The Issue Whether the subject outdoor advertising signs are illegal because they were erected without state permits from Petitioner. Whether the subject signs should be removed. Whether Petitioner is equitably estopped to assert that the signs are illegal and should be removed.
Findings Of Fact Respondent owns and maintains an outdoor advertising sign located adjacent to Interstate 95 on Northwest 6th Court, which is between Northwest 75th Street and Northwest 76th Street, Miami, Dade County, Florida. For ease of reference, this sign will be referred to as the Interstate 95 sign. The Interstate 95 sign has two facings, each of which is visible from Interstate 95. The Interstate 95 sign is located within 147 feet of the right-of-way of Interstate 95. Respondent owns and maintains an outdoor advertising sign located adjacent to Interstate 395 at the corner of Northwest 14th Street and Northwest 1st Court, Miami, Dade County, Florida. For ease of reference, this sign will be referred to as the Interstate 395 sign. The Interstate 395 sign has two facings, each of which is visible from Interstate 395. The Interstate 395 sign is located within 240 feet of the right- of-way of Interstate 395. Eugene A. (Andy) Hancock, Jr., is the President of the corporate Respondent and, at the times pertinent to this proceeding, controlled the activities of Respondent. Mr. Hancock caused the corporate Respondent to lease the respective properties on which the subject signs are located in November 1998. He thereafter caused the corporate Respondent to erect the two double-faced signs at issue in this proceeding. The subject signs were constructed during September and October 1999. Each sign was constructed without a state permit from Petitioner. Each sign is within the permitting jurisdiction of Petitioner. Mr. Hancock testified that his company did not apply for permits from Petitioner because of a conversation he had with Bernard Davis, a former outdoor advertising administrator for Petitioner. Mr. Hancock testified that Mr. Davis represented to him that his company would not need permits from Petitioner if it had permits from the City of Miami. This testimony is rejected. 3/ Respondent has applied for state sign permits for the subject signs. Permits for these signs have not been issued because of their proximity to existing, permitted signs. 4/
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order finding that the subject signs are illegal and must be removed pursuant to Section 479.105, Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of February, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of February, 2001.
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Respondent's sign permits should be revoked on the basis that the permit location is not within an unzoned commercial or industrial area as required by the foregoing provisions of the statutes and rules.
Findings Of Fact On or about October 8, 1982, Branch's Outdoor Advertising filed applications for two sign permits to allow erection of an outdoor advertising sign in Jackson County, Florida. The sign is located on the north side of I-10 approximately 1.92 miles east of State Road 69. The sites applied for were field-inspected by the Department's outdoor advertising inspector, were approved and the Department issued the permits numbered AI33-10 and AI34-10 for the requested location. When the entity known as Branch's Outdoor Advertising submitted the application for the permits, it designated thereon that the proposed location was in a commercial or industrial unzoned area within 800 feet of a business and that the signs to be erected would meet the requirements of Chapter 479, Florida Statutes. The business which is located within 800 feet of the Respondent's sign is known as "Branch's Garage" Branch's Garage is located in a large tin shed which is used as a storage shed for farm equipment by Mr. Branch. Mr. Branch is a farmer as well as the operator of the welding and automotive repair business which is located in that same tin building. A portion of that building is visible from the main traveled way of Interstate 10. Branch's Garage is the only business located within 800 feet of the Respondent's-sign. Mr. Branch maintains two signs on or in the vicinity of his building advertising Branch's Garage and Welding Shop. The signs and the parked cars and vehicles associated with the business are, in part, visible from I-10. Mr. Jack Culpepper, the Petitioner's "Right-of-Way Administrator", was given the specific assignment of attempting to "reestablish effective control of outdoor advertising in the third district" in approximately the Summer of 1983. Mr. Culpepper had no direct knowledge of and had not inspected the vicinity of the sign in question prior to that time. In 1984, shortly before the Notice to Show Cause in question was issued, Mr. Culpepper did inspect the area and arrived at the belief that no commercial activity was occurring at the site known as Branch's Garage. Mr. Culpepper acknowledged that during his inspection, while driving down Interstate 10 in the vicinity, might not have noticed commercial activity which might have been going on at Branch's Garage. Mr. Culpepper acknowledged that, outdoor advertising regulatory personnel in the third district had adopted a more strict enforcement policy and interpretation. of the foregoing legal authority at issue in 1984 than had been the case in 1982 when the sign was permitted. In essence, that change in interpretation embodied a policy of not permitting, or seeking to revoke, permits for signs for unzoned commercial activity areas or locations when the commercial activity upon which the permits were predicated was not visible from the main traveled way of I-10, as opposed to the situation in 1982 whereby permits were issued if a commercial activity was present within 800 feet of a sign, without consideration of whether the commercial activity was visible from I-10. Mr. Branch conducted his welding and auto repair business known as Branch's Garage during the time in question in 1982 when the permits were issued at the site in question (the tin building). He also was conducting that activity during 1984 including the time when the Notice to Show Cause was issued. Mr. Branch is a farmer and uses the tin building in question for both businesses. Mr. Branch derives a part of his livelihood from the automobile repair and welding business. The on-premise signs located at Branch's Garage are visible from I-10. The applications for the outdoor advertising permit submitted by Branch's Outdoor Advertising were subjected to a field inspection as to the proposed site by the Department's outdoor advertising inspector on October 13, 1982. That inspector had been employed by the Department for some twelve years at the time. In connection with his duties involving enforcement of Chapter 479, Florida Statutes, and Rule 14.10, Florida Administrative Code, he had adopted a basic procedure for inspection of sign sites applied-for, which included actual inspection of the proposed site and, if the proposed site was in an unzoned area, ascertaining that there was an unzoned commercial activity present within 800 feet of the sign site. The inspector had made prior inspections of the site. As a result of those prior inspections he had already issued permits to another sign company authorizing the erection of a sign within the same vicinity based upon the unzoned commercial activity known as Branch's Welding and Garage. Based upon his field inspection in connection with the Branch's Outdoor Advertising applications in question, this inspector approved the applications, resulting in the issuance of the permits in question. The inspector had not been provided with rules or guidelines which would assist him in identifying and determining whether a commercial activity was present at the time of his inspection. He was required to make such determinations on a case-by-case basis, given the relevant statutory provisions, his experience, and instructions by his superiors, as to what would qualify as a commercial activity. Based upon the activities he observed being conducted at Branch's Welding and Garage, he concluded that there was sufficient legal basis for issuance of the permits. Upon issuance of the outdoor advertising sign permits to Branch's Outdoor Advertising, Mr. Branch erected a sign on his property which was improperly located and violated the spacing requirements between it and a sign known as the "Fuqua sign" which had previously been erected within the vicinity of his business. The incorrect location of Branch's sign created an enforcement problem for the Department's outdoor advertising personnel. In order to resolve that conflict with Mr. Branch, the owner of Branch's Outdoor Advertising, the inspector took an agent and representative from Tri-State Systems, Inc., Mr. Matt Fellows, to the site and identified the permits for Mr. Branch's sign as being legal permits. The inspector advised Matt Fellows that the sign was improperly located and suggested that Tri-State purchase Mr. Branch's permits and build a properly located sign at that vicinity location for which the permits had originally been issued. Based upon the information and suggestion from the Department's outdoor advertising inspector, the Respondent contacted Mr. Branch and made arrangements to purchase the sign permits in question. After consummating the purchase, it constructed a sign in question at the location authorized by the permits. The purchase of the permits and the subsequent erection of the sign was done in reliance upon the directions, information and suggestions from the Department's outdoor advertising inspector. The Notice of violation issued October 3, 1984, to Respondent's assignor, Branch~s Outdoor Advertising, was issued at the behest of Mr. Jack Culpepper, the Right-of-Way Administrator for the Department's Third District on or about September 27, 1984. Mr. Culpepper determined to issue the notice of violation based upon his formal inspection of the area immediately prior to that date, whereupon he concluded that the permits had been issued in error in 1982. Mr. Culpepper had no personal knowledge of whether any commercial activity was being conducted at the subject location in 1982, but relied on what had been reported to him by other third district personnel. The inspector who had personally inspected the property in 1982 had been satisfied that an unzoned commercial activity was occurring a proper distance from the sign site and his immediate supervisor had agreed with that interpretation which resulted in the permits being issued. Because of the change in interpretation of the foregoing statutory authority concerning sign permits in the Department's third district to a more strict interpretation, as delineated above, the Notice to Show Cause was issued against Respondent's assignor on October 3, 1984.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore RECOMMENDED that the petition by the Department of Transportation against Tri-State Systems, Inc. should be dismissed and that Tri-State Systems, Inc. should be permitted to retain the permits referenced above. DONE and ORDERED this 28th day of October, 1986 in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of October, 1986. APPENDIX Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected as not comporting in its entirety with the competent substantial evidence of record. Rejected for the same reason except for the last sentence which is accepted in so far as it demonstrates the reason for issuance of the Notice of Violation. Accepted, although this proposed finding of fact is not material, relevant nor dispositive of the material issues involved in this case. Accepted, although, as to its last sentence this proposed finding of fact is not material or relevant to a disposition of the material issues presented. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted, but not in and of itself dispositive of the material issues presented in that it is immaterial to disposition of those issues. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Copies furnished: Maxine P. Ferguson, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, M.S. 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-8064 Gerald S. Livingston, Esquire Post Office Box 2151 Orlando, Florida 32802-2151 Thomas Drawdy, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301-8064 A. J. Spalla, Esquire General Counsel Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building ============================================================ =====
The Issue The issues in this case are whether six outdoor advertising sign permits previously issued to Petitioner should be reinstated; or, if not, whether new permits should be issued for the six advertising facings (two on each of three sign structures) in Clearwater, Florida.
Findings Of Fact In June 1982, National lawfully erected an outdoor advertising billboard structure with two advertising facings located adjacent to State Road 60, 0.5 mile east of U.S. 19, pursuant to permit number 6868 issued by the City of Clearwater (the City), on October 22, 1981, and pursuant to state sign permit numbers AF604 and AF605 issued by DOT on November 18, 1981. In January 1983, National lawfully erected an outdoor advertising billboard structure with two advertising facings located adjacent to State Road 60, 0.4 mile east of U.S. 19, pursuant to permit number 10406 issued by the City on October 15, 1982, and pursuant to state sign permit numbers A1288 and A1289 issued by DOT on December 20, 1982. On or about July 1, 1984, National lawfully erected an outdoor advertising billboard structure with two advertising facings located adjacent to State Road 60, 0.3 mile east of U.S. 19, pursuant to permit number SN - 24060117 issued by the City on June 6, 1984, and pursuant to state sign permit numbers AM631 and AM632 issued by DOT on January 12, 1984. National maintained the three outdoor advertising billboard structures, containing six advertising faces, as identified in Findings of Fact numbers 1, 2 and 3, above (the "subject sign structures"), in the same condition as they were when erected. Following the lawful erection of the subject sign structures, National paid DOT the required annual permit fees through the year 1995, which allowed National to maintain and operate the subject sign structures through December 31, 1995. In March of 1995, DOT notified National that it was dropping state sign permit numbers AF604, AF605, A1288, A1289, AM631, and AM632 from its inventory because DOT had no jurisdiction over the segment of State Road 60, east of U.S. 19, adjacent to which the subject sign structures were located. The evidence was that DOT did so by serving on National a "Notice of Violation," citing DOT's lack of jurisdiction. The "Notice of Violation" gave National the opportunity to request an administrative hearing to contest DOT's action. National had no reason to question DOT's position on the jurisdictional issue but rather relied upon DOT's determination that DOT did not have jurisdiction in March of 1995. National chose not to request a hearing. The evidence was not clear as to when the DOT lost, or believed it lost, jurisdiction; the evidence also was not clear whether the DOT ever had, or believed it ever had, jurisdiction. At the time DOT dropped state sign permit numbers AF604, AF605, A1288, A1289, AM631, and AM632 from its inventory, DOT did not refund any permit fees to National, including the permit fees which National had paid for the 1995 calendar year. Consequently, permit numbers AF604, AF605, A1288, A1289, AM631, and AM632 were fully paid through December 31, 1995. On November 2, 1995, the section of State Road 60, east of U.S. 19, along which the subject sign structures are located became part of the National Highway System (NHS), and became jurisdictional for the purpose of permitting outdoor advertising billboard structures. On August 26, 1996, Kenneth M. Towcimak, as Director of DOT's Office of Right of Way, issued a memorandum to all District Outdoor Advertising Administrators addressing implementation of outdoor advertising control over roadways which were previously uncontrolled by DOT, and which became designated as part of the NHS on November 28, 1995. The Towcimak memorandum of August 26, 1996, required notification by registered mail, with return receipt requested, to all owners of such outdoor advertising billboard structures, that they must obtain state permits by January 1, 1997. There was no evidence as to whether DOT ever notified National by registered mail, with return receipt requested, that National was required to obtain state permits by January 1, 1997, for the subject sign structures. National filed six applications for the subject sign structures on or about December 29, 1997 (one for each of the two sign facings on each sign structure). On the part of the forms asking for the location of the sign, the six applications described the location of the signs, respectively, as: "Reinstated State Tag # AF 604-10"; "Reinstated State Tag # AF 605-10"; "Reinstated State Tag # AM 631-10"; "Reinstated State Tag # AM 632-10"; "Reinstated State Tag # AI 288-10"; and "Reinstated State Tag # AI 289-10." The applications contained copies of the permits previously issued by DOT for the operation and maintenance of the subject sign structures, copies of Landowner's permission and copies of City building permits for the original construction of the sign structures. Although the applications included copies of the City building permits for the original construction of the sign structures, DOT knew that the City no longer considered the sign structures to be legal under the City's code. In 1989, the City amended its code to place limitations on the size (height and area) and concentration (one per lot) of signs in the locations of the subject sign structures. The subject sign structures exceeded at least some of the new limitations; however, the code amendment provided for a seven-year "amortization" period, until January 19, 1996, during which the signs would be permitted as legal, non-conforming signs. At the end of the "amortization" period, the signs no longer were legal under the City code. Some of the information on National's six applications was incorrect or incomplete. But all of the incorrect or incomplete information could easily have been remedied, and "incorrect information" is not the real basis upon which DOT gave notice of intent to deny the applications. The real basis for the notice of intent was the illegality of the sign structures under the City code. On or about November 22, 1999, National filed with DOT a Petition for Reinstatement for each of the three signs (each petition seeking reinstatement of the two permits for the two advertising facings for each sign structure) under Section 479.07(8)(b)1-3, Florida Statutes (1999). On January 31, 2000, DOT issued a Notice of Intent to Deny Petition for Reinstatement as to each of the three such petitions filed by National.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Department of Transportation enter a final order denying National's petitions for reinstatement and National's applications for new sign permits. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of April, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of April, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Gerald S. Livingston, Esquire Aileen Reilly, Esquire Livingston & Reilly, P.A. Post Office Box 2151 Orlando, Florida 32802 Kelly A. Bennett, Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Thomas F. Barry, Secretary Attention: James C. Myers Clerk of Agency Proceedings Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Pamela Leslie, General Counsel Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458
The Issue The issue in these causes is whether denial of Petitioners' outdoor advertising sign site permit applications by Respondent were correctly determined under Subsection 479.111(2), Florida Statutes (2003), on the basis that the sign sites were unzoned commercial/industrial areas; and on the basis that within attending factual circumstances, the sign site did not qualify as unzoned commercial/industrial areas as defined in Subsection 479.01(23), Florida Statutes (2003).
Findings Of Fact Based upon the observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying; documentary materials received in evidence; evidentiary rulings made pursuant to Sections 120.569 and 120.57, Florida Statutes (2003); and the entire record of this proceeding, the following relevant and material findings of fact are determined: Petitioner, Tropical Landholdings, a Florida Corporation, was created in 1998 and purchased approximately 700 to 800 acres of land comprised of residential multi-family and commercial properties along Interstate 75 (I-75) in Punta Gorda, Florida. On September 8, 2003, Petitioner, Crown Advertising, Inc., of Belleview, Florida, submitted three outdoor advertising sign site permit applications to the Department for review. On September 23, 2003, the Department denied the three outdoor advertising sign site permit applications for the following reasons: (1) the sign sites were not permitted under the local land use designation of site (§ 479.111(2), Fla. Stat. (2003)); and (2) the sign sites did not qualify as unzoned commercial/industrial area. § 479.01, Fla. Stat. (2003). The sign site permit application forms used by Petitioners in these causes were composed and authorized by the Department. The form required the applicant to obtain and provide information regarding the proposed sign site, what is proposed to be constructed on the site, and where the proposed construction is to occur. The sign site permit applications also required the applicant to secure information from the appropriate local zoning official of the future land use designation and the current zoning of the proposed sites enacted by the local government's Comprehensive Plan and land use development regulations. This form required information from the local government as to whether the applicant is or is not in compliance with all adopted local ordinances. Permission to erect an outdoor sign structure on the identified sign site is subject to approval by the City. Petitioners complied with the requested information. The local government, the City of North Port, approved the three sign site permit applications in question and granted Petitioners permission to erect three outdoor billboard signs. This local grant of approval was then subjected to concurring approval by the Department. After receiving the sign site permits that were approved by the City, the Department engaged the services of a consultant to conduct on-site review and identification of: (1) the local government's designation for each proposed sign site; (2) the permitted uses of each proposed sign site (local drainage facilities, pipeline corridors, underground communication cables, electric transmission lines, and outdoor advertising signs); and (3) a review of adjacent and surrounding parcels. The consultant reported to the Department the factual circumstances attendant the three locally approved sign sites. It should be noted that the consultant did not render an opinion regarding the Department's approval or denial of the sign site permit applications. The sign sites in question were zoned under the local "land use designation" of the City of North Port's Ordinance 02-46, Section 53.146 (Ordinance 02-46), as a "utility industrial corridor." The zoned land was composed of strips of land measuring 25 to 70 feet in width on the west side and 160 to 170 feet in width on the east side. The "permitted governmental uses" of a parcel zoned as a "utility industrial corridor," included such uses as underground communication cables, electric transmission lines, and outdoor advertising signs. Ordinance 02-46, under the title "Prohibited Uses and Structures," specifically prohibits "all commercial and industrial uses." Based upon a review of all information provided by Petitioners, the local government, and its consultant, the Department first determined the three sign sites on which the subject signs were to be erected and located, prohibited commercial or industrial uses. The Department then determined, based upon an analysis of the materials provided by its consultant and the City of North Port, the three sign sites in question had not been zoned for commercial or industrial uses as a part of the local government's comprehensive zoning plan. Based upon (1) the prohibition of commercial or industrial uses and (2) no commercial or industrial zoning of the sign sites, the Department concluded these three sign sites were zoned "primarily to permit outdoor advertising," a prohibited function. The denials were required. Under the local land use designation of Ordinance 02-46, the City of North Port's permitted uses included local drainage facilities and a pipeline corridor. Under governmental uses designation of Ordinance 02-46, the City of North Port's permitted uses included underground communication cables, electric transmission lines, and outdoor advertising. However, Ordinance 02-46 specifically prohibits all commercial and industrial uses under the governmental uses designation. When questioned by Petitioners, Ms. Holschuh testified "that the Department's intent was to allow [sign] permits whenever possible and never prohibit the installation of billboards." From this specific statement of testimony, Petitioners argued that "implementing the intent the Department must look beyond the labels of the zoning and look at the actual primary uses allowed under those designations." (Emphasis added.) Ms. Holschuh disagreed with Petitioners' characterization of the Department's procedures and convincingly maintained that the Department based its denials on "sign site zoning" and factors considered for determining an "unzoned commercial/industrial area" as defined by statute. Continuing with its argument, Petitioners conclude "[T]he department . . . appears to be in conflict with Judge Barbara Staros' decision of February 16, 2004, in a rule challenge proceeding, where she analyzed the Sign Permit procedure under Section 479.07, Florida Statutes." In her Final Order, Administrative Law Judge Barbara Staros made a Finding of Fact in paragraph 30, stating: Once the local government zoning official certifies that the proposed sign identified in the application is in compliance with the comprehensive plan adopted pursuant to Chapter 163, the Department does not go behind that certification to look factually at whether the zoning action was consistent with the comprehensive plan. Page 13. The procedures followed by the Department in this proceeding complied with Judge Staros Finding of Fact in paragraph 31, where she wrote: The Department uses the application and the information contained therein to determine whether a proposed sign location falls within the definition of a "commercial or industrial zone." If it does, [fall within] then the Department determines whether those designations were adopted as part of the local government's comprehensive planning efforts or were "primarily" adopted to permit outdoor advertising signs on that location. Page 30. Based upon it's receipt, review, and analysis of the specific facts provided by all parties of interest, the Department determined the sites where the signs were to be erected prohibited commercial or industrial use. The Department factually determined that no local zoning identified the sites as commercial or industrial. The Department concluded correctly and in accord with Florida Administrative Code Rule 14-10.0052 that these three sign sites were zoned by the City of North Port, the local governmental entity, "primarily to permit outdoor advertising" contrary to sign site permit procedures under Section 479.07, Florida Statutes (2003). Based upon the evidence of record and considering the size of the sign site, the local government's zoning of the site, designated uses of the site, and prohibited uses on the site, denial of the sign applications was correctly determined pursuant to Subsection 479.111(2), Florida Statutes (2003), and Florida Administrative Code Rule 14-10.0052. Based on the testimonies of Ms. Holschuh and James Duff, who testified regarding his ownership, property taxes paid, and the investors' inability to use the property in question to their economic advantage, Petitioners failed to carry the burden of producing a preponderance of credible evidence to establish that the Department incorrectly and/or wrongfully denied Petitioners' applications for three sign site permits pursuant to Subsection 479.111(2), Florida Statutes (2003), and Florida Administrative Code Rule 14-10.0052.
The Issue Whether the structure described in the Department of Transportation's Notice of Violation No. 10B DB 2000 007 (Notice) is in violation of Section 479.07(1), Florida Statutes, and therefore subject to removal pursuant to Section 479.105, Florida Statutes, as alleged in the Notice.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at the final hearing and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner is an outdoor advertising company that was formerly known as AK Media. On December 10, 1998, Petitioner (while still known as AK Media) entered into an agreement with NWT Partners, Ltd., the owner of the New World Tower (Building), a "thirty story four (4) sided building" located at 100 North Biscayne Boulevard in Miami, Florida, to lease certain portions of the Building. The lease agreement contained the following provisions, among others: Effective Date. This Lease shall become effective on the later of (x) the date that Tenant provides written notice to Landlord that Tenant has obtained all permits, license and governmental approvals necessary or required to enable Tenant to construct, maintain and operate the Wall Faces and Wall Structures, as hereinafter defined or (y) January 1, 1999 (the "Effective Date"). Tenant shall have ninety (90) days from the date of this Lease to obtain all such permits, licenses and approvals or the Landlord may cancel this Lease. Purpose. The purpose of this lease is for Tenant to construct, maintain and operate painted, printed, illuminated and/or electrical signs on the north and south wall faces of the Building (the "Wall Faces"), and all other uses not inconsistent therewith, including all necessary supporting structures, devices, illumination facilities and connections, service ladders and equipment, and other appurtenances (the "Wall Fixtures"). All construction to the Building, and advertising thereon, including construction drawing and artwork to be furnished by the Tenant shall be subject to Landlord's written approval, which approval shall not be unreasonably withheld. Tenant's Right to Enter and Use. For the duration of this Lease, Tenant shall have the non-exclusive right to enter onto the Property and into the Building and use the Wall Faces for the purposes described in this Lease and any other purposes allowed or required by this Lease and Tenant has the exclusive right to use the Wall Faces Property for advertising. In exercising Tenant's rights hereunder, Tenant may hang or attach the Wall Fixtures to the roof and exterior structure of the Building. Tenant shall maintain the Wall Fixtures at Tenant's cost and expense. Tenant shall pay all utility charges in connection with the operation and maintenance of the Wall Fixtures. Tenant shall be responsible for damage to the Building which is caused by Tenant's operation and maintenance and removal of the Wall Fixtures and shall repair any such damage and restore the Building to the condition it was in immediately prior to such damages at the expiration or termination of this Lease. Term. The term of this Lease is for five (5) years from the "Rent Commencement Date," as hereinafter defined, to the last day of the month during which the fifth anniversary of the Rent Commencement Date occurs (the "Term"). Rent. Tenant shall pay Landlord rent annually, in accordance with the schedule (the "Rent Schedule") set forth on Exhibit "B" hereto, inclusive of all taxes . . . . Contracts. Anything herein to the contrary notwithstanding, Tenant will use its best efforts to obtain contracts (the "Contracts") for advertising on the Building which exceed the amount of the Guaranteed Rent, as set forth on the Rent Schedule. . . . 9. Ownership/Removal. At all times, Tenant is and shall remain the owner of the Wall Fixtures and all signs and permits of any kind in relation thereto, and has the right to remove the Wall Fixtures at any time. . . . Exhibit "B" Rent Schedule Tenant shall pay annual rent to Landlord in an amount equal to the greater of (x) Fifty-five percent (55%) of the gross revenues attributable to advertisements displayed on the North Wall and the South Wall of the Building less any agency fee or commissions not greater than 16 2/3% to bona fide third parties (the "Net Revenues") associated with such advertisements (the "Percentage Rent") or (y) the minimum guaranteed annual rent (the "Guaranteed Rent") hereinafter set forth as follows: . . . The Landlord may terminate the Lease Agreement upon thirty (30) days prior written notice to Tenant if either Wall is vacant for more than one hundred twenty (120) consecutive days during the Term of the Lease and the Tenant has failed to obtain a contract, before the expiration of such notice period, for advertising on the North Wall or South Wall, as the case may be, pursuant to which the projected Percentage Rent under such contract would exceed the Guaranteed Rent. . . . Subsequently, Petitioner (while still operating under the name AK Media) entered into a "bulletin contract" with New York Outdoor, an advertising agency acting on behalf of Supreme International, in which Petitioner agreed, for a fee, to produce and maintain an "outdoor advertising display" for Supreme International on the north wall of the Building. Supreme International sells "Perry Ellis" and "Perry Ellis for Men" brand fashion apparel. In accordance with the "bulletin contract," Petitioner produced an "outdoor advertising display" for Supreme International on the north wall of the Building. The "outdoor advertising display" that Petitioner produced was a large mural more than 100 feet high and more than 60 feet wide. Such a product is referred to in the outdoor advertising industry as a "wallscape." The "wallscape" that Petitioner produced for Supreme International consisted of artwork (a picture of a young woman) and print (the words "Perry Ellis for Men") on a "canvass-type" material that was mounted on a "picture frame" support structure attached to the north wall of the Building. It was located within 660 feet of the nearest edge of the right-of-way of a roadway, US Highway 1 (also known, in that location, as North Biscayne Boulevard), which is a part of the federal-aid primary highway system. The artwork and print could be seen without visual aid by motorists of normal visual acuity travelling on US Highway 1 in the vicinity of the Building. At no time has Petitioner applied for, or obtained, a permit from the Department authorizing it to erect and maintain a "sign," as that term is used in Chapter 479, Florida Statutes, on the north wall of the Building. Petitioner, however, did seek and obtain a Class II Special Permit from the City of Miami. The permit was granted by the Miami City Commission, through the passage of Miami City Commission Resolution 99- 828, at its October 26, 1999, meeting. The printed agenda distributed in advance of the meeting stated the following concerning the permit for which Petitioner had applied: Consideration of approving Class II Special Permit No. 99-0142 for the property located at approximately 100 North Biscayne Boulevard for a sign of a graphic or artistic value. This will allow a mural containing a commercial message. The resolution passed by the Miami City Commission at the meeting read as follows: A RESOLUTION OF THE MIAMI CITY COMMISSION APPROVING THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE PLANNING DEPARTMENT FOR ISSUANCE OF CLASS II SPECIAL PERMIT APPLICATION NO. 99-0142, SUBJECT TO THE CONDITION THAT THERE SHALL BE NO WRITING PERMITTED WITH THE MURAL AND OTHER CONDITIONS AS RECOMMENDED BY THE PLANNING DEPARTMENT FOR THE PROPERTY LOCATED AT APPROXIMATELY 100 NORTH BISCAYNE BOULEVARD, MIAMI, FLORIDA, PURSUANT TO SECTION 401 OF ORDINANCE NO. 11000, AS AMENDED, THE ZONING ORDINANCE OF THE CITY OF MIAMI, FLORIDA, AS AMENDED. WHEREAS, the Director for the Department of Planning is recommending approval of Class II Special Permit Application No. 99-0142, with conditions, for the property located at approximately 100 North Biscayne Boulevard, Miami, Florida; and WHEREAS, Zoning Ordinance No. 11000, as amended, the Zoning Ordinance of the City of Miami, Florida, requires City Commission approval of the Class II Special Permit as hereinafter set forth; and WHEREAS, the City Commission after careful consideration of this matter, finds the application for a Class II Special Permit does meet the applicable requirements of Zoning Ordinance No. 11000, as amended, and deems it advisable and in the best interest of the general welfare of the City of Miami and its inhabitants to approve the recommendation of the Director of the Department of Planning to uphold the issuance of the Class II Special Permit, subject to the condition that there shall be no writing permitted with the mural and other conditions as recommended by the Planning Department; NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED BY THE COMMISSION OF THE CITY OF MIAMI, FLORIDA: Section 1. The recitals and findings contained in the Preamble to this Resolution are hereby adopted by reference thereto and incorporated herein as if fully set forth in this section. Section 2. The recommendation of the Director of the Department of Planning to issue Class II Special Permit Application No. 99-0142, subject to the condition that there shall be no writing permitted with the mural and other conditions as recommended by the Planning Department, for the property located at approximately 100 North Biscayne Boulevard, Miami, Florida, is hereby approved, and the City Commission finds that the issuance of Class II Special Permit Application No. 99-0142, with conditions does meet the applicable requirements of Zoning Ordinance No. 11000, as amended. Section 3. The Resolution shall become effective immediately upon its adoption and signature of the Mayor. Inasmuch as the words "Perry Ellis for Men" were on the "wallscape" that Petitioner produced for Supreme International, this "wallscape" was not in compliance with the condition imposed by the Miami City Commission, in issuing the Class II Special Permit to Petitioner, that there "be no writing permitted with the mural." On February 22, 2000, Bernard Davis, who, at the time, was the Department's District 6 Roadside Outdoor Advertising Administrator, issued a Notice of Violation (Notice No. 10B DB 2000 007) alleging that the "wallscape" on the north wall of the Building (described above) was "in violation of Section 479.07(1), Florida Statutes, which requires a permit for all outdoor advertising signs not exempted by Section 479.16, Florida Statutes" and directing that the sign be removed within 30 days. Petitioner thereafter requested an administrative hearing on the matter. Prior to the hearing, the artwork and print on the "wallscape" on the north wall of the Building were changed. As of the date of the final hearing in this case, the "wallscape" on the north wall of the Building contained a picture of a man and part of a woman and the words "Perry Ellis," underneath which was written "www.perryellis.com," Supreme International's website address. The Monday and Tuesday before the final hearing (February 5 and 6, 2001), Mr. Davis' successor, C. Jean Cann, went inside the Building to determine whether Supreme International had an "on-premises presence." On Monday, February 5, 2001, Ms. Cann entered the Building at approximately 1:15 p.m. After obtaining information from the Building's Electronic Directory that "Perry Ellis" occupied room 2128, she took the elevator to the 21st floor. After getting off the elevator, she walked down a hallway, where she saw a paper sign on a door which read "Perry Ellis/Supreme International, Incorporated, 2128." When she knocked on the door, no one answered. She waited 10 to 15 seconds and then knocked again, with the same result. She then, unsuccessfully, attempted to open the door. At around 1:45 p.m., she left the Building. Ms. Cann returned to the Building the following day at approximately 11:40 a.m., at which time she spoke to a security guard, who informed her that "Perry Ellis" "was in 2126." She then again went up to the 21st floor, and, on the same door that she had seen the "Perry Ellis/Supreme International, Incorporated, 2128" sign the day before, she saw a paper sign that read "Perry Ellis/Supreme International, Incorporated, 2126." Her knocks on the door, like those of the previous day, went unanswered, and she was again unable to open the door. At around 12:00 noon, she exited the Building. At no time during either of her two visits was Ms. Cann able to ascertain what, if any, business activity Supreme International was engaging in inside the Building.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order finding that the "wallscape" on the north side of the Building is a "sign" that was erected and is being maintained without the Department-issued permit required by Section 479.07(1), Florida Statutes, and that it therefore is a public and private nuisance that must be removed pursuant to Section 479.105(1), Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of March, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___________________________________ STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of March, 2001.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner owns the sign located on the west side of and adjacent to U.S. Highway 331, approximately 5.5 miles north of the intersection of U.S. Highway 331 and U.S. Highway 90 in Walton County, Florida. The sign advertises a motel owned by Petitioner. The sign is important to the motel's business. The sign is required to have an outdoor advertising sign permit. U.S. Highway 331 is a Federal Aid Primary Highway and was a Federal Aid Primary Highway prior to the sign's erection. Walton County is operating under a duly adopted comprehensive plan. However, the State of Florida has not fully approved such plan and Walton County has not yet entered into a compliance agreement with the State in regards to its comprehensive plan. Pursuant to its comprehensive plan, Walton County utilizes a method of zoning known as "performance zoning", as opposed to the traditional "euclidian zoning". Performance zoning has specific regulations and restrictions for each type of use, and each type of use has to meet certain criteria. In essence, performance zoning allows mixed uses of certain zones within the county. Different areas of the county have different requirements regarding the development of such use in order to safeguard the integrity of the zoning plan. The specific area where the sign is located allows for commercial, industrial and residential use and is permitted by the zoning scheme of Walton County. In a general sense, residential as well as commercial and industrial use is allowed in all of the areas of Walton County north of U.S. Highway 90. This area constitutes approximately one-half of the county. However, zones contained within the areas of Walton County north of U.S. Highway 90 may differ in the circumstances and criteria of the zoning plan under which such uses would be permitted. Even though Walton County was comprehensively zoned, Respondent's previous administration treated Walton County as if it did not have zoning. Therefore, Respondent would have previously permitted the sign in question. However Respondent changed its treatment of Walton County because it had been cited by the Federal Highway Administration for its lax interpretation of zoned and unzoned commercial and industrial areas within the counties. The Federal Highway Administration threatened to withdraw federal highway monies if the Department did not begin to follow the language in its statutes and rules defining zoned and unzoned areas. The clear language of the Respondent's statutes and rules governing the permitting of outdoor advertising signs, as well as the threatened action of the Federal Highway Administration demonstrate the reasonableness of and the factual basis for the Department's change in its interpretation of zoned and unzoned areas within a county. In this case, it is clear that the sign is located in a zoned area and not in an unzoned area. The area in which the sign is located is not zoned commercial or industrial. The area is zoned for mixed use according to the performance zoning utilized by Walton County. Since the sign is not in an area zoned commercial or industrial, the sign is not permittable under Chapter 479, Florida Statutes.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner's application for a permit to maintain a sign located on the west side of U.S. Highway 331, approximately 5.5 miles north of the intersection of U.S. Highway 331 and U.S. Highway 90 in Walton County, Florida, be denied. DONE and ENTERED this 5th day of June, 1991, at Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of June, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The facts contained in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, and 8 of Petitioner's Proposed Recommended Order are adopted in substance, insofar as material. The facts contained in paragraphs 9 and 10 of Petitioner's Proposed Recommended Order are subordinate. The facts contained in paragraph 12 of Petitioner's Proposed Recommended Order were not shown by the evidence. The fact contained in paragraph 11 of Petitioner's Proposed Recommended Order are immaterial. The facts contained in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 of Respondent's Proposed Recommended Order are adopted in substance, insofar as material. The facts contained in paragraphs 13 and 14 of Respondent's Proposed Recommended order are subordinate. COPIES FURNISHED: William K. Jennings 119 E. Park Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Charles G. Gardner, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Ben G. Watts, Secretary ATTN: Eleanor F. Turner, M.S. 58 Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Thornton J. Williams, Esquire Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458
The Issue There are three issues presented: Whether the signs in question were erected at such a time and under such conditions that would entitle them to be permitted; Whether the signs in question, if not entitled to a permit, have some type of grandfather status where the owner would be entitled to compensation for the removal; and Whether the signs in question qualify as on-premise signs not requiring a permit. Both parties submitted detailed proposed recommended orders, which have been read and considered. There are few disputes concerning the basic facts. To the extent the findings herein differ from the proposals, those findings are based upon the most credible evidence. Certain findings have been deleted because they are not relevant to the issues or are not findings of fact.
Findings Of Fact The signs in question in Cases No. 81-1672T and 81-1675T are on the north-facing wall of the "El Okey Market" at 1630 NW 27th Avenue in Miami, Florida. Each sign is an aluminum framed poster six by 12 feet. An inspector of the Department of Transportation (Department) Investigated the signs at the El Okey Market in March of 1981, and notices of violation were issued to Empire Outdoor Advertising (Empire) on May 11, 1981. The parties stipulated that the inspection revealed neither sign bears a valid outdoor advertising permit issued by the Department. The signs are visible to traffic traveling south on 27th Avenue and are located within 660 feet of the right of way Empire has acknowledged owning the signs in question The inspector's investigation of the El Okey Market signs also revealed the existence of a permitted outdoor advertising sign, owned by another sign company, which is located approximately 70 feet south of the Empire signs and which also faces north. The Department introduced into evidence a map, certified by a Department official, which shows the Federal-Aid Primary Highway System for the Miami area as it existed in 1979. The inspector located the El Okey Market on the map, which indicates that that portion of 27th Avenue was a Federal-Aid Primary Highway in 1979. No contrary evidence was introduced. At the location of the subject signs, 27th Avenue is a Federal-Aid Primary Highway. The Vice President and General Manager of Empire testified that the present company evolved from a firm called Peppi Advertising Company started by his father, and that he had been employed by the company since the early 1950's. The firm was sold to Donnelly Advertising and then to Ackerly Communications, and continued to operate as Empire. The firm obtained a building permit on June 6, 1965, for the erection of billboard-type signs on the side of the building located at 1630 NW 27th Avenue. The Vice President testified it was company policy to erect signs shortly after the permit was issued. He further testified that he serviced the poster through the 1960's. The signs in question were erected in 1965, and have been in existence since that date. No permits were applied for when the signs became subject to regulation in 1971. Photographs had been taken of the signs in question showing advertising copy on July 15, 1982, to consist of Kraft Mayonnaise and EverReady Energizer Batteries. Advertising copy on June 24, 1982, shows Kraft Cheese and J & B Scotch in Spanish. The above items are products of national companies who pay Empire to advertise their products. Empire pays the El Okey Market for the privilege of placing the signs on the wall of the market. The signs in question are not on-premise signs. Patrick D. Galvin, the Department's Administrator for outdoor advertising, testified that it is the Department's policy to deny permits to signs lawfully erected within the city limits prior to the date such signs became subject to Chapter 479, Florida Statutes, where the sign is less than the prescribed distance from a second sign which has obtained a valid outdoor advertising permit from the Department. It is the inspector's practice to recommend that a permit be issued to applicants where the sign in question has no permit but was built before the date permits became required and is otherwise a lawful sign. The Department admitted policy is that lawfully erected signs may lose their grandfather status as nonconforming signs under Chapter 479 and may thus become subject to uncompensated removal because the owner failed to obtain a permit within the 60-days period which followed the effective date of Florida's outdoor advertising regulations.
Recommendation The Department of Transportation has shown that the signs in question are subject to removal because they have been in existence for more than five years since they became nonconforming. The Department may remove the signs at anytime upon payment to the owner for full value of the subject signs which were erected prior to December 8, 1971. DONE and ORDERED this 21st day of September, 1982, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of September, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Vernon L. Whittier, Jr., Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 L. Martin Reeder, Jr., Esquire Jeffrey Bercow, Esquire 1400 SE Bank Building Miami, Florida 33131 Paul N. Pappas, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 =================================================================
The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether Petitioner's applications to erect a steel monopole which would support a two- sided outdoor advertising sign to be located west of Interstate Highway 95 (I-95), 2,244 feet north of I-95's intersection with Indrio Road, St. Lucie County, Florida, should be approved.
Findings Of Fact Preliminary matters Petitioner POZ Outdoor Advertising, Inc. (POZ), is a corporation engaged in the business of erecting and maintaining outdoor advertising signs. The principals of POZ are Richard Pozniak and his wife, Barbara. Respondent, Department of Transportation (Department) is a state agency charged with, inter alia, the responsibility to regulate outdoor advertising, under the provisions of Chapter 479, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 14-10, Florida Administrative Code. On February 17, 1997, POZ applied with the Department for permits to erect a monopole sign which would support a two- sided billboard to be located west of I-95, and 2,244 feet north of the intersection of I-95 and Indrio Road, St. Lucie County, Florida. The Department reviewed the applications, and on February 20, 1997, gave notice to POZ that the applications were denied because the "[s]ite is within 500 feet of a restricted interchange or intersection at grade (S. #14-10.006(1)(b)5, FAC)." POZ filed a timely request for a formal hearing to challenge the Department's decision, and these proceedings duly followed. Matters at issue POZ did not contend, and indeed offered no proof at hearing to demonstrate, that the proposed site was not, as found by the Department, within 500 feet of a restricted interchange or intersection at grade, as proscribed by Rule 14-10.006(1)(b)5, Florida Administrative Code.2 Rather, as noted in the preliminary statement, POZ contends the Department should be precluded from applying the Rule's spacing provisions as a basis for denial of the requested permits based on a theory of estoppel or a theory of inconsistent application of the Rule's spacing requirements. POZ's estoppel theory To accept POZ's estoppel theory, one must accept, as offered, Mr. Pozniak's version of events which he avers transpired in 1990, when he conducted his outdoor advertising business through AdCon Outdoor Advertising, Inc. (AdCon).3 According to Mr. Pozniak, in 1990 he met with Vana Kinchen, then a sign inspector with the Department, to establish the proper location of a billboard that AdCon proposed to permit. Again, according to Mr. Pozniak, Ms. Kinchen helped him measure the site, and identified the same location at issue in this proceeding (2244 feet north of the intersection of I-95 and Indrio Road) as an appropriate placement for a billboard. Following Ms. Kinchen's advice as to location, Mr. Pozniak avers that he applied for permits on behalf of AdCon to erect a monopole sign which would support a two-sided billboard to be located at the exact same site that is at issue in this proceeding. Those applications, according to Mr. Pozniak, were approved and Department tags issued; however, the sign was not erected within 270 days after the permit issued, as required by Section 479.05(3)(5)(b), Florida Statutes, and the permits became void. Having carefully considered the proof in this case, it must be concluded that Mr. Pozniak's version of the events surrounding AdCon's permitting activities in 1990 is less than credible. Rather, the persuasive proof demonstrates that AdCon's application for permits to erect a billboard at the site at issue in this proceeding were denied and it is most unlikely that Ms. Kinchen ever advised Mr. Pozniak that such site was a proper location for a billboard. Regarding AdCon's permitting activities in 1990, the proof demonstrates that on April 6, 1990, AdCon filed applications (inexplicably dated May 6, 1990) with the Department to erect a monopole sign which would support a two-sided billboard to be located west of I-95, and 3050 feet north of the intersection of I-95 and Indrio Road. Consistent with the requirement of Section 479.04(3)(b), Florida Statutes, the applications included a separate statement from the local government that the proposed signs complied with local government requirements. Those applications were approved and, on May 3, 1990, the Department's tag numbers BB-457-35 (for the north facing sign) and BB-458-35 (for the south facing sign) were issued. Subsequently, on November 9, 1990, AdCo filed applications dated November 7, 1990, with the Department to erect a monopole sign which would support a two-sided billboard to be located west of I-95, and 2,244 feet north of the intersection of I-95 and Indrio Road (the location at issue in this case). Those applications were rejected by the Department on November 15, 1990, because they violated the spacing requirements of Section 479.07(9)(a)1, Florida Statutes, which prohibits the issuance of a permit unless the sign is located at least 1,500 feet from any other sign on the same side of an interstate highway. Notably, as the Department observed at that time, those applications conflicted with the previously approved applications of AdCon for the site located at 3,050 feet north of the intersection of I-95 and Indrio Road, and the permittee still had until January 28, 1991, to erect those signs. The applications were also rejected by the Department because they failed to include a statement from local government as required by Section 479.04(3)(b), Florida Statutes, that the proposed signs complied with local government requirements. Rather, what AdCon submitted was a copy of the local government approval it had secured for the location permitted by the Department on May 3, 1990. That documentation did not, as AdCon knew or should have known, meet the requirements for the new location. Clearly, the Department did not previously permit the site at issue in this case, and it is most unlikely that Ms. Kinchen ever affirmatively advised Mr. Pozniak as to the suitability of the site. In so concluding, Mr. Pozniak's testimony, as well as Petitioner's Exhibit 3 (what purports to be copies of applications, dated November 7, 1990, by AdCon for the site at issue in this proceeding, and purportedly approved by the Department) have been carefully considered. However, when compared with the other proof of record it must be concluded that Petitioner's Exhibit 3 is a fabrication,4 and that Mr. Pozniak's testimony on the subject is not credible or worthy of belief. POZ's theory of inconsistency Mr. Pozniak offered testimony at hearing concerning two outdoor advertising signs at the intersection of I-95 and State Road 60 which he opined did not conform with the Department's spacing requirements and, therefore, represent inconsistent application of the District's rule. The persuasive proof is, however, to the contrary. The first sign, located within 500 feet of the interchange, was in existence when the Department's "ramp rule" regarding spacing requirements became effective and, accordingly, its presence was grandfathered. However, at some time following the enactment of the ramp rule, the owner replaced the sign. At that time, the sign became nonconforming and the Department, as soon as it became aware of the nonconformity, commenced an action to secure the sign's removal. The other sign alluded to by Mr. Pozniak, and identified in Petitioner's Composite Exhibit 1, is owned by Division Street, Inc., and, contrary to Mr. Pozniak's testimony, that sign complies with the Department's spacing requirements and was properly permitted.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered denying the subject applications for outdoor advertising sign permits. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of December, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of December, 1997.
The Issue Whether the Petitioner's outdoor advertising sign located at 1.106 miles south of State Road 50, on State Road 91, is an illegally erected sign pursuant to the Notice of Violation No. 10B-DM-1997-125-NF. Whether Petitioner's outdoor advertising structure is eligible for a permit pursuant to Chapter 479, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact On June 26, 1997, Respondent's Inspector issued Notice of Violation No. 10B-DM-1997-125-NF for an outdoor advertising sign located 1.106 miles south of State Road 50, on State Road 91, in Orange County, Florida. The subject sign is located within 660 feet of the right-of-way of State Road 91, outside any city limits. On June 26, 1997, the above-referenced sign did not have a current valid permit. On June 26, 1997, the above-referenced sign was not an on-premises sign. Charles Tucker is the owner of the subject sign and the property on which it is located. Charles Tucker has never had a valid State Outdoor Advertising Permit for the subject sign. Charles Tucker has not applied for a permit under Section 479.105, Florida Statutes. Sometime in the late 1960's, Winter Garden Inn constructed the subject sign on property owned by Charles Tucker. The Inn received permits for said sign from Respondent for each year until 1973, and displayed advertising signage thereon. Charles Tucker has owned the subject sign since 1974. In 1981, Tucker leased advertising copy on the sign to the R.C. Dunn Oil Company. In 1983, Charles Tucker painted out the advertising copy, after it had remained on the subject sign for two years (from April 1981 through April 1983). However, the advertising copy remained visible for several years thereafter. On May 19, 1997, Charles Tucker entered into Lease Agreement with Petitioner, for the purpose of maintaining and operating the sign. Respondent agreed to be agent of record for all matters relating to the sign and signage. Petitioner has not properly completed an application for a permit under Section 479.105, Florida Statutes. There has been a seven-year period of time during which the subject sign displayed advertising copy. No structural changes have been undertaken on the subject sign since it was constructed.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Secretary enter a final order which finds that the Respondent properly issued the Notice of Violation, but that Petitioner, Universal Outdoor, Inc., is entitled to a State Outdoor Advertising Permit, under the provisions of Section 479.105(1)(e), Florida Statutes. Upon proper application in accordance with this chapter within a reasonable period of time, payment of a penalty fee of $300.00 and all pertinent fees required by this chapter, including annual permit renewal fees payable from 1974 to the present, a permit should be issued. DONE AND ORDERED this 6th day of March, 1998, at Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of March, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Kelly A. Bennett Assistant General Counsel Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street, Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Mark Gamble Real Estate Representative Universal Outdoor, Inc. 5333 Old Winter Garden Road Orlando, Florida 32811 Thomas F. Barry, Secretary Attention: Diedre Grubbs 605 Suwannee Street Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Pamela Leslie, General Counsel 605 Suwannee Street Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450
