th of the common elements and that each unit owner pays 1/55th of the common expenses at Glenwood Manor; however, he has no documents indicating his ownership interest to be other than 1/56th of the common elements. Although the amendment creating the units in Phases VI and VII was filed on April 5, 1984, respondent paid no monthly assessments on developer-owned units in Phases VI and VII until Certificates of Occupancy were issued for those phases. Certificates of Occupancy for Phases VI and VII of Glenwood Manor were issued on October 25, 1985, and November 13, 1985, respectively. The assessment per unit of the condominium per month was $55 from April, 1984, through August, 1985; as of September, 1985, the assessment increased to $70 per unit. For the developer-owned units in Phases VI and VII from the date of amendment until the certificates of occupancy were filed, the assessments would have been $17,182.65. At 18 percent simple interest computed from the end of the year respondent owed for the assessments to the day before turnover of the association to the owners, interest on the assessments totals $2,029.92. Respondent admitted that it paid no assessments on the units in Phase VI and VII until Certificates of Occupancy were issued. Mr. Cloutier testified that respondent did not pay the assessments because it received legal advice that a unit is not in existence until a certificate of occupancy is issued. However, the first assessment was paid on November 4, 1981, and the certificates of occupancy for the first sixteen units were not issued until December 17, 1981. Mr. Cloutier also testified that respondent relied on language in the Declaration of Condominium which excused it from paying such assessments until the certificates of occupancy were issued. However, respondent did not introduce into evidence the portion of the Declaration on which it relied. Further, the Fourth Amendment to the declaration, which added the units in Phases VI and VII to the condominium, clearly provided that each unit would bear a proportionate share of the "common expenses." In the declaration "assessment" is defined as the "share of the funds required for the payment of common expenses." Respondent admitted that it made no guarantee to unit owners at Glenwood Manor Condominium which would excuse it from payment of assessments on developer-owned units other than pursuant to the provisions of Section 718.116(8)(a)1., Florida Statutes (1985), which provides, in pertinent part, as follows: (8)(a) No unit owner may be excused from the payment of his share of the common expense of a condominium unless all unit owners are likewise proportionately excused from payment, except ... in the following cases: If the declaration so provides, a developer or other person who owns condominium units offered for sale may be excused from the payment of the share of the common expenses and assessments related to those units for a stated period of time subsequent to the recording of the declaration of condominium. The period must terminate no later than the first day of the fourth calendar month following the month in which the closing of the purchase and sale of the first condominium unit occurs ... The closing of the purchase and sale of the first unit at Glenwood Manor occurred on October 20, 1981. Reserves are monies put aside each month to provide for future replacement or repair of major items. The original budget provided for funding of reserves in the amount of $6.00 per unit per month. Funding of reserves at Glenwood Manor for 1981 was waived at a meeting of unit owners on January 10, 1982; for 1982, on January 10, 1982; for 1983 on January 10, 1983, and for 1984, on August 16, 1985. If the reserves cannot be waived retroactively, the respondent would owe $3,036.55 for reserves that were not properly waived. However, respondent made one deposit to reserves in the amount of $1,800; therefore, respondent's total liability for underfunded reserves would be $1,236.55. Between May 19, 1983, and May 20, 1985, the developer made the following loans to the association: June 19, 1983 $ 500 at 13 percent interest June 3, 1983 $ 500 at 13 percent interest August 6, 1984 $1200 at 12 1/2 percent interest September 7, 1984 $1500 at 12 1/2 percent interest September 28, 1984 $2300 at 12 1/2 percent interest March 2, 1985 $ 600 at 12 1/2 percent interest May 20, 1985 $1400 at 12 percent interest On July 14, 1983, the first two loans were repaid with interest. The loans made from the developer to the association during the years 1983, 1984 and 1985 were necessary to provide operating funds for the association. At a meeting of unit owners on August 25, 1985, it was decided that repayment of these loans would take place after turnover of control of the association to the non-developer owners. On the dates these loans were made, the percentages of units which had been sold by the developer were as follows: August 6, 1984 - 56.4 percent; September 7, 1984 - 56.4 percent; September 28, 1984 - 56.4 percent; March 3, 1985 - 60 percent; and May 20, 1985 - 61.8 percent. If the repayment of the loans were based on the percentage of units owned by the developer vis-a-vis the non- developers on the date of the loan, the developer would owe $2954.80 and the non-developer unit owners would owe $4045.20. Respondent offered 33 condominium units for sale, and entered into purchase contracts for units in Phases II, III, V, VI and VII of Glenwood Manor Condominiums, prior to February 5, 1986. Respondent closed on the sales of 33 units in Phases II, III, V, VI and VII of Glenwood Manor Condominiums prior to February 10, 1986. Respondent first filed subsequent phase documents with the Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes for Phases II, III, V, VI and VII of Glenwood Manor Condominium on February 5, 1986. On August 11, 1985, Venice Realty accepted a deposit from the Days for the purchase of Unit 605 at Glenwood Manor Condominium. Ms. McKinney testified that the Division's records indicated only that the Law Firm of Rosen, Able and Bryant would serve as escrow agent for sales of units at Glenwood Manor Condominium. In its answer to the charges, respondent admitted that Venice Realty was not the proper escrow agent for respondent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding that respondent committed the violations alleged in Charges 1-7, finding that respondent did not commit the violation alleged in Charge 8, and imposing a civil penalty against respondent of Four Thousand, Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($4,250), assessed as follows: For the violations set forth in the first charge, $1,000; for the violations set forth in the second charge, $1,000; for the violations set forth in the third charge, $1,000; for the violations set forth in charges four and five, $750; and for the violations set forth in charges six and seven, $500. It is further RECOMMENDED that the Final Order require that the respondent take the following affirmative action: Within sixty (60) days of the Final Order, file the appropriate documents in the public records of Sarasota County, Florida, indicating that Glenwood Manor Condominium consists of 55 units, and that each unit's share of the common elements, expenses, and surplus is 1/55th. The filing of such amendments shall comply fully with the provisions of Chapter 718, Florida Statutes, and Rule 7D-17, Florida Administrative Code. Within thirty (30) days of issuance of the Final Order, remit permanently and irretrievably to Glenwood Manor Owners' Association, Inc., the respondent's liability for assessments and reserves in the amount of $19,210.16 for assessments and $1,236.55 for reserves. Accept as full repayment of the loans made by respondent to the association, the sum of $4,045.20. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of March, 1988, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE A. GRUBBS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of March, 1988.
The Issue Petitioner seeks attorney's fees and costs as a prevailing small business party pursuant to Section 57.111, F.S. Appropriate stipulations have eliminated all but this central issue: whether the underlying enforcement proceeding had a reasonable basis in law and fact at the time that it was initiated or whether special circumstances exist which would make the award unjust.
Findings Of Fact Nicholas A. Musashe is a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida and was the respondent in the case, Department of Business Regulation, Division of Real Estate v. Nicholas Musashe, case no. 91-4463. During the relevant period, Musashe owned a business, Apartment Locator Specialists, with a principal office in Orlando, Florida. As stipulated by the parties, Nicholas A. Musashe is a "small business party", as provided in Section 57.111(3)(d), F.S. The underlying agency proceeding was based on a document sent to the Governor's office and forwarded to the Department of Professional Regulation on October 29, 1990. The document is a one-page copy of a newsletter from Apartment Locator Specialists. Portions of the newsletter are underlined, and at the bottom there is this handwritten notation: "Why are these people allowed to go on month after month breaking real estate laws? Are they brokers or not? This is a formal complaint! [signature illegible] 'Republican'." (p. 10, Investigative Report) The newsletter includes this text: To keep you posted on our lucky drawings -- Robin DeMorse at Summer Place Apartments posted a whopping $100 and Pam Hyde at Monterey Crossings once again received a check for $50 in asking those clients they were unable to help to call us at Apartment Locator Specialists. Remember these numbers -- 657-8282, 345-1000 and in Kissimmee 846-8808. These numbers could mean cash to you next month. Apartment Locator's helper of the month is Melodi Hanson of the Villas. Her name was drawn for always calling us to let our consultants know when a client rented or stopped by. A $50 gift certificate at the Florida Mall was her choice for that extra shopping spree. Thanks for being so considerate, Melodi. (page 10, investigation file) According to the Investigative Report, interviews were conducted between January 28 and February 5, 1991, and included Nicholas Musashe and the women mentioned in the newsletter. Musashe denied compensating unlicensed individuals for making referrals, but said that the drawings were "thank you rewards" for calling his office. Melodi Hanson, Pam Hyde and Robin DeMorse are each unlicensed employees of their respective apartment complexes. They confirmed that their names were drawn at random and that each time they called Apartment Locator Specialists their names were entered for the drawing. Apartment Locator Specialists had contracts with the respective apartment complexes and received a commission when their referrals rented an apartment. The apartment complex employees were encouraged to call Apartment Locator Specialists to report on the outcome of the referral. Each of the three women signed an affidavit stating she was not operating as a licensee as defined in Chapter 475, F.S., and would not so operate in the future without complying with the requirements of law. The investigative report form lists these alleged violations: "475.25(1)(e) Violation of a rule; Rule 21V-10.019 lotteries". There are two uniform complaint forms in the investigative file. One lists the same violations as on the investigative report form; the other lists, "475.42(1)(a) - unlicensed activity". An administrative complaint was drafted and was presented to the Florida Real Estate Commission Probable Cause Panel on February 19, 1991. The panel found cause and voted to proceed with administrative action in accordance with the proposed administrative complaint. The administrative complaint, dated February 20, 1991, makes factual allegations based on the investigation described above. Two counts of violations are alleged: COUNT I Based upon the foregoing, the Respondent is guilty of fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, false promises, false pretenses, dishonest dealing by trick, scheme or device, culpable negligence or breach of trust in a business transaction in violation of Subsection 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes. COUNT II Based upon the foregoing, the Respondent is guilty of having employed persons as a salesman [sic] who were not the holders of a valid and current license as a salesman in violation of Subsection 475.42(1)(c), Florida Statutes and therefore in violation of Subsection 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes. The case was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) and was set for hearing. It was later continued and was placed in abeyance while the parties presented a stipulation to FREC. By this time Musashe had informed the agency attorney that he had sold his business and was pursuing other business interests. FREC rejected the stipulation on December 3, 1991, after Respondent Musashe made substantial changes in the standard stipulation text. Shortly thereafter, Musashe retained William M. Furlow, Esquire, and the case was again set for hearing by DOAH. On July 7, 1992, Musashe, through counsel, filed his motion to dismiss the administrative complaint. The motion to dismiss argued the agency's burden of proving the charges by clear and convincing evidence. It argued that Count I was unsupported by any allegations in the complaint or by any actual facts. The motion also argued that Count II was not supported by the allegations; that winning a drawing did not establish an employment relationship; that the women who were employed by the apartment complexes were exempt from Chapter 475, F.S., pursuant to Section 475.011(4), F.S.; and that a FREC legal advisor had issued an opinion that the type of referral business conducted by Apartment Locator Specialists did not require licensure. The motion also pointed out that although Section 475.25(1)(h), F.S., prohibits paying a fee to a nonlicensed person for referral of business, the administrative complaint did not include that charge. Moreover, since the apartment complex employees were exempt from Chapter 475, it would not have been a violation to give them a fee. And finally, they were not given a fee, but rather a chance to win a prize, not for referrals, but for mere informational telephone calls. The administrative complaint recites facts which are substantially consistent with the facts outlined in the motion to dismiss. For example, paragraph 8 of the complaint states: 8. The Respondent admitted that each time an employee of a contracted leasing office calls his office, that individual's name is put into a fish bowl, from which the drawing is held. The Respondent stated that the name is entered whether or not the client rents the apartment. The parties agreed to further abeyance of the proceeding before DOAH and to presentation of the motion to dismiss directly to the FREC. On August 18, 1992, FREC granted Respondent's motion and the administrative complaint was dismissed. The Final Order was entered on September 2, 1992. As stipulated by the parties, Nicholas A. Musashe incurred reasonable and necessary legal fees in the amount of $6,756.25, and costs in the amount of $858.62, for a total of $7,614.87.
