The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent condominium association properly assessed unit owners for common expenses based on their respective proportionate shares of such expenses as set forth in the declaration of condominium.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Eden Isles Condominium Association, Inc. ("Association") is the entity responsible for operating the common elements of the Eden Isles Condominium ("Condominium"). As such, the Association is subject to the regulatory jurisdiction of Petitioner Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes ("Division"). The Condominium was created——and continues to be governed by——a Declaration of Condominium ("Declaration"), which has been amended at least once during the Condominium's existence. The Condominium comprises seven identical buildings. Each four-story building contains 52 units. Each unit is laid out according to one of three different floor plans. The Declaration prescribes each unit's proportionate share (expressed as a percentage, e.g. 2.16%, 2.08%, 1.64%, etc.) of the common expenses. These percentages are used to calculate the amounts assessed against each respective unit to collect the funds needed to pay common expenses. For reasons not revealed at hearing, the Declaration——at least in its original form——established a separate and unique schedule of percentages for each building in the Condominium, with the result that similarly situated owners (i.e. those whose units had the same floor plan and comparable locations) did not necessarily pay the same proportionate share of the common expenses. Not surprisingly, owners who were compelled to contribute more toward the common expenses than their similarly situated neighbors were wont to complain about the seeming unfairness of this. Some time in 2004 the Association's governing Board of Directors ("Board") was made aware of an amendment to the Declaration, which, among other things, had revised the appendix that specified each unit's proportionate share of the common expenses. Due to an absence of evidence, the undersigned cannot determine when this amendment took effect, yet neither its existence (a copy is in evidence) nor its authenticity is in doubt. There is, further, no evidence explaining why the Board had not previously been familiar with the amendment, but——for whatever reason(s)——it was not. After deliberating over the meaning and import of the amendment, the Board voted, during an open meeting, to construe the amendment as providing for the assessment of common expenses against all units in the Condominium according to the percentages assigned to the units located in "Building G," which was the last of the buildings in the Condominium to be completed. In other words, the Board interpreted the amendment as requiring that all similarly situated unit owners be assessed the same amount for common expenses, using only the most recent proportionate shares. Consequently, starting in 2005, the Association assessed unit owners for common expenses pursuant to the Board's interpretation of the amendment. While this course of action evidently pleased most residents, someone complained to the Division about the change. The Division investigated. Based on its own understanding of the amendment, which differs from the Board's, the Division determined that the Association was not properly assessing the unit owners; accordingly, it demanded that the Association remedy the situation. Under pressure from the Division, which was threatening to impose penalties against the Association for noncompliance with the Division's directives, and for some other reasons not relevant here, the Board eventually decided to "revert back" to the original proportionate shares, beginning in 2006. The Board continues to believe, however, that its interpretation of the amendment (as requiring similarly situated owners to be assessed at the same percentage) is correct.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Division enter a final order rescinding the Notice to Show Cause and exonerating the Association of the charge of failing to assess for common expenses in the appropriate percentages as set forth in the Declaration, as amended. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of May, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of May, 2007.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Division of Florida Land Sales and Condominiums of the Department of Business Regulation, is seeking by a Cease and Dosist Order to enforce the provisions of Chapter 718, Florida Statutes, the "Condominium Act," pursuant to the authority granted in Sections 718.501(1) and 498.051, Florida Statutes, alleging that it has evidence that Respondent has violated Section 718.401(8), Florida Statutes, by binding an owner of a condominium parcel in Covered Bridge Condominium Phase 18 to the provisions of a long-term lease that contains an escalation clause. Respondent, Hovnanian Florida, Inc., is a "developer" as defined in Section 718.103(13), Florida Statutes. Kevork S. Hovnanian is the President of the corporation. Covered Bridge Condominium Association, Inc., incorporated on June 8, 1971, is an "association" as defined in Section 718.103(2) subscribed to by Kevork S. Hovnanian, Lawrence Dombrowski and John R. Langly (Respondent's Exhibit A). Covered Bridge Condominium No. 18 was created by a "Declaration of Condominium," as defined in Section 718.103(12) and filed on December 14, 1978. Attached as "Exhibit 3" and expressly made a part of Covered Bridge Condominium No. 18 is a "Lease Agreement" dated July 8, 1971 in which Respondent was the lessor and Covered Bridge Condominium Association, Inc. is a lessee (Petitioner's Exhibit 1). Kevork S. Hovnanian is the assignee of the Lease Agreement by assignment from Respondent on June 24, 1974 (Respondent's Exhibit C). Covered Bridge Condominium Association, Inc. is the association responsible for operation of the condominium, Covered Bridge Condominium No. 18. Paragraph IX of the foregoing Declaration, The Operating Entity, states in C.(9) in part that "Every owner of a Condominium Parcel, whether he has acquired his ownership by gift, conveyance or transfer by operation of law, or otherwise, shall be bound by the Bylaws of the Association (Exhibit 2), the provisions of this Declaration and the Long-Term Lease" (Exhibit 3). (Petitioner's Exhibit 1) IX A. provides in part: "Covered Bridge Condominium Association, Inc. shall administer, supervise and shall act by and on behalf of the owners of the family units in Covered Bridge Condominium No. 18 in accordance with this instrument, the Bylaws of the Association annexed hereto as 'Exhibit No. 2' and in accordance with the Condominium Act of the State of Florida, its supplements and amendments." Paragraph XIX of the Declaration, Long-Term Lease, requires each original purchaser from the Developer to execute a copy of the Long-Term Lease to secure the unit owner's (original purchaser's) obligation to pay his share of the common expenses as to the Long-Term Lease. The Long-Term Lease referred to in Paragraphs VIII, IX, X, XI, XII, XV, XVII, XIX, XX and XII of the Declaration was attached as "Exhibit 3" and is the aforesaid Lease Agreement of July 8, 1971 in which the Respondent is the lessor and the Developer, and Kevork S. Hovnanian is the assignee. Paragraph XXI, Miscellaneous Provisions, Section G, provides: "If any of the provisions of this Declaration, or of the Bylaws, or of the Long-Term Lease attached hereto, or of the Condominium Act, or any section, sentence, clause, phrase, or work, or the application thereof, in any circumstance, is held invalid, the validity of the remainder of this Declaration, the Bylaws, the Long-Term Lease or the Condominium Act, and of the application of any such provision, action, sentence, clause, phrase, or word, in other circumstances, shall not be affected thereby." XXI K. provides: "The captions used in this Declaration of Condominium and Exhibits annexed hereto, are inserted solely as a matter of convenience and shall not be relied upon and/or used in construing the effect or meaning of any of the text of this Declaration or Exhibits hereto annexed." XXI N. provides in part: "By way of clarification as to Article XIX of this Declaration, the Long-Term Lease may be amended by an instrument in writing, executed by the Lessor and the Condominium Association, by and through its Board of Directors except there shall be no Amendment affecting the Long- Term Lease which would change a unit owner's rent under the Long-Term Lease nor the manner of sharing common expenses under the Long-Term Lease, nor impair the rights of unit owners to the use and enjoyment of the recreational facilities, without the unit owners so affected, and all record owners of Institutional Mortgages thereon, joining in the execution of said Amendment." The Bylaws in Article XIV, Rules and Regulations, Section 4, "Recreation Area and Facilities," establish rules for the recreational facilities. Section 5, "Conflict," provides that should conflict arise the Condominium Act shall prevail (Respondent's Exhibit B). Section IX, Improvements, of the Lease Agreement provides in part: "The Lessor covenants and warrants unto the Lessee that it has constructed, or is in the process of constructing upon the aforedescribed premises, at Lessor's cost and expense, certain recreational facilities, consisting of a swimming pool and sundeck areas, shuffleboard courts, Community Center Building which will include and provide for a meeting area, cardroom, space for arts and crafts, sewing, and billiards, together with equipment and personalty contained therein, and such other improvements and personalty as Lessor determines in its sole discretion." Section XXIV, Rent Adjustment, provides in part: "Lessor and Lessee herein covenant and agree that the rental payments Provided for in Article III above, shall be adjusted, higher or lower, based upon the Cost of Living Index, as hereinafter defined and provided in this Paragraph at one (1) year intervals, commencing January 1st, 1972, and continuing yearly thereafter throughout the term of this Lease" (Petitioner's Exhibit 1). On September 26, 1979 Respondent sold by Warranty Deed a condominium in Covered Bridge Condominium No. 18 to Mr. and Mrs. Milton Marcus. The deed recited the fact of the assignment of the recreational facilities and further recited: "The Long-Term Lease as to the recreational facilities ... has been contemporaneously entered into by the Grantee(s) herein." On the same date the parties executed an "Acknowledgement of Lease Agreement" which recited their covenant to be bound by the 1979 Long-Term Lease Agreement (Petitioner's Exhibit 2). On October 15, 1979 Respondent sold another condominium in Covered Bridge Condominium No. 18 to Mr. and Mrs. Saul Schwartz with similar recitations and with a similar lease acknowledgement agreement (Petitioner's Composite Exhibit 3) Rental payments attributed to the escalation clause in the Long-Term Lease were paid by Covered Bridge Condominium Association, Inc. subsequent to June 4, 1975, the effective date of Section 718.401(8), Florida Statutes, which declared that public policy precludes the inclusion or enforcement of escalation clauses (Stipulation) On June 5, 1979 Petitioner Division of Florida Land Sales and Condominiums served a Notice to Show Cause why a cease and desist order should not issue on Respondent Hovnanian Florida, Inc. alleging: Covered Bridge, Phase 18, is a condominium created pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 718, Florida Statutes. The Respondent is offering for sale and has closed on contracts for sale of condominium parcels in the condominium. Article IX of the Declaration of Condominium binds the owner of a condominium parcel to the provisions of a long-term lease, attached to the Declaration of Condominium as Exhibit 3. Section XXIV of said long-term lease contains an escalation clause as defined and prohibited by Section 718.701(8)(a), Florida Statutes (1978 Supp.). On July 17, 1979 Petitioner requested an administrative hearing. A Notice of Hearing was mailed by the Division of Administrative Hearings on August 6, 1979 notifying the parties that a formal hearing would be held October 24, 1979 in West Palm Beach, Florida. The notice recited: ISSUES: Whether a cease and desist order should be entered against the Respondent for an escala- tion clause prohibited by statute. AUTHORITY: Chapters 120 and 718, F.S. Sections 718.401 and 718.501(b), F.S.; Section 478.171(1), F.S. The hearing was rescheduled and then continued numerous times but went to hearing on April 15, 1980. In the initial stage of the formal hearing on that date the parties jointly moved for a Continuance on the basis of an attached Stipulation, infra, which it was stated would change the character of the hearing and limit the necessity for an extended hearing. The Stipulation is set forth in full for clarity: "Stipulation A Declaration of Condominium creating Covered Bridge Condominium No. 18, address 7240 Covered Bridge Boulevard, Lake Worth, Florida, 33463, was filed and recorded on December 14, 1978, in the Circuit Court of Palm Beach County. Section XI, entitled "Assessments" of the Declaration states that "the portion of the common expenses under the Long-Term Lease shall be fixed and determined by the Lessor as provided under said Lease." Common expenses are defined in Section IH of the Declaration as "the expenses for which the unit owners are liable to the Association." Section XIX of the Declaration, entitled "Long-Term Lease" refers to a Lease and Assignment "... attached hereto as Exhibit 3 and made a part hereof, just as though said Lease were fully set forth herein." Payments under the lease are declared to be common expenses in Section XIX. By the above- referenced language, the Long-Term Lease is incorporated in and made a part of the Declaration of Condominium. Section XIX requires that each unit owner execute a copy of the Long-Term Lease attached as Exhibit 3, and that such lease be recorded in the Public Records of Palm Beach County, together with the deed conveying the unit to the owners. Exhibit No. 3 of the Declaration entitled "Lease Agreement" is an agreement between Hovnanian Florida, Inc., lessor, and Covered Bridge Condominium Association, Inc., lessee, the entity responsible for the operation of the condominium. Therein, it is stated that any reference to an obligation of a "lessee" shall be deemed to include Covered Bridge Condominium Association, Inc., and all individual lessees, jointly and severally. The Long-Term Lease, in Section III C states that rent due under it shall be the obliga- tion of the Individual Lessees and the Lessee-Association. Section XXIV of the Long-Term Lease provides that rental payments due under the lease shall be adjusted yearly. Such adjustment is computed by utilizing a nationally recognized comodity or consumer price index. Such lease was assigned to KEVORK S. HOVNANIAN by HOVNANIAN FLORIDA, INC., on June 24, 1974. Subsequent to the recordation of the Declara- tion of Covered Bridge Condominium No. 18, the developer did sell units to purchasers, and close on such sales. Purchasers were required to and did sign acknowledgements of Lease Agreement, in which purchasers have agreed to be bound by all the terms, covenants and conditions, set forth in the Long-Term Lease, and acknowledged that their signatures constituted an acknowledgement of the Long- Term Lease Agreement and their covenant to be bound by it. Such purchasers purchased sub- sequent to June 4, 1975. In 1975, Section 711.231, Florida Statutes, became effective on June 4, 1975. That act declared that the public policy of this state precludes the inclusion or enforcement of escalation clauses in leases for recreational facilities on other commonly used facilities serving residential condominiums. That statute has since been renumbered and is now Section 718.401(8), Florida Statutes. It is the position of the developer that all rents, including portions due under the esca- lation clause, are and remain the obligation of the association--lessees and the association remains bound to assess unit owners amounts necessary to pay such rents. The lessor has demanded such amounts from the lessee(s), and the lessee Association has refused to pay them. Rental payments attributed to the escalation clause were paid by the association to the lessor subsequent to June 4, 1975. It is stipulated that the following documents are placed before the Hearing Officer for con- sideration in deciding this matter, subject to the recitals in #13 relating to the determina- tion of the relevancy and admissability in this cause For petitioner: Warranty Deed - Hovnanian, Inc. to Saul, Shirly & Schwartz Acknowledgement & Acceptance by Grantee, Saul, Shirly & Schwartz Acknowledgement of Lease Agreement Milton & Rose Marcus Warranty Deed Hovnanian, Inc. to Milton & Rose Marcus Amendment to Declaration of Condominium Covered Bridge No. 18 Recorded August 31, 1979 Amendment to Declaration of Condominium Covered Bridge No. 18 Recorded April 26, 1977 Amendment to Declaration of Condominium Covered Bridge No. 18 Recorded February 21, 1979 Declaration of Condominium Covered Bridge No. 18, with Exhibits Recorded December 14, 1978 Complaint for Damages and Declaratory Relief, Case No. 79-306, 15th Judicial Circuit. Answer, Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim, Case No. 79-306, 15th Judicial Circuit. Offering Circulars Without Exhibits For Respondent: All documents listed by Petitioner: Bylaws of Covered Bridge Condominium Association, Inc., as recorded in Official Record Book 1913 at pages 1025 through 1054 and in official Record Book 1013 at pages 1085 and 1086 of the Public Records of Palm Beach County. Assignment of Lease dated June 24, 1974 as duly recorded in Official Record Book 2320 at pages 1096 through 1100 of the Public Records of Palm Beach County, Florida. Covered Bridge Plat #1, as recorded in Plat Book 29 on Page 44 of the Public Records of Palm Beach County, Florida. Covered Bridge Plat #2 as recorded in Plat Book 29 on page 79 of the Public Records of Palm Beach County, Florida. 1976 Settlement Agreement entered into between Kevork Hovnanian, Hov- nanian Florida, Inc. and Covered Bridge Condominium Association, Inc. Exhibit 4, Offering Circular Petitioner and Respondent agree and stipulate that the facts recited in this stipulation and the documents are true and accurate. The parties reserve the right to present legal arguments directed to the relevancy and/or materiality of any and all facts and documentary evidence, or the contents thereof, to this action. This stipulation is contingent upon the Hearing Officer granting a Motion for Con- tinuance of the hearing scheduled in this matter for April 15 and 16, 1980. The parties agree that this stipulation will not be intro- duced into evidence in any proceeding or used in any manner unless and until the above- referenced Motion for Continuance is granted and, in the event the Motion for Continuance is denied, this stipulation is null and void. In no event will this stipulation be used in any other proceeding. The parties agree that should the stipu- lation be accepted and the hearing continued by the Hearing Officer no witnesses will be called in this cause at any future time, and additional documentary evidence will be placed before the Hearing Officer only upon the agreement of both the Petitioner and Respon- dent to such admission. Petitioner and Respondent agree that the sole remaining matters to be placed before the Hearing Officer shall consist of legal arguments re- lating to the admissability of evidence as stated above, and argument pertinent to the disposition of this cause." The hearing was continued and rescheduled to be heard June 24, 1980. The Notice of Hearing was in the same form and showed the same issue and authorities as stated in each of the previous notices, but with the addition: "issues involved in Stipulation filed April 15, 1980." Thereafter, a Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a course of action was denied. At the commencement of the formal hearing rescheduled for June 24, 1980, Petitioner moved to amend the complaint on the grounds that Article IX (9) of the Declaration was cited in error in the complaint rather than Article XIX (19). The Motion to Amend was orally granted. A Motion for Continuance was then presented by Respondent on the grounds that since the Motion for Amendment had been granted the Respondent had insufficient time to prepare a defense to the amended charge and had not been informed of the issue involved in the case. Believing that the Notice to Show Cause, both original and as amended, together with the Stipulation filed at the previous hearing and the issue and authorities stated in the numerous Notices of Hearing, the Motions and Memoranda filed by Respondent, and the length of time from the inception of the case to the date of hearing had given Respondent adequate notice of the issues involved in the case and the time to prepare, the Hearing Officer denied Respondent's Motion for Continuance of the administrative hearing then in process. Exerpts from the voluminous documentary evidence which was introduced at the hearing are hereinbefore detailed, but a capsule summary of the facts follows: Covered Bridge Condominium Association, Inc. and the plats of the property show that it was anticipated in June of 1971 that Covered Bridge Condominium No. 18 might be erected on said corporate property and that when erected, purchasers of the' condominium units would become members of the Association. The Bylaws in 1971 authorized the Board of Directors of the Association to enter into long-term leases of recreational facilities. The Developer entered into the subject lease agreement that contained an escalation clause with the Association in July of 1971. The lease provided that common expenses would be assessed against all condominium units. Respondent created Covered Bridge Condominium No. 18 by "Declaration of Condominium" on December 13, 1978 "pursuant to Chapter 718, Florida Statutes (1976)." It incorporated the lease agreement of 1971 by reference as well as the Bylaws of 1971 and provided that the operating entity of 1971 should be Covered Bridge Condominium Association, Inc. The Declaration stated under "Operating-Entity" that Covered Bridge Condominium No. 18 should be administered under Covered Bridge Condominium Association, Inc., its Bylaws and "in accordance with the Condominium Act of the State of Florida, its supplements and amendments." Respondent expressly sought to tie the owners to the long-term lease which contained an escalation clause. When the new units in the condominium created in 1978 were sold in 1979, the deeds bound the purchasers to the 1971 lease agreement which provided recreational facilities to the condominium parcel. The parties submitted proposed findings of fact and memoranda of law, and Respondent submitted a proposed recommended order. These instruments were considered in the writing of this order. To the extent the proposed findings of fact have not been adopted in or are inconsistent with factual findings in this order, they have been specifically rejected as being irrelevant or not having been supported by the evidence.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law the Hearing Officer recommends that an order be entered requiring Respondent Hovnanian Florida, Inc. to cease and desist from enforcing the escalation clause in the "Lease Agreement" of 1971 as it pertains to the condominium created in 1978, Covered Bridge Condominium No. 18, and the purchasers of units in said condominium. DONE and ORDERED this 29th day of August, 1980, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of September, 1980. COPIES FURNISHED: Mary Jo M. Gallay, Esquire Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Samuel Spector, Esquire Cynthia S. Tunnicliff, Esquire Guyte P. McCord, III, Esquire SPECTOR & TUNNICLIFF, P. A. Suite 750 Barnett Bank Building Post Office Box 82 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
Findings Of Fact Margaret Cline is an applicant for licensure as an employment agency/agent. Cline meets all qualifications for licensure except the experience requirements, which are the subject of this proceeding. Cline was employed until December, 1975, with the Ramada Inn. The Department recognizes that her experience in this employment was equivalent that of an employment clerk. Cline was unemployed for a period of four to five months immediately following the termination of her employment with the Ramada Inn. From May until September, 1976, she was sales director for a condominium. She admits that her employment was not as an employment clerk or its equivalent. From September, 1976, until September, 1977, she was employed in establishing a bookkeeping system in another condominium company. She admits that the duties of her employment were not those of an employment clerk or its equivalent. Cline was employed from September, 1977, until February, 1978, by Gulf Terrace Condominium. She asserts, and the agency does not deny, that her employment was as an employment clerk or its equivalent. Cline was employed from February, 1978, until September, 1978, with Seascape Inn. She asserts, and the agency does not deny, that her employment during this period was as an employment clerk or its equivalent. Since September, 1978, Cline has been involved in preparing to open or in operating an employment agency. She currently operates an employment agency in Dothan, Alabama, and has done so since November, 1978. Cline has been continuously employed as an employment clerk or its equivalent since September of 1977, or approximately 18 months.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law the Hearing Officer recommends that the application of Margaret Cline be denied. DONE and ORDERED this 16th day of February, 1979, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of February, 1979. COPIES FURNISHED: Gerald Curington, Esquire Department of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida Margaret Cline 940 Santa Rosa Boulevard Fort Walton Beach, Florida
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Camino Real Village, is the joint venture and developer of a sixty-four unit condominium project known as Camino Real Village V (project) in Boca Raton, Florida. The project consists of two buildings (5751 and 5801) with thirty-two units each. Respondent, B&S Ventures, Inc. (B&S), a Florida corporation, is a partner in the joint venture. The other partner, Middlesex Development Corporation, a California corporation, was not named a respondent in this cause. Although the development consists of at least four separate condominium projects known as Camino Real Villages II, III, IV and V, only Camino Real Village V is in issue in this proceeding. Respondents, as the developer and partner of the joint venture, are subject to the regulatory requirements of petitioner, Department of Business Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes (Division). They are charged with violating various provisions of Chapter 718, Florida Statutes (1985), as set forth in greater detail in the Division's notice to show cause issued on July 17, 1986. The Camino Real project is considered to be a multi-condominium project. This means the development includes more than one condominium project but that all are operated by a common association. The parties agree that the project is not a phase condominium project. Under Division rules and applicable statutes, the developer of a multi-condominium project is required to file with the Division a set of "creating" documents at the inception of the project. The creating documents include, among other things, a prospectus, declaration of condominium, plans and survey, legal description, percentages of common ownership, surplus and expenses, articles of incorporation, by- laws, site plan, restrictions (if any), and the estimated operating budget for the first year. Such documents must be submitted for each condominium within the project. However, where the documents are identical to those submitted for another condominium, the developer may file a "certificate of identical documents" wherein the developer certifies that all disclosure items are identical with items for another condominium within the project which has been previously filed with the Division. After the creating documents are filed, the developer must thereafter file additional documents as new condominiums are constructed and completed. This is generally accomplished by filing an amendment to the original declaration for condominium. The amendment includes a surveyor's certificate attesting that the construction on the project has been completed. The purpose of the later filing is to inform the Division that construction on the new condominium has been substantially completed. On an undisclosed date in 1979, respondents filed their creating documents for certain condominiums in Camino Real Village. On November 19, 1980, they submitted their filing for the creation of Camino Real Village V. These documents were accepted as to "form" on December 11, 1980. They included a certificate of identical document signed by B&S' president which certified certain documents were identical to those previously submitted for Camino Real Village IV, a legal description of the property on which the condominium sits, sketches of the types of units to be built, a typical floor plan for Buildings 5751 and 5801, an estimated operating budget based on sixty-four units and common ownership percentages for each unit in the two buildings. Under Division requirements and state law, the documents should have contained a statement reflecting that the condominium was not substantially completed. 3/ However, they did not, and this omission was not detected by the Division when it reviewed and approved the initial filing. On October 23, 1984 respondents filed the declaration of condominium for Camino Real Village V in the local public records. The documents have been received in evidence as petitioner's composite exhibit 1. They reflected that the percentage of ownership in the common elements for both buildings equaled one hundred percent. Section 3(b) of the declaration provided for the creation of a condominium consisting of two buildings (5751 and 5801) containing thirty- two units each. The documents included a surveyor's certification that Building 5751 was substantially completed. However, as to Building 5801, which was not completed at that time, no statement reflecting its state of completion was filed. It is also noted that the declaration was not filed with the Division as required by law, and the Division did not learn of its existence until sometime later. Since the filing of the declaration, respondents have operated Camino Real Village V as a condominium. On October 23, 1984, respondents executed the closing documents on the sale of the first unit (Unit No. 106 in Building 5751) in Camino Real Village V. The warranty deed was later recorded in the local public records on November 1, 1984, and it is found this is the appropriate date on which the sale of the first unit occurred. This is consistent with the standard practice of parties executing documents prior to closing but not considering a unit sold until the money is actually transferred from the buyer to the seller. This date is significant since it may bear directly upon the date when the developer must begin paying common expenses on developer-owned units. On or about October 24, 1985 a "First Amendment to the Declaration of Camino Real Village V" was recorded by respondents in the local public records. It amended the declaration previously executed on October 23, 1984 and included, among other things, a surveyor's certificate reflecting that Building 5801 had been substantially completed. It also attempted to submit Building 5801 to condominium ownership. Although the amendment and attached documents should have been filed with the Division, respondents neglected to do so. The Division first learned that the documents existed during the course of this proceeding. According to paragraph 15 of the declaration, common expenses can only be assessed by the Association against "each condominium parcel." A condominium parcel is defined in paragraph 4(c) as "the condominium unit, together with an undivided share in the common elements appurtenant thereto." A condominium unit in turn is defined in paragraph 4(a) as "the unit being a unit of space, designated 'condominium unit' on the sketch of survey and plans attached hereto and marked as Exhibit B." The latter exhibit, which is attached to the declaration, contains the plans and survey of the project, the surveyor's certification of substantial completion, and a graphic description of each finished unit within the project. Therefore, the above definitions evidenced an intent that common expenses could be assessed only against completed units. Pursuant to Subsections 718.116(1) and (8), Florida Statutes (1985), a developer is responsible for paying his pro- rata share of common expenses on all developer-owned units. The same law permits the declaration to provide that the developer is relieved of this per-unit obligation until the expiration of a ninety-day period after the first unit is sold. In this case, the declaration had such a provision in paragraph 14. It provided in part as follows: . . . for such time as the Developer continues to be a Unit Owner, but not exceeding ninety (90) days subsequent to the closing of the first condominium unit, the Developer shall only be required to contribute such sums to the common expenses of the Condominium, in addition to the total monthly common expense assessments paid by all other Unit Owners, as may be required for the Condominium Association to maintain the condominium as provided in said Declaration of Exhibits . . . Developer hereby reserves the option to guarantee the level of assessments to unit owners for a specified time interval and thereby limit its obligations to contribute to condominium maintenance in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 718.116(8), Florida Statutes. The parties agree that the monthly assessments for common expenses during the period relevant to this proceeding were as follows: Type A Units $135.20 Type B Units 138.64 Type C Units 163.96 The declaration also provides that ten percent interest must be added to any liability owed. The record reflects, and respondents concede, that such assessments were not paid on any units in Building 5801 until the following dates: Units 100-107 ----------- August 28, 1985 Units 200-207 ----------- September 5, 1985 Units 300-307 ----------- September 10, 1985 Units 400-407 ----------- September 18, 1985 The above dates are exactly ninety days after certificates of occupancy were issued for each of the four floors of Building 5801. Even though assessments were not paid by respondents until those dates, beginning on January 31, 1985 and continuing until such assessments were paid, other unit owners were charged and paid assessments based upon a budget for sixty-four units. As it turned out, the difference between the budget and annual common expenses actually incurred by the project was approximately $32,100, or the amount the Division contends respondents owe. In 1982-84, petitioner conducted an investigation of Camino Real Villages II, III and IV based upon complaints received from a certain unit owner. The complaint concerned allegations that access to association books was denied, that the declaration contained a developer guarantee, that maintenance expenses were not properly paid, and that improper assessments were levied on unit owners. The file was closed in November, 1984 after the Division's enforcement supervisor concluded that the allegations were either "unfounded" or could be resolved through voluntary compliance by the Association. As to the fourth issue, which was an allegation that the developer- controlled Association had improperly assessed unit owners from November, 1980 to January, 1982, the investigative report noted that the developer was "allocating them based on the completed units versus the total units filed for the entire community." The enforcement supervisor concluded that this was "the method chosen by the Association," and "absent specifics in the documents, we lack jurisdiction . . . to question this practice." There is no mention of the term "certificate of occupancy" in the report. However, uncontradicted testimony by respondents reflects that its use of the date of issuance of the certificate of occupancy to determine when assessments became due was the focus of the investigation, and that respondents relied upon those statements in continuing their practice of not paying assessments until ninety days after a certificate of occupancy was issued on a unit. They did so, at least in part, on the theory that the Association did not assume responsibility for expenses until that time. Respondents point out that the filing documents submitted to the Division in November, 1980 were defective in that the surveyor's certificate was incorrect. They go on to suggest that, because of this deficiency, the filing might be invalidated by a court and therefore the statutory assessment provision would not apply. However, no person has ever challenged the validity of the filing, and the general law contains a curative provision for any initial filing errors. They also assert that, if any liability is in fact owed, they are entitled to set-offs for expenses incurred by the developer while the project was being constructed. These include payments for real estate taxes, utility bills, Boca Del Mar Improvement Association, Inc. fees, trash removal, insurance, security service, assessments and maintenance and are itemized in attachments to respondents' exhibit 1. However, there is no rule or statutory provision which authorizes this type of set-off to be applied against common expenses. Therefore, the expenses itemized in respondents' exhibit 1 are deemed to be irrelevant.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the respondents be found guilty of violating Section 718.116, Florida Statutes (1985), as charged in the notice to show cause, and that they be required to pay the Association for past due common expenses on developer-owned units in Building 5801 as set forth in paragraph 8 of the conclusions of law plus ten percent interest to and including the date of payment. DONE AND ORDERED this 30th day of March, 1988, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of March, 1988.
The Issue Whether Rule 61B-23.003(9), Florida Administrative Code, is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: Petitioner, Michael Gertinisan, is a unit owner and member of the Bay Hills Village Condominium Association, Inc. (Association). The Association is responsible for the operation of the Bay Hills Village Condominium. Petitioner purchased his unit in December, 1992. Prior to December, 1992, the Petitioner had leased the unit for a number of years. The Bay Hills Village Condominium is a mobile home park condominium where each unit is comprised of a parcel of vacant land upon which is placed a mobile home. Transfer of control of the Association from the developer to the unit owners, other than the developer, pursuant to Section 718.301, Florida Statutes, has not occurred. However, unit owners, other than the developer, are entitled to elect a representative to the board of administration of the Association in an upcoming election. The declaration of condominium for Bay Hills Village Condominium was recorded in the public records in 1985. A number of units were sold to purchasers in 1985. At the time Bay Hill Village Condominium was created and the declaration of condominium recorded in the public records in 1985, the controlling statute, Chapter 718, Florida Statutes, contained no maximum period of time during which the developer was entitled to control the operation of the Association through its ability to elect a majority of the board of administration. The developer of a condominium is statutorily entitled to control the affairs of the condominium association for a period set forth in the statutes. This right to control the affairs of the condominium association for the period set forth in the statutes is a substantive vested right. With the right to control the condominium association, comes the attendant rights, including but not limited to, the right to: (a) adopt a budget meeting the marketing needs of the developer; (b) enter in to contracts with related entities providing for maintenance and management of the condominiums; (c) control ingress and egress on and over the condominium property to move construction equipment; (d) adopt board policies relating to the renting of units in the condominium; (e) adopt board policies regarding placement of "For Sale" signs on the condominium property and to model its units; (f) maintain the property in accordance with the developer's need to conduct an ongoing sales program; and (g) change the size and configuration of units in the condominium to meet the needs of the developer's marketing campaign. In those situations where the developer still exercises control over the condominium association, the aforestated rights of the developer would be substantively impaired by a retroactive application of Section 718.301(1)(e), Florida Statutes, as created by Chapter 91-103, Section 12, Laws of Florida, to condominiums in existence prior to the affective date of the Chapter 91-103, Section 12, Laws of Florida.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, accordingly, ORDERED that the Petitioner failed to establish that Rule 61B-23.003(9), Florida Administrative Code, is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority and the relief sought by the Petitioner is DENIED. DONE AND ORDERED this 14th day of January, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of January, 1994. APPENDIX TO FINAL ORDER, CASE NO. 93-6214RX The following constitutes my specific rulings, pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties in this case. Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact: The Petitioner elected to not file any proposed findings of fact. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact: Proposed findings of fact 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8 and 9 are adopted in substance as modified in Findings of Fact 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8, respectively. Proposed finding of fact is unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael Gertinisan 10506 Bay Hills Circle Thonotosassa, Florida 33592 Karl M. Scheuerman, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007 Henry M. Solares, Director Division of Florida Land Sales Condominiums and Mobile Homes 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Jack McRay, Acting General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue On February 27, 1987, petitioner issued a Notice to Show Cause which alleged that respondent had violated various provisions of Chapter 718, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 7D-17 and 7D-23, Florida Administrative Code. On March 20, 1987, respondent served petitioner with a Response to Notice to Show Cause and Request for Formal Hearing. The Notice to Show Cause and response identify the specific violations alleged and issues to be resolved as follows: CHARGE: Respondent, while in control of the association, violated Section 718.116(1)(a) and (8)(a), Florida Statutes (1985), by excusing itself from the payment of its share of common expenses pertaining to assessments on unbuilt developer-owned units in Phase VI and VII of Glenwood Manor by failing to pay assessments on the units until certificates of occupancy were issued; RESPONSE: Respondent denied that it had any liability for assessments on unbuilt developer-owned units in Phases VI and VII of Glenwood Manor Condominiums, and alleged that respondent paid assessments on developer-owned units commencing with the creation of the unit pursuant to Section 718.403, Florida Statutes (1985). CHARGE: Respondent, while in control of the association, violated Section 718.112(2)(k), Florida Statutes (1980 Supp.), Section 718.112(2)(f), Florida Statutes (1985), and Rule 7D- 23.04(2), Florida Administrative Code (1985), by failing to properly waive or fully fund reserve accounts for capital expenditures and deferred maintenance for the years 1981, 1982, 1984, 1985 and 1986; RESPONSE: Respondent denied that reserve accounts were improperly waived or funded as alleged in the notice, asserting that reserves were properly waived for the years 1981, 1982, and 1984, were not waived for the year 1985, and that respondent was without knowledge as to 1986 because the turnover of the condominium took place prior to the 1986 annual meeting. CHARGE: Respondent, while in control of the association, violated Section 718.112(2)(h), Florida Statutes (1982 Supp.), and Section 718.112(2)(g), Florida Statutes (1985), by failing to adopt budgets and make assessments for the fiscal years 1984, 1985 and 1986 in an amount no less than required to provide funds in advance for payment of all anticipated current operating expenses and all of the unpaid expenses previously incurred, in that respondent loaned the association $8,000 from May 19, 1983 to May 19, 1985, to cover operating expense, with repayment plus interest due after turnover; RESPONSE: Respondent denied that it failed to adopt budgets and make assessments for fiscal years 1984, 1985 and 1986 in amounts sufficient to provide funds in advance for payment of anticipated current operating expenses and for all of the unpaid expenses previously incurred. Respondent alleged that it adopted in good faith budgets which the association estimated would be required to meet these expenses. Respondent admitted loaning money to the association to meet the needs of the association. CHARGE: Respondent failed to follow its plan of phase development as stated in the original declaration of condominium or amend the plan of phase development, in violation of Sections 718.403(1), (2)(b), (6) and 718.110(4), Florida Statutes (1983), in that the original declaration describes Phase IV as containing eight units while the amendment adding Phase IV created only seven units; RESPONSE: Respondent denied that it failed to follow its plan of phase development as stated in the original declaration of condominium in that the Declaration of Condominium provided that the developer would have the option of constructing a swimming pool in Phase IV and that the construction of the pool would require a reduction in the number of units contained in Phase IV from eight to seven. CHARGE: Respondent violated Section 718.104(4)(f), Florida Statutes (1985), by creating a condominium in which the aggregate undivided share in the common elements appurtenant to each unit, stated as a percentage, does not equal the whole, in that Glenwood Manor consists of 55 units with each unit owning a 1/56th share of the common elements. RESPONSE: Respondent denied that it created a condominium in which the aggregate undivided shares in the common elements appurtenant to each unit did not equal the whole, and alleged that any reference to a unit owner owning 1/56th undivided share in the common elements is due to a scrivener's error which respondent would be willing to correct to clarify that each unit owner owns 1/55th undivided share in the common element. CHARGE: Respondent offered 33 condominium units for sale, and entered into purchase contracts in Phase II, III, V, VI and VIII of Glenwood Manor prior to filling the subsequent phase documents with the Division of Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes (Division) on February 5, 1986, in violation of Section 718.502(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1984 Supp.), and Rule 7D- 17.03(2), Florida Administrative Code; CHARGE: Respondent closed on 33 units prior to obtaining Division approval on February 10, 1986, of subsequent phase documents for Phases II, III, V, VI and VII, in violation of Section 718.502(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1984 Supp.), and Rule 7D- 17.01(3), Florida Administrative Code; RESPONSE TO (6) AND (7): Respondent admitted that due to the death of one of its attorneys, it inadvertently did not file the subsequent phase documents for Phases II, III, V, VI and VII prior to offering some of those units for sale and closing on the sale, but filed the necessary documents with the Division and obtained the necessary approvals upon realizing that the documents had not been filed. CHARGE: Respondent accepted a deposit on the purchase contract for unit 605, Phase V, without filing a fully executed escrow agreement for Venice Realty, Inc., with the Division, in violation of Rule 7D-17.02(6), Florida Administrative Code. RESPONSE: Respondent admitted that due to confusion between respondent and the realtor involved, Venice Realty, Inc. inadvertently accepted a deposit on a contract for the purchase of Unit 605, Phase VI, but that prior to closing on the unit, respondent directed Venice Realty to transfer the deposit to the proper escrow agent which transfer was accomplished. Respondent requested a formal hearing on the issues thus joined, and on April 9, 1987, this matter was forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings for further proceedings. At the hearing, petitioner presented the testimony of Glen Turnow, a resident of Glenwood Manor Condominium and association board member; Candy McKinney, Examination Specialist with the Bureau of Condominiums; John Benton, Financial Analyst, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes; and Marcel Cloutier, Secretary/Treasurer of Waterside Land Corporation. Petitioner's exhibits 1-8 were admitted into evidence. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, Petitioner's First Request for Admissions and responses, and petitioner's Exhibit No. 2, Petitioner's First Set of Interrogatories, were admitted into evidence as late-filed exhibits. Marcel Cloutier, an officer of Waterside Land Corporation, was accepted as the authorized representative for respondent and testified on respondent's behalf. Respondent did not enter any exhibits into evidence. A prehearing stipulation was submitted by the parties prior to the hearing. No transcript of the hearing has been filed. However, both petitioner and respondent have filed proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, and a ruling on each of the proposed findings of fact is included in the Appendix to this Recommended Order.
Findings Of Fact At all times between October 21, 1981, and February 27, 1987, respondent was the developer, as that term is defined by Section 718.103(14), Florida Statutes (1985), of Glenwood Manor Condominium. Glenwood Manor Condominium is a phased condominium consisting of seven (7) phases with fifty-five (55) units located in Sarasota County, Florida. Between October 21, 1981, and February 17, 1986, respondent was in control of the Board of Directors of Glenwood Manor Owners Association, Inc. (Association). Control of the Board of Directors of the Association was turned over to the unit owners on February 17, 1986. The Declaration of Condominium of Glenwood Manor Condominium was recorded in the public records of Sarasota County, Florida, on October 21, 1981. Paragraph II of the Declaration of Condominium provides, in pertinent part, as follows: Developer does hereby declare the property owned by it and first described above, to be Condominium property under the Condominium Act of the State of Florida, now in force and effect, to be known as: GLENWOOD MANOR CONDOMINIUMS, hereinafter referred to as the CONDOMINIUM??, and does submit said Condominium property to Condominium ownership pursuant to said Act. Developer may, but is not obligated to create additional Phases of Development of GLENWOOD MANOR CONDOMINIUMS ... which said Phases, if any, shall be operated and managed in conjunction with this Condominium through that certain nonprofit corporation known as: GLENWOOD MANOR OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., and hereinafter referred to as the "ASSOCIATION." The creation of any such further Phases will merge the common elements of this Condominium with the common elements of such additional Phases. As Developer creates such additional Phases, Developer shall ... record an amendment to this Declaration of Condominium describing the lands and improvements so added and the revised percentage of owner- ship in the common elements of this Condominium as so enlarged. (e.s.) The details of the phase development are set forth on Exhibit B to the Declaration of Condominium, entitled Phase Development Exhibit, which provides as follows: This Condominium is being developed as a Phase Development under Florida Statute 718.403. The first Phase of Development, which is the Phase hereby submitted to Condominium ownership, is designated on the Condominium plat described in paragraph II of the Declaration of Condominium above as Phase I. It consists of 8 Condominium Units numbered 1 through 8. Each Unit owner will own 1/8th of the common elements and share 1/8th of the common expenses and is entitled to 1/8th of common surplus relative to this Condominium. Phase II consists of 8 proposed Condominium Units as depicted on said condominium plat. At such time as Phase II is added to this Condominium by appropriate amendment of this Declaration of Condominium, if that be the case, the two phases shall then and there be considered as merged. Upon such merger each unit shall be vested with a 1/16th ownership of the common elements of said phases as merged, bear 1/16th of the common expenses of the merged phases and be entitled to 1/16th of the common surplus of the merged phases. At such time as Phase III is added to this Condominium by appropriate amendment of this Declaration of Condominium, if that be the case, the three phases shall then and there be considered as merged. Upon such mercer each unit shall be vested with a 1/24th ownership of the common elements of said phases as merged, bear 1/24th of the common expenses of the merged phases and be entitled to 1/24th of the common surplus of the merged phases. At such time as Phase IV is added to this Condominium by appropriate amendment of this Declaration of Condominium, if that be the case, the four phases shall then and there be considered as merged. Upon such merger each unit shall be vested with a 1/32nd ownership of the common expenses of said phases as merged, bear 1/32nd of the common expenses of the merged phases and be entitled to 1/32nd of the common surlus [sic] of the merged phases. At such time as Phase V is added to this Condominium by appropriate amendment of this Declaration of Condominium, if that be the case, the five phases shall then and there be considered as merged. Upon such merger each unit shall be vested with a 1/40th ownership of the common elements of said phases as merged, bear 1/40th of the common expenses of the merged phases and be entitled to 1/40th of the common surplus of the merged phases. At such time as Phase VI is added to this Condominium by appropriate amendment of this Declaration of Condominium, if that be the case, the six phases shall then and there be considered as merged. Upon such merger each unit shall be vested with a 1/48th ownership of the common elements of said phases as merged, bear 1/48th of the common expenses of the merged phases and be entitled to 1/48th of the common surplus of the merged phases. At such time as Phase VII is added to this Condominium by appropriate amendment of this Declaration of Condominium, if that be the case, the seven phases shall then and there be considered as merged. Upon such merger each unit shall be vested with a 1/56th ownership of the common elements of said phases as merged, bear 1/56th of the common expenses of the merged phases and be entitled to 1/56th of the common surplus of the merged phases. (e.s.) The units in Phases II - VII were submitted to condominium ownership pursuant to amendments to the Declaration of Condominium filed in the public records of Sarasota County, Florida, on the following dates: First Amendment Phase II November 16, 1981 Second Amendment Phase III June 10, 1983 Third Amendment Phase IV November 3, 1983 Fourth Amendment Phases V, VI and VII April 5, 1984 Each amendment provided for the merger of the common elements of the new phase with the previous phases, listed all units included in the condominium, and indicated the new share of ownership in and expenses for the common elements of the condominium for each unit. For example, the First Amendment of Declaration of Condominium, which added Phase II, consisting of eight units, to the condominium, which initially consisted of eight units, provided: As a result of the addition of the Phase II lands to the Condominium, as set forth above, each unit of Glenwood Manor, Condominiums as amended heretofore and hereby, shall be vested with a 1/16th owner- ship of the common elements of the merged Phases I and II lands and each unit shall bear a 1/16th share of the common expenses and be entitled to a 1/16th share of the common surplus of said merged phases of development. Both the First and Second Amendments added eight units to the condominium in accordance with the Phase Development Exhibit included in the Declaration of Condominium. However, the Third Amendment, adding Phase IV, added only seven units to the condominium, resulting in a total of 31 units. The Third Amendment correctly stated that each unit "shall be vested with a 1/31st ownership of the common elements of the merged Phases I, II, III and IV lands and each unit shall bear a 1/31st share of the common expenses ..." However, when the Fourth Amendment was filed, adding Phases V, VI and VII, each consisting of eight units, the share of ownership in the common elements for each unit was stated as 1/56th, whereas the total number of units included in the condominium was correctly shown as 55. Each amendment to the Declaration of Condominium ratified and confirmed the declaration and plat "[e]xcept as expressly modified" by the amendment. Unit owner and board member Glen Turnow stated that it was his understanding that he owns 1/55th of the common elements and that each unit owner pays 1/55th of the common expenses at Glenwood Manor; however, he has no documents indicating his ownership interest to be other than 1/56th of the common elements. Although the amendment creating the units in Phases VI and VII was filed on April 5, 1984, respondent paid no monthly assessments on developer-owned units in Phases VI and VII until Certificates of Occupancy were issued for those phases. Certificates of Occupancy for Phases VI and VII of Glenwood Manor were issued on October 25, 1985, and November 13, 1985, respectively. The assessment per unit of the condominium per month was $55 from April, 1984, through August, 1985; as of September, 1985, the assessment increased to $70 per unit. For the developer-owned units in Phases VI and VII from the date of amendment until the certificates of occupancy were filed, the assessments would have been $17,182.65. At 18 percent simple interest computed from the end of the year respondent owed for the assessments to the day before turnover of the association to the owners, interest on the assessments totals $2,029.92. Respondent admitted that it paid no assessments on the units in Phase VI and VII until Certificates of Occupancy were issued. Mr. Cloutier testified that respondent did not pay the assessments because it received legal advice that a unit is not in existence until a certificate of occupancy is issued. However, the first assessment was paid on November 4, 1981, and the certificates of occupancy for the first sixteen units were not issued until December 17, 1981. Mr. Cloutier also testified that respondent relied on language in the Declaration of Condominium which excused it from paying such assessments until the certificates of occupancy were issued. However, respondent did not introduce into evidence the portion of the Declaration on which it relied. Further, the Fourth Amendment to the declaration, which added the units in Phases VI and VII to the condominium, clearly provided that each unit would bear a proportionate share of the "common expenses." In the declaration "assessment" is defined as the "share of the funds required for the payment of common expenses." Respondent admitted that it made no guarantee to unit owners at Glenwood Manor Condominium which would excuse it from payment of assessments on developer-owned units other than pursuant to the provisions of Section 718.116(8)(a)1., Florida Statutes (1985), which provides, in pertinent part, as follows: (8)(a) No unit owner may be excused from the payment of his share of the common expense of a condominium unless all unit owners are likewise proportionately excused from payment, except ... in the following cases: If the declaration so provides, a developer or other person who owns condominium units offered for sale may be excused from the payment of the share of the common expenses and assessments related to those units for a stated period of time subsequent to the recording of the declaration of condominium. The period must terminate no later than the first day of the fourth calendar month following the month in which the closing of the purchase and sale of the first condominium unit occurs ... The closing of the purchase and sale of the first unit at Glenwood Manor occurred on October 20, 1981. Reserves are monies put aside each month to provide for future replacement or repair of major items. The original budget provided for funding of reserves in the amount of $6.00 per unit per month. Funding of reserves at Glenwood Manor for 1981 was waived at a meeting of unit owners on January 10, 1982; for 1982, on January 10, 1982; for 1983 on January 10, 1983, and for 1984, on August 16, 1985. If the reserves cannot be waived retroactively, the respondent would owe $3,036.55 for reserves that were not properly waived. However, respondent made one deposit to reserves in the amount of $1,800; therefore, respondent's total liability for underfunded reserves would be $1,236.55. Between May 19, 1983, and May 20, 1985, the developer made the following loans to the association: June 19, 1983 $ 500 at 13 percent interest June 3, 1983 $ 500 at 13 percent interest August 6, 1984 $1200 at 12 1/2 percent interest September 7, 1984 $1500 at 12 1/2 percent interest September 28, 1984 $2300 at 12 1/2 percent interest March 2, 1985 $ 600 at 12 1/2 percent interest May 20, 1985 $1400 at 12 percent interest On July 14, 1983, the first two loans were repaid with interest. The loans made from the developer to the association during the years 1983, 1984 and 1985 were necessary to provide operating funds for the association. At a meeting of unit owners on August 25, 1985, it was decided that repayment of these loans would take place after turnover of control of the association to the non-developer owners. On the dates these loans were made, the percentages of units which had been sold by the developer were as follows: August 6, 1984 - 56.4 percent; September 7, 1984 - 56.4 percent; September 28, 1984 - 56.4 percent; March 3, 1985 - 60 percent; and May 20, 1985 - 61.8 percent. If the repayment of the loans were based on the percentage of units owned by the developer vis-a-vis the non- developers on the date of the loan, the developer would owe $2954.80 and the non-developer unit owners would owe $4045.20. Respondent offered 33 condominium units for sale, and entered into purchase contracts for units in Phases II, III, V, VI and VII of Glenwood Manor Condominiums, prior to February 5, 1986. Respondent closed on the sales of 33 units in Phases II, III, V, VI and VII of Glenwood Manor Condominiums prior to February 10, 1986. Respondent first filed subsequent phase documents with the Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes for Phases II, III, V, VI and VII of Glenwood Manor Condominium on February 5, 1986. On August 11, 1985, Venice Realty accepted a deposit from the Days for the purchase of Unit 605 at Glenwood Manor Condominium. Ms. McKinney testified that the Division's records indicated only that the Law Firm of Rosen, Able and Bryant would serve as escrow agent for sales of units at Glenwood Manor Condominium. In its answer to the charges, respondent admitted that Venice Realty was not the proper escrow agent for respondent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding that respondent committed the violations alleged in Charges 1-7, finding that respondent did not commit the violation alleged in Charge 8, and imposing a civil penalty against respondent of Four Thousand, Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($4,250), assessed as follows: For the violations set forth in the first charge, $1,000; for the violations set forth in the second charge, $1,000; for the violations set forth in the third charge, $1,000; for the violations set forth in charges four and five, $750; and for the violations set forth in charges six and seven, $500. It is further RECOMMENDED that the Final Order require that the respondent take the following affirmative action: Within sixty (60) days of the Final Order, file the appropriate documents in the public records of Sarasota County, Florida, indicating that Glenwood Manor Condominium consists of 55 units, and that each unit's share of the common elements, expenses, and surplus is 1/55th. The filing of such amendments shall comply fully with the provisions of Chapter 718, Florida Statutes, and Rule 7D-17, Florida Administrative Code. Within thirty (30) days of issuance of the Final Order, remit permanently and irretrievably to Glenwood Manor Owners' Association, Inc., the respondent's liability for assessments and reserves in the amount of $19,210.16 for assessments and $1,236.55 for reserves. Accept as full repayment of the loans made by respondent to the association, the sum of $4,045.20. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of March, 1988, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE A. GRUBBS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of March, 1988.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant to this case, the Respondent, Pebble Springs Condominium Association of Bradenton, Inc., was the condominium association for Pebble Springs Condominium VI in Bradenton, Florida. Matthew Ford is and, at all times relevant to this complaint, was a unit owner at Pebble Springs Condominium VI and a member of the condominium association. Matthew Ford requested to inspect the Respondent's records, hereafter described in paragraph 4 and referred to as Exhibits A and B, which were prepared and provided by the law firm of Becker, Poliakoff and Streitfeld, P.A., to the Respondent as a bill for legal services rendered in the Respondent's suit against Ford. At the time that Ford made his request for Inspection of the Respondent's records pursuant to Section 718.111(7), Florida Statutes, he was the defendant in a circuit court lawsuit in which the Respondent was plaintiff. Said court case is currently on appeal. Joint Exhibits A and B constitute the entirety of said law firm's bill to the Respondent. Joint Exhibit B describes each instance of attorney's service to the Respondent and the amount of time attributed to said service. The parties stipulate that the information contained in the document sought by Ford is the same as that reported in Exhibit B. The data in Exhibit B is reported in four columns, as follows: date, attorney, time, and actions. The information listed under "actions" includes the following listings: (03/14/83) Telephone conversation with bank officers and association officers re unfreezing of association funds. (03/14/83) Preparation for meeting with board members and witnesses; preparation of counterclaim. (03/14/83) Research concerning mandamus and other injunctive relief; preparation of counterclaim. (03/15/83) . . . preparation of counterclaim and motions to strike. (03/16/83) Preparation of counter-claim; . . . filing of counterclaim and coordination of service. (04/06/83) Preparation of motion to dismiss or for more definite statement and motion to strike on behalf of firm and Daniel J. Lobeck. (04/07/83) Memorandum to Alan E. Tannenbaum re Murley contempt of court order. (04/08/83) Receipt and review of motion to dismiss filed on behalf of board by insurance counsel; . . . (04/12/83) Preparation of motion to hold [deleted in exhibit] in contempt. (04/13/53) Correspondence to auto owners; correspondence to [deleted]; amendment of motion for contempt; setting of contempt hearing. (04/15/83) Review of motion to appoint special master and notice of bearing; telephone conference with Alan Tannenbaum re same. (04/18/83) Conference with Daniel J. Lobeck re: motion to appoint receiver. (04/19/83) Preparation of proposed order dismissing motion to appoint special master; research and preparation for hearing on motion; hearing on motion; telephone conferences with clients re hearing and order. Ford's request as to Joint Exhibit B was refused by the Respondent, which did provide him with Joint Exhibit A which states the sum due for legal services together with stated costs and total balance due. The Respondent also provided for Ford's inspection the Respondent's ledgers and checkbooks, which displayed the sums paid each month by the Respondent to the law firm. In the course of the litigation between the Respondent and Ford, Ford sought the production of documents from the Respondent as evidenced by Exhibit C. In the context of the hearing for attorney fees in the litigation between the Respondent and Ford, the Respondent has offered to provide Ford with the information which he had previously sought. During March or April 1983, Ford filed a complaint with the Petitioner alleging that he was being denied access to the Respondent's books and records contrary to Section 718.111(7), Florida Statutes. The Petitioner conducted an investigation of Ford's complaint, which resulted in the issuance by the Petitioner of a Notice to Show Cause to the Respondent issued May 9, 1983. The Respondent requested a formal hearing by petition dated June 1, 1983, which request was granted.
Recommendation Having found the Respondent not guilty of the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaint, it is recommended that the Administrative Complaint filed against Respondent be dismissed. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 5th day of March, 1984, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of March, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: Karl M. Scheuerman, Esquire Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Daniel J. Lobeck, Esquire 1343 Main Street, Suite 204 Sarasota, Florida 33577 Gary Rutledge, Secretary Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
