The Issue The issue in the case is whether the Petitioner has been the subject of a discriminatory housing practice by the Respondent through the alleged failure of the Respondent to provide a reasonable accommodation for a disability.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to the case, the Respondent operated an age-restricted mobile home park in Sarasota, Florida. With limited exceptions, residents of the mobile home park are 55 years of age and older. In September 2000, the Petitioner, a woman over 55 years of age, purchased a mobile home located within the Ridgewood Mobile Home Park. The mobile home was purchased through a real estate broker. The mobile home park apparently identifies itself through signage as a community for persons 55 years of age and older. Prior to the purchase the Petitioner had no communication with the Respondent and made no inquiry of the Respondent as to whether her son, who is under 55 years of age, would be allowed to live in the mobile home park. Within a few days of the purchase, the Petitioner was advised that residence in the mobile home park was limited, with certain exceptions, to persons 55 years of age and older. The Respondent advised the Petitioner that her son, who is under 55 years of age, could remain with her only for a period of up to two months to help her "settle in." By lease application dated October 1, 2000, the Petitioner advised the Respondent that her son would remain with her for a period of two months. In November 2000, after the two months had passed, the manager of the mobile home park (Mr. Cobb) informed the Respondent that her son would have to leave the residence. At that time, the Petitioner's son asserted that he was his mother's full-time, live-in caregiver. Prior to this point, the Petitioner had not indicated to the Respondent that she suffered from a handicap or required the services of a full-time, live-in caregiver The evidence fails to establish that, either at the time of the Petitioner's initial residence at the Respondent's mobile home park or by November 2000, the Petitioner suffered from a handicap or from any condition that substantially limited any major life activity, or that the Petitioner required the assistance of a full-time, live-in caregiver. At the time the Petitioner moved into the Respondent's mobile home park, the Petitioner was able to accomplish all major life activities. Although diabetic, the Petitioner was able to walk, drive, and shop for food or other necessities. Her son assisted in house cleaning and in other routine activities, but there is no credible evidence that, prior to August 2002, such assistance was required for performing major life activities. In August 2002, shortly after a medical procedure on the Petitioner's carotid artery, the Petitioner suffered a stroke. She was hospitalized for a period of approximately ten days and then transferred into a rehabilitation hospital for a period of approximately six weeks. Letters submitted from medical professionals involved with the Petitioner's case at the time of her stroke suggest that assistance was needed during the period of incapacity related to the stroke. There is no credible evidence that, subsequent to rehabilitation, the Petitioner needed the services of a full- time, live-in caregiver. After rehabilitation, the Petitioner recovered from the stroke sufficiently to regain her ability to perform major life activities, including driving an automobile. A subsequent automobile accident wherein she ran down a stop sign in the mobile home park after going shopping suggests that driving at night may be inappropriate. Following post-stroke rehabilitation, the Petitioner's son continued to reside with his mother, to assist in household duties and in assuring that the Petitioner followed a medication regimen, but the evidence fails to establish that she currently requires a full-time, live-in caregiver. At the time of the hearing, neither the Petitioner nor her son was residing in the Respondent's mobile home park. The evidence establishes that disabled or handicapped persons in the mobile home park who require full-time, live-in caregivers are accommodated without regard to the age of the caregiver or to the mobile home park's age-related restrictions.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing the complaint of Dona M. Burgess against the Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of July, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of July, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Elizabeth M. Boyle, Esquire Gulfcoast Legal Services, Inc. 1750 17th Street, Building 1 Sarasota, Florida 34234 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Kimberly P. Walker, Esquire Kevin Bruning, Esquire Williams, Parker, Harrison, Dietz & Getzen 200 South Orange Avenue Sarasota, Florida 34236-6802 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Respondents Alfred Homes and Felicia Homes Foster1 subjected Petitioner Nidia Cruz to discriminatory housing practices based on Ms. Cruz’s national origin, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act, chapter 760, part II, Florida Statutes (FHA).
Findings Of Fact Ms. Cruz, who is Hispanic in national origin, rented and occupied a mobile home at lot #9 in Pine Grove Trailer Park (Pine Grove), in an unincorporated area adjacent to Fernandina Beach, Florida. Respondent Alfred Homes owns Pine Grove. His daughter, Respondent Felicia Homes Foster, oversees the business operations of Pine Grove. Ms. Foster lives in a mobile home at Pine Grove, and owns two other mobile homes that are rental units. Ms. Cruz rented one of these mobile homes from Ms. Foster. The remaining mobile homes in Pine Grove are owner-occupied, with those owners renting their lots from Respondents. Neither party could produce a lease between Respondents and Petitioner concerning the mobile home. Based on the parties’ testimony and other evidence presented at the final hearing, the undersigned finds that Petitioner’s tenancy for the mobile home commenced on or about October 15, 2016, for an approximately one-year term ending November 30, 2017. Respondents charged a $500 security deposit, and $600 per month for rent, which included water and sanitary sewer that Pine Grove’s well and septic system provided. Ms. Cruz was responsible for electrical services to the mobile home. After the expiration of the lease on November 30, 2017, the parties did not renew the lease, and Ms. Cruz continued to occupy the mobile home under a month-to-month agreement, until she vacated the mobile home on or about September 29, 2018. Ms. Cruz sought out Respondents to rent a mobile home, as her previous landlord had terminated the lease for her previous residence because of her unauthorized possession of pets. Ms. Foster informed Ms. Cruz that she had an available mobile home to rent, but as the previous tenants had just moved out, she needed to make repairs to the mobile home before it could be occupied. Ms. Cruz requested to move in immediately while the Respondents repaired the mobile home, because she and her daughter were, at that point, homeless. Respondents employed Michael Hamilton to repair and provide maintenance work to the mobile homes in Pine Grove. Mr. Hamilton worked for Respondents on weekends, as he had a full-time job during the week. Within approximately one month of Ms. Cruz moving into her mobile home, Mr. Hamilton made the needed repairs to its interior, including replacing the refrigerator, carpet, commode, and door locks. After moving into the mobile home, Ms. Cruz was involved in an incident at a nearby McDonald’s restaurant with an employee. That employee, Theresa McKenzie, was a tenant of Pine Grove and resided in lot #10, which was adjacent to Ms. Cruz’s mobile home. Ms. Cruz and her daughter, Ms. Burgos, complained to Ms. Foster that Ms. McKenzie and her co-tenant Earnest Roberts made loud, harassing, and defamatory statements about Ms. Cruz and her national origin. Respondents, individually, warned Ms. McKenzie and Mr. Roberts to refrain from calling Ms. Cruz and Ms. Burgos names. The feud between Ms. Cruz and Ms. McKenzie was interrupted when Ms. Cruz was arrested on November 18, 2016. Ms. Cruz was charged with, among other offenses, aggravated stalking arising from a violation of an order of protection and filing a false police report. The victim of these offenses was a previous landlord from whom Ms. Cruz had rented a room. While in pretrial detention, a psychologist evaluated Ms. Cruz, and determined her to be incompetent to proceed in the criminal proceeding. The trial court subsequently committed Ms. Cruz to a mental health facility, and she pled guilty to filing a false police report. The trial court sentenced Ms. Cruz to a split sentence of two years with special conditions, which included enrollment into the mental health court program. After acceptance into the mental health court program, Ms. Cruz was released from the Nassau County Jail. On February 13, 2017, Ms. Foster hand delivered a letter to Ms. McKenzie and Mr. Roberts, which warned them that if they did not refrain from verbal attacks against Ms. Cruz, Respondents would evict them from Pine Grove and obtain a no trespassing order. Chris Cummings, who was a Pine Grove resident at lot #4, testified he was aware of the incident at McDonald’s involving Ms. Cruz and Ms. McKenzie, as his wife also worked at that McDonald’s. Mr. Cummings observed, but could not hear, Ms. Cruz and Ms. McKenzie “squaring off” against each other. Mr. Cummings recounted that he observed Ms. Cruz lift her skirt and bend over, in a manner that he interpreted to mean that Ms. McKenize could kiss her rear end. In August 2017, Hurricane Irma caused a large branch from a pine tree to fall on top of Ms. Cruz’s mobile home, puncturing the exterior metal skin of the mobile home’s roof, which allowed water to intrude into the interior of the mobile home. The water intrusion caused significant damage to the ceilings, walls, and floor coverings of the mobile home. It is undisputed that Hurricane Irma inflicted serious damage to the mobile home, and that Ms. Cruz resorted to using buckets to catch water leaking from the roof. Shortly after Hurricane Irma passed, Mr. Hamilton placed a tarp over the top of the mobile home to stop the water intrusion. He then began repairs to Ms. Cruz’s mobile home over the course of several weekends, which included removing and replacing damaged sheet rock, patching the metal roof, and installing new carpet and linoleum flooring. Mr. Hamilton testified that Ms. Cruz, on several occasions, frustrated his ability to complete these repairs by denying him entry into the mobile home. Ms. Cruz presented evidence that her mobile home required extensive repairs upon moving in, and that it sustained severe damage from Hurricane Irma. However, she presented no credible evidence to rebut the testimony that Mr. Hamilton, on behalf of Respondents, completed all necessary repairs. Additionally, Ms. Cruz presented no credible evidence that Respondents treated her differently than other Pine Grove tenants in responding to and completing any necessary repairs to other tenant’s mobile homes. Neither the passage of time, incarceration, nor the trauma of Hurricane Irma, ended the feud between Ms. Cruz and Ms. McKenzie. The Nassau County Sheriff’s Office had regular call-outs to Pine Grove regarding Ms. Cruz and Ms. McKenzie. The feud escalated when, on January 4, 2018, Ms. McKenzie filed a petition for an injunction for protection against Ms. Cruz, and the circuit court entered a temporary injunction that same day. The next day, January 5, 2018, Ms. Cruz and Ms. Burgos each filed petitions for an injunction for protection against Ms. McKenzie. Then, on January 16, 2018, Ms. Cruz sought a petition for an injunction for protection against Mr. Roberts, which the circuit court granted, as a temporary injunction, that same day. On January 17, 2018, the circuit court held a hearing on the petition against Ms. Cruz and Ms. Burgos’s petition against Ms. McKenzie, and on January 18, 2018, granted a final injunction in each case. On January 18, 2018, Ms. Burgos filed a petition for an injunction for protection against Mr. Roberts, which the circuit court denied. On January 24, 2018, the circuit court heard Ms. Cruz’s petitions against Ms. McKenzie and Mr. Roberts; the circuit court denied the injunction against Ms. McKenzie, but granted a final injunction against Mr. Roberts. On January 29 and February 9, 2018, the circuit court entered orders to show cause in Ms. Burgos’s injunction against Ms. McKenzie, and after hearing argument, dismissed them on February 15, 2018. Despite these multiple injunction proceedings, Ms. Cruz and Ms. McKenzie continued their feud. On January 22, 2018, Ms. Cruz was arrested for violation of the protection order in favor of Ms. McKenzie. Ms. Cruz’s arrest triggered a violation of her felony probation. While in pretrial detention, she was again evaluated by a psychologist, who determined her to be incompetent to proceed. The circuit court committed Ms. Cruz to a mental health facility. She subsequently returned to court and pled guilty to a violation of probation. The circuit court sentenced Ms. Cruz to a split sentence of time served, reinstated probation, and extended probation with an added special condition for 12 months. Ms. Cruz was released from the Nassau County Jail on July 27, 2018. On July 31, 2018, Ms. Foster hand delivered a notice to terminate the lease, stating that the lease will end on August 31, 2018, and that Ms. Cruz should vacate the mobile home no later than September 1, 2018. Ms. Cruz and Ms. Burgos continued to hold over in the mobile home until they moved out on September 29, 2018. Ms. Cruz failed to provide any credible evidence that Respondents, or Mr. Hamilton, made any disparaging statements to Ms. Cruz regarding her national origin. Ms. Cruz failed to provide any credible evidence that Respondents treated her less favorably than other tenants with regard to her feud with Ms. McKenzie. Put differently, Ms. Cruz failed to provide any credible evidence that Respondents treated any other tenant disputes differently than the way they treated the dispute between Ms. Cruz and Ms. McKenzie. Ms. Foster attempted to intervene on behalf of Ms. Cruz to end the feud, when she hand-delivered the letter to Ms. McKenzie on February 13, 2017, that threatened eviction. The credible evidence presented demonstrated that Ms. Cruz often created or exacerbated this feud, which ultimately led to her incarceration. Ms. Cruz failed to provide any credible evidence that Respondents’ decision to end the month-to-month holdover of the lease of the mobile home was based on her national origin, or that Respondents treated Ms. Cruz differently than any other tenants who resided at Pine Grove in ending the month-to-month holdover of a lease.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the undersigned hereby RECOMMENDS that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing Nidia Cruz’s Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of July, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT J. TELFER III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of July, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed) Nidia Cruz Post Office Box 1923 Callahan, Florida 32011 (eServed) James Pratt O'Conner, Esquire James Pratt O'Conner, P.A. Post Office Box 471 Fernandina Beach, Florida 32035 (eServed) Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed)
The Issue The issues for consideration in this case concern the petition and challenge to the validity of Rule 7D-32.001(4); Rule 7D-32.003 and Rules 7D- 32.004(1) and (2), Florida Administrative Code. The basis for the challenge is premised upon an alleged vagueness, inadequacy in the establishment of standards for agency decisions, the vesting of unbridled discretion in the agency and the contention that the rules are arbitrary and capricious.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the owner of Lake Waldena Resort, a mobile home park located in Marion County, Florida. That park is regulated under the provisions of Chapter 723, Florida Statutes. Petitioner is a mobile home park owner within the definition set out in Section 723.003(7), Florida Statutes. In addition, Petitioner is presently charged, through a notice to show cause/administrative complaint, with violating Section 723.037(3), Florida Statutes and Rule 7D- 32.004(1), Florida Administrative Code, by his alleged refusal to meet with a designated homeowners' committee within 30 days of the giving of notice of a proposed increase of lot rental. That disciplinary case was heard on the same date as the present case and is awaiting disposition through a recommended order. If Petitioner is found to have violated provisions within Chapter 723, Florida Statutes and Chapter 7D-32, Florida Administrative Code, he may be subjected to a civil penalty or have other administrative sanctions imposed. The rules that are under challenge are related to the formation of the homeowners committee; the activities of that committee in ascertaining the basis for the park owners' reason for a lot rental increase; the obligation of the park owner to meet with the committee and the opportunity of the park owner to request certification of the committee's selection to participate in the meeting envisioned by Section 737.0037(3), Florida statues. Respondent by the authority set forth in Section 732.006(6), Florida Statutes, is authorized to promulgate rules which it deems to be necessary to implement, enforce, and interpret the provisions of Chapter 723, Florida Statutes. In accordance with that authority and the authority set forth in Section 723.037, Florida Statutes, it enacted the rules which are the subject of this dispute. Intervenor is a Florida non-profit corporation which represents over 150,000 mobile home owners and tenants in Florida and has as its purpose the representation of those mobile home owners in various activities, to include legal issues. The Petitioner and Respondent and the mobile home owners whom the Intervenor represents are substantially affected by the decision concerning the validity of the aforementioned rules.
The Issue Whether the discriminatory housing practices alleged in Petitioner's amended housing discrimination complaint were committed by Respondents and, if so, what relief should the Florida Commission on Human Relations (Commission) provide Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at the final hearing and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner is a woman of Native American heritage. The record evidence, however, does not reveal that, at any time material to the instant case, anyone outside of her family, including Respondents, was aware of Petitioner's Native American background; nor does the record evidence establish that Petitioner was ever subjected to derogatory remarks about being of Native American descent. At all times material to the instant case, Petitioner has suffered from health problems that have substantially limited her ability to walk and have required her to use a motorized wheelchair to ambulate. Petitioner is now, and has been at all times material to the instant case, a resident of Kings Manor Estates (Park), a residential community of single-family mobile homes that is located in Davie, Florida. The Park is one of various mobile home communities that Respondent Uniprop Corporation (Uniprop) owns and operates. Like the other residents of the Park, Petitioner owns the mobile home in which she resides and pays rent to Uniprop for the use of the lot on which home is situated. Petitioner's home occupies lot 78 in the Park. As a resident of the Park, Petitioner has use of the Park's common areas and facilities, which include a swimming pool. There has been no showing that Petitioner has been denied access to any of these common areas or facilities due to her handicap. Residents of the Park must comply with the Park's rules and regulations. These rules and regulations reasonably require, among other things, that residents obtain, in addition to any permits they may need from the Town of Davie, the approval of Uniprop (referred to as "design approval") before constructing any improvements on their lots, including wheelchair ramps. To obtain such "design approval," a resident must submit to Park management a completed "design approval" application form and any supporting documentation. The application form provides a space for the resident to provide a "[d]escription, [d]rawing [l]ocation & [s]ize of [the proposed] [a]ddition." Immediately underneath this space on the form is the following pre-printed language: It is the Resident's responsibility to obtain all governmental approvals, to make certain the proposed improvement is suitable for the purpose intended and that the improvement complies with all applicable codes, standards and governmental requirements. Approval by Management of any improvement is limited to considerations of appearance. Resident agrees to have their home improvements built to the specifications listed above and illustrated in the space above and/or attached drawings, exhibits and permits. It is the responsibility of the Park's property manager, with the help of the Park's assistant property manager, to enforce the Park's rules and regulations. The duties of the Park's property manager and assistant property manager (whose work stations are located in the Park's business office) also include collecting rent from the Park's residents and taking appropriate action when residents are delinquent in their rental payments. There is a "drop off box" located outside the Park's business office in which residents can place their rental payments when the office is closed and the Park's property manager and assistant property manager are unavailable. Neither the property manager nor the assistant property manager is authorized to give residents "design approval." Only the Uniprop regional supervisor has such authority. The property manager and assistant property manager merely serve as "conduits" between the resident and the Uniprop regional supervisor in the "design approval" process. They take the completed "design approval" application form from the resident, provide it to the Uniprop regional supervisor, and, after hearing back from the regional supervisor, communicate the regional supervisor's decision to the resident. At all times material to the instant case, Respondent Delores Maddox was the Park's property manager. Ms. Maddox no longer works for Uniprop. Hazel Crain is now, and has been at all times material to the instant case, the Park's assistant property manager. At all times material to the instant case, Milton Rhines was the Uniprop regional supervisor having authority over the activities at the Park. Mr. Rhines was based in Ft. Myers, Florida, on the other side of the state from the Park. Josephine Patricia Silver is now, and has been at all times material to the instant case, employed as a sales consultant for Uniprop. In this capacity, she engages in activities designed to facilitate the sale of mobile homes manufactured by Uniprop (to be placed in the Park and other mobile home communities Uniprop owns and operates). Although her office is located in the Park, she plays no decision-making role in Park management. Notwithstanding that it is not her job responsibility to accept rental payments, she sometimes will do so as a courtesy to Park residents when she is at the Park on weekends or during the evening hours and the business office is closed. Although Ms. Silver and Petitioner do not get along, Ms. Silver has never threatened to "throw away" Petitioner's rental payments; nor has she ever told any of Park's residents that Petitioner was not paying her rent. Ms. Silver, however, has "gossiped" and made derogatory comments about Petitioner, but no showing has been made that Petitioner's handicap, her Native American heritage, or her having exercised any of her rights under Florida's Fair Housing Act played any role in Ms. Silver's having made these comments. In August of 2002, Petitioner mentioned to Ms. Crain about her interest in having a wheelchair ramp constructed on her lot. Ms. Crain suggested to Petitioner that she contact the Town to discuss the feasibility of such a project. Petitioner subsequently telephoned Brian Dillon, the Town's chief structural inspector. Mr. Dillon not only attempted to assist Petitioner in her efforts to obtain a permit from the Town to construct the wheelchair ramp, he also helped her make arrangements to have a boy scout troop construct the ramp for her with donated materials. The Town would not issue Petitioner a permit for the ramp unless and until she obtained the written approval of the Park owner, Uniprop. The ramp was constructed for Petitioner by the boy scouts during a weekend in mid-November 2002, without Petitioner's having first obtained Uniprop's "design approval" or a permit from the Town. Prior to the construction of the ramp, Petitioner had received a "design approval" application form from Ms. Crain and, on or about November 12 or 13, 2002, with Ms. Crain's assistance, had begun the application process. Petitioner, however, did not wait to receive the "design approval" she had applied for from Uniprop before giving the boy scouts the go ahead to start constructing the ramp. After discovering that the ramp had been constructed, Park management attempted to "work" with Petitioner to enable her to complete the paperwork necessary to obtain (belatedly) "design approval" for the ramp. On November 21, 2002, Petitioner submitted to Park management the following note from her physician, James Milne, D.O.: Due to Medical Necessity, my patient Mary Helen Meacham requires use of a motorized wheelchair, and it is necessary for her to have ramp access. If you have any questions, please feel free to call my office. By December 5, 2002, Petitioner had yet to submit the design plans needed to obtain "design approval" for the ramp. Accordingly, on that date, Uniprop's attorney, Ernest Kollra, Esquire, sent Petitioner, by certified mail, a Notice of Violation of Community Covenants, which read as follows: Please be advised the undersigned represents Kings Manor Estates with respect to your tenancy at the Community. This Notice is sent to you pursuant to Florida Statute, Chapter, 723.061, Et Seq. Park Management has advised the undersigned that you are in violation of the following Community Covenants of Kings Manor Estates: 7. Improvements: Before construction of any type is permitted on the homesite or added to a home, the Resident must obtain written permission from Management in the form of a Design Approval. Additional permits may be required by the municipality in which the Community is located. 10. Handicap Access: Any Residents requiring handicap access improvements such as ramps are permitted. All plans for such ramps must be approved by Management and comply with all other Community Covenants and governmental standards. You are in violation of the above Community Covenants, in that you have failed to submit plans to Management prior to the construction of your ramp. Park Management has been apprised by the Town of Davie that permits are required and none was obtained by you prior to construction, in compliance with Town of Davie governmental standards. In order to correct the above violation, you must within seven (7) days from delivery of this Notice, remove the ramp from your homesite. Delivery of the mailed notice is deemed given five (5) days after the date of postmark. If you fail and/or refuse to comply with this Notice, your tenancy will be terminated in accordance with Florida Statute Chapter 723.061.[2] If you have any questions concerning any of the above, you may contact Park Management at . . . . Petitioner did not remove the ramp by the deadline imposed by the December 5, 2002, Notice of Violation of Community Covenants. Park management, however, took no action to terminate her tenancy. After receiving the December 5, 2002, Notice of Violation of Community Covenants, Petitioner stopped making rental payments to Uniprop and, instead, deposited these monies with the Florida Justice Institute to be held in escrow until the controversy concerning the ramp was resolved. In or around mid-January 2003, Park management received from Petitioner corrected design plans for the ramp (that had been prepared by Doug Amos of Doug Amos Construction). On January 15, 2003, Ms. Maddox sent to Mr. Rhines, by facsimile transmission, a copy of these plans. Petitioner was subsequently granted "design approval" for the ramp. It has not been shown that there was any unreasonable or excessive delay involved in the granting of such approval. On February 19, 2003, Ms. Maddox wrote the following letter to the Town's Building Department: Please be advised that MaryHelen Meacham Woods is authorized to have permits issued for site #78 at 12620 SW 6th Street Davie, Florida 33325 for the Installation of a handicapped ramp. Thank you for your consideration in this matter. Following an inspection, the Town, in March 2003, issued a permit for the ramp. Petitioner has had use of the ramp since mid-November 2002 when it was first built (notwithstanding that she did not obtain Uniprop's "design approval" and a permit from the Town until some months later). On or about May 30, 2003, Petitioner authorized the Florida Justice Institute to deliver to Uniprop the rental payments it was holding (at Petitioner's request) in escrow. Uniprop accepted these rental payments when they were delivered. Petitioner has had raw eggs thrown at her wheelchair ramp. She suspects that Ms. Maddox's children were responsible for this vandalism, but there is insufficient record evidence to identify the culprits, much less ascertain their motives. On or about August 31, 2004, at a time when Hurricane Frances was approaching the Florida peninsula from the southeast, Park management sent Petitioner a Notice of Violation of Community Covenants, which read as follows: Pursuant to Florida Statute 723.061 et seq, you are hereby advised that you are in violation of the following Community Covenant(s) of which the Community first became aware on August 30, 2004. SECTION I: HOME AND SITE MAINTENANCE - Eachresident shall keep his/her site and home in a clean and neat condition and free of any fire hazards, there is no storage permitted around or under the home or in screened rooms. ALL items must be stored inside the home or storage shed. Although you have previously been furnished a copy of the Community Covenants of the park, and said Community Covenants are posted in the recreation center and business office, a copy of the rule(s) of which you are in violation is attached to this notice for your convenience. Specifically, you are in violation of the above Community Covenant(s) in that Your home, trim and utility shed are dirty, there is growth in the gutters and there is a window air conditioner on the home. In order to correct the above violation of the Community Covenant(s) you must Wash your home, trim and utility shed, paint with colors approved by management, clean the growth from the gutters and remove the window air conditioner within seven (7) days from delivery date of this letter. If you fail and/or refuse to correct the violations of the Community Covenant(s) in the manner listed above, the park will pursue all its rights and remedies pursuant to 723.061 et seq. PLEASE GOVERN YOURSELF ACCORDINGLY It has not been shown that Park management took this action to retaliate against Petitioner for having requested permission to construct a wheelchair ramp on her lot or that such action was motivated by any other improper purpose. Park management has not pursued the matter the further. At no time has Park management initiated legal action to terminate Petitioner's tenancy and evict her. The record evidence is insufficient to establish that Respondents, or anyone acting on their behalf, have said or done anything having the purpose or effect of disadvantaging Petitioner based on her handicap, her Native American heritage, or her having asked to be allowed to build a wheelchair ramp on her lot.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission issue a final order finding that Respondents are not guilty of any "discriminatory housing practice" and dismissing Petitioner's amended housing discrimination complaint based on such finding. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of May, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ___ STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of May, 2005.
The Issue Did Westside Ridge Adult Mobile Home Community (Westside) violate Rule 10D-26.085, Florida Administrative Code, by having standing water in its mobile home park for more than 48 hours? If so, is this sufficient basis for the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (Department) to deny Westside's application for renewal of its mobile home park operating permit?
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the deposition testimony and documentary evidence presented by the parties in this case, the following findings of fact are made: Westside Ridge, Ltd., a Florida limited partnership, is the owner of Westside Ridge Adult Mobile Home Community. Under Chapter 513, Florida Statutes, the Department, in conjunction with the representative county public health units, such as the Polk County Public Health Unit, is the agency charged with the responsibility of inspecting mobile home parks such as Westside to assure their compliance with public health laws and rules. On August 14, 1995, the Department inspected Westside and found water underneath some of the mobile homes in the park; water covering some of lots in the park; and water ponding in some of the streets in the park. This water had been standing for more than 48 hours. The Department's inspector issued an Inspection Report dated August 14, 1995. This report indicated that the unsatisfactory condition found at the mobile home park was the park drainage. The report stated that all violations of standing water must be corrected within 14 days. Westside received a copy of the Inspection Report from the August 14, 1995, inspection in a timely manner. Sometime around September 10, 1995, Westside retained the services of J. D. Smith Exterminators, Inc. (Smith), a professional pest control service, to treat any standing water in Westside's mobile home park. Westside has not corrected the conditions which affected the drainage in the mobile home park and resulted in the water standing in the park for over 48 hours. The Department contends that the rule requires Westside correct the conditions - either fill in the depressions in the soil or provide proper drainage of the water - which affect the drainage and results in water standing over 48 hours in the mobile home park. Westside contends that the rule does not prohibit water standing over 48 hours where the water is treated and does not contribute to mosquito or fly breeding. By letter dated September 15, 1995, Westside advised the Department that Westside would retain a professional pest control service to prevent any standing water from contributing to mosquito or fly breeding. Westside also requested that the Department advise it if the Department intended to seek enforcement pursuant to the Department's interpretation of Rule 10D-26.085, Florida Administrative Code. Apparently, the request concerning enforcement was made as a result of a telephone conversation between one of the Department's representatives and Westside's counsel on Thursday, September 14, 1995, concerning the Department's interpretation of the rule and what the Department intended to require Westside to correct the alleged violation of the rule. The Department did not advise Westside or its counsel of its intent to pursue enforcement. On or about September 10, 1995, Smith visited Westside mobile home park and found water standing as reported on the August Inspection Report but did not treat the water because Smith did not have the necessary chemical on hand. On or about September 13, 1995, Smith returned to Westside's mobile home park to treat the standing water but, upon arrival, Smith did not find any standing water at the mobile home park that required treatment. Before Westside's current annual mobile home park operating permit expired, Westside timely filed its application with the Department for the renewal of its mobile home park operating permit. The Department issued a Denial Of Application For Mobile Home Park/Recreational Vehicle Park Operating Permit dated November 26, 1995, denying Westside's application for its annual mobile home park operating permit. The basis of the Department's denial was that Westside mobile home park had violated Rule 10D-26.085, Florida Administrative Code, in that the mobile home park had been found to have standing water in the park in excess of the 48 hour period allowed by the rule. The denial also warned Westside that unless it had requested a hearing, or ceased operating the park, or remit a plan of action to remove all standing water and measures to prevent reoccurrence of the violation that Westside would be cited for operating without a valid permit within 30 days. During the summer of 1995, there was an above-average rainfall in Polk County, Florida which resulted in flooding problems in mobile home parks located throughout Polk County, Florida, including Westside's mobile home park. Based on the testimony of the Department's employees involved with the inspection of mobile home parks, the flooding conditions were the worst seen in Polk County, Florida in 25 years. The is no evidence of how long water had been standing in Westside's mobile home park before the Department's inspection on August 14, 1995, other than it had been standing over 48 hours. There is no evidence of Westside being cited for having water standing in its park for over 48 hours at any time previous to the August 14, 1995, inspection. There is no evidence of any water standing, for any length of time, in Westside's mobile home park, after September 14, 1995. Although the inspection report for January 10, 1996, indicates water standing in drainage ditches along the sides of Westside mobile home park, there is no evidence that these drainage ditches are in fact within the park boundary. The Department did not inspect Westside mobile home park again until January 10, 1996, which was after the issuance of the denial of the permit on November 26, 1995. There were no violations or unsatisfactory conditions, such as drainage, indicated on the Department's January 10, 1996, Inspection Report, notwithstanding that the Department's position is that since Westside has failed to correct the drainage problem which resulted in the standing water it continues to be in violation of Rule 10D-26.085, Florida Administrative Code. Treating standing water with chemicals to prevent mosquito and fly breeding does not solve all of the public health problems that may be associated with water that has been standing for long periods of time. It is the Department's position that water standing in the park for more than 48 hours is a violation of Rule 10D-085, Florida Administrative Code, and, without any other violation, is sufficient to deny the application for the operating permit. Other than the violation for having standing water in the park for over 48 hours and the failure to correct the conditions which resulted in the standing water, the Department concedes that Westside meets all other criteria for granting the application for a mobile home park operating permit.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services enter a final order granting Petitioner's application for a mobile home operating permit. However, it is further recommended that the Department monitor the Westside mobile home park so as to determine if conditions presently existing at the park result in water standing in the park in excess of 48 hours under normal rainfall. If water found is to be standing in the park in excess of 48 under normal rainfall, the Department should then move to require Westside to correct the condition. RECOMMENDED this 7th day of May, 1996, at Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of May, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 96-0273 The following constitutes my specific rulings, pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties in this case. Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. Proposed findings of fact 1 through 11, 13, 16, 17, 19 through 25, 29, 30, 31 and 33 through 36 are adopted in substance as modified in the Findings of Fact 1 through 22. Proposed findings of fact 12 and 26 through 28 are neither material nor relevant. Proposed findings of fact 14, 15 and 37 through 41 are argument rather than findings of fact. Proposed findings of fact 18 and 32 are not supported by evidence in the record. Department's Proposed Findings of Fact. Proposed findings of fact 1 through 22 are adopted in substance as modified in Findings of Fact 1 through 22. Proposed findings of fact 23 and 24 are argument rather than findings of fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Gregory D. Venz, Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Richard Doran, General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Timothy F. Campbell, Esquire Clark, Comparetto & Campbell, P.A. 4740 Cleveland Heights Boulevard Post Office Box 6559 Lakeland, Florida 33807 Jack Emory Farley, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services District 14 270 Bartow Municipal Airport Bartow, Florida 33830
Findings Of Fact The Subject Property. The property at issue in this proceeding consists of approximately 66 lots (hereinafter referred to as the "Subject Property"), located in Highridge Estates Subdivision (hereinafter referred to as "Highridge"). Each lot is approximately one-third acre in size. Highridge and the Subject Property are located in Clay County, Florida. Highridge was filed in the public records of Clay County, Florida, as a platted subdivision in January of 1970. At the time Highridge was platted, each lot met the zoning requirements applicable to Highridge. Pursuant to then-existing zoning, each Highridge lot could be developed as a single-family residence by construction or the placement of a mobile home thereon. Adoption of the Clay County 2001 Comprehensive Plan. Clay County adopted the Clay County 2001 Comprehensive Plan (hereinafter referred to as the "Plan"), on January 23, 1992, as required by the Local Government Comprehensive Planning and Land Development Regulation Act, Part II, Chapter 163, Florida Statutes (hereinafter referred to as the "Act"). At the time of the adoption of the Plan, the Plan contained policies which would have permitted lots such as those in Highridge that had not yet been developed to be developed as a single-family residence by the placement of a mobile home thereon. As required by the Act, the Plan was submitted to the Florida Department of Community Affairs (hereinafter referred to as the "Department"), for review and determination of whether the Plan was "in compliance" as defined by the Act. During the time that the Plan was being considered it was publicly known that the policies which would allow the placement of mobile homes on each of the lots in Highridge might not be accepted by the Department. Petitioner's Acquisition of the Subject Property. During the early 1990's William Bitetti began looking for real estate to invest in. Mr. Bitetti, through the services of Century 21 Lakeside Realty, became aware of the availability of lots in Highridge as a possible investment. Mr. Bitetti was assured by Century 21 Lakeside Realty's realtor that Highridge could be developed by the placement of a single mobile home on each lot. On or about March 25, 1992 Mr. Bitetti entered into a Contract for Sale and Purchase of 56 lots in Highridge. The following condition was included in the Contract for Sale and Purchase: this contract is only conditioned upon Buyer being able to place a Doublewide Mobile Home with attendant well, septic tank and system and electric service on each Lot, to be deter- mined by Buyer's attorney within 2 (two) weeks of the effective date of this contract. Mr. Bitetti intended that the lots would be purchased by the Petitioner, St. William Land Company, Inc. Mr. Bitetti is the sole shareholder and the President of Petitioner. Mr. Bitetti intended that the lots would be marketed for sale as single-family mobile home sites. Mr. Bitetti's attorney, Paul D. Newell, had experience with Highridge, having owned lots within Highridge himself. Mr. Newell was also aware of the language of the Plan that would allow development of the lots in Highridge. Mr. Newell had attempted to keep himself informed as to the progress of the Plan. Mr. Newell spoke to an official of the Clay County Planning and Zoning Department to confirm the language that would allow development of the lots in Highridge was included in the Plan and was told that it was. Mr. Newell also confirmed that regulations in existence at the time would allow Mr. Bitetti to market the lots as intended. The evidence failed to prove that any official of Clay County gave Mr. Newell assurances that the Plan would be approved by the Department as written. Mr. Newell was aware that the Plan had been submitted to the Department for review and had not yet been approved by the Department. Mr. Newell was also aware that it was possible that the Department would not accept the portion of the Plan that allowed continued development of developments like Highridge. On May 21, 1992 the Petitioner purchased the 56 lots in Highridge. Two of the 56 lots were subsequently sold by Petitioner. On or about October 12, 1992, Petitioner purchased an additional 12 lots in Highridge. The 12 lots purchased on October 12, 1992 and 54 of the lots purchased on May 21, 1992 constitute the Subject Property. At the time of purchase, the Subject Property lots could be sold for the installation of a mobile home on each lot pursuant to the law then in effect. The Plan was, however, still being reviewed by the Department. The Subject Property lots have direct access to a publicly owned and maintained right-of-way or to a privately owned platted right-of-way. Alleged Government Action Relied Upon by the Petitioner. On or about July 5, 1992, after acquiring the first 56 lots, Petitioner was issued a permit by the Clay County Building Department authorizing Petitioner to place a mobile home sales model on one of the lots. The evidence failed to prove that Clay County made any representation to Petitioner or Mr. Bitetti, or their representatives, that the policies of the Plan which would allow each lot of the Subject Property to be developed as individual sites for mobile homes would be approved by the Department or that, if it was, the law would not subsequently be changed. Nor did the evidence prove that Clay County represented in anyway that the Subject Property could be developed as Petitioner intended. Petitioner's Alleged Detrimental Reliance. Petitioner purchased the Subject Property for approximately $49,048.18, including closing costs. Two of the 68 lots purchased by Petitioner were subsequently sold. Petitioner realized a profit of approximately $2,582.31 on the sale of these lots. During 1992 Petitioner paid $29,515.37 to purchase and locate a mobile home as a model on one of the lots, to furnish the mobile home, and for landscaping, utilities, and the installation of a well, septic tank and power pole associated with the lot the mobile home was placed on. Petitioner also incurred the following expenses: $1,452.29 for postage associated with attempting to sell lots; $250.00 for charitable donations; $167.66 in bank account service fees; $2,957.85 for hazard and liability insurance; $36.50 in "miscellaneous" expenses; $2,355.72 for ad valorem taxes; and $510.00 in legal fees. Similar expenses were also incurred in 1993. The evidence failed to prove that Petitioner incurred any expenses or obligations for the development of the Subject Property. Rights That Allegedly Will Be Destroyed. Subsequent to Petitioner's acquisition of the Subject Property, the issuance of the permit to place a mobile home sales model on one of the lots and the acquisition of the mobile home and placement of the mobile home on one lot, the Plan was determined to not be in compliance with the Act. In particular, it was determined that the policies of the Plan which would have permitted lots such as those in Highridge that had not yet been developed to be developed by the placement of a mobile home on each lot caused the Plan to be "not in compliance". Clay County subsequently amended the Plan to eliminate the policies that would have permitted lots such as those in Highridge that had not yet been developed to be developed by the placement of a mobile home on each lot. The Plan was determined to be in compliance on April 27, 1993. As a result of the elimination of the policies pertinent to this matter, Clay County was required to modify the zoning for the Subject Property. The Subject Property was zoned for use for the smallest lot size allowed pursuant to the Plan: one-half acre. As a result of the foregoing, most of the Subject Property lots are too small to be developed individually. Pursuant to the Plan, lots that stand alone may be developed by the placement of a single mobile home thereon. Two of the 66 lots stand alone and, therefore, may be developed by the placement of a single mobile home thereon. The remaining 64 lots of the Subject Property are located in contiguous groups and, pursuant to the Plan, must be combined into one-half acre lots or larger. As a result, the Petitioner will lose the ability to sell some number of his lots for the placement of a single mobile home thereon. The evidence failed to prove what the actual economic impact will be to Petitioner if it cannot sell each lot for use as a single mobile home lot. Petitioner was notified by a letter dated August 24, 1993 and a letter to its real estate broker dated January 24, 1994 and a letter to Mr. Bitetti dated February 2, 1994, of the restrictions on the use of the Subject Property. The letters were all from Clay County personnel.
The Issue This case concerns a Notice to Show Cause served by Petitioner on Respondents, by which Petitioner orders Respondents to cease and desist their activities, to pay statutory fees, and to be assessed penalties. The activities in question are associated with the alleged need for Respondents to pay annual fees for mobile home lots rented within an alleged mobile home park operated by Respondents from the years 1984 through 1991. See, Section 723.007, Florida Statutes. Based upon the alleged nonpayment of the annual fees, Petitioner seeks to impose a civil penalty in accordance with Section 723.006(5)(d)1., Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact In 1978, Park T. Brittle purchased property in Leon County, Florida, which had been foreclosed on by Barnett Bank. This property had been originally developed by Miles Salgret. Prior to the purchase by Park T. Brittle, some lots had been sold by Mr. Salgret, approximately four in number. The property in question is known as Briarwood Estates. The Briarwood Estates is for use by mobile home owners who either own or rent lots on this property. Subsequent to his purchase, Park T. Brittle had the property surveyed by Tom Howard, a surveyor. Through this survey, a plat was prepared. The plat was submitted to the Leon County Property Appraiser. Subsequent to that time, beginning in 1980, the lots within Briarwood Estates have been individually assessed by the Property Appraiser for tax purposes. That is to say that the tax assessment is made on the individual lot owners. Park T. Brittle has sold 29 or 30 lots during his ownership. The property that is described in the plat is property in which the individual lot owners own to the center line of the roads which adjoin the lots. Respondents provide water and street lights as amenities within Briarwood Estates. Respondents are billed for these utilities and, in turn, charge individual lot owners for the amenities. In addition to the mobile home lots which have been sold, beginning with 1984 when the Florida Mobile Home Act was passed, the relevant time frame in this inquiry, Respondents have rented 10 or more mobile home lots on the property known as Briarwood Estates. These lots were rented to residential mobile home owners. More specifically, Respondents have continually collected monthly rents for mobile home lots on the property from 16 residential mobile home owners. All 16 of these mobile homes, during the period of 1984 through 1991, were mobile homes which were at least 8 feet by 35 feet in dimension. None of these 16 mobile homes are owned by Respondents. The 16 lots are not for purposes of rental spaces for RVs. In view of an attempt to institute a rental increase for the mobile home lots which Respondents rented at Briarwood Estates, a complaint was made to Petitioner concerning Respondents' intention to increase the rental fees. Respondents deferred to the requirements set forth by Petitioner concerning rent increases for those lots rented to the residential mobile home owners. Respondents complied notwithstanding Respondents' claimed uncertainty concerning the necessity to follow the guidelines and requirements established by Petitioner for adopting rent increases for lots rented to residential mobile home owners at Briarwood Estates. The uncertainty asserted by Respondents concerned the question of whether the 16 lots for which Respondents receive rents are part of a mobile home park, as defined in Section 723.003(6), Florida Statutes. Respondent, Park T. Brittle, testified at page 17 in the hearing transcript: "I attempted to follow those guidelines, not because I felt obligated, but if indeed later on it was determined that I was operating a mobile home park, I wanted to be sure that I was clear on that part of it." This refers to the increases in lot rental fees. Respondents do not concede that they are operating a mobile home park as it pertains to the payment of annual fees for each of the 16 lots in the amount of $1.00 in 1984 and $3.00 from 1985 through 1991, together with a 10% late fee charge for each year and each lot if the fees were not paid prior to December 31st of the year in question. Consequently, the fees for the 16 lots in the years 1984 through 1991 have not been paid. The amount due for the annual lot fees and penalties is $387.20. In addition to the amount assessed for annual fees for the lots and penalties for late payment, historically, Petitioner has assessed a $500.00 fine per year for noncompliance with the requirement to pay annual lot fees. Respondents do not believe that they are operating a mobile home park, rather it is their assertion that they are operating a mobile home subdivision. Respondents have cooperated with the Petitioner in the investigation concerning the payment of annual fees for lot rentals which was occasioned by inquiries by Park Brittle as well as a complaint by a tenant in one of the sixteen lots in question over increases in the monthly mobile home lot rental fees.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that final order be entered which requires Respondents to pay $387.20 in annual fees and penalties for the period 1984-1991, and assesses a civil penalty in the amount of $500. DONE and ENTERED this 7th day of October, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of October, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-2961 The following discussion is given concerning the proposed facts of the parties: Petitioner's Facts: Paragraphs 1 through 11 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 12 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraph 13 is subordinate to facts found. Respondents' Facts: Paragraphs 1 through 7 are subordinate to facts found. COPIES FURNISHED: E. Harper Field, Esquire Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-1007 George Carswell, Esquire Post Office Box 508 Monticello, Florida 32344 Henry M. Solares, Director Department of Business Regulation, Florida Land Sales Condominiums and Mobile Homes 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-1007 Donald D. Conn, General Counsel Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-1007
Findings Of Fact After a realtor told Robert Edward Poland that the Flagship Bank was foreclosing on Villa Rosa Mobile Home Park in Jacksonville Beach, Mr. Poland and his wife offered to purchase the property. The incompetency of the owner, Mrs. Ritchie, then in her eighties, together with ensuing legal proceedings, complicated negotiations. But on August 21, 1986, Robert Edward Poland and Jacqueline Poland became joint owners of Villa Rosa Mobile Home Park. A portion of the park they acquired in fee simple, but another portion (now known as Beach Boulevard Trailer Park) they acquired only as a life estate pur autre vie. On the death of Mrs. Ritchie in mid-October 1987, the life estate was extinguished, and that portion has become the property of Mrs. Ritchie's daughter, Elizabeth Drey, and possibly the daughter's husband, Richard Drey. Only beginning with rent for February of 1989, however, have the Dreys begun receiving income from the trailer park. Rent Raised On August 21, 1986, the day they acquired ownership, the Polands gave tenants written notice of their intention "to adjust rent effective December 1, 1986" to $130 a month for a single mobile home lot and to $155 monthly for a double wide mobile home on a single lot. This proposed rental increase did not pertain to lots 3, 6, 13, 15, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, or 007, which were rented only to over-nighters. Perhaps misunderstanding the notice, Tom Williams on Lot C began paying a higher amount on October 1, 1986, before the increase took effect. The following month, Debra Black Wood, J. E. Turner and James Mahoney also paid the increased rent prematurely. In their cases, and in the case of Mr. Williams, the Polands accepted the money but credited the surplus to the tenant. Not counting the lot which the boundary between the Drey property and the Polands' property divides, Mr. and Mrs. Poland offered for rent or lease 26 or more mobile home lots as residences, both before and after Mrs. Ritchie's death. The following tenants' monthly rent increased by the amounts indicated on December 1, 1986: Name of Tenant Lot No. Amount of Increase Ila Story 1 $30.00 Rosa Robinson 2 30.00 Rick Tahey 4/5 55.00 Virginia Dawson 7 5.00 Isabe Sutcliffe 8 30.00 Deborah Blackwood 9 5.00 B. E. Turner 12 30.00 Ingrid C. Fegan 14 30.00 Helen Marin 17 40.00 Alden Waterman 18 30.00 Ethel Dunsmoor 19 30.00 Martina O'Hare 20 30.00 Zora Hyde 21 30.00 William Vollkmer 22 30.00 Richard Rasmussen 23 5.00 Marjorie Barnes 24 30.00 James Mahoney 26 30.00 Roger Zucco 27 5.00 George Bunting 29 55.00 Robert Grabel 30 55.00 David Escopie 31 30.00 Catherine Stevens 32 30.00 Richard Law 33 30.00 Maxwell Page 35 30.00 Helen Hines 36 5.00 Norman Peterson 37 5.00 Hernandez/Johns 38/39 25.00 Lester Rogers 40 30.00 Rita Boyer 41 30.00 Thelma Thornton 42 30.00 Maxwell Page 43 30.00 Kenneth Driscoll 44 55.00 Edna Praine 45 55.00 Cassus Powell 100 30.00 David Koehler 101 5.00 Jerry Welker 102 62.50 John Embleton 103 5.00 Corrine Beach 104 55.00 Clyde Wiley 105 30.00 Candie Blasman 106 30.00 Harry Wilson 107 30.00 Stanley Dolka A 30.00 Goffery Riser D 5.00 William Page E 30.00 Pat Pattillo F 40.00 Roy Pike G 30.00 Frieda Suomella H 5.00 Charlotte Reid I 30.00 Bernard Hakes J 30.00 Herbert Davis K 30.00 Lee Haley L 30.00 Heide Alexander M 30.00 Joseph Moore N 5.00 Mary Lo Wampler O 40.00 Ernest Grizzard P 30.00 Bertha Martin Q 40.00 Cathy Lumbar R 65.00 Ruth Pooley S 5.00 Norma Baker U 5.00 H. W. DeMoss V 30.00 Arthur Pitman W 40.00 Jesse Wagnor X 5.00 James Hicks Y 5.00 Robert Wilder 00 20.00 At hearing, Mr. Poland testified to a total of 85 lots of which "seventy-three are singlewide [including some devoted to overnighters], and the balance would be overnighters or doublewides." T.88. According to DBR records, respondents reported 87 lots when applying for approval for their prospectus. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3, pp. 000017, 000021. Past Practice Historically, the park had been run on the basis of oral agreements, creating month-to-month tenancies. Such records as existed when the Polands acquired ownership of the mobile home park reflected 13 different amounts charged different tenants for equivalent mobile home lots. Apparently Mrs. Ritchie had played favorites. A longtime resident testified that the rental rate structure was "kind of on the buddy/buddy system." T. 68. From time to time, and on no more than a month's notice, Mrs. Ritchie had raised rents. Robert L. Davis, who moved to the trailer park in October of 1976, originally paid $50.00 a month. On September 1, 1983, monthly rent increased from $50.00 to $75.00; and on December 1, 1983, from $75.00 to $100.00. One longtime resident, Katherine Stevens, "imagined" (T.127) that Mrs. Ritchie had asked for rent increases to defray utility rate hikes, but written notices of increases offered no explanation. T.48-49. Like Mr. Davis and Ms. Stevens, Robert Wilder, who seeks no money in this proceeding (T.75), was a tenant at the mobile home park before June 4, 1984. Until May of 1986, nobody ever received a prospectus. On June 10, 1983, however, rules and regulations were drawn up which provided in paragraph 20: Management specifically reserves the right to increase rental rates, fees, charges or assessments imposed on resident either by amendment or by addition to these rules, provided thirty (30) day written notice is given. Rosa Ritchie herself gave Ms. Stevens and other tenants a copy of the rules and regulations which first set out in writing her practice of giving thirty days' notice before raising rents. Regulatory Approval Only after the Polands had acquired the property, and announced their intention to raise rents, did Mr. Poland learn of the requirement that a prospectus be furnished tenants. On September 9, 1986, he wrote Mr. John D. Floyd of DBR as follows: With regards to the prospectus of Villa Rosa, please find enclosed a copy of the Rules and Regulations which are provided each tenant prior to renewing or extending `an existing rental agreement and prior to entering into a new rental agreement. This document was previously submitted to your Division and I assume that it remains acceptable. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3. In response, Senior Clerk Pamela T. Parker of the Department of Business Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes, wrote Mr. Poland on September 19, 1986, listing various "deficiencies for form." With regard to the prospectus, she wrote, among other things: The prospectus fee was not in accordance with Section 723.011(1)(d), Florida Statutes. Please submit a check for the appropriate amount. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3. Having received this reply, Mr. Poland wrote Ms. Parker on September 25, 1986, as follows: Enclosed please find the Mobile Home Prospectus, Filing Statement and Filing Fee. Currently, there are no rental agreements in writing for the mobile home park. All agreements are oral, to the best of my knowledge. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3, p. 000018. Petitioner received Mr. Poland's letter of September 25, 1986, the following day. The letter is marked "RECEIVED FISCAL SEP 26 1986." DBR's Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes did not "process" the $150 check which accompanied the letter, until October 15, 1986, however, when somebody marked the letter "RECEIVED FISCAL OCT 15 1986" and crossed through the earlier received stamp. Another eight days passed before a form letter from the Division went out to Mr. Poland advising him of the Division's intention to examine the contents of his filing, to ensure its adequacy, and promising him he would "be notified as to the results of this examination within" forty five days of October 15, 1986. On November 20, 1986, more than 45 days after the prospectus had been received, the Division sent another letter to Mr. Poland, signed by Bridget St. Clair, apprising Mr. Poland of a number of deficiencies in the prospectus. On December 2, 1986, Mr. Poland made a second submission. In a cover letter addressed to Ms. St. Clair, he wrote: During our recent telephone conversation, you indicated that a prospectus is not necessary unless a rate increase Is anticipated. Since I have no intention of raising rates for the next year, I do question why this prospectus is necessary. Your thoughts on this point would be greatly appreciated. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3, p. 000013. In May of 1987, after several further emendations, Mr. Poland was told over the telephone that the prospectus submitted in December passed muster, as revised. Having received oral approval, he asked an employee, Jack N. Justice, to deliver prospectuses. Mr. Justice delivered by hand to every resident who was home a copy of the prospectus and, whenever somebody was not at home, put a copy in the mail box. (Before these deliveries, the planned increase in rent had taken effect, as of December 1 of the previous year.) Petitioner gave written notice of approving the prospectus by letter dated May 27, 1987. The approved prospectus apprised tenants of the landlord's intention to pass on "ad valorem property taxes or utilities charges ... during the term of the lot rental agreement ... [p]rorated equally among all lots," Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, p. 46, and warned tenants that an increase in water, sewer or garbage collection charges or property taxes "may result in an increase in the home owner's lot rental amount." Id. Rent Raised Again On June 25, 1987, Mr. Poland sent out a second notice proposing another increase of rent, to take effect on October 1, 1987, "due to the increase in real estate taxes and for capital improvements, including the water pressure problems complained of." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 4. The increase amounted to $15.00 per month for each single mobile home on a single lot, and to $20.00 for double wide mobile homes (or other mobile homes on double lots.) Id. On April 7, 1987, the City of Jacksonville Beach increased water and sewer rates. Mr. Poland's claim that the increase resulted in an average additional charge of approximately $14.12 per month per lot went unrebutted. A garbage collection container had to be added at $100 ($1.15 per lot) a month; $330 was expended to install a new water meter. Ad valorem taxes increased between 1985 and 1986, but were not shown to have risen at any time after December 1, 1986. The following tenants paid increased rent in the following monthly increments, effective October 1, 1987: Name of Tenant Lot No. Amount of Increase *Ila Story 1 $15.00 Mark Robson 2 15.00 *Rick Tahey 4/5 25.00 Seahorn/Gulledge 7 15.00 *Isabe Sutcliffe 8 15.00 William R. Hernandez 9 15.00 Bertie Willis 10/11 25.00 *B. E. Turner 12 15.00 *Ingrid C. Fegan 14 15.00 Ray Brozoski 16 5.00 *Helen Marin 17 15.00 *Alden Waterman 18 15.00 *Ethel Dunsmoor 19 15.00 *Martina O'Hare 20 15.00 *Zora Hyde 21 15.00 *William Vollkmer 22 15.00 William E. Wolfe 23 15.00 H. D. Seahorn 25 15.00 *James Mahoney 26 15.00 *Roger Zucco 27 15.00 Roland Page 28 15.00 *George Bunting 29 15.00 *Robert Grabel 30 15.00 Joseph Mickey 31 5.00 *Catherine Stevens 32 15.00 *Richard Law 33 15.00 Edna Barrett 34 15.00 *Maxwell Page 35 15.00 *Helen Hines 36 15.00 Christ. Hooley 37 15.00 *Hernandez/Johns 38/39 20.00 Arminta Rogers 40 15.00 *Rita Boyer 41 15.00 *Thelma Thornton 42 15.00 *Maxwell Page 43 15.00 *Kenneth Driscoll 44 15.00 *Edna Praine 45 15.00 James Wilson 46 15.00 Nancy C. Lane 100 15.00 *David Koehler 101 15.00 *Jerry Welker 102 15.00 *John Embleton 103 15.00 *Corrine Beach 104 20.00 *Clyde Wiley 105 15.00 *Candie Blasman 106 15.00 *Harry Wilson 107 20.00 *Stanley Dolka A 15.00 Tom Williams C 15.00 *Goffery Riser D 15.00 *William Page E 15.00 *Pat Pattillo F 15.00 *Roy Pike G 15.00 *Frieda Suomella H 15.00 *Charlotte Reid I 15.00 Michelle Holt J 15.00 *Herbert Davis K 15.00 *Lee Haley L 15.00 *Heide Alexander M 15.00 Joseph Morris N 15.00 *Mary Lo Wampler O 15.00 *Ernest Grizzard P 15.00 Juanita Holliman Q 15.00 *Kathalee Lombar R 15.00 *Ruth Pooley S 15.00 *Norma Baker U 15.00 *H. W. DeMoss V 15.00 *Arthur Pitman W 15.00 *Jesse Wagnor X 15.00 *James Hicks Y 15.00 W. Crowe Z 15.00 *Robert Wilder 00 20.00 Asterisks indicate those who were tenants on December 1, 1986. No lot rental agreements were in writing.
Recommendation It is, accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That petitioner reprimand respondents for raising rents before distributing prospectuses to their tenants. That petitioner require respondents to return the amounts by which rents collected for December of 1986 and January, February, March and April of 1987 exceeded rents charged the same tenants for November of 1986. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of December, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of December, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 88-5983 Petitioner's proposed findings of fact Nos. 1 through 4 recite procedural matters only. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact Nos. 5 through 11, 13, 15 through 19, and 21 through 25 have been adopted, in substance, insofar as immaterial. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 12, ad valorem taxes may also have contributed to the 1986 increase. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 14 is rejected. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 20, Mrs. Ritchie distributed something she called rules and regulations. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 26, the charges themselves were included but not increases. Respondents' proposed findings of fact Nos. 1 through 4, 6, 7, 10 through 12, 14 through 17, 21, 22, 23, 25, and 26 have been estopped, in substance insofar as material. Respondents' proposed finding of fact No. 5 in immaterial. With respect to respondents' proposed findings of fact Nos. 8 and 9, the change in garbage collection charges, except for addition of a dumpster, occurred before respondents acquired the property; and the tax increase was $5,000.00 not $10,000.00. With respect to respondents' proposed finding of fact No. 13, respondents' selective (DBR advised them not to raise rents before distributing prospectuses) reliance on DBR for legal advice, whenever it may have ended, does not give rise to an estoppel. With respect to respondents' proposed findings of fact Nos. 18 and 19, utility rate charges are only one variable; usage was not proven. With respect to respondents' proposed finding of fact No. 20, Leroy Kierstaedt and Haze Studivant were apparently overnighters. With respect to respondents' proposed finding of fact No. 24, Ms. Stevens said she "imagined" this was so. Respondents' proposed finding of fact No. 27 was not established by the evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Reynold Meyer Assistant General Counsel Department of Business Regulation Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1070 Jeffrey C. Regan, Esquire 1300 Gulf Life Drive Jacksonville, Florida 32207 =================================================================
Findings Of Fact It was stipulated that Joseph H. Clempson had resided in the trailer park long enough to come with the purview of the Uniform Relocation Assistance Act. Joseph H. Clempson owned and occupied a one bedroom, one bath, trailer with a living room, located on a 30x40 foot lot (1200 sq. ft.) in Port Everglades Over Night Trailer Park. The Department of Transportation was acquiring real estate (for highway construction) in the area where Mr. Clempson's trailer was located. The trailer was a 1978 model, with exterior dimensions of 8x31 feet. The Department's Household Survey indicated the trailer was in good condition, met the decent, safe and sanitary standards and could be moved. Mr. Clempson had lived in his trailer for approximately 5 years and had resided at the Port Everglades Park for 7 years. He paid $130 monthly for the lot when he first moved there and was paying $130 monthly when he left. Rent included water, garbage and septic utilities. Mr. Clempson worked as a night manager at the park the last two years he was there. He was paid $4.00 per hour and worked approximately 15 hours per week. The rent for anyone new coming into the park would be $170.00 per month. William H. Brown, former operations manager for the Port Everglades Park acknowledged that Mr. Clempson received special consideration for rent because he was a long-standing good tenant. Mr. Clempson did not receive special consideration because he worked there. It is noted that Mr. Clempson did not work for the park during his first five years there and his rent was not increased. Mr. Brown testified that Mr. Clempson's rent would have stayed at $130.00 even if Mr. Clempson had stopped working for the park. Bernard Davis, Right of Way Specialist, Department of Transportation, did the evaluation of comparable locations for the relocation of Mr. Clempson. His income was not low enough to come under the 25 percent factor because 25 percent of Mr. Clempson's gross monthly income exceeded his monthly rent at the trailer park. It was Mr. Davis' responsibility to find a park that would be similar or comparable to the subject park, close to commercial and public facilities. He went to other parks but found a park, Mobile Home Country Club, where three comparables were computed to be the best in all respects. Mobile Home Country Club had 25x55 foot lots available for a monthly rental of $145, water and sewer included. There were no common bathing facilities at the park and the park did not allow pets. The Mobile Home Country Club was selected because it was close to commercial and public facilities within a reasonable distance from the subject, approximately 8 miles. The Household Survey indicated Mr. Clempson's trailer met decent, safe and sanitary standards, it was in good condition and could be moved. It had a toilet and bath facilities. It was standard procedure with the Department that all three comparables could be determined at the same general location for mobile home (trailer) parks, residential or apartments. The park where the comparables were determined would accept mobile homes or trailers. The size of the lot in the park was a little larger than the lot Mr. Clempson had at Port Everglades Park. Kathleen Roach, Right of Way Specialist, Department of Transportation, inspected Mr. Clempson's trailer at the Port Everglades Park and updated the Household Survey on March 15, 1983. She met with Mr. Clempson and measured the trailer to determine how many square feet were inside. Ms. Roach went through the trailer and noted the bathroom was in very good condition. Mr. Clempson informed her the bathroom facilities functioned but he preferred to use the common bathrooms at the park because of his size. She noted the trailer was four years old, structurally sound, decent, safe and sanitary and could be moved. Ms. Roach was aware that Mr. Clempson had a cat but could not recall the exact date when she was so informed. The pet would not change the calculations of Mr. Clempson. This was due to an instructional memorandum from the Federal Highway Administration that indicated pets cannot be considered in raising the rent supplement. Also, there is no requirement that a location be used in determining comparables where pets can stay. Mr. Clempson purchased a single wide mobile home, 51 feet long, with 3 bedrooms, a living room and a bath and a half in Rexmere Village where he is presently living. The Department did not determine (pursuant to federal and state standards) that the lot in this mobile home park was comparable to his prior accommodation and did not tell Mr. Clempson to move to this park. Rexmere Village allows pets but has no common bathing facilities. Mr. Clempson's current location has a front yard and back yard. The current lot would be considerably larger than his Port Everglades lot to accommodate a larger dwelling (three bedroom mobile home 51 feet long), and to provide a front and back yard. Mr. Clempson pays a rent of $180 plus approximately $27 a month for water and sewer. The lot at Rexmere Village is not comparable to the lot at Port Everglades Park. Mr. Clempson sold his trailer at the first park before he bought his new mobile home. Mr. Clempson indicated he had to sell his trailer at a $3000.00 loss because of its condition. He said that the roof leaked and it had termites (or ants) in it in late 1982. He did nothing to correct the problem except set off some bug bombs. He did not call in any pest control services. He did nothing because he intended to get rid of the trailer. Mr. Clempson told Ms. Roach about the termites but was unsure about when she was told. He thought he told her in telephone conversations when he was telling her about a mobile home he wanted to buy but he could not recall a specific time. He testified that Ms. Roach was in his trailer several times but he never pointed out to her where the termites were. Ms. Roach testified that the trailer was structurally sound when she inspected it and indicated there was nothing in her contact notes to show she had received information from Mr. Clempson about problems with the trailer. Having weighed the credibility of the witnesses, it is found that the trailer was decent, safe and sanitary when it was inspected and that any economic loss suffered by Mr. Clempson was the result of his actions and not those of the Department.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a Final Order authorizing payment of replacement housing benefit of $720.00. DONE and ENTERED this 27th day of August, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE K. KIESLING Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of August, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: Donald H. Benson, Esquire 301 Southeast 10th Court Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33316 Vernon L. Whittier, Esquire Haydon Burns Building, M.S. 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-8064 Paul A. Pappas, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
