The Issue The issue in the case is whether the Petitioner has been the subject of a discriminatory housing practice by the Respondent through the alleged failure of the Respondent to provide a reasonable accommodation for a disability.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to the case, the Respondent operated an age-restricted mobile home park in Sarasota, Florida. With limited exceptions, residents of the mobile home park are 55 years of age and older. In September 2000, the Petitioner, a woman over 55 years of age, purchased a mobile home located within the Ridgewood Mobile Home Park. The mobile home was purchased through a real estate broker. The mobile home park apparently identifies itself through signage as a community for persons 55 years of age and older. Prior to the purchase the Petitioner had no communication with the Respondent and made no inquiry of the Respondent as to whether her son, who is under 55 years of age, would be allowed to live in the mobile home park. Within a few days of the purchase, the Petitioner was advised that residence in the mobile home park was limited, with certain exceptions, to persons 55 years of age and older. The Respondent advised the Petitioner that her son, who is under 55 years of age, could remain with her only for a period of up to two months to help her "settle in." By lease application dated October 1, 2000, the Petitioner advised the Respondent that her son would remain with her for a period of two months. In November 2000, after the two months had passed, the manager of the mobile home park (Mr. Cobb) informed the Respondent that her son would have to leave the residence. At that time, the Petitioner's son asserted that he was his mother's full-time, live-in caregiver. Prior to this point, the Petitioner had not indicated to the Respondent that she suffered from a handicap or required the services of a full-time, live-in caregiver The evidence fails to establish that, either at the time of the Petitioner's initial residence at the Respondent's mobile home park or by November 2000, the Petitioner suffered from a handicap or from any condition that substantially limited any major life activity, or that the Petitioner required the assistance of a full-time, live-in caregiver. At the time the Petitioner moved into the Respondent's mobile home park, the Petitioner was able to accomplish all major life activities. Although diabetic, the Petitioner was able to walk, drive, and shop for food or other necessities. Her son assisted in house cleaning and in other routine activities, but there is no credible evidence that, prior to August 2002, such assistance was required for performing major life activities. In August 2002, shortly after a medical procedure on the Petitioner's carotid artery, the Petitioner suffered a stroke. She was hospitalized for a period of approximately ten days and then transferred into a rehabilitation hospital for a period of approximately six weeks. Letters submitted from medical professionals involved with the Petitioner's case at the time of her stroke suggest that assistance was needed during the period of incapacity related to the stroke. There is no credible evidence that, subsequent to rehabilitation, the Petitioner needed the services of a full- time, live-in caregiver. After rehabilitation, the Petitioner recovered from the stroke sufficiently to regain her ability to perform major life activities, including driving an automobile. A subsequent automobile accident wherein she ran down a stop sign in the mobile home park after going shopping suggests that driving at night may be inappropriate. Following post-stroke rehabilitation, the Petitioner's son continued to reside with his mother, to assist in household duties and in assuring that the Petitioner followed a medication regimen, but the evidence fails to establish that she currently requires a full-time, live-in caregiver. At the time of the hearing, neither the Petitioner nor her son was residing in the Respondent's mobile home park. The evidence establishes that disabled or handicapped persons in the mobile home park who require full-time, live-in caregivers are accommodated without regard to the age of the caregiver or to the mobile home park's age-related restrictions.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing the complaint of Dona M. Burgess against the Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of July, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of July, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Elizabeth M. Boyle, Esquire Gulfcoast Legal Services, Inc. 1750 17th Street, Building 1 Sarasota, Florida 34234 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Kimberly P. Walker, Esquire Kevin Bruning, Esquire Williams, Parker, Harrison, Dietz & Getzen 200 South Orange Avenue Sarasota, Florida 34236-6802 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue to be determined is whether Respondent engaged in retaliatory conduct against Petitioner in violation of Section 760.37, Florida Statutes (2000), due to assistance rendered by Petitioner to a third party in filing a complaint against Respondent for discriminatory housing practices.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was, at all times relevant to this proceeding, a tenant of Respondent at the Pink Top Mobile Home Park in Tavares, Lake County, Florida. Purportedly in August 1999, Petitioner filed a Petition for relief with FCHR alleging harassment of Petitioner by Respondent (FCHR No. 99-W396H). Petitioner claims the harassment was in retaliation for assistance he provided to a third party, Joseph Ralabate, in the filing of an earlier complaint with HUD and FCHR dated May 11, 1999, against Respondent for housing discrimination (FCHR No. 99-W241H). Petitioner's claims of harassment included the following: violation notices about his cat; enforcement by Respondent of rules requiring payment of guest fees for additional residents in a mobile home within the park; and notification to Petitioner that he was watering his lawn excessively. Petitioner also claims Respondent deprived him of a storage shed which he purchased from another tenant at the time the other tenant was vacating the park, and denied Petitioner the right to construct a new storage shed of his own. Finally, Petitioner submitted evidence concerning an incident in which he was forcibly removed from the park office by Mr. Carlos Rodriguez, in the course of which Petitioner claims to have sustained physical injuries. Petitioner became a tenant at Pink Top in April 1997. There is no evidence that he experienced any problems with Respondent about his tenancy until January 1999, when Respondent through her counsel sent Petitioner a formal notification that he was in violation of park rules for having a pet cat, and for failing to pay guest fees for an additional person temporarily residing in his home. A second notice was sent to Petitioner concerning the cat, and excessive lawn watering, on March 10, 1999. Although both letters indicated that failure to comply with park rules may lead to eviction, Respondent never filed eviction proceedings, nor followed up on the rule violation notices notwithstanding Petitioner's admission that he kept the cat. Mr. Ralabate's complaint alleging housing discrimination toward his handicap was dated May 11, 1999. Respondent received written notice by FCHR of the Ralabate complaint, in early June 1999. Both correspondence occurred several months after the delivery of the rule violation notices. Although Petitioner testified that he verbally informed Respondent, prior to receiving the rule violation notices, that he had filed, or would be filing, a complaint about her alleged discrimination against Mr. Ralabate, Respondent denied having been told. With regard to the storage shed disputes between the parties, the evidence shows that some time prior to May 13, 1999, before Respondent received written notification of the Ralabate complaint, Petitioner requested approval to demolish his existing storage shed and construct a new one. On May 13, 1999, counsel for Respondent notified Petitioner in writing of the requirements in the park rules for storage sheds, and requested detailed plans and information about the proposed new shed. Shortly thereafter, Respondent became aware of the allegations filed against her, and notified Petitioner that all aspects of Petitioner’s tenancy in the park were being held in abeyance, until the resolution of the pending complaints. Thereafter, Petitioner purchased an existing shed from another tenant in the park, and alleges that Respondent denied him possession of the shed, as retaliation. Petitioner, however, did not obtain a bill of sale or other proof of purchase when he purportedly bought the shed. It was not until May or June 2000, a year after the alleged date of purchase, and after Respondent had denied his undocumented claim to the shed, that Petitioner obtained a bill of sale, on which he wrote in his own handwriting a date of sale which differed significantly from the date on the document itself. Petitioner submitted this post-dated, altered bill of sale to Respondent and again demanded the shed. Respondent denied his request on the basis that when the other tenant vacated the park, he owed outstanding rent which was being partially satisfied by the shed. Petitioner also alleges that retaliation and physical harm occurred when he attempted to persuade Respondent, in her office, to allow him to construct a new shed. He claims he was forcibly thrown out of the office by an individual named Carlos Rodriguez, who was related to Respondent. There are significant factual disputes about the incident, however it was referred to the State Attorney’s office which declined to prosecute The State Attorney’s office conducted a second review and again declined to prosecute. The preponderance of the evidence, including law enforcement reports and documents submitted by Petitioner after the DOAH hearing, suggests Respondent, who is an elderly lady and partially handicapped, was in fear of Petitioner. The reports, including an eyewitness account from a disinterested third party, indicate that Petitioner tripped over an obstruction during his departure from the office. Petitioner finally argues that he was forced out of Pink Top Mobile Home Park by Respondent's continued harassment, lost his investment in the home due to the minimum age requirements, and suffered unknown monetary damages. However, Petitioner admits that he had minimal contact with Respondent after being served with the rule violation notices in early 1999, except for his request to construct a new shed and his attempt to purchase a shed from another tenant and admits being told when he purchased the home that tenants in the park must be over the age of 55. Although it is apparent that Petitioner and Respondent had disagreements and were not cordial with each other, there is insufficient evidence to conclude that Respondent acted in a discriminatory or retaliatory manner against Petitioner.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner’s allegation of retaliatory conduct and Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of July, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. PFEIFFER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of July, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert S. McCance 14422 Hibiscus Street Tavares, Florida 32778 Fred A. Morrison, Esquire McLin, Burnsed, Morrison, Johnson Newman & Roy 12000 West Main Street Post Office Box 491357 Leesburg, Florida 34749-1357 Azizi M. Dixon, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Suite 240, Building F Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana A. Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Suite 240, Building F Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
Findings Of Fact As of June 4, 1984, ten or more spaces in Southwinds Mobile Home Park were being leased by individuals who owned the mobile homes in which they resided on the property. Some of those ten or more residents were Beverly Leight, William Daniel, Frank Addison, Keith Hellstrom, Faye Koch, and Helen Sutton. As of May 25, 1986, ten or more spaces in Southwinds Mobile Home Park were being leased by individuals who owned the mobile homes in which they resided. On May 25, 1986, Johnny Owens owned the mobile home in which he resided on leased Lot 10. As of October 28, 1986, ten or more spaces in Southwinds Mobile Home Park were being leased by individuals who owned the mobile homes in which they resided. On that date, Charles and Pauline Murphy owned the mobile home in which they resided on leased Lot 26. Upon paying the annual fee for southwinds Mobile Home Park, pursuant to Section 723.007 F.S., for the period of October 2, 1987 through October 1, 1988, Respondent Hugh D. Rowles, the park owner, advised Petitioner agency that he had dropped below ten lots available for rent. Respondent had reached this stage by simply not leasing out lots to new tenants as lots were voluntarily vacated by old tenants, and a natural attrition had occurred. The Petitioner's Fees Section accepted Respondent's word on the matter without further investigation, and Petitioner sent Respondent no more statements for the payment of the annual fee. In its business and public records, Petitioner listed Respondent and his park as not under jurisdiction of Chapter 723 F.S. On December 27, 1988, Respondent Rowles still owned Southwinds Mobile Home Park. As of that date, Beverly Leight, William Daniel, Frank Addison, Keith Hellstrom, Faye Koch, Helen Sutton, Johnny Owens, and the Murphys (8 tenants) were still residing in their respective mobile homes on the lots they were leasing from Respondent in Southwinds Mobile Home Park, as described supra. On that date, Leight, who had sold the park to Respondent in 1980, and Daniel, Addison, Hellstrom, Koch, and Sutton had been residents of Southwinds Mobile Home Park for at least three and a half years each; Owens had been a resident approximately two and a half years, and the Murphys had been residents approximately two years. In the park there were also some mobile homes owned' by Respondent which were rented as units--lot and mobile home together. To those individuals who owned their mobile homes and were leasing lots in Southwinds Mobile Home Park, Respondent sent a letter dated December 27, 1988, which provided in pertinent part: To those of you who own your own homes, I want to give you as much advance notice as possible. Sometime within the next few weeks, you will begin seeing land surveyors, soil testing people and others in the park. There is a VERY STRONG possibility that the property will be sold in JUNE of 1989. If and when the property is sold, there will NO LONGER be a trailer park here. It is STRONGLY SUGGESTED that you start making plans NOW for the removal of your trailer. If there is any way that I can assist you in relocating, I will be glad to help you. Until further notice, everything remains as usua1. After serving the letter f December 27, 1988, Respondent served the mobile home owners in Sothwinds Mobile Home Park with no other notice prior to June 1989. Faye Koch interpreted the letter of December 27, 1988 as requiring her to leave southwinds Mobile Home Park. Beverly Leight, on the other hand, understood it to mean that the park might be sold, but not that it definitely would be sold. In January 1989, Mr. Rowles offered Mrs. Koch $1,000 to leave the park by February 1, 1989. She moved out to a larger, better mobile home, after paying Respondent her overdue rent. Respondent rented the mobile home purchased from Mrs. Koch and the lot it was on, as a unit, to another person foil a short while. Rowles also purchased the mobile home of Keith Hellstrom for $1,000, which he likewise rented to someone else as a unit with his lot for a short time, He purchased Johnny Owens' mobile home for $1,000. Thereafter, Rowles sold each of these mobile homes at a loss. The Koch, Hellstrom, and Owens mobile homes were sold by Rowles for $100, $500, and $100, respectively. In March 1989, Respondent Rowles was contacted by a representative of Petitioner, apparently from the Enforcement Section, who had been contacted by Mrs. Leiht, and who advised Rowles of Petitioner agency's position that the tenancies of the remaining mobile home owners in Southwinds Mobile Home Park were subject to the protections of Chapter 723 F.S. Respondent advised Petitioner's representative that he did not regard his park as covered by Chapter 723 F.S. Respondent also requested Petitioner's representative to show Respond.ent that Chapter 723 FS was applicable to him and his park and advised the agency representative that, if he was subject to the agency's jurisdiction, he would comply. Respondent received no written response from the agency until the Notice to Show Cause was filed on July 18, 1989. On April 6, 1989, Respondent and his wife entered into a contract for the sale of the property comprising Southwinds Mobile Home Park to a third party. An addendum to the contract required Respondent to remove or pay for the removal of all personal property (that is, the mobile homes) located on the parcel upon being given thirty days notice from the third party buyer. The contract c6ntemplated that the property would continue to operate as rental property until the new owners elected to close it down or change its function. The closing on this contract for sale still had not occurred as of the date of formal hearing. The purchasers of the property comprising Southwinds Mobile Home Park have never given Respondent notice to remove any personal property from the park, nor has permitting of the property occurred such as would entitle the buyers to demand removal of such personal property. At the time Respondent entered into the April 6, 1989 contract for sale of Southwinds Mobile Home Park, only four mobile home owners were still leasing lots in the park. It may be inferred from the testimony as a whole that these were month to month tenancies. Respondent attempted to negotiate purchase of those four mobile homes. He did not suggest to any residents that they had any other options besides moving their mobile homes out of his park or selling them to him. Mrs. Leight held out for $2,500 and refused to move. She was joined in her refusal by Mr. Daniel, Ms. Sutton, and a Miss Warnock, all of whom were residing in their own mobile homes on Respondent's lots. On June 1, 1989, Respondent notified the fourmobile home owners remaining in Southwinds Mobile Home Park toremove their mobile homes no later than June 30, 1989. Thisnotification is in accord with the standards of Section 83.03(3)F.S. for month-to-month tenancies. At that point, Leight, Daniel, and Sutton were four-year residents There is noinformation as to Warnock's term of residency at southwindsMobile Home Park. On August 4, 1989, Respondent shut off waterservice to the mobile home owners remaining in southwinds MobileHome Park. As a result of Respondent's action, Beverly Leightwas compelled to move out of her mobile home in order to complywith health department requirements. In so doing, she incurredcosts of 4,486, for which she has not been reimbursed; however,she is one of the four remaining mobile homed owners (Leight,Daniel, Sutton, and Warnock) who left the subject property on orbefore October 30, 1989, pursuant to a stipulation with the Respondent whereby the Respondent deposited $10,000 with their attorney pending a judicial determination as to whether themobile home lot tenancies were governed by Chapter 723 or by Chapter 83, Parts II F.S. The Circuit Court action wherein the stipulation was filed had not yet resulted in such adetermination as of the date of formal hearing.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Business Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes enter a final order dismissing the Notice to Show Cause. DONE and ENTERED this 6th day of March, 1990, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of March, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER CASE NO. 89-4572 The following constitute specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2) F.S. upon the parties' respective proposed findings of fact (PFOF): Petitioner's PFOF: Accepted: 1-17, 19. Rejected as mere characterization of testimony and argument of counsel: 18 (with footnote) Respondent' s PFOF: Accepted: 1-3, 5-10, 12 Except for irrelevant, immaterial, subordinate or unnecessary material, the following PFOF are accepted: 4 Rejected as containing a conclusion of law: 11 COPIES FURNISHED: Eric H. Miller Assistant General Counsel Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007 F.A. Ford, Jr., Esquire Post Office Box-48 DeLand, Florida 32721-0048 E. James Kearney, Director Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1000 Stephen R. MacNamara, Secretary Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1000 Joseph A. Sole, General Counsel Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1000 =================================================================
The Issue Whether Respondent Tardiff committed the violations as set forth in the Notice to Show Cause dated February 24, 1997, and what penalty, if any, should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the agency of the State of Florida charged with the responsibility to administer and to enforce the Florida Mobile Home Act, Chapter 723, Florida Statutes. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent has been the owner of Pondview Mobile Home Park. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent has had 10 or more lots offered for rent or lease. Respondent offered for rent or lease at least 22 lots. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent was a "mobile home park owner," as the term is defined in Section 723.003(7), Florida Statutes. No annual fees were paid by Respondent from 1984 until 1996. Currently, annual fees are $4.00 per lot, per year. Annual fees are payable to the division between July 1 and October 1 of each year. When Respondent increased his rent in 1993, he failed to file a copy of the lot rental increase notice with the Bureau of Mobile Homes. Under Chapter 723, Florida Statutes, the reason for the increase in rent is irrelevant to the filing requirement. When new tenants entered Respondent's mobile home park, Respondent failed to give them a prospectus or written notification of required information. Twelve homeowners have entered into rental agreements without receiving the statutorily required document. Respondent produced a cancelled check at the formal hearing showing that 1996 annual fees had been paid to the division. It is the park owner's responsibility to comply with Chapter 723, Florida Statutes. It is not the duty of the division to pursue park owners in order to obtain compliance with the Florida Mobile Home Act. Respondent has been permitted with the Department of Health (formerly Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS)) every year since 1983.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is, RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner enter a Final Order finding Respondent has violated the Sections of Chapter 723, Florida Statutes, as charged in the Notice to Show Cause, and ordering the Respondent to Pay annual fees for the years 1984-1995 in the amount of $814, plus a 10 percent penalty of $81.40 which equals $895.40; Pay a penalty of $1,200 for the violation of Section 723.013., Florida Statutes; Pay a penalty of $5,000 for the violation of Section 723.037, Florida Statutes; and Comply with all provisions of Chapter 723, Florida Statutes, in the future. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of August, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of August, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Suzanne V. Estrella, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Roland Tardiff Route 12 Box 394 Lake City, Florida 32025 Robert H. Ellzey, Jr., Director Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Lynda L. Goodgame, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner based on her sex or an alleged handicap contrary to Sections 760.20 through 760.37, Florida Statutes (2008), Fair Housing Act, as amended (the Act).
The Issue Did Respondent violate Section 723.037(1), Florida Statutes, by failing to give timely written notice of rent increase on mobile home lots, and, if so, what penalty should be imposed?
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent owned the Arcadia Peace River Campground (Campground) located in DeSoto County, Florida, whose mailing address is 2988 Northwest Highway 70, Arcadia, Florida 34266. From October 3, 1996 through March 21, 1998, the Campground had 14 or more of its mobile home lots occupied by mobile homes. From October 3, 1996 through March 21, 1998, seven or more of the mobile homes located in the Campground were owned by residents of the Campground other than Respondent. Furthermore, these mobile homes were placed on lots leased by the mobile home residents from the Campground. From October 3, 1996 through March 21, 1998, four or more of the mobile homes located in the Campground were owned by Respondent's employees and placed on lots in the Campground. The rental for these lots was considered as part of the employees' compensation. On January 1, 1997, Respondent implemented and began collecting a $30.00 increase in the monthly lot rental from those mobile home owners leasing spaces in the Campground. Respondent gave the affected mobile home owners written notice of the January 1, 1997, monthly lot rental increase on November 26, 1996, some 36 days prior to the effective date (January 1, 1997) of the increase. No other notice of the lot rental increase was given to the affected mobile home owners. Respondent collected the $30.00 lot rental increase from the affected mobile home owners during the period from January 1, 1997, through March 21, 1998. On January 1, 1998, Respondent implemented and began collecting a $15.00 increase in the monthly lot rental from those mobile home owners leasing spaces in the Campground. Respondent gave the affected mobile home owners written notice of the January 1, 1998, monthly lot rental increase on October 28, 1997, some 65 days prior to the effective date of the increase. Respondent collected the $15.00 monthly lot rental increase from January 1, 1998, through March 21, 1998. Each of the following affected mobile home owners paid both the $30.00 monthly lot rental increase from January 1, 1997, through March 21, 1998 and the $15.00 monthly lot rental increase from January 1, 1998, through March 21, 1998: Charles Collins; Arthur P. McRae; Harold Martin; Maurice W. Jackson; Robert F. Martin; Irene K. Apps and; Reba Conner. On March 21, 1998, the Peace River flooded the Campground. The mobile homes located in the Campground were damaged. Subsequently, the mobile homes were removed from the Campground, purchased by Respondent, or were purchased by one or more new employees of Respondent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and having specifically reviewed the factors set out in Section 723.006(5)(c), Florida Statutes, it is recommended that the Division enter a final order assessing Respondent with an administrative fine of $500.00. It is further recommended that Respondent be ordered to refund to Charles Collins, Arthur P. McRae, Harold Martin, Maurice W. Jackson, Robert F. Martin, Irene K. Apps, and Reba Conner all sums collected from these individuals as increases in lot rental during the period of January 1, 1997 through March 21, 1998. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th of June, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6947 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of June, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Philip Nowick, Director Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 William Woodyard, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Eric H. Miller, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007 George Lempenau, Qualified Representative 2998 Northwest Highway 70 Arcadia, Florida 34266
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Home Owners Direct Sales, Inc., is now and was at all times alleged herein a registered real estate entity. Respondent, Roger L. Davis is now a registered real estate broker and from July 30, 1976 to the present time, has been a registered real estate broker, President and active firm member of Respondent, Home Owners Direct Sales, Inc. Respondent Davis, by and through agents of Respondent Home Owners Direct Sales, Inc., solicited from property owners in the Dade, Broward and Palm Beach County areas the payment of a fee in return for listings to sell their property in a magazine which was published by Home Owners Direct Sales, Inc. The complaint alleges that in its solicitation efforts, Respondents advised property owners that the magazine would be published monthly and contain the property owners listing; that such representations were false and known to be false when made; that subscribers relied upon such representations which prompted them to simultaneously pay a listing fee; that none of said fees received subsequent to July 1, 1976 were held or maintained in a trust account and that by reason thereof, the Respondents are guilty of fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, false pretenses, false promises, etc. within the meaning of Subsection 475.25(1)(a), Florida Statutes, and Respondent Home Owners Direct Sales, Inc. by and through President Davis is additionally guilty of collecting an advance fee without depositing 75 percent thereof in a trust account in violation of Subsection 475.452, Florida Statutes, all in violation of Subsection 475.25(1)(d), Florida Statutes. The complaint alleges further that the Respondents, as a means to assure the receipt of said deferred payments, recorded the deferred payment contract amount as liens against the real property interest of those who chose this method of payment for the service to be performed by Home Owners Direct Sales, Inc. Based thereon, the complaint alleges that the Respondents have placed upon the public records of the county, a lien which purports to affect the title of, or encumber, real property for the purpose of collecting a commission or to coerce the payment of money to the broker in violation of Subsection 475.42(1)(j) Florida Statutes, and derivatively in violation of Subsection 475.25(1)(d), Florida Statutes. Further, the complaint alleges that approximately 207 contracts were recorded in Broward County as liens of which there presently remains outstanding approximately 187 liens against the real property interests of those who chose the deferred payment method of compensation to Respondent Home Owners Direct Sales, Inc.; that Respondent has failed to take any steps to remove said liens from the public records and that by reason thereof, Respondent Home Owners Direct Sales, Inc. by and through its President, Roger L. Davis, is guilty of false pretenses, dishonest dealing, trick, scheme or device in a business transaction in violation of Subsection 475.25(1)(a), Florida Statutes. The complaint also alleges that Ronald Kavin, during times material, was a registered real estate salesman in the employ of Home Owners Direct Sales, Inc.; that pursuant to the terms of his (Kavin) employment agreement, Respondent Home Owners Direct Sales, Inc. by and through its President, Roger L. Davis, paid the sums of $250 and $150 by checks dated September 16 and 29, 1976, respectively to salesman Kavin which were returned for nonsufficient funds. Based thereon, the complaint alleges that the Respondents are guilty of dishonest dealing in violation of Subsection 475.25(1)(a), Florida Statutes. Based thereon, the complaint concludes that the Respondents are guilty of a course of conduct or practices which show that they are so dishonest and untruthful that the money, property transactions and rights of investors and those with whom they may sustain a confidential relation may not be safely entrusted to them, all in violation of Subsection 475.25(3), Florida Statutes. An examination of the record compiled herein reveals that sometime during the month of March, 1975, a corporate brokerage agreement was entered into between Jeff Davey, James McKay and Marylin Benjamin. As a means of doing business, the parties utilized a previously established Florida corporation, Macoda, Inc. James McKay was President of the corporation and Jeff Davey and Marylin Benjamin were Vice Presidents with Benjamin also serving as active broker. Jeff Davey was the son-in-law of President McKay who advanced the initial funds for capitalizing the corporation. Jeff Davey was charged with publishing and distributing the magazine, ensuring that signs were placed on the property of owners who utilized the service, and taking photos of such properties. Messr. McKay envisioned establishing a profitable, ongoing venture for his son-in-law and daughter. As originally conceived, the corporation planned to publish a magazine which would illustrate real property that was available for sale by owners in Dade, Broward and Palm Beach counties. The procedure simply stated involved putting the sellers of property in contact with buyers so that a viewing time could be arranged between them. Further negotiations between seller and prospective buyer were usually handled solely between them without any input or assistance from the personnel of Respondent Home Owners Direct Sales, Inc. During the early days of the corporate venture, monies collected from advertisers and all publication expenses, office expenses and salaries were handled by Jeff Davis and/or James McKay. In the early months of the operation, Messrs. Davey and McKay, pursuant to guidance and counseling from their accountants and lawyers, collateralized the listing fee contracts and used them as receivables to defray the steadily mounting negative cash flow resulting from the business operations. Sometime in December, 1975, Jeff Davey left the country for personal reasons. Thereafter, Messr. McKay took a more active role in the publication of the magazine and took sole charge of financial matters and policy decisions. The best guesstimate is that during this period, the venture was operating at a deficit of approximately $200,000 and was committed to substantial fixed overhead expenses. Mr. McKay who was retired and wealthy, contacted Respondent Roger L. Davis, who was then the publisher of a business and financial opportunity magazine and engaged his services to try to sell the business. Respondent Davis advertised the business in his financial opportunity publication for the asking price of $50,000. After several months of screening prospects, it became apparent to Respondent Davis that he would be unsuccessful in his efforts to locate a prospective buyer for the business and so advised the owner, Messr. McKay. During June or July of 1976, Respondent Davis offered to purchase the business for the outstanding obligations which amounted to approximately $12,000. At the outset of his assumption, Messr. Davis satisfied outstanding obligations of approximately $7,000 which were due to the printer. That amount also represented outstanding bills for rent, phone, salaries and other current expenses. Respondent Davis testified that when he purchased the business in June, 1976, the books were in a shambles and it was extremely difficult to determine what receivables the corporation was due and what obligations were due and owing. His testimony which was corroborated by his ex-wife, Ann Davis, reveals that he (Davis) made an honest good faith effort to satisfy all outstanding obligations with the limited funds available. He was able to obtain extensions from the printer so that approximately 15,000 copies of the magazine's November issue was printed. Respondent Davis found difficulty in physically laying out the magazine due to his lack of experience in layout work. By this time, Davis had exhausted all of his available revenues from the service and he had no funds to hire personnel to perform those functions. He contacted several property owners who had a listing agreement with Respondent Home Owners Direct Sales, Inc. after he took over its operations and was able to determine that approximately 50 - 60 property owners had in fact sold their houses and therefore no longer needed the service. He also testified that he was not responsible for filing the liens on the property of owners who utilized the deferred payment plan with Respondent Home Owners Direct Sales, Inc. He related several instances wherein he, when confronted by a property owner and was advised that an outstanding lien was affecting the title to their property, gave a release or satisfaction for the lien. When Respondent Davis took over the operations of the business, he retained the services of Ronald Kavin for office and sales manager in overall charge of initiating sales. His overall responsibilities included training salesmen, making appointments for sales persons and assuring that they kept appointments. Approximately September 16, 1976, Messr. Kavin approached Respondent Davis for $250 which he needed to pay a garage repair bill. Messr. Davis credibly testified that he advised Messr. Kavin that although he had no money, he would issue him a check which should not be deposited until he assured him that sufficient funds were on deposit in the bank to cover the check. Approximately two weeks later, Messr. Kavin again approached Messr. Davis for $150 to defray expenses which he had incurred in his duties as office manager. Again Respondent Davis explained that while he had no money, he expected to obtain some money shortly from an investor whom he had arranged financing for some property which he owned and that he (Kavin) should not attempt to negotiate the check until he had prior clearance from Davis that he had sufficient monies on deposit in the bank. Messr. Kavin attempted to negotiate both checks which were returned for nonsufficient funds.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings and conclusions, I hereby recommend that the registration of the Respondent corporation, Home Owners Direct Sales, Inc. and the license and registration of Respondent Roger Davis be placed on probation for a period of one year. RECOMMENDED this 22nd day of May, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Louis B. Guttmann, III, Esquire Florida Real Estate Commission 400 West Robinson Avenue Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Roger L. Davis, Esquire c/o "A" Inc. 1980 North Atlantic Boulevard Cocoa Beach, Florida 32931 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION, An agency of the state of Florida, Plaintiff, PROGRESS DOCKET NO. 3218 BROWARD COUNTY DOAH CASE NO. 77-2065 HOME OWNERS DIRECT SALES INC. and ROGER L. DAVIS, Respondents. /
The Issue Whether the proposed repeal of Rule 61B-31.001(5), Florida Administrative Code, constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. Further, whether certain agency policies constitute rules and violate the provisions of Section 120.535, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Florida Manufactured Housing Association, Inc. (FMHA) is a Florida not for profit corporation organized to represent the interests of the owners of approximately 750 mobile home parks. All of the parks owned by FMHA members are regulated by the Respondent. The FMHA's members will be substantially affected by the proposed repeal of the rule. The FMHA has standing to participate in his proceeding. The Florida Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes (Respondent), is the state agency charged with implementation, administration and enforcement of Chapter 723, Florida Statutes, relating to Mobile Home Park Lot Tenancies. The Federation of Mobile Home Owners of Florida, Inc. (Federation) is a Florida not for profit corporation organized to represent a substantial number of mobile home owners residing in Florida mobile home parks. The Federation's members will be substantially affected by the proposed repeal of the rule. The Federation has standing to participate in this proceeding. Insofar as is relevant to this case, a mobile home owner commonly rents a mobile home park lot upon which the home is placed. Pursuant to Section 723.011(1)(a), Florida Statutes, the owner of a mobile home park containing 26 or more lots must deliver a prospectus to the home owner prior to entering into an enforceable rental agreement for the mobile home lot. A mobile home park prospectus is intended to provide full and fair disclosure of the terms and conditions of residency and sets forth the regulations to which the home owner will be subjected after signing a lot rental agreement with the park owner. The prospectus must be filed with and approved by the Respondent. The challenged rule was adopted as Rule 7D-31.01(5), Florida Administrative Code, in 1985. Without alteration, it was subsequently renumbered as Rule 61B-31.001(5), Florida Administrative Code, and provides as follows: The Prospectus distributed to a home owner or prospective home owner shall be binding for the length of the tenancy, including any assumptions of that tenancy, and may not be changed except in the following circumstances: Amendments consented to by both the home owner and the park owner. Amendments to reflect new rules or rules that have been changed in accordance with procedures described in Chapter 723, F.S., and the prospectus. Amendments to reflect changes in the name of the owner of the park. Amendments to reflect changes in zoning. Amendments to reflect a change in the person authorized to receive notices and demands on the park owner's behalf. Amendments to reflect changes in the entity furnishing utility or other services. Amendments required by the Division. Amendments required as a result of revisions of Chapter 723, F.S. Amendments to add, delete or modify user fees for prospective home owners. Neither the statute nor the rule defines what is meant by the term "tenancy." Historically, the Respondent has taken the position that the prospectus was binding on the park owner and the mobile home owner until the mobile home no longer occupied the lot or the tenant was evicted, whichever occurred first. In other words, the "tenancy" existed for as long as the mobile home remained on the lot, and the prospectus was binding during the length of the "tenancy", including any assumptions of the "tenancy." However, several legal cases, most recently in 1992, have essentially stated that a mobile home "tenancy" exists for the period of time during which a mobile home rental agreement is effective. The effect of the legal decision is to permit Rule 61B-31.001(5), Florida Administrative Code, to be construed to provide that a prospectus is valid only for the period covered by a rental agreement. The Legislature has not adopted legislation subsequent to the case which would affect the substance of the decision. On January 20, 1995, the Respondent published notice of the proposed repeal of Rule 61B-31.001(5), Florida Administrative Code, in the Florida Administrative Weekly, Vol. 21, No. 3. The Respondent's purpose in repealing the rule is primarily to eliminate the language relating the period of validity for a prospectus to the "tenancy." Although the Respondent asserts that it has no current policy as to the period of validity for a prospectus, the Respondent acknowledges taking the continuing position that the prospectus is binding for longer than the period of a rental agreement. The Petitioner challenges the agency position as being an unpromulgated, and therefore invalid, rule. The Petitioner also challenges as being an unpromulgated and invalid rule, the Respondent's decision to discontinue the review and approval mechanism for amendments to any previously approved prospectus. The Respondent asserts that, notwithstanding prior practice, it has no statutory authority to review and approve amendments to a previously approved prospectus and that it will no longer do so.
The Issue The issues are whether the respondents engaged in a discriminatory housing practice, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act, Sections 760.20 through 760.37, Florida Statutes (2007),1 by discriminating against Petitioner, on the basis of her alleged disability, and by harassing Petitioner and retaliating against her.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a former resident of Broadview Mobile Home Park (Broadview), located at 1701 Post Road, Melbourne, Florida. Petitioner resided in Broadview for approximately six years from an undisclosed date in 2002 through September 8, 2008. Mr. Lamont Garber holds an ownership interest in Broadview. The record does not quantify the ownership interest of Mr. Garber. Mr. Garber manages Broadview with his brother, Mr. Wayne Garber. Broadview rents sites within the mobile home park to residents who own mobile homes. Each site has access to water and electric service. Each resident arranges his or her water and electric service directly with the respective utility provider. Sometime in 2005, Petitioner purchased a mobile home for approximately $6,500.00 and moved within Broadview to Lot 24. The rental agreement for Lot 24 required rent to be paid on the first day of each month. The rent for July 2008 was due on July 1, 2008. Petitioner failed to pay the rent payment that was due on July 1, 2008. On July 9, 2008, Broadview served Petitioner, by certified mail, with a notice that she had five business days in which to pay the rent due (the five-day notice). Petitioner received the five-day notice on July 10, 2008. The five-day period expired on July 17, 2008, with no rent payment from Petitioner. Petitioner had paid rent late in the past, but Petitioner had never been more than four or five days late. After July 17, 2008, Broadview initiated eviction proceedings. Petitioner tendered the rent payment on July 20, 2008, but Broadview proceeded with the eviction. Petitioner did not appear and defend the eviction proceeding. On August 26, 2008, the County Court for Brevard County, Florida, issued a Final Default Judgment of Eviction awarding possession of Lot 24 to Broadview. Law enforcement officers thereafter executed the Court's order and evicted Petitioner from Broadview on or about September 8, 2008. After Petitioner received the notice of eviction, she filed a complaint with the Florida Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Florida Condominiums, Timeshares, and Mobile Homes (DBPR). DBPR is the state agency responsible for regulating mobile home parks, including Broadview. The allegations in the complaint that Petitioner filed with DBPR were substantially similar to the claims of discrimination, retaliation, harassment, and unlawful rent increases Petitioner asserts in this proceeding. DBPR rejected Petitioner's allegations and found that Broadview lawfully evicted Petitioner for non-payment of rent. The final agency action of DBPR is substantially similar to that of HUD and the Commission's proposed agency action in this proceeding. Each agency found that Broadview lawfully evicted Petitioner for non-payment of rent and rejected the allegations of discrimination, harassment, and retaliation. The DOAH proceeding is a de novo consideration of the proceeding before the Commission. A preponderance of the evidence does not establish a prima facie showing that Petitioner is disabled or handicapped. Petitioner has cancer and is receiving chemotherapy and radiation treatment. A preponderance of evidence does not show that the medical condition substantially limits one or more major life activities of Petitioner. Petitioner also alleges that she is disabled and handicapped by a mental condition. Petitioner submitted no medical evidence of the alleged disability or handicap. A preponderance of evidence does not establish a prima facie showing that, if such a mental condition exists, the condition substantially limits one or more major life activities of Petitioner. Assuming arguendo that a preponderance of the evidence showed that Petitioner were disabled or handicapped, a preponderance of evidence does not establish a prima facie showing that either of the respondents discriminated against Petitioner, harassed her, or evicted her in retaliation for Petitioner's disability or handicap. It is undisputed that Petitioner conducted neighborhood organization efforts to protest a rent increase at Broadview and repeatedly called law enforcement officials to report alleged drug and prostitution activity in Broadview.2 However, Broadview did not evict Petitioner for those activities, and Petitioner's testimony to the contrary is neither credible nor persuasive. Rather, Petitioner engaged in other activities that the respondents found objectionable. Petitioner baby sat for one or more dogs in violation of Broadview's prohibition against pets. Some of the dogs were dangerous to other residents. Petitioner also verbally abused Mr. Wayne Garber when he attempted to mediate with Petitioner concerning the presence of dogs and Petitioner's conduct toward management at Broadview. On July 1, 2008, Broadview served Petitioner with a seven-day notice concerning Petitioner's compliance with lease requirements. The notice, in relevant part, alleged that Petitioner harassed management and impaired the ability of management to perform its duties. The testimony of respondents describing the activities of Petitioner that precipitated the seven-day notice is credible and persuasive. A preponderance of the evidence shows that the respondents had legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for requiring Petitioner to comply with the terms of the seven-day notice and for requiring Petitioner to comply with the requirement for rent to be paid on July 1, 2008. Petitioner failed to comply with either requirement, and Broadview evicted Petitioner for legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons. The respondents did not harass or retaliate against Petitioner.3
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a final order finding that the respondents did not engage in an unlawful housing practice and dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of May, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of May, 2009.
