Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Professional Regulation, Florida Real Estate Commission, enter a Final Order and therein: Dismiss Counts III-XIX of the Administrative Complaint. Suspend the license of Keith Allen Miller for 90 days and impose a fine of $2,000 based upon Counts I and XX of the Administrative Complaint. Suspend the license of Keith Miller Realty Company for 90 days and impose a fine of $2,000 based upon Counts II and XXI of the Administrative Complaint. DONE and ENTERED this 18th day of December, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE K. KIESLING Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of December, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Howard Hadley, Esquire 827 Deltona Boulevard Deltona, Florida 32725 James H. Gillis, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32802 Harold Huff, Executive Director Department of Professional Regulation Florida Real Estate Commission 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32802 Fred Roche, Esquire 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 =================================================================
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the documentary evidence received and the entire record compiled herein, I hereby make the following findings of fact: Respondent is and was at all times material hereto a registered real estate salesman in the State of Florida having been issued license no. 0390547. In March of 1985, the Respondent's real estate salesman's license was placed with Raymond Joseph Deangelis Investments (RDI) in Naples, Florida. Since March of 1985, Respondent has had a couple of transactions that have actually closed with Mr. Deangelis. Prior to being placed with RDI, the Respondent's registration certificate was placed with EVI Properties, Inc., in Naples, Florida. EVI was a registered corporation. On March 31, 1984, the corporate registration of EVI Properties, Inc was canceled due to non-renewal. Some confusion exists in the Florida Real Estate Commission's records as to when the licenses of the associates of EVI were cancelled. By letter dated January 4, 1985, to EVI Properties, Inc., the Records Section stated: "In reviewing the Division's Records, I find that registration held by your corporation/ partnership expired on 3/31/84 and no renewal has been processed as of the above date. For your convenience, I am enclosing proper form 400.3 on which to request renewal of your corporation/partnership. I suggest that same be filed within 20 days from the date of this letter, otherwise we have no alternative than to cancel the licenses of all associates with your corporation/ partnership. . ." (Emphasis Added) Further, the Respondent was issued a salesman's license effective November 17, 1984, expiration date 3/31/86, registered with EVI Properties, Inc. Although that license was apparently issued in error, the Respondent received no further communication regarding it from the Record's Section. Nevertheless, the Respondent was aware that he did not possess a valid current registration certificate as a salesman during the times material to this complaint. The Respondent enrolled in and completed a 12 hour Bert Rodgers Schools of Real Estate course and re-applied for a current registration certificate. The new registration certificate was issued effective March 18, 1985. During the time that Respondent's registration certificate with EVI Properties was cancelled, he was also employed as vice-president of American Home Funding, a large New York based mortgage firm. As vice-president with American Home Funding, the Respondent was in charge of their Florida organization as a mortgage broker. The Respondent has been licensed as a mortgage broker in Florida since 1981. While the Respondent was associated with EVI Properties no transactions transpired and he inadvertently failed to maintain a valid and current registration certificate as a real estate salesman. From April 1, 1984 through March 17, 1985, Respondent did not possess a valid and current registration as a real estate salesman. In June 1984, the Respondent met Mr. James D. Peterson. Mr. Peterson is the owner of several nursing home facilities located in Rhinelander, Wisconsin, Florida, and Illinois. The Respondent attempted to arrange permanent financing for Mr. Peterson for Some property known as Buena Vida, in Naples. However, the transaction was never consummated. The Respondent, in reviewing Mr. Peterson's financial statements while attempting to arrange financing for him, became aware of a nursing home facility owned by Peterson in Rhinelander, Wisconsin. At the time, the Rhinelander nursing facility was not for sale. In October 1984, the Respondent met Deborah M. Maclean, a real estate sales person at a cocktail party. The party was attended by the Respondent, Mr. Corcelli an attorney and CPA, Mr. Corcelli's partner, Joseph Moore, an, attorney and the owner of Naples Title Company and Ms. Debra Maclean. The Respondent had arranged a S1.8 million dollar construction loan for Mr. Corcelli and Mr. Moore to build a facility on Vanderbilt Beach. As a result of obtaining that mortgage loan commitment, and following the closing, the Respondent invited Mr. Corcelli and Mr. Moore and his wife to his home for cocktails. As his guest, Mr. Corcelli brought Deborah Maclean. During the course of the evening at the dinner party, Respondent and Mr. Corcelli were discussing the real estate industry and Respondent mentioned Mr. Peterson. The following day, Ms. Maclean called Respondent and informed him that she was aware of a company which had a strong interest in purchasing nursing home facilities anywhere in the United States. The firm was called Canadian International Health Services' Inc. Ms. Maclean related to the Respondent that she had all cash buyers". Ms. Maclean contacted the Respondent several times requesting that she be introduced to Mr. Peterson, but Respondent refused. Apparently, Respondent was concerned that he might lose an anticipated mortgage brokerage commission because Ms. Maclean had "all cash" buyers. At some point, Ms. Maclean went to the Rhinelander facility and told one of Mr. Peterson's key employees that she had a buyer for any, end all of their facilities, and in particular the Rhinelander facility. Mr. Peterson decided to sell the Rhinelander nursing home facility, but preferred to deal with Respondent rather than Ms. Maclean. Mr. Peterson, therefore, employed Respondent to serve as a shield between he, Mr. Peterson, and Ms. Maclean during negotiations for the sale of the nursing home facility. If a sale had resulted, Respondent expected to be compensated by the sellers at the rate of 4% of the selling price of $13,000,000 less the value of the inventory. The Respondent agreed to share his commission 50/50 with Deborah Maclean. In December of 1984 and May of 1985, a meeting was held between Ms. Maclean, her attorney George P. Langford, and Respondent to further discuss the sale of the facility and any fee arrangements. Respondent informed Mr. Langford that he did not have a current license, but Respondent stated that he felt that the transaction primarily involved a business and not real property. Respondent did not state to any of the persons involved that he had the "listing" for the Rhinelander property. However, Mr. Peterson informed Ms. Maclean that there was a detailed listing for the property. Respondent's employing broker, Raymond J. Deangelis, did not discover that Respondent was attempting to obtain a purchaser for the Wisconsin property through sales negotiations with Deborah Maclean until May, 1985. None of the negotiations or documents involved in the attempted sale of the Rhinelander property were routed through Respondent's broker.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that The Florida Real Estate Commission suspend the real estate salesman's license of Respondent Ronald Gilbert Rice for a period of 6 months and that an administrative fine of $500 be assessed. DONE and ORDERED this 8th day of January, 1986 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. W. MATTHEW STEVENSON, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of January, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: James H. Gillis Esquire Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate/Legal 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 J. Stephen Crawford, Esquire 12751 Cleveland Avenue Suite 207 Ft. Myers, Florida 33907 Fred Roche Secretary 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Salvatore A. Carpino, Esquire General Counsel 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Harold Huff Executive Director Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street P. O. Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802
Findings Of Fact The Respondent Marinatown Realty, Inc., is a corporate real estate broker, holding license number 0208680 and located at 3440 Marinatown Lane, Northwest, North Fort Myers, Florida. Marinatown Realty is a wholly owned subsidiary of Seago Group, Inc., a publicly held land development and rental corporation whose president is Thomas P. Hoolihan. In late 1977, Hoolihan met L. E. Hutchinson, the complainant in this case, through another broker for whom Hutchinson at the time was employed. In December, 1977, Hoolihan and Hutchinson discussed the marketing of two condominium projects being developed by Hoolihan and reached an oral agreement whereby Hutchinson would be paid $18,000 in salary with a 1 1/2 percent commission on all sales. When the condominium units were completed and mostly sold, the parties' employment agreement was revised in late December, 1979. Under the new agreement, Hutchinson was to receive $30,000 a year salary, commissions on the remaining condominium units that had not yet closed and any commissions on outside property listings neither owned nor controlled by Seago. In return for the $30,000 guarantee, Hutchinson was to forego commissions on future properties owned or controlled by Seago Group, Inc. During the period from 1977-1978 when Hutchinson was receiving $18,000 plus a 1 1/2 percent commission, sales were handled through Lee Hutchinson Realty, Inc., which held license number 0182945. In early 1979, Marinatown Realty was incorporated to market Seago's real estate inventory, to identify and list outside properties and to act as a management agent for purposes of renting condominium units previously sold in recent projects. When Marinatown Realty was formed, the complainant became its active broker. While employed as the broker for Marinatown and receiving $30,000 a year as a salaried employee, Hutchinson held two other broker's licenses, one as L. E. Hutchinson Realty, Inc., and another as L. E. Hutchinson. In January, 1980, Hoolihan agreed to pay a $15,000 bonus to Hutchinson in lieu of a salary increase. Since at that time sales were minimal, Hoolihan decided to pay the bonus in installments as sales occurred. Because Hutchinson left in May, 1980, he received only $10,000 of the bonus which represented moneys previously paid. On April 23, 1980, Hutchinson and Chuck Bundschu, a licensed real estate broker, negotiated and obtained a sales contract between Hancock Harbor Properties, Ltd., a wholly owned subsidiary of Seago Group, Inc., seller, and Frank Hoffer, buyer and licensed real estate broker, in which Hoffer offered to purchase approximately 3.16 acres of unimproved acreage for $500,000. Thomas P. Hoolihan, general partner of Hancock Harbor, executed the contract on behalf of the partnership. Prior to presenting the contract to Hoolihan, Bundschu, Hoffer and Hutchinson decided on a 30 percent, 40 percent 30 percent respective co- brokerage split on the $50,000 commission due on the sale of the Hancock Harbor Property. The co-brokerage fee split was typed on the bottom of the contract submitted to Hoolihan and was signed by the three brokers. The commission due to Hutchinson was made payable to L. E. Hutchinson Realty, Inc. On April 25, 1980, the contract with the original co-brokerage split was presented to Hoolihan who refused to agree to its co-brokerage split provision. In the presence of Hutchinson, Hoolihan informed Bundschu and Hoffer that he would not pay a commission to Hutchinson because he was a salaried employee of the Seago Group and not entitled to a commission on the sale of this property. Accordingly, the co-brokerage fee provision of the executed contract was never signed by the seller, Thomas P. Hoolihan. Instead, on April 25, 1980, Bundschu, Hoffer and Hoolihan agreed to a split of $20,000 to Hoffer and $15,000 to Bundschu in lieu of the split specified on the bottom of the contract. At the closing on July 18, 1980, which was held at Coastland Title Company, a closing statement was prepared which shows that real estate commissions were disbursed to Chuck Bundschu Realty, Inc. ($15,000), Marinatown Realty, Inc., ($15,000) and Hoffer's firm, Landco, Inc., ($20,000). The checks were written and disbursed following a conversation between an official of Coastland Title Company and Hoolihan in which Hoolihan informed the official that Hutchinson was a Seago employee and he would not agree to pay a $15,000 commission to him under such circumstances. On July 18, 1980, a check for $15,000 was issued by Coastland Title Company to Marinatown Realty, Inc. The $15,000 represented Hutchinson's share of the co-brokerage agreement. When received on July 18, 1980, by Billie Robinette, the broker for Marinatown Realty, the check was signed over by her to Seago Group, Inc., since in her opinion it did not represent commissions earned by Marinatown Realty. The oral agreement between Hutchinson and Hoolihan was to terminate at the end of April, 1980, or approximately five days after the Hoffer contract was presented. Hoolihan offered to renew the contract without a provision for a guaranteed salary because Marinatown Realty had been consistently losing money since its incorporation. On May 6, 1980, Hoolihan received a letter of resignation from Hutchinson and concluded that his offer had been rejected. In early May, 1980, Hoolihan received a call from Ms. Robinette, who had been employed as Hutchinson's secretary, regarding filling the open brokerage position at Marinatown Realty, Inc. Hoolihan discovered from Ms. Robinette that Hutchinson had paid himself 50 percent of the commissions due Marinatown Realty, Inc., for the management of condominium rentals. After examining the check stubs from Marinatown's bank account, Hoolihan took personal possession of all the books and records of the company and had the office locks changed. When he examined the books and records of the realty company, Hoolihan realized that his assumption that Hutchinson Realty, Inc., became inactive when Marinatown Realty, Inc. was formed in January, 1979, was erroneous and that Hutchinson had operated his own realty company, L. E. Hutchinson Realty, Inc., while employed by Marinatown Realty, Inc. Although he held multiple licenses, Hutchinson denied that a conflict ever existed between his duties to Marinatown Realty, Inc., and his own company, L. E. Hutchinson Realty, Inc. When questioned during the final hearing regarding how he decided where to list properties while he was the broker for both companies, the following exchange occurred between Hutchinson and counsel for Marinatown Realty, Inc.: Q Let me ask you, Mr. Hutchinson, how would it be decided when you were to go out and list property as to whether or not that property would be listed under Marinatown Realty or L. E. Hutchinson Realty, Inc.? Who would make that determination? A I would. Q Solely on your own? A I had no contract with anyone. I had nothing in writing to direct me where to place any business. Q So this would be solely your decision as to how you would list the property? Either Marinatown Realty or L. E. Hutchinson Realty? A If I secured the listing it was my dis- cretion as to where I listed the real estate. I had the choice of one of two companies. * * * Q If you were to list property in my hypo- thetical with Marinatown Realty, is it not a fact that they would receive, and being Marinatown Realty, would receive one half of the commission and you, as the broker, would receive the other half? A That was what I did. Q So it would certainly be beneficial to Seago to have you list as much property as you could with Marinatown Realty because they, in fact, owned the stock with Marinatown Realty, is that not true? A Yes, sir. Q When you would list property with L. E. Hutchinson Realty, Inc., would you do this with the full knowledge, consent and permission of Marinatown Realty, Inc.? A Yes, sir. Q How would you say that you gave full consent when you just testified that it was solely up to you as to how you would list property? A If I solely decided, I give my consent. I don't have anybody else to answer to. (T. pp. 108-110) During the period that Hutchinson was a broker for Marinatown Realty and L. E. Hutchinson Realty, Hutchinson believed his primary duty was toward his own company as illustrated by the following exchange between counsel for Respondent and the complainant: Q It's a fair statement to say that you, as a broker for Marinatown Realty, Inc. didn't make a whole lot of money for Marinatown Realty, did you? A I didn't run the P & L statement. Q I'm asking you as being the broker. You didn't make a lot of money for Marinatown Realty, Inc., did you? A I made as much money for them as I did for the responsibility. Q Well, did L. E. Hutchinson Realty, Inc. make a lot of money during that period of time? MR. FERNANDEZ: Objection as to relevancy, this whole line of questioning. MR. NEEL: Your Honor, it isn't. It's germaine. HEARING OFFICER: Objection overruled. THE WITNESS: I'm sorry, the question? Q Did L. E. Hutchinson Realty, Inc. make a lot of money during this period of time? A That's relative. Q In comparison to what money Marinatown Realty made? A Yes, sir, because L. E. Hutchinson Realty had a thirty thousand retainer that was coming in up until April 30th. Q From Seago? A Certainly. Q So L. E. Hutchinson Realty, Inc. made a lot more money than Marinatown Realty, Inc., didn't they? A That's the way its supposed to work. Q And, again, it was at your sole dis- cretion as to how you would list the properties; under which principal. A Yes, but I asked for a specific con- tract and never got it. (T. pp. 124-125) The Administrative Complaint in this case was filed on July 22, 1981. The preliminary investigative report compiled by Robert Corno, DPR Investigator, was filed on September 24, 1981 and the final investigative report was filed on September 30, 1981. The following is a synopsis of the investigator's findings and recommendation: That the COMPLAINANT [Hutchinson] worked for the SUBJECT [Hoolihan] and their contractual agreement was verbal. COMPLAINANT was paid on a salary/commission basis by companies of which SUBJECT is Chief Officer. That the COMPLAINANT filed civil action suit against SUBJECT in this case and it was dismissed with prejudice. That prior investigation by the DPR re- commended that no action be taken against the SUBJECT in this case. That two weeks after this investigation was undertaken, an Administrative Com- plaint was being filed by the DPR against the SUBJECT. That the existing BROKER for MARINATOWN REALTY, INC. was not involved in this case, and that since the time of the above referenced transaction, the SUBJECT has acquired his BROKER'S license #020462 which had no effect in this case. That conflicting statements by inter- viewers, namely former and present em- ployees and other agents involved in this case revealed that there is a reasonable doubt for probable cause against the SUBJECT. (Respondent's Exhibit 1) As noted by Investigator Corno, this was the second time Marinatown Realty had been investigated in relation to this case. In both instances a recommendation that no action be taken against the Respondent was apparently made. At the final hearing on December 1, 1981, counsel for the Department saw the complete investigative report, including the investigator's recommendation of a lack of probable cause, for the first time. Count II of the Administrative Complaint alleges that Hutchinson is entitled to compensation for services rendered on the following sales contracts: Seago Group, Inc. as seller, to Michael T. and Judith Marchiando as buyers, Seago Group, Inc. as seller, to John E. and Charlotte A. Ferguson as buyers, and Seago Group, Inc. as sellers, to Kenneth J. Dawson as buyer. In regard to the first transaction, the Marchiandos were personal friends of the son-in-law of Seago's major shareholder, Mr. R. Berti. Hutchinson's role in this transaction was limited to preparing the contract and mailing it to the Marchiandos for signature. Hutchinson had no part in selling this property and never met the Marchiandos. The sale of the Ferguson's arose in a manner similar to the Marchiandos. Mr. Ferguson is the manager of a Detroit company owned by Mr. Berti. Similarly, Mr. Dawson works for Mr. Berti in Detroit as an accountant. These sales were made by Mr. Berti and Hutchinson furnished administrative assistance by completing the contracts and sending them to these individuals for signature. Under the terms of the agreement between Hoolihan and Hutchinson, a commission was not due on these properties to Hutchinson since these were not outside listings and his agreement with Hoolihan did not contemplate that commissions be paid in such situations.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Administrative Complaint filed against Marinatown Realty, Inc. be dismissed. DONE and ORDERED this 28th day of April, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. SHARYN L. SMITH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of April, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Xavier J. Fernandez, Esquire NUCKOLLS JOHNSON & FERNANDEZ Suite 10, 2710 Cleveland Avenue Fort Myers, Florida 33901 James A. Neel, Esquire 3440 Marinatown Lane, N.W. Fort Myers, Florida 33903 Frederick H. Wilsen, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Samuel R. Shorstein, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Carlos B. Stafford Executive Director Florida Real Estate Commission 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802
The Issue In both of these two consolidated cases the Petitioner seeks to take disciplinary action against the Respondent on the basis of allegations of misconduct set forth in two Administrative Complaints. In Case No. 96-1492 the Respondent is charged with four counts of violations of several paragraphs of Section 489.129(1), Florida Statutes. In Case No. 96-1493 the Respondent is charged with three counts of such violations.
Findings Of Fact Background findings At all times material to the allegations in the Administrative Complaints in these consolidated cases, the Respondent held a certified building contractor’s license issued by the Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board. His license number is CB-CO31896. At all times material to the allegations in the Administrative Complaints in these consolidated cases, the Respondent was aware that he was responsible for the acts of any business entity for which he became the qualifying agent. Since being licensed as a certified building contractor, the Respondent has been the qualifying agent for at least four corporations. He was the qualifying agent for Chrisdon Development Corporation from April 30, 1985, until some time in April of 1989. He was again the qualifying agent for Chrisdon Development Corporation from May 16, 1989, until June 30, 1992. The Respondent was the qualifying agent for Chrisdon Housing Corporation from April 25, 1989, until September 21, 1992. The Respondent was the qualifying agent for Chrisdon Custom Homes Corporation from July 1, 1989, until June 30, 1992. Since November 4, 1992, the Respondent has been the qualifying agent for MKS Construction, Inc. The Respondent did not have an ownership interest in any of the Chrisdon corporations for which he was the qualifying agent. The Respondent does have an ownership interest in MKS Construction, Inc. At all times material to the allegations in the Administrative Complaints in these consolidated cases, the three Chrisdon corporations for which the Respondent was the qualifying agent were all owned by Mr. Donald McKnought. Mr. Donald McKnought was also the owner of Breckenridge Estates Corporation and several other corporations.2 Mr. Donald McKnought was also the Respondent's father-in-law. The Respondent first went to work with the Chrisdon corporations in 1984 as a construction superintendent. Approximately a year later, the Respondent became a qualifying agent for one of the Chrisdon corporations, Chrisdon Development Corporation. At that time there was apparently at least one other qualifying agent for the Chrisdon family of corporations.3 When the Respondent first started working with the Chrisdon corporations in 1984, it appeared to be a very successful business enterprise. The Chrisdon corporations had a good reputation, appeared to have good relationships with lending institutions, and were doing a very large volume of business. The financial operations of the Chrisdon corporations were in the hands of experienced businessmen and certified accountants and the corporations appeared to be financially sound and well- managed. During the period from 1984 until mid-1989, the Respondent was not involved in the financial affairs of the Chrisdon companies and did not have any appreciable amount of information about those financial affairs. In April of 1989 a Mr. James Morgan was fired from his position as president of one or more of the Chrisdon corporations. Mr. Morgan was fired because he had done several things contrary to the best interests of the Chrisdon corporations. Among other things, the actions of Mr. Morgan had a serious negative impact on the cash flow of the Chrisdon corporations. Shortly after Mr. Morgan was fired, the Respondent was appointed to the position of vice president of some or all of the Chrisdon corporations. At about the same time, the Respondent became the sole qualifying agent for three of the Chrisdon corporations; Chrisdon Development Corporation, Chrisdon Housing Corporation, and Chrisdon Custom Homes Corporation. When the Respondent became the sole qualifying agent for three of the Chrisdon corporations, he did not make any inquiry into the financial circumstances of any of the Chrisdon corporations. He simply continued to assume that all was well in that regard. In the Respondent's own words: Essentially, on reflection, I had stepped into qualifying Chrisdon in 1989 not knowing what the financial situation of the company was despite the fact that everything looked incredibly rosy. Chrisdon was building a tremendous amount of houses. It had a lot of employees, etcetera, etcetera, etcetera. On reflection later, about a year later, essentially a lot of problems surfaced that I then could see had been there for many years. During the next year, until about the middle of 1990, the Respondent continued to have little or no involvement in the financial affairs of the Chrisdon corporations and had minimal information about the status of those affairs. He assumed those matters were being handled adequately by the businessmen and accountants assigned to handle the financial affairs of the Chrisdon corporations. By the middle of 1990, the cash flow problems of the Chrisdon corporations had reached crisis proportions. In July of 1990 the officers of the Chrisdon corporations held a meeting with the subcontractors. At that meeting the Chrisdon financial problems were candidly discussed and efforts were made to try to avoid or minimize any financial loss to any of the subcontractors, while at the same time attempting to maintain the Chrisdon corporations as viable businesses. Late in 1990 and early in 1991, as the financial prospects of the Chrisdon corporations continued to worsen, the Respondent and other officers of the Chrisdon corporations made numerous efforts to avoid or minimize financial loss to the customers whose houses were not yet finished. In a number of cases, the Chrisdon corporations were able to arrange for other builders to finish the houses at little or no additional cost to the customers. In some cases the Chrisdon corporations were able to take other actions to fulfill their obligations to customers. And in some cases the Chrisdon corporations were unsuccessful in their efforts to fulfill their obligations to their customers. The Chrisdon corporations ceased doing business in March or April of 1991. As part of his personal efforts to fulfill obligations to Chrisdon customers, the Respondent contributed $88,000.00 of his own money towards the satisfaction of Chrisdon corporate obligations. The Respondent also worked for three or four months without salary trying to resolve problems for Chrisdon customers as the business activities of the Chrisdon corporations were coming to a close. Findings regarding the Lattanzio transaction Mr. and Mrs. Lattanzio entered into a contract for the purchase of a lot and a house to be built in Breckenridge Estates. The evidence in this case does not reveal the name of the corporation with which Mr. and Mrs. Lattanzio entered into the contract. The house they contracted for was built by Chrisdon Housing Corporation.4 The Respondent pulled the permit for the house that was built for Mr. and Mrs. Lattanzio. The Respondent oversaw the construction of that house. Mr. and Mrs. Lattanzio paid for the construction of their house with their own cash. They paid over $100,000.00 for the construction of the house.5 Eventually, the house that was built for Mr. and Mrs. Lattanzio was finished and a certificate of occupancy was obtained. Mr. and Mrs. Lattanzio never closed on the purchase of the house. This was due at least in part to the fact that numerous liens were filed against the house. The Chrisdon corporations disputed the validity of many of the liens. In an effort to bring about a closing, the Chrisdon corporations arranged to have some of the liens removed and arranged certain other financial inducements for Mr. and Mrs. Lattanzio. Mr. and Mrs. Lattanzio were apparently not satisfied with these arrangements and declined to close. Findings regarding the Nicotra/Greco transaction On or about July 18, 1990, Chrisdon Housing Corporation contracted with Ms. Nicotra and Ms. Greco for the sale and purchase of Lot 6, Block 1, Winston Park, in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. The contract also included the construction of a single-family home on the lot for a total contract price of $135,055.00. On or about July 10, 1990, Ms. Nicotra paid a $5,000.00 deposit to Chrisdon Housing Corporation. On or about August 2, 1990, Ms. Nicotra paid an additional $9,000.00 deposit to Chrisdon Housing Corporation.6 Construction on the Nicotra/Greco house was commenced, but it was never finished before the Chrisdon corporations ceased business operations in March or April of 1991. The Respondent and other representatives of the Chrisdon corporations made efforts to obtain another house to take the place of the one they never finished building for Ms. Nicotra and Ms. Greco. Those efforts were unsuccessful. Ms. Nicotra never received a refund of any of her deposit money and never received anything else of value from any of the Chrisdon corporations. Findings regarding the Morales transaction On or about November 17, 1989, Mr. and Mrs. Morales signed a contract for the sale and purchase of Lot 21, Block 18, in Breckenridge Estates subdivision, in Coconut Creek, Florida. The contract also included the construction of a single-family home on the lot for a total contract price of $178,813.00. It was understood by Mr. Morales that one of the Chrisdon corporate entities would build the house he was purchasing. At that time the only Chrisdon entity building houses in Breckenridge Estates subdivision was Chrisdon Housing Corporation. It is not exactly clear which corporate entity entered into a contract with Mr. and Mrs. Morales. The basic contract form signed by Mr. and Mrs. Morales identifies the seller as Breckenridge Estates Corporation. Attached to the basic contract form are six addenda, some of which identify the seller as Breckenridge Estates Corporation, some of which identify the seller as Chrisdon Housing Corporation, and some of which contain ambiguous references to Breckenridge Estates Corporation, Chrisdon Housing Corporation, and another corporate entity named Breckenridge Estates Development Corporation. Some of the advertising material given to Mr. and Mrs. Morales bears the name of Breckenridge Estates, but also includes laudatory statements about the quality of Chrisdon homes and Chrisdon communities. When Mr. Morales inquired about the relationship between Breckenridge Estates Corporation and Chrisdon, the sales agent told him that the former was a subsidiary of Chrisdon. On or about November 17, 1989, Mr. and Mrs. Morales paid a $5,000.00 deposit. On or about April 2, 1990, Mr. and Mrs. Morales paid an additional $12,881.00 deposit. The sales agent instructed Mr. Morales to make both checks payable to "Chrisdon," and he did so. Construction on the Morales house was commenced, but it was never finished before the Chrisdon corporations ceased business operations in March or April of 1991. Mr. and Mrs. Morales never received a refund of any of their deposit money and never received anything else of value from any of the Chrisdon corporations.
Recommendation On the basis of all of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be issued in these consolidated cases to the following effect: Dismissing the charges alleged in Counts I and II of the Administrative Complaint in Case No. 96-1492. Dismissing the charges alleged in Count III of the Administrative Complaint in case No. 96-1493. Finding the Respondent guilty of the violations charged in Counts III and IV of the Administrative Complaint in Case No. 96-1492. Finding the Respondent guilty of the violations charged in Counts I and II of the Administrative Complaint in Case No. 96-1493. Imposing penalties consisting of the following: (a) a requirement that the Respondent pay a total of $4,000.00 in administrative fines (one $1,000.00 administrative fine for each of the four violations); (b) a requirement that the Respondent pay reimbursement to Ms. Nicotra in the amount of $14,000.00; (c) a requirement that the Respondent pay reimbursement to Mr. and Mrs. Morales in the amount of $17,881.00, and (d) a requirement that the Respondent pay the costs associated with the investigation and prosecution of these cases. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of June, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27 day of June, 1997.
The Issue The issues in this case are: (1) Whether Respondent violated Subsection 489.127(1)(f), Florida Statutes, by engaging in the business or acting in the capacity of a contractor without being registered or certified; and, if so, (2) what penalty should be imposed against Respondent.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence and testimony of the witnesses presented, the following facts are found: Crestwood Construction Corporation (Crestwood Construction) was established about six years ago and is located in Port Charlotte, Florida. At all times material to the proceeding, Respondent, Edward Kolba, was president of Crestwood Construction. When Crestwood Construction was established and at all times relevant hereto, Marc Lusardi was the vice-president and the qualifying contractor for the company. Respondent is not currently nor has he ever been a licensed contractor in the State of Florida. On or about August 28, 1998, Respondent as president of Crestwood Construction, entered into a contract with Robert and Doris LaBar to construct a house at 27421 Neaptide Drive, Charlotte County, Florida. The contract price for the construction was $79,994.00. At or near the time Mr. and Mrs. LaBar and Respondent were negotiating the construction contract, Respondent gave the impression that he was the contractor responsible for supervising the construction of the LaBars' house. Consistent with the impressions or representations of Respondent regarding his responsibilities for the LaBar project, Respondent did, in fact, oversee most of the project. At the time Crestwood Construction and the LaBars entered into the contract, Mr. Lusardi, the company's qualifying contractor, did not reside in Florida but in Colorado. Moreover, during most of the time the LaBar home was under construction, Mr. Lusardi was not in Florida. Furthermore, the only part of the LaBar project that Mr. Lusardi oversaw was the construction of the foundation. Respondent acknowledged that at all other times, Mr. Lusardi was out of state. In Lusardi's absence, Respondent became responsible and/or assumed responsibility for overseeing the construction of the LaBars' house. Respondent has had extensive work experience in the construction industry. However, Respondent admitted and did not dispute that he is not a registered or certified contractor in the State of Florida. The investigative costs for the Department of Business and Professional Regulation in this case, excluding costs associated with any attorney's time, were $213.08.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended a final order be entered (1) finding that Respondent violated Section 489.127(1)(f), Florida Statutes, as alleged in the Administrative Complaint, and (2) imposing an administrative penalty of $5,000. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of December, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of December, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Brian A. Higgins, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 Edward Kolba Post Office Box 8014 Port Charlotte, Florida 33949-8014 Marc S. Lusardi 2101 South Ocean Drive Hollywood, Florida 33019 Marc S. Lusardi 182 East Byrd Drive Pueblo, Colorado 81007 Hardy L. Roberts, III, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060
The Issue The issues presented for determination are whether Florida Housing Finance Corporation’s (FHFC) determinations regarding the applications responding to Request for Applications 2019-116 SAIL Financing of Affordable Multifamily Housing Development to Be Used In Conjunction With Tax-Exempt Bond Financing And Non-Competitive Housing Credits (the RFA), were clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious; and whether the award to Respondent Christian Manor Restoration, LLC (Christian Manor), is contrary to governing statutes, rules, or the solicitation specifications of the RFA.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Parkwood is an applicant responding to the RFA. The Parkwood application, assigned number 2020-422BS, was deemed eligible but was not selected for funding under the terms of the RFA. Respondent Christian Manor is an applicant responding to the RFA. The Christian Manor application, assigned number 2020-405BS, was deemed eligible and was selected for funding under the terms of the RFA. FHFC is a public corporation created pursuant to section 420.504, Florida Statutes. The purpose of FHFC is to promote public welfare by administering the governmental function of financing affordable housing in Florida. FHFC is tasked with allocating a portion of the certain Disaster Recovery funding allocated by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development pursuant to the State of Florida Action Plan for Disaster Recovery. Waterview was an applicant responding to the RFA. The Waterview application, assigned number 2020-424BSN, was deemed eligible but was not selected for funding under the terms of the RFA. FHFC is authorized to allocate housing credits and other funding by means of requests for proposals or other competitive solicitation. See § 420.507(48), Fla. Stat.; Fla. Admin. Code Ch. 67-60 (governing the competitive solicitation process). FHFC allocates its competitive funding pursuant to the bid protest provisions of section 120.57(3). Funding is made available through a competitive application process commenced by the issuance of a Request for Applications (RA). An RA is equivalent to a “request for proposal” as indicated in Florida Administrative Code Rule 67-60.009(4). The RFA was issued on November 6, 2019. It was modified several times, and the final RFA was issued on December 20, 2019. The application deadline was December 30, 2019. Sixty-five applications were submitted in response to the RFA. A Review Committee was appointed to review the applications and make recommendations to FHFC’s Board of Directors (the Board). The Review Committee found 57 applications eligible, seven applications ineligible, and one application withdrew from the selection process. Through the ranking and selection process outlined in the RFA, 13 applications were preliminarily recommended for funding, including Christian Manor. The Review Committee developed charts listing its eligibility and funding recommendations to be presented to the Board. On March 6, 2020, the Board met and considered the recommendations of the Review Committee for the RFA. At 9:35 a.m. that same day, all RFA applicants received notice that the Board determined whether applications were eligible or ineligible for funding consideration and that certain eligible applicants were preliminarily selected for funding, subject to satisfactory completion of the credit underwriting process. Such notice was provided by the posting of two spreadsheets on the FHFC website, www.floridahousing.org: (1) listing the Board-approved scoring results for the RFA, and (2) identifying the applications which FHFC proposed to fund. There is no dispute that Petitioner and Christian Manor received this notice. In the March 6, 2020, posting, FHFC announced its intention to award funding to 13 applications including Christian Manor. No challenges were made to the terms of the RFA. RANKING AND SELECTION PROCESS Through the RFA, FHFC seeks to award an estimated total of $71,360,000 in SAIL Financing, as well as tax-exempt bonds, to assist in financing the development of affordable rental housing for tenants who are either low-income or extremely low-income. The available SAIL financing was to be divided so that a certain amount was targeted both geographically, between Large, Medium, and Small Counties, and demographically, between applicants proposing housing for families and those proposing housing for the elderly. Applicants who are awarded tax-exempt bond financing are also entitled to an award of non-competitive federal low-income housing tax credits. FHFC made approximately $5,611,650 in National Housing Trust Fund (NHTF) funding available to applicants committing to build either new construction or rehabilitation of family or elderly housing for “Persons with Special Needs.” Applications in this RFA are scored in two categories for a possible total of ten points. Five points each can be awarded for Submission of Pre- Approved Principal Disclosure Form and Local Government Contributions. Because so many applicants achieve a perfect score of ten, the RFA establishes a series of tiebreakers referred to as a “sorting order,” designed to rank order applications for funding selection. The RFA set the following sorting order, after listing applications from highest score to lowest score: By eligibility for Proximity Funding Preference; then By eligibility for the Per Unit Construction Funding Preference; then By Leveraging Level number 1 through 5; then By eligibility for the Florida Job Creation Preference; then By randomly assigned lottery number. The RFA also established a series of funding goals. Those goals were: One New Construction Application in a Large County serving Elderly residents. Three New Construction Applications in a Large County serving Family residents, with a preference that at least two of such Applications being from “Self-Sourced” Applicants. One New Construction Application in a Medium County serving Elderly residents. Two New Construction Applications in a Medium County, with a preference that at least one such Application being from a self-sourced Applicant. The RFA designated each county in Florida as either Large, Medium, or Small. The RFA also allowed an applicant to designate itself as “Self- Sourced,” which requires applicants proposing new construction family projects to provide a portion of their development funding themselves, in an amount of at least half of its SAIL Request Amount (or $1 million, whichever is greater). The RFA provided that eligible applicants be assigned a Leveraging Level 1 through 5, with 1 being the best score, based on the total Corporation SAIL Funding amount relative to all other eligible applicants’ total Corporation SAIL Funding amount. The Leveraging Level is a comparative tool to rank applicants based on how much SAIL funding each applicant has requested per affordable housing unit (Set-Aside Unit) it proposes to construct. Calculation of the Leveraging Level includes adjusting the total amount of SAIL funds requested by an applicant based on a variety of factors, including development type, development location, construction method to be employed, and whether a Public Housing Authority is part of the applicant, then dividing that adjusted amount by the applicant’s proposed number of Set-Aside Units. For example, the SAIL Request per Set-Aside Unit is reduced by ten percent for applicants proposing a Mid-Rise Four-Story building, while applicants proposing Garden Apartments or Townhouses do not receive this adjustment, and applicants proposing Five-Story or Six-story Mid-Rises or High-Rises get a greater reduction. Applicants whose adjusted SAIL Request per Set-Aside Unit is among the lowest ten percent of all calculated SAIL Request amounts per Set-Aside Unit in this RFA are assigned Leveraging Level 1; the next 20 percent are Leveraging Level 2; the next 20 percent are Leveraging Level 3; the next 20 percent are Leveraging Level 4; and the highest 30 percent are Leveraging Level 5. The RFA employed a “funding test,” requiring that the full amount of an applicant’s SAIL request be available for award when that applicant is under consideration for funding; partial funding awards are not permitted. Sufficient SAIL funding must be available in both the county size group (Large, Medium, or Small), and the demographic category (elderly or family) for an applicant to be selected. Within the county size group, the RFA contains a pour-over provision for any unallocated Small County funding to be divided between the Medium and Large County funding availability; and any unallocated Medium County funding would be made available to Large County applicants. Further, in order to promote geographic distribution of funding awards, the RFA included a County Award Tally mechanism. If an applicant was selected in a particular county, a second applicant would not generally be selected from that same county if there was any eligible applicant available (even with a lower total application score) from any other county, from which an applicant had not already been selected for funding. The RFA set forth a very specific funding selection order, taking into consideration two specific counties (Miami-Dade and Broward), county size groups, development category (new construction or rehabilitation), demographic group (elderly or family), and self-sourced status. CHRISTIAN MANOR’S APPLICATION One of the criteria in the RFA for scoring and ranking applications involves proximity to certain services. The RFA provides in relevant part: e. Proximity The Application may earn proximity points based on the distance between the Development Location Point [(DLP)] and the Bus or Rail Transit Service (if Private Transportation is not selected at question 5.e.(2)(a) of Exhibit A) and the Community Services stated in Exhibit A. Proximity points are awarded according to the Transit and Community Service Scoring Charts outlined in Item 2 of Exhibit C. Proximity points will not be applied towards the total score. Proximity points will only be used to determine whether the Applicant meets the required minimum proximity eligibility requirements and the Proximity Funding Preference, as outlined in the chart below. Requirements and Funding Preference Qualifications All Large County Applications must achieve a minimum number of Transit Service Points and achieve a minimum number of total proximity points to be eligible for funding ... All Applications that achieve a higher number of total proximity points may also qualify for the Proximity Funding Preference as outlined below. Community Services (Maximum 4 Points for each service, up to 3 services) Applicants may provide the location information and distances for three of the following four Community Services on which to base the Application’s Community Services Score. The Community Service Scoring Charts, which reflect the methodology for calculating the points awarded based on the distances, are outlined in Exhibit C. Location of coordinates for Community Services Coordinates must represent a point that is on the doorway threshold of an exterior entrance that provides direct public access to the building where the service is located. * * * Eligible Community Services Grocery Store - This service is defined in Exhibit B and may be selected by all Applicants. Public School - This service is defined in Exhibit B and may be selected only if the Applicant selected the Family Demographic Commitment. Medical Facility - This service is defined in Exhibit B and may be selected by all Applicants. Pharmacy - This service is defined in Exhibit B and may be selected by all Applicants. Scoring Proximity to Services (Transit and Community) (b) Bus and Rail Transit Services and Community Services Applicants that wish to receive proximity points for Transit Services other than Private Transportation or points for any community service must provide latitude and longitude coordinates for that service, stated in decimal degrees, rounded to at least the sixth decimal place, and the distance between the [DLP] and the coordinates for the service. The distances between the DLP and the latitude and longitude coordinates for each service will be the basis for awarding proximity points. Failure to provide the distance for any service will result in zero points for that service. The Transit and Community Service Scoring Charts reflecting the methodology for calculating the points awarded based on the distances are in Exhibit C. (emphasis added). Applicants from a Large County, including Palm Beach County (where Christian Manor is located), must receive at least 10.5 Proximity Points (including at least 2.0 Transit Service points) to be eligible for consideration for funding, and at least 12.5 Proximity Points to receive the Proximity Funding Preference. In its Application, Christian Manor selected three public bus stops for its Transit Services, at claimed distances of .04 miles, .03 miles, and .51 miles from its proposed DLP. It was awarded 5 points for Transit Services. The validity of Christian Manor’s claimed Transit Services is not disputed. For its Community Services, Christian Manor identified the following services: Grocery Store - Aldi Food Market, 2481 Okeechobee Blvd., West Palm Beach, Florida 33409, at a distance of 0.73 miles Medical Facility - MD Now Urgent Care, 2007 Palm Beach Lakes Blvd., West Palm Beach, Florida 33409, at a distance of 0.82 miles Pharmacy - Target (CVS Pharmacy), 1760 Palm Beach Lakes Blvd., West Palm Beach, Florida 33401, at a distance of 0.70 miles. The Aldi Food Market meets the definition of a Grocery Store in the RFA. The MD Now Urgent Care meets the definition of a Medical Facility in the RFA. Christian Manor identified each service by latitude and longitude coordinates and by distance. These coordinates, however, did not accurately reflect the doorway threshold of either the Aldi Food Market or the MD Now Urgent Care Center. The latitude and longitude coordinates provided for the Grocery Store were erroneous. The listed coordinates identify a point over 0.9 miles away from the doorway threshold of the Aldi Food Market. The latitude and longitude coordinates provided for the Medical Facility identify a point over 0.8 miles away from the doorway threshold of the MD Now Urgent Care Center. The actual distance between the Aldi Food Market and the DLP is .73 miles. The actual distance between the street address of the MD Now Urgent Care Center and the DLP is .82 miles. Based on these identified services, Christian Manor was awarded 3 points for the Grocery Store, 3 points for the Pharmacy, and 2.5 points for the Medical Facility. The points awarded for the Pharmacy are not disputed. Parkwood argues that Christian Manor should be awarded no proximity points for its identified Grocery Store or Medical Facility. Parkwood does not argue that the Aldi Food Market is not a Grocery Store as defined by the RFA, nor does it argue that the MD Now Urgent Care is not a Medical Facility as defined by the RFA. Parkwood does not question the identified addresses for the Community Services or contest that the distances between the identified Aldi Food Market and the MD Now Urgent Care and the DLP are .73 miles and .82 miles respectively. Rather, Parkwood’s argument is narrowly focused on the fact the erroneous longitude and latitude coordinates for the grocery and medical services are not at the doorway threshold. Parkwood would have FHFC ignore the actual addresses and distances because of the error in coordinates. Respondents argue the mistake in coordinates was a minor irregularity. The RFA specifically gives FHFC the right to waive minor irregularities. Rule 67-60.008 provides the criteria that FHFC is to consider when evaluating whether an error should be waived as a minor irregularity. Minor irregularities are those irregularities in an Application, such as computation, typographical, or other errors, that do not result in the omission of any material information; do not create any uncertainty that the terms and requirements of the competitive solicitation have been met; do not provide a competitive advantage or benefit not enjoyed by other Applicants; and do not adversely impact the interests of the Corporation or the public. Minor irregularities may be waived or corrected by the Corporation. Ms. Button testified that an evaluating FHFC Review Committee member does not use the latitude or longitude coordinates to confirm the accuracy of the distances provided. Rather, the inclusion of the requirement for such coordinates dates back to when measurements were done by surveyors, who would certify the distances on a special form. FHFC no longer requires the surveyor certification form. FHFC now requires an applicant to self-designate the community services and proximity requirements. FHFC considers the actual distances as the most relevant factors when evaluating points awarded for proximity from the DLP to a selected Community Service. Ms. Button also testified that listing the incorrect latitude and longitude coordinates could, in this particular case, be waived as a minor irregularity. She explained that because the proximity points are based on the distance between the DLP and the identified services, and because the distances claimed in Christian Manor’s application were correct, the proximity points awarded were also correct. Ms. Button opined that Christian Manor did not garner a competitive advantage from the coordinate errors in the application. The coordinates did not create any uncertainty in the application as to what Community Services were identified or how far they were from the DLP. Petitioner pointed to no evidence of any such advantage. Ms. Button also testified that the error in coordinates did not result in any harm to the public or to FHFC. Again, Petitioner provided no evidence of such harm. Rather, Petitioner relies on a different application in a different RA, where the scorer for FHFC had determined that an applicant should be found ineligible because that applicant had failed to list the proper coordinates for one of its listed Community Services. That applicant, however, never challenged FHFC’s finding, and therefore never presented evidence or argument contesting this finding of ineligibility. It is unclear whether the applicant in the other case was found ineligible for other reasons as well, where that applicant was ranked, and whether there were other circumstances that would have affected the scoring and ranking in that particular RA. Ms. Button testified that if the error in coordinates had been challenged, FHFC would then have examined the particular circumstances of the situation to determine whether or not the error should have been waived as a minor irregularity. There is no dispute that the Christian Manor application contained a similar error, and that if Christian Manor had not been able to demonstrate that the claimed distances to the grocery store and medical facility were accurate, that error would have resulted in the application being found ineligible. But there is insufficient evidence to determine whether Petitioner is comparing “apples to apples” when relying on this other situation. Any reference to this other applicant in the other RA is unreliable and unconvincing. Regardless, in this case, the undersigned examined the circumstances of Christian Manor’s application and finds based on the preponderance of the evidence (made up of the stipulated facts and Ms. Button’s unrefuted testimony) any inaccuracies in the longitude and latitude coordinates provided by Christian Manor constitute a minor irregularity that may be waived by FHFC. Based on the facts established, the award to Christian Manor is reasonable and neither erroneous, arbitrary, nor capricious. WATERVIEW’S APPLICATION One of the requirements of the RFA is that applicants demonstrate certain Ability to Proceed elements. One of those elements is as follows: Appropriate Zoning. Demonstrate that as of the Application Deadline the entire proposed Development site is appropriately zoned and consistent with local land use regulations regarding density and intended use or that the proposed Development site is legally non-conforming by providing, as Attachment 9 to Exhibit A, the applicable properly completed and executed verification form: The Florida Housing Finance Corporation Local Government Verification that Development is Consistent with Zoning and Land Use Regulations form (Form Rev. 08-18) [(Zoning Form)]. As part of its application, Waterview submitted a Zoning Form executed by Elisabeth Dang, a City Public Official. The Zoning Form states, among other requirements: The undersigned service provider confirms that, as of the date that this form was signed, the above referenced Development’s proposed number of units, density, and intended use are consistent with current land use regulations and zoning designation or, if the Development consists of rehabilitation, the intended use is allowed as a legally non-conforming use. To the best of my knowledge, there are no hearings or approvals required to obtain the appropriate zoning classification. Assuming compliance with the applicable land use regulations, there are no known conditions that would preclude construction or rehabilitation of the referenced Development on the proposed site. Once it receives the Zoning Form, FHFC does not require that an applicant demonstrate in its application that it will be capable of constructing the proposed development, nor does FHFC attempt to independently verify that an applicant will be capable of constructing the proposed development during the application process. FHFC does not require an applicant to submit engineering drawings or final site plans during the application process, nor does the RFA contain any restrictions or requirements concerning the height of any proposed buildings. All of the details and verifications concerning the actual construction of the proposed project are evaluated during the credit underwriting process. Based partially on its identification of Development Type in its application to FHFC as “Mid-rise 4 stories,” Waterview’s adjusted SAIL request per affordable unit resulted in it being assigned Leveraging Level 4. If it had instead identified a Development Type of “Garden Apartments,” it would have received Leveraging Level 5. Petitioner argues that Waterview will be unable to construct the four- story mid-rise building identified in its application while also meeting a 40- foot height limitation in the local zoning code. As explained above, for the same reasons the undersigned sustained the objections to Petitioner’s exhibits relating to zoning issues and feasibility of constructing the proposed development, the undersigned finds at this stage (eligibility, scoring, and ranking), FHFC was not required to independently verify that the proposed development would comply with all building and zoning regulations.4 The evidence established that Waterview submitted the required Zoning Form executed by a person with authority from the City to execute such a form. There was no evidence presented that Waterview’s Zoning Form was improperly completed, or that it was obtained through fraud or illegality. Moreover, there was no convincing evidence that the Zoning Form was improperly completed. FHFC did not make an independent determination as to whether a proposed project would comply with all local zoning requirements, but instead relied on the representation of the local official who executed the Zoning Form. Petitioner also argues Waterview should be deemed ineligible because it presented different information to the City than it presented to FHFC in its application. Specifically, Petitioner challenges use of the term “garden apartment” by Waterview in materials it submitted to the City, but not submitted to FHFC; and the impact of Waterview’s proposed development on wetlands. The undersigned rejects these arguments for multiple reasons. 4 Had Waterview been awarded funds, but its proposed development could not be built due to zoning restrictions, that would be addressed during the credit underwriting process. First, Petitioner alleges that the presentation of additional information to the City somehow conflicts with the Applicant Certification and Acknowledgement Form that applicants are required to sign which provides in relevant part: “In eliciting information from third parties required by and/or included in this Application, the Applicant has provided such parties information that accurately describes the Development as proposed in this Application.” Ms. Button, however, testified that providing more information to the local government than is presented to FHFC would not in itself conflict with this statement in this form. Second, Mr. Savino’s deposition testimony established he had a number of communications with the City regarding the proposed project and submitted numerous documents for the City to review. Mr. Savino testified he used the term “garden apartments” when discussing the project with the City to refer to apartment complexes, not to the FHFC definition of “garden apartments” as being three stories or less. There is no evidence rebutting Mr. Savino’s version of events, nor is there any indication what the City understood the term to mean. Third, Petitioner argues that Waterview’s proposed project might have impacted wetlands on the property, contrary to relevant regulations. However, Mr. Savino testified that Waterview could build the project without impacting wetlands. Waterview also included among the documents submitted to the City a Revised Preliminary Site Plan which indicated that the Waterview development would not impact wetlands. Regardless, even if it had been shown that the Waterview project would impact wetlands, this would only impact its ability to receive NHTF funds; it would not have any impact on whether FHFC deems an applicant eligible for funding under this RFA. Ms. Button testified that each applicant is required to check a box on the application indicating whether it is seeking this special funding, but none are required to take it. This special funding is not considered by FHFC when evaluating an applicant’s funding sources during the application review process, and FHFC does not even evaluate an applicant’s eligibility for the NHTF during the scoring process. Even if Petitioner could prove Waterview would not be able to qualify for the special funding, there would be no impact on the scoring of its application. Ultimately, Petitioner presented no evidence that the City had somehow been misled into signing the Zoning Form required by the RFA, or that it had not understood that the proposed project involved a four-story building. The fact that the Ms. Dang did sign the Zoning Form indicates that she believed the City had all the information it needed to do so. Based on the preponderance of the evidence, Waterview’s application is eligible for funding.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Florida Housing Finance Corporation, enter a final order consistent with its initial decisions: (1) finding the applications of Waterview Preserve, LLC, and Christian Manor Restoration, LLC, eligible for funding; (2) awarding the RFA funding to Christian Manor Restoration, LLC; and (3) dismissing the formal written protest of BDG Parkwood Lofts, LP. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of June, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HETAL DESAI Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of June, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Hugh R. Brown, General Counsel Florida Housing Finance Corporation 227 North Bronough Street, Suite 5000 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1329 (eServed) Michael P. Donaldson, Esquire Carlton Fields Suite 500 215 South Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32302 (eServed) Michael J. Glazer, Esquire Ausley McMullen 123 South Calhoun Street Post Office Box 391 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 (eServed) Christopher Dale McGuire, Esquire Florida Housing Finance Corporation 227 North Bronough Street, Suite 5000 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1329 (eServed) Corporation Clerk Florida Housing Finance Corporation 227 North Bronough Street, Suite 5000 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1329 (eServed)
The Issue Whether Respondent, Florida Housing Finance Corporation’s (“Florida Housing”), decision to award funding, pursuant to Request for Applications 2017-111 (“the RFA”), to HTG Sunset, LLC (“Sunset Lake”); HTG Creekside, LLC (“Oaks at Creekside”); and Harper’s Pointe, LP (“Harper’s Pointe”), is contrary to its governing statutes, rules, or the RFA specifications; and, if so, whether the decision is clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Madison Oaks is the Applicant entity for a proposed affordable housing development to be located in Osceola County, Florida. Petitioner Sterling Terrace is the Applicant entity for a proposed affordable housing development to be located in Hernando County, Florida. American Residential and Sterling Terrace are Developer entities as defined by Florida Housing in Florida Administrative Code Rule 67-48.002(28). Sunset Lake, Oaks at Creekside, and Harper’s Pointe are all properly registered business entities in Florida in the business of providing affordable housing. Florida Housing is a public corporation organized pursuant to chapter 420, Part V, Florida Statutes, and, for the purposes of these proceedings, an agency of the State of Florida. Through the RFA, Florida Housing proposes to award an estimated $10,978,942 in Housing Credit Financing for Affordable Housing Developments located in medium and small counties (“affordable housing tax credits”). The RFA outlines a process for selecting developments for funding. Section Five B. outlines the Selection Process, and subsection 2. is the Application Sorting Order. On November 5, 2017, Florida Housing received 167 applications in response to the RFA. Madison Oaks, Sterling Terrace, Sunset Lake, Oaks at Creekside, and Harper’s Pointe timely submitted applications seeking funding to assist in the development of multi-family housing in medium counties. Florida Housing selected a review committee to score all submitted applications. The review committee issued a recommendation of preliminary rankings and allocations, and the Board of Directors of Florida Housing approved these recommendations on May 4, 2018. The Board found that the parties to this proceeding all satisfied the mandatory and eligibility requirements for funding, but awarded funding to Intervenors based upon the ranking criteria in the RFA. If Sterling Terrace can demonstrate that any two of the three Intervenors should not have been recommended for funding, it and Blue Sunbelt, LLC, will displace them as applications selected for funding. If Madison Oaks can demonstrate that all three Intervenors should not have been recommended for funding, Sterling Terrace and Blue Sunbelt, LLC, will displace them as applications selected for funding. Sunset Lake Section Four A.5.e.(3) of the RFA allows applicants to receive up to four points for proximity to certain community services. The RFA provides that applicants in medium counties must receive at least seven points to be eligible for funding, and at least nine points to be eligible for a Proximity Funding Preference. One of those community services is public schools, which are defined as follows: A public elementary, middle, junior and/or high school, where the principal admission criterion is the geographic proximity to the school. This may include a charter school, if the charter school is open to appropriately aged children in the radius area who apply, without additional requirements for admissions such as passing an entrance exam or audition, payment of fees or tuition, or demographic diversity considerations. Additionally, it must have been in existence and available for use by the general public as of the Application Deadline. (emphasis added). Sunset Lake identified the Jewett School of the Arts (“Jewett School”) as a public school, received four points for proximity, and as a result, was eligible for the Proximity Funding Preference. The Jewett School is a magnet school within the Polk County Florida School District. The Jewett School was in existence and available for use by the general public as of the application deadline. Petitioners maintain the Jewett School does not meet the definition of “public school.”4/ If the Jewett School does not meet the definition of a “public school,” Sunset Lake would not be entitled to four points for proximity to community services. As a result, it would have a total of seven points for proximity, and while it would remain eligible, it would lose the Proximity Funding Preference. As a result, Sunset Lake would not have been ranked as highly and would not have been recommended for funding. The Jewett School does not meet the RFA definition of “public school” because geographic proximity to the school is not the principal admission criterion. Although a student must live in Polk County Schools’ Magnet Zone B to apply for admission to the Jewett School, the principal admission criteria is a random lottery process. Geographic location within the Polk County magnet school zones is a threshold issue which qualifies a student to apply for admission. However, the magnet school decision-making process entails a subsequent elaborate demographic diversity analysis, sorting based on the outcome of that analysis, and, ultimately, a random lottery drawing which determines final admission. The Jewett School admission process is contrary to Florida Housing’s primary purpose of awarding proximity points to proposed housing developments--to ensure the intended residents can, in fact, use the services in proximity to the development. Sunset Lake is not entitled to four points for proximity to community services and should not be awarded Proximity Funding Preference. As a result, Sunset Lake should not have been ranked as highly and should not have been recommended for funding. Oaks at Creekside Oaks at Creekside identified the Manatee Charter School (“Manatee School”) as a public school, received three points for proximity, and, as a result, was eligible for funding but not for the Proximity Funding Preference. The Manatee School is a charter school located in Bradenton, Florida. The Manatee School was in existence and available for use by the general public as of the application deadline. Petitioners maintain the Manatee School does not meet the definition of a “public school.”5/ If the Manatee Charter School does not meet that definition, then Oaks at Creekside is not entitled to three points for proximity. As a result, it would have only six total proximity points, and would not be eligible for funding. Florida Housing maintains that a charter school must meet both parts of the definition of a public school in order for a proposed development to receive proximity points based on proximity to that school. That means a charter school must (1) use geographic proximity as the primary admission criteria, and (2) be “open to appropriately aged children in the radius area who apply, without additional requirements for admissions such as passing an entrance exam or audition, payment of fees or tuition, or demographic diversity considerations.” Geographic proximity is not the primary admission criterion for the Manatee School. On the contrary, the Manatee School is open for admission regardless of geographic proximity thereto. The Manatee School operates pursuant to a contract with the Manatee County School Board, and is “open to any student residing in the Manatee County School District, students covered in an interdistrict agreement and students as provided for in Section 1002.33(10), Florida Statutes (2010).”6/ The Manatee School operates a “controlled open enrollment” process. The application period opens in early January and closes at the end of February, and the School accepts students from any school district in the state whose parent or guardian can provide transportation to the school, if the school has not reached capacity. This process is sometimes referred to as “school choice” and is mandatory pursuant to section 1002.31, Florida Statutes.7/ The Manatee School has enrolled students throughout Manatee County, as well as from adjoining Sarasota County. Historically, the Manatee School has not reached capacity. Once the School reaches capacity in any one grade level or class, students will be selected by a system-generated, random lottery process. The term “radius area” is not defined in the RFA or in Florida Housing’s rules. Florida Housing introduced no evidence regarding the meaning of the term “radius area” within the definition of “public school.” When questioned about the meaning, Marisa Button, Florida Housing’s Director of Multifamily Allocations, stated she did not know, but “[I] assume it means if the charter school has a radius area. I don’t know.”8/ The term “radius” is defined as “a bounded or circumscribed area.” Merriam-Webster Online, www.merriam- webster.com (2018). The bounded or circumscribed area for admission to the Manatee School is the Manatee County School District, pursuant to its contract. The Manatee School is open to appropriately-aged children in the radius area who apply. The Manatee School does not apply additional requirements for admission, such as passing an entrance exam or audition, payment of fees or tuition, or demographic diversity considerations.9/ The Manatee School does provide admissions preferences to students of active duty military personnel, siblings of a student already enrolled, siblings of an accepted applicant, children of an employee of the School, and children of a charter board member. Each of these preferences is authorized pursuant to section 1002.33(10)(d). The preferences are not additional requirements for admission to the Manatee School. The Manatee School meets the second part of the definition of “public school” for purpose of qualifying Oaks at Creekside to receive proximity points pursuant to the RFA. Harper’s Pointe Madison Oaks argues Harper’s Pointe is ineligible for funding pursuant to the RFA because the Harper’s Pointe development site is a “scattered site,” and Harper’s Pointe did not identify the site as such and comply with the RFA requirement to designate latitude and longitude coordinates for both sites.10/ Rule 67-48.002(105) defines “scattered sites” as follows: (105) “Scattered sites,” as applied to a single Development, means a Development site that, when taken as a whole, is comprised of real property that is not contiguous (each such non-contiguous site within a Scattered Site Development, is considered to be a “Scattered Site”). For purposes of this definition “contiguous” means touching at a point or along a boundary. Real property is contiguous if the only intervening real property interest is an easement, provided the easement is not a roadway or street. All of the Scattered Sites must be located in the same county. Section Four A.5.c. of the RFA states: “The Applicant must state whether the Development consists of Scattered Sites.” Section Four A.5.d. of the RFA requires that applicants provide latitude and longitude coordinates for the Development Location Point and any scattered sites. Section Five A.1. provides that “only items that meet all of the following Eligibility Items will be eligible for funding and consideration for funding selection.” Among the items listed are “Question whether a Scattered Sites Development answered” and “Latitude and Longitude Coordinates for any Scattered Site provided, if applicable.” Harper’s Pointe did not state in its application that the development consists of scattered sites, and did not provide separate latitude and longitude coordinates for scattered sites. Harper’s Pointe’s proposed development site, as identified in its Site Control Documents, consists of land located within a platted tract of property. The plat recorded in Alachua County indicates that the site is bisected by a platted 50-foot street easement running east/west through the property. The parties stipulated the street has never been constructed. Although portions of the east/west easement area show signs of having been improved at some time in the past, the easement area has never been paved, and is currently impassible by car or truck due to vegetation in the easement area. Even if the easement area were improved, there is no roadway to the west of the property to which it would connect. A fence runs along the property line and the property beyond the fence is platted residential lots accessed by Northeast 22nd Street. An existing roadway, Northeast 23rd Avenue, terminates at the eastern property line just south of the east/west easement. The City has placed barriers at that property line prohibiting access to the property from Northeast 23rd Avenue. If the platted street is a “roadway or street” as those terms are used in rule 67-48.002(105), the site would meet the definition of a “scattered site.” Ms. Button testified on behalf of Florida Housing that the property meets the definition of a scattered site because “there is an easement that is a road or a street” that bisects the property. Ms. Button first testified that Florida Housing’s determination did not depend on whether a roadway or street is actually constructed within the easement, but rather, “it goes back to the easement, whether there is an easement that is a roadway or street.” Ms. Button’s testimony seemed logical enough. If the easement were a street easement, access between the northern and southern portions of the development site would be constrained. By contrast, if the easement were a conservation or utility easement, there would be no impairment of access between portions of the development site. However, on cross examination, Ms. Button testified that, in making the determination whether an easement for a road or street existed, Florida Housing would consider a number of other factors, including whether a roadway was actually constructed within the easement, whether there were physical obstructions preventing access to the “prospective” roadway or street, and whether the public had a right to use the “prospective” roadway or street. Ms. Button did not testify with specificity what factors she considered in making the determination that the easement, in this case, was “a roadway or street.” Ms. Button’s direct-examination testimony was conclusory: “Based on the documentation we received, there is an easement that is a road or street.” On direct examination, her determination appeared to be based solely on the plat designation of a street easement. On cross-examination, however, Ms. Button testified that “a street designated . . . on a plat could be evidence of the existence of a scattered site.” (emphasis added). Moreover, Ms. Button testified that Florida Housing could consider whether a roadway or street was actually constructed, whether there were obstructions to its use, and whether the public had a right to use the purported roadway. Ms. Button’s testimony that the Harper’s Point development site was a scattered site was equivocal, and the undersigned does not accept it as either reliable or persuasive.11/ There is no physical roadway or street constructed within the easement. While there is some evidence that some portions of the easement area were improved in the past, said improvement was at least 25 years old. The current condition of the property is fairly heavily wooded. To the extent a “path” exists on the property, it is not passable by a standard four- wheeled vehicle. Moreover, there are physical barriers preventing vehicular access to the property from the adjoining street to the east. There is no access to the property from the residential development to the west of the property. There is not an improved area preventing access from the northern to the southern portion of the development site. There is no structure built within the easement which would have to be demolished in order to build the project on the development site as a single parcel. Based on the entirety of the reliable evidence, the Harper’s Pointe development site is not a “scattered site” as defined in the RFA. Madison Oaks failed to prove that Florida Housing’s initial determination to award tax credits to Harper’s Pointe, pursuant to the RFA, was incorrect.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Florida Housing issue a final order finding (1) that its initial scoring decision regarding Sunset Lake was erroneous, and awarding funding to the applicant with the next highest lottery number; and (2) awarding funding to Oaks at Creekside and Harper’s Pointe, pursuant to its initial scoring decision. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of August, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE VAN WYK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of August, 2018.
The Issue Whether Petitioner's request for an interim rate should have been granted with an effective date of May 23, 2005, rather than the September 12, 2005, effective date established by the Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA).
Findings Of Fact Lanier Manor is a nursing home that participates in the Florida Medicaid Program. AHCA is the single state agency charged with administering Florida's Medicaid Program. On May 23, 2005, Lanier Manor opened a new ventilator unit at its nursing home facility. The operation of the new ventilator unit caused Lanier Manor's allowable Medicaid costs to increase to a level in which it was eligible for an interim rate. An interim rate is a rate increase that takes place during a period between AHCA's semi- annual rate settings. A letter requesting same is called an "interim rate request" (IRR). On June 2, 2005, Stanley W. Swindling, a shareholder in the certified public accounting firm of Moore Stephens, Lovelace, P.A., authored a letter requesting an interim rate for the Lanier Manor ventilator costs. Attached to this letter was the accounting information necessary for AHCA to approve the request contained in the letter. Prior to his association with Moore Stephens, Lovelace, P.A., Mr. Swindling was a Medicaid auditor for Respondent's predecessor agency for nine years. Mr. Swindling has been a member of Moore Stephens, Lovelace, P.A., for more than 20 years. During the last 29 years, and having personally submitted approximately 100-250 IRRs or similar applications to AHCA within the last 20 years, Mr. Swindling has never had a problem with having an IRR sent to the Agency by regular mail not being timely received by the Agency. His June 2, 2005, letter was addressed to J. Ross Nobles, Acting Medicaid Planning Administrator for Florida Medicaid. Messrs. Swindling and Nobles are acquainted through Mr. Swindling's consulting for various nursing homes. Mr. Nobles is the appropriate person within AHCA to whom IRRs are to be submitted. His Agency unit sets per diem rates for qualified nursing homes. IRRs are directed to, and routed through, his office. The address on the June 2, 2005, letter is Mr. Nobles' correct address. At hearing, Gloria Adams, who has been in charge of production for Mr. Swindling for 17 years, testified credibly that it is the firm's and Mr. Swindling's standard business practice to have Ms. Adams or a secretary type each letter he authors. Ms. Adams then takes the typed letter to Mr. Swindling to approve by signing. Once Mr. Swindling's signature is on the letter, regardless of who typed it, Ms. Adams personally makes all necessary copies, addresses all the envelopes, places the necessary postage on every envelope, and places the completed series of envelopes on the receptionist's desk. Moore Stephens, Lovelace, P.A.'s standard business practice then is for the receptionist to gather all completed envelopes from her desk and exit the building at approximately 5:30 p.m. each work day. Upon reaching the street, the receptionist either hands the completed envelopes to the mailman, if he is waiting on the corner outside, or places them in the permanent mailbox on the corner, if the mailman has not yet arrived. As to June 2, 2005, Ms. Adams had no specific recollection of personally typing the IRR in question or of seeing the receptionist deposit it with the United States Postal Service's mailbox or mailman. However, on almost every work day afternoon, Ms. Adams has, in fact, watched through her window and seen the mailman arrive on the corner between 5:20 p.m. and 5:35 p.m. Frequently, she has observed the receptionist, named "Yadi," hand to the mailman the firm's outgoing mail for the day, or has observed Yadi drop the firm's mail for the day in the mailbox if the mailman has not yet arrived. Yadi was pregnant on June 2, 2005, but she did not leave the firm on maternity leave until July 2005. There was stipulated in evidence a copy of Mr. Swindling's June 2, 2005, letter bearing the date "6/4/05" and the initials M.G., indicating that his copy of the IRR had been received by Lanier Manor's chief financial officer, Mike Greenwald, on June 4, 2005. Mr. Swindling usually sends IRRs to AHCA via regular mail because there is a 60-day window for retroactive approval provided by Part IV.J.1. of the Title XIX Medicaid Long Term Reimbursement Plan (the Medicaid Plan), which has been adopted, pursuant to Florida Administrative Code Rule 59G-6.010, as AHCA's "Payment Methodology for Nursing Homes Services." For Lanier Manor, the June 2, 2005, IRR only requested that AHCA make approval retroactive by seven days to May 23, 2005. Mr. Swindling usually sends cost reports and other date-specific materials to AHCA via Federal Express, which has a tracking system and which can provide a return receipt if necessary. Messrs. Nobles and Swindling interacted by phone and correspondence on other matters between June 2, 2005, and November 11, 2005. At no time during that period Mr. Swindling bring up the Lanier Manor IRR, which had not yet been acted upon by AHCA. Mr. Swindling did not bring up the Lanier Manor IRR in his June to November 2005, phone calls or correspondence with Mr. Nobles because he assumed Agency approval had been mailed directly to the nursing home or its chief financial officer, Mike Greenwald. However, on November 11, 2005, Lanier Manor contacted AHCA to inquire concerning the status of its June 2, 2005, IRR and was informed that the Agency did not have that IRR. That same day, Mr. Swindling faxed a copy of his June 2, 2005, letter and its attached IRR figures to Mr. Nobles. Mr. Nobles received the fax transmission on November 11, 2005. On November 11, 2005, Mr. Nobles sent an e-mail to Mr. Swindling, requesting proof from Mr. Swindling that he had submitted the IRR in June. AHCA was willing, upon receipt of verifiable proof of a June submission to back-date the IRR request to June 2, 2005. On November 16, 2005, Mr. Nobles e-mailed nine employees in his office at AHCA to determine if they had received the IRR before November 11, 2005. Three employees did not even indicate "read" by computer to Mr. Nobles' inquiry, and two did not reply; one did. A total of five negative replies were returned within 15 minutes of Mr. Nobles' inquiry. Some of these replies were returned in four to six minutes, hardly time for a thorough search for the IRR. No other units within AHCA were polled. No other parts of Mr. Nobles' building were polled. Mr. Nobles determined that AHCA could not identify the receipt of the June 2, 2005, letter until it received a copy of the letter sent by Mr. Swindling via facsimile transmission on November 11, 2005. Mr. Nobles, himself, made the determination of the official date of receipt of the June 2, 2005, letter on behalf of the Agency. Mr. Nobles determined that the IRR was not received prior to that date because neither he, nor any of the analysts in his office, could find a copy of the June 2, 2005, letter on November 16, 2005. Mr. Nobles testified that his search was the sole deciding factor as to whether the Agency received the June 2, 2005, letter prior to November 11, 2005. On December 13, 2005, in a letter addressed to Mr. Swindling, the Agency granted the interim rate with an effective date of September 12, 2005. September 12, 2005, is 60 days prior to the November 11, 2005, receipt by AHCA of the fax transmission of the IRR. The parties have stipulated that the rate increase in the IRR was correct and appropriate. Mr. Nobles testified that the September 12, 2005, effective date was the earliest the interim rate could be effective given his determination that the IRR was not received by AHCA until November 11, 2005. He relied on the Medicaid Plan, which is applicable in this case. (See Finding of Fact 15.) The parties have stipulated that if it had been determined that Lanier Manor's IRR had been received on or about June 2, 2005, the interim rate would have been effective on May 23, 2005, as requested in Mr. Swindling's letter. As it is, the provider, Lanier Manor, has suffered a loss of approximately $22.54 per bed, per day, for three and a half months, which is a substantial loss.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order establishing the effective date of the interim rate increase as May 23, 2005. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of August, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of August, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Peter A. Lewis, Esquire Goldsmith, Grout & Lewis, P.A. 307 West Park Avenue, Suite 200 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 L. William Porter, II, Esquire Neverson-Anyjah Heatley, III, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Building 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Richard Shoop, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Station 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 William Roberts, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building, Suite 3431 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Christa Calamas, Secretary Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3116 Tallahassee, Florida 32308
