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DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, DIVISION OF HOTELS AND RESTAURANTS vs CLARK APARTMENT & ROOMS, 03-003821 (2003)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Jacksonville, Florida Oct. 16, 2003 Number: 03-003821 Latest Update: Aug. 13, 2004

The Issue Whether Respondent is guilty of violating Sections 509.221(1) and (7) and 509.032, Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rules 61C-1.004(5), (6), and (13), 61C- 3.001(2), as set out in the Administrative Complaint dated March 24, 2003.

Findings Of Fact The Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Hotels and Restaurants (DHR) is the State Agency charged with regulating the operation of hotel establishments pursuant to Section 20.165 and Chapter 509, Florida Statutes. At all times material hereto, Respondent has been licensed by DHR or otherwise subject to DHR's jurisdiction, pursuant to issued License No. 26-00783. Respondent's last known business address is Clark Apartment and Rooms, 9762 Bayview Avenue, Jacksonville, Florida 32208. On February 3, 2003, and again on March 10, 2003, a DHR sanitation and safety specialist, John Phelan, inspected Respondent's premises. On February 3, 2003, the initial inspection, Mr. Phelan was accompanied by his superior, David Futlon. At the February 3, 2003, initial inspection, the following deficiencies were observed by both inspectors and noted for Respondent by Mr. Phelan: No proof was observed that the smoke detectors were interconnected as required by law and as stated by management. The door of a gas oven was held in place by a garden spade. Live roaches were on the floor and climbing the walls around the oven. The inspectors observed a stained mattress and a missing mattress pad on the bed in room They also observed that the second floor bathroom was out- of-order, and that shower curtains and shower stalls were dirty with soap scum. On March 10, 2003, Mr. Phelan returned to Respondent's premises by himself and noted that the foregoing problems/violations remained. According to both inspectors, the most serious violation was that there was no documentation that the smoke detectors were interconnected. This is a critical violation because it could present a potential fire hazard. The next violation that was found to be critical was that there was "a garden spade holding the oven door closed." This was seen as a violation because of the potential for fire. Next down the urgent and critical scale was the presence of live roaches around the oven. The absence of a mattress pad on room 17's mattress and the stain on the mattress were of somewhat less concern. However, these bedding problems are violations because they pose a sanitary issue. The next-ranked violation was that the second floor bathroom was out-of-order. The bathroom also presented a lesser sanitary issue, which was that the shower curtain and shower stall were dirty with soap scum. Based on the foregoing uncorrected deficiencies, Mr. Phelan caused an administrative complaint to be issued against Respondent on March 24, 2003, alleging Respondent's violation of Chapter 509, Florida Statutes, and/or the administrative rules promulgated thereunder. Although it was demonstrated at hearing that Mr. Clark, Respondent's principal, had been attempting, between the two inspections, to fix the originally-cited deficiencies, and although some progress at renovation had been made, most problems had not been fully addressed as of the date of the follow-up inspection on March 10, 2003. The credible evidence and testimony as a whole show that Mr. Phelan had recognized that a gas heater which had been cited at the initial inspection had been disconnected by the date of the second inspection and that it was no longer in use at the time of the second inspection. Therefore, the gas heater had been crossed off the notification to Respondent by Mr. Phelan and had not been cited as a violation in the administrative complaint. The stove also had been disconnected prior to the re-inspection. The gas heater and gas stove were disconnected at the same time, so propping the stove door open or closed with a spade had no significance with regard to fire hazard. Like the heater, the stove should have been removed from the premises as a safety precaution, but because Mr. Phelan did not know that the stove had been disconnected when he made his re-inspection, it was cited and included in the administrative complaint. The reason the disconnected stove was still present on the premises was because Respondent was fumigating for roaches by setting off "roach bombs" inside it. The fumigation of the roaches in an area where all other exit holes for them were intentionally sealed had resulted in some dead roaches, but many live roaches had fled into the kitchen in the vicinity of the stove. The live roaches were observed by all the witnesses who saw the kitchen on or about the re-inspection date. The testimony of several witnesses was credible that the upstairs bathroom's sink and tub had been repaired prior to the re-inspection. Mr. Musselwhite recalled credibly that he had screwed the faucet handles back on the tub between the two inspections. However, the testimony of Mr. Musselwhite that he was using the tub and sink upstairs at the time of the re- inspection is not credible. The greater weight of the credible evidence is that the tub and sink upstairs might have been repaired, but they were not actually in working order at the time of the March 10, 2003, re-inspection, because the water had not yet been turned back on. The evidence is clear that plaster board had been installed in the shower by the date of the re-inspection and that this was done to deal with the prior notice concerning discoloration. A dispute among the witnesses as to whether the discoloration on the old shower walls was soap scum, discoloration by scum removers, or mildew cannot be resolved. However, it was proven that, despite several changes of shower curtains between the two inspections, the shower curtains present on the re-inspection date remained covered with soap scum and/or mildew. Respondent admitted that the lack of a mattress pad on the mattress in room 17 on the date of re-inspection was an oversight. It was proven that a mattress from a first floor room had been moved upstairs to room 17. In the opinion of Respondent's witnesses, this constituted, a "new" mattress which was not stained. In this situation, Mr. Phelan's observation of the mattress stain is more credible. On his first inspection, Mr. Phelan told Mr. Clark that in the absence of other documentation, Mr. Clark needed to have the State Fire Marshall inspect Respondent's smoke detectors, in order to provide documentation that they were interconnected. By "interconnectedness" the parties meant that if one smoke detector sounded, then all of the smoke detectors throughout the hotel should also sound. Mr. McGee and Mr. Clark testified that between the two inspections the issue of the smoke detectors had been "looked into" with employees of Home Depot and at the local fire department. Mr. Clark stated that he had contacted the Jacksonville Fire Department, which would not give him any documentation, but its employees agreed to come and inspect his smoke detectors. Mr. Clark testified convincingly that he had purchased and installed smoke detectors from the Home Depot which did not provide written documentation of interconnectedness but which could be tested for interconnectedness by pushing their buttons. He maintained that if the inspector had punched the button on any single smoke detector on the re-inspection date, the interconnectedness of all the smoke detectors would have been demonstrated by their all "going off" at once. The inspectors did not punch the smoke detectors' buttons during the two inspections because they could not reach the buttons, as they had no ladders. Respondent was written-up by DHR on both occasions because written documentation of interconnectedness was not provided and because interconnectedness was not otherwise demonstrated. In other words, Respondent provided neither papers showing interconnectedness nor a physical demonstration of interconnectedness during the second inspection.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Hotels and Restaurants, shall enter a final order: Finding Respondent guilty of violating Sections 509.221(1) and (7), Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rules 61C-1.004(5) and (6), and 61C-3.001(2), and not guilty of violating Florida Administrative Code Rule 61C- 1.004(13); Ordering Respondent to pay an administrative penalty in the amount of $2,500.00, due and payable to the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Hotels and Restaurants, 1940 North Monroe Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32399, within 30 days of the final order; Requiring Respondent to attend a Hospitality Education Program class within 60 days of the date of the final order and provide proof thereof to the Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Hotels and Restaurants; and Requiring that Respondent pass a re-inspection of its premises within the same 60 days set out in (3), above. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of July, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of July, 2004.

Florida Laws (4) 120.5720.165509.221509.261
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DR. ERIC J. SMITH, AS COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION vs CHC PRIVATE SCHOOLS, 09-000993 (2009)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Trenton, Florida Feb. 19, 2009 Number: 09-000993 Latest Update: Jun. 25, 2013

The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent’s participation in the John M. McKay Scholarships for Students with Disabilities Program (McKay Scholarships) and the Corporate Income Tax Credit Scholarship Program (CTC Scholarships) should have been suspended, and whether Respondent’s eligibility to participate in the programs should be revoked.

Findings Of Fact CHC is a private school located in Merritt Island, Florida. Lara Nichilo is the owner and head administrator of CHC. Ms. Nichilo was also the owner and head administrator of another private school located in Cocoa, Florida. For the purposes of this proceeding, the school located in Cocoa, Florida, will be referred to as CHC 2.2 CHC and CHC 2 had participated in the McKay Scholarships and CTC Scholarships programs. Section 1002.39, Florida Statutes, authorizes the McKay Scholarships program, which affords a disabled student an opportunity to receive a scholarship to defray the cost of attending a private school of choice. Section 220.187, Florida Statutes, authorizes the CTC Scholarships program, which enables taxpayers to make private, voluntary contributions so that students who qualify for free or reduced-price school lunches under the National School Lunch Act may receive a scholarship to defray the cost of attending a private school of choice. The Department of Education has the responsibility to annually verify the eligibility of a private school to participate in these scholarship programs. Private schools participating in the McKay Scholarships and CTC Scholarships programs are required to comply with Section 1002.421, Florida Statutes, and must meet applicable state and local health, safety, and welfare laws, codes, and rules, including laws, codes, and rules relating to firesafety and building safety. If a private school participating in the McKay Scholarships and CTC Scholarships programs desires to renew its participation in the programs, the school must file a signed, notarized Form IEPC SCF-1 affidavit with the Department of Education by March 1 of each year for participation in the subsequent school year. The Form IEPC SCF-1 affidavit contains a list of requirements to which the private school must certify that it meets or does not meet. If the school certifies that it does not meet a requirement, such certification constitutes an outstanding compliance issue, which must be resolved by the school prior to May 1 of each year for the school to remain eligible to participate in the scholarship programs. Specifically, the signature page of the Form IEPC SCF-1 affidavit states in part: “I understand that in answering ‘No’ to any requirement in Section 9: School Facility, the provision of a reason for answering ‘No’ shall not make the school compliant with the reporting requirement and will be considered an outstanding compliance issue for resolution as described in State Board of Education Rules 6A-6.03315, 6A-6.0960, and 6A- 6.0970, Florida Administrative Code.” Florida Administrative Code Rule 6A-6.03315(2) requires that every third year a school applies for renewal of eligibility for the scholarship programs there must be a review of compliance documentation. This means that the school must submit documentation to support its eligibility along with the affidavit. For the renewal of eligibility for the 2009-2010 school year, CHC had to submit compliance documentation for review. On November 6, 2008, Ms. Nichilo executed and mailed the Form IEPC SCF-1 affidavit for CHC for renewal of CHC’s eligibility to participate in the McKay Scholarships and CTC Scholarships programs for the 2009-2010 school year. Subsection 1 of Section 9 of the Form IEPC SCF-1 affidavit requires the school to answer the following question: Does the school facility possess a current, violation free or satisfactory Fire Code Inspection and compliance report in accordance with Section 1002.421(2)(g)1., Florida Statutes, State Finance Services Rule 69A-58.004, Florida Administrative Code, and county and/or municipal ordinance? Ms. Nichilo answered “Yes” to the question. CHC submitted a fire inspection certificate for CHC with a date of February 22, 2008. At the time Ms. Nichilo executed and submitted the Form IEPC SCF-1 affidavit in November 2008, CHC did not have a current Fire Code Inspection and compliance report. The last fire inspection certificate was dated February 22, 2006, and had expired on February 22, 2007. Ms. Nichilo executed and submitted a Form IEPC SCF-1 affidavit for the 2007-2008 school year, certifying that CHC had a current, violation-free fire inspection report. The certificate affidavit which Ms. Nichilo signed stated: I have read the applicable scholarship program rules and understand that by signing this form I am certifying that the school is currently in compliance and agrees [sic] to remain in compliance with all scholarship program rules and reporting requirements. If at any point, the school is not in compliance with scholarship rules, or if there is a change in the status of any reporting requirement, the school will have 15 days to notify the Department of Education and will provide all information necessary to document its continued compliance with program rules and requirements. At the time the certification was submitted on January 11, 2007, CHC did have a current, violation-free fire inspection report; however, CHC did not have a current, violation-free fire inspection report that was valid for the entire 2007-2008 school year. CHC did not notify the Department of Education that it was not in compliance with the fire safety inspections during the 2007-2008 school year. On December 5, 2007, Ms. Nichilo executed and submitted a Form IEPC SCF-1 affidavit for the 2008-2009 school year, certifying that CHC had a current, violation-free fire inspection report. At the time of submission of the affidavit, CHC did not have a current, violation-free fire inspection report, and, from the beginning of the 2008-2009 school year until December 23, 2008, CHC did not maintain a current, violation-free fire inspection report nor did CHC notify the Department of Education as late as December 11, 2008, that CHC was not in compliance with the fire inspection requirement. On November 19, 2008, Assistant Fire Marshall Doug Carter of Brevard County Fire Rescue (BCFR) received a complaint concerning CHC and CHC 2 from an anonymous caller. It is the policy of BCFR to follow up on all complaints. On November 20, 2008, Lead Fire Inspector William Morissette, following up on the anonymous complaint, went to CHC for the purpose of performing a fire inspection. On November 20, 2008, Mr. Morissette performed a fire inspection on CHC and noted some violations. During the inspection on November 20, 2008, Mr. Morissette noticed that the fire inspection certificate that was posted at CHC was partially obscured, and he could not see the school’s address. On November 20, 2008, Mr. Morissette performed a fire inspection of CHC 2 and noted some violations. He observed the posted fire certificate at CHC 2 during his inspection. The fire certificate had an account number 23832 and was dated February 22, 2008. The font used in the printing of the certificate did not appear to be the same type as used by BCFR. While at CHC 2, Mr. Morrissette called Assistant Fire Marshall Carter and learned that account number 23832 was for CHC and not CHC 2 and that no fire certificate had been issued to CHC 2 on February 22, 2008. The last fire certificate that had been issued to CHC 2 was on December 15, 2005, and had expired on December 16, 2006. On November 6, 2008, CHC sent a copy of the fire inspection certificate dated February 22, 2008, to the Department of Education as part of the documentation supplied to verify CHC’s eligibility for renewal. The fire inspection certificate was a forgery. Ms. Nichilo testified that she did not send the forged certificate to the Department of Education and that some disgruntled former employee who had access to CHC’s files must have sent the certificate to the Department of Education or must have put the forged certificate in the envelope containing the renewal information that was sent to the Department of Education. Ms. Nichilo’s testimony is not credible. The certificate came in the same envelope as the other material which CHC submitted in November 2008. Ms. Nichilo signed and mailed the renewal information on November 6, 2008. Her testimony that the envelope must have been in the mail room a couple of days before it was mailed, thereby allowing the disgruntled employee an opportunity to slip the forged certificate in the envelope, is not credible. After the renewal package was sent to the Department of Education, Ms. Nichilo asked her secretary to contact BCFR to schedule a fire inspection. Ms. Nichilo knew that she needed a fire inspection because she knew that she did not have a current fire inspection certificate when she sent the renewal submittal to the Department of Education. Based on the clear and convincing evidence presented, it can only be concluded that Ms. Nichilo knew the fire inspection certificates, which she included with the renewal submittals, were forgeries. On or about December 5, 2008, Mr. Carter contacted the Department of Education and informed the Department of Education that he had concerns about CHC’s and CHC 2’s fire inspection certificates. Mr. Carter sent a memorandum dated December 9, 2008, to Riley Hyle with the Department of Education, explaining BCFR’s observations and concerns relating to the fire inspection certificates. After learning from Mr. Carter that CHC’s and CHC 2’s fire inspection certificates were in question, Mr. Hyle checked the Department of Education’s renewal files on CHC and CHC 2. Mr. Hyle found forged fire inspection certificates in both files. When CHC’s and CHC 2’s submittals arrived on November 10, 2008, in the same envelope, Mr. Hyle reviewed the submittals and verified that both submittals contained fire inspection certificates. He received no further documentation from CHC or CHC 2 from November 10, 2008, and the time he talked to Mr. Carter on December 5, 2008. On December 8, 2008, Mr. Morrissette returned to CHC 2 to do a follow-up inspection. CHC 2 had not corrected all its violations. Mr. Morrissette was advised by the principal at CHC 2 that CHC also had not corrected all of its violations. One of the violations CHC had was a broken lockbox. On December 7, 2008, CHC had called BCFR and requested an application for a lockbox. Thus, on December 8, 2008, CHC would still have not corrected its lockbox violation. On December 11, 2008, Ms. Nichilo signed a revised version of the Form IEPC SCF-1 affidavit3 for CHC for the 2009- 2010 school year. The question posed in the affidavit submitted in November 2008 concerning whether the facility had a current, violation-free fire code inspection remained the same in the revised affidavit. Again, CHC stated that it did have a current, violation-free Fire Code Inspection and compliance report. The revised affidavit also contained the same language as the November 2008 affidavit that answering a question in the negative in Section 9 would result in an out-of-compliance issue. Both the November affidavit and the revised affidavit contained the following language: I have read the applicable scholarship program rules and understand that by signing the form I am certifying that the school is currently in compliance and agrees [sic] to remain in compliance with all scholarship program rules and reporting requirements. If at any point, the school is not in compliance with the scholarship rules, or if there is a change in the status of any reporting requirement, the school shall have 15 days to notify the Department of Education and will provide all information necessary to document its continued compliance with program rules and requirements. The revised affidavit was submitted to the Department of Education, which received the affidavit on December 16, 2008. At the time CHC submitted the affidavit, it did not have a current, violation-free Fire Code Inspection and compliance report. On December 23, 2008, the BCFR re-inspected CHC and found that the violations had been corrected. After its inspection on December 23, 2008, BCFR issued a fire inspection certificate backdated to November 20, 2008, which was the date of the original inspection. On December 17, 2008, the Agency issued an Administrative Complaint, suspending CHC’s eligibility for the McKay Scholarships and CTC Scholarships programs for failure to have a current fire inspection report. By letter dated December 23, 2008, and received by the Department of Education on December 29, 2008, CHC advised that the school had been re- inspected and now had a current fire code inspection certificate. On January 2, 2009, CHC sent a 12-page facsimile transmission to the Department of Education. One of the pages of the transmission was a copy of a facsimile transmission coversheet dated December 31, 2008, with the BCFR letterhead concerning inspection reports. The comments section of the coversheet read “Please read letter.” The second page of the transmission was an unsigned to-whom-it-may-concern letter dated December 30, 2008. At the top of the letter, printed in large, bold type was the following: “Brevard County Fire Rescue.” The letter stated: To whom it may concern, In reviewing and trying to figure out what happen with the 2007 inspection reports this is the conclusion we have come to. If you review the two reports on both CHC-1 and CHC-2 the visiting inspection times over lap each other making it seem like a 2007 inspection was done when in reality it was not. CHC-1 inspection has a date on it February 22, 2006 to February 2007. CHC-2 inspection shows January 12, 2006 (re-inspection) January 2007. I believe that this was just an over site on both our parts due to the fact that the fire department does come in regularly every year even without an appointment. Lara Nichilo did notify us to come in ASAP when the reports could not be found. But as of November 20, 2008 all her inspections were done and her follow up correction reports have been completed putting her in good standing with the fire and inspections department. CHC-1 and CHC-2 (inspection reports provided to you with this letter) For more information you may contact us at 321-455-6383 Thank you for your time, The telephone number given in the letter was the telephone number for CHC. The original letter submitted at the final hearing by CHC was written on stationary bearing the CHC watermark. The letter received by the Department of Education had no visible watermark. The facsimile transmission coversheet that accompanied the letter was a coversheet which BCFR had sent to CHC on December 31, 2008. The statements in the comments section that BCFR sent had been deleted and replaced with “Please read letter.” The following are the comments which BCFR had written: There are no reports or certificates for 690 Range Road for 2006 or 2007. There are no inspection reports or certificates for 55 McLeod for 2007. Certificates will be issued upon receipt of payment. Laura Harrison, the director of the McKay Scholarships and CTC Scholarships programs at the Department of Education, transmitted a copy of the letter to BCFR and asked if the letter had originated from BCFR. Mr. Carter advised Ms. Harrison that the letter did not come from BCFR. Ms. Nichilo wrote the letter. A person reading the letter would be led to believe that the letter came from BCFR. The letter was accompanied by a facsimile transmission coversheet bearing the BCFR letterhead and the coversheet comments said “Please read letter.” The letter refers to Ms. Nichilo in the third person and uses first person plural pronouns to refer to BCFR. The letter purports to bear the letterhead of BCFR. It must be concluded that Ms. Nichilo intended the Department of Education to rely on the letter as a letter transmitted by BCFR to Ms. Nichilo to explain the situation. If Ms. Nichilo had intended the Department of Education to treat the letter as a letter written by her, she would have written the letter using CHC letterhead, signed the letter, not referred to herself in the third person, not referred to BCFR in the first person, and not used a transmission coversheet from BCFR in which the comments section had been altered. In a conversation on December 30, 2008, Ms. Nichilo advised Mr. Hyle that she was sending him a letter that would explain everything and would resolve the situation concerning the fire inspections. Ms. Nichilo testified that she told Mr. Hyle that she was writing the letter. Mr. Hyle did not recall whether Ms. Nichilo said that she was writing a letter. Jade Quinif, who was Ms. Nichilo’s administrative assistant on December 30, 2008, listened to the conversation between Mr. Hyle and Ms. Nichilo on speakerphone. She recalls Ms. Nichilo asking Mr. Hyle if he would like her to write a letter regarding Ms. Nichilo’s conversations with BCFR. Mr. Hyle said that would be fine. Ms. Nichilo typed a letter and asked Ms. Quinif to send it to the Department of Education. Ms. Quinif sent a letter to the Department of Education dated December 30, 2008. Based on the evidence presented, the letter that Ms. Quinif sent was a letter dated December 30, 2008, written on CHC letterhead and signed by Ms. Nichilo.4 It was not the letter dated December 30, 2008, which appeared to be from BCFR (purported BCFR letter). The only evidence of receipt of the purported BCFR letter by the Department of Education is in a 12-page facsimile transmittal, which was transmitted twice on January 2, 2009. Ms. Quinif credibly testified that she did not send a 12-page transmission and that she did not send the doctored transmission coversheet from BCFR. She also credibly testified that the letter that she sent was a few days after Christmas and was not more than a week after Christmas. Ms. Nichilo testified that Ms. Quinif did sent the transmittal coversheet from the BCFR on December 30, 2008; however, Ms. Nichilo’s testimony is not credible given that the transmittal coversheet from BCFR was dated December 31, 2008, and showed a transmission date of December 31, 2008, to CHC. The clear and convincing evidence is that Ms. Nichilo wrote and sent the purported letter from BCFR and the doctored transmittal coversheet from BCFR in an attempt to make it appear that BCFR was taking some of the blame for CHC not having maintained current fire inspection certificates. BCFR does not automatically do an annual inspection of schools. If a school desires to have a fire inspection, the school must notify BCFR and arrange for a fire inspection. The failure to have current, violation-free fire inspection reports rests with CHC and not with BCFR. The bogus letter was an effort by CHC to seek mitigation for its failure to adhere to the requirements for eligibility for the scholarships programs. After learning that the letter transmitted on January 2, 2009, was not from BCFR, the Agency issued an Amended Administrative Complaint on January 23, 2009, which superseded the December 17, 2008, Administrative Complaint. The Amended Administrative Complaint deleted the allegations concerning the failure to have a current, violation-free fire inspection report and added allegations involving fraud and failure to maintain current, violation-free fire inspection reports.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered sustaining the suspension of CHC’s eligibility for the McKay Scholarships and CTC Scholarships programs and revoking CHC’s eligibility for the McKay Scholarships and CTC Scholarships programs. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of May, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUSAN B. HARRELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of May, 2009.

Florida Laws (6) 1002.011002.391002.421002.421120.569120.57 Florida Administrative Code (2) 69A-58.0046A-6.03315
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AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION vs WESLEY MANOR, INC., D/B/A WESTMINSTER WOODS ON JULINGTON CREEK, 03-001549 (2003)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Jacksonville, Florida Apr. 30, 2003 Number: 03-001549 Latest Update: May 26, 2004

The Issue Whether Petitioner Agency for Health Care Administration properly assigned conditional license status to Respondent, Westminster Woods on Julington Creek, based upon its determination that Respondent had violated Florida Administrative Code, Rule 59A-4.130, and 42 CFR Section 483.70 via Florida Administrative Code Rule 59A-4.1288, due to the presence of two wide-spread Class I deficiencies cited at the most recent annual licensure survey of January 27-29, 2003. Whether Petitioner Agency for Health Care Administration properly assessed a $30,000.00 fine against Respondent for violating 42 CFR Section 483.70 via Florida Administrative Code Rule 59A-4.1288, as well as Florida Administrative Code Rule 59A-4.130, due to the presence of two wide-spread Class I deficiencies at the most recent annual survey on January 27-29, 2003. Whether the Agency for Health Care Administration is entitled to $6,000.00 in costs related to the investigation and prosecution of this case(s), pursuant to Section 400.121(10), Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact Pursuant to Chapter 400, Part II, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 59A-4, Florida Administrative Code (2002), AHCA is the regulatory authority responsible for licensure of skilled nursing facilities and for enforcement of all applicable statutes and rules governing skilled nursing facilities, of which Respondent Westminster Woods at Julington Creek is one. On January 27-29, 2003, AHCA conducted an annual licensure and re-certification survey of Respondent's facility. As a result of that survey, the facility was cited for two Class I deficiencies related to failure of the facility's fire alarm system. Each of these deficiencies was cited upon the same underlying facts. AHCA represented that one was cited as a Federal "tag" and the other was cited as a State "tag." In the Administrative Complaints, AHCA alleged, in a single Count, two separate Class I deficiencies. Respondent is a 60-bed skilled nursing facility located in Jacksonville, Florida. Respondent houses more of the "older- old" or "elderly-elderly" residents than the average skilled nursing facility. Respondent is a second floor facility with two stairwells that provide direct outside egress from the facility and that can be used as fire exits. During the January 27-29, 2003, survey, the facility housed 58 residents. Respondent's 58 residents on those dates were fairly dependent in terms of their physical capabilities. More than one-half of them were over the age of 85, and a couple of the residents were over 100 years old. Only one of the residents on January 27-29, 2003, was independently ambulatory. The remainder of the residents were incapable of independent ambulation. One of the residents was bed-ridden. Thirty-eight residents required extensive assistance in transferring or ambulating. The remainder of the resident population required assistive devices such as canes or walkers to transfer or ambulate. Due to their age, physical condition, and inability to engage in self preservation, these residents were extremely vulnerable in the event of a fire. The survey team arrived at the facility at 6:00 a.m. on January 27, 2003. At around 8:00 a.m., the facility's maintenance supervisor, John Doran, conducted his usual rounds of the facility. Mr. Doran personally checks the fire alarm panel twice daily, and did so that morning. The panel has three lights: A green light which means that the panel is working; a yellow light which means a mechanical failure has occurred; and a red light which signifies an alarm. Mr. Doran noted that no light was on. The fire doors, which close automatically if the alarm is activated, were still open. Except for the absence of any alarm panel light, everything seemed to be normal. Therefore, on the morning of January 27, 2003, Mr. Doran believed that there was a problem with the fire alarm panel, not the fire alarm system. In addition to Mr. Doran's twice-daily checks, Respondent's alarm system is monitored by an outside monitoring company which is supposed to call the facility if any problem is detected with its fire alarm system. The monitoring company did not call, which also suggested that the system itself was not malfunctioning, but merely that a light was out on the alarm panel. Nonetheless, Mr. Doran called his secretary, who contacted "W. W. Gay," the contract repair company for the system, and asked that a technician come to the facility. Thinking there was no immediate danger, but only that there was a problem with the alarm panel lights, and believing that everything that could be done up to that point had been done, Mr. Doran did not mention the alarm panel/system to surveyor Patricia McIntire, R.N., when she interviewed him about hot water temperatures around 10:00 a.m. on January 27, 2003. W. W. Gay's technician arrived at the facility about 10:30 a.m. and began trouble shooting the fire alarm system. The first technician could not find the problem, so he called for a second technician. During the course of January 27, 2003, three technicians arrived at Respondent's facility and worked on the panel, in full view of staff and surveyors who were in and around the nurses' station. During the entire period that the fire alarm panel was not working, which ultimately amounted to at least three days, a large number of staff and other responsible people were around the resident areas. The January 27, 2003, morning shift had a minimum of 17 staff members directly assigned, with others coming and going from the unit. In all, there were around 25 people circulating in the nursing home during the day shift. After the surveyors had left, the evening shift had nine staff members assigned to the unit, with additional staff overlapping from the day shift. The night shift had six assigned staff members, plus "Ron," Respondent's security man, who was assigned to a fire watch, beginning late on the afternoon of January 27, 2003. (See Finding of Fact 32.) On Tuesday, January 28, 2003, there were 20 staff people directly assigned to the unit on the day shift. Counting the AHCA surveyors and ancillary staff, there were approximately 27 people on the floor. The evening shift had nine specifically assigned staff members, with others overlapping. The night shift had at least six staff members. On Wednesday, January 29, 2003, the numbers were similar. During the course of January 27, 2003, Mr. Doran did not tell Respondent's administrators, Don Wilson or Mike Sweeney, about the problem with the fire alarm panel because he thought the fire alarm panel problem was being resolved by the W. W. Gay technicians and because both administrators were very busy with the AHCA survey. Around 4:00 p.m., January 27, 2003, Mr. Doran found out that the problem with the fire panel was more serious than he had earlier thought. The AHCA surveyors had already left the facility. Mr. Doran went to Mr. Sweeney and Mr. Wilson. He told them at that time that W. W. Gay's third technician had told him that it would be the next morning before the fire alarm/system panel could be repaired. Mr. Sweeney and Mr. Wilson advised Mr. Doran that the situation was unacceptable. They instructed Mr. Doran to call W. W. Gay and tell that company to return and fix the panel immediately. Mr. Doran made the phone call, but as it ultimately turned out, the fire panel could not be fixed that night because a part had to be ordered. The facility had in-place a three-tiered system of evacuation in case of fire. First, residents in the room where the fire is located and those in the two adjoining rooms would be moved to safety. Second, if the fire continued to spread, all residents on the side of the fire doors where the fire was located would be moved to the other side of the doors and the fire doors closed. Third, and only if the fire were still not contained, would the residents be moved out of the building through the stairwells. The control panel of the fire alarm system is the "brains" of the facility's fire safety system. It has a direct connection to the local fire department and provides the fire department with direct, immediate notification if there is a fire in the facility. It provides immediate notification to the residents and staff of the facility through the sounding of bells, chimes, strobes, etc., of the existence of an emergency. It operates the smoke detectors. It automatically shuts down the air conditioning unit to prevent the spread of carbon monoxide, smoke, and fumes throughout the facility, and it automatically locks and unlocks the fire doors. It is the transfer of smoke and toxic gases generated during a fire which is the most common cause of casualty. The continued operation of the air conditioning system during a fire could make the lateral transfer of residents to another compartment on the same floor (tiers one and two of the facility's fire safety plan) ineffective because the continued operation of the air conditioning system could still transfer gases and smoke throughout the facility. However, in this case, although the facility's air conditioning system does move air, smoke being carried throughout the building was unlikely, since the intakes were located in common areas where smoke would be detected by staff. Fire drills are held by Respondent at least monthly. Staff is trained to respond to fires by Scott Fogg, a facility employee who has 23 years' United States Navy experience in training to fight fires, watching for fires, and fighting fires. Mr. Fogg has personally fought over 30 fires. He orients each new employee for at least one and one-half to two hours. He also does annual training of staff. Part of the training provided by Mr. Fogg consists of going step by step through the facility's fire plan. The plan includes contacting the fire department. Once the charge nurse knows of a fire, it is her responsibility to call "911." The facility's plan requires that the charge nurse notify the fire department, regardless of whether or not the alarm system is functioning.1/ The facility's fire plan is kept at several locations, including in the possession of the charge nurse and at the nurses' station. Every individual who goes through orientation also receives a copy. There is a sprinkling system for the entire facility. The sprinkling system is not dependent on the alarm system functioning. Each resident's room has at least two sprinklers, and some rooms have three sprinklers. The bathrooms inside the residents' rooms have an additional sprinkler. The dining room, halls, common area, and stairwells have sprinklers. There are fire extinguishers located at each corner of the building and fire hoses on the walls. Mr. Fogg evaluates the monthly fire drills. If he notes a problem, he writes it up and does follow-up training. The building is made of concrete, and nonflammable paint is used. Smoking is not permitted in the facility building. Staff are required to smoke in a designated smoking area behind another building. Residents are not allowed to keep combustible materials in their rooms. The kitchen and laundry are located in another building. Evacuation routes are posted throughout the building. Upon learning at approximately 4:00 p.m. January 27, 2003, that the fire alarm/system could not be fixed that night, Messrs. Wilson and Sweeney instructed Mr. Doran to institute a one-hour fire watch. A fire watch involves dedicating an individual to go around the building at stated intervals (in this case, hourly) looking for potential fire, smoke, or fire risk. Mr. Sweeney is the facility's Executive Director. He is also a licensed nursing home administrator. Based on his 25 years of experience in health care and his knowledge of the properties of the facility's physical plant, he thought a one- hour fire watch was reasonable and appropriate. Mr. Wilson, the facility's Health Services Administrator, concurred. Respondent's security man, Ron, was instructed to perform the hourly fire watch. Mr. Doran walked Ron around the area and told him to use his eyes, ears, touch, and sense of smell to look for any signs of fire. Ron carried a cell phone so that he could quickly communicate with Messrs. Doran, Wilson, Sweeney, or the fire department, if necessary. There is no evidence that Ron failed in his instructed duties for an hourly fire watch. Most of the survey team returned about 7:00 a. m., on January 28, 2003. At approximately 8:30 a.m., another team member, Nicholas Linardi, AHCA's Life Safety Inspector, arrived at the facility for the first time. Mr. Doran met with Mr. Linardi in the administrative conference room at around 9:00 a.m. There is no dispute that the first order of business was Mr. Linardi's review of all of the facility's service and safety logs. Mr. Fogg was also present at that time. After this point, there are significant differences among the witnesses' respective testimonies as to the chronology of events and the time span involved. However, having weighed the credibility of the respective witnesses, it is found that no later than their arrival on the second floor skilled nursing unit at approximately 9:30 a.m., January 28, 2003, Mr. Doran told Mr. Linardi that there was a problem with the fire alarm panel/system. How clear Mr. Doran was in this first explanation of the extent of the problem or how much or how little of Mr. Doran's explanation Mr. Linardi appreciated at that time is not clear from the record, but Mr. Linardi inquired concerning what the facility was doing about solving the problem, and Mr. Doran told him. Mr. Linardi requested that Mr. Doran call W. W. Gay again. Mr. Linardi did not require that the facility shut off the air-conditioning, pending repair of the fire alarm system. He did not offer any immediate suggestions as to additional actions the facility staff should take to protect its residents. He did not state that the facility should increase the frequency of the fire watch. There also is no clear evidence that he told anyone at that time that the facility must notify the local fire department that the panel/system was inoperative. Mr. Linardi's testimony was clear that when he is on a facility's premises, he is one of the appropriate persons or entities to whom AHCA expects the facility will report a fire alarm/system malfunction, but he was also adamant that rigid enforcement of "tags and fire standards," means that the facility is required to report any malfunction to the local fire authority, in this case, to the St. Johns County Fire Department. It is Mr. Linardi's practice to issue a survey citation, regardless of the reason a fire alarm is out of commission. The rest of AHCA's survey team first became aware of the extent of the problem with the fire alarm system at approximately 2:45 p.m., on January 28, 2003, when Mr. Linardi conducted a fire drill in the facility for purposes of AHCA’s survey. During the fire drill, it became evident to the AHCA survey team that the alarm did not sound and the fire doors did not automatically close. During the fire drill, staff members had to yell out information to alert other staff members that there was a fire drill and to identify the location of the "pretend" fire. If the fire alarm system is working, it automatically closes the correct doors. If it is not working, staff members do not know which doors to close until told where the fire or pretend fire is, but during the fire drill, it took facility staff only four and one-half minutes to realize that the correct fire doors had not closed and to go to the north corridor to manually shut them. In general terms, Mr. Linardi felt that an incipient fire can start and be transferred throughout a facility within four minutes. He did not specifically discuss Respondent's facility. No one testified to what the response time should have been if an alarm had sounded. Beyond what could at most have been a half-minute response delay due to the absence of a functioning alarm, AHCA apparently found no fault with the staff's response to, and conduct of, the fire drill. Mr. Linardi was, in fact, complimentary of the results. After the fire drill on January 28, 2003, Mr. Linardi personally called W. W. Gay and verified that the part necessary to fix the panel/system was on order. Still later in the afternoon, Mr. Linardi notified the St. Johns Fire Marshal that Respondent's fire alarm system was not in service. The St. Johns Fire Marshal directed that the facility institute a 15-minute fire watch. Respondent immediately instituted the 15-minute fire watch on January 28, 2003. Mr. Linardi testified that he was concerned that the Fire Marshal's assigned fire watch frequency of 15 minutes was too liberal and that a fire watch perhaps should have been instituted at even shorter intervals, but since the regulations presume that the local authority shall set the protocol for fire watches, he said nothing. There was some surveyor commentary to the effect that laundry carts "stored" in Respondent's hallway near one of the exits to the stairs violated survey criteria and aggravated danger to residents, but Mr. Linardi conceded that laundry carts could legitimately be rolled through hallways as linen goods were transported in them from the linen closet to each resident's room. It was his opinion such carts should have been parked in residents' rooms for any extended period of time. No accurate measurements of acceptable time or unacceptable time that these carts remained in the hallways was advanced by any witness, so this survey criticism is not indicative of a citable flaw. A chair was found on the landing at the top of one of the two exit stairwells. The landing and stairwell are large. The chair was not blocking the door leading onto the second floor landing from the skilled nursing unit. The chair's location would not have prevented an ambulatory person or a person on a cane, assisted by another, from descending via the stairs. The only obstruction the chair might have represented would have been if a patient had to be carried on a stretcher or litter and the stretcher or litter had to be turned by two people on the landing. Mr. Linardi commented that actual egress was not at issue, but because survey criteria specifically prohibit furniture or any other object from being there, the chair's presence on the landing was still a citable offense. Renovations were ongoing in the facility during this period, and construction workers had temporarily stored some of the construction materials that they were using in the bottom recess of an exit stairwell. These supplies were stored without permission or knowledge of facility staff. The bottom of the stairwell is a large open area, 22 feet long by 10 feet wide. Most of the construction materials were stored beneath the stairs and were not blocking either a step down from the stairs or access to the outside exit door. However, one piece of flat molding protruded in front of the exit door, and had the potential of impeding egress. Although there was testimony that this molding could have been easily stepped over, the photographs make clear that this item could have impeded the speed of an evacuation of the above-described frail, elderly and non-ambulatory population if an evacuation had been necessary. There is no persuasive evidence that a hinge on any exit door prevented its being opened or that any exit door was otherwise unreachable or otherwise out of commission. During the 15-minute fire watch on the third day of the survey, January 29, 2003, Ron (See Findings of Fact 13, 32, and 42) found a tray on top of the juice machine in the beverage area of the facility’s dining room and removed it. This area is within three feet of a sprinkler head and within six feet of a fire extinguisher. The juice machine has thermal overload protection to prevent electricity going to the motor if the motor gets hot. In short, if the motor gets hot, the machine cuts off. When the surveyors arrived on that date, a number of residents and staff members were in the dining room. The surveyors noted an odor similar to that of a burning motor in the vicinity of the juice machine. At that time, the tray had already been found and removed as part of the 15-minute fire watch. When a motor overheats, the smell lingers for a long time. There is no evidence that the incident did more than produce an unpleasant odor. AHCA gave Respondent a written mandated correction date of February 6, 2003, but before the survey team finally exited on January 29, 2003, the facility had changed the fire watch to every 15 minutes and had advised that the fire alarm system would be operational on January 30, 2003. Therefore, AHCA removed the "immediate jeopardy" classification on January 29, 2003, prior to the end of the survey, when it determined that fire watches were being conducted every 15 minutes.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order Finding Respondent guilty of a single, isolated Class III deficiency, fining Respondent $1,000.00 therefore, and removing Respondent's conditional licensure status; and Remanding to the Division of Administrative Hearings the issue of the amount of any costs related to the investigation and prosecution of these cases, pursuant to Section 400.121(10), in the event the parties cannot stipulate to those costs. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of November, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of November 2003.

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DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, DIVISION OF HOTELS AND RESTAURANTS vs RAMADA INN RESTAURANT, 01-003011 (2001)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Clermont, Florida Jul. 25, 2001 Number: 01-003011 Latest Update: May 06, 2002

The Issue Whether the Respondent violated certain provisions of Chapter 509, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 61-C, Florida Administrative Code, as alleged in the Administrative Complaint.

Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence and testimony of the witness presented and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: On February 15, 2001, Angela Carragher, Safety and Sanitation Supervisor, conducted an initial inspection of Respondent. Ms. Carragher conducted re-inspections of Respondent on February 16, 2001, and March 5, 2001. During the inspections, Ms. Carragher observed numerous rodent droppings in the backside storage closets, as well as in the food storage area on the shelves. Rodent droppings are a critical violation because rodent droppings indicate the presence of vermin and rodents inside the facility which can contaminate the food. Ms. Carragher observed moldy vegetables in the walk- in cooler. Moldy vegetables in the walk-in cooler are a critical violation because spoiled food is not safe to serve to a customer. Ms. Carragher observed raw beef stored over some lettuce and cheese that were in the walk-in cooler. Raw beef stored over ready-to-eat foods like lettuce and cheese are a critical violation because raw beef can have bacteria, which could contaminate or cross-contaminate those ready-to-eat items. Ms. Carragher observed that Respondent did not have proof of a certified food manager at the facility. The certified food manager is the person who has the responsibility to ensure that all of the food workers are trained in food safety and proper food handling and that the facility is following all requirements of the Food Code. Proof that a certified food manager at the facility is critical because, otherwise, there is no way to know if somebody is supervising and overseeing the establishment. Ms. Carragher observed that the fire suppression system was not currently tagged and certified and that an emergency light did not light when tested. The fire suppression system is required to be inspected and certified every six months. The fire suppression system was last inspected in March 2000. A certified and tagged fire suppression system is critical because in the event of a fire, the system may fail to automatically discharge and put the fire out. Ms. Carragher observed an unlabeled spray bottle containing some unidentifiable green chemical solution. Restaurants often use a number of different chemicals in their kitchen, such as window cleaners, degreaser, and sanitizers. An unlabeled spray bottle is a critical violation because an employee may mistakenly use a wrong chemical on the wrong surface, which could create a contamination hazard for food items. Ms. Carragher observed dried food debris on the slicer and inside the three-door, reach-in cooler. Dried food on the slicer and cooler surfaces is a violation because dried food can harbor bacteria which can potentially contaminate fresh food. Ms. Carragher observed that the heat lamp bulbs on the cook's line were not shielded. Unshielded heat lamp bulbs are a violation because should a lamp break, the shattered glass may fall into the food to be served causing a physical hazard. Ms. Carragher observed that the ice scoop was stored on the top of the ice machine and not on a clean surface. The ice scoop is used to scoop the ice that is going to be used for beverages and food. The ice scoop stored on the top of the ice machine is a violation because the top of the machine contains dust and debris, which may cause potential physical contamination. Ms. Carragher observed holes in the walls in the backside storage closet, and grime accumulated on the floor underneath the sink and on the walls in the dishwashing area. Holes in walls and accumulated grime on sinks and walls are a violation because the dirt may contaminate clean dishes and holes may permit access by vermin. Ms. Carragher observed that the gasket on the door on the reach-in cooler was torn. A torn gasket is a violation because the gasket forms a barrier between the outside and inside of the cooler preventing hot air from the kitchen from getting into the cooler. It also creates a place where mildew can grow and contaminate food. Ms. Carragher observed that the carbon dioxide tank in the kitchen was not secured. A carbon dioxide tank which is not secured is a safety violation because a pressurized tank may be propelled violently by the compressed gas if the valve is damaged, hurting people in the restaurant.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered for suspension of Respondent's license until he pays a fine in the amount of $2,000. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of December, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of December, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles F. Tunnicliff, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2201 Lewis Pace Ramada Inn Restaurant 20349 North U.S. Highway 27 Clermont, Florida 34711 Manohar Jain Ramada Inn Restaurant 4800 South Apopka Vineland Road Orlando, Florida 32819 Susan R. McKinley, Director Division of Hotels and Restaurants Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Hardy L. Roberts, III, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202

Florida Laws (5) 120.5720.165202.11509.261601.11
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ADULT FAMILY CARE HOME (FLORENCE AKINTOLA, D/B/A ADULT FAMILY CARE HOME) vs AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION, 96-004099 (1996)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Deland, Florida Aug. 28, 1996 Number: 96-004099 Latest Update: Jul. 02, 2004

The Issue The issue for determination is whether the application for an initial license to operate an Adult Family Care Home ("AFCH") should be denied because the applicant submitted fraudulent or inaccurate information in the application.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is owned by Ms. Marvell Lawton, R.N. (the "applicant"). On June 3, 1996, the applicant applied for a license to operate an AFCH at 550 East Division Street, Deland, Florida (the "facility"). Respondent is the state agency responsible for licensing AFCHs. Respondent requires several documents to be submitted with the application including: a Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services ("HRS") Community Residential Homes Sponsor Certification Form (the "HRS Form"); a statement by the local zoning office that the facility is properly zoned (the "zoning approval"); and a fire inspection report. The applicant altered the HRS Form, the zoning approval, and the fire inspection report to indicate that the facility was approved for a maximum capacity of five residents. Respondent initially denied the license application solely on the basis of the fire inspection report. However, the basis of denial was amended to include the HRS Form and the zoning approval pursuant to an order entered by Judge Stephen F. Dean on October 16, 1996. By letter dated July 11, 1996, Respondent notified the applicant that her application was denied. The letter stated, in relevant part, that the specific basis for denial was: . . . Submission of fraudulent or inaccurate information to the agency. The fire safety inspection report submitted with the application package was altered to indicate approval for five residents when the fire marshal's office had only approved three residents. The local fire marshal's office has verified that the original approval was for three residents because Ms. Lawton did not want to install a manual alarm system which is required for four or five residents. Submission of fraudulent or inaccurate information to the agency is grounds for denial of the AFCH application, s. 400.619(11)(e),F.S. On April 2, 1996, the applicant obtained a fire inspection report from the City of Deland Fire Department (the "Fire Department"). The fire inspection report limited the maximum capacity of the facility to three residents because the applicant did not have the manual alarm system required for four or five residents and did not wish to install such a system. The applicant altered the fire inspection report that she submitted with her application. She changed the number "3" to a "5" so that the fire inspection report appeared to approve the facility for a maximum capacity of five residents. As part of its review of the application, Respondent attempted to verify the fire inspection report included in the application by calling the Fire Department. When the Fire Department did not verify that the maximum capacity was five residents, Respondent obtained a copy of the original fire inspection report from the Fire Department. On March 22, 1996, the applicant obtained a zoning approval from the City of DeLand stating that the maximum capacity of the facility is three residents. The applicant added the phrase "to 5" after the number "3" in the zoning approval so that the zoning approval authorized a maximum capacity of "3 to 5" residents. On June 3, 1996, the applicant submitted the HRS Form to Respondent. The applicant amended the portion of the HRS Form requiring a designation of capacity for facilities with six or fewer residents as well as that for facilities with 7-14 residents. The latter category does not apply to Petitioner. The applicant did not submit fraudulent information to Respondent. The applicant did not intend to defraud Respondent. She misunderstood the application process. The facility has space for only three residents. It is physically impossible to house more than three residents in the facility. The applicant would have gained nothing from an authorized capacity of more than three residents. The applicant's refusal to add the manual alarm system required for four or five residents is consistent with the facility's limit of three residents. The applicant assumed that Respondent's minimum license category is for a license of 1-5 residents. The applicant altered the HRS Form, the zoning approval, and the fire inspection report under the mistaken belief that the capacity designation in each document should conform to the maximum capacity in Respondent's license category. In the HRS Form, the applicant even altered the licensed capacity for facilities with 7-14 residents. The applicant mistakenly submitted inaccurate information to Respondent within the meaning of Section 400.619(11)(e), Florida Statutes.1 The maximum licensed capacity of the facility must be consistent with fire safety requirements for the welfare of the residents. The licensed capacity of the facility must also conform to applicable zoning laws.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a Final Order and thereinGRANT a license to operate an AFCH for three residents. RECOMMENDED this 21st day of February, 1997, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of February, 1997.

Florida Administrative Code (1) 58A-14.0091
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AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION vs WESLEY MANOR, INC., D/B/A WESTMINSTER WOODS ON JULINGTON CREEK, 03-002568 (2003)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Jacksonville, Florida Jul. 15, 2003 Number: 03-002568 Latest Update: May 26, 2004

The Issue Whether Petitioner Agency for Health Care Administration properly assigned conditional license status to Respondent, Westminster Woods on Julington Creek, based upon its determination that Respondent had violated Florida Administrative Code, Rule 59A-4.130, and 42 CFR Section 483.70 via Florida Administrative Code Rule 59A-4.1288, due to the presence of two wide-spread Class I deficiencies cited at the most recent annual licensure survey of January 27-29, 2003. Whether Petitioner Agency for Health Care Administration properly assessed a $30,000.00 fine against Respondent for violating 42 CFR Section 483.70 via Florida Administrative Code Rule 59A-4.1288, as well as Florida Administrative Code Rule 59A-4.130, due to the presence of two wide-spread Class I deficiencies at the most recent annual survey on January 27-29, 2003. Whether the Agency for Health Care Administration is entitled to $6,000.00 in costs related to the investigation and prosecution of this case(s), pursuant to Section 400.121(10), Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact Pursuant to Chapter 400, Part II, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 59A-4, Florida Administrative Code (2002), AHCA is the regulatory authority responsible for licensure of skilled nursing facilities and for enforcement of all applicable statutes and rules governing skilled nursing facilities, of which Respondent Westminster Woods at Julington Creek is one. On January 27-29, 2003, AHCA conducted an annual licensure and re-certification survey of Respondent's facility. As a result of that survey, the facility was cited for two Class I deficiencies related to failure of the facility's fire alarm system. Each of these deficiencies was cited upon the same underlying facts. AHCA represented that one was cited as a Federal "tag" and the other was cited as a State "tag." In the Administrative Complaints, AHCA alleged, in a single Count, two separate Class I deficiencies. Respondent is a 60-bed skilled nursing facility located in Jacksonville, Florida. Respondent houses more of the "older- old" or "elderly-elderly" residents than the average skilled nursing facility. Respondent is a second floor facility with two stairwells that provide direct outside egress from the facility and that can be used as fire exits. During the January 27-29, 2003, survey, the facility housed 58 residents. Respondent's 58 residents on those dates were fairly dependent in terms of their physical capabilities. More than one-half of them were over the age of 85, and a couple of the residents were over 100 years old. Only one of the residents on January 27-29, 2003, was independently ambulatory. The remainder of the residents were incapable of independent ambulation. One of the residents was bed-ridden. Thirty-eight residents required extensive assistance in transferring or ambulating. The remainder of the resident population required assistive devices such as canes or walkers to transfer or ambulate. Due to their age, physical condition, and inability to engage in self preservation, these residents were extremely vulnerable in the event of a fire. The survey team arrived at the facility at 6:00 a.m. on January 27, 2003. At around 8:00 a.m., the facility's maintenance supervisor, John Doran, conducted his usual rounds of the facility. Mr. Doran personally checks the fire alarm panel twice daily, and did so that morning. The panel has three lights: A green light which means that the panel is working; a yellow light which means a mechanical failure has occurred; and a red light which signifies an alarm. Mr. Doran noted that no light was on. The fire doors, which close automatically if the alarm is activated, were still open. Except for the absence of any alarm panel light, everything seemed to be normal. Therefore, on the morning of January 27, 2003, Mr. Doran believed that there was a problem with the fire alarm panel, not the fire alarm system. In addition to Mr. Doran's twice-daily checks, Respondent's alarm system is monitored by an outside monitoring company which is supposed to call the facility if any problem is detected with its fire alarm system. The monitoring company did not call, which also suggested that the system itself was not malfunctioning, but merely that a light was out on the alarm panel. Nonetheless, Mr. Doran called his secretary, who contacted "W. W. Gay," the contract repair company for the system, and asked that a technician come to the facility. Thinking there was no immediate danger, but only that there was a problem with the alarm panel lights, and believing that everything that could be done up to that point had been done, Mr. Doran did not mention the alarm panel/system to surveyor Patricia McIntire, R.N., when she interviewed him about hot water temperatures around 10:00 a.m. on January 27, 2003. W. W. Gay's technician arrived at the facility about 10:30 a.m. and began trouble shooting the fire alarm system. The first technician could not find the problem, so he called for a second technician. During the course of January 27, 2003, three technicians arrived at Respondent's facility and worked on the panel, in full view of staff and surveyors who were in and around the nurses' station. During the entire period that the fire alarm panel was not working, which ultimately amounted to at least three days, a large number of staff and other responsible people were around the resident areas. The January 27, 2003, morning shift had a minimum of 17 staff members directly assigned, with others coming and going from the unit. In all, there were around 25 people circulating in the nursing home during the day shift. After the surveyors had left, the evening shift had nine staff members assigned to the unit, with additional staff overlapping from the day shift. The night shift had six assigned staff members, plus "Ron," Respondent's security man, who was assigned to a fire watch, beginning late on the afternoon of January 27, 2003. (See Finding of Fact 32.) On Tuesday, January 28, 2003, there were 20 staff people directly assigned to the unit on the day shift. Counting the AHCA surveyors and ancillary staff, there were approximately 27 people on the floor. The evening shift had nine specifically assigned staff members, with others overlapping. The night shift had at least six staff members. On Wednesday, January 29, 2003, the numbers were similar. During the course of January 27, 2003, Mr. Doran did not tell Respondent's administrators, Don Wilson or Mike Sweeney, about the problem with the fire alarm panel because he thought the fire alarm panel problem was being resolved by the W. W. Gay technicians and because both administrators were very busy with the AHCA survey. Around 4:00 p.m., January 27, 2003, Mr. Doran found out that the problem with the fire panel was more serious than he had earlier thought. The AHCA surveyors had already left the facility. Mr. Doran went to Mr. Sweeney and Mr. Wilson. He told them at that time that W. W. Gay's third technician had told him that it would be the next morning before the fire alarm/system panel could be repaired. Mr. Sweeney and Mr. Wilson advised Mr. Doran that the situation was unacceptable. They instructed Mr. Doran to call W. W. Gay and tell that company to return and fix the panel immediately. Mr. Doran made the phone call, but as it ultimately turned out, the fire panel could not be fixed that night because a part had to be ordered. The facility had in-place a three-tiered system of evacuation in case of fire. First, residents in the room where the fire is located and those in the two adjoining rooms would be moved to safety. Second, if the fire continued to spread, all residents on the side of the fire doors where the fire was located would be moved to the other side of the doors and the fire doors closed. Third, and only if the fire were still not contained, would the residents be moved out of the building through the stairwells. The control panel of the fire alarm system is the "brains" of the facility's fire safety system. It has a direct connection to the local fire department and provides the fire department with direct, immediate notification if there is a fire in the facility. It provides immediate notification to the residents and staff of the facility through the sounding of bells, chimes, strobes, etc., of the existence of an emergency. It operates the smoke detectors. It automatically shuts down the air conditioning unit to prevent the spread of carbon monoxide, smoke, and fumes throughout the facility, and it automatically locks and unlocks the fire doors. It is the transfer of smoke and toxic gases generated during a fire which is the most common cause of casualty. The continued operation of the air conditioning system during a fire could make the lateral transfer of residents to another compartment on the same floor (tiers one and two of the facility's fire safety plan) ineffective because the continued operation of the air conditioning system could still transfer gases and smoke throughout the facility. However, in this case, although the facility's air conditioning system does move air, smoke being carried throughout the building was unlikely, since the intakes were located in common areas where smoke would be detected by staff. Fire drills are held by Respondent at least monthly. Staff is trained to respond to fires by Scott Fogg, a facility employee who has 23 years' United States Navy experience in training to fight fires, watching for fires, and fighting fires. Mr. Fogg has personally fought over 30 fires. He orients each new employee for at least one and one-half to two hours. He also does annual training of staff. Part of the training provided by Mr. Fogg consists of going step by step through the facility's fire plan. The plan includes contacting the fire department. Once the charge nurse knows of a fire, it is her responsibility to call "911." The facility's plan requires that the charge nurse notify the fire department, regardless of whether or not the alarm system is functioning.1/ The facility's fire plan is kept at several locations, including in the possession of the charge nurse and at the nurses' station. Every individual who goes through orientation also receives a copy. There is a sprinkling system for the entire facility. The sprinkling system is not dependent on the alarm system functioning. Each resident's room has at least two sprinklers, and some rooms have three sprinklers. The bathrooms inside the residents' rooms have an additional sprinkler. The dining room, halls, common area, and stairwells have sprinklers. There are fire extinguishers located at each corner of the building and fire hoses on the walls. Mr. Fogg evaluates the monthly fire drills. If he notes a problem, he writes it up and does follow-up training. The building is made of concrete, and nonflammable paint is used. Smoking is not permitted in the facility building. Staff are required to smoke in a designated smoking area behind another building. Residents are not allowed to keep combustible materials in their rooms. The kitchen and laundry are located in another building. Evacuation routes are posted throughout the building. Upon learning at approximately 4:00 p.m. January 27, 2003, that the fire alarm/system could not be fixed that night, Messrs. Wilson and Sweeney instructed Mr. Doran to institute a one-hour fire watch. A fire watch involves dedicating an individual to go around the building at stated intervals (in this case, hourly) looking for potential fire, smoke, or fire risk. Mr. Sweeney is the facility's Executive Director. He is also a licensed nursing home administrator. Based on his 25 years of experience in health care and his knowledge of the properties of the facility's physical plant, he thought a one- hour fire watch was reasonable and appropriate. Mr. Wilson, the facility's Health Services Administrator, concurred. Respondent's security man, Ron, was instructed to perform the hourly fire watch. Mr. Doran walked Ron around the area and told him to use his eyes, ears, touch, and sense of smell to look for any signs of fire. Ron carried a cell phone so that he could quickly communicate with Messrs. Doran, Wilson, Sweeney, or the fire department, if necessary. There is no evidence that Ron failed in his instructed duties for an hourly fire watch. Most of the survey team returned about 7:00 a. m., on January 28, 2003. At approximately 8:30 a.m., another team member, Nicholas Linardi, AHCA's Life Safety Inspector, arrived at the facility for the first time. Mr. Doran met with Mr. Linardi in the administrative conference room at around 9:00 a.m. There is no dispute that the first order of business was Mr. Linardi's review of all of the facility's service and safety logs. Mr. Fogg was also present at that time. After this point, there are significant differences among the witnesses' respective testimonies as to the chronology of events and the time span involved. However, having weighed the credibility of the respective witnesses, it is found that no later than their arrival on the second floor skilled nursing unit at approximately 9:30 a.m., January 28, 2003, Mr. Doran told Mr. Linardi that there was a problem with the fire alarm panel/system. How clear Mr. Doran was in this first explanation of the extent of the problem or how much or how little of Mr. Doran's explanation Mr. Linardi appreciated at that time is not clear from the record, but Mr. Linardi inquired concerning what the facility was doing about solving the problem, and Mr. Doran told him. Mr. Linardi requested that Mr. Doran call W. W. Gay again. Mr. Linardi did not require that the facility shut off the air-conditioning, pending repair of the fire alarm system. He did not offer any immediate suggestions as to additional actions the facility staff should take to protect its residents. He did not state that the facility should increase the frequency of the fire watch. There also is no clear evidence that he told anyone at that time that the facility must notify the local fire department that the panel/system was inoperative. Mr. Linardi's testimony was clear that when he is on a facility's premises, he is one of the appropriate persons or entities to whom AHCA expects the facility will report a fire alarm/system malfunction, but he was also adamant that rigid enforcement of "tags and fire standards," means that the facility is required to report any malfunction to the local fire authority, in this case, to the St. Johns County Fire Department. It is Mr. Linardi's practice to issue a survey citation, regardless of the reason a fire alarm is out of commission. The rest of AHCA's survey team first became aware of the extent of the problem with the fire alarm system at approximately 2:45 p.m., on January 28, 2003, when Mr. Linardi conducted a fire drill in the facility for purposes of AHCA’s survey. During the fire drill, it became evident to the AHCA survey team that the alarm did not sound and the fire doors did not automatically close. During the fire drill, staff members had to yell out information to alert other staff members that there was a fire drill and to identify the location of the "pretend" fire. If the fire alarm system is working, it automatically closes the correct doors. If it is not working, staff members do not know which doors to close until told where the fire or pretend fire is, but during the fire drill, it took facility staff only four and one-half minutes to realize that the correct fire doors had not closed and to go to the north corridor to manually shut them. In general terms, Mr. Linardi felt that an incipient fire can start and be transferred throughout a facility within four minutes. He did not specifically discuss Respondent's facility. No one testified to what the response time should have been if an alarm had sounded. Beyond what could at most have been a half-minute response delay due to the absence of a functioning alarm, AHCA apparently found no fault with the staff's response to, and conduct of, the fire drill. Mr. Linardi was, in fact, complimentary of the results. After the fire drill on January 28, 2003, Mr. Linardi personally called W. W. Gay and verified that the part necessary to fix the panel/system was on order. Still later in the afternoon, Mr. Linardi notified the St. Johns Fire Marshal that Respondent's fire alarm system was not in service. The St. Johns Fire Marshal directed that the facility institute a 15-minute fire watch. Respondent immediately instituted the 15-minute fire watch on January 28, 2003. Mr. Linardi testified that he was concerned that the Fire Marshal's assigned fire watch frequency of 15 minutes was too liberal and that a fire watch perhaps should have been instituted at even shorter intervals, but since the regulations presume that the local authority shall set the protocol for fire watches, he said nothing. There was some surveyor commentary to the effect that laundry carts "stored" in Respondent's hallway near one of the exits to the stairs violated survey criteria and aggravated danger to residents, but Mr. Linardi conceded that laundry carts could legitimately be rolled through hallways as linen goods were transported in them from the linen closet to each resident's room. It was his opinion such carts should have been parked in residents' rooms for any extended period of time. No accurate measurements of acceptable time or unacceptable time that these carts remained in the hallways was advanced by any witness, so this survey criticism is not indicative of a citable flaw. A chair was found on the landing at the top of one of the two exit stairwells. The landing and stairwell are large. The chair was not blocking the door leading onto the second floor landing from the skilled nursing unit. The chair's location would not have prevented an ambulatory person or a person on a cane, assisted by another, from descending via the stairs. The only obstruction the chair might have represented would have been if a patient had to be carried on a stretcher or litter and the stretcher or litter had to be turned by two people on the landing. Mr. Linardi commented that actual egress was not at issue, but because survey criteria specifically prohibit furniture or any other object from being there, the chair's presence on the landing was still a citable offense. Renovations were ongoing in the facility during this period, and construction workers had temporarily stored some of the construction materials that they were using in the bottom recess of an exit stairwell. These supplies were stored without permission or knowledge of facility staff. The bottom of the stairwell is a large open area, 22 feet long by 10 feet wide. Most of the construction materials were stored beneath the stairs and were not blocking either a step down from the stairs or access to the outside exit door. However, one piece of flat molding protruded in front of the exit door, and had the potential of impeding egress. Although there was testimony that this molding could have been easily stepped over, the photographs make clear that this item could have impeded the speed of an evacuation of the above-described frail, elderly and non-ambulatory population if an evacuation had been necessary. There is no persuasive evidence that a hinge on any exit door prevented its being opened or that any exit door was otherwise unreachable or otherwise out of commission. During the 15-minute fire watch on the third day of the survey, January 29, 2003, Ron (See Findings of Fact 13, 32, and 42) found a tray on top of the juice machine in the beverage area of the facility’s dining room and removed it. This area is within three feet of a sprinkler head and within six feet of a fire extinguisher. The juice machine has thermal overload protection to prevent electricity going to the motor if the motor gets hot. In short, if the motor gets hot, the machine cuts off. When the surveyors arrived on that date, a number of residents and staff members were in the dining room. The surveyors noted an odor similar to that of a burning motor in the vicinity of the juice machine. At that time, the tray had already been found and removed as part of the 15-minute fire watch. When a motor overheats, the smell lingers for a long time. There is no evidence that the incident did more than produce an unpleasant odor. AHCA gave Respondent a written mandated correction date of February 6, 2003, but before the survey team finally exited on January 29, 2003, the facility had changed the fire watch to every 15 minutes and had advised that the fire alarm system would be operational on January 30, 2003. Therefore, AHCA removed the "immediate jeopardy" classification on January 29, 2003, prior to the end of the survey, when it determined that fire watches were being conducted every 15 minutes.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order Finding Respondent guilty of a single, isolated Class III deficiency, fining Respondent $1,000.00 therefore, and removing Respondent's conditional licensure status; and Remanding to the Division of Administrative Hearings the issue of the amount of any costs related to the investigation and prosecution of these cases, pursuant to Section 400.121(10), in the event the parties cannot stipulate to those costs. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of November, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of November 2003.

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