The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Petitioners have been guilty of violation of pertinent statutes and rules governing qualification and capability to hold a foster home license and to operate a foster home, in this case a "therapeutic foster home" and, if so, whether their application for renewal of licensure should be denied.
Findings Of Fact The above-named Petitioners were licensed as operators of a therapeutic foster home and as therapeutic foster parents. Due to an alleged abuse report, they became involved in a revocation proceeding with the Department concerning their previously-held license. Upon advice by personnel with Camelot, Inc. (Camelot), a private provider which provides services to the Department for therapeutic foster care, by contract, they voluntarily relinquished their previous license on February 6, 2006, in the belief that they would still be entitled to a formal proceeding to contest that the alleged abuse occurred, and their licensure entitlement. The Department declined to afford them a hearing on the issue, and they appealed to the District Court of Appeal for the First District. The Department was upheld. They then applied for a renewal of their therapeutic foster care license on August 10, 2006, for Lake County, Florida. An evaluation of the application was launched by the Department and ultimately the Department issued a denial of the license application. A timely request for an administrative proceeding to contest denial of that license was filed by the Giegers. The license denial was based initially upon the Department's determination that the Giegers had allegedly inappropriately punished children in their home and that they had some sort of business interest or income interest in being licensed foster parents, purportedly a violation of foster parenting rules. Sometime thereafter a supplemental basis for denial was served upon them by the Department wherein the Department alleged that the Petitioners had also violated Section 409.175(4) and (12)(a), Florida Statutes (2006), because they had a child placed in their home through a guardianship agreement that had not been approved by a court and were therefore acting as an unlicensed foster home. A response to that supplemental denial notice was made by the Petitioners. Therapeutic foster parents are trained to provide for children with difficult behavioral problems. The Giegers received this training and remained in compliance with the training updates and continued education necessary in order to continue their licensure in good standing. In addition to this, Mrs. Geiger is a trained mental health specialist, with a master's degree, who works for Lifestreams, a mental health provider, providing services to disturbed children. The Giegers were previously affiliated, as therapeutic foster parents, with the private provider, Camelot, which provides services to the Department for therapeutic foster care. They were licensed as therapeutic foster parents at that time, and accepted a number of severely disturbed children into their home over the years while they were affiliated with Camelot. When a foster parent has a child placed in their home, Camelot has a therapeutic system whereby a therapist is assigned to that child and is available for consultation at any time of day. If the primary therapist is unavailable, the supervisor of that therapist is available for consultation. Camelot's therapeutic personnel and various mental health professionals have been frequently in the Giegers' home to consult, monitor, and assist with the care and therapy of foster children placed there. A number of those therapeutic personnel testified. They established that the Giegers are excellent parents who have provided exemplary care to the foster children placed in their home. These people have training in mental health and related fields. Some hold master's degrees and have been trained to recognize abuse or evidence of it. Some are psychologists, specifically assigned as the mental health professional working with particular children placed in the Giegers' home. In 2005, a child, J.D., was placed in the Giegers' home by the Department. In addition to J.D., there were other children in the home, including Tyler, a non-foster care child placed privately by Camelot with the Giegers, as well as the Giegers' own adopted son. All of the children in the home had been abused prior to their placement with the Giegers. J.D.'s previous situation before coming to the Giegers' home was particularly egregious. He had been starved, locked in a closet, had his fingernails removed by his parents and otherwise was the victim of severe parental abuse before coming into foster care. His was a case of high public notoriety and appears to have been thus treated with a heightened level of attention by the Department, as compared to the case of other children. When J.D. arrived at the Giegers' home after his initial rescue from his earlier situation, he purportedly weighed 58 pounds and was only 4 feet 8 inches tall, at the age of 17 years. During the time he resided with the Giegers, he grew several inches and gained almost 80 pounds due to the care given him by the Giegers. He was placed on special vitamins and formula, in addition to his regular meals, in order to restore him to appropriate physical condition. Because of his physical condition, extra efforts were made by the Petitioners to assure his safety. They even placed him in a private school because they felt he would be at risk attending a large public high school, which he would otherwise have been required to attend. J.D. did well at the Giegers' home initially and it was planned for him to remain in their home after he reached 18 years of age, if he continued to adjust favorably to being a member of their family. He began "acting out" more severely, however, with problematic behaviors. Ultimately it was determined by both the Giegers and Camelot that he should not remain in their home after he turned 18 because of the adverse impact he was having on other children residing in the home. Before the determination was made that J.D. would not remain in the Giegers' home after he reached 18 years of age, the Department had praised the Petitioners' care of J.D. After that decision was made, an attorney for the Department suggested to Mrs. Gieger that she be hired by the Department to provide special services to J.D. Apparently there was a funding problem with regard to continuing J.D. in private school, and this was suggested as a means of funding the private school. Mrs. Gieger, however, did not feel this funding was appropriate because she was already being paid by Camelot for these services, and expressed this to the attorney, she therefore declined that offer. In December 2005 the Department decided to have J.D. re-evaluated by his original evaluator, a psychologist, Dr. Dykel. During his meeting with Dr. Dykel, J.D. apparently told Dr. Dykel that the Giegers had cursed in his presence and in the presence of other children, used racially derogatory language concerning Black children in the foster childrens' presence and that Mrs. Gieger had sat on him as a means of restraint or punishment. He also stated that he was being deprived of food. This meeting occurred on a Friday afternoon. After the meeting J.D. returned to the Giegers' home and made statements about what he had said to Dr. Dykel. Initially the Petitioners thought nothing about the statements, but on the following Tuesday an abuse report was called in indicating that the Giegers had inappropriately punished J.D. in the manner he had related to Dr. Dykel. The child Tyler, who had been placed in the Giegers' home was a child who suffered from severe mental health issues. He had been placed privately with Camelot by his father. He had set his father's and step-mother's bed on fire the previous Christmas because he did not receive a toy, a "PS2," that he asked to be given him for Christmas. There was testimony that he was told by J.D. that if he would make a statement against the Giegers to the Department that he would get the PS2 toy that he wanted. He was taken by Erica Summerfield, an investigator assigned by the Department to the case concerning the abuse report, to the "Child Advocacy Center," for a statement. He apparently made such a statement, of the above import, but then recanted it. Nonetheless, based only on the statement made by J.D. and by Tyler, Erica Summerfield made a determination that the abuse report should be determined to be "founded." As a result of her report (and apparently a past history of abuse reports concerning the Giegers' foster care facility, none of which had been proven to be "founded"), Camelot apparently suggested to the Giegers that they voluntarily relinquish their license, purportedly telling them that they would still have the ability to challenge the abuse report through a Chapter 120 hearing. They sought to obtain a Chapter 120 hearing and the Department denied their request. An appeal ensued and the denial by the Department was affirmed by the District Court of Appeal. During the pendency of that appeal, the Giegers filed an application to renew their license, which was denied. This proceeding ensued after that denial, when the Giegers requested a formal proceeding. The Department offered the testimony of Erica Summerfield who was a child protective investigator assigned to the investigation. She was the supervisor of the person who interviewed J.D. and Tyler, apparently the only sources of investigative information leading to her finding that abuse had occurred. Ms. Summerfield testified that her concerns about the Giegers led her to make a report finding that abuse had occurred because alarms had been placed on the bedroom doors of childrens' bedrooms in the Giegers home; that the Giegers had used excessive restraint against J.D. (allegedly held him on the floor and lay on him or sat on him); and that J.D. had been mentally injured by the Giegers and not provided with sufficient food. She also opined that Mrs. Gieger had made inappropriate statements to J.D. None of these purported findings are supported by credible evidence. Initially it is found that J.D.'s and Tyler statements to the interviewer, who then apparently related them to Ms. Summerfield, constitute, at best, "second-hand" hearsay. Neither the interviewer nor J.D., nor Tyler testified at the hearing, and Tyler later recanted his statements made to the interviewer. The Respondent's exhibits two, three, and four, the interview reports, were offered into evidence and were only admitted regarding a basis for the Department's course of conduct in the matter, but not for the truth of any facts depicted on the face of those exhibits. Concerning the alleged complaint, related to the interviewer, regarding lack of food, the credible persuasive evidence shows that J.D. actually grew several inches after being placed with the Giegers, even though doctors had opined that he would not grow much, if at all, because of the starvation that had occurred early in his life. He also gained substantial weight while being cared for by the Giegers, so that he essentially looked like a normal child by the time he left their care. He had been emaciated when he came to the Giegers' care and had been described as looking like a "concentration camp victim." He was described as being far smaller than a child of his age when he came to the Giegers' care, but seven months later appeared to be essentially a normal child in physical appearance. The evidence, in fact, clearly supports the determination that the Giegers did provide J.D. with appropriate nutrition during their care of him. The basis for the alleged abuse regarding his not being properly fed is simply not credible. The Giegers had also been accused by J.D. or Tyler, or both, with using inappropriate language, racial slurs and cursing in J.D.'s presence, purportedly causing him mental harm. However, mental health experts present in the Giegers' home on a weekly and almost daily basis had never heard any inappropriate language, including any inappropriate racial language or inappropriate cursing in the childrens' presence during their visits to the Giegers' home. Many of these visits were unannounced. Two of the counselors or mental health professionals often present in the home were African-American. They found no evidence of racial tension or racially derogatory language being used by the Giegers or in the Giegers' home. It was their belief that the Giegers did not exhibit any behavior which suggested racism. Further, there were no Black children placed in the Giegers' home during the time that J.D. was there. There is simply no credible evidence to support any finding that inappropriate language was used by Mr. or Mrs. Gieger in J.D.'s or other childrens' presence, of a racially derogatory nature or otherwise. Part of the basis for the abuse finding (and the reason for license denial) was excess restraint or "sitting on" J.D. as punishment. This position was based on the statements of the two children, J.D. and Tyler. One of them, Tyler, tearfully recanted his story shortly after he made the statement. Erica Summerfield testifying for the Department, admitted in her testimony that she was aware of his recantation. She also admitted that Tyler's parents had asked her more than once to allow him to be placed back in the Giegers' home. They also had disclosed to her that he had a habit of making inappropriate statements and lying. There is evidence that J.D. had told him that he would receive a toy he wanted very much if he would make a statement to the Department that J.D. had been abused by the Giegers. Most importantly, J.D. had identified the point in time when Ms. Gieger was supposed to have sat on him as during an occasion when he broke a window at the house. Other mental health providers who were in the home around that time reported never seeing any bruise marks or other evidence of injury to J.D. or at any other time. They also reported that Mrs. Gieger was especially careful of his safety because of the seriously debilitated condition of his body. Most importantly, however, during the time that the window was broken by J.D. and he was severely acting out, Mrs. Gieger was on the phone with a professional from Camelot who was helping her to calm or "de-escalate" J.D. and who remained on the phone with Mrs. Gieger during the entire incident. That expert heard nothing which indicated that Mrs. Gieger had sat on the child or in anyway inappropriately restrained him. Mrs. Gieger denied using physical restraints on the foster children at the hearing. The Department maintains, however, that in two prior reports discussed in Camelot's letter, report 1999-127436 and 2002-007021, the Giegers had admitted restraining foster children. In the 1999 incident the child purportedly sustained rug burns on the face while being restrained on the floor by Mr. Gieger. These reports are at best second-hand hearsay. Moreover, they are not reasons of which the Petitioners were provided notice, as part of the basis for the denial of their licensure application which triggered this proceeding. Moreover, both of those incidents were immediately reported by the Giegers themselves to the Department and, ironically, the Department did not see fit to make any determination at the time, or since, that those incidents amounted to abuse. No finding was made that those alleged incidents were "founded" abuse episodes. Moreover, the Department relies upon an incident where Mrs. Gieger purportedly stated that she used force against J.D. when he tried to grab her neck. She purportedly told Ms. Summerfield in an interview that she gave J.D. a "therapeutic bear hug" by grabbing his arm and turning him around. He fell to the floor as a result. Parenthetically, not even the Department claims that she forced him to the floor. Mrs. Gieger's testimony at hearing concerning this event was to the effect that she grabbed J.D.'s wrist in order to prevent him from striking her or grabbing her neck and that he just collapsed to the floor. The Department then maintains that foster parents are not permitted to use such "force" on foster children, such as grabbing J.D.'s wrist, because it equates this to the use of corporal punishment and that grabbing a child's arm or wrist could "traumatize" an already vulnerable foster child. Mrs. Gieger's testimony, however, indicates that the use of "therapeutic bear hug," even if it occurred, is part of an approved method of training which she had, which is designed to safely manage children who are acting out in a potentially dangerous way, until they can calm down. She testified that Camelot, the Department's contracting agent, had approved this training for her. Moreover, when a foster parent is in danger of attack by a 17-year-old, even a somewhat debilitated child, who threatened striking or grabbing the foster parent by neck or throat, to grab his arm or wrist to prevent such conduct is reasonable and does not constitute unreasonable restraint. Assuming this event occurred, to characterize the grabbing of a child's wrist, to prevent injury or potential injury to a foster parent or another, as excessive force or "corporal punishment" is nonsensical. There is no credible, persuasive evidence that either Mr. or Mrs. Gieger engaged in any excessive force or restraint amounting to abuse. A concern was raised by Dr. Dykle, the psychologist, who was fearful of the fact that alarms had been placed on childrens' rooms in the foster home. Ms. Summerfield based her finding that abuse had occurred, in part, on the report that the alarms had been placed on the doors of some of the childrens' rooms. Ms. Summerfield, however, admitted in her testimony that alarms are often and routinely placed on childrens' rooms in therapeutic foster care homes. The mental health experts who testified clearly established that in every therapeutic foster home such alarms must be placed on bedroom doors because of a safety concern for other children. Children who are placed in this type of home are often serious safety risks for themselves or for other children. They have often been found themselves to be perpetrators of inappropriate or violent conduct. Many times they are children who have been sexually abused and have themselves become sexual perpetrators. In fact, there was a child in the Giegers' home at the time J.D. was there who had set his parents' bed on fire because he did not get a desired toy for Christmas. Dr. Dykle's apparent grave concern about alarms being placed on the childrens' bedroom doors is surprising since it appears to be completely contrary to generally accepted, safe practice for therapeutic foster homes, something that he should have been aware of if he is indeed an expert in child abuse issues. Ms. Summerfield admitted that she was aware that this was a virtually universal safety practice in therapeutic foster homes and yet, paradoxically, used it as a factor in support of her finding that abuse had occurred, as a basis of denial of re-licensure. Ms. Summerfield also admitted that she had spoken with Camelot professionals who assured her that the Giegers had been exemplary foster care parents. She acknowledged that J.D. had made untrue statements in the past about other foster placements. She admitted that the only evidence of improper restraint, or any kind of abuse or neglect in the home, was essentially predicated on the statements of the two children who did not testify in this proceeding. She conceded that one of them had recanted and she knew of this well before the hearing. Mental health experts from Camelot who testified, established that it is a very frequent event for foster children placed in therapeutic foster homes to act out and to make false statements and accusations concerning their care-givers. They also indicated that J.D. had made such false allegations in the past against other caregivers. This was all information that a thorough investigation would have made known to the Department, at the time it was making the determination that there was a basis for a finding of abuse. The only witness other than Ms. Summerfield, presented by the Department, was Amy Hammett, the licensing official who actually signed the letter denying the license application. She testified that she did not review all of the documents that made up the Giegers' license application. Some other department employee had been assigned to the case and it had been later transferred to Ms. Hammett before the final decision was made. She had reviewed five relevant forms, but nothing else. She had no evidence to support the Department's position that the Giegers had relied upon the foster care services they provided for income to support their own family, other than the fact that they had taken a legal position in the appeal from the previous attempt at a Chapter 120 proceeding, to the effect that they had something in the nature of a property interest in their foster care license. This may have been a necessary position to take in an attempt to establish jurisdiction or standing in that proceeding, but other than that, and one statement attributable to Mr. Gieger that there was an adverse financial effect on the Giegers related to that proceeding, it was not established that the Giegers were relying on the income from foster care services to support their family. Rather, in the context of that statement and the Giegers legal position during the course of their appeal, the reference was most likely made in the context that the hiring of an attorney, with related expense, in prosecuting the first case, including an appellate proceeding, caused an adverse financial effect, which is understandable. That does not constitute credible, persuasive evidence that the Giegers were relying upon foster care services as income to support their own family and themselves in violation of any Department rule. Mrs. Gieger, indeed, testified under oath that they did not rely upon foster care income to support their family. Her testimony and that of others showing that they have successfully operated a well- managed, licensed home for a substantial period of time, shows that the Petitioners are financially capable of operating safely and successfully under a new license. There is no persuasive evidence to the contrary. The greater weight of the credible evidence is persuasive in establishing that the Giegers provide quality therapeutic foster care and have not engaged in the abuse with which they are charged. Even J.D. expressed the desire to come back and live with the Giegers and, after he reached 18 years of age, he did so. This certainly does not support the existence of abuse. Moreover, Earnest Thomas, J.D.'s guardian ad litem established that the Giegers provided J.D. with excellent care. He was a frequent visitor in their home and paid close attention to J.D.'s well-being during times pertinent to this case. Further, the caseworker, Sheila Donato, was the person who took J.D. from the Giegers' home when he was removed by the Department. On this occasion she stated that he was tearful and crying when he left the Giegers' home and asked if he would be able to come back to their home for Christmas. There were no bruises or other evidence that he had been harmed in any way. She established that the fact that he returned to the Giegers home after he turned 18 years of age is evidence that he had never been abused while there. After the Giegers' foster care license had been relinquished voluntarily by them under the above-referenced circumstances, Tyler's parents executed "guardianship papers" placing Tyler in the custody or guardianship of the Giegers and they continue to allow Tyler to reside in their home. The Department maintains that this was an illegal placement because the Giegers were not a licensed foster care facility at that time and had not secured a court order allowing Tyler to be in their guardianship. The circumstances were, however, that Ms. Giegers' mother was the attorney who prepared the guardianship papers for the Giegers and for Tyler's parents to execute. She rendered an opinion to them that that was sufficient to justify allowing Tyler to remain in the Giegers' home. Ms. Gieger testified that she knew of other teachers and other individuals who had used similar documents to establish a basis to take custody of a child in their home. She believed that what she was doing was legal. There was no intent by her, or Mr. Gieger, to engage in any kind illegal custody, guardianship or circumvention of the foster care licensure requirements, or any other illegal act. There is no evidence that Tyler had been adjudicated dependent and subject to the custody of the Department.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Children and Family Services granting a foster home license to the Petitioners, authorizing their operation as a therapeutic foster home. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of August, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of August, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Jerri A. Blair, Esquire Lockett & Blair Post Office Box 130 Tavares, Florida 32778 Ralph J. McMurphy, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 1601 West Gulf Atlantic Highway Wildwood, Florida 34785 Gregory Venz, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204B 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John J. Copelan, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Robert A. Butterworth, Secretary Department of Children and Family Services Building 1, Room 202 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether Petitioners committed violations of Florida Statutes and Florida Administrative Code sufficient to justify revocation of Petitioners’ license to operate a foster care facility.
Findings Of Fact Petitioners’ foster home is a private agency foster home licensed by Respondent to provide substitute care for children in foster care. On or about August 24, 2000, a report was made to the Florida Abuse Registry indicating that a child, A.C., who suffers from Downs Syndrome and who resided in Petitioners’ care at the time, had suffered a burn mark that was three to four inches long. The burn reportedly appeared to be from an iron. Pursuant to this report, Respondent’s Child Protective Investigator commenced an investigation of the matter on August 24, 2000. During the course of the August 24, 2000, investigation, Respondent’s investigator observed the burn on A.C.’s arm. Testimony of the investigator establishes the presence of such a burn on A.C.’s arm at the time. That testimony is corroborated by photographs in Respondent’s Composite Exhibit No. 3 and fairly and accurately depicts A.C.’s burned arm as it appeared on August 24, 2001. Petitioner Carol Golden, when asked about the situation, stated that she was unaware of the burn on A.C.’s right arm until the matter was brought to her attention by the investigation which commenced on August 24, 2000, following the discovery of the child's injury by school personnel. Interviews with other children in the home revealed that another child was ironing clothes on the evening of August 23, 2000, and left the iron unattended momentarily, during which time A.C. burned his arm on the iron. Respondent’s investigator referred A.C. to the Child Protection Team for an examination of his injury. Subsequently, A.C. was removed from Petitioners’ foster home after the findings of the Child Protection Team revealed that the child’s injury was indicative of inadequate supervision. Respondent’s investigator concluded her investigation and closed the case, Abuse Report 2000-133049, with verified findings for lack of supervision and failure to seek medical attention for A.C. Subsequently, Petitioners’ foster care license was revoked because of the verified findings of neglect and inadequate supervision found in Abuse Report 2000-133049. Medical examination of A.C.’s injury, as it appeared on August 24, 2000, reveals that the injury was on the child’s right arm; was five by eight centimeters in size; and was a charred burn in the shape of an iron with the circles for the steam holes clearly visible. The burn was in such a place, and of such a size, that any caretaker responsible for the bathing and clothing of A.C. should have seen the injury. Attempts by Respondent’s employees to conduct an assessment of A.C. were not successful. He was friendly and interacted well; however, he only pointed to his injury and could not communicate how it happened.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, the evidence of record, and the testimony of the witnesses, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered confirming the revocation of Petitioner’s foster license. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of January, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of January, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles Golden Carol Golden 7939 Denham Road Jacksonville, Florida 32208 Robin Whipple-Hunter, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services Post Office Box 2417 Jacksonville, Florida 32211 Peggy Sanford, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204B Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue Should Petitioners' application for family foster home license be granted?
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings are made: The Department is the agency in the State of Florida responsible for the licensure of family foster homes. Linda Patterson and Robert Patterson (Pattersons), a married couple, applied for licensure as a family foster home. The Pattersons completed the initial training for prospective foster parents in March of 1995. The Department completed a home study on the Pattersons. The results of the home study and background information on the Pattersons, including the Pattersons tenure as foster parents in Connecticut, were considered by the Department before denying the Pattersons' application for licensure as a family foster home for children. On August 24, 1994, the Department issued Notice Of Denial to the Patterson which in pertinent part provides: This letter provides notice to you that your application for a family foster home license is denied, based on Section 409.175(8)(a), Florida Statutes, and Rule 10M-6.023, Florida Administrative Code (FAC). The reasons for this denial are: Mr. Patterson has been charged with numerous law violations in the past. Although none of the law violations auto- matically disqualifies him from fostering, they do reflect a lack of judgment needed to provide adequate care for foster children, indicating an inability to comply with Rule 10-6.023(e). Your home was investigated in August of 1992 because of allegations of sexual abuse on your 18 year old adopted daughter. You admitted inappropriate contact with this child. As a result of this investigation your license was limited, and your home was approved only for males, ages 5 to 11. In April of 1993, your marital coun- selor stated that you have difficulty setting limits with sexuality, and recommended against the placement of any child with a known history of sexual acting out, or approaching puberty. This recommendation was made shortly after an incident of child on child sexual abuse in your home. In September of 1993, a clinical psychologist evaluated you. He stated that Mr. Patterson's ability to control his impulses is "probably" satisfactory, but should not be tested with sexually active adolescent females. He also opined that your family might have some difficulty dealing with sexually abused and acting out children without professional guidance. All of these incidents indicate an inability to comply with Rule 10M-6.023(1)(e), particularly in view of the fact that approxi- mately 85 percent of our foster children fall into the categories of children that should not be placed with Mr. Patterson. Robert Patterson admitted to several law violation between 1960 and 1980. However, most of these violations were misdemeanors and committed while he was a juvenile. There was one felony violation (car theft) by Robert Patterson while he was a juvenile. Robert Patterson admitted that in 1980 he was charged with larceny concerning an alleged fraudulent claim for unemployment compensation to which he pled nolo contendere. Notwithstanding that he pled nolo contendere to the charge, Robert Patterson contended that the unemployment compensation claim was a legal claim. There was no evidence of any further law violations after the nolo contendere plea in 1980. The Pattersons were licensed in Connecticut as foster parents for approximately 10 years. During the time the Pattersons were licensed as a foster home in Connecticut the Patterson home was investigated because of a complaint alleging sexual abuse of a female foster child in the Pattersons' home. Although there was no finding of sexual abuse of this female, Robert Patterson admitted to having unintentionally touched the female's breast and buttocks while they were wrestling. There was another incident where this same female foster child, while inebriated, rubbed Robert Patterson' penis several times. Robert Patterson testified that he felt sexually attracted to this female child, but that he never acted on those feelings. The female child that was the subject of the abuse complaint was not removed from the Pattersons' home, and subsequently the State of Connecticut allowed the Pattersons to adopt this child. After this investigation, the Pattersons requested that their foster care home license be limited to males, ages 5 years to 11 years. This limitation on placement was requested by the Patterson because they felt inadequate to cope with sexually acting out or sexually abused children. The Paterson's marriage counselor in Connecticut advised the Connecticut DCF (the equivalent of Florida DHRS) that the Pattersons had difficulty setting limits with sexuality, and recommended against placement of any child in the Pattersons' home with a known history of sexual acting out, or approaching puberty. Many foster children are victims of sexual abuse and sexual exploitation which causes these foster children to behavior inappropriately. Often the Department is unaware of prior abuse or the resultant behavior when a child is placed in a foster home. A foster parent's ability to deal appropriately with sexually abused and sexually acting out children is a very important attribute, particularly given the number of children in foster care with these difficulties. The Pattersons requested to be licensed for placement of males only, ages 5 years to 11 years. The Department has licensed foster homes with age and sex restrictions on placements. However, the Department attempts to avoid licensing homes with such restrictions. Such restrictions on placement interfere with the Department's statutory duty to keep siblings together, and with the goal of attempting to avoid moving children from foster home to foster home.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law it is recommended that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services enter a final order denying the Petitioners licensure as a family foster home. RECOMMENDED this 23rd day of September, 1996, at Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of September, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER CASE NO. 96-1567 The following constitutes my specific rulings, pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Department in this case. Petitioners' Proposed Findings of Fact. Petitioners elected not to file any proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Department's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1. Proposed findings of fact 1 - 19 are adopted in substance as modified in Findings of Fact 1 through 19. COPIES FURNISHED: Gregory D. Venz, Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1317 Winewood Blvd., Bldg. 2, Room 204X Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Richard Doran, General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1317 Winewood Blvd., Room 201 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-07001 Robert and Linda Patterson 8653 Indian Ridge Way Lakeland, Florida 33809 M. Elizabeth Wall, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 200 North Kentucky Avenue Lakeland, Florida 33801
The Issue Whether the Petitioner, Gwen McClain, meets the requirements of the Respondent, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, for relicensure as an adult foster home sponsor.
Findings Of Fact Ms. McClain's home has been licensed as an adult foster home by the Department for approximately one year prior to April, 1992. Ms. McClain's husband, Jay McClain, resides with her. At the time of the final hearing of this matter, Ms. McClain provided a home for three adults who were mentally retarded or developmentally disabled. On or about October 31, 1991, Ms. McClain, her husband and a neighbor drove a man from Ms. McClain's home to Georgia. The man was not a family member or even a close friend of Ms. McClain. During the final hearing Ms. McClain described the man as someone her husband worked with. Ms. McClain's neighbor drove the vehicle in which the man was taken to Georgia. Ms. McClain and her husband were passengers. Ms. McClain was aware at the time that she rode to Georgia that the man had shot and wounded another man earlier that evening. Although the man that was shot ultimately died, Ms. McClain was not aware of his death at the time she accompanied the man to Georgia. Ms. McClain and her husband were eventually charged with criminal conduct as a result of the incident described in finding of fact 3. The evidence, however, failed to prove when she or her husband were charged or what she or her husband were charged with. The evidence failed to prove that the Department has adopted any rule which required that Ms. McClain disclose to the Department that she or her husband had been involved in the incident described in finding of fact 3 or that she or her husband had been charged with a crime as a result of the incident. At some time prior to April 1, 1992, probably in February, 1992, Ms. Gwen Howell, a Human Services' Counselor III for the Department, read an article in the Jasper News reporting the incident described in finding of fact 3. Ms. Howell had been at Ms. McClain's home at least once between October, 1991, and the date when Ms. Howell read about the incident in the newspaper. Ms. McClain had not mentioned the incident to Ms. Howell. Ms. Howell confronted Ms. McClain about the incident described in finding of fact 3 sometime shortly after reading the newspaper article. Ms. McClain, when asked about the incident, responded "how did you know?" The weight of the evidence failed to prove, however, what Ms. McClain may have meant by this statement. It is not, therefore, apparent whether Ms. McClain made the comment because she was merely curious where Ms. Howell had heard about the incident, because she had been hoping that Ms. Howell would not find out about the incident or for some other reason. When confronted by Ms. Howell, Ms. McClain admitted her involvement in the incident described in finding of fact 3. Ms. McClain also admitted her involvement in the incident to Carter Bass, Ms. Howell's immediate supervisor at some time before April, 1992. Ms. McClain was remorseful for her involvement, admitted she had exercised poor judgement and admitted that she had not thought of the consequences of what she had done. On or about March 31, 1992, Ms. McClain signed an Adult Foster Home Annual Renewal Application (hereinafter referred to as the "Renewal Application"). DHRS exhibit #1. The Renewal Application was received by the Department on or about April 1, 1992. The evidence failed to prove that Ms. McClain did not accurately provide all information requested on the Renewal Application. No where on the Renewal Application was Ms. McClain asked any question concerning whether she or her husband had been charged with any crime or whether she or her husband had been involved in any incident similar to the one described in finding of fact 3. Nor has the Department cited any rule which required that Ms. McClain make such a disclosure on the Renewal Application. At the time that Ms. McClain filed the Renewal Application she had admitted her involvement in the incident to Ms. Howell, the Department's employee responsible for investigating and making the initial recommendation concerning the Renewal Application, and Mr. Bass, the Department's employee responsible for recommending to the Department's district office whether the Renewal Application had been approved. The Department was, therefore, on notice of the incident when Ms. McClain filed the Renewal Application. Ms. McClain and her husband had not been adjudicated guilty of any crime at the time the Renewal Application was filed. On April 20, 1992, Ms. McClain plead, and was adjudicated, guilty of the crime of obstructing an officer without violence as a result of the incident described in finding of fact 3. Ms. McClain was sentenced to one year of supervised probation. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that the crime for which Ms. McClain was adjudicated guilty involved "harm to others." Also on April 20, 1992, Ms. McClain's husband plead, and was adjudicated, guilty of the crime of accessory after the fact to second degree murder as a result of the incident described in finding of fact 3. Ms. McClain's husband was also sentenced to one year of supervised probation. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that the crime for which Ms. McClain's husband was adjudicated guilty involved "harm to others." At some time prior to June 5, 1992, Mr. Bass recommended to James Godwin, a program administrator in the Department's district office, that the Renewal Application not be approved. Mr. Godwin exercised his authority to deny the Renewal Application and instructed Mr. Bass to so inform Ms. McClain. By letter dated June 5, 1992, the Department notified Ms. McClain that the Renewal Application was being denied for the following reason: Your application for relicensure as an Adult Foster Home Sponsor has not been recommended for approval at this time for the following reason: You do not meet the Adult Foster Home Sponsor Qualifications as per HRS Manual 140-11, Page 5-12, Paragraph 5-5d. A foster home sponsor should be free of confirmed reports of abuse, neglect or exploitation or any crime involving harm to others. At the final hearing the Department stipulated that Ms. McClain, except as set out in the Department's letter of June 5, 1992, meet the other requirements for relicensure. HRS Manual 140-11, Page 5-12, Paragraph 5-5d, provides the following requirement for licensure as an adult family home sponsor: d. a foster home sponsor should be free of confirmed reports of abuse, neglect, or exploitation or any crime involving harm to others. At the final hearing, the Department also suggested that the Renewal Application was properly denied because Ms. McClain had shown a lack of judgement. The Department, therefore, suggested that Ms. McClain did not meet the requirements of HRS Manual 140-11, Page 5-12, Paragraph 5-5c, which provides: c. A foster home sponsor should be of suitable physical and mental ability, to the extent that he is able to provide care and supervision appropriate for the clients he serves; be capable of handling an emergency situation promptly and intelligently; and be willing to cooperate with the department staff. Although the Department had not previously informed Ms. McClain that paragraph 5-5c also formed part of the reason for denying the Renewal Application, Ms. McClain raised no objection to the evidence concerning this issue presented by the Department. More importantly, it does not appear that Ms. McClain was prejudiced in any way by not being informed of the issue prior to the final hearing. Based upon the weight of the evidence, Ms. McClain's actions during the incident described in finding of fact 3 evidenced a lack of ability to react to a unusual and surprising situation in a calm and rational manner and to make an appropriate decision as to how to respond to the situation. Ms. McClain's actions, therefore, evidence a lack of ability to handle an emergency situation promptly and intelligently. Based upon the testimony of the mothers of two of the adults currently under Ms. McClain's care and four of the six Department employees who testified in this proceeding, Ms. McClain has provided good care to the adults residing in her home.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED the Department enter a final order denying Ms. McClain's Renewal Application and dismissing, with prejudice, Ms. McClain's petition in this case. DONE and ENTERED this 9th day of October, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of October, 1992. APPENDIX The Department has submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. Ms. McClain did not file a proposed recommended order. The Department's Proposed Findings of Fact Findings of fact 1 and 10. Finding of fact 12. The last sentence is not relevant. See findings of fact 11 and 13. Not relevant. See findings of fact 11 and 13. Findings of fact 14 and 15. See finding of fact 3. The evidence failed to prove that the man was taken to Texas. The only testimony concerning where the man was taken after he was taken to Georgia was hearsay. Findings of fact 6-9. The fact that Ms. McClain had not voluntarily disclosed the charges against her is irrelevant. The Department has failed to cite any authority which requires that she make such a disclosure. The only rule referred to by the Department during the hearing required disclosure after a conviction. The Department was fully aware of the charges and the incident prior to any adjudication of guilt in this case. See finding of fact 8. Finding of fact 9. Finding of fact 23. Hereby accepted. Findings of fact 9 and 16. Finding of fact 16. COPIES FURNISHED TO: Gwen McClain Post Office Box 314 Jennings, Florida 32053 Ralph McMurphy Assistant Legal Counsel District 3 Legal Office Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1000 N.E. 16th Avenue Gainesville, Florida 32609 Sam Power, Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Building One, Room 407 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John Slye Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Building One, Room 407 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issue at the final hearing was whether the Petitioners met the statutory criteria for licensure as a children's foster home.
Findings Of Fact Based on my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the documentary evidence received and the entire record compiled herein, I hereby make the following findings of fact: The Petitioners, Paul and Patricia Burnette, were married in 1969 and have lived together continuously since that time. The Petitioners were previously licensed as foster home parents in the State of Florida and have had children placed in their home. During the summer of 1984, the Petitioners' became interested in adopting six (6) children, aged sixteen (16), fifteen (15), eleven (11), six (6), five (5), and four (4) years old. Because the parental rights of the natural mother had not been finally terminated, the Petitioners were advised by their case worker that they should apply for foster home care licensure. The case worker advised the Petitioners that if they were licensed for foster home care, they would be able to obtain custody of the children pending final termination of the parental rights of the natural mother. Thus, the Petitioners sought licensure to provide foster home care as a step toward ultimately adopting the six (6) children. By application dated November 1, 1984, the Petitioners, Paul and Patricia Burnette, applied for a license to provide foster-family care for children in accordance with the provisions of Section 409.175, Florida Statutes (1983). The application provided for Ms. Burnette to indicate whether or not she had been convicted for anything other than a minor traffic violation. Ms. Burnette did not indicate "yes" or "no" on that portion of the form. On October 4, 1983 Patricia Burnette was convicted in the County Court of the Ninth Judicial Circuit of Orange County, Florida of the offense of petit theft. Ms. Burnette was tried by jury and was represented by counsel. She was adjudicated guilty and placed on six (6) months unsupervised probation. Ms. Burnette was further ordered to pay a fine of $150, $15 victims compensation, $7.50 surcharge and $14 court costs within 30 days. She was sentenced to serve ten (10) days in the Orange County jail, suspended on the condition that she complete ten (10) days of alternative community service beginning October 15, 1983. Ms. Burnette was further ordered not to go onto the premises of Albertson's located at 2801 South Orange Avenue, Orlando, Florida. Ms. Burnette was represented at trial by Leo A. Jackson, an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Florida. At the conclusion of the trial, Mr. Jackson informed Patricia Burnette that the judge had withheld adjudication. Mr. Jackson explained to Ms. Burnette that because the judge had withheld adjudication, she was not convicted of the crime. Based on the legal advice received from Mr. Jackson, Ms. Burnette believed that she had not been convicted of the offense of petit larceny. A medical history form was also included as a part of the application for licensure as a children's foster home. On the medical history form, Ms. Burnette responded "no" to the question of whether or not she had or had ever had any back pain. Prior to licensure as a children's foster home, the applicant's are required to be examined by a physician. The physician is required to complete a form entitled "Physicians Report on Adoption Applicants." As a part of completing the form, the physician requests information from the applicant concerning the applicants medical history or previous illnesses. Ms. Burnette was examined by Dr. Din On-Sun, D.O. on October 5, 1984. During the examination, Ms. Burnette did not indicate any prior back pain or any other problems related to her back. On November 10, 1978, Patricia Burnette was involved in an industrial accident and injured her back. Ms. Burnette was paid temporary total disability benefits for a period of 1,200 days and sustained a 3% permanent impairment as a result of the accident. As a result of her injury, Ms. Burnette was on crutches for two (2) years and was told that she would never walk again. Ms. Burnette occasionally still suffers from back pain and must take pain medication. Because of her back injury, Ms. Burnette did not·perform the community service which was ordered as a result of her conviction for petit theft in October 1983. From October 1983 through September 1984, Ms. Burnette continued to advise Ms. Sue Rash (the Alternative Service Coordinator responsible for arranging her community service) that she was unable to perform any community service because she was having considerable trouble with her back and needed back surgery but could not afford it. In September of 1984, MS. Rash arranged a special assignment for MS. Burnette to work approximately 2 hours per day at the Sand Lake Treatment Plant Laboratory washing glassware and doing "light cleaning up." Ms. Burnette told MS. Rash that she wanted to talk to her doctor before she agreed to do any community service. On September 18, 1984, Ms. Burnette's physician advised Ms. Rash that he didn't think that Ms. Burnette could stand long enough to wash glassware and do clean-up work at the Sand Lake Treatment Plant Laboratory. On October 13, 1984, Ms. Rash sent a letter to the judge who had originally ordered Ms. Burnette to perform the community service. Ms. Rash explained to the judge that Ms. Burnette was still unable to perform her community service and recommended that a different sentence be considered for Ms. Burnette in lieu of community service. At that point, Ms. Rash closed Ms. Burnette's file.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is, RECOMMENDED THAT: Petitioners' present application for licensure as a children's foster home be VOIDED; and, Petitioners be allowed to submit a new application so that their eligibility for licensure as a children's foster home may be evaluated by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services based on full and truthful responses to the inquiries contained therein. DONE and ORDERED this 16th day of April, 1986 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. W. MATTHEW STEVENSON, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day April, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Douglas L. Whitney, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 400 W. Robinson Street Suite 911 Orlando, Florida 32801 N. Diane Holmes, Esquire 209 East Ridgewood Street Orlando, Florida 32803 William "Pete" Page, Jr. Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Steve Huss, Esquire General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioners should be licensed to operate a foster home in Marianna, Jackson County, Florida.
Findings Of Fact Respondent licensed Petitioners to operate a foster home in Respondent's District No. 9, West Palm Beach, Florida, beginning in 1995 through April 1, 2000. The Department of Health, under its Children's Medical Services Program, licensed Petitioners as medical foster parents for almost two years of that time. At all times material to this proceeding, Petitioners had five children living with them in West Palm Beach, Florida. Two boys, aged six and three, were Petitioners' adopted sons. A two-year-old boy, A.B., and his one-year-old sister, T.B. were medical foster children. C.S. was a two-year-old female foster child. In August 1999, Petitioners bought a home in Respondent's District No. 2, which includes Marianna, Jackson County, Florida. Mr. Mayes is a carpenter and intended to make repairs to the home before moving his family to North Florida. Petitioners knew their foster home license in District No. 9 was not transferable to District No. 2. Therefore, they applied for a foster home license in District No. 2. Petitioners wanted their three foster children to move with them to Mariana, Florida. Petitioners hoped to adopt C.S. and to keep A.B. and T.B. in the same placement until another family adopted them. All of the foster children had been in Petitioners' home since they were a few days old. A.B. was a very active two-year-old child. He regularly climbed out of his crib. On one occasion he climbed up on the stove and turned on the burners. He seemed to "have no fear." In the fall of 1999, Mrs. Mayes requested Respondent to provide her with behavior management assistance for A.B. Because Petitioners were planning to move out of District No. 9, Respondent decided to wait until A.B. was settled after Petitioners' move to perform the behavior management evaluation. In the meantime, Petitioners could not keep A.B. in his highchair during mealtime. They had difficulty keeping him in his crib. They bought a safety harness and attempted to use it to keep A.B. in his crib on one occasion and in his highchair on another occasion. A.B. was able to wiggle out of the harness on both occasions. Petitioners subsequently discarded the harness. They resorted to tightening the highchair's feeding tray in order to keep A.B. still long enough to feed him. Petitioners never used and never intended to use the harness to punish A.B. Petitioners usually disciplined the children by placing them in timeout for one minute per year of age. Timeout for Petitioners' foster children usually meant being held in Mrs. Mayes' lap. Mrs. Mayes admitted using the safety harness on A.B. during a telephone conversation with Respondent's medical foster care counselor in January 2000. The counselor informed Ms. Mayes that foster parents are not allowed to use a harness to restrain foster children. Prospective foster parents must participate in and complete training classes designed by Respondent. Persuasive evidence indicates that Respondent teaches prospective foster parents during this training that children should never be restrained by a harness. Petitioners have taken these training classes. If A.B. and the other children were free to go into a bedroom, they would pull everything out of the chest of drawers. They would flush objects down the toilet in the bathroom. Mr. Mayes put a hook-type latch on the door to the Petitioners' bedroom, A.B.'s bedroom, and the bathroom in the hall. The primary purpose of the door latches was to keep the children out of unsupervised areas of the home. Petitioners never used the door latches as a means of discipline. On two occasions Mrs. Mayes latched the door to A.B.'s room while he was in the room asleep. The first time she latched the door while she went to the mail box in front of her home. The other time, she latched the door while she bathed another child who had a doctor's appointment later that afternoon. On both occasions, A.B. was locked in his room for only a few minutes. Petitioners knew that they needed permission from Respondent in order to take A.B., T.B., and C.S. out of the state on vacations. On several occasions, Respondent's staff gave Petitioners permission to take the foster children to North Florida for short visits during the time that Mr. Mayes was remodeling the home. Respondent's staff approved these short visits as if they were vacations. Petitioners knew that they needed to be licensed in Respondent's District No. 2 before Respondent's staff in District No. 9 could approve the permanent transfer of the foster children. At the same time, the Respondent's staff in District No. 2 could not license Petitioners until they actually made the move with all of their furniture. Petitioners discussed their dilemma with several members of Respondent's staff in District No. 9. During these conversations, Petitioners asked Respondent if they could take the children with them and treat the time that they would be temporarily unlicensed as if it were a vacation. At least one member of Respondent's staff responded that treating the move initially as if it were a vacation was "an option that could be explored." Respondent's staff subsequently advised Petitioners that under no circumstances could the foster children move to Jackson County, temporarily or permanently, until Petitioners were properly licensed. Petitioner's never attempted to deceive Respondent; to the contrary, they were openly looking for an acceptable way to take the foster children with then when they moved. They never intended to circumvent the proper licensing process. Based on Petitioners' former experience with Respondent, they believed that treating the move as a vacation would be an appropriate way to solve what was otherwise a "catch twenty-two" situation. By letter dated March 14, 2000, Respondent's staff in District No. 2 advised Petitioners that they would receive a provisional foster home license as soon as information furnished by Petitioners and copies of Petitioners' file from the licensing unit in District No. 9 could be sent to Respondent's office in Panama City, Florida. Respondent removed the three foster children from Petitioners' home just before Petitioners moved to Jackson County on April 1, 2000. In a memorandum dated April 19, 2000, Respondent listed Petitioners' home as one of two medical foster homes in Jackson County, Florida. Despite the representation in this memorandum, Respondent issued the letter of denial on June 5, 2000.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent enter a final order denying Petitioners a foster home license. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of October, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of October, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: James Mayes Gail Mayes 4561 Magnolia Road Marianna, Florida 32448 John R. Perry, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 2639 North Monroe, Suite 252-A Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2949 Virginia A. Daire, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204B 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issue presented herein is whether or not Petitioner is eligible to be assigned foster children.
Findings Of Fact Based on the Hearing Officer's observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, documentary evidence received, and the entire record complied herein, I make the following relevant factual findings: Petitioner, Johnnie Mae Smith, was licensed as a foster parent on July 1, 1987, for one (1) female foster child (Certificate No. 787-48-1). Thereafter, Petitioner requested that foster children be placed in her home and she was denied. Specifically, by letter dated December 4, 1987, Gloria P. Simmons, District Operations Manager, Children Youth and Family (CYF) Services, advised Petitioner that "we are not placing any foster children in your home for the following reasons: Insufficient income to provide adequate cash flow to support additional expenses incurred. Lack of integrity in reporting income while receiving AFDC 1/ payments. "Your provocative, overbearing, abrasive, and implusive (sic) behavior." Petitioner was advised of her right to appeal Respondent's denial of placement of foster children in her home and she timely appealed that denial. Gene Majure, (Majure hereafter) Senior CYF Counselor, has been employed by Respondent in excess of 16 years. Majure is presently assigned to making license recommendations for foster home applicants in Dade County. Majure was assigned Petitioner's foster home applicants license application for review. During October 1986, Petitioner received pre-service training as a foster parent at which time she made application for licensure as a foster parent. Petitioner's initial foster home study was conducted by Gene Majure, who rejected it primarily on the basis of "insufficient income." Petitioner protested her initial foster home application rejection and instead of being processed through normal appeal channels, she was informed by Leonard Helfand, District Legal Counsel, that she would be reinvited to pre- service training and she could reapply. Petitioner reattended the second part of pre-service training on May 21, 1987, and she officially reapplied. Lois Rossman, (hereafter Rossman) Senior Youth and Family Counselor, and Peggy Ann Siegal, Children Youth and Family Supervisor, visited Petitioner in her home on June 12, 1987. Their interview of Petitioner revealed that Petitioner shared her three-bedroom home in Opa Locka with her two daughters, Chantrell (15) and Latrise (14). Petitioner is separated from her husband for approximately one year and his specific whereabouts is unknown. Majure again visited Petitioner during January 1987. At that time, Majure inquired as to Petitioner's financial income and Petitioner responded verbally, and in writing, on October 9, 1986, and again on June 12, 1987, that she has $400 per month earned income which income is derived from a laundry service which she has operated for the past 5 years. On the other hand, Petitioner signed a monthly income statement with AFDC indicating that she has no earned income. To the extent that Petitioner has earned income, she incorrectly reported her income to AFDC since October 1986, which may result in either an overpayment or fraudulent involvement in her income reporting. (Respondent's exhibit 3). Rossman was also assigned Petitioner's case to determine her eligibility to be assigned foster children. Rossman was present on the June 12, 1987, visit to Petitioner's residence at which time Petitioner again related that she had earned income of approximately $400 per month which income statement was contrasted with the available records that Respondent's employees had obtained from the AFDC office wherein Petitioner indicated that she had no earned income. To the extent that Petitioner does not have earned income, she has indicated a total income of $264 per month and stated expenses of approximately $400-$605 per month which creates cause for concern as to her ability to maintain a stable and secure family environment for foster children. Rossman also became involved in circumstances wherein Petitioner repeatedly called the CYF counselor's office demanding to speak with supervisory employees wherein she demanded that she be assigned foster children since she was licensed. When secretarial employees advised Petitioner that her message would be relayed and that as soon as a supervisor or other placement official became available, they would return her call, Petitioner would again call using an alias to attempt to get through. This problem persisted for several months following the time that Petitioner's foster home application was approved in July 1987. Respondent's secretarial employees who answer the phone and greet clients in person have been trained to deal with irate and abusive clients, however Petitioner's unrelentless calling became so problematic that employees felt harassed and one employee broke down and starting crying based on Petitioner's persistence about seeing or talking to certain supervisory employees at certain times. Prior to the time that Petitioner's foster home license application was approved, she was much more pleasant in her conversations with employees in the CYF office. (Testimony of Peggy Siegal and Ellie Roman). Petitioner also keeps three large dogs in her yard, one of which is a Pit Bull and two are large German Shepherds who made threatening postures at Respondent's employees when they visited Petitioner's home for inspections. Although Petitioner maintains that the two German Shepherds do not belong to her, they were at her home on each occasion when she was visited by licensing staff and Respondent's sanitation inspector. Petitioner keeps the dogs, which roam at will around the fenced area her home, at bay by swinging a rubber hose at them. The fact that Petitioner is receiving welfare benefits is not an automatic disqualification which prevents her from being assigned foster children. Petitioner encountered problems with her spouse which culminated in a separation and she was, therefore, left with insufficient income to maintain herself and she applied for and is receiving welfare benefits. Petitioner plans to begin employment at Jackson Memorial Hospital shortly.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that: Respondent, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, enter a final order finding that Petitioner is not eligible to be assigned foster children. 2/ DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 13th day of October, 1988. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of October, 1988.
The Issue The issue presented is whether Respondents' foster home license should be revoked.
Findings Of Fact Respondents have been licensed by Petitioner to operate a foster home since August 1994. At all times material hereto, Mercedes and Topacio Hernandez were foster children who resided in Respondents' home. Mercedes was born on October 3, 1986, and Topacio was born on August 31, 1988. On March 1, 1996, Darlise Baron, a protective investigator for Petitioner, picked up Mercedes and Topacio from school and took them home. When she picked them up, they and their clothes were dirty. When they arrived at Respondents' home, Baron allowed the girls to play outside in the dirt while she waited for a Spanish-speaking police officer to arrive to assist her with her investigation. After Baron and the police officer entered Respondents' home, Baron inspected the kitchen area. The refrigerator contained "hardly any food", and the cabinets contained only a "couple of cans of vegetables." Respondent Ana Diaz explained to Baron that the girls received their breakfasts and lunches at school and the family had their evening meals catered. Baron noted that Mercedes was "average weight" and Topacio was "small for her weight". It is assumed from Baron's description that Topacio was overweight. Baron noticed a slide lock on the outside of the girls' bedroom door. The lock was the type where one merely raises the knob and slides the lock over. The lock was not a "dead bolt" lock. What Baron did not notice was that there were such slide locks on the outside of all the bedroom doors in Respondents' home. The purpose of the locks was to prevent Respondents' granddaughter from entering any of the bedrooms unattended. That toddler was the child of Respondents' daughter who also resided with Respondents. Baron determined that Mercedes and Topacio were not in immediate danger. She determined that the children did not need to be removed from Respondents' home. On March 4, 1996, Brenda Boston, a foster care unit supervisor for Petitioner, visited Respondents' home. She checked the sheets on the girls' bed: the top sheet was clean but the bottom sheet was soiled. In her view, the girls' bedroom was untidy because there were some packed boxes in the room. Boston checked the refrigerator and found it empty but there was a box of food in the freezer. The cupboards were also empty. Respondent Ana Diaz explained that their food was catered and showed Boston containers of warm food on the kitchen counter. There were no snacks available for the girls at that time. While Boston was there, she observed the interaction among Mercedes, Topacio, and Respondents and found it to be good. She determined that the foster children were not in any immediate danger and left them in Respondents' home. Lee C. Hickey is a social worker who has been the case manager for Mercedes and Topacio since December 1995. She sees the girls on a weekly basis, at home, at school, or in therapy. She has observed the interaction among them and the other students and the interaction among them and Respondent Ana Diaz and has found those interactions to be positive. Although she testified that there were no books in the Diaz foster home for the girls to read, she did not testify as to when that situation occurred and for how long that situation continued to exist. She did testify, however, that Topacio was in the second grade at the time and could not read. On March 26, 1996, Carol Rodriguez, a counselor employed by Petitioner, visited the Diaz foster home. She observed the children's room to be neat. Although she noticed the slide lock on the bedroom door, she did not question its presence. During that visit, Respondent Ana Diaz indicated that she was not happy with the Department and wanted Mercedes and Topacio removed from the home. On March 29, 1996, Rodriguez spoke with Respondent Ana Diaz who told her that Petitioner needed to remove the children from the Diaz home that day because Respondent Alejandro Diaz needed surgery on an emergency basis and they were leaving for Columbia the next day. Respondents did not lock Mercedes or Topacio in their bedroom for punishment, did not require them to clean the house in order to eat, did not keep them from eating meals as a family, and did not hit or threaten them. The children missed several therapy appointments when Respondent Ana Diaz was unable to transport them to therapy. They did receive therapy, however, on February 14, 1996, two days after their father died following a terminal illness.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding Respondents not guilty and dismissing the charges filed against them. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of January, 1997, in Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of January, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Colleen Farnsworth, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 401 Northwest Second Avenue Miami, Florida 33128 Arthur Spiegel, Esquire 1800 Northwest Seventh Street Miami, Florida 33125 Richard Doran General Counsel 1317 Winewood Boulevard, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Gregory D. Venz, Agency Clerk 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building Two, Room 204-X Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding is whether Petitioner, a foster home operator, committed violations of the Florida Statutes and the Florida Administrative Code, as alleged by Respondent, sufficient to justify Respondent's refusal to renew Petitioner's license.
Findings Of Fact On December 20, 1999, Petitioner applied for renewal of her license to operate a foster care home. The license was due to expire on February 15, 2000. Respondent's investigation of the application was eventually concluded on June 15, 2000. By letter dated August 10, 2000, Petitioner was notified of Respondent's decision that, as a consequence of the Florida abuse report finding that Petitioner had failed to provide adequate food and medical care to children in her care, her home would not be re-licensed as a foster home. At final hearing, Petitioner's testimony established that she did not intend to again operate a foster home. Her desire in requesting a hearing was simply "to clear her good name" from the allegations contained in Florida abuse report number 1999-124723. She further admitted that her personal physician opposed renewal of her license due to Petitioner's heart condition. Petitioner offered copies of medical reports from a medical practitioner as proof that allegations of the abuse report were incorrect. Specifically, it is found that the medical records proffered at best show only that the children were taken to a doctor on specific occasions and does little to rebut the abuse report’s allegations of inadequate food and medical care. Further, testimony of Respondent’s employees at final hearing established that Petitioner’s son, a convicted felon without exemption status, had been residing in the home. Pursuant to applicable statutes, such a resident in the home also prevents re-licensure.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, and the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, it is recommended that a final order be entered confirming the denial of Petitioner’s license to operate a foster home. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of November, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of November, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Ralph McMurphy, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 1601 West Gulf Atlantic Highway Wildwood, Florida 34785-8158 Stephanie Reeves 1707 Birchwood Circle Apartment 1 Leesburg, Florida 34748 Virginia A. Daire, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204B Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue Whether Petitioners, K.W. and L.A.W., should be granted a license to be foster parents.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing, the following findings of facts are made: Petitioners are a married couple who applied to Respondent for a foster home license. Petitioners have three children. The background investigation conducted by Respondent revealed reports of incidents of domestic violence and battery involving Petitioners and their children. On October 4, 1999, police officers responded to Petitioners' home after receiving a report of domestic violence. The officer's investigation revealed that one of the Petitioners, L.A.W., had been battered by her son. The child had been involved in pastoral counseling for his aggressive behavior. Petitioner, K.W., advised the police officer that the child, W.A.W., would be moving from the residence because of his continuing inappropriate behavior. On April 7, 2002, another incident of domestic violence was reported and investigated. On this occasion, the two younger children of Petitioners were involved in an altercation that resulted in Petitioner, K.W., being rendered unconscious by a blow to the head with an object delivered by one of the children, C.W. C.W. was arrested for aggravated battery. In February 2003, Petitioners desired to keep a six- month-old, unrelated child in their home. The child was placed in the home contingent on C.W.'s moving from the home and not residing in the home. Petitioners agreed to this contingency of placement, and the child was placed in Petitioners' home. On November 5, 2003, Petitioners applied to be licensed as foster parents. Ten days after Petitioners applied to be licensed, another incident of domestic violence occurred. On November 15, 2003, two of Petitioners' adult children got into a fistfight which resulted in one having a broken nose. As a result, W.A.W. was arrested. At the time of the altercation, W.A.W., 21 years old and the oldest child who had moved out at an earlier time as a result of his behavior, was residing at Petitioners' residence. Although the police report indicates that the incident occurred at Petitioners' residence, the testimony indicated that it occurred "down the street." All three of Petitioners' children continue to reside locally and frequent their parents' home. Petitioners are highly recommended by a representative of The Children's Home Society, a Guardian ad Litem, and their pastor. Respondent has the responsibility of placing foster children in a safe setting. But for the behavior of their children, Petitioners would qualify for licensure. As long as Petitioners' children frequent Petitioners' residence, any child placed in that residence is at risk. As a result, Petitioners are not qualified to be licensed as foster parents.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Family Services enter a final order denying the foster care license application of Petitioners. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of January, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of January, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas J. Thompson, Esquire Thomas Thompson, P.A. 100 South Washington Avenue Titusville, Florida 32780 Richard Cato, Esquire Department of children and Family Services 400 West Robinson Street, Suite S-1106 Orlando, Florida 32801-1782 Paul Flounlacker, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204B Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
