Findings Of Fact Chapter 723, Florida Statutes, the Florida Mobile Home Act, became law on June 4, 1984, created by Chapter 84-80, Laws of Florida. Chapter 723 expressly preempts to the state all regulation and control of mobile home lot rents in mobile home parks and all those matters relating to the landlord-tenant relationship treated by or falling within the purview of the chapter. The statute regulates any residential tenancy in which a mobile home is placed upon a rented or leased lot in a mobile home park in which 10 or more lots are offered for rent or lease. The statute requires that every owner of a mobile home park containing 26 or more lots shall file a prospectus with the Respondent prior to entering into an enforceable rental agreement. Respondent has the power and duty to enforce and ensure compliance with the provisions of the chapter and rules promulgated pursuant to the chapter relating to the rental of mobile home lots. Respondent is further authorized to promulgate rules, pursuant to Chapter 120, which are necessary to implement, enforce and interpret the chapter. The proposed rule at issue in this proceeding was first published in the Florida Administrative Weekly, Volume 14, Number 7, February 19, 1988. The parties have requested official recognition of the proposed rule and its date of publication, and that request is hereby granted. Proposed rule 7D-31.002, Florida Administrative Code, provides: 7D-31.002 Fees, Charges and Assessments. For tenancies in existence before June 4, 1984, including any assumptions of those tenancies pursuant to Section 723.059, Florida Statutes, the mobile home owner is not obligated to pay any fees, charges or assessments which were not disclosed fully in writing prior to occupancy, any provision to the contrary in a prospectus notwithstanding, unless the park owner can establish that the fees, charges or assessments have been collected as a matter of custom as defined in subsection (4) of this rule. Furthermore, the mobile home owner is not obligated to install any permanent improvements at all, including those mandated by governmental entities or utility companies. For tenancies created on or after June 4, 1984, pass through charges, as defined in Section 723.003(9), Florida Statutes, may be imposed by the mobile home park owner if the mobile home owner's obligation to pay such charges was disclosed in general terms pursuant to Sections 723.011 and 723.012, Florida Statutes, or pursuant to Section 723.013, Florida Statutes, even though the charge being imposed was not disclosed specifically, and the imposition of such pass through charges is not a violation of Section 723.042, Florida Statutes. However, pass through charges may not be imposed if the mobile home owner's obligation to pay such charges was not disclosed generally and prior to occupancy as required by Section 723.042, Florida Statutes and by Sections 723.011(2) and 723.012, Florida Statutes or Section 723.013, Florida Statutes, whichever is applicable. No fee, charge or assessment shall be imposed by a mobile home park owner on the purchaser of a mobile home situated in the park that is offered for sale by a resident of the park and as a condition to the purchaser being reviewed or approved for residency in the park. A fee, charge or assessment has been collected as a matter of custom if it was collected prior to July 1, 1976. Petitioner is a not-for-profit incorporated association, whose members include approximately 1,000 mobile home park owners and operators who own and operate mobile home parks in the State of Florida. Petitioner's members each lease at least 25 or more lots for the placement of mobile homes within each of their mobile home parks. Each of the members is therefore required to file and receive approval of a prospectus from Respondent prior to entering into an enforceable rental agreement for the lease of lots in those mobile home parks. Tom Coon, owner and operator of Hillsboro Mobile Home Park, located at Route 3, Box 801, Pompano Beach, Florida 33067, has "passed through" and charged for the hook-up fees and installation of sewer and water lines for hook-up to the Coconut Creek City Utility System. The cost to Mr. Coon for hook-up was $116,808 which includes fees which were not disclosed prior to occupancy and permanent improvements which were mandated as a result of actions by state and local government and the utility company. David Zell, owner of Colony Mobile Home Park, 2301 North 29th Avenue, Hollywood, Florida 33020, has "passed on" real estate tax increases in 1987 and 1988, as a result of entering into a three year negotiated agreement with the home owners negotiating committee, pursuant to mediation in 1986. The agreement allows for pass-on of increases in taxes and limits rent increases during that three year term. The total cost of pass-on charges for ad valorem property tax increases was $6,417.62 over that two year period. There is at least a $3,337.62 ad valorem property tax increase which will be passed-on in 1989. This pass-on charge for real estate taxes would be prohibited in that the real estate taxes were not disclosed to the residents prior to occupancy, nor were they collected prior to July 1, 1976. Charles Aultman is the owner and operator of Plantation Manor Mobile Home Park, 3032 South U.S. Route 1, Fort Pierce, Florida 33450. Aultman passed-on ad valorem property tax and utility increases for the years 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987 and 1988 for all residents of the park. The total amount passed-on was $33,872.57. This charge would be prohibited as not disclosed prior to occupancy or charged as a matter of custom as defined in the proposed rule. Jim Dale, owner of Rexmere Village Mobile Home Park, 11300 Rexmere Boulevard, Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33325-4099, has passed-on increases to ad valorem property taxes for the mobile home park to each of his residents in 1987 and 1988. The approximate cost of the pass-ons at this point is $120,000 per year. The pass-on charge for increased ad valorem property taxes is based upon an agreement entered into between the mobile home owners and the park owner that limits the increases in lot rental amount in the park, but allows for pass-ons of increased ad valorem property taxes. In addition, the mobile home park prospectus includes a charge for parking which limits the on-street parking in the mobile home park. This charge was not collected prior to July 1, 1976, and was not disclosed prior to occupancy, but has been collected since the prospectus was delivered in the mobile home park. There is a collection rate of approximately $8,000 per year parking charges in the mobile home park. Pauline Mantwil is the owner of Sunshine Mobile Manor, which had its sewage treatment plant condemned by the Department of Environmental Regulation. The park was required to tie into the Martin County Sewage Treatment System (Dixie Plant). The cost to each mobile home owner was allocated at $730 per space. The park owner passed-through this cost. The cost was disclosed in the prospectus, but was not disclosed prior to occupancy in the mobile home park. The total cost for impact fees and other costs associated with tie-in to the system is approximately $150,000. This pass-on of tie-in and other costs to hook up to the sewage treatment plant would be prohibited under the proposed rule because it was not disclosed prior to occupancy and because, in part, the costs include some permanent improvements to the sewage treatment system within the park. Mike Pond is the owner of Palm Shores Mobile Village, Inc., a mobile home park located at Number 1, East Lane, Lake Alfred, Florida 33850. The mobile home park consists of 97 lots. The park owner has no records of the fees and charges which were collected prior to July 1, 1976, and there was no disclosure of fees and charges prior to occupancy to the residents who moved in prior to the time the prospectus was approved and delivered. The prospectus was approved August 21, 1985, and delivered shortly thereafter. The mobile home park was mandated to enlarge its sewage treatment plant by the Department of Environmental Regulation. The park passed-through the costs of the sewage treatment plant enlargement to each resident within the park, at a cost of $218.25 per lot. In addition, there is an ad valorem property fire tax which is passed-on to each resident of $34.05 per lot. The fire tax is included within the November 1 tax bill and is paid March 31 of the next year. Neither the charge for sewer enlargement or the fire tax was disclosed prior to occupancy. The park owner has no record as to whether these types of fees and charges were collected prior to July 1, 1976. Clayton, Williams and Sherwood is a partnership doing business in the State of Florida, which operates the Coral Lakes Mobile Home Park located in Broward County, Florida. Clayton, Williams and Sherwood has passed-on increases in ad valorem property taxes in 1986 and 1987 to each resident within the mobile home park. The total pass-on charges for those two years is $15,600. There are 118 lots in the park that were occupied by residents prior to June 4, 1984. Each of these lots was charged a pass-on charge for taxes. Clayton, Williams and Sherwood is not aware of whether ad valorem tax increases were passed-on to residents prior to July 1, 1976, nor are they aware as to what disclosures were made to the residents in the mobile home park prior to occupancy. Clayton, Williams and Sherwood is the park owner of Shadow Hills Mobile Home Park in Orange County, Florida. Orange County has mandated that the mobile home park hook-up to the county sewer system. The cost of hook-up is $829,000 for hook-up fees, $50,000 to install a lift station for the purpose of complying with regulations for hook-up to the county sewage system, and $50,000 to eliminate percolation ponds which are currently on site. The owner of the mobile home park intends to pass-through the cost of the hook-up to the Orange County sewer system by amortizing that cost over a fourteen-year period. The mobile home park prospectus provides that the mobile home park may pass-through costs incurred due to the actions of state and local governments or utility companies. The park owner does not know whether these charges were collected prior to July 1, 1976. Clayton, Williams and Sherwood is also the park owner of Lakewood Mobile Home Park in Indian River County, Florida. Indian River County has mandated that Lakewood Mobile Home Park hook-up to the county sewer system at a cost of $484,000 to the mobile home park. This $484,000 includes hook-up fees and approximately $50,000 for a lift station to be installed as part of the hook-up. The prospectus for Lakewood Mobile Home Park provides that the park owner may pass-through costs incurred due to actions by state and local governments or utility companies as a separate charge. However, the park owner does not know whether a pass-through charge was disclosed to the residents of the park prior to occupancy nor whether such charge was collected prior to July 1, 1976. Charles Metcalf is the owner of Woodall's Trailer Park, located at 2121 New Tampa Highway, Lakeland, Florida 33801. Woodall's Trailer Park was required by the City of Lakeland to upgrade the electric utility system in the park. The approximate cost of this upgrade, which is presently being installed, is $35,000. The park owner operated the mobile home park based upon oral leases prior to the submission and approval of the prospectus of the mobile home park. The prospectus was approved June 4, 1985, by Respondent. The mobile home park owner intends to pass-through the cost of upgrading the electrical utility system to 253 mobile home lots located in the park. Those 253 mobile home lots are occupied by residents who were residents of the park as of June 4, 1984. The park owner did not disclose a pass-through or pass-on charge to any of those residents prior to occupancy, nor has a pass-through or pass-on charge been collected in the park prior to July 1, 1976. A pass-through charge is allowed in the mobile home park prospectus for costs incurred as the result of actions of state or local governments or utility companies. Jack Zieaer is the manager of Gulfstream Harbor, a 383 unit mobile home park, which began development in 1980. Approximately 235 lots were occupied on June 4, 1984 and approximately 260 lots were occupied on December 31, 1984. The prospectus for the mobile home park, which was filed on December 31, 1984, and distributed to existing tenants in the park, authorizes the imposition of separate charges on the home owners in addition to the basic lot rental amount, which separate charges were not disclosed in advance of occupancy. One hundred and twenty-three residents of the park received advance disclosure of all the charges set forth in the prospectus prior to occupancy. The tenancies of those 123 residents began after June 4, 1984. James F. Gould is the resident manager of Mobile Home Country Club, which contains 269 lots and which has been in operation for approximately 25 years. Twenty to twenty-five residents apply for residency in the park each year. The park imposes an application fee of $50 to screen the residents. Approximately $32,000 per year is collected for separate water and sewer charges plus an administrative fee. The separate charge for water was disclosed to people when they moved into the park. William Hart is the owner and operator of seven mobile home parks, including Havenwood Adult Mobile Home Community. In 1981, 1986 and 1987, Hart passed-through to the residents at Havenwood tax increases in addition to the basic lot rental amount. All of Hart's prospectuses authorize the pass-through of charges billed by state or local governments or utility companies and provide for a $50 investigation fee to investigate proposed residents. The total investigative fees collected from all seven of Hart's parks in 1987 was approximately $9,400. The taxes passed-on in Havenwood in 1981, 1986 and 1987 total approximately $850, $1,300, and $2,100 respectively. DeAnza Corporation owns eight mobile home parks in Florida with about 5,300 spaces, including Mobil Americana Mobile Home Park in St. Petersburg, Florida. Mobil Americana Mobile Home Park was in operation prior to June 4, 1984, and was developed beginning about 22-23 years ago. DeAnza purchased Mobil Americana in 1976, at which time there was a lease in place in the park. There were 758 residents in the park at the time it was purchased of whom 275 continue in occupancy today. DeAnza charges an application fee in all of its parks of $50, except for one park which charges an application fee of $20. Five hundred and forty-eight of the 758 lots presently occupied at Mobil Americana are occupied by residents who moved in before June 4, 1984. The City of St. Petersburg has instructed DeAnza to install 11 new fire hydrants in Mobil Americana, and DeAnza has responded by proposing to install two. An engineer has estimated that it would cost approximately one-half million dollars to install 11 hydrants in the park and that it would cost approximately $68,500 to install only two. DeAnza and the City are continuing to negotiate concerning the fire hydrants. The park intends to pass-through the costs of any fire hydrants to the residents. Rents are increased in the park yearly, and every two years the rental level is set by the market. The park owner determines the market. A substantial number of Petitioner's members will experience an adverse and/or substantial economic impact as a result of the proposed rule, if adopted. The past practice of collecting pass-through and pass-on charges by the park owners will be illegal under the proposed rule. In addition, the past collections of fees, charges and assessments which were not disclosed prior to occupancy or collected prior to July 1, 1976, will be illegal and subject to Respondent's enforcement jurisdiction. Those illegal charges may be required to be paid back to the homeowners. As such, there is a substantial economic impact from the proposed rule. Petitioner has standing to challenge proposed rule 7D-31.002, pursuant to sections 120.54(4) and 120.57, Florida Statutes. Petitioner's Executive Director conducted a partial survey of Petitioner's members. Over 5 percent of the surveyed parks have already charged pass-through charges for governmentally mandated capital improvements to their residents, including residents of the parks prior to June 4, 1984, and a substantial number of others intend to in the future. The term "entrance fee," as that term is commonly understood in the mobile home industry, is a fee charged for moving a mobile home onto a vacant mobile home lot in a mobile home park, whether that is done by a dealer or a home owner. The term "application fee" as that term is commonly understood in the mobile home industry, is a charge for recouping the costs associated with credit checks, screening, and criminal background checks in qualifying a potential resident of the park. It applies to someone who purchases an existing home in the park. The Respondent acknowledges that there is an economic impact from the statute as interpreted by the proposed rule and that the economic impact of the proposed rule on regulated persons was pointed out to the Respondent during workshops on the proposed rule. However, the Respondent did not conduct any investigation of the economic impact of the proposed rule. No economist conducted the economic impact analysis; rather, the economic impact statement supporting the proposed rule was prepared by Respondent's legal section. No consideration was given by Respondent to the amount of monies involved in pass- through charges. Further, no review was made by Respondent of the prospectuses contained in its own files in order to determine the kind or extent of economic impact on the persons regulated by Respondent, i.e., the park owners. The parties have stipulated that there is no provision in chapter 723, Florida Statutes, which expressly provides that all fees, charges and assessments have to be fully disclosed in writing. Pass-through charges or pass-on charges are not prohibited by chapter 723, Florida Statutes; rather, that chapter specifically defines pass-through charges and even requires that all prospectuses contain a description of the manner in which pass-through charges will be assessed. It is the common understanding in the mobile home industry that park owners cannot require mobile home owners to install permanent improvements on their individual lots, such as driveways, etc. However, mobile home owners can be contractually obligated to pay the cost of installing capital improvements required by local governments or utility companies--pass-through charges by statutory definition.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Bertram Gould, is president and stockholder of Mohican Valley, Inc., d/b/a Indian Woods Subdivision. The Indian Woods Subdivision is located in Seminole County and consists of in excess of 150 subdivided lots. On May 20, 1982, Mohican Valley, Inc. purchased a mobile home park located in Seminole County, Florida, from Winter Springs Mobile Home Corporation. The park was formerly known as Mohawk Village, but is now known as the Indian Woods Subdivision. Bertram Gould and Mohican Valley, Inc. acquired their interest in the subdivision by virtue of a purchase and sale agreement, deed and assignment of lease indentures from Winter Springs Mobile Home Corporation. Individuals desiring to live in the mobile home park purchase their mobile home and contemporaneously sign a 99-year lease on the lots upon which the mobile homes are to be placed. The mobile homes purchased by prospective residents in the subdivision are typically purchased from Vaughn Motors, Inc., a corporation of which Mr. Gould is president. In 1981, Vaughn Motors, Inc. sold a mobile home to Alfred and Beverly Powers, which arrived at the park and was setup on November 30, 1981, or shortly thereafter. On March 1, 1982, Vaughn Motors, Inc. sold that mobile home to Warren E. and Sylvia Joyce Krummel, since the Powers had elected not to close the purchase. On the date of the sale to the Krummels, the mobile home was already setup on Lot 1, Block E, of the subdivision and ready for occupancy. On June 14, 1982, after the May 20 purchase of the subdivision by Mohican Valley, Inc, through its president, Bertram Gould, the Krummels executed an Indenture of Lease for Lot 1, Block E. There was thus a residential building on that property subject to the lease at the time the lease was entered into. On June 5, 1982, Dorothy Merritt signed a purchase agreement to buy a mobile home and the mobile home was delivered and setup on her lot on August 6, 1982. On that date she also signed a lease for the lot where the mobile home was placed. Thus, when the interest in that property was conveyed by lease, there was a residential building on the lot. Roy and Lydia Ardizzone initially leased a lot in the park from Winter Springs Mobile Home Corporation before the sale to Mohican Valley, Inc. and Bertram Gould. In August, 1982, after Mohican Valley, Inc. purchased the subdivision, the Ardizzones decided to place a mobile home on their lot, but since the Phase II portion of the subdivision in which their original lot was located was not completely developed, it was not feasible to place the home on the lot at that time. Accordingly, they asked Mr. Gould to substitute their lot for a lot in Phase I in order to facilitate placing a home on the lot and begin living in the park. Mr. Gould agreed and the substitution occurred on August 31, 1982, on which date the Ardizzones also signed a lease for the lot. They ordered a mobile home to be placed on that lot, which arrived some 10 days later, on September 9, 1982. It was immediately setup on the Ardizzone's lot. Thus, at the time the lease of August 31, 1982, was executed by the Ardizzones and Bertram Gould, the Ardizzones had already ordered the mobile home for immediate delivery, which was delivered and setup some 10 days later. Thus, there was an obligation on the part of the Respondent to provide a mobile home to them in less than two years and indeed within days. On or about September 4, 1982, Bertram Gould caused a mobile home to be placed on Lot 3, Block B of the subdivision and had it prepared for occupancy. On November 5, 1982, George W. and Alice H. Woodward signed a purchase agreement for the mobile home and ultimately executed a lease for the lot upon which that mobile home sat on January 10, 1983. They moved into their home on or about February 17, 1983. Thus, at the time the lease was executed by the Woodwards and Respondent, a residential building was present on the property subject to the lease. Mohican Valley, Inc.'s predecessor in title, Winter Springs Mobile Home Corporation, had, during the course of its development of the mobile home park, entered into approximately 156 ground leases for mobile home lots. In conjunction with the acquisition of title to the park by Mohican Valley, Inc., Mohican Valley Inc. was assigned all rights of Winter Springs Mobile Home Corporation in those 156 leases which had already been recorded by Winter Springs Mobile Home Corporation prior to the acceptance of assignment by Mohican Valley, Inc. It was not established that Mohican Valley, Inc. or Bertram Gould had participated in any offer or disposition of the property which was the subject of those leases prior to Mohican Valley, Inc.'s acceptance of their assignment. Prior to May 20, 1982, the Respondent had no ownership interest in either the mobile home park or in Winter Springs Mobile Home Corporation, which owned and managed the Park. He was not an officer, director, employee, salesman or any type of agent for the owner of the mobile home subdivision prior to May 20, 1982. The only nexus between the Respondent and the mobile home park prior to May 20, 1982, was his position as president of Vaughn Motors, Inc. which had sold mobile homes to some of the residents of the park who had executed leases which ultimately became assigned to Mohican Valley, Inc. The Respondent caused certain advertisements to be placed in the Orlando Sentinel newspaper. Although an advertisement was placed April 25, 1982, the Respondent was not involved in the publishing of that advertisement. It appeared in the newspaper approximately a month prior to purchase of the park by Mr. Gould's company. On June 4 and 5, 1982; September 19, 1982; October 10, 1982; and January 29, 1983, the Respondent admittedly placed advertisements in the Orlando Sentinel representing amounts of monthly lot rent, terms of available bank financing, the office address, the phone number and hours of operation, as well as representing the fact that mobile homes could be purchased at the park for a listed price, including certain optional features, as well as the representation that the mobile home park then owned by Mohican Valley, Inc. offered quarter-acre lots and double-wide homes with certain amenities. The price for lot rent was represented as never increasing. Bank financing was advertised as available variously at 14 and a quarter percent interest and 13 and a half percent interest. The representations contained in those advertisements were true, however, at the time Mohican Valley, Inc. took title to the mobile home park, a foreclosure action and lis pendens had been filed on that property by Florida Land Company, the mortgagee on a mortgage executed by Winter Springs Mobile Home Corporation, Mohican Valley, Inc.'s predecessor in title. That foreclosure had been filed on or before March 21, 1983, as evidenced by the Motion to Intervene (in evidence as Petitioner's Exhibit 4), which was filed in that foreclosure proceeding by Mohican Valley, Inc. No representation was made in these advertisements concerning the fact that the property which was the subject of the mobile home lot leases offered by Respondent was the subject of a mortgage encumbrance which was then in foreclosure, which foreclosure predated those advertisements. Bertram Gould, as president of Mohican Valley, Inc., as the movant in that Motion to Intervene, and as the successor in title to the mortgagor-in-foreclosure, knew of the existence of the facts surrounding that foreclosure as they related to the interest in the land he sought to convey and the effects such a foreclosure might have on the persons or residents of the park who executed those leases as lessee thereafter. Bertram Gould thus materially participated in the offer or disposition of the lots for lease in the subdivision and advertised those dispositions or offerings without representing that the real property to which they related was the subject of a pending foreclosure action. No reservation program has been approved by Petitioner for Bertram Gould, Mohican Valley, Inc. and/or Indian Woods, nor has any application for such been filed. No public offering statement for Bertram Gould, Mohican Valley, Inc. or Indian Woods, nor any application for such has, as of the time of the hearing, been filed and approved. The Indian Woods Subdivision has not been registered with the Petitioner by either Bertram Gould or Mohican Valley, Inc. Bertram Gould has engaged in the disposition of these subdivided lands directly as well as on behalf of Mohican Valley, Inc., of which corporation he is president and stockholder. Bertram Gould has offered, disposed of or participated in the offer or disposition of interests in the subdivided lands involved herein, which are located in Florida, by offering the subject land for leases to prospective mobile home purchasers and park residents.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence in the record and the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, it is, therefore RECOMMENDED: That Bertram Gould be found guilty of violations of Sections 498.023(1) and (2), and Section 498.049(4) and Sections 498.051(1)(a), (b), and (d); that a penalty of $2,000 be imposed and that the Respondent be ordered to cease and desist the above described activities until the requirements delineated above involving registration of the subject subdivision, approval and promulgation of a current offering statement have been accomplished. DONE and ENTERED this 31st day of January, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of January, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: Harold F. X. Purnell, Esquire Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Ladd H. Fassett, Esquire Post Office Box 2747 Orlando, Florida 32802 E. James Kearney, Director Division of Florida Land Sales and Condominiums Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Gary R. Rutledge, Secretary Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Lake Waldena Resort is a mobile home park as defined by Section 723.003(6), Florida Statutes. It is located at Route 4, Box 300, Silver Springs, Florida 32688. The mobile home park is subject to regulation pursuant to Section 723.002(1), Florida Statutes. That law is administered by the Petitioner. All Respondents are mobile home park owners as defined by Section 723.003(7), Florida Statutes. The Hilgemans are park owners and have been at all relevant times for this dispute. At the times relevant to the inquiry Pat Montgomery was the park operator, which equates to park owner under the terms of the statute. Pat Montgomery concluded her affiliation with Lake Waldena Resort in May 1989. Pat Montgomery, as the park operator, who had been employed by Donald L. Hilgeman, collected the rent from the mobile homeowners who had lots within the park. She attended any problems that the mobile homeowners confronted her with. She ordered supplies for the operation of the mobile home park. She sold mobile homes for use in the park and ordered them for sale. She was involved with the provision of carports and screen rooms associated with mobile homes in the park. She was responsible for the payroll and basically everything that transpired in the day-to- day operations in the mobile home park. The Hilgemans had limited affiliation with the park. Mr. Hilgeman was involved with doing physical labor at the park and was Montgomery's employer. On July 26, 1988, a notice of lot rental increase was mailed to all tenants in the Lake Waldena Resort Mobile Home Park. This notice was provided in accordance with Rule 7D-32.002(1), Florida Administrative Code. The basis for this increase was associated with the economic pressures on the park owner brought about by increases in real estate taxes, insurance costs, sanitation fees, other fees payable to the Petitioner, and wage increases. An exemplar of the form notice which had been sent out to each mobile home owner may be seen in Respondents' Exhibit 5 admitted into evidence. All notices were dispatched by U.S. Mail. As contemplated by Rule 7D-32.002(4), Florida Administrative Code, official notice was considered to have been made within five days of July 26, 1988, which corresponded to July 31, 1988. A meeting within 30 days of the provision of notice as described in Section 723.037(3), Florida Statutes, would equate to August 30, 1988. The proposed lot increase was from $78 to $88. At the time of notification of the lot increase Lloyd Carter was the vice president of the homeowners' association at Lake Waldena Resort. He was residing in the mobile home park. Gordon Gibson was the president of the homeowner's association who, at the moment of the lot increase, was residing in Minden, Ontario, Canada. Mr. Carter picked up a copy of the notice of lot rental increase from the office at the mobile home park shortly after the notice had been prepared on July 26, 1988. He then called Mr. Gibson in Canada and explained the particulars of that notice. At that time, Mr. Carter stated no concerns to Mr. Gibson about the notice of lot rental increase. He merely informed Mr. Gibson of the pendency of the lot rental increase. Under ordinary circumstances the' expected time for delivery of mail dispatched from the United States to Canada was in the neighborhood of five to seven days; however, in August 1988, the Canadians were undergoing a postal strike which delayed matters. Nonetheless, Mr. Gibson received his copy of the notice and on August 4, 1988, he wrote Mr. Hilgeman. A copy of that correspondence may be seen as Respondents' Exhibit 6 admitted into evidence. Mr. Gibson informed Mr. Hilgeman in that correspondence that he wished to have a meeting to discuss the lot rental increase. The meeting would be attended by a committee of not more than four persons under the direction of Mr. Carter. He asked that the meeting be held at a convenient time prior to August 26, 1988. The basis for Mr. Gibson's action in which he requested a meeting with the park owner was through the process of discussion with his board of directors in independent conversations in which it was decided that a meeting was desired. A meeting to discuss the reasons for the lot rental increase was not held before August 26, 1988, or before August 30, 1988. When Mr. Gibson sent his August 4, 1988 correspondence he was aware of the problems of the postal strike in Canada and the delay that this might promote in the receipt of his letter by the park owner. He had not instructed Mr. Carter to make any contact with the park owner prior to the park owner's receipt of the correspondence which outlined the fact of Mr. Carter's duties as chairman of the committee. The return receipt correspondence from Gibson to Hilgeman dated August 4, 1988, was received by, Pat Montgomery in mid August 1988. By correspondence of August 22, 1988, addressed from Mr. Hilgeman to Mr. Gibson, a copy of which may be seen as Respondents' Exhibit 7 admitted into evidence, Mr. Hilgeman demanded of Mr. Gibson that he confirm that a majority of the Lake Waldena residents had in fact selected Mr. Gibson to represent them. Reference is made in that letter to section 723.078(2)(b), Florida Statutes, having to do with the requirements for bylaws in homeowners' associations. This request of Mr. Gibson is not a prerogative of Mr. Hilgeman as park owner in dealing with the issue of the conduct of the meeting. Nor is it available to Mr. Hilgeman to remind Mr. Gibson that he had to comply Section 723.037(1), Florida Statutes or Section 723.076(1), Florida Statutes. To the extent that those provisions have any relevance to the homeowners' association, the former pertains to standing to challenge increases in such things as the lot rental amount through the homeowners' association, something that the park owner is not called upon to advise the homeowners' association about. This question of standing does not enter in to the matter of the ability to represent mobile home owners at a meeting pursuant to Section 723.037(3), Florida Statutes, for purposes of discussing the lot rental increase. Likewise, the latter statutory reference that describes the idea of incorporation of a homeowners' association and the need to notify the park owner is not associated with the meeting to discuss the purposes of the lot rental increase. On the other hand, when Mr. Hilgeman referred to Rules 7D-32.003(1) and 7D-32.004(2), Florida Administrative Code, those are provisions which have some significance in considering the matter of a meeting to discuss a lot rental increase. Rule 7D-32.004(2), Florida Administrative Codes, states: If requested to do so by the park owner or subdivision developer, the committee shall certify that it has been selected as described Rule 7D-32.003, Florida Administrative Code. The certification shall include a certificate of all members of the committee attesting to its proper formation under the statute in these rules. Significantly, that provision does not describe the relationship of such a request to the obligation of the park owner to meet within 30 days of notice of lot rental increase as contemplated by Section 723.037(3), Florida Statutes. None of the principals, given the statutory scheme and rules that were designed to effectuate the purposes of the statute, could have reasonably understood on what terms the park owner was entitled to make this request taking into account the complications of corresponding back and forth between the United States and Canada in the midst of a mail strike, the consequence of which made it unlikely that the meeting would take place on or before August 30, 1988. In the conclusions of law a discussion is made of the effect of the request for certification and whether it tolls the time for conducting the informational session to discuss the reasons for the lot rental increase. The envelope for the August 22, 1988 correspondence was stamped in the United States on August 23, 1988, in Bradenton, Florida. It also bears a date of August 29, 1988, which is seen as a part of the verification of receipt of that letter in Canada. Mr. Gibson received the Hilgeman correspondence of August 22, 1988 on August 29, 1988. Mr. Carter also received a copy of the August 22, 1988 correspondence by Mr. Hilgeman and had a discussion with Mr. Hilgeman about that letter sometime around August 23 or August 24, 1988. That conversation took place in the mobile home park. This did not lead to the resolution of the certification request made by Mr. Hilgeman to the homeowners' association. It was left to Mr. Gibson to take care of the response to the request for certification. In the conversation being described, between Hilgeman and Carter, Carter made it known that he intended to complain to the Petitioner about the park owner not meeting with the homeowners' committee within 30 days of notice. A complaint was made as may be seen in a copy of that complaint which is Respondent's Exhibit No. 2 admitted into evidence. That complaint was sent out on August 26, 1988. The basis for the homeowners' association complaining to the Petitioner was related to their concern that they preserve their right to have the meeting even if it transpired beyond the 30 days contemplated in the statute. Notwithstanding the complaint's existence, Mr. Gibson went forward with his attempts to try to satisfy Mr. Hilgeman concerning certification and did so with the assistance of Victor Davis a member of the board of directors of the homeowners' association. Mr. Gibson's attitude about this was to the effect that the request by Mr. Hilgeman was a legitimate request that should be complied with. A discussion had also been held between Carter and Hilgeman on August 18, 1988, in which Mr. Hilgeman gave advance notice of the fact that he needed several questions answered and that there would be a delay in the meeting. The indication was made that a letter would be sent to Mr. Gibson to have those questions answered. That eventuated in the August 22, 1988 correspondence from Hilgeman to Gibson. Upon making these matters known to Mr. Carter on August 18, 1988, Mr. Carter's only remark was that this would be "fine." On September 9, 1988, a letter was written from Ralph B. Murray, Jr., Specialist Enforcement Section, Bureau of Mobile Homes within the Petitioner's department which was sent to Mr. Hilgeman reminding him of the necessity to respond to allegations that had been made by the Lake Waldena Resort Homeowners' Association concerning the claim that Mr. Hilgeman had refused to meet with those mobile homeowners in the statutorily prescribed time as announced at Section 723.037(3), Florida Statutes. A copy of this correspondence may be found as Respondent's Exhibit No. 9, admitted into evidence. On September 13, 1988, by correspondence, a copy of which may be found as Respondent's Exhibit No. 10 admitted into evidence, Mr. Hilgeman offered his reply. He tells Mr. Murray that he is not sure whether the homeowners' association is legitimate and that they had not responded to his August 22, 1988 correspondence to Mr. Gibson which he enclosed in his letter to Mr. Murray. He spoke of delays in the mailing time for mail coming from Canada. He makes mention of the fact of having informed Mr. Carter that the manager, who was Ms. Montgomery was on vacation and would not return until August 30, 1988. In fact, Ms. Montgomery was not available to meet with the homeowners' association in the period August 18 through August 30, 1988. This would not have relieved Mr. Hilgeman of the necessity to meet with the homeowners' association on or before August 30, 1988, had they complied with his request for certification prior to that date. They did not. Compliance with the certification process was achieved by correspondence of September 12, 1988 from Gibson to Hilgeman in which he sets out the explanation of certification of the credentials of the homeowners' association to form a committee and meet with the park owner. That was received by the park owner on September 19, 1988, in the person of Pat Montgomery. A copy of this correspondence and the certification of receipt may be found as Respondent's Exhibit No. 11 admitted into evidence. After receipt of the information concerning the certification of the homeowners' association committee, Mr. Hilgeman sent a letter to Mr. Carter on September 29, 1988, to establish a meeting. A copy of that correspondence may be found as Respondent's Exhibit No. 13 admitted into evidence. It outlines the fact that Mr. Hilgeman is sufficiently satisfied concerning the certification to have the meeting and offers a meeting prior to October 4, 1988 or after October 9, 1988, and invites Mr. Carter to consult with Pat Montgomery to establish a mutually convenient time for the meeting. A meeting was held between Mr. Murray and Mr. Hilgeman in October, 1988, in which a discussion ensued concerning whether or not Mr. Hilgeman himself would meet with the homeowners' committee. Mr. Hilgeman held firm in his attitude that his manager Pat Montgomery would be available to meet with the homeowners' committee, but that Mr. Hilgeman would not be meeting with them. As explained in the correspondence of October 14, 1988, addressed from Mr. Carter to Mr. Murray, a copy of which may be found as Respondent's Exhibit No. 14 admitted into evidence, contact was made between Carter and Montgomery and Carter was told on October 11, 1988 that a meeting would be held at 10:00 a.m. on October 14, 1988, between Montgomery and the committee. She was told by Carter that this meeting would not be acceptable unless Mr. Hilgeman was in attendance. Based upon conversations with Mr. Murray, the homeowners' association had been persuaded that it was only appropriate to meet with Mr. Hilgeman. Consequently, by this logic it was not appropriate to meet with Ms. Montgomery. A copy of this correspondence of August 14, 1988 was made available to Mr. Hilgeman. On June 7, 1989, the Petitioner brought an action against the Respondent and he sought a formal hearing which was conducted on February 22, 1990. Prior to that hearing the homeowners did have their meeting with Mr. Hilgeman on November 14, 1989, in which they were made aware of the reasons for the lot rental increase. The homeowners accepted the explanation and the idea of the increase and do not desire to pursue the present complaint against the Respondents. When Mr. Hilgeman sought certification of the credentials of the committee assigned by the homeowners association he was acting in good faith. In addition, he was entitled to look to Pat Montgomery as park operator and by consequence park owner under the definition of Section 723.003(7), Florida Statutes, to speak for him in the course of the meeting to discuss the lot rental increase. The misconception of the committee of mobile home owners concerning the necessity to meet with Mr. Hilgeman and not with his park operator, as fostered by the remarks of Mr. Murray, who lead those mobile homeowners to believe that they could only meet with Mr. Hilgeman, caused a delay in arranging the meeting. Mr. Hilgeman should not be hold accountable for that delay.
Recommendation Based upon the consideration of the facts found and the conclusions of law reached, it is, RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered that dismisses these actions against the Respondents. DONE and ENTERED this 18th day of April, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of April, 1990. APPENDIX CASE NO. 89-4100 The following discussion is given concerning the proposed facts of the parties. Petitioner's Facts Paragraphs 1-9 are subordinate to facts found. Although Paragraph 10 is an accurate portrayal of the meeting of August 24, 1988 between Mr. Carter and Mr. Hilgeman, it should be stated that any meeting to discuss lot rental increase was contingent upon the response to the certification request made by Mr. Hilgeman and replied to by Mr. Gibson on a date beyond the 30 day period. Paragraphs 11 and 12 are subordinate to facts found. Concerning Paragraph 13, whatever Mr. Hilgeman perceptions would be about the role of Ms. Montgomery, whether she was considered to be the same as an attorney representing or in some other capacity, in law she was a park owner and entitled to act in behalf of the park owners at the meeting. Concerning Paragraph 14, the effect of failing to respond to the request for certification within the 30 day period was tantamount to a waiver or agreement to meet at a time later. Paragraph 15 is subordinate to facts found. Concerning Paragraph 16, to the extent this paragraph suggests that the length of the meeting or breadth of detail in the explanation made by Mr. Hilgeman was inadequate, that idea is rejected in that sufficient explanation was given to comply with the requirements of law. The comments in Paragraph 17 are not relevant. The accommodation that was made between counsel was not a necessary arrangement to mitigate the circumstance in an instance where Respondent Donald L. Hilgeman had violated Chapter 723, Florida Statutes. This meeting was beneficial to the homeowners and park owners alike, but came at this late date based upon the failure of the homeowners to meet with Pat Montgomery over a year earlier. Respondents' Facts Paragraph 1 is subordinate to facts found Paragraph 2 is not necessary to the resolution to the dispute. Paragraph 3 is subordinate to facts found with the exception of those two sentences that come before the last sentence in that paragraph. Paragraphs 4 and 5 and all sentences save the last of Paragraph 6 are subordinate to facts found. That sentence is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraphs 7 through 11 with the exception of the second sentence in Paragraph 11 are subordinate to facts found. The second sentence is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraph 12 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 13 is misleading in that it intimates that Mr. Carter was derelict in his duties to make contact with Mr. Hilgeman to establish a meeting; however, the contacts that were made were in accordance with the expectations of Mr. Hilgeman and Mr. Gibson who were controlling the timing of that meeting. Paragraphs 14 through 16 with the exception of the last sentence to Paragraph 16 are subordinate to facts found. The last sentence to Paragraph 16 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraph 17 is subordinate to facts found with the exception of the last sentence which is not necessary to the resolution of this dispute. Paragraphs 18 and 19 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 20 is subordinate to facts found with the exception of the last sentence which is not necessary to the resolution of this dispute. Paragraph 21 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute and is an inaccurate portrayal of the requirements of law as to gaining the approval of the majority of homeowners before representing them in the course of a meeting to discuss lot rental increases. Paragraphs 22 through 25 are subordinate to facts found. COPIES FURNISHED: Stephen R. MacNamara, Secretary Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-1007 Joseph A. Sole, General Counsel Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-1007 David D. Eastman, Esquire Parker, Skelding, Labasky & Corry Post Office Box 669 Tallahassee, FL 32302 Susan C. Marvin Pamela Leslie Assistants General Counsel Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, FL, 32399-1007
The Issue The issues are whether, pursuant to section 393.0673(1), Florida Statutes (2018), Respondent, which holds a license to operate a group home facility, was identified in a verified report by the Department of Children and Families (DCF) as the perpetrator of exploitation of a vulnerable adult, failed to disclose on a renewal application a perpetrator of "the . . . abuse, neglect, or exploitation of a vulnerable adult" (Maltreatment),1 and allowed a new employee to begin working at the group home before completing all of the background screening requirements; and, if so, what penalty should be imposed against Respondent's license.
Findings Of Fact At all material times, as authorized by the License, Respondent, a Florida not-for-profit corporation, has provided services to intellectually disabled persons residing at the Group Home. At all material times, Respondent's directors have been Etha Griffith, her daughter Kim Griffith, and Francis Griffith. The record does not disclose if Respondent has any members. Etha Griffith, who is 79 years old, serves as an officer and the onsite manager of the group home, for which Kim Griffith and Francis Griffith serve as the backup managers or supervisors of the Group Home. Petitioner presented no admissible evidence in support of Count I. Prominent among the excluded evidence is the Verified Report, as to which Petitioner failed to demonstrate its relevance, as explained in the Conclusions of Law, or its authenticity, given that it is unsigned and bears other indicia of an investigation that, although closed, was never completed.5 In support of Count II, Petitioner introduced the Application,6 which was filed on November 12, 2018. Etha Griffith7 completed the Application by providing the information requested on Petitioner's application form, which serves a natural person or legal entity who or that is an applicant or licensee seeking the issuance or renewal of a group home facility license (Application Form). Etha Griffith signed the Application as Respondent's designated representative, and her signature was notarized on November 8, 2018. The Application states the answer, "no," to the question posed in Section V, Item 2: "Have you or ownership controlling entity affiliated with this application ever been identified as responsible for the abuse, neglect, or abandonment of a child or the abuse, neglect, or exploitation of a vulnerable adult?" For several reasons, Petitioner failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence the material facts in support of Count II. First, "no" was correct because the question refers to a determination, not allegation, of Maltreatment. The Application Form does not define "identified," whose common meaning is not "alleged," but "established,"8 such as after a completed investigation. As explained in endnote 5, the evidence fails to establish that DCF determined that Etha Griffith is the perpetrator of Maltreatment. Second, even if there had been a determination of Maltreatment in the Verified Report by November 12, 2018, "no" was not a willful or intentional misstatement or a false statement because neither Etha Griffith nor any other agent of Respondent knew about the Verified Report or DCF's determination of Maltreatment--and not for a lack of inquiry. Aware that an investigation had taken place during the summer of 2018, in October 2018, Kim Griffith contacted the DCF protective investigator who had conducted the investigation and asked for any findings. The investigator returned to her, not the Verified Report, but a Notice of Conclusion, stating only that the investigation was "complete" and "closed," and DCF had recommended no additional services. Etha Griffith has never received a copy of the Verified Report. No agent of Respondent knew anything about the Verified Report until preparing for the hearing in this case. On these facts, Etha Griffith and Respondent's other agents had no reason to think, as of November 12, 2018, that DCF had determined that Etha Griffith had perpetrated Maltreatment. Third, even if, by November 12, 2018, Etha Griffith were aware that DCF had determined that she had perpetrated Maltreatment, the failure to disclose this fact or the Verified Report was not material. An audit of the Group Home by Petitioner led to DCF's protective investigation, and the findings of the protective investigation, such as they were,9 implied that any misappropriation involved substantially smaller sums than those specified in the audit.10 Knowledge of the audit findings would thus include knowledge of the protective investigation findings. Fourth, as discussed in the Conclusions of Law, "no" is correct because, in the question posed in Section V, Item 2, "you" refers to the applicant or licensee, and "ownership controlling entity affiliated with this application" does not effectively refer to Etha Griffith. The Application Form does not define these terms. Items 1, 3, and 4 also contain questions posed to "you." The questions in Items 1 and 3 alternatively address a "controlling entity affiliated with this application," so, except for dropping "ownership," the questions in Items 1 and 3 are directed to the same addressee as is the question in Item 2. The question in Item 4 is directed only to "you." All four of these items frame questions seeking potentially important information about past license discipline and adverse action involving the Medicaid and Medicare programs.11 Judging from her testimony at the hearing, Etha Griffith possesses modest language skills. Given the level of analysis required to determine the meaning of "you" and "ownership controlled entity affiliated with this application," Etha Griffith could not possibly have understood that the question in Section V, Item 2 addressed her. The two key issues in Count III are whether Ms. Meliard was an employee or a covered volunteer, as defined in the Conclusions of Law, and, if so, whether she had completed her local screening. Ms. Meliard did not testify, nor did Petitioner direct any questions to Kim Griffith as to Count III. Petitioner's investigator testified that, upon his unannounced arrival at the Group Home at 2:05 p.m. on January 1, 2019, he found Ms. Meliard "seated in a chair by the front window," presumably in a common area of the house, such as a living room. Tr., p. 63. Ms. Meliard was alone in the Group Home, as the residents typically returned from their day programs around 3:00 p.m. Tr., p. 63. On the investigator's arrival, Ms. Meliard called Etha Griffith, who arrived at the Group Home very shortly after the call. Tr., p. 64. On her arrival, Etha Griffith told the investigator that she was "trying to give [Ms. Meliard] a job." Tr., p. 64. The testimony recited in this paragraph is credited. Petitioner's witnesses were in conflict as to the screening that Ms. Meliard had cleared. Petitioner's operations management consultant testified that Ms. Meliard had not cleared level 1 or 2 screening. Tr., p. 44. Petitioner's investigator testified to the same effect, but immediately corrected himself by saying that she had cleared Level 2 screening, but not local screening. Tr., pp. 65-66. Petitioner is unable to produce documentary evidence of screenings because this material is confidential, even in hearings of this type, according to Petitioner's counsel. Tr., p. 46. When asked if Ms. Meliard had cleared her level 2 screening, Etha Griffith testified, "That is the one we got, yeah." Tr., p. 95. No one asked Etha Griffith directly if Ms. Meliard had not yet passed her local screening. In a clear-and-convincing case, no finding is possible based on the negative implication inherent in Etha Griffith's statement. Her modest communication skills and laconic communication style betray a lack of mental acuity, so no inference is possible by Etha Griffin's use of the definite article, "the." A personnel file, which may be opened for a candidate for employment, typically contains evidence of a local screening, which comprises an inquiry to the relevant local law enforcement agency and a response from the agency. Tr., p. 83. Proof of a failure to obtain a local screening thus depends on a negative-- the absence of documentation in the personnel file. Unable to recall clearly whether he had seen evidence of a level 2 screening, Petitioner's investigator testified that he recalled not seeing evidence in Ms. Meliard's personnel file of clearing the local screening. Tr., p. 83. The testimony on the issues of employment and local screening is too vague and uncertain to support findings by clear and convincing evidence that, on January 10, 2019, Ms. Meliard was employed by Respondent and had not passed her local screening. The investigator presented himself as exceptionally capable and articulate, but nothing in the record suggests that he investigated with any diligence the employment or local screening issues involving Ms. Meliard.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Persons with Disabilities enter a final order finding Respondent not guilty of all counts set forth in the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of November, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of November, 2019.
Findings Of Fact The Petition filed herein, among other matters, alleges, in pertinent part, that: This is a petition for determination of the invalidity of a proposed rule of the Department of Business Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes, pursuant to Section 120.54(4), Fla. Stat. (1987). The 1,000 members of the FMHA may be sub- jected to this rule and Gerry Barding as an individual are substantially affected in that the rule has the effect of allowing the DBR to schedule a mediation or arbitration if the request "does not substantially comply with Chapter 723, Fla. Stat., and these rules." Section 723.037 limits the substantial rights of a party who fails to mediate or arbitrate a dispute under Section 723.037 with the DBR . . . . * * * The substantial rights of the members of FMHA will be affected if the DBR is allowed to grant mediation or arbitration requests when the mobile home owners have not complied with the provisions of Section 723.037, Fla. Stat. (1987). The proposed rule of the DBR enlarges, modifies, or otherwise contravenes the statu- tory authority granted by Chapter 723, Fla. Stat. (1987), and is unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious. Petitioner, FMHA, is an incorporated association not for profit whose members include approximately 1,000 mobile home park owners. All of the mobile home park members of FMHA own mobile home parks which contain greater than 25 mobile home lots which are offered for lease. A substantial number of the members of the FMHA on a regular basis annually increase the lot rental amount in their mobile home parks. The residents of the FMHA members' mobile home parks are entitled to and may request mediation of lot rental amount increases pursuant to Sections and 723.038, F.S. (1987), and the rules of the Florida Department of Business Regulation. Requests for mediation have been made in the past by homeowners residing in FMHA members' mobile home parks and many of those mediation proceedings have not yet been completed. Petitioner, Gerry Barding, is the owner of Pinelake Village Mobile Home Park located in Jensen Beach, Florida. In the past, Mr. Barding has increased the lot rental amount in Pinelake Village Mobile Home Park and expects to do so in the future. In September 1987, a request for mediation from Pinelake Village residents was not filed within 30 days of the meeting between the park owner and the residents. The Department of Business Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes reviewed the request for mediation and determined that it was willing to mediate the dispute. The Division requested that Mr. Barding advise it of his willingness or refusal to participate in the mediation. Mr. Barding declined to agree to mediation of the dispute, and the mediation file of the Division was closed. Sections 723.037(4), F.S. (1987), provides in pertinent part that: Within 30 days of the date of the scheduled meeting described in subsection (3), the home owners shall request that the dispute be submitted to mediation pursuant to Section if a majority of the affected home owners have designated, in writing, that: The rental increase is unreasonable; The rental increase has made the lot rental amount unreasonable; The decrease in services or utilities is not accompanied by a corresponding decrease in rent or is otherwise unreasonable; or The change in the rules and regulations is unreasonable. [Emphasis supplied]. The Department of Business Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes does not interpret Section 723.037(4), F.S., as depriving it of authority to mediate when the request for mediation is filed more than 30 days after the referenced meeting. Section 723.037(6), F.S., provides that: No action relating to a dispute described in this section may be filed in any court unless and until a request has been submitted to the Division for mediation and arbitration and the request has been processed in accordance with Section 723.038. Section 723.037(7), F.S., provides that: If a party refuses to agree to mediate or arbitrate, or fails to request mediation, upon proper request, that party shall not be entitled to attorney's fees in any action relating to a dispute described in this section. Section 723.004(4), F.S., provides that: Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to prevent the enforcement of a right or duty under this section, Sections 723.022; 723.023; 723.031; 723.033; 723.035; 723.037; 723.038; 723.061; 723.0615; 723.062; 723.063; or 723.081 by civil action after the party has exhausted its administrative remedies, if any. Existing Rule 7D-32.005(3), F.A.C., provides in pertinent part: The homeowners' committee shall request mediation, or the homeowners' committee and the park owner may jointly request arbitration, by mailing or delivering the following items to the Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes, 725 South Bronough Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007: A completed Form DBR 405, which becomes effective on the same date as this rule and which may be obtained by writing to the Division at the above address, and A copy of the written designation required by Rule 7D-32.005(1), Florida Administrative Code, and Section 723.037(4), Florida Statutes; and A copy of the notice of lot rental increase, reduction in services or utilities, or change in rules and regulations which is being challenged as unreasonable; and A copy of the records which verify the selection of the homeowners' committee in accordance with Rule 7D-32.003, Florida Administrative Code, and Section 723.037(3), Florida Statutes. [Emphasis supplied] Proposed Rule 7D-32.005(4), F.A.C., which was published in Volume 14, No. 4, Florida Administrative Law Weekly (January 29, 1988), and which is here challenged, provides that: A request for mediation or arbitration shall be denied if the request does not substantially comply with Chapter 723, Fla. Stat., and these rules. The word "may," which is struck through, is to be deleted from the existing rule now in effect. The underlining indicates that the words "shall" and "substantially" are amendatory language to be added. Rule 7D-32.005(5), Florida Administrative Code, provides: If the homeowners' committee requests media- tion, a copy of the four items required by subsection (3) of this rule shall be furnished to the park owner by Certified U. S. Mail, Return Receipt Requested, at the time the request is filed with the Division. Failure to comply with this requirement may result in a delay in scheduling of a mediation meeting until the required items have been furnished to the park owner. [Emphasis supplied] Rule 7D-32.005(6), Florida Administrative Code, provides: Within 10 days from the date that the park owner or his agent receives copies of the documents required to be furnished to him pursuant to subsection (5) of this rule, the park owner shall advise the Division in writing of his willingness or refusal to participate in the requested mediation. If the park owner is of the opinion that the home owners or the homeowners' committee have failed to satisfy the statutory requirements set forth in Section 723.037, Florida Statutes, or the requirements of these rules he may indicate his willingness to participate in the mediation process without waiving his objections to the procedures used by the homeowners' committee. Rule 7D-32.005(7), Florida Administrative Code, provides: A decision by the Division to grant or deny a request for mediation does not constitute an adjudication of any issues arising under Section 723.037, Florida Statutes. Any dispute concerning the applicability of Section 723.037(6)-(7), Florida Statutes, must be submitted to a court of competent jurisdiction in the event that judicial proceedings are initiated. Rule 7D-32.001(5), Florida Administrative Code, provides: `Mediation' means a process whereby a mediator provided by the Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes partici- pates in discussions with a homeowners' committee and a park owner concerning the reasonableness of an increase in lot rental amount, change in park rules and regulations, or a decrease in services or utilities. The purpose of the mediator's participation is to assist the parties in arriving at a mutually agreeable settlement of their differences.
Findings Of Fact After a realtor told Robert Edward Poland that the Flagship Bank was foreclosing on Villa Rosa Mobile Home Park in Jacksonville Beach, Mr. Poland and his wife offered to purchase the property. The incompetency of the owner, Mrs. Ritchie, then in her eighties, together with ensuing legal proceedings, complicated negotiations. But on August 21, 1986, Robert Edward Poland and Jacqueline Poland became joint owners of Villa Rosa Mobile Home Park. A portion of the park they acquired in fee simple, but another portion (now known as Beach Boulevard Trailer Park) they acquired only as a life estate pur autre vie. On the death of Mrs. Ritchie in mid-October 1987, the life estate was extinguished, and that portion has become the property of Mrs. Ritchie's daughter, Elizabeth Drey, and possibly the daughter's husband, Richard Drey. Only beginning with rent for February of 1989, however, have the Dreys begun receiving income from the trailer park. Rent Raised On August 21, 1986, the day they acquired ownership, the Polands gave tenants written notice of their intention "to adjust rent effective December 1, 1986" to $130 a month for a single mobile home lot and to $155 monthly for a double wide mobile home on a single lot. This proposed rental increase did not pertain to lots 3, 6, 13, 15, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, or 007, which were rented only to over-nighters. Perhaps misunderstanding the notice, Tom Williams on Lot C began paying a higher amount on October 1, 1986, before the increase took effect. The following month, Debra Black Wood, J. E. Turner and James Mahoney also paid the increased rent prematurely. In their cases, and in the case of Mr. Williams, the Polands accepted the money but credited the surplus to the tenant. Not counting the lot which the boundary between the Drey property and the Polands' property divides, Mr. and Mrs. Poland offered for rent or lease 26 or more mobile home lots as residences, both before and after Mrs. Ritchie's death. The following tenants' monthly rent increased by the amounts indicated on December 1, 1986: Name of Tenant Lot No. Amount of Increase Ila Story 1 $30.00 Rosa Robinson 2 30.00 Rick Tahey 4/5 55.00 Virginia Dawson 7 5.00 Isabe Sutcliffe 8 30.00 Deborah Blackwood 9 5.00 B. E. Turner 12 30.00 Ingrid C. Fegan 14 30.00 Helen Marin 17 40.00 Alden Waterman 18 30.00 Ethel Dunsmoor 19 30.00 Martina O'Hare 20 30.00 Zora Hyde 21 30.00 William Vollkmer 22 30.00 Richard Rasmussen 23 5.00 Marjorie Barnes 24 30.00 James Mahoney 26 30.00 Roger Zucco 27 5.00 George Bunting 29 55.00 Robert Grabel 30 55.00 David Escopie 31 30.00 Catherine Stevens 32 30.00 Richard Law 33 30.00 Maxwell Page 35 30.00 Helen Hines 36 5.00 Norman Peterson 37 5.00 Hernandez/Johns 38/39 25.00 Lester Rogers 40 30.00 Rita Boyer 41 30.00 Thelma Thornton 42 30.00 Maxwell Page 43 30.00 Kenneth Driscoll 44 55.00 Edna Praine 45 55.00 Cassus Powell 100 30.00 David Koehler 101 5.00 Jerry Welker 102 62.50 John Embleton 103 5.00 Corrine Beach 104 55.00 Clyde Wiley 105 30.00 Candie Blasman 106 30.00 Harry Wilson 107 30.00 Stanley Dolka A 30.00 Goffery Riser D 5.00 William Page E 30.00 Pat Pattillo F 40.00 Roy Pike G 30.00 Frieda Suomella H 5.00 Charlotte Reid I 30.00 Bernard Hakes J 30.00 Herbert Davis K 30.00 Lee Haley L 30.00 Heide Alexander M 30.00 Joseph Moore N 5.00 Mary Lo Wampler O 40.00 Ernest Grizzard P 30.00 Bertha Martin Q 40.00 Cathy Lumbar R 65.00 Ruth Pooley S 5.00 Norma Baker U 5.00 H. W. DeMoss V 30.00 Arthur Pitman W 40.00 Jesse Wagnor X 5.00 James Hicks Y 5.00 Robert Wilder 00 20.00 At hearing, Mr. Poland testified to a total of 85 lots of which "seventy-three are singlewide [including some devoted to overnighters], and the balance would be overnighters or doublewides." T.88. According to DBR records, respondents reported 87 lots when applying for approval for their prospectus. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3, pp. 000017, 000021. Past Practice Historically, the park had been run on the basis of oral agreements, creating month-to-month tenancies. Such records as existed when the Polands acquired ownership of the mobile home park reflected 13 different amounts charged different tenants for equivalent mobile home lots. Apparently Mrs. Ritchie had played favorites. A longtime resident testified that the rental rate structure was "kind of on the buddy/buddy system." T. 68. From time to time, and on no more than a month's notice, Mrs. Ritchie had raised rents. Robert L. Davis, who moved to the trailer park in October of 1976, originally paid $50.00 a month. On September 1, 1983, monthly rent increased from $50.00 to $75.00; and on December 1, 1983, from $75.00 to $100.00. One longtime resident, Katherine Stevens, "imagined" (T.127) that Mrs. Ritchie had asked for rent increases to defray utility rate hikes, but written notices of increases offered no explanation. T.48-49. Like Mr. Davis and Ms. Stevens, Robert Wilder, who seeks no money in this proceeding (T.75), was a tenant at the mobile home park before June 4, 1984. Until May of 1986, nobody ever received a prospectus. On June 10, 1983, however, rules and regulations were drawn up which provided in paragraph 20: Management specifically reserves the right to increase rental rates, fees, charges or assessments imposed on resident either by amendment or by addition to these rules, provided thirty (30) day written notice is given. Rosa Ritchie herself gave Ms. Stevens and other tenants a copy of the rules and regulations which first set out in writing her practice of giving thirty days' notice before raising rents. Regulatory Approval Only after the Polands had acquired the property, and announced their intention to raise rents, did Mr. Poland learn of the requirement that a prospectus be furnished tenants. On September 9, 1986, he wrote Mr. John D. Floyd of DBR as follows: With regards to the prospectus of Villa Rosa, please find enclosed a copy of the Rules and Regulations which are provided each tenant prior to renewing or extending `an existing rental agreement and prior to entering into a new rental agreement. This document was previously submitted to your Division and I assume that it remains acceptable. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3. In response, Senior Clerk Pamela T. Parker of the Department of Business Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes, wrote Mr. Poland on September 19, 1986, listing various "deficiencies for form." With regard to the prospectus, she wrote, among other things: The prospectus fee was not in accordance with Section 723.011(1)(d), Florida Statutes. Please submit a check for the appropriate amount. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3. Having received this reply, Mr. Poland wrote Ms. Parker on September 25, 1986, as follows: Enclosed please find the Mobile Home Prospectus, Filing Statement and Filing Fee. Currently, there are no rental agreements in writing for the mobile home park. All agreements are oral, to the best of my knowledge. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3, p. 000018. Petitioner received Mr. Poland's letter of September 25, 1986, the following day. The letter is marked "RECEIVED FISCAL SEP 26 1986." DBR's Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes did not "process" the $150 check which accompanied the letter, until October 15, 1986, however, when somebody marked the letter "RECEIVED FISCAL OCT 15 1986" and crossed through the earlier received stamp. Another eight days passed before a form letter from the Division went out to Mr. Poland advising him of the Division's intention to examine the contents of his filing, to ensure its adequacy, and promising him he would "be notified as to the results of this examination within" forty five days of October 15, 1986. On November 20, 1986, more than 45 days after the prospectus had been received, the Division sent another letter to Mr. Poland, signed by Bridget St. Clair, apprising Mr. Poland of a number of deficiencies in the prospectus. On December 2, 1986, Mr. Poland made a second submission. In a cover letter addressed to Ms. St. Clair, he wrote: During our recent telephone conversation, you indicated that a prospectus is not necessary unless a rate increase Is anticipated. Since I have no intention of raising rates for the next year, I do question why this prospectus is necessary. Your thoughts on this point would be greatly appreciated. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3, p. 000013. In May of 1987, after several further emendations, Mr. Poland was told over the telephone that the prospectus submitted in December passed muster, as revised. Having received oral approval, he asked an employee, Jack N. Justice, to deliver prospectuses. Mr. Justice delivered by hand to every resident who was home a copy of the prospectus and, whenever somebody was not at home, put a copy in the mail box. (Before these deliveries, the planned increase in rent had taken effect, as of December 1 of the previous year.) Petitioner gave written notice of approving the prospectus by letter dated May 27, 1987. The approved prospectus apprised tenants of the landlord's intention to pass on "ad valorem property taxes or utilities charges ... during the term of the lot rental agreement ... [p]rorated equally among all lots," Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, p. 46, and warned tenants that an increase in water, sewer or garbage collection charges or property taxes "may result in an increase in the home owner's lot rental amount." Id. Rent Raised Again On June 25, 1987, Mr. Poland sent out a second notice proposing another increase of rent, to take effect on October 1, 1987, "due to the increase in real estate taxes and for capital improvements, including the water pressure problems complained of." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 4. The increase amounted to $15.00 per month for each single mobile home on a single lot, and to $20.00 for double wide mobile homes (or other mobile homes on double lots.) Id. On April 7, 1987, the City of Jacksonville Beach increased water and sewer rates. Mr. Poland's claim that the increase resulted in an average additional charge of approximately $14.12 per month per lot went unrebutted. A garbage collection container had to be added at $100 ($1.15 per lot) a month; $330 was expended to install a new water meter. Ad valorem taxes increased between 1985 and 1986, but were not shown to have risen at any time after December 1, 1986. The following tenants paid increased rent in the following monthly increments, effective October 1, 1987: Name of Tenant Lot No. Amount of Increase *Ila Story 1 $15.00 Mark Robson 2 15.00 *Rick Tahey 4/5 25.00 Seahorn/Gulledge 7 15.00 *Isabe Sutcliffe 8 15.00 William R. Hernandez 9 15.00 Bertie Willis 10/11 25.00 *B. E. Turner 12 15.00 *Ingrid C. Fegan 14 15.00 Ray Brozoski 16 5.00 *Helen Marin 17 15.00 *Alden Waterman 18 15.00 *Ethel Dunsmoor 19 15.00 *Martina O'Hare 20 15.00 *Zora Hyde 21 15.00 *William Vollkmer 22 15.00 William E. Wolfe 23 15.00 H. D. Seahorn 25 15.00 *James Mahoney 26 15.00 *Roger Zucco 27 15.00 Roland Page 28 15.00 *George Bunting 29 15.00 *Robert Grabel 30 15.00 Joseph Mickey 31 5.00 *Catherine Stevens 32 15.00 *Richard Law 33 15.00 Edna Barrett 34 15.00 *Maxwell Page 35 15.00 *Helen Hines 36 15.00 Christ. Hooley 37 15.00 *Hernandez/Johns 38/39 20.00 Arminta Rogers 40 15.00 *Rita Boyer 41 15.00 *Thelma Thornton 42 15.00 *Maxwell Page 43 15.00 *Kenneth Driscoll 44 15.00 *Edna Praine 45 15.00 James Wilson 46 15.00 Nancy C. Lane 100 15.00 *David Koehler 101 15.00 *Jerry Welker 102 15.00 *John Embleton 103 15.00 *Corrine Beach 104 20.00 *Clyde Wiley 105 15.00 *Candie Blasman 106 15.00 *Harry Wilson 107 20.00 *Stanley Dolka A 15.00 Tom Williams C 15.00 *Goffery Riser D 15.00 *William Page E 15.00 *Pat Pattillo F 15.00 *Roy Pike G 15.00 *Frieda Suomella H 15.00 *Charlotte Reid I 15.00 Michelle Holt J 15.00 *Herbert Davis K 15.00 *Lee Haley L 15.00 *Heide Alexander M 15.00 Joseph Morris N 15.00 *Mary Lo Wampler O 15.00 *Ernest Grizzard P 15.00 Juanita Holliman Q 15.00 *Kathalee Lombar R 15.00 *Ruth Pooley S 15.00 *Norma Baker U 15.00 *H. W. DeMoss V 15.00 *Arthur Pitman W 15.00 *Jesse Wagnor X 15.00 *James Hicks Y 15.00 W. Crowe Z 15.00 *Robert Wilder 00 20.00 Asterisks indicate those who were tenants on December 1, 1986. No lot rental agreements were in writing.
Recommendation It is, accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That petitioner reprimand respondents for raising rents before distributing prospectuses to their tenants. That petitioner require respondents to return the amounts by which rents collected for December of 1986 and January, February, March and April of 1987 exceeded rents charged the same tenants for November of 1986. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of December, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of December, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 88-5983 Petitioner's proposed findings of fact Nos. 1 through 4 recite procedural matters only. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact Nos. 5 through 11, 13, 15 through 19, and 21 through 25 have been adopted, in substance, insofar as immaterial. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 12, ad valorem taxes may also have contributed to the 1986 increase. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 14 is rejected. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 20, Mrs. Ritchie distributed something she called rules and regulations. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 26, the charges themselves were included but not increases. Respondents' proposed findings of fact Nos. 1 through 4, 6, 7, 10 through 12, 14 through 17, 21, 22, 23, 25, and 26 have been estopped, in substance insofar as material. Respondents' proposed finding of fact No. 5 in immaterial. With respect to respondents' proposed findings of fact Nos. 8 and 9, the change in garbage collection charges, except for addition of a dumpster, occurred before respondents acquired the property; and the tax increase was $5,000.00 not $10,000.00. With respect to respondents' proposed finding of fact No. 13, respondents' selective (DBR advised them not to raise rents before distributing prospectuses) reliance on DBR for legal advice, whenever it may have ended, does not give rise to an estoppel. With respect to respondents' proposed findings of fact Nos. 18 and 19, utility rate charges are only one variable; usage was not proven. With respect to respondents' proposed finding of fact No. 20, Leroy Kierstaedt and Haze Studivant were apparently overnighters. With respect to respondents' proposed finding of fact No. 24, Ms. Stevens said she "imagined" this was so. Respondents' proposed finding of fact No. 27 was not established by the evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Reynold Meyer Assistant General Counsel Department of Business Regulation Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1070 Jeffrey C. Regan, Esquire 1300 Gulf Life Drive Jacksonville, Florida 32207 =================================================================
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Respondent's proposed rule 7D-31.002 is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. The Petitioners and the Intervenor MLH Property Managers, Inc., contend that the rule is invalid. The Respondent and the Intervenor Federation Of Mobile Home Owners Of Florida contend the proposed rule is valid.
Findings Of Fact Facts stipulated to by the parties Petitioner, Florida Manufactured Housing Association, Inc. (FMHA), is a Florida nonprofit corporation whose address is 115 North Calhoun Street, Suite 5, Tallahassee, Florida 32301. The agency affected by this proceeding is the Respondent, Department of Business Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes (DBR), whose address is The Johns Building, 725 South Bronough Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1000. The DBR is charged with the implementation, enforcement and interpretation of Chapter 723, Florida Statutes, concerning mobile home park lot tenancies. The DBR also possesses statutory authority to impose civil penalties against a mobile home park owner for any violation of Chapter 723, Florida Statutes, a rule of the Department promulgated thereunder, or a properly promulgated park rule or regulation. This proceeding concerns the Respondent's proposed rule 7D-31.002, which was published in Vol. 16, No. 7 of the Florida Administrative Weekly (April 27, 1990). The FMHA is a Florida nonprofit corporation, which is organized and maintained for the benefit of the owners of approximately 1,000 mobile home parks containing a combined total of approximately 300,000 to 350,000 mobile home lots. The owners of the 1,000 mobile home parks comprise a substantial portion of the membership of the FMHA. One of the primary purposes of the FMHA is to act on behalf of its members before the various governmental entities of this state, including the Respondent, Florida Department of Business Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes. FMHA member mobile home parks are subject to the provisions of Chapter 723, Florida Statutes, and the rules of the DBR contained in Rules 7D-30 through 7D-32, Florida Administrative Code. FMHA member mobile home parks are required to register with the DBR, to pay annual fees to the DBR, to file prospectuses and pay filing fees for the same to the DBR, to submit advertising to the DBR for approval, and are otherwise subject to the regulatory authority of the DBR with respect to the operation and management of their mobile home parks. Additionally, FMHA member mobile home parks are subject to the DBR's enforcement authority, which includes the power to fine or impose other civil penalties for failure to comply with the above-referenced rules and statutes. Each of the owners of the FMHA member mobile home is engaged in the business of leasing individual mobile home lots to mobile home owners. The mobile home owners lease mobile home lots for the purpose of installing on the lots a mobile home owned by the tenant. The Federation of Mobile Home Owners of Florida (FMO) is a Florida nonprofit corporation whose membership is comprised of over 100,000 mobile home owners residing in Florida. The normal activities of the FMO include, among other things, representing the interests of Florida's mobile home owners before Florida administrative agencies, including DBR and the Division of Administrative Hearings, in rulemaking proceedings and otherwise. Thousands of FMO members reside in mobile home parks which are governed by Chapter 723, Florida Statutes, and the rules adopted thereunder by DBR. Thousands of FMO members were tenants of those parks on June 4, 1984, and thousands more have become tenants by purchasing a home located in those parks from a former mobile home owner who was a tenant of those parks on June 4, 1984. MLH Property Managers, Inc. (MLH), a Delaware corporation, is the managing general partner of MLH Income Realty Partnership V, a New York limited partnership. MLH Income Realty Partnership V is the owner of eight mobile home parks in the State of Florida, each of which contain 26 or more mobile home lots which are offered for lease or rent for the placing thereon of mobile homes to be used as residences. NIH has entered into rental agreements with the majority of residents in each of the parks which have a one-year term, with the intent of NIH that the terms and conditions of tenancy be established on a yearly basis. The NIH parks contain lots which were leased to their present mobile home owner tenants (or their predecessor mobile home owners) prior to June 4, 1984. The full text of the proposed rule which is the subject of this proceeding is as follows: 7D-31.002 Tenancy. (a) A tenancy under chapter 723, Florida Statues, begins when the mobile home park owner and mobile home owner enter into an initial rental agreement as defined in section 723.003(4), Florida Statues, or when the mobile home owner assumes occupancy in the park, whichever occurs first. (b) Once a tenancy begins in accordance with paragraph (1)(a) of this rule, it is continuous and cannot be terminated by the mobile home park owner except pursuant to section 723.061, Florida Statutes. (a) The enactment of chapter 723, Florida Statutes, did not terminate the tenancy of a mobile home park owner which was in existence on June 4, 1984, the effective date of the chapter. Furthermore, chapter 723, Florida Statutes, does not allow or authorize the mobile home park owner to terminate a tenancy in existence on June 4, 1984, the effective date of the chapter, in any manner other than pursuant to section 723.061, Florida Statutes. (b) A tenancy in existence on June 4, 1984, the effective date of chapter 723, Florida Statutes, shall be deemed a tenancy under chapter 723 if, prior to June 4, 1984, the mobile home owner either entered into a rental agreement with the mobile home park owner, or the mobile home owner assumed occupancy in the mobile home park. The rest of the facts The Respondent has previously attempted to adopt a similar rule. In Volume 14, Number 7, of the Florida Administrative Weekly of February 19, 1988, the Respondent published a proposed rule 7D-31.002. The rule proposed in February of 1988 read as follows: 7D-31.002 Fee, Charges and Assessments. For tenancies in existence before June 4, 1984, including any assumptions of those tenancies pursuant to Section 723.059, Florida Statutes, the mobile home owner is not obligated to pay any fees, charges or assessments which were not disclosed fully in writing prior to occupancy, any provision to the contrary in a prospectus notwithstanding, unless the park owner can establish that the fees, charges or assessments have been collected as a matter of custom as defined in subsection (4) of this rule. Furthermore, the mobile home owner is not obligated to install any permanent improvements at all, including those mandated by governmental entities or utility companies. For tenancies created on or after June 4, 1984, pass through charges, as defined in Section 723.003(9), Florida Statutes, may be imposed by the mobile home park owner if the mobile home owner's obligation to pay such charges was disclosed in general terms pursuant to Sections 723.011 and 723.012, Florida Statutes, or pursuant to Section 723.013, Florida Statutes, even though the charge being imposed was not disclosed specifically, and the imposition of such pass through charges is not a violation of section 723.042, Florida Statutes. However, pass through charges may not be imposed if the mobile home owner's obligation to pay such charges was not disclosed generally and prior to occupancy as required by Sections 723.011(2) and 723.012, Florida Statutes, or Section 723.013, Florida Statutes, whichever is applicable. No fee, charge or assessment shall be imposed by a mobile home park owner on the purchaser of a mobile home situated in the park that is offered for sale by a resident of the park and as a condition to the purchaser being reviewed or approved for residency in the park. A fee, charge or assessment has been collected as a matter of custom if it was collected prior to July 1, 1967. In the case of Florida Manufactured Housing Association, Inc., v. Department of Business Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes, et al., 10 F.A.L.R. 3919 (June 24, 1988), the former proposed rule quoted immediately above was determined to be invalid on several grounds. The proposed rule that is the subject of this case will substantially affect the substantial interests of the Petitioner and each of the Intervenors. A substantial number of the members of the FMHA and the FMO are substantially affected by the proposed rule and the relief sought is the type and nature which these associations may properly seek on behalf of their respective members. Mr. Bob Custer is a Vice President in De Anza Corporation. De Anza Corporation is the owner of Mobile Americana Mobile Home Park. De Anza Corporation is a member of the FMHA. De Anza Corporation purchased the park in July 1976. At that time there was a written lease offered to all home owners in the park. Subsequently, the park offered written leases to home owners in the park. After the adoption of Chapter 723 on June 4, 1984, the park owner filed a prospectus with the DBR, received approval from the DBR, and distributed the approved prospectus to the mobile home owners in the park in 1985. The prospectus contains provisions, including fees and charges, that are different from the earlier offered rental agreements used in the park. The prospectus is the controlling document used by De Anza Corporation in determining increases in lot rent and fees and charges that will be collected during the tenancy. Mr. Tom Keenan is the Vice President for Property Operations for Mobile Home Communities, Inc., which owns and operates 10 mobile home parks in Florida. Each of the individual-parks is a member of the FMHA. Lake Haven Mobile Home Park is owned and operated by Mobile Home Communities, Inc. Lake Haven Mobile Home Park entered into 4 year leases with its tenants, beginning in 1975 and again in 1979. After the adoption of Chapter 723, on June 4, 1984, Lake Haven Mobile Home Park filed and received approval for a prospectus from DBR, which was distributed to mobile home owners in 1985. The prospectus, including the rental agreement therein, contains terms and conditions different from the earlier 4 year leases (including the term of the rental agreement which is changed to annual), and there are different fees and charges which can be collected. Of the 379 lots that are rented in the park, approximately 200 tenants entered the park prior to the delivery of the prospectus. Mobile Home Communities, Inc., operates the park pursuant to the disclosures contained in the prospectus. Ms. Jan West is the owner and operator of Eagle's Nest Mobile Home Estates, a 64 space mobile home park located in Fruitland Park, Florida. Ms. West is a member of the FMHA. Eagle's Nest was developed in the 1930's and purchased by Jan West's parents in the 1940's. Prior to 1987 the rental agreements in the park were all oral. Ms. West does not know the terms and conditions of the rental agreements offered to tenants when her parents operated the park. All 64 of the lots in the park were offered for rent or lease on June 4, 1984, the effective date of Chapter 723. In 1987 Eagle's Nest filed a prospectus with the DBR and the prospectus was approved. All of the tenants of the park signed the lease agreement contained in the prospectus in 1987 when the approved prospectus was delivered. The fees and charges that are included in the prospectus were never disclosed in writing to any of the tenants prior to the delivery of the prospectus. The prospectus is the document that Eagle's Nest uses to determine the landlord tenant relationship under Chapter 723. Eagle's Nest collects lawn mowing fees and special services fees when they apply. Ms. West does not know if there were charges, other than the base rent, that were collected prior to 1987. She does not know if other charges, like late charges, return check charges, guest fees, vehicle storage fees, pet fees, special services fees, or pass-through charges were charged prior to delivery of the prospectus. Lawn mowing fees and maintenance fees were collected prior to 1987. It is a common practice in the industry to use a fixed term lease, or a lease for a term of years, in the prospectus and rental agreement approved by the DBR. The Mobile Home Study Commission was created in 1988 to study problems with alternative dispute resolution relating to mobile home park rents. Chapter 88-147, Laws of Florida. The Study Commission was reauthorized in 1989 for another one year period to study this issue. Chapter 89-202, Laws of Florida. The Study Commission was in existence, in 1988, when the Florida Manufactured Housing Association challenged an earlier proposed rule, 7D-31.002, which regulated the fees and charges that could be collected in mobile home parks. In that case the Division of Administrative Hearings issued a Final Order invalidating the earlier proposed rule on several grounds. That Final Order was affirmed by the First District Court of Appeal. Florida Manufactured Housing Association, Inc. v. Department of Business Regulation, 10 F.A.L.R. 3919 (DOAH 1988), affirmed, 547 So.2d 636 (1st DCA 1989) (hereafter referred to as FMHA I). The DBR appeared at the Study Commission in 1990 and suggested legislation to directly overturn the hearing officer's decision in FMHA I. That suggested legislation was virtually identical to the proposed rule at issue in this proceeding. The legislation suggested by the DBR was not adopted. Thirty-five to forty percent of the tenants residing in MLH parks today resided there prior to the enactment of Chapter 723, Florida Statutes, on June 4, 1984. MLH or its predecessors in interest delivered prospectuses approved by DBR to all tenants residing in the parks on June 4, 1984, at or before the expiration of those tenants' pre-Chapter 723 leases. The prospectuses delivered to such residents disclosed the manner in which the residents' lot rental amount would be increased, other fees and charges which the resident would thereafter be charged, and the manner in which pass-through charges (for governmentally- mandated capital improvements) would be assessed. In some of its barks MLH has passed on ad valorem property tax increases to park tenants. A number of tenants in MLH's parks are now contending that such charges cannot be passed on to them, even though such charges are disclosed in the park prospectuses which they received after enactment of Chapter 723, Florida Statutes, because (the tenants assert) such charges were not disclosed to them prior to their moving into the parks before the enactment of Chapter 723. MLH has no knowledge as to whether each charge disclosed in its approved Chapter 723 prospectuses was disclosed by the previous owners of MLH parks at the time that the original tenant moved onto a particular lot before the enactment of Chapter 723. MLH intends to continue passing on ad valorem tax increases. The prospectuses for MLH parks approved by DBR provide for the collection of a $3.00 annual DBR filing fee. The obligation to pay that filing fee was not disclosed to tenants who moved into the parks before the enactment of Chapter 723 because, at that time, neither DBR nor any other state agency had regulatory jurisdiction over the parks and the legislature did not impose such a filing fee until the passage of Chapter 723 and the concomitant creation of the Bureau of Mobile Homes. As to the years prior to the enactment of Chapter 723, it is sometimes very difficult, if not impossible, for a current park owner to ascertain and establish what fees, charges, and assessments were disclosed to tenants before they moved into a park. There was no central regulatory authority at that time which was charged with the responsibility to monitor such disclosures. There was no required, standardized disclosure document such as the prospectus which is now required of most parks by Chapter 723. Some parks now subject to regulation under Chapter 723 came into existence as early as the 1930's and operated as informal, family-run businesses. Thus, for the industry in general, the records are not available to establish what disclosures were made to tenants who long ago moved in, and still reside in the parks, at the time they initially took up residence. MLH intends to continue the operation of its parks in Florida and, therefore, will be governed directly by the proposed rule, if it is adopted. Prior to the enactment of Chapter 723, there was no statutory limitation on the frequency of rent increases, no requirement that the park owner disclose the factors which would be considered in setting rents, and no requirement of the park owner to mediate rent disputes with statutorily recognized tenant organizations, all of which are now imposed under Chapter 723. All of the approved MLH prospectuses contain the land use descriptions required by Section 723.012(4)(c), (5), (14) (b), Florida Statutes, including a lot layout showing the location and size of all lots in the parks (whether vacant or occupied), the location of all recreation and common facilities, and a detailed description of those facilities. MLH was a member of the Florida Manufactured Housing Association at the time that the Division of Administrative Hearings rendered its opinion in Florida Manufactured Housing Association, Inc. v. Department of Business Regulation, 10 F.A.L.R. 3910 (D.O.A.H. 1988) ("FMHA I") and at the time FMHA I was affirmed by the First District Court of Appeal. DBR will apply the proposed rule to the administration of Section 723.031(5),(6), Florida Statutes. DBR will apply the proposed rule to the administration of existing rule 7D-31.001(5), Florida Administrative Code. "Length of tenancy," as used in existing rule 7D- 31.001(5), F.A.C., is not defined by Chapter 723, Florida Statutes, or by existing DBR rules. Nor is the term "tenancy" expressly defined in Chapter 723, Florida Statutes or in DBR's implementing rules. The word "continuous" used in the proposed rule is intended to have its common and ordinary meaning. The resale value of a tenant's mobile home in a park, as compared to the value of a comparable mobile home purchased from a dealer's lot, is significantly higher due to the recreational and other amenities which are provided by the park owner for the tenants' use. The resale value of a tenant's mobile home in a park, as compared to the value of a comparable mobile home purchased from a dealer's lot, is significantly higher if the tenant can pass on to the purchaser of the in-place home a rent schedule which is more favorable than the current rent schedule being charged for a home newly being placed in the park. MLH uses and has entered into fixed-term, twelve-month leases with tenants in some of its parks. Those leases are part of DBR-approved prospectuses for the parks. MLH's parks and other parks regulated under Chapter 723, Florida Statutes, compete vigorously for tenants and are willing to and, in fact, do negotiate long-term leases and even lifetime leases with residents of the parks. It is important to park operators to have the flexibility to modify the prospectus disclosures regarding the use of vacant lots, vacant common areas, and land and improvements devoted to recreation facilities, in order to meet market changes and competition. It is very difficult, and sometimes impossible to obtain unanimous consent of residents in a mobile home park on most issues. In the case of MLH's park at Ellenton, Florida, the park land and improvements are valued at approximately $22,000,000. Yet it would cost MLH conservatively, $56,300,000 to purchase the homes in the park from the tenants. It would cost MLH, conservatively, $9,200,000 to $22,000,000 to move all of the tenants' homes from the park. Moreover, a portion of that required purchase price is for value added to the homes by reason of the placement of the homes in the owner's park. Ninety-eight percent (98%) of the 1000 members in the full park division of the FMHA have parks that contain more than twenty-five (25) spaces. The Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services licenses a total of 5,500 mobile home parks in the State of Florida. FMHA developed a model prospectus for its members to comply with the law as enacted in 1984. FMHA advised its members to put all potential fees, charges, and assessments in prospectuses although such fees, charges, and assessments may not have been disclosed to the homeowner prior to the homeowner's occupancy in the park or prior to the homeowner entering into his or her initial rental agreement. Mobile Americana Mobile Home Park, a Pinellas County mobile home park, was purchased by De Anza in July, 1976. The park's prospectus number 5200119P was approved and delivered to homeowners in 1985. Since 1976, several leases and rules and regulations have been in effect in the park. The prospectus number 5200119P includes fees, charges, and assessments that were not previously disclosed in prior leases to homeowners. However, De Anza is not presently charging or collecting these undisclosed fees. De Anza manages A Garden Walk Mobile Home Park for MLH. Prospectus numbers 5000867P and 500086P86 are offered in the park. MLH offers various leases in A Garden Walk, including lifetime leases and the leased marked MLH Ex. $9. MLH Ex. #9 was used in the park after 1985 although the exact time of use is not known. Neither De Anza or MLH know what fees, charges, or assessments were disclosed to homeowners by previous park owners. For the last 3 years, De Anza has managed Hacienda Village Mobile Home Park. De Anza sets the rental amounts in its parks and uses the market approach. With the market approach, the park owners arrive at a market rent by comparing the rents in their parks with rents of other mobile home communities of comparable value. The park owners unilaterally arrive at the market value rent. The collection of governmental fees is accounted for in arriving at the market value rent. Approximately 5 to 7 years prior to the enactment of Chapter 723, Florida Statutes, De Anza disclosed to homeowners living in De Anza owned parks the homeowners' obligations to pay for increased costs due to governmental actions and increases in taxes. All pre-1984 De Anza leases were subject to Chapter 83. Mobile Americana, Hacienda Village, and A Garden Walk are members of the FMHA. Mobile Home Communities also operates Windmill Village Mobile Home Park. Homeowners in Windmill Village were provided a prospectus in 1985. The prospectus contains terms and conditions that are different from the rental agreement that was in effect from 1983 until 1985. Five of the parks owned by MLH were purchased on July 1, 1987. The other three parks were purchased between July 2, 1986, and 1989. At the time MLH purchased its eight parks each park had an approved prospectus in place. One of MLH's parks, Colony Cove Ellenton, is located in Ellenton, Florida, and offers three separate prospectuses, including prospectus numbers 410024P, 410024P86 and 410024P2. Pages 74, 75, and 76 of Colony Cove Ellenton prospectus number 410024P describe the park's recreational facilities. The park owner, on page 77, paragraph 4(f), reserves the right from time to time to alter or change any of the facilities by the removal, relocation, or alteration of existing facilities or the construction of new facilities. Page 85 of this prospectus provides for the collection of costs incurred as a result of state and local government actions. MLH owns and operates Clearwater Cascade Mobile Home Community of Clearwater, Florida. Prospectus Number 5200525P86 lists each lot, including lot size, as well as describes recreational facilities and common facilities in the park. LaCasa Mobile Home Park, a MLH park, offers at least two prospectuses in the park, prospectus numbers 5800237P and 5800237P86. Prospectus number 5800237P describes the recreational facilities in the park. The prospectus provides for an assessment to homeowners for ad valorem taxes. The park owner also reserves the right from time to time to change any of the facilities by the removal, relocation, or alteration of existing facilities or the construction of new facilities. MLH has not been told by the Division it would not have a right to make modifications to its facilities in accordance with its prospectuses. The prospectuses delivered to homeowners in MLH parks allow for a variety of lease situations. There are no provisions in the prospectuses delivered by MLH which state that a prospectus applies only to persons who were in residence on June 4, 1984. All of the MLH prospectuses include reservation language similar to language contained in the Colony Cove Ellenton prospectus, reserving the right to modify facilities. MLH owns and operates Valleydale Estate Mobile Home Park, which it purchased on July 1, 1987. The Valleydale Estates prospectus contains some fees that were not disclosed to homeowners prior to occupancy. When MLH purchased Valleydale, it did not inquire as to disclosures made to homeowners. MLH also owns Heritage Village Mobile Home Park. Prior to its purchase of the park, MLH did not inquire as to disclosures made to homeowners living in the park. Since 1984, Dr. Faye Mayberry has been the Chief of the Bureau of Mobile Homes. The Division has the duty to review and approve prospectuses. Park owners draft prospectuses and submit them to the Division for review. Approximately 3000 prospectuses have been approved by the Bureau of Mobile Homes. As part of the approval process the Division does not verify the accuracy of the contents of the prospectus, nor does the Division determine if the contents of the prospectus are consistent with rental agreements offered to a particular mobile home owner. Park owners are advised by the Division that failure to cite deficiencies in the prospectus filing does not relieve them of obligations under the law. On January 10, 1985, Rule 7D-30.003 Florida Administrative Code, was adopted. Mobile home parks may offer more than one version of a prospectus in a park. Park owners sometimes submit subsequent prospectus filings that are inconsistent with previously delivered prospectuses. The Division has not established a policy regarding subsequent prospectus filings which contain disclosures concerning the number of lots in the park which are inconsistent with the disclosures in the previously approved and delivered version of the prospectus. Such inconsistencies between the subsequent prospectus and the previously approved and delivered prospectus filings are handled by the Division on a case by case basis. Prior to June 4, 1984, the primary issue of concern for mobile home owners was the mobile home park owners' failure to live up to disclosures that were given prior to the homeowners' occupancy in the park. (TV V, pg. 613). The prospectus delivered to mobile home owners residing in the following mobile home parks included fees, charges, and assessments other than pass-through charges, which were not disclosed to homeowners until after they moved into the parks: Park East Club -- Sarasota, Florida Caribbean Estates -- New Port Richey, Florida River Grove Mobile Home Village -- Sebastian, Florida Hacienda Village -- Winter Springs, Florida Ocean Pines Mobile Home Park - Indialantic, Florida A Garden Walk -- Palm Beach Gardens, Florida The amount for which a mobile home located in a mobile home park can be sold tends to decrease when the lot rental amount charged by the park increases. It costs several thousand dollars to move a double- wide mobile home within a 50 mile radius and set it up again the way it was before the move. /1 Many FMO members have complained to the FMO leadership of prospectuses being delivered in their mobile home parks which include fees, charges, or assessments which were not disclosed prior to June 4, 1984.
The Issue Did Westside Ridge Adult Mobile Home Community (Westside) violate Rule 10D-26.085, Florida Administrative Code, by having standing water in its mobile home park for more than 48 hours? If so, is this sufficient basis for the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (Department) to deny Westside's application for renewal of its mobile home park operating permit?
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the deposition testimony and documentary evidence presented by the parties in this case, the following findings of fact are made: Westside Ridge, Ltd., a Florida limited partnership, is the owner of Westside Ridge Adult Mobile Home Community. Under Chapter 513, Florida Statutes, the Department, in conjunction with the representative county public health units, such as the Polk County Public Health Unit, is the agency charged with the responsibility of inspecting mobile home parks such as Westside to assure their compliance with public health laws and rules. On August 14, 1995, the Department inspected Westside and found water underneath some of the mobile homes in the park; water covering some of lots in the park; and water ponding in some of the streets in the park. This water had been standing for more than 48 hours. The Department's inspector issued an Inspection Report dated August 14, 1995. This report indicated that the unsatisfactory condition found at the mobile home park was the park drainage. The report stated that all violations of standing water must be corrected within 14 days. Westside received a copy of the Inspection Report from the August 14, 1995, inspection in a timely manner. Sometime around September 10, 1995, Westside retained the services of J. D. Smith Exterminators, Inc. (Smith), a professional pest control service, to treat any standing water in Westside's mobile home park. Westside has not corrected the conditions which affected the drainage in the mobile home park and resulted in the water standing in the park for over 48 hours. The Department contends that the rule requires Westside correct the conditions - either fill in the depressions in the soil or provide proper drainage of the water - which affect the drainage and results in water standing over 48 hours in the mobile home park. Westside contends that the rule does not prohibit water standing over 48 hours where the water is treated and does not contribute to mosquito or fly breeding. By letter dated September 15, 1995, Westside advised the Department that Westside would retain a professional pest control service to prevent any standing water from contributing to mosquito or fly breeding. Westside also requested that the Department advise it if the Department intended to seek enforcement pursuant to the Department's interpretation of Rule 10D-26.085, Florida Administrative Code. Apparently, the request concerning enforcement was made as a result of a telephone conversation between one of the Department's representatives and Westside's counsel on Thursday, September 14, 1995, concerning the Department's interpretation of the rule and what the Department intended to require Westside to correct the alleged violation of the rule. The Department did not advise Westside or its counsel of its intent to pursue enforcement. On or about September 10, 1995, Smith visited Westside mobile home park and found water standing as reported on the August Inspection Report but did not treat the water because Smith did not have the necessary chemical on hand. On or about September 13, 1995, Smith returned to Westside's mobile home park to treat the standing water but, upon arrival, Smith did not find any standing water at the mobile home park that required treatment. Before Westside's current annual mobile home park operating permit expired, Westside timely filed its application with the Department for the renewal of its mobile home park operating permit. The Department issued a Denial Of Application For Mobile Home Park/Recreational Vehicle Park Operating Permit dated November 26, 1995, denying Westside's application for its annual mobile home park operating permit. The basis of the Department's denial was that Westside mobile home park had violated Rule 10D-26.085, Florida Administrative Code, in that the mobile home park had been found to have standing water in the park in excess of the 48 hour period allowed by the rule. The denial also warned Westside that unless it had requested a hearing, or ceased operating the park, or remit a plan of action to remove all standing water and measures to prevent reoccurrence of the violation that Westside would be cited for operating without a valid permit within 30 days. During the summer of 1995, there was an above-average rainfall in Polk County, Florida which resulted in flooding problems in mobile home parks located throughout Polk County, Florida, including Westside's mobile home park. Based on the testimony of the Department's employees involved with the inspection of mobile home parks, the flooding conditions were the worst seen in Polk County, Florida in 25 years. The is no evidence of how long water had been standing in Westside's mobile home park before the Department's inspection on August 14, 1995, other than it had been standing over 48 hours. There is no evidence of Westside being cited for having water standing in its park for over 48 hours at any time previous to the August 14, 1995, inspection. There is no evidence of any water standing, for any length of time, in Westside's mobile home park, after September 14, 1995. Although the inspection report for January 10, 1996, indicates water standing in drainage ditches along the sides of Westside mobile home park, there is no evidence that these drainage ditches are in fact within the park boundary. The Department did not inspect Westside mobile home park again until January 10, 1996, which was after the issuance of the denial of the permit on November 26, 1995. There were no violations or unsatisfactory conditions, such as drainage, indicated on the Department's January 10, 1996, Inspection Report, notwithstanding that the Department's position is that since Westside has failed to correct the drainage problem which resulted in the standing water it continues to be in violation of Rule 10D-26.085, Florida Administrative Code. Treating standing water with chemicals to prevent mosquito and fly breeding does not solve all of the public health problems that may be associated with water that has been standing for long periods of time. It is the Department's position that water standing in the park for more than 48 hours is a violation of Rule 10D-085, Florida Administrative Code, and, without any other violation, is sufficient to deny the application for the operating permit. Other than the violation for having standing water in the park for over 48 hours and the failure to correct the conditions which resulted in the standing water, the Department concedes that Westside meets all other criteria for granting the application for a mobile home park operating permit.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services enter a final order granting Petitioner's application for a mobile home operating permit. However, it is further recommended that the Department monitor the Westside mobile home park so as to determine if conditions presently existing at the park result in water standing in the park in excess of 48 hours under normal rainfall. If water found is to be standing in the park in excess of 48 under normal rainfall, the Department should then move to require Westside to correct the condition. RECOMMENDED this 7th day of May, 1996, at Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of May, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 96-0273 The following constitutes my specific rulings, pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties in this case. Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. Proposed findings of fact 1 through 11, 13, 16, 17, 19 through 25, 29, 30, 31 and 33 through 36 are adopted in substance as modified in the Findings of Fact 1 through 22. Proposed findings of fact 12 and 26 through 28 are neither material nor relevant. Proposed findings of fact 14, 15 and 37 through 41 are argument rather than findings of fact. Proposed findings of fact 18 and 32 are not supported by evidence in the record. Department's Proposed Findings of Fact. Proposed findings of fact 1 through 22 are adopted in substance as modified in Findings of Fact 1 through 22. Proposed findings of fact 23 and 24 are argument rather than findings of fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Gregory D. Venz, Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Richard Doran, General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Timothy F. Campbell, Esquire Clark, Comparetto & Campbell, P.A. 4740 Cleveland Heights Boulevard Post Office Box 6559 Lakeland, Florida 33807 Jack Emory Farley, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services District 14 270 Bartow Municipal Airport Bartow, Florida 33830
The Issue Whether Rules 7D-30.04, 7D-30.06, 7D-31.01(2), 7D-31,01(4), 7D-31.01(5), 7D-31.01(12), 7D-32.01 and 7D-32.02, Florida Administrative Code, constitute an invalid exercise of delegated authority and are arbitrary and capricious?
Findings Of Fact The following findings of fact were stipulated to and are hereby adopted: The following is a Florida non-profit corporation, whose address is 115 N. Calhoun Street, Tallahassee, Florida. The FMHA is organized and maintained for the benefit of its members, which includes approximately 950 mobile home park owners and operators. A substantial portion of these members own or operate parks which contain 10 or more lots and therefore are subject to regulation by the Division of Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes, Department of Business Regulation. The Division of Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes, Department of Business Regulation is delegated the authority pursuant to Chapter 723, Florida Statutes, to regulate mobile home parks, including the powers to enforce and ensure compliance with the provisions of the Chapter and rules promulgated pursuant thereto, including the authority to impose a civil penalty against a mobile home park owner for any violation of the Chapter, or a rule or regulation of the Division. Chapter 723, Florida Statutes, was enacted by the Florida Legislature as Chapter 84-80, was signed by the Governor and filed in the office of the Secretary of State on June 4, 1984. Rules 7D-30, 7D-31, and 7D-32, Florida Administrative Code, are rules of the Division of Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes, Department of Business Regulation, which were properly adopted in accordance with Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. The Petitioner is a trade association the members of which are engaged in business in the mobile home industry in the State of Florida. The Petitioner has members who are mobile home manufacturers, retailers, equipment suppliers and servicers, owners and operators of mobile-home rental parks, developers of mobile home parks and subdivisions, insurance firms and lending institutions. The Petitioner has 1,020 members who develop mobile home parks and subdivisions or are owners and operators of mobile home rental parks. As stipulated to by the parties, approximately 950 of the Petitioner's members are owners and operators of mobile home rental parks. The Petitioner's members are involved in the rental of between 300,000 and 350,000 mobile home spaces. A substantial number of the Petitioner's members are subject to regulation by the Respondent pursuant to Chapter 723, Florida Statutes (1985), the "Florida Mobile Home Act." In July of 1984, subsequent to the effective date of Chapter 723, Florida Statutes (1985), the Bureau of Mobile Homes was created as a part of the Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes. Dr. Faye Mayberry has been, and continues to be, the Chief of the Bureau of Mobile Homes. Following the enactment of Chapter 723, Florida Statutes (1985), the Bureau of Mobile Homes concluded that there was a need to clarify certain portions of Chapter 723, Florida Statutes (1985), and a need to establish procedures necessary for the filing of prospectuses and other documents. Therefore, the Bureau initiated a process to determine what rules needed to be adopted. The Bureau also received numerous inquiries from mobile home owners and mobile home park owners concerning Chapter 723. The Bureau first looked at Chapter 723 in-house and looked at the nature of inquiries it had received and then drafted a conceptual approach to part of the rules. The conceptual draft, at the invitation of the Bureau, was reviewed by representatives of the Petitioner and the Intervenor. A meeting was held with the Respondent to discuss the conceptual approach. The Respondent left the meeting with the impression that the conceptual approach was not that far off. Following its discussions of the conceptual approach with the Petitioner and Intervenor, the Respondent drafted rules pursuant to Chapter 723. Four workshops, in three locations in Florida, were conducted to receive public input on the draft rules. Advance notice of the workshops was published in the Florida Administrative Weekly. Representatives of the Petitioner had notice of, and participated in, the workshops. Subsequent to the public workshops, in October of 1934, the Respondent published proposed rules under Chapters 7D-30 and 7D-31, in the Florida Administrative Weekly. In November of 1984, the Respondent published proposed rules under Chapter 7D-32. After publication of the proposed rules in the Florida Administrative Weekly, requests for a public hearing were received by the Respondent and public hearings were held. Representatives of the Petitioner attended these hearings and had an opportunity to provide input on the content of the proposed rules. Revisions were made to the proposed rules based upon suggestions from the Joint Administrative Procedures Committee and comments made by the public during the hearings held by the Respondent. The revisions were published in the Florida Administrative Weekly in January of 1985. As revised, the rules contained in Chapters 7D-30 and 7D-31, Florida Administrative Code, became effective on January 10, 1985. The rules contained in Chapter 7D-32. Florida Administrative Code, became effective on February 6, 1085. The Joint Administrative Procedures Committee did not file any challenge to the rules after they became effective. A substantial amount of input and work went into adopting Chapters 7D-30, 7D-31 and 7D-39, Florida Administrative Code. The Petitioner had notice of the promulgation of the rules at issue and has been involved in the development and distribution of information it believed was necessary to assist its members in complying with the requirements of Chapter 723. The Petitioner has distributed memoranda, conducted seminars, distributed prospectuses and communicated with representatives of the Respondent in an effort to assist its members in complying with the requirements of Chapter 723. The Petitioner provided definitions of terms for use in prospectuses and notices required by Chapter 723 and for use in complying with the Respondent's rules. The Petitioner has attempted to assist its members in preparing a prospectus which could be filed with the Respondent and would meet the requirements of Chapter 723. Toward this end, the Petitioner prepared a sample or model prospectus and conducted a seminar on the model prospectus on December 17, 1984. The seminar was conducted in Orlando, Florida, and was attended by over 600 people. In the model prospectus the Petitioner provided three alternative methods of providing for future rental increases to be included in a prospectus. The model prospectus discussed at the December 17, 1984 seminar was for use by those mobile home parks with 100 or more rental spaces. The Petitioner also prepared a model prospectus for mobile home parks with 26 to 99 rental spaces which it distributed in June of 1985. This model prospectus was sent to all members of the Petitioner. A large number of the Petitioner's members used the model prospectus prepared by the Petitioner. Information provided to members by the Petitioner was developed by the Petitioner based in part upon its discussions with the staff of the Respondent. The Petitioner received questions from its members concerning certain aspects of the Respondent's rules and Chapter 723 which the Petitioner attempted to answer. A substantial number of the Petitioner's members advertise their mobile home parks. Mr. Neil Kullman is a member of the Petitioner and is the President of Florida Leisure Communities. Florida Leisure Communities owns and operates 3 mobile home parks in Florida. Florida Leisure Communities waits for the Respondent to approve advertising materials it files with the Respondent because it has decided that it does not want to risk using an advertisement which may be found to be defective by the Respondent. Florida Leisure Communities does not wait for approval of its advertisements by the Respondent because it believes that it is required to do so by the Respondent's rules. Time delays have been experienced in getting advertisements approved. A substantial number of the Petitioner's members have rental agreements in existence at mobile homes parks which have anniversary dates or renewal dates which would allow increases in rent. Most of the rental agreements have renewal dates or anniversary dates of July 1 or January 1. The Petitioner provided information to its members in March of 1985 and August of 1985 concerning the Petitioner's understanding of what constitutes an effective notice of lot rental increase. In explaining how members can provide a concise explanation of the reason for a proposed lot rental increase, the Petitioner told its members the following in a memorandum distributed in March of 1985: You need only to provide a concise explanation of the reason for the proposed change. Be brief! You should only include a list of factors (for rent increases), or a short plain statement for the change in services or rules or regulations. Important! As for rent increases, the rule limits the factors you may consider to those specifically identified in the prospectus. If the homeowners go to mediation or arbitration, or to court, then only those factors identified in the prospectus can be used to justify the reasonableness of the increase. Also, you should only place on the notice of increase the category of factor used to determine the rent increase level. For example: Operating costs; Prevailing market rent; Prevailing economic conditions; or Consumer Price Index (CPI). Be sure to list only those factors which are necessary to fully justify the rent increase. In August of 1985 the Petitioner provided the following guidance to its members with respect to how to provide a concise explanation of the reason for a lot rental increase: 4. You need only to provide a concise explanation of the reason for the proposed increase. Be brief! You should only include a list of factors, or a short plain statement of the reason or reasons for the increase. For example, a response might be: "The reasons for the increase are increased operating costs, prevailing market rent, and prevailing economic [sic] conditions, as set forth in the prospectus." You need not to go [sic] into great detail as to the specific costs which may have increased during the course of the year which you may want to take into consideration, or do you need to explain what is intended to mean [sic] by prevailing market rent or prevailing economic conditions. You need only to include a concise explanation of the reasons for the increase. The recommendation of the Petitioner to its members concerning how to provide a concise explanation of an increase in lot rental was basically that the member refer to factors which might cause a rental increase as provided in the member's prospectus. In the model prospectus recommended by the Petitioner to its members in June of 1985, the Petitioner recommended that the following explanation of the manner in which lot rental could be increased should be used by its members: is as follows: Increase in Lot Rental The manner in which lot rental will be increased, Definitions. As used in this Section VIII: "Lot rental" means all sums paid or to be paid by the mobile home owner in consideration of leasing or renting a mobile home lot or lots in the Park. Such sums include any and all rents, special use fees, pass-through charges, installation and set-up charges, and other fees, charges and assessments imposed by the Owner. "Special use fees" mean those separately itemized amounts for specific services or privileges which are charged in addition to rent, including, but not limited to, such charges as guest fees, pet fees and entrance fees. "Pass-through charges" are defined as those amounts, other than special use fees, which are itemized and charged separately from the rent and which represent the mobile home owner's share of costs charged to the Park Owner by any state or local government or utility company. Notice of Increase. The mobile home owner shall be notified of any increase in the lot rental at least 90 days prior to the effective date of such increase. Lot Rental-Increases. General. The lot rental and each of the categories of charges current Iv or hereafter comprising a part of the lot rental are subject to periodic increases by the Owner. However, except for increases resulting from the imposition of pass-through charges, the lot rental will not be increased more frequently than annually, except for initial tenancies which commence after the beginning of the annual rental term. Factors Affecting Increases. Factors which may affect the level of increases in lot rental are as follows: Increased costs, which refers to any increases experienced by the Owner since the delivery of notice of the last increase in the lot rental in the total costs arising out of the ownership, operation and management of the Park. Prevailing Market Rent--Refers to the lot rental imposed in mobile home parks comparable to this Park, or the lot rental willingly paid from time to time by new residents of this Park. A park will be deemed comparable if it is located in the same general vicinity as this Park, and offers similar densities, amenities and services. Prevailing Economic Conditions--are intended to refer to those factors which bear on the economic viability of a real estate investment and which would be considered by a prudent businessman in establishing the base rent and other charges or any increase in the amount thereof. These factors may include: the costs attendant to the replacement of this Park in the economic environment existing at the time of any rental increase, including land acquisition costs, construction costs, and losses associated with the operation of a park prior to full occupancy, and the level at which the lot rental must be established in order that the Park Owner will realize a reasonable return on the costs referred to in this clause (1); the level of interest rates and other financing charges associated with construction, interim and permanent financing; (3) the availability of alternative forms of real estate investment capital; (4) the levels of the Consumer Price Index, defined as the United States Department of Labor, Consumer Price Index, U.S. City Average--All Urban Consumers, 1967 100, or, in the event of the discontinuation of publication of the Consumer Price Index, then an alternative index which has been reasonably related to the Consumer Price Index in evaluating economic conditions, and which has been, or can reasonably be expected to be, generally accepted as a replacement index for the Consumer Price Index; (5) the level at which the lot rental must be established in order that the Owner will realize a reasonable return on the "Owners's Equity"; for this purpose, the "Owner's Equity" refers to the fair market value of the Park from time to time, less existing mortgage indebtedness; (6) other economic factors which might reasonably be expected to affect-either the value of the Park, the rate of return available to the Owner of the Park at the existing level of rent, the present value of the real estate investment in the then current economic conditions, and which would be taken into consideration by a prudent businessman in considering the amount of rental increase required in the Park in order -to realize a rate of return similar to other at risk real estate ventures from the then current value of the Park. To the extent permitted by law, the mobile home owner may also be required to bear, in the form of increases in the lot rental, the costs incurred by Owner in installing capital improvements or performing major repairs in the Park. Additional Considerations The reasons for the increase in lot rental or other fees and charges will be set forth in the notice of increase. Only those factors set forth in the notice will be relied upon by the Park Owner as justification for the rent increase. The Park Owner reserves the right to amend this Prospectus or any Exhibit thereto from time to time to the extent permitted by law to conform with changes in relevant statutory provisions or changes in relevant rules of the Department of Business Regulation, or any other agency having jurisdiction over the operation of this mobile home park. An increase in one or more of the above- described factors may result in an increase in the mobile home owner's rent or other charges. Tenants assuming the remaining portion of a tenancy as prescribed by Section 723.059(3), F.S., are hereby notified that upon the expiration of the assumed tenancy, the Park Owner expressly reserves the right to increase lot rental amount in an amount deemed appropriate by the Park Owner with such increase being imposed in the manner disclosed in the Prospectus delivered to the initial recipient. A number of the Petitioner's members used the notice of lot rental increase recommended by the Petitioner and the portion of the prospectus quoted in finding of fact 33. The Respondent advised some of the Petitioner's members that the notice recommended by the Petitioner was deficient under the Respondent's rules. The notice was deficient because the Respondent determined that the notice did not provide a concise explanation of the reason for a lot rental increase. The notice used by several members of the Petitioner stated that the reason for the increase was "prevailing market conditions and economic conditions." The Respondent notified members that used this explanation that it was deficient. The Respondent also told those members that "the explanation must include the specific changes in the factors described in the prospectus under prevailing market conditions and economic conditions which were the reasons for the change." The Petitioner challenged the Respondent's interpretation of its rules concerning notices in Leon County Circuit Court. The Court advised the parties to work things out following a preliminary injunction hearing. Representatives of the Petitioner and the Respondent met and discussed the problem with the Petitioner's notice and the Respondent subsequently indicated that several examples of a concise explanation for lot rental increases proposed by the Petitioner were acceptable. The method of increasing rent provided in existing rental agreements at various mobile home parks varies. Because existing tenants have different anniversary dates or renewal dates, if notice of a lot rental increase affecting some tenants is given to all tenants of a park, it is more costly to the park owner. It is possible, however, to mail one notice of rental increase to all tenants of a park at the beginning of each year. Florida Leisure Communities has filed a prospectus for all three of its mobile home parks in Florida. The prospectuses have been approved by the Respondent. At the Colonnades, a Florida Leisure Communities park, 156 lots have been completed and 19 of those lots have been occupied. Improvements to be made by Florida Leisure Communities are specified in the prospectus for the parks. In order to keep pace with market conditions and provide different improvements, a new prospectus has to be filed with the Respondent. At Brittany Estates, another Florida Leisure Communities park, after a prospectus had been distributed to all tenants, a tornado destroyed 50 mobile homes. Most of the tenants of the 50 homes voluntarily terminated their leases. Mr. Bernie Covington is vice-president and director of the parks of Angeles Real Estate Management Company (hereinafter referred to as "Angeles"). Angeles owns and operates 13 mobile home parks in Florida. Angeles has filed a prospectus for Heritage Village, a 436 site park. The prospectus had not been approved or distributed as of the date of the hearing of these cases. Heritage Village owns and operates its own sewage treatment plant and water system. Heritage Village will be required, however, to tie into the County's water and sewage system at substantial costs. Existing leases with tenants of Heritage Village allow the park to pass the impact fees ($1,250.00 for sewage and $1,149.00 for water, per site) and the cost of tieing into the force main ($30,000.00 to $35,000.00) on to the tenants. The cost of tieing into the force main may not be passed on to the tenants under the Respondent's rules, however. Angeles has also filed a prospectus for Pleasant Living Mobile Home Park which has 218 tenants. The prospectus had not been approved or distributed as of the date off the final hearing of these cases. Angeles would now like to provide a secure area for storage of boats, RVs and cars and charge a fee for this service. The prospectus being reviewed by the Respondent, however, does not indicate that a secure area will be provided.
