Findings Of Fact Based upon the record evidence, the following Findings of Fact are made: Petitioner was formerly employed by Respondent as a Human Services Worker assigned to the Landmark Learning Center, a residential facility located in Dade County. She began her employment on May 10, 1985. On January 13, 1989, Petitioner received the following memorandum from the Residential Services Director of Facility I at Landmark: In reviewing your time and attendance record from August, 1988, I have observed that you are exhibiting excessive absences and/or tardiness. These frequent absences place an unfair burden on your coworkers and interfere with the operations of this center. Therefore they will no longer be tolerated. Effective on the date you receive this communication, the following restrictions will be in effect: As always, you are expected to have all leave time approved in advance by your immediate supervisor. You are expected to submit a doctor's statement justifying your absence prior to the approval of any sick leave, annual-sick leave, or family-sick leave. You will not be allowed to substitute any other type of leave for these absences. Failure to comply with the above restrictions will result in disapproved leave without pay for the dates in question, and a recommendation for disciplinary action based on absence without authorized leave. In addition a continued pattern of excessive absence could result in disciplinary action for excessive absence/tardiness. All disciplinary [action] will be in accordance with HRS-P-60-1, Employee's handbook. I am confident that you will correct this situation in a satisfactory manner. At no time prior to the termination of Petitioner's employment with Respondent were the "restrictions" imposed by this memorandum lifted. In early 1990, Petitioner sustained an on-the-job injury. As a result of the injury, Petitioner was on authorized leave from February 25, 1990, until April 4, 1990. When she returned to work on April 5, 1990, Petitioner was assigned to "light duty" in the field office of which Sylvia Davis, a Senior Residential Unit Supervisor, was in charge. Petitioner's working hours were 6:00 a.m. to 2:30 p.m. Petitioner was advised that Roberta Barnes would be her immediate supervisor during her "light duty" assignment. On April 5, 1990, Petitioner worked six and a half hours. She was on authorized leave the remainder of her shift. On April 6 and 7, 1990, she worked her full shift. On April 8 and 9, 1990, Petitioner did not report to work. She telephoned the field office before the beginning of her shift on each of these days and left word that she would not be at work because she was experiencing pain in her lower back and right leg; however, she never received supervisory authorization to be absent from work on these days. April 10 and 11, 1990, were scheduled days off for Petitioner. At approximately 11:00 p.m. on April 11, 1990, Petitioner telephoned the field office and gave notice that, inasmuch as her physical condition remained unchanged, she would not be at work the following day. Petitioner did not report to work on April 12, 1990. Although she had telephoned the field office the night before to give advance notice of her absence, at no time had she received supervisory authorization to be absent from work on April 12, 1990. On April 13, 14, 15 and 16, 1990, Petitioner did not report to work because she was still not feeling well. She neither telephoned the field office to give advance notice of her absences, nor obtained supervisory authorization to be absent on these days. April 17 and 18, 1990, were scheduled days off for Petitioner. Prior to the scheduled commencement of her shift on April 19, 1990, Petitioner telephoned the field office to indicate that she would not be at work that day because she had a doctor's appointment, but that she hoped to return to work on April 20, 1990. Petitioner did not report to work on April 19, 1990. Although she had telephoned the field office to give advance notice of her absence, at no time had she received supervisory authorization to be absent from work on that day. On April 19, 1990, Petitioner was sent the following letter by the Superintendent of Landmark: You have not called in or reported to work since April 12, 1990 and therefore you have abandoned your position as a Human Services Worker II and are deemed to have resigned from the Career Service according to Chapter 22A-7.010(2)(a) of Personnel Rules and Regulations of the Career Service System. Your resignation will be effective on the date that you receive this letter or on the date we receive the undelivered letter advising you of your abandonment. You have the right to petition the State Personnel Director, 530 Carlton Building, Tallahassee, Florida 32304 for review of the facts. Such petition must be filed within twenty (20) calendar days after receipt of this letter. At approximately 12:40 a.m. on Friday, April 20, 1990, unaware that she had been deemed to have resigned her position, Petitioner telephoned the field office to give notice that she would be out of work until after her doctor's appointment on Monday, April 23, 1990. On April 23, 1990, Petitioner again telephoned the field office to advise that she had to undergo further medical testing and therefore would remain out of work until the required tests were performed. Petitioner's call was transferred to Elaine Olsen, a Personnel Technician II at Landmark, who told Petitioner about the letter the Superintendent had sent to Petitioner the previous Thursday. Petitioner received the letter on April 30, 1990. Petitioner did not report to work during the period referenced in the Superintendent's letter because she was not feeling well. She did not intend, by not reporting to work on these days, to resign or abandon her position. It was her intention to return to work when she felt well enough to do so.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Administration enter a final order (1) finding that Petitioner did not abandon her career service position, and (2) directing Respondent to reinstate Petitioner with back pay. DONE and ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 16th day of May, 1991. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of May, 1991.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, James D. Reeves (Reeves), was employed full time by Respondent, Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services (Department), as an Inspector I in Vero Beach, Florida. On February 3, 1986, Reeves met with Mr. Charles E. Knight, Director of the Department's Division of Fruit and Vegetable Inspection. Recognizing that Reeves was suffering severe emotional problems, Mr. Knight authorized him to take sick leave to visit his family physician in Wrens, Georgia. Regarding the duration of that leave, Mr. Knight testified: I told Mr. Reeves as soon as he got into Georgia, he needed to see his doctor, if he had to go there and sit and wait all day and be the last person to see him, because he needed to follow the personnel rules and regulations, and he needed to get a doctor's excuse signed, if he was going to be off for any extended period of time. I told him I'd like to see him back at work within ten days, if he could get back to work by then. But I told him we would abide by whatever the doctor said, if he signed a written excuse, and he got his papers in. I also told him that he needed to stay in contact with me or the personnel office.... Reeves executed an application for sick leave effective February 4, 1986, with an open return date. On February 4, 1986, while enroute to Wrens, Georgia, his automobile broke down on I-95 near Savannah, Georgia. By February 10, 1986 the necessary repairs, including a rebuilt engine, had been competed on his automobile, and Reeves was able to resume his journey. On February 12, 1986, Reeves was finally able to see his physician, who prepared a "written excuse" that provided: Mr. Dixon Reeves was seen by me today in the office. He related his work history and present employment situation to me. Mr. Reeves admits to and is obviously under a great deal of stress concerning this issue. From the standpoint of mental well being, it is inadvisable for him to return to the cannery. I also understand that from the physical standpoint, he had to consult a podiatrist after working in the cannery for a number of years. Mr. Reeves is currently under my care for treatment of anxiety that the present circumstances have created. It is my opinion that a return to his former position in the cannery would worsen his condition and is therefore medically contraindicated. Please feel free t contact me if you need any further information. On February 13, or 14, 1986, Reeves forwarded a copy of his doctor's excuse, as well as a copy of the towing bill and repair bill for his car, to the Department's personnel office. These documents were sent to the Department without benefit of a cover letter and were the first contact the Department received from Reeves after his departure. By certified letter of February 19, 1986, the Department advised Reeves that his absence from work on February 10-12, 1986, was unauthorized and that, pursuant to Rule 22A-7.010(2), F.A.C., he was deemed to have abandoned his position and resigned from the Career Service. The letter further advised Reeves of his right to petition the Department of Administration for a review of the facts, and whether they constitute abandonment. Reeves timely petitioned the Department of Administration for review. On May 15, 1986, the Department accepted Reeves petition and on July 18, 1986 requested the assignment of a Hearing Officer from the Division of Administrative Hearings to conduct the final hearing. While it certainly would have been better practice for Reeve's to have kept his employer informed of the problems he encountered on his journey and the delays occasioned to his return, it cannot be concluded from this record that Reeve's absences of February 10-12, 1986 were unauthorized or that he abandoned his position. While somewhat open ended, Reeves' leave was at least authorized through February 13, 1986.
The Issue Whether Petitioners received salary overpayments from the Agency for Persons with Disabilities.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Petitioners Ileana Toledo, Norma Pedraza, and Lil Guerrero have been career service employees of Respondent. The Department of Management Services (“DMS”) has a classification and pay system that is used by Respondent, and DMS is responsible for designating employment positions within Respondent. A position is either included for overtime pay or excluded from overtime pay. At issue is whether Petitioners erroneously received monetary compensation for overtime hours worked after their position was reclassified from an included career service position to an excluded career service position. Prior to March 28, 2013, Petitioners held the position of Human Services Counselor III, which was designated by DMS as an included career service position. On March 26, 2013, Respondent proposed to reclassify Petitioners’ position from Human Services Counselor III to Human Service Program Analyst, which is designated by DMS as an excluded career service position. The proposed reclassification resulted from a reorganization of Respondent’s regional offices, and an effort by Respondent to standardize its functions, services, and types of positions in its regional offices. In a letter dated March 26, 2013, Petitioners were advised by Respondent’s Human Resources Director, Dale Sullivan, that if they accepted an offer to reclassify their position from Human Services Counselor III to Human Service Program Analyst, their “current status and salary will remain unchanged.” Notably, the March 26, 2013, letter makes no specific mention of overtime. On March 28, 2013, Petitioners accepted Respondent’s offer of employment to reclassify their position from Human Services Counselor III to Human Service Program Analyst. Typically, employees of Respondent who are appointed to new positions are placed in probationary status, as opposed to permanent status, and are required to review and execute new position descriptions. However, the reclassification of Petitioners’ position by Respondent was not typical. As part of the reclassification of Petitioners’ position to Human Service Program Analyst, Respondent provided Petitioners with a new position description. However, Petitioners’ job duties, salaries, and permanent status remained the same as they had been in their prior position of Human Services Counselor III. Petitioners read and acknowledged their receipt of the new position description on March 28, 2013. On the first page of the position description, there is a heading titled “Position Attributes”. Under this heading, the term “Overtime” is shown, followed by two boxes, “Yes” and “No.” The “No” box is marked, indicating that Petitioners are not eligible to work overtime hours. The position description further indicates that Petitioners would be career service employees. However, the position description does not specifically include the terms included or excluded. Prior to the reclassification, Petitioners were paid bi-weekly based on an 80-hour pay period. If they worked more than 80 hours in a pay period, they received additional monetary compensation for their overtime hours. Payment for Petitioners’ regular and overtime work hours was based on employee timesheets submitted to the People First leave and payroll system. After the reclassification of their position, Petitioners continued to work overtime in excess of their bi-weekly contractual hours, despite the prohibition in the position description. Petitioners were required to obtain approval by their supervisors before being allowed to work overtime. Petitioners’ overtime was approved by their supervisors after the reclassification despite the prohibition on working overtime hours as indicated in the position description. During the pay periods of March 29-April 11, 2013; April 26-May 9, 2013; and May 10-June 23, 2013, Petitioner Ileana Toledo worked a total of 28 hours of overtime, and received monetary compensation in the amount of $464.63 from Respondent for these overtime hours. For the pay periods of March 29-April 11, 2013; April 12-April 25, 2013; April 26-May 9, 2013; and May 10-May 23, 2013, Petitioner Norma Pedraza worked a total of 32.25 hours of overtime, and received monetary compensation in the amount of $624.14 from Respondent for these overtime hours. For the pay periods of March 29-April 11, 2013; April 12-April 25, 2013; April 26-May 9, 2013; and May 10-May 23, 2013, Petitioner Lil Guerrero worked a total of 25.50 hours of overtime, and received monetary compensation in the amount of $426.65 from Respondent for these overtime hours. Respondent’s payment of monetary compensation to Petitioners for the overtime hours worked after the reclassification of their position to Human Service Program Analyst occurred due to an administrative coding error, thereby resulting in the overpayment of monetary compensation to Petitioners by Respondent in the amounts the Respondent seeks to recover from Petitioners. The administrative coding error occurred because of Respondent’s failure to note the change from included to excluded on the People First system following the reclassification of Petitioners’ position. The error occurred due to an honest mistake, and resulted in the overpayments at issue. Petitioners should not have received monetary compensation for their overtime hours in the Human Service Program Analyst position because a Human Service Program Analyst position is an excluded career service position. An excluded career service employee must earn and receive regular compensation leave credits for overtime work, but cannot receive monetary compensation for overtime work. On the other hand, included career service employees, such as those persons in Petitioners’ previous position of Human Services Counselor III, must receive monetary compensation for overtime hours worked, rather than regular compensatory leave credits. Neither Petitioners nor their supervisors were aware at the time that the overpayments were made that Petitioners could not receive monetary compensation for their overtime hours, but must instead receive regular compensatory leave credits. At hearing, Petitioners did not dispute the amounts and hours of overtime worked as set forth in paragraphs 12-14 above. In accordance with the Department of Management Services’ Bureau of Payroll Manual, the amount of salary overpaid, and the amount sought to be repaid, was calculated as set forth in paragraphs 12-14 above. When an agency has determined that a salary overpayment has occurred, it is required to follow procedures set forth in the above-referenced manual, to seek repayment. Respondent followed those procedures in making the calculations relevant in this case.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Agency for Persons with Disabilities determining that: 1) Petitioner Ileana Toledo was erroneously paid salary in the amount of $464.63; 2) Petitioner Norma Pedraza was erroneously paid salary in the amount of $624.13; 3) Petitioner Lil Guerrero was erroneously paid salary in the amount of $426.65; and 4) Petitioners are entitled to be compensated by Respondent through compensatory leave credits for the overtime hours worked as reflected in paragraphs 12-14 above. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of November, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DARREN A. SCHWARTZ Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of November, 2013.
Findings Of Fact Respondent was employed by the Brevard County School District on January 15, 1990, as a Secretary III, Classified. She was assigned as secretary to Margaret Lewis, Director of Vocational Education. Classified employees are distinguished from certified employees who are teachers or administrators who hold teaching certificates. Respondent's duties included typing, handling and filing documents and correspondence, keeping budget and payroll records, copying and receiving incoming phone calls to the Department of Vocational Education. For approximately six months, Respondent and her supervisor had a good working relationship. Both were new to the Brevard County School District, and Margaret Lewis felt that together they could make positive changes in the unit. Respondent's personnel evaluation dated March 15, 1990, rates her in the "exceptional high" range in every category, with the highest possible rating being given in the categories, "work attitude," "cooperativeness," "personal appearance" and "tardiness." Something happened in the summer of 1990 around the time that the unit was moving from its office in Rockledge to the new district building in the Brevard County Governmental Center at Viera. The relationship between the two women rapidly deteriorated, a phenomenon observed by co-workers and the assistant superintendents, including Margaret Lewis' supervisor, Daniel Scheuerer. The circumstances were confusing, even to Jerry Copeland, Assistant Superintendent of Personnel Services. None could pinpoint the cause of the rift, although both Ms. Cooper and Ms. Lewis offered their own theories. Ms. Cooper described her supervisor arriving at work one morning crying and upset over some domestic situation. She went into Ms. Lewis' office with her and urged her to go home. Ms. Lewis eventually did leave and was gone for several days. Upon her return, Ms. Cooper felt that Ms. Lewis was very cool toward her and began communicating with her through notes or through messages to other staff. Ms. Lewis believes Ms. Cooper's work attitude changed radically after she was passed over for a secretarial position in the School Board attorney's office. On two occasions, Ms. Cooper approached Abraham Collinsworth, the Superintendent, with concerns she had about Margaret Lewis. Mr. Collinsworth referred the matter back to Dr. Scheuerer, Ms. Lewis' supervisor and the Assistant Superintendent for Instructional Services. Dr. Scheuerer told the superintendent that he had a very disruptive situation with loud conversations and people not feeling good about each other. During the several months period, July through September 1990, Dr. Scheuerer met with the women individually and together. Ms. Cooper complained that Ms. Lewis required her to make too many copies of things, that she communicated with her through yellow stickers, "post-it" notes, and that she, Ms. Lewis, would not tell her where she was going. Dr. Scheuerer counselled Ms. Cooper to adapt to her supervisor's way of doing things and also made suggestions to Ms. Lewis of ways to improve communications, for example, allowing her secretary to keep the calendar. The meeting he had with both women together was very unpleasant. It was obvious that there was a lot of hostility and animosity, tension and stress between the two. Generally, however, Ms. Lewis conducted herself in a professional manner. Ms. Cooper kept a tape recorder that she used to play subliminal tapes. Ms. Lewis felt that she was using the tape recorder to tape their conversations. Ms. Lewis felt that Ms. Cooper spent an inordinate amount of time away from her desk and abused break periods. Ms. Cooper said that she was making deliveries or copying. Ms. Lewis begin writing notes of their confrontations in order to avoid getting emotionally involved. This seemed to inflame Ms. Cooper. Ms. Cooper's reaction to direction was often either a sullen shrug or a verbal retort. Ms. Cooper felt Ms. Lewis gave her conflicting or serial requests. She also kept notes of their interactions. Early on the morning of October 8, 1990, several employees in the area of Ms. Cooper's and Ms. Lewis' office overheard a verbal confrontation between the two. Ms. Cooper had her voice raised and when Ms. Lewis asked her not to talk so loud, she replied she wanted everyone to hear. It was obvious to Daniel Scheuerer, who also overheard part of the confrontation, that Ms. Cooper was the one doing the yelling. On October 9, 1990, Ms. Lewis gave Ms. Cooper the following written reprimand: This is a formal letter of reprimand as a result of your unacceptable behavior on the morning of October 8, 1990. It is being issued as a result of your intentional (you stated that you wanted to be heard by everyone when I asked you to lower your voice) vociferous and disruptive shouting at me in your work area and the disrespect which you displayed toward me as your supervisor after I had made reasonable requests. This type of behavior is unacceptable, disturbing and disruptive to the work effort of the department and the entire area. This is to inform you that any similar outburst of this matter will result in your immediate termination. CC: Personnel File (Petitioner's exhibit No. 5) Sometime around the end of September, or early October, Karen Denbo, the district Equal Employment Opportunity Officer, had a secretarial position open that would have been a lateral transfer (same level, same pay) for Janice Cooper. She applied, and Dr. Scheuerer asked Ms. Denbo to interview Ms. Cooper. Ms. Denbo asked if he was telling her to hire Ms. Cooper. Dr. Scheuerer was given the impression by both Ms. Cooper and Ms. Denbo that they had misgivings about Ms. Cooper performing in a position requiring a lot of technical filings for which there would be no training. Ms. Cooper was not offered the transfer and no other efforts were made to find Ms. Cooper alternative employment. On October 26, 1990, Ms. Lewis gave Janice Cooper a memorandum titled "Job Expectations." It informed her that her supervisor had concerns regarding job performance, relationships with other employees, work attitude and failure to follow administrative directives. It directed her to take specified times for break and it stated she must be accurate, careful, effective and courteous. It stated that her performance was not satisfactory and warned that "failure to make necessary adjustments will result in additional disciplinary action." (Petitioner's exhibit No. 6) On November 1, 1990, near the end of the work week, Ms. Lewis needed some coping done and could not find Janice Cooper. She filled out a copy request form and put Ms. Cooper's name as the contact person. Ms. Cooper returned and Ms. Lewis asked if the form was completed properly. Ms. Cooper looked at it and then replied, "It if says what you want it to say, then its alright." After Ms. Lewis returned to her office, Ms. Cooper followed her in and said if she was going to use her name she needed to get her permission first. As Ms. Lewis began writing down Ms. Cooper's comments, Ms. Cooper reached across the desk, knocking off pencils and paper, and tore the paper out of her hand. Ms. Lewis reached for the phone and asked Dr. Scheuerer to come immediately. Ms. Cooper left and did not return until November 5th, after the weekend. In the meantime, Ms. Lewis met with Dr. Scheuerer; the Assistant Superintendent of Personnel, Jerry Copeland; and the Labor Relations Director, Bob Barrett. Upon Ms. Cooper's return to work, Ms. Lewis called her in to her office. Bob Barrett was also present. She was given this letter: November 5, 1990 Ms. Janice Cooper, Secretary Vocational Education Department Dear Ms. Cooper: This is to inform you that your employment with the School Board of Brevard County is terminated effective immediately, November 5, 1990. The reason for this termination is your unsatisfactory performance. You have been counseled and warned on several occasions regarding the need to improve your performance. On October 26, 1990, you were provided a memorandum which outlined your responsibilities and gave you direction for improving your performance. You were notified that your performance was unsatisfactory and that your failure to make the necessary adjustments would bring additional disciplinary action. Since October 26, 1990, your performance has continued to deteriorate to the point that your unwillingness to make the effort required to function as a Secretary III necessitates this action. Prior to your departure from the work site today, you should turn in any keys or other such School Board material which was issued to you to uses in your job. Sincerely, Margaret Lewis Director, Vocational Education (Respondent's Exhibit No. 2) (emphasis in original) When asked if she had anything to say, Ms. Cooper made no response and refused to acknowledge receipt of the letter. She was directed to collect her personal items and to leave the office. With guidance from the State Department of Education, the Brevard County School District has a policy of discipline of all employees which it calls, "NEAT." The acronym stands for the right to "Notice," followed by "Explanation," followed by "Assistance," within a reasonable "Time." If the deficiencies are not corrected at the end of this process, the employee may be terminated. The School Board's adopted rule 6Gx5-7.05, provides in pertinent part: Suspension/Dismissal. A certificated employee may be suspended or dismissed at any time during the work year pursuant to provisions set forth in Florida Statute 230.33(7)(h), 231.36(4)(6) and the Rules of the Educational Practices Commission. A classified employee may be dismissed for cause. The immediate supervisor shall suspend the employee and notify him/her in writing of the recommendation for dismissal, stating the cause. Termination Date. The effective date of any termination of employment or suspension shall be the last day on which the employee works. (Respondent's Exhibit No. 1) In addition to the above, the School Board's administrative staff acknowledge an employee's right to a pre-termination process that gives her an opportunity to explain why she should not be terminated. The record in this proceeding establishes that Janice Cooper was insubordinate on several occasions. She yelled at her supervisor, disrupting the workplace; she refused to follow instructions or was insolent; and finally, she virtually assaulted her supervisor when she grabbed the paper and tore it up. There is little specific evidence, however, of her poor job performance. Her only evaluation during the ten months of her employment was exceptionally positive. The "Job Expectations" memorandum was provided four days before the incident leading to Ms. Cooper's separation, which incident was plainly insubordination or misconduct, but not "poor job performance." The administrative staff make no apparent distinction between "termination" and "suspension" as both are separations from employment; and they do not view Ms. Lewis' letter, therefore, as a violation of the policy described in paragraph 18 above. Practically, there is no distinction, as no separation is final until the Board takes its action. In the meantime, the employee is no longer on the payroll. In Ms. Cooper's case, the time off of the payroll has been two years, most of which time has been the result of circumstances beyond the control of the School Board. Neither before, nor immediately after her termination by Margaret Lewis, was Janice Cooper offered reasonable opportunity to explain why she should not be terminated. She was given the letter and asked if she had a response. The letter states that termination is a fait accompli. She did not respond, and was told to leave. No evidence was presented as to the need to take immediate action. Both the district and Ms. Cooper could have benefited from a brief cooling off period; the district, by taking the time to draft a letter reflecting the proper cause for its action; and Ms. Cooper, by having an opportunity to reflect on her employment jeopardy and to prepare a response. The district presented evidence sufficient to support a finding of cause to terminate Ms. Cooper. It did not, however, prove that the cause was "poor performance." For that reason, and because the employee was not offered a reasonable opportunity to respond, the termination procedure was fatally flawed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the School Board of Brevard County enter its final order reinstating Janice Cooper to full back pay and benefits from November 9, 1990, until and including October 7, 1992, and approving her termination effective October 7, 1992. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 20th day of January 1993. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of January 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The following constitute specific rulings on the findings of fact proposed by the parties. Petitioner's Proposed Findings Adopted in Paragraph 1. Adopted in Paragraph 3. Adopted in Paragraph 4. Adopted in substance in Paragraph 7. Adopted in substance in Paragraph 10. Adopted in substance in Paragraph 8. Adopted in substance in Paragraph 10. Adopted in substance in Paragraph 11. With the exception of the October 26, 1990 memo, the facts proposed here are rejected as unsupported by the weight of evidence. Poor performance was not proven, nor was it proven that Respondent was taping conversations, rather than playing her own "subliminal tapes." Adopted in substance in Paragraph 14. Adopted in substance in Paragraph 16. Rejected as irrelevant and immaterial. Moreover, there was some mention of a grievance, but no evidence of what this process was or whether it was actually filed and withdrawn. Adopted in Paragraph 17. Rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence, as to unsatisfactory job performance, which is distinguished, according to the School Board's witness, from "insubordination" or misconduct. (Transcript, p. 70-71) Rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence. Respondent's Proposed Findings Adopted in Paragraph 1. Adopted in substance in Paragraph 16. Adopted in Paragraph 18. 4-8. Rejected as argument or conclusions, or summary of testimony rather than discrete findings of fact. Some of those arguments and conclusions have been adopted in the conclusions of law herein. COPIES FURNISHED: Harold T. Bistline, Esquire Building E 1970 Michigan Avenue Cocoa, Florida 32922 F. Michael Driscoll, Esquire Suite 58 3815 North Highway One Cocoa, Florida 32926 Abraham L. Collinsworth, Superintendent Brevard County School Board 2700 St. Johns Street Melbourne, Florida 32940-6699 Betty Castor, Commissioner Department of Education The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400
The Issue The issue presented is whether Petitioner is entitled to retirement service credit for certain additional periods of time.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was employed by the Miami-Dade County Public Health Trust--Jackson Memorial Hospital (Dade County) in September 1970 as a full-time employee. As such, he was eligible to earn service credit for retirement. Dade County is an employer in the Florida Retirement System (FRS). Petitioner is a member of the FRS. There are approximately 870 employers within the FRS, and approximately 600,000 employees are members of the FRS. In the late 1990s the FRS began sending to each member an annual statement regarding that member's retirement account. The statement also advised that a member of the FRS could request an audit of that member's account at any time. The FRS sent these statements to the employing agency for distribution to that agency's employees who were members of the FRS. The procedure changed in 2000 after the FRS obtained member-employees' addresses. Statements were subsequently sent by the FRS directly to each member-employee. Prior to July 1, 1979, the employing agency determined which of its employees were eligible for membership in the FRS. On that date a new rule promulgated by Respondent became effective. Thereafter, the FRS determined which employees were eligible. At the time of the final hearing in this cause, Petitioner had 34.83 years of service for which he had obtained retirement service credit. He was not given retirement service credit, however, for the time periods of January 11, 1976, through May 1, 1976; August 22, 1976, through May 28, 1977; and May 29, 1977, through August 6, 1977. In this proceeding, Petitioner seeks retirement service credit for these additional three time periods. What benefits an employee receives is within the discretion of the employing agency. Similarly, how an employee is categorized, and what budgetary item or code an employee is paid from, is within the discretion of the employing agency. During the time periods in question Dade County used four different budget codes or statuses for paying its employees. Budget codes 1 and 2 signified regular full-time employees. However, budget codes 3 and 4 signified employees in temporary, part-time, or summer positions, the equivalent of the State of Florida's other personnel services category. Those employees within budget codes 1 and 2 received retirement service credit, but those within budget codes 3 and 4 did not and were not eligible. Petitioner's personnel file contains a copy of Dade County's Advice of Personnel Action form dated January 11, 1976, changing his status from full-time to part-time and placing him in budget status 3. Another Advice of Personnel Action form dated May 2, 1976, changed his status from part-time back to full-time and placed him in budget status 1. A third Advice of Personnel Action form dated August 22, 1976, changed Petitioner's status from full-time back to part-time and placed him in budget status 3. A Payroll--Employee Master Record shows that on May 29, 1977, Petitioner was promoted from a respiratory therapy tech 2 to a respiratory therapist, but his status remained part-time. A second Payroll--Employee Master Record shows that Petitioner was changed from part-time back to full- time on August 7, 1977. Petitioner admitted during the final hearing in this cause that there were times when he was given reduced hours of work at his request. His personnel file indicates the impact of his requests. Although he had been hired as a regular, full- time employee, during the time periods in question, he was only a part-time employee. Contrary to his testimony, Petitioner's personnel file reflects that he was aware at the time that his periods of part- time employment did not provide him with retirement service credit. His file contains a copy of a form enrolling him in the FRS signed by him on August 17, 1977. The form provides that Petitioner was employed by Jackson Memorial Hospital from September 14, 1970, through January 11, 1976, and again from May 16, 1976, through August 22, 1976. The file also contains a second FRS form which he signed on September 17, 1976, indicating that the reason he was submitting it was that he was going to full-time employment from part-time. Accordingly, Petitioner knew that he was not accruing continuous retirement service credit and understood that he needed to enroll in the FRS whenever he changed from part-time employment back to full- time. A one-page payroll register submitted by Petitioner as one of his exhibits in this proceeding covers one of the time periods in question. Although it shows that Petitioner paid for insurance and union dues, it does not reflect any information regarding retirement and, therefore, cannot support the implication that Petitioner suggests, i.e., that he is entitled to retirement service credit. Petitioner was careful to re-enroll in the FRS whenever he changed to full-time employment with Dade County. Similarly, Dade County changed the budget code each time Petitioner changed his employment status, which indicates an appropriate budget code was specifically selected.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered denying Petitioner's request for retirement service credit for the time periods of January 11, 1976 through May 1, 1976; August 22, 1976, through May 28, 1977; and May 29, 1977, through August 6, 1977. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th of October, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINDA M. RIGOT Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th of October, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Larry D. Scott, Esquire Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Luis J. Morrina 6211 Southwest 161 Avenue Southwest Ranches, Florida 33331 Sarabeth Snuggs, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Post Office Box 9000 Tallahassee, Florida 32315-9000 Steven S. Ferst, General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
Findings Of Fact Coflin was a permanent Career Service Employee, in Employment Office Supervisor (EOS) III Position. Coflin was "bumped" from his position by another permanent Career Service employee (Mr. Reddy), whose EOS III position was abolished by virtue of the failure of Hillsborough County to renew a contract for service with the Department of Commerce in November, 1975. Coflin was "bumped" on April 1, 1976 because pursuant to Department guidelines approved by the State Personnel Director as required by the State Personnel Rules, Coflin had fewer retention points than Reddy. Coflin, pursuant to the guidelines and rules and regulations, was in turn entitled to "bump" either the incumbent of an EOS III position who was not permanent in the position of EOS III or the employee within the State with the least retention points. This right and the positions available to him were communicated to Coflin; however, because he would have had to move to another area of the State to assume either of these positions, Coflin elected under protest to take the third alternative, demotion to another class in which he held permanent status in his immediate geographical area. Coflin appealed the resulting demotion, asserting that he had been wrongfully demoted. The demotion was solely the result of Coflin having been "bumped" in accordance with the guidelines of the Department of Commerce and not because of Coflin's job performance and conduct which were above average. The Department's guidelines were not adopted as rules in the manner prescribed in Chapter 120, Florida Statutes.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Officer recommends that Coflin be reinstated to his position as EOS III, the personnel action taken having not been for good cause. DONE and ORDERED this 10th day September, 1976 in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of September, 1976. COPIES FURNISHED: Mrs. Dorothy Roberts Appeals Coordinator Division of Personnel and Retirement Department of Administration 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Kenneth H. Hart, Jr., Esquire 401 Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Brian Duffy, Esquire Post Office Box 1170 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant, Petitioner was employed as a Clerk Typist with Respondent. Petitioner did not report to work on February 3, 4 and 5, 1988. Respondent's leave policy is that leave should be requested in advance; if an employee gets sick, he or she needs to call in. Petitioner had not requested leave prior to February 3, 1988. On February 3, 1988, Ms. Lester, a co-worker of Petitioner's received a telephone call from a Ms. Williams who stated that Petitioner was in the hospital. Ms. Baker, Petitioner's supervisor, called three hospitals in the area and none had a Ms. Stanyard listed as a patient. Also, she contacted Ms. Stanyard's brother and another person, neither of whom had any knowledge of Petitioner's whereabouts. Finally, Ms. Baker went to Ms. Stanyard's home, but could not find Ms. Stanyard. As of the end of the day on February 5, 1988, Petitioner had not contacted her supervisor or her office.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that Department of Administration issue a final order ruling that Petitioner abandoned her position and resigned from the career service. DONE and ORDERED this 29th day of September, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. JOSE A. DIEZ-ARGUELLES Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of September, 1988. COPIES FURNISHED: Ms. Ethelda Stanyard 7855 Wilson Boulevard Apartment 17 Jacksonville, Florida 32210 Scott D. Leemis Assistant District Legal Counsel Post Office Box 2417 Jacksonville, Florida 32231-0083 Larry D. Scott, Esquire Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Adis Vila, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Agustus D. Aikens, Jr. Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner’s position was properly reclassified by Respondent under the Service First Initiative from Career Service to Select Exempt Service.
Findings Of Fact Ms. Blow-Beasley was employed with DCFS, formerly known as Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, hereinafter HRS, in Broward County, Florida from February 1, 1988 to June 7, 2002. From August 3, 2000 to July 2001, as part of her employment with DCFS, Ms. Blow-Beasley worked for Economic Services. On September 29, 2000, Ms. Blow-Beasley was hired as a Public Assistance Specialist Supervisor by DCFS, which was a Career Service position. From September 29, 2000 to July 2001, a Public Assistance Specialist Supervisor was a supervisory position with HRS and/or DCFS. From September 29, 2000 to July 1, 2001, in her role as a Public Assistance Specialist Supervisor, Ms. Blow-Beasley supervised two or more employees. As part of her duties as a Public Assistance Specialist Supervisor, Ms. Blow-Beasley reviewed and approved employee time (work time, sick leave, annual leave, vacation, etc.) of employees under her supervision. Also, as part of her duties as a Public Assistance Specialist Supervisor, Ms. Blow-Beasley reviewed the work and performance of employees under her supervision. Additionally, as part of her duties as a Public Assistance Specialist Supervisor, Ms. Blow-Beasley was responsible for ensuring that employees under her supervision met certain DCFS’ performance standards and measures. Further, as part of her duties as a Public Assistance Specialist Supervisor, Ms. Blow-Beasley was responsible for ensuring that employees under her supervision complied with certain state and federal laws. Furthermore, as part of her duties as a Public Assistance Specialist Supervisor, Ms. Blow-Beasley conducted, approved and/or executed performance evaluations for those persons whom she supervised. By letter dated June 15, 2001, Ms. Blow-Beasley was notified by DCFS that her position in Career Service was being “transferred” to SES, effective July 1, 2001. Her position in Career Service was reclassified as a SES position. Ms. Blow-Beasley informed her supervisor that she did not want to remain in SES and would accept a demotion to be in Career Service. Her request was not granted. From July 2001 to June 7, 2002, as part of her employment with DCFS, Ms. Blow-Beasley worked for the Economic Self-Sufficiency, hereinafter ESS, Program. From July 2001 to June 7, 2002, Ms. Blow-Beasley’s position title was, and she was employed as, ESS Supervisor Specialist. From July 2001 to June 7, 2002, an ESS Supervisor Specialist was a supervisory position with DCFS. As part of her duties as an ESS Supervisor Specialist, Ms. Blow-Beasley reviewed and approved employee time (work time, sick leave, annual leave, vacation, etc.) of employees under her supervision. Also, as part of her duties as an ESS Supervisor Specialist, Ms. Blow-Beasley reviewed the work and performance of employees under her supervision. Additionally, as part of her duties as an ESS Supervisor Specialist, Ms. Blow-Beasley was responsible for ensuring that employees under her supervision met certain DCFS’ performance standards and measures. Further, as part of her duties as an ESS Supervisor Specialist, Ms. Blow-Beasley was responsible for ensuring that employees under her supervision complied with certain state and federal laws. Furthermore, as part of her duties as an ESS Supervisor Specialist, Ms. Blow-Beasley conducted, approved and/or executed performance evaluations for those persons whom she supervised. Ms. Blow-Beasley does not dispute that, from September 29, 2000 to June 7, 2002, she was a supervisor and had been in both Career Service and SES as a supervisor. Ms. Blow-Beasley does not dispute that, when her position was reclassified from Career Service to SES, her duties and responsibilities did not change, but remained the same. No direct evidence was presented to demonstrate that Ms. Blow-Beasley had the authority to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline subordinate employees. However, an inference is drawn and a finding of fact is made that, based on her duties, she had the authority to effectively recommend the action to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline subordinate employees. Approximately one year after the reclassification, on June 7, 2002, Ms. Blow-Beasley was dismissed from employment with DCFS. On the said date, she signed a letter acknowledging receipt of the notice of dismissal from DCFS.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Family Services enter a final order finding that Ms. Sherry A. Blow-Beasley’s Career Service position was properly reclassified as a Select Exempt Service position. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of November 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of November, 2008.
Findings Of Fact In September, 1989, Shirley B. Walker (Walker), was a clerk-typist in the Bartow office of the Respondent, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS), District 6, Subdistrict B, Children, Youth and Families, Child Protection Services. Walker was absent on Tuesday, September 5, 1989, and had a friend call her supervisor to say that Walker would not be at work until Friday, September 8, 1989, due to a medical condition. Walker reportedly had been in an altercation with her husband over the Labor Day weekend and had been injured to the extent that her neck was in a brace. The supervisor, Patricia Lawler, asked that the friend give Walker the message that she would need to bring a doctor's excuse with her on her return to work. Walker did not return to work on Friday, September 8, 1989. Walker did not give, or arrange for, any notification to her supervisor or anyone in the office that she would not be at work that day. Since Walker had no home telephone, and the telephone number of a relative that had been given to her supervisor as a means of contacting her at home was obsolete by September 8, Lawler asked office friends of Walker to go to Walker's home during the lunch hour to check on her well-being and find out why she was not at work. When they did, they found no one at home. Walker also did not go to work on Monday through Friday, September 11 through 15, 1989. Again, she did not give, or arrange for, any notification to her supervisor or anyone in the office that she would not be at work. No one at the office knew anything further about Walker or why she was not at work from Friday, September 8 through Friday, September 15, 1989. When Walker began her work at HRS, she was given an employee handbook, part of which clearly states: "If you are absent for three consecutive workdays without authorization, you may be considered to have abandoned your position and thus resigned." At approximately 4:45 p.m. on Friday, September 15, 1989, Lawler hand- delivered to Walker at Walker's home a letter notifying Walker that she was being terminated from her employment with HRS for the consecutive unexcused and unauthorized absences, which were viewed as an abandonment of her employment and a resignation from the State Career Service. Although Walker asked for a formal administrative hearing on the question whether she had abandoned her position, neither she nor anyone on her behalf appeared at the hearing.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Administration enter a final order finding that the Petitioner, Shirley B. Walker, abandoned her position and resigned from the State Career Service. RECOMMENDED this 1st day of March, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of March, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Shirley B. Walker 1050 Golfview Avenue Apartment 803 Bartow, FL 33830 Jack Emory Farley, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 400 W. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., Boulevard Room 500 Tampa, Florida 33614 Aletta Shutes Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 Augustus D. Aikens, Jr. General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issue of abandonment in these proceedings, the Petitioner was a Career Service employee. On January 13, 1988, while on leave from employment due to a work related injury, the Petitioner met with her new rehabilitation counselor, Irene Brzozowski. During the meeting, the Petitioner informed Ms. Brzozowski that she had an appointment scheduled with her physician at 5:00 p.m. on the following day. The purpose of the visit was to obtain a medical evaluation so that the Petitioner could return to work in a light duty capacity. The Petitioner incorrectly used the word "discharged" for the planned appointment. The counselor asserted that a "discharge" meant that the Petitioner had to return to work on Friday, January 15, 1988. The Petitioner said that her work shift began on Wednesday and that she would rather return to work on that day. The two women had different views over a decision which was a medical decision which neither woman was in a position to make. The discussion resulted from the Petitioner's misuse of a term that was accepted as a fact by the counselor. At the close of this meeting, the counselor said she would call D.H.R.S. to tell them that the Petitioner would be "discharged." The counselor went beyond what she told the Petitioner she was planning to do. On January 14, 1988, even before the medical appointment took place, the counselor misrepresented to Shirley Eaton, the administrative secretary at D.H.R.S., the following matters: That Ms. Brzozowski had seen a doctor's statement that the `Petitioner would be released on January 14, 1988. That Petitioner preferred to return to work on Wednesday, January 20, 1988, but based on the discharge, the counselor had instructed her to return to work on Wednesday, January 15, 1988. Based upon the counselor's misrepresentations, which appeared to Ms. Eaton to be predicated upon a doctor's written discharge and the Petitioner's personal knowledge that she had to return to work January 15, 1988, the Petitioner was placed on the work schedule for the following day. No one informed the Petitioner that she was scheduled for work on January 15, 1988, even before her doctor had rendered his opinion about her ability to return to work. On January 14, 1988, the Petitioner kept her doctor's appointment. During the examination, she told the doctor her work week began on Wednesday. As a result, the doctor told her he would give her a return to work date of January 20, 1988, for light duty activities. The return to work slip was partially prepared by Karen Nalewaik, a licensed practical nurse. She does not recall why she did not complete the note or why she put down the date of January 18, 1988, on the slip. The slip was signed by the doctor after it was completed by his staff and given to the Petitioner. January 15, 16, and 17 passed without the Petitioner's receiving notification that she had been scheduled to work those dates. Sometime after the Petitioner read the doctor's slip and before Monday, January 18, 1988, she noticed the return date was different from the one orally represented to her by her doctor. She did not inform her employer of the mistaken date. Instead, she returned to the doctor's office on Monday, January 18, to obtain a revised slip which accurately reflected his decision. Upon leaving the doctor's office, the Petitioner advised her employer of her return date. She was told she was unable to return because she had abandoned her position when she did not appear for work on January 15, 16 and A copy of her separation letter was given to the Petitioner on this date. The Petitioner did not abandon her employment. She had not been informed that she was to return to work without a medical evaluation. Her actions on January 18, 1988, manifest a clear intent to continue with her work duties for her employer. Her conduct between January 13, 1988, and January 18, 1988, was consistent in all respects with her testimony at hearing and her desire to remain a Career Service employee for the Respondent. The Respondent mistakenly relied on the new rehabilitation counselor who speculated, surmised, and erroneously substituted her own judgment for that of the attending physician who had been treating the Petitioner for related injuries for over three years. The doctor decided his patient could return to light duty work the following work week on January 18 or January 20 because that was when her work week began. His records show that she was not discharged and was still experiencing medical problems on January 14, 1988. Unfortunately, when the Petitioner tried to straighten this out with her employer after she was separated from her position, the counselor continued to be involved. The counselor had a new medical slip manufactured by a member of the doctor's staff on February 3, 1988, and presented it to the Respondent. The slip, which was never signed by the doctor, tended to support her prior misrepresentations that the Petitioner could return to work on January 15, 1988. Interestingly enough, the doctor's notes do not reflect the information placed on this third slip. It is also contrary to every other piece of credible evidence presented at hearing. Even during the statements under oath presented by the Respondent as the physician's deposition, the counselor was present. She interrupted the questioning at different times, educating the doctor on her version of the facts. Her slanting of the situation, as well as the endorsement of her version by Ms. Orser, a D.H.R.S. worker who also spoke during the deposition, make the doctor's deposition of April 22, 1988, unreliable. It is rejected by the Hearing Officer as incompetent and unreliable testimony due to the constant interjections of the two women with presumed facts and misinformation. The major mistake which kept reoccurring in this series of events was that various parties relied on everyone else but the attending physician to timely determine when the Petitioner could return to work. The doctor's first slip which was undated but was signed on January 14, 1988, is given great weight by the Hearing Officer. The second slip, dated only four days later, is given the greatest weight because it is consistent with all of the credible testimony presented as to why the Petitioner would be given a second note. As a result, abandonment could not have taken place on January 15, 16 and 17, 1988.
